De Leon vs.

Esguerra

No. L-78059. August 31, 1987

Parties:

Petitioners: Alfredo M. De Leon, Angel S. Salamat, Mario C. Sta. Ana et. al.

Respondents: Hon. Benjamin B. Esguerra OIC Gov. of Rizal, Hon. Romeo C. De Leon, OIC Mayor of Taytay
Rizal, Florentino Magno et. al.

Doctrine:

Until the term of office of barangay of officials has been determined by law, therefore, the term of office
of six (6) years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern.

There is no inconsistency between the term of six (6) years for elective Barangay officials and the 1987
Constitution.—Contrary to the stand of respondents, we find nothing inconsistent between the term of
six (6) years for elective Barangay officials and the 1987 Constitution, and the same should, therefore, be
considered as still operative, pursuant to Section 3, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution.

Facts:

 An original action for Prohibition instituted by petitioners seeking to enjoin respondents from
replacing them from their respective positions as Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen of
Barangay Dolores, Municipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal.
 In the Barangay elections held on May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected
Barangay Captain and
o the other petitioners Angel S. Salamat, Mario C. Sta. Ana, Jose C. Tolentino, Rogelio J. de
la Rosa and Jose M. Resurreccion, as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay,
Rizal under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as the Barangay Election Act of
1982.
 On February 8, 1987, petitioner Alfredo M. de Leon received a Memorandum antedated
December 1, 1986 but signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987
designating respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores, Taytay,
Rizal.
o The designation made by the OIC Governor was “by authority of the Minister of Local
Government.
o Respondent OIC Governor signed a Memorandum, antedated December 1, 1986
designating respondents Remigio M. Tigas, Ricardo Z. Lacanienta, Teodoro V. Medina,
Roberto S. Paz and Teresita L. Tolentino as members of the Barangay Council of the same
Barangay and Municipality.
  Petitioners pray that the subject Memoranda of February 8, 1987 be declared null and void and
that respondents be prohibited from taking over their positions of Barangay Captain and Barangay
Councilmen, respectively.
o Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP
Blg. 222), their terms of office "shall be six (6) years which shall commence on June 7,
1982 and shall continue until their successors shall have elected and shall have qualified,"
or up to June 7, 1988.
o It is also their position that with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, respondent OIC
Governor no longer has the authority to replace them and to designate their successors.
 On the other hand, respondents rely on Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution,
promulgated on March 25, 1986, which provided:
o "SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973
Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or
executive order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of their
successors, if such appointment is made within a period of one year from February 25,
1986."
o By reason of the foregoing provision, respondents contend that the terms of of fice of
elective and appointive officials were abolished and that petitioners continued in office
by virtue of the aforequoted provision and not because their term of six years had not yet
expired; and that the provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of
Barangay of ficials to six (6) years must be deemed to have been repealed for being
inconsistent with the aforequoted provision of the Provisional Constitution.

Issue:

Whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made during the one-
year period which ended on February 25, 1987.

Held:

No. Considering the candid Affidavit of respondent OIC Governor, we hold that February 8, 1977, should
be considered as the effective date of replacement and not December 1, 1986 to which it was antedated,
in keeping with the dictates of justice.

But while February 8, 1987 is ostensibly still within the one-year deadline, the aforequoted provision in
the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been overtaken by Section 27, Article XVIII of the
1987 Constitution reading:

"Sec. 27. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions."

The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date, therefore, the
Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been superseded. Having become inoperative,
respondent OIC Governor could no longer rely on Section 2, Article III, thereof to designate respondents
to the elective positions occupied by petitioners. Petitioners must now be held to have acquired security
of tenure specially considering that the Barangay Election Act of 1982 declares it "a policy of the State to
guarantee and promote the autonomy of the barangays to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant
communities."

Similarly, the 1987 Constitution ensures the autonomy of local governments and of political subdivisions
of which the barangays form a part, and limits the President's power to "general supervision" over local
governments. Relevantly, Section 8, Article X of the same 1987 Constitution further provides in part:

"Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined
by law, shall be three years x x x"

Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by law, therefore, the term of office of
six (6) years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern.

SAN JUAN v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, 196 SCRA 69 (1991)

Parties:

REYNALDO R. SAN JUAN, petitioner

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and CECILIA ALMAJOSE,
respondents.

Doctrine:

When the Civil Service Commission interpreted the recommending power of the Provincial Governor as
purely directory, it went against the letter and spirit of the constitutional provisions on local autonomy.

If the DBM Secretary jealously hoards the entirety of budgetary powers and ignores the right of local
governments to develop self-reliance and resoluteness in the handling of their own funds, the goal of
meaningful local autonomy is frustrated and set back.

The right given by Local Budget Circular No. 31 which states: “SEC. 6.0— The DBM reserves the right to fill
up any existing vacancy where none of the nominees of the local chief executive meet the prescribed
requirements.” is ultra vires and is, accordingly, set aside.

The DBM may appoint only from the list of qualified recommendees nominated by the Governor. If none
is qualified, he must return the list of nominees to the Governor explaining why no one meets the legal
requirements and ask for new recommendees who have the necessary eligibilities and qualifications.

Facts:

 On March 22, 1988, the position of Provincial Budget Officer (PBO) for the province of Rizal was
left vacant by its former holder, a certain Henedima del Rosario.
  In a letter dated April 18, 1988, the petitioner informed Director Reynaldo Abella of the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) Region IV that Ms. Dalisay Santos assumed office
as Acting PBO since March 22, 1988 pursuant to a Memorandum issued by the petitioner who
further requested Director Abella to endorse the appointment of the said Ms. Dalisay Santos to
the contested position of PBO of Rizal.
o Ms. Dalisay Santos was then Municipal Budget Officer of Taytay, Rizal before she
discharged the functions of acting PBO.
 *On August 1, 1988, DBM Undersecretary Nazario S. Cabuquit, Jr. signed the appointment papers
of the private respondent as PBO of Rizal upon the aforestated recommendation of Abella.
 In a letter dated August 3, 1988 addressed to Secretary Carague, the petitioner reiterated his
request for the appointment of Dalisay Santos to the contested position unaware of the earlier
appointment made by Undersecretary Cabuquit.
 DBM Regional Director Agripino G. Galvez wrote the petitioner that Dalisay Santos and his other
recommendees did not meet the minimum requirements under Local Budget Circular No. 31 for
the position of a local budget officer.
o Director Galvez whether or not through oversight further required the petitioner to
submit at least three other qualified nominees who are qualified for the position of PBO
of Rizal for evaluation and processing.
 On November 2, 1988, the petitioner after having been informed of the private respondent’s
appointment wrote Secretary Carague protesting against the said appointment on the grounds
that Cabuquit as DBM Undersecretary is not legally authorized to appoint the PBO; that the
private respondent lacks the required three years work experience as provided in Local Budget
Circular No. 31; and that under Executive Order No. 112, it is the Provincial Governor, not the
Regional Director or a Congressman, who has the power to recommend nominees for the position
of PBO.
 On January 9, 1989 respondent DBM, through its Director of the Bureau of Legal & Legislative
Affairs (BLLA) Virgilio A. Afurung, issued a Memorandum ruling that the petitioner’s letter-protest
is not meritorious considering that public respondent DBM validly exercised its prerogative in
filling-up the contested position since none of the petitioner’s nominees met the prescribed
requirements.

Issue:

W/N the private respondent is lawfully entitled to discharge the functions of PBO of Rizal pursuant to the
appointment made by public respondent DBM’s Undersecretary upon the recommendation of then
Director Abella of DBM Region IV.

Held:

No. In the event that the Governor recommends an unqualified person, is the Department Head free to
appoint anyone he fancies? This is the issue before us.

The issue before the Court is not limited to the validity of the appointment of one Provincial Budget
Officer. The tug of war between the Secretary of Budget and Management and the Governor of the
premier province of Rizal over a seemingly innocuous position involves the application of a
most important constitutional policy and principle, that of local autonomy. We have to obey the clear
mandate on local autonomy. Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized
power in Malacañang and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of
autonomy. (See Doctrine)

GANZON v. CA, 200 SCRA 271 (1991)

Parties:

RODOLFO T. GANZON, MARY ANN RIVERA ARTIEDA petitioners,

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and LUIS T. SANTOS, in his capacity as the Secretary of the
Department of Local Government, respondents.

Doctrine:

—It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the constitutional language,
the charter did not intend to divest the legislature of its right—or the President of her prerogative as
conferred by existing legislation to provide administrative sanctions against local officials.

The Constitution places the local governments under the general supervision of the Executive.

“Control” has been defined as “the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former for test of the latter.”

“Supervision” on the other hand means “overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties.”

Facts:

 The petitioners are the Mayor of Iloilo City (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) and a member of the
Sangguniang Panglunsod thereof (G.R. No. 93746), respectively.
 The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a series of administrative complaints, ten in
number, filed against him by various city officials sometime in 1988, on various charges, among
them, abuse of authority, oppression, grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct,
intimidation, culpable violation of the Constitution, and arbitrary detention.
 In the said hearings, petitioner’s counsel cross-examined the complainants and their witnesses.
Finding probable grounds and reasons, the respondent issued a preventive suspension order on
August 11, 1988 to last until October 11, 1988 for a period of sixty (60) days.
 In the meantime, a prima facie evidence was found to exist in the arbitrary detention case filed
by Pancho Erbite so the respondent ordered the petitioner’s second preventive suspension dated
October 11, 1988 for another sixty (60) days.
o The petitioner was able to obtain a restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction
in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Iloilo City. The second preventive suspension was
not enforced.
 Amidst the two successive suspensions, Mayor Ganzon instituted an action for prohibition against
the respondent Secretary of Local Government (now, Interior) in the Regional Trial Court, Iloilo
 City, where he succeeded in obtaining a writ of preliminary injunction. Presently, he instituted CA-
G.R. SP No. 16417, an action for prohibition, in the respondent Court of Appeals.
 Meanwhile, on May 3, 1990, the respondent Secretary issued another order, preventively
suspending Mayor Ganzon for another sixty days, the third time in twenty months, and
designating meantime Vice-Mayor Mansueto Malabor as acting mayor.
 The CA dismissed all cases CA-G.R. SP No. 16417 and G.R. SP No. 20736.
 In a Resolution dated January 24, 1990, it issued a Resolution certifying the petition of Mary Ann
Artieda, who had been similary charged by the respondent Secretary, to this Court.
 All three cases were consolidated.

Issue:

The petitioners take common issue on the power of the President (acting through the Secretary of Local
Government), to suspend and/or remove local officials.

Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the President’s alter ego, can suspend and/or
remove local officials.

Held:

(1) Did the 1987 Constitution, in deleting the phrase “as may be provided by law” intend to divest
the President of the power to investigate, suspend, discipline, and/or remove local officials? (2)
Has the Constitution repealed Sections 62 and 63 of the Local Government Code? (3) What is the
significance of the change in the constitutional language?

It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the constitutional language,
the charter did not intend to divest the legislature of its right—or the President of her prerogative as
conferred by existing legislation to provide administrative sanctions against local officials. It is our opinion
that the omission (of “as may be provided by law”) signifies nothing more than to underscore local
governments’ autonomy from congress and to break Congress’ “control” over local government affairs.
The Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake of local autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all
authority over municipal corporations, in particular, concerning discipline.

Autonomy, in the constitutional sense, is subject to the guiding star, though not control, of the legislature,
albeit the legislative responsibility under the Constitution—and as the “supervision clause” itself suggest
—is to wean local government units from overdependence on the central government.

The Court is consequently reluctant to say that the new Constitution has repealed the Local Government
Code, Batas Blg. 37. As we said, “supervision” and “removal” are not incompatible terms and one may
stand with the other notwithstanding the stronger expression of local autonomy under the new Charter.

We have indeed held that in spite of the approval of the Charter, Batas Blg. 337 is still in force and effect.

BASCO v. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52 (1991)

Parties:

ATTORNEYS HUMBERTO BASCO, EDILBERTO BALCE, SOCRATES MARANAN AND LORENZO SANCHEZ,
petitioners,
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENTS AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR), respondent.

Doctrine:

—The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed that “municipal
corporations are mere creatures of Congress” (Unson v. Lacson, G.R. No. 7909, January 18, 1957) which
has the power to “create and abolish municipal corporations” due to its “general legislative powers”
(Asuncion v. Yriantes, 28 Phil. 67; Merdanillo v. Orandia, 5 SCRA 541). Congress, therefore, has the power
of control over local governments (Hebron v. Reyes, G.R. No. 9124, July 2, 1950). And if Congress can grant
the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back
the power.

The power of local governments to regulate gambling thru the grant of franchises, licenses or permits was
withdrawn by PD 771, it is now vested exclusively on the National Government.

Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government; PAGCOR, being
an instrumentality of the Government, is therefore exempt from local taxes.

The principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means “decentralization” It does not
make local governments sovereign within the state or an “imperium in imperio.” Local Government has
been described as a political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial
control of local affairs. In a unitary system of government, such as the government under the Philippine
Constitution, local governments can only be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, it
cannot be an imperium in imperio. Local government in such a system can only mean a measure of
decentralization of the function of government.

Facts:

 On July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under P.D. 1869 to enable the Government to regulate
and centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law.
 To attain these objectives PAGCOR is given territorial jurisdiction all over the Philippines. Under
its Charter’s repealing clause, all laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations,
inconsistent therewith, are accordingly repealed, amended or modified.
 But the petitioners, are questioning the validity of P.D No. 1869. They allege that the same is “null
and void” for being “contrary to morals, public policy and public order,” monopolistic and tends
toward “crony economy”, and is violative of the equal protection clause and local autonomy as
well as for running counter to the state policies enunciated in Sections 11 (Personal Dignity and
Human Rights), 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II, Section 1 (Social Justice) of Article
XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue:

W/N P.D. 1869 is unconstitutional and whether it constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to
impose taxes and the legal fees; that the exemption clause in P.D. 1869 is violative of the principle of local
autonomy. (They must be referring to Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as the
franchise holder from paying any “tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges
or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local.”)
Held:

No. P.D. 1869 is constitutional

Yes. Only the National Government has the power to issue “licenses or permits” for the operation of
gambling. Necessarily, the power to demand or collect license fees which is a consequence of the issuance
of “licenses or permits” is no longer vested in the City of Manila.

PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is governmental,
which places it in the category of an agency or instrumentality of the Government. Being an
instrumentality of the Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from local taxes. (See
Doctrines)

MAGTAJAS v. PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC., 234 SCRA 255 (1994)

Parties:

MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO, petitioners,

PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. & PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPO-RATION,
respondents.

Doctrine:

Tests of a Valid Ordinance

1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute;

2) It must not be unfair or oppressive;

3) It must not be partial or discriminatory;

4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade;

5) It must be general and consistent with public policy; 6) It must not be unreasonable.

The apparent flaw in the ordinances in question is that they contravene P.D. 1869 and the public policy
embodied therein insofar as they prevent PAGCOR from exercising the power conferred on it to operate
a casino in Cagayan de Oro City.

*While insisting that the decree has only been “modified pro tanto,” they are actually arguing that it is
already dead, repealed and useless for all intents and purposes because the Code has shorn PAGCOR of
all power to centralize and regulate casinos.

Facts:

 There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a casino in Cagayan de
Oro City.
o PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City.
 o To this end, it leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation,
Inc., one of the herein private respondents, renovated and equipped the same, and
prepared to inaugurate its casino there during the Christmas season.
 The reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile. On
December 7, 1992, it enacted Ordinance No. 3353: “AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ISSUANCE
OF BUSINESS PERMIT AND CANCELLING EXISTING BUSINESS PERMIT TO ANY ESTABLISHMENT FOR
THE USING AND ALLOWING TO BE USED ITS PREMISES OR PORTION THEREOF FOR THE
OPERATION OF CASINO.”
 On January 4, 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance No. 3375-93 “AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING
THE OPERATION OF CASINO AND PROVIDING PENALTY FOR VIOLATION THEREFOR.”
 Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as
intervenor and supplemental petitioner.
o Their challenge succeeded.
o On March 31, 1993, the Court of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the
writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement. Reconsideration of this decision was denied
on July 13, 1993.

Issue:

W/N the said ordinance enacted was valid.

Held:

No.

Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to enact ordinances for the
purpose indicated in the Local Government Code. It is expressly vested with the police power under what
is known as the General Welfare Clause now embodied in Section 16.

However, the morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se.

The only question we can and shall resolve in this petition is the validity of Ordinance No. 3355 and
Ordinance No. 3375-93 as enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City.

Under Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or
suppress, among others, “gambling and other prohibited games of chance.” Obviously, this provision
excludes games of chance which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law.

The apparent flaw in the ordinances in question is that they contravene P.D. 1869 and the public policy
embodied therein insofar as they prevent PAGCOR from exercising the power conferred on it to operate
a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. The petitioners have an ingenious answer to this misgiving. They deny
that it is the ordinances that have changed P.D. 1869 for an ordinance admittedly cannot prevail against
a statute. Their theory is that the change has been made by the Local Government Code itself, which was
also enacted by the national lawmaking authority. In their view, the decree has been, not really repealed
by the Code, but merely “modified pro tanto” in the sense that PAGCOR cannot now operate a casino over
the objection of the local government unit concerned. This modification of P.D. 1869 of the Local
Government Code is permissible because one law can change or repeal another law.
While insisting that the decree has only been “modified pro tanto,” they are actually arguing that it is
already dead, repealed and useless for all intents and purposes because the Code has shorn PAGCOR of
all power to centralize and regulate casinos. Strictly speaking, its operations may now be not only
prohibited by the local government unit; in fact, the prohibition is not only discretionary but mandated
by Section 458 of the Code if the word “shall” as used therein is to be given its accepted meaning. Local
government units have now no choice but to prevent and suppress gambling, which in the petitioners’
view includes both legal and illegal gambling. Under this construction, PAGCOR will have no more games
of chance to regulate or centralize as they must all be prohibited by the local government units pursuant
to the mandatory duty imposed upon them by the Code. In this situation, PAGCOR cannot continue to
exist except only as a toothless tiger or a white elephant and will no longer be able to exercise its powers
as a prime source of government revenue through the operation of casinos.

It is noteworthy that the petitioners have cited only Par. (f) of the repealing clause, conveniently
discarding the rest of the provision which painstakingly mentions the specific laws or the parts thereof
which are repealed (or modified) by the Code. Significantly, P.D. 1869 is not one of them.

There is no sufficient indication of an implied repeal of P.D. 1869. On the contrary, as the private
respondent points out, PAGCOR is mentioned as the source of funding in two later enactments of
Congress, to wit, R.A. 7309, creating a Board of Claims under the Department of Justice for the benefit of
victims of unjust punishment or detention or of violent crimes, and R.A. 7648, providing for measures for
the solution of the power crisis. PAGCOR revenues are tapped by these two statutes. This would show
that the PAGCOR charter has not been repealed by the Local Government Code but has in fact been
improved as it were to make the entity more responsive to the fiscal problems of the government.

On the assumption of a conflict between P.D. 1869 and the Code, the proper action is not to uphold one
and annul the other but to give effect to both by harmonizing them if possible. This is possible in the case
before us. The proper resolution of the problem at hand is to hold that under the Local Government Code,
local government units may (and indeed must) prevent and suppress all kinds of gambling within their
territories except only those allowed by statutes like P.D. 1869. The exception reserved in such laws must
be read into the Code, to make both the Code and such laws equally effective and mutually
complementary.

This approach would also affirm that there are indeed two kinds of gambling, to wit, the illegal and those
authorized by law.

Local governments, administrative regions, autonomous regions

ABBAS v. COMELEC, 179 SCRA 287 (1989)

Parties:

Petitioners representing the other taxpayers of Mindanao

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and HONORABLE GUILLERMO C. CARAGUE, DEPARTMENT SECRETARY OF

BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT,
Doctrine:

Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734, the creation of the autonomous region shall take effect
only when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite, and only those
provinces and cities where a majority vote in favor of the Organic Act shall be included in the autonomous
region. The provinces and cities wherein such a majority is not attained shall not be included in the
autonomous region. It may be that even if an autonomous region is created, not all of the thirteen (13)
provinces and nine (9) cities mentioned in Article II, section 1(2) of R.A. No. 6734 shall be included therein.
The single plebiscite contemplated by the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734 will therefore be determinative
of (1) whether there shall be an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which provinces and
cities, among those enumerated in R.A. No. 6734, shall comprise it.

The creation of the autonomous region is made to depend, not on the total majority vote in the plebiscite,
but on the will of the majority in each of the constituent units.

What is required by the Constitution is a simple majority of votes approving the Organic Act in individual
constituent units and not a double majority of the votes in all constituent units put together, as well as in
the individual constituent units.

—It must be pointed out that what is referred to in R.A. No. 6734 is the merger of administrative regions,
i.e. Regions I to XII and the National Capital Region, which are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for
administrative purposes [Integrated Reorganization Plan (1972), which was made as part of the law of the
land by Pres. Dec. No. 1; Presidential Decree No. 742].

Administrative regions are not territorial and political subdivisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays [see Art. X, sec. 1 of the Constitution].

While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a
power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of
general supervision over local governments [see Art. X, sec. 4 of the Constitution].

There is no conflict between the power of the President to merge administrative regions with the
constitutional provision requiring a plebiscite in the merger of local government units because the
requirement of a plebiscite in a merger expressly applies only to provinces, cities, municipalities or
barangays, not to administrative regions.

Facts:

The present controversy relates to the plebiscite in thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities in Mindanao
and Palawan,1 scheduled for November 19, 1989, in implementation of Republic Act No. 6734, entitled
“An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.”

 These consolidated petitions pray that the Court:

o (1) enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting the plebiscite and
the Secretary of Budget and Management from releasing funds to the COMELEC for that
purpose; and
o (2) declare R.A. No. 6734, or parts thereof, unconstitutional.
 After a consolidated comment was filed by the Solicitor General for the respondents, which the
Court considered as the answer, the case was deemed submitted for decision, the issues having
been joined.
 The arguments against R.A. No. 6734 raised by petitioners may generally be categorized into
either of the following:
o that R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the Constitution, and
o that certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the Tripoli Agreement.
 The Tripoli Agreement, more specifically, the Agreement Between the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines and Moro National Liberation
Front with the Participation of the Quadripartite Ministerial Commission
Members of the Islamic Conference and the Secretary General of the
Organization of Islamic Conference” took effect on December 23, 1976. It
provided for “[t]he establishment of Autonomy in the Southern Philippines within
the realm of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines” and enumerated the thirteen (13) provinces comprising the “areas
of autonomy.
o In 1987, a new Constitution was ratified, which for the first time provided for regional
autonomy. Article X, section 15 of the charter provides that “[t]here shall be created
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces,
cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical
and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics
within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.”
 Petitioners premise their arguments on the assumption that the Tripoli Agreement is part of the
law of the land, being a binding international agreement. The Solicitor General asserts that the
Tripoli Agreement is neither a binding treaty, not having been entered into by the Republic of the
Philippines with a sovereign state and ratified according to the provisions of the 1973 or 1987
Constitutions, nor a binding international agreement.

Issues:
W/N that R. A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the Constitution and the Tripoli Agreement

Held:

No. We find it neither necessary nor determinative of the case to rule on the nature of the Tripoli
Agreement and its binding effect on the Philippine Government whether under public
international or internal Philippine law. In the first place, it is now the Constitution itself that
provides for the creation of an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao.

The standard for any inquiry into the validity of R.A. No. 6734 would therefore be what is so
provided in the Constitution.

Thus, any conflict between the provisions of R.A. No. 6734 and the provisions of the Tripoli
Agreement will not have the effect of enjoining the implementation of the Organic Act.
The Court shall therefore only pass upon the constitutional questions which have been raised by
petitioners.

Petitioner Abbas argues that R.A. No. 6734 unconditionally creates an autonomous region in
Mindanao, contrary to the aforequoted provisions of the Constitution on the autonomous region
which make the creation of such region dependent upon the outcome of the plebiscite

Petitioner cites Article II, section 1(1) of R.A. No. 6734 which declares that “[t]here is hereby
created the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, to be composed of provinces and cities
voting favorably in the plebiscite called for the purpose, in accordance with Section 18, Article X
of the Constitution.” Petitioner contends that the tenor of the above provision makes the creation
of an autonomous region absolute, such that even if only two provinces vote in favor of
autonomy, an autonomous region would still be created composed of the two provinces where
the favorable votes were obtained.

Invoking the earlier cited constitutional provisions, petitioner Mama-o, on the other hand,
maintains that only those areas which, to his view, share common and distinctive historical and
cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics should be
properly included within the coverage of the autonomous region. He insists that R.A. No. 6734 is
unconstitutional because only the provinces of Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Lanao del Sur, Lanao del
Norte and Maguindanao and the cities of Marawi and Cotabato, and not all of the thirteen (13)
provinces and nine (9) cities included in the Organic Act, possess such concurrence in historical
and cultural heritage and other relevant characteristics. By including areas which do not strictly
share the same characteristics as the others, petitioner claims that Congress has expanded the
scope of the autonomous region which the Constitution itself has prescribed to be limited.

Petitioner’s argument is not tenable. The Constitution lays down the standards by which Congress
shall determine which areas should constitute the autonomous region. Guided by these
constitutional criteria, the ascertainment by Congress of the areas that share common attributes
is within the exclusive realm of the legislature’s discretion. Any review of this ascertainment
would have to go into the wisdom of the law. This the Court cannot do without doing violence to
the separation of governmental powers. [Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936);
Morfe v. Mutuc, G.R. No. L-20387, January 31, 1968, 22 SCRA 424].

Petitioners also impugn the constitutionality of Article XIX, section 13 of R.A. No. 6734 which,
among others, states

... Provided, That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included
in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite
do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative
regions: Provided, however, that the President may, by administrative determination, merge the
existing regions.
 It must be pointed out that what is referred to in R.A. No. 6734 is the merger of administrative
regions, i.e. Regions I to XII and the National Capital Region, which are mere groupings of
contiguous provinces for administrative purposes [Integrated Reorganization Plan (1972), which
was made as part of the law of the land by Pres. Dec. No. 1, Pres. Dec. No. 742]. Administrative
regions are not territorial and political subdivisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays [see Art. X, sec. 1 of the Constitution]. While the power to merge administrative regions
is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged
with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local
governments [see Art. X, sec. 4 of the Constitution]. There is no conflict between the power of the
President to merge administrative regions with the constitutional provision requiring a plebiscite
in the merger of local government units because the requirement of a plebiscite in a merger
expressly applies only to provinces cities, municipalities or barangays, not to administrative
regions.

CHIONGBIAN v. ORBOS 245 SCRA 253 (1995)

Chiongbian - Congressman in third district, South Cotabato; Orbos - Executive Secretary

Date of Promulgation: June 22, 1995

Ponente: Mendoza

Motion: Certiorari and Prohibition; Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court

Background

In 1968, R.A. 5435 authorized the President of the Philippines, with the help of Commission on
Reorganization, to recognize the different executive departments, bureaus, offices, agencies, and
instrumentalities of the government, including banking or financial institutions and corporations owned
or controlled by it. Purpose was to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government.

Facts

The Congress passed the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (RA 6743)
pursuant to Article 10, Section 18 of the Constitution. A plebiscite was called in some provinces which
resulted to 4 provinces (Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi Tawi) in favor of creating an
autonomous region and therefore became the ARMM. The RA says that those provinces and cities who
did not vote in favor of it shall remain in their existing administrative regions provided, however, that the
President may merge the existing regions through administrative determination. President Cory then
issued the EO containing the provinces/cities that will be “merged,” transferring provinces from their
existing region to another. The petitioners who are members of the Congress representing legislative
districts protested the Executive Order, saying that there is no law which authorizes the President to pick
certain provinces and cities within existing regions and restructure them to new administrative regions.
The transfer of one province under its current region to another (ex: Misamis Occidental from Region X
to IX) is a form of reorganization, an alteration of the existing structures of the government. The RA 6743
only holds authority of the president to merge existing regions and cannot be construed as reorganizing
them.

Issue

W/N the power to merge administrative regions is legislative (petitioner’s stand) in character or
executive as the respondents contend

● Petitioners: It unduly delegates power to the President to merge regions through

administrative determination or at any rate provides no standard for the exercise of the power
delegated

● Respondents: No undue delegation but only a grant of power to fill up or provide the
details of legislation because the Congress did not have the facility to provide for them

Ruling: Petition is DISMISSED.

The creation and subsequent reorganization of administrative regions have been by the President
pursuant to authority granted to him by law. In conferring on the President the power to merge the
existing regions following the establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Congress
merely followed the pattern set in previous legislation dating back to the initial organization of
administrative regions in 1972. (RA5453)

This was also the basis for the sufficient standard by which the President is to be guided in the exercise of
power. Standard can be gathered or implied. Standard can be found in the same policy underlying grant
of power to the President in RA No. 5435 of the power to reorganize the Executive Department:“to
promote simplicity, economy, efficiency, in the government to enable it to pursue its programs consisted
with the national goals for accelerated social and economic development.”

CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION v. COA, 181 SCRA 495 (1990)

Doctrine:
E.O. 220 does not create the autonomous region, it merely provides for transitory
measures in anticipation of the enactment of an organic act and the creation of an autonomous region;
E.O. 220, not unconstitutional.

A reading of E.O. No. 220 will easily reveal that what it actually envisions is the consolidation and
coordination of the delivery of services of line departments and agencies of the National Government in
the areas covered by the administrative region as a step preparatory to the grant of autonomy to the
Cordilleras.

The Cordillera Administrative Region is not a territorial or political subdivision, it is a mere sophisticated
version of a regional consultative council.— REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL

Facts:

In these consolidated petitions, the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 220, dated July 15, 1987,
which created the Cordillera Administrative Region, is assailed on the primary ground that it pre-empts
the enactment of an organic act by the Congress and the creation of the autonomous region in the
Cordilleras conditional on the approval of the act through a plebiscite. (Art. X Constitution 1987)

 Executive Order No. 220, issued by the President in the exercise of her legislative powers under
Art. XVIII, sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution, created the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR),
which covers
o the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province and the
City of Baguio [secs. 1 and 2].
o It was created to accelerate economic and social growth in the region and to prepare for
the establishment of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras [sec. 3].
o Its main function is to coordinate the planning and implementation of programs and
services in the region, particularly, to coordinate with the local government units as well
as with the executive departments of the National Government in the supervision of field
offices and in identifying, planning, monitoring, and accepting projects and activities in
the region [sec. 5].
o It shall also monitor the implementation of all ongoing national and local government
projects in the region [sec. 20].
o The CAR shall have a Cordillera Regional Assembly as a policy-formulating body and a
Cordillera Executive Board as an implementing arm [secs. 7, 8 and 10].
o The CAR and the Assembly and Executive Board shall exist until such time as the
autonomous regional government is established and organized [sec. 17].
 Explaining the rationale for the issuance of E.O. No. 220 its last “Whereas” clause provides:
o WHEREAS, pending the convening of the first Congress and the enactment of the organic
act for a Cordillera autonomous region, there is an urgent need, in the interest of national
security and public order, for the President to reorganize immediately the existing
administrative structure in the Cordilleras to suit it to the existing political realities therein
and the Government’s legitimate concerns in the areas, without attempting to pre-empt
the constitutional duty of the first Congress to undertake the creation of an autonomous
region on a permanent basis.
 During the pendency of this case, Republic Act No. 6766 entitled “An Act Providing for an Organic
Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region,” was enacted and signed into law. The Act recognizes
the CAR and the offices and agencies created under E.O. No. 220 and its transitory nature.
W/N
E.O. 220 is Constitutional.

Held:
It is well-settled in our jurisprudence that respect for the inherent and stated powers and prerogatives of
the law making body, as well as faithful adherence to the principle of separation of powers, require that
its enactment be accorded the presumption of constitutionality. Thus, in any challenge to the
constitutionality of a statute, the burden of clearly and unequivocally proving its unconstitutionality
always rests upon the challenger. Conversely, failure to so prove will necessarily defeat the challenge.

A reading of E.O. No. 220 will easily reveal that what it actually envisions is the consolidation and
coordination of the delivery of services of line departments and agencies of the National Government in
the areas covered by the administrative region as a step preparatory to the grant of autonomy to the
Cordilleras. It does not create the autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution. It merely
provides for transitory measures in anticipation of the enactment of an organic act and the creation of an
autonomous region. In short, it prepares the ground for autonomy. This does not necessarily conflict with
the provisions of the Constitution on autonomous regions.

After carefully considering the provisions of E.O. No. 220, we find that it did not create a new territorial
and political subdivision or merge existing ones into a larger subdivision.

ORDILLO v. COMELEC, 192 SCRA 100 (1990)

The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region. It is explicit in
Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution that: "Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions
in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordillera consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical
areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and
other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as
well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines." (Italics Supplied)

The keywords—provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas connote that "region" is to be
made up of more than one constituent unit. The term "region" used in its ordinary sense means two or
more provinces. This is supported by the fact that the thirteen (13) regions into which the Philippines is
divided for administrative purposes are groupings of contiguous provinces. (Integrated Reorganization
Plan (1972), which was made as part of the law of the land by P.D. No. 1; P.D. No. 742) Ifugao is a province
by itself. To become part of a region, it must join other provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical
areas. It joins other units because of their common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage,
economic and social structures and other relevant characteristics. The Constitutional requirements are
not present in this case.

Facts: On January 30, 1990, the people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and
Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite held pursuant to Republic Act No.
6766 entitled “An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region.”
The official Commission on Elections (COMELEC) results of the plebiscite showed that the creation of the
Region was approved by a majority of 5,889 votes in only the Ifugao Province and was overwhelmingly
rejected by 148,676 votes in the rest of the provinces and city above-mentioned.
Consequently, the COMELEC, on February 14, 1990, issued Resolution No. 2259 stating that the Organic
Act for the Region has been approved and/or ratified by majority of the votes cast only in the province of
Ifugao.
the petitioner filed a petition with COMELEC to declare the non-ratification of the Organic Act for the
Region. The petitioners maintain that there can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in only one
province as the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 require that the said Region be composed of more
than one constituent unit.

Issue: The question raised in this petition is whether or not the province of Ifugao, being the only province
which voted favorably for the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region can, alone, legally and validly
constitute such Region.

Held: The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region.
It is explicit in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution. The keywords — provinces, cities,
municipalities and geographical areas connote that “region” is to be made up of more than one
constituent unit. The term “region” used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces. This is
supported by the fact that the thirteen (13) regions into which the Philippines is divided for
administrative purposes are groupings of contiguous provinces. Ifugao is a province by itself. To become
part of a region, it must join other provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas. It joins other
units because of their common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social
structures and other relevant characteristics. The Constitutional requirements are not present in this case.

Article III, Sections 1 and 2 of Republic Act No. 6766 provide that the Cordillera Autonomous Region is to
be administered by the Cordillera government consisting of the Regional Government and local
government units. It further provides that:
“SECTION 2. The Regional Government shall exercise powers and functions necessary for the proper
governance and development of all provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangay or ili within the
Autonomous Region . . .”
From these sections, it can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single province may
constitute the autonomous region. Otherwise, we would be faced with the absurd situation of having
two sets of officials, a set of provincial officials and another set of regional officials exercising their
executive and legislative powers over exactly the same small area.

BAGABUYO v. COMELEC, 573 SCRA 290 (2008)

Facts:

Cagayan de Oro used to have only one legislative district. But in 2006, CdO Congressman Constantino
Jaraula sponsored a bill to have two legislative districts in CdO instead. The law was passed (RA 9371)
hence two legislative districts were created. Rogelio Bagabuyo assailed the validity of the said law and he
went immediately to the Supreme Court to enjoin the COMELEC from enforcing the law in the upcoming
elections. Bagabuyo was contending that the 2nd district was created without a plebiscite which he
averred was required by the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not a plebiscite was required in the case at bar.

HELD: No, a plebiscite is not required in the case at bar. RA 9371 merely increased the representation of
Cagayan de Oro City in the House of Representatives and Sangguniang Panglungsod pursuant to Section
5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution; the criteria established under Section 10, Article X of the 1987
Constitution only apply when there is a creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of
boundaries of a province, city, municipality, or barangay; in this case, no such creation, division, merger,
abolition or alteration of boundaries of a local government unit took place; and R.A. No. 9371 did not
bring about any change in Cagayan de Oro’s territory, population and income classification; hence, no
plebiscite is required. What happened here was a reapportionment of a single legislative district into two
legislative districts. Reapportionment is the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about
by changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation.

Before, Cagayan de Oro had only one congressman and 12 city council members citywide for its
population of approximately 500,000. By having two legislative districts, each of them with one
congressman, Cagayan de Oro now effectively has two congressmen, each one representing 250,000 of
the city’s population. This easily means better access to their congressman since each one now services
only 250,000 constituents as against the 500,000.

THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO v. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN, 568 SCRA 402 (2008)

G.R. No. 183591 October 14 2008

Province of North Cotabato vs Government of the Republic of the Philippines

FACTS:

On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the
GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to compel
respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit
the slated signing of the MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation thereon. They also pray that the
MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the same.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;

2. Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern
(Art 3 Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2,
Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991)

3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be
binding itself

a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical,
territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;
 b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;

c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain
in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997), particularly
Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION, RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)

RULINGS:

1. Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of the respondents to consult the local
government units or communities affected constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate
under EO No. 3. Moreover, the respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing
amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by any branch of government
is a proper matter for judicial review.

As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of transcendental
importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the
requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal- Arroyo.

In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, this Court held:

x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action,
the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act . Indeed,
even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.x x x x

By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal
of Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x x settling the dispute
becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts.

That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness.

2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution involved in the matters
of public concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).

(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information,
while Sec 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The complete
and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public
disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as
may be provided by law.

The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in
the highest order. In declaring that the right to information contemplates steps and negotiations leading
to the consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the executory nature or
commercial character of the agreement.

E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local
levels and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on
the Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and
recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society.

3. a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical,
territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;

Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in
the BJE the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.

The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.

No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an
“associative” relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go
beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the
recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any
state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status
that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.

The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in the
Constitution. It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the
national government being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all
but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a
permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with
other states.

Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine
territory, the spirit animating it – which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association – runs
counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.

The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE
being itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of
the MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws.
The BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by the term
“autonomous region” in the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict
with it.
 b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA:

The MOA-AD provides that “any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing
legal framework shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting
the necessary changes to the legal framework,” implying an amendment of the Constitution to
accommodate the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the
Constitution .

It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to preserve
and defend the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to
change the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as she
limits herself to recommending these changes and submits to the proper procedure for constitutional
amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act.

The “suspensive clause” in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed standards.

Given the limited nature of the President’s authority to propose constitutional amendments,
she cannot guarantee to any third party that the required amendments will eventually be put in place,
nor even be submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is submit these proposals as
recommendations either to Congress or the people, in whom constituent powers are vested.

c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain
in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997), particularly
Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION, RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)

This strand begins with the statement that it is “the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of
Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as ‘Bangsamoros.’” It defines “Bangsamoro people” as
the natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu
archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and their descendants whether mixed or of full blood,
including their spouses.

Thus, the concept of “Bangsamoro,” as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not only “Moros”
as traditionally understood even by Muslims, but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent
islands. The MOA-AD adds that the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall be respected. What this
freedom of choice consists in has not been specifically defined. The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the
“Bangsamoro homeland,” the ownership of which is vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by
virtue of their prior rights of occupation. Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral domain
does not form part of the public domain.
Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut procedure for
the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance
of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples.
Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the power to
delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.

Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices to conduct
consultations beforeany project or program critical to the environment and human ecology including
those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is implemented
therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a
vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or
displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment.

CONCLUSION:

In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed
to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and
Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary
to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and
despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined.

The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions
but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP
and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and
implies that the same is on its way to independence.

Effectivity of the Local Government Code

EVARDONE v. COMELEC, 204 SCRA 464 (1991)

Doctrine:

Article XVIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution ex-presely provides that all existing laws not inconsistent
with the 1987 Constitution shall remain operative, until amended, repealed or revoked. Republic Act No.
7160 providing for the Local Government Code of 1991, approved by the President on 10 October 1991,
specifically repeals B.P. Blg. 337 as provided in Sec, 534, Title Four of said Act. But the Local Government
Code of 1991 will take effect only on 1 January 1992 and therefore the old Local Government Code (B.P.
Blg 337) is still the law applicable to the present case. Prior to the enactment of the new Local
Government Code, the effectiveness of B.P. Blg. 337 was expressly recognized in the proceedings of the
1986 Constitutional Commission.

Facts:

These two (2) consolidated petitions (G.R. No. 94010 – petition for prohibition with an urgent prayer for
immediate issuance of restraining order and/or PI to restrain petition and G.R. No. 95063 motion to set
aside) have their origin in en banc Resolution No. 90–0557 issued by the respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) dated 20 June 1990 which approved the recommendation of the Election Registrar
of Sulat, Eastern Samar to hold and conduct the signing of the petition for recall of the incumbent Mayor
of Sulat, Eastern Samar, on 14 July 1990.

 Felipe Evardone (hereinafter referred to as Evardone) is the mayor of the

Municipality of Sulat, Eastern Samar, having been elected to the position during
the 1988 local elections.
o He assumed office immediately after proclamation.
o On 14 February 1990, Alexander R. Apelado, Victorino E. Aclan and Noel
A. Nival (hereinafter referred to as Apelado, et al.) filed a petition for the
RECALL of Evardone with the Office of the Local Election Registrar,
Municipality of Sulat.
o On June 20, 1990, the respondent COMELEC issued Resolution No. 90–
0557, approving the recommendation of Mr. Vedasto B. Sumbilla,
Election Registrar of Sulat, Eastern Samar, to hold on 14 July 1990 the
signing of the petition for recall against incumbent Mayor Evardone of
the said Municipality.
o On the same day (12 July 1990), the notice of TRO was received by the
Central Office of the respondent COMELEC.
 But it was only on 15 July 1990 that the field agent of the respondent COMELEC
received the telegraphic notice of the TRO—a day after the completion of the
signing process sought to be temporarily stopped by the TRO.
 In an en banc resolution, the respondent COMELEC nullified the signing process
held in Sulat, Eastern Samar for being violative of the order of this Court in G.R.
No. 94010.
 Apelado, et al., filed a motion for an MR on August 29, 1990, respondent
COMELEC denied said motion:
“x x x. The critical date to consider is the service or notice of the
Restraining Order on 12 July 1990 upon the principal i.e. the Commission
on Election, and not upon its agent in the field."

 Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari

o The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
approving the recommendation of the Election Registrar
of Sulat, Eastern Samar to hold the signing of the petition
for recall without giving petitioner his day in court.
 o The COMELEC likewise committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in promulgating Resolution No. 2272 on
May 22,1990 which is null and void for being unconstitutional"
o In G.R. No. 95063, Apelado, et al., raises the issue of
whether or not the signing process of the petition for
recall held on 14 July 1990 has been rendered nugatory
by the TRO issued by this court in G.R. No. 94010 dated
12 July 1990 but received by the COMELEC field agent
only on 15 July 1990.

Issue:

W/N

1. Resolution no. 2272 promulgated by respondent COMELEC on May 23, 1990 by virtue of its
powers under the Constitution and Batas Pambansan Blg. 337 (Local Government Code) is
constitutional?
2. Whether or not the TRO issued by this Court rendered nugatory the signing process of the petition
for recall held pursuant to Resolution No. 2272.

Held:

No.

1. Evardone maintains that Article X, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution repealed Batas Pambansa
Blg. 337 in favor of one to be enacted by Congress.

“Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective
mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units
their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment
and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters
relating to the organization and operation of the local units.”

Since there was, during the period material to this case, no local government code enacted by Congress
after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution nor any law for that matter on the subject of recall of elected
government officials, Evardone contends that there is no basis for COMELEC Resolution No. 2272 and that
the recall proceedings in the case at bar is premature.

The respondent COMELEC, in its Comment

“The constitutional provision does not refer only to a local government code which is in futurum but also
in esse. It merely sets forth the guidelines which Congress will consider in amending the provisions of the
present Local Government Code. Pending the enactment of the amendatory law, the existing Local

Government Code remains operative. The adoption of the 1987 Constitution did not abrogate the
provisions of BP No. 337, unless a certain provision thereof is clearly irreconciliable with the provisions of
the 1987 Constitution In this case, Sections 54 to 59 of Batas Pambansa No. 337 are not inconsistent with
the provisions of the Constitution. Hence, they are operative."

We find the contention of the respondent COMELEC meritorious.

Article XVIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides that all existing laws not inconsistent
with the 1987 Constitution shall remain operative, until amended, repealed or revoked. Republic Act No.
7160 providing for the Local Government Code of 1991, approved by the President on 10 October 1991,
specifically repeals B.P. Blg. 337 as provided in Sec. 534, Title Four of said Act.

But the Local Government Code of 1991 will take effect only on 1 January 1992 and therefore the old Local
Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) is still the law applicable to the present case. Prior to the enactment of
the new Local Government Code, the effectiveness of B.P. Blg. 337 was expressly recognized in the
proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission.

Chapter 3 (Sections 54 to 59) of B.P. Blg. 337 provides for the mechanism for recall of local elective
officials. Section 59 expressly authorizes the respondent COMELEC to conduct and supervise the process
of and election on recall and in the exercise of such powers, promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations.

The Election Code contains no special provisions on the manner of conducting elections for the recall of a
local official. Any such election shall be conducted in the manner and under the rules on special elections,
unless otherwise provided by law or rule of the COMELEC.5 Thus, pursuant to the rule-making power
vested in respondent COMELEC, it promulgated Resolution No. 2272 on 23 May 1990.

2. In the present case, the records show that Evardone knew of the Notice of Recall filed by Apelado,
et al. on or about 21 February 1990 as evidenced by the Registry Return Receipt; yet, he was not vigilant
in following up and determining the outcome of such notice. Evardone alleges that it was only on or about
3 July 1990 that he came to know about the Resolution of respondent COMELEC setting the signing of the
petition for recall on 14 July 1990. But despite his urgent prayer for the issuance of a TRO, Evardone filed
the petition for prohibition only on 10 July 1990.

3. Indeed, this Court issued a TRO on 12 July 1990 but the signing of the petition for recall took place
just the same on the scheduled date through no fault of the respondent COMELEC and Apelado,
et al. The signing process was undertaken by the constituents of the Municipality of Sulat and its
Election Registrar in good faith and without knowledge of the TRO earlier issued by this Court.

Whether or not the electorate of the Municipality of Sulat has lost confidence in the incumbent
mayor is a political question. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are the judge.9
“Loss of confidence is the formal withdrawal by an electorate of their trust in a person’s ability to
discharge his office previously bestowed on him by the same electorate."10 The constituents have
made a judgment and their will to recall the incumbent mayor (Evardone) has already been
ascertained and must be afforded the highest respect. Thus, the signing process held last 14 July 1990
in Sulat, Eastern Samar, for the recall of Mayor Felipe P. Evardone of said municipality is valid and has
legal effect.
 SECRETARY OF HEALTH v. COURT OF APPEALS, 241 SCRA 688 (1995)

Doctrine:

—In the case at bar, respondent Fe Sibbaluca was administratively charged before
petitioner department in 1991. The case was docketed as Administrative Case No. 000023
S. 1991 and the suspension order was issued by petitioner Secretary of Health on
December 17, 1991. At the time of the commencement of the administrative action, the
operative laws are the Administrative Code of 1987 and Executive Order No. 119. Under
the said laws, the Secretary of Health exercises control, direction and supervision over his
subordinates, which include private respondent. Consequently, since jurisdiction has
been acquired by the Secretary of Health over the person of private respondent before
the effectivity of the Local Government Code on January 1,1992, it continuous until the
final disposition of the administrative case.

Facts:

Petitioners seeks the reversal of respondent court's decision dated July 21, 1993
dismissing petitioners' petition for certiorari and prohibition in CA-G.R. No. 28361
assailing the decision and orders of respondent Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 1 of Tuguegarao, Cagayan restraining petitioners from enforcing the order
of preventive suspension issued against respondent Fe Sibbaluca, former Administrative
Officer of the Provincial Health Office of Cagayan.

 This petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners stemmed from the
administrative complaint filed against private respondent Fe Sibbaluca, the
administrative Officer III of the Provincial Health Office of Cagayan, for grave misconduct,
dishonesty, etc.
o The case was docketed as Administrative Case No. 000023 S. 1991 of the
Department of Health, Manila.
 As a consequence of the administrative case, private respondent was placed under
preventive suspension for ninety (90) days per order dated December 17, 1991, issued
by herein petitioner Secretary of Health.
 "Private respondent sought the lifting of her suspension thru a motion dated January 8,
1992.
 'Pending resolution of her said motion, private respondent instituted an action for
prohibition, mandamus, and injunction with a prayer for a temporary restraining order
and a writ of preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tuguegarao
(Branch 1), docketed as Civil Case No. 4379 and 4397, seeking the nullification of the
order of preventive suspension and of the entire administrative proceedings.
 o Her action is anchored on her contention that when the New Local Government
Code took effect on January 1, 1992, the Secretary of Health had lost his
disciplinary power and authority over her, considering that such power to
discipline the personnel of the Provincial Health Office is now vested in the
Provincial Governor.
 Finding merit to the ancillary remedy sought by private respondent, the Regional Trial
Court, thru the herein respondent Judge, issued a temporary restraining order on January
15, 1992, restraining the Secretary of Health and his representatives from enforcing the
preventive suspension order and from conducting further proceedings in the
administrative case against private respondent.
 On February 3, 1992, the Secretary of Health filed an omnibus motion to dismiss private
respondent's action and to quash the temporary restraining order, with opposition to the
issuance of a preliminary injunction, contending inter alia that private respondent had
failed to exhaust administrative remedies and that the New Local Government Code did
not divest the Secretary of Health of his disciplinary jurisdiction over the private
respondent.
 In a decision dated March 25, 1992, the respondent Judge rendered judgment in favor of
private respondent and against petitioners.
 On April 27, 1992, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the March 25, 1992
decision and of the April 14, 1992 order, insisting that the Secretary of Health has
jurisdiction over the administrative case. Petitioners also contended, among other things,
that respondent Judge has no jurisdiction to nullify all orders issued by the Secretary of
Health, 'they being of equal rank.'
 Notice of Appeal + Motion to Stay Execution of Decision.
 "Both the notice of appeal and the motion to stay execution were denied upon the ground
that the notice of appeal was filed out of time, and that the assailed decision had already
become final and executory. The denial was contained in a decision dated June 26, 1992
which convicted co-petitioner Dr. Jose Cabrera of indirect contempt of court for refusing
to comply with the writ of execution

Issue:

W/N the CA erred in not giving due course to the special civil action of certiorari and prohibition filed by
petitioners.

Held:

Yes. Fe Sibbaluca loses.

In a long line of cases we held that the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
will not lie as a substitute for an available or lost appeal (Sy v. Romero, 214 SCRA 187 [192]). Nevertheless,
even when appeal is available and is the proper remedy, this Court has allowed a writ of certiorari when
the orders of the lower court were issued either in excess of or without jurisdiction (PNB v. Florendo, 206
SCRA 582 [1992]). In the present case, the petition for certiorari filed before respondent court was not
filed as a mere substitute for appeal.
The facts and circumstances of this case warrant the filing of the petition for certiorari and prohibition.
The lower court issued a writ of execution of its March 25, 1992 decision. The motion to stay execution of
the said decision filed by petitioner Secretary of Health was denied. Likewise, the notice of appeal filed by
the said petitioner was also denied. In the same order, petitioner Dr, Jose Cabrera was found guilty of
indirect contempt and a penalty of three months imprisonment was imposed upon him for allegedly
refusing to comply with the writ of execution. Most importantly, petitioners question the jurisdiction of
the lower court in enjoining the order issued by the Secretary of Health preventively suspending and
subsequently dismissing private respondent and declaring that the said department does not have the
jurisdiction to issue the said order.

On the merits, petitioners' main contention is that the court a quo erred in finding that the Secretary of
Health has ceased to have administrative jurisdiction over the person of private respondent in view of the
enactment of the Local Government Code of 1991 which took effect on January 1,1992 (Rollo, p. 19).

The resolution of the main issue raised by the petitioners calls for the determination of the date of
effectivity of the Local Government Code of 1991. The pertinent provision of the Local Government Code
of 1991 provides: "Sec. 536. Effectivity Clause.—This Code shall take effect on January first, nineteen
hundred ninety-two, unless otherwise provided herein, after its complete publication in at least one (1)
newspaper of general circulation." (Italics Supplied)

It is explicit in the abovestated law that the Local Government Code of 1991 shall take effect on January
1, 1992. It is an elementary principle of statutory construction that where the words and phrases of a
statute are not obscure and ambiguous, the meaning and intention of the legislature should be
determined from the language employed, and where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room
for construction (Allarde v. Commission on Audit, 218 SCRA 227 [1993]). Furthermore, it is well-settled
that jurisdiction is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action
(Philippine Singapore Ports Corporation v. NLRC, 218 SCRA 77 [1993]).

In the case at bar, respondent Fe Sibbaluca was administratively charged before petitioner department in
1991. The case was docketed as Administrative Case No. 000023 S. 1991 and the suspension order was
issued by petitioner Secretary of Health on December 17, 1991. At the time of the commencement of the
administrative action, the operative laws are the Administrative Code of 1987 and Executive Order No.
119. Under the said laws, the Secretary of Health exercises control, direction and supervision over his
subordinates, which include private respondent. Consequently, since jurisdiction has been acquired by
the Secretary of Health over the person of private respondent before the effectivity of the Local
Government Code on January 1, 1992, it continuous until the final disposition of the administrative case.