[No. L-11959.

 October 31, 1959]

ARTURO B. PASCUAL, petitioner and appellant, vs. HON. PROVINCIAL BOARD
OF NUEVA ECIJA, respondent and appellee.
467
VOL. 106, OCTOBER 31, 1959 467
Pascual vs. Hon. Provincial Board, of Nueva Ecija

1. 1.OFFICERS; ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE

REMEDIES; PRINCIPLE NOT APPLICABLE IF QUESTION is PURELY LEGAL.—The
settled rule in this jurisdiction that where the law has delineated the
procedure by which administrative appeal or remedy could be effected, the
same should be followed before recourse to judicial action can be initiated
(Ang Tuan Kai vs. Import Control Commission, 91 Phil., 143;
Coloso vs. Board, 92 Phil., 938; Miguel vs. Reyes, 93 Phil., 542), is not
without exception.. Where the only question to be settled is a purely legal
one—whether or not a municipal mayor may be subjected to an
administrative investigation of a charge based on misconduct allegedly
committed by him during his prior term the rule does not apply.

1. 2.ID.; ID.; REMOVAL OF ELECTIVE OFFICIALS; ACTS DONE DURING A

PREVIOUS TERM NOT CAUSE FOR REMOVAL.—Offenses committed, or acts
done, during a previous term are generally held not to furnish cause for
removal and this is especially true where the constitution provides that the
penalty in proceedings for removal shall not extend beyond the removal
from office, and disqualification from holding office for the term for which
the officer was elected or appointed (67 C.J.S. p. 248, citing Rice vs. State,
161 S.W. 2d. 401; Montgomery vs. Nowell, 40 SW. 2d. 418; People ex rel.
Bagshaw vs. Thompson, 130 P. 2d. 237; Board of Com'rs of Kingfisher
Country vs. Shutler, 281 P. 222; State vs. Blake, 280 P. 388; In re Fudula,
147 A. 67; State vs. Ward, 43 S.W. 2d. 217). The underlying theory is that
each term is separate from other terms, and that the reelection to office
operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent
of cutting off the right to remove him therefor (43 Am. Jur. p. 45, citing Atty.
Gen. vs. Hasty, 184 Ala. 121, 63 So. 559, 50 L.R.A. (NS) 553).

APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. Makasiar,
J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Amado G. Salazar, Felicisimo S. Ocampo, Arturo S. Tomas, Feliciano
Bautista and Severo Ongsiapco for appellant.
Mariano D. Capuyoc for appellee.
468
468 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pascual vs. Hon. Provincial Board\ of Nueva Ecija

GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:

We are asked in this appeal to revoke an order of the Court of First Instance
of Nueva Ecija denying appellant's petition for a writ of prohibition with
preliminary injunction.
Petitioner-appellant Arturo B. Pascual had been elected mayor of San Jose,
Nueva Ecija, in November 1951 and reelected in 1955. On October 6, 1956,
the Acting Provincial Governor of that province filed with the Provincial Board
three administrative charges against the said appellant. Charge III was for
"Maladministrative, Abuse of Authority, and Usurpation of Judicial Functions,"
committed as follows:
"Specification I—That on or about the 18th and 20th day of December, 1954, in the
municipality of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, the above-named respondent, being
municipal mayor of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, and while the justice of the peace of the
said municipality was present therein, did then and there willfully, feloniously,
criminally, without legal authority, and with grave abuse of authority, assumed and
usurped the judicial powers of the said justice of the peace by accepting the
criminal complaint filed in Criminal Case No. 3556, of the said court, conducting the
preliminary investigation thereof, fixing the bail bond of P6,000.00, and issuing the
corresponding warrant of arrest; and after the accused in the said criminal case had
been arrested, while the justice of the peace was in his office in San Jose, Nueva
Ecija, the herein respondent, in defiance of the express refusal by the justice of the
peace to reduce the bail bond of the accused in Criminal Case No. 1556, acted on
the motion to reduce bail and did reduce the bail bond to P3,000.00.
After the presentation of evidence regarding the first two charges, petitioner-
appellant filed with the respondentappellee, the Provincial Board, a motion to
dismiss the third charge above referred to, on the main ground that the
wrongful acts therein alleged had been committed during his previous term
of office and could not constitute a ground for disciplining him during his
second term. Upon opposition filed by a special counsel for the respond-
469
VOL. 106, OCTOBER 31, 1959 469
Pascual vs. Hon. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija
ent-appellee, the motion to dismiss was denied by resolution of the Board.
After the denial of a motion for reconsideration of that resolution, the
appellant filed with this Court a petition for a writ of prohibition with
preliminary injunction (G. R. No. L-11730), to enjoin the Provincial Board of
Nueva Ecija from taking cognizance of the third charge, but the petition was
denied by minute resolution of December 21, 1956 "without prejudice to
action, if any, in the Court of First Instance." Accordingly, the petitioner-
appellant filed with the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija a petition for
prohibition with preliminary injunction seeking to inhibit the said Provincial
Board from proceeding with the hearing of Charge No. III, for lack of
jurisdiction.
Instead of filing an answer, the respondent-appellee moved for the
dismissal of the case on the ground that it states no cause of action because
the petitioner-appellant had not complied with the cardinal principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies before he could appeal to the courts,
and because the Provincial Board had jurisdiction over Charge No. III. After
responsive pleadings had been filed by both parties, the court below issued
an order dismissing the petition "for being premature", for the reason that
the petitioner had not first appealed to the Executive Secretary. From that
order, the case was brought before us on appeal. Upon urgent petition, a writ
of preliminary injunction was issued restraining the respondent-appellee
from investigating petitioner-appellant on the charge abovementioned.
In his brief, petitioner-appellant claims that the court below erred: (1) in
not holding that the alleged usurpation of judicial functions in December
1954 is not a legal ground for disciplining the appellant during his second
term of office after a reelection, and in not holding that the respondent
patently has no authority or jurisdiction to take cognizance of Charge No. 3;
(2) in holding that
470
470 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pascual vs. Hon. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija
the petition for prohibition is premature and that the appellant must first
exhaust all administrative remedies available to him under the Revised
Administrative Code; and (3) in dismissing the petition for prohibition.
The first question posed is whether or not it was legally proper for
petitioner-appellant to have come to court without first bringing his case to
the Executive Secretary for review. True it is that, in this jurisdiction, the
settled rule is that where the law has delineated the procedure by which
administrative appeal or remedy could be effected, the same should be
followed before recourse to judicial action can be initiated (Ang Tuan
Kai vs. Import Control Commission, 91 Phil., 143; Coloso vs. Board, 92 Phil.,
938; Miguel vs. Reyes, 93 Phil., 542, and several other cases), but we believe
that this rule is not without exceptions, as in a case like the present, where
the only question to be settled in the prohibition proceedings is a purely
legal one—whether or not a municipal mayor may be subjected to an
administrative investigation of a charge based on misconduct allegedly
committed by him during his prior term.
"The rule is inapplicable where no administrative remedy is provided. Likewise, the
rule will be relaxed where there is grave doubt as to the availability of the
administrative remedy; where the question in dispute is purely a legal one, and
nothing of an administrative nature is to be or can be done; where although there
are steps to be taken, they are, under the admitted facts, merely matters of form,
and the administrative process, as a process of judgment, is really over; or where
the administrative remedy is not exclusive but merely cumulative or concurrent to a
judicial remedy. A litigant need not proceed with optional administrative process
before seeking judicial relief." (73 C.J.S. p. 354) (Italic ours)
On the above authority, we are inclined to agree with the petitioner-
appellant that his bringing the case to court is not a violation of, but merely
an exception to, the cardinal rule above referred to.
471
VOL. 106, OCTOBER 31, 1959 471
Pascual vs. Hon. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija
In a case (Mondano vs. Silvosa * 51 Off. Gaz., [6], p. 2884), this Court granted
a writ of prohibition against the provincial board of Capiz, notwithstanding
the fact that the petitioner therein did not appeal to the Executive Secretary,
the only question therein involved being whether or not the charged filed
against the municipal mayor of Calibo, Capiz, constituted any one of the
grounds f or suspension or removal provided for in sec. 2188 of the Revised
Administrative Code.
We now come to the main issue of the controversy—the legality of
disciplining an elective municipal official for a wrongful act committed by him
during his immediately preceding term of office.
In the absence of any precedent in this jurisdiction, we have resorted to
American authorities. We found that cases on the matter are conflicting due
in part, probably, to differences in statutes and constitutional provisions, and
also, in part, to a divergence of views with respect to the question of whether
the subsequent election or appointment condones the prior misconduct. The
weight of authority, however, seems to incline to the rule denying the right
to remove one from office because of misconduct during a prior term, to
which we fully subscribe.
"Offenses committed, or acts done, during previous term are generally held not to
furnish cause for removal and this is especially true where the constitution provides
that the penalty in proceedings for removal shall not extend beyond the removal
from office, and disqualification from holding office for the term for which the officer
was elected or appointed." (67 C.J.S. p. 248, citing Rice vs. State, 161 S.W. 2d.
401; Montgomery vs.Nowell, 40 S.W. 2d. 418; People ex rel.
Bagshaw vs. Thompson, 130 P. 2d. 237; Board of Com'rs of Kingfisher
County vs. Shutler, 281 P. 222; State vs.Blake, 280 P. 388; In re Fudula, 147 A.
67; State vs. Ward, 43 S.W. 2d. 217).
The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms, and
that the reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer's
previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him
therefor (43
_______________

* 97 Phil., 143.

472
472 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Gallardo and Andres, vs. Hon. Tuason, et al.
Am. Jur. p. 45, citing Atty. Gen. vs. Hasty, 184 Ala. 121, 63 So. 559, 50 L.R.A.
(NS) 553. As held in Conant vs. Brogan (1887) 6 N.Y.S.R. 332, cited in 17
A.I.R. 281, 63 So. 559, 50 LRA (NS) 553—
"The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present
term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect
their officers. When the people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed
that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they
disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is
not for the court, by reason of such faults or misconduct to practically overrule the
will of the people."
In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is hereby revoked; the writ
of prohibition prayed for is hereby granted and the preliminary injunction
heretofore issued made permanent. Without special pronouncement as to
costs.
Parás, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista
Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia and Barrera, JJ., concur.
Order revoked.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 768

Aguinaldo vs. Santos
G.R. No. 94115. August 21, 1992. *

RODOLFO E. AGUINALDO, petitioner, vs. HON. LUIS SANTOS, as Secretary of

the Department of Local Government, and MELVIN VARGAS, as Acting
Governor of Cagayan, respondents.
Administrative Law;  Re-election renders administrative case moot and
academic.—Petitioner’s re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan has
rendered the administrative case pending before Us moot and academic.
Same;  Removal from Office; Except for criminal acts committed, public official
can not be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term.
— Clearly then, the rule is that a public official can not be removed for
administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to
office operates as a condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to the extent
of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds no
application to criminal cases pending against petitioner for acts he may have
committed during the failed coup.
Same;  Power of Secretary to remove local government officials; The power of
Secretary to remove government officials has both constitutional and statutory
basis.—The power of respondent Secretary to remove local government officials is
anchored on both the Constitution and a statutory grant from the legislative branch.
The constitutional basis is provided by Articles VII (17) and X (4) of the 1987
Constitution which vest in the President the power of control over all executive
departments, bureaus and offices and the power of general supervision over local
governments, and by the doctrine that the acts of the department head are
presumptively the acts of the President unless expressly rejected by him. The
statutory grant found in B.P. Blg. 337 itself has constitutional roots, having been
enacted by the then Batasan Pambansa pursuant to Article XI of the 1973
Constitution, Section 2.
Same;  Local Government Code; B.P. Blg. 337 not repealed by the 1987
Constitution.—Inasmuch as the power and authority of the legislature to enact a
local government code, which provides for the
______________

 EN BANC.
*

769
VOL. 212, AUGUST 21, 1992 769
 Aguinaldo vs. Santos
manner of removal of local government officials, is found in the 1973
Constitution as well as in the 1987 Constitution, then it can not be said that B.P. Blg.
337 was repealed by the effectivity of the present Constitution.
Same;  Power of Secretary to appoint local government officials; Sec. 48 (1) of
B.P. Blg. 337 grants Secretary power to appoint local government officials in case of
incumbent’s removal from office.—As to petitioner’s argument of the want of
authority of respondent Secretary to appoint respondent Melvin Vargas as Governor
of Cagayan, We need but point to Section 48 (1) of B.P. Blg. 337 to show the fallacy
of the same.
Same;  Suspension or removal from office; Proof required;  Not proof beyond
reasonable doubt but substantial evidence is required when not prosecuted
criminally but administratively.—Equally without merit is petitioner’s claim that
before he could be suspended or removed from office, proof beyond reasonable
doubt is required inasmuch as he is charged with a penal offense of disloyalty to the
Republic which is defined and penalized under Article 137 of the Revised Penal
Code. Petitioner is not being prosecuted criminally under the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code, but administratively with the end in view of removing
petitioner as the duly elected Governor of Cagayan Province for acts of disloyalty to
the Republic where the quantum of proof required is only substantial evidence.

PETITION for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary mandatory injunction

to review the decision of the Secretary of Local Government.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Victor I. Padilla for petitioner.
     Doroteo B. Laguna and Manuel T. Molina for private respondent.

NOCON, J.:

In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary mandatory

injunction and/or restraining order, petitioner Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo assails
the decision of respondent Secretary of Local Government dated March 19,
1990 in Adm. Case No. P-10437-89 dismissing him as Governor of Cagayan
on the
770
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 770
Aguinaldo vs. Santos
ground that the power of the Secretary of Local Government to dismiss local
government officials under Section 14, Article I, Chapter 3 and Sections 60 to
67, Chapter 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg.337, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code, was repealed by the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution.
The pertinent facts are as follows: Petitioner was the duly elected
Governor of the province of Cagayan, having been elected to said position
during the local elections held on January 17, 1988, to serve a term of four
(4) years therefrom. He took his oath sometime around March 1988.
Shortly after the December 1989 coup d’etat was crushed, respondent
Secretary of Local Government sent a telegram and a letter, both dated
December 4, 1989, to petitioner requiring him to show cause why he should
not be suspended or removed from office for disloyalty to the Republic,
within forty-eight (48) hours from receipt thereof.
On December 7, 1989, a sworn complaint for disloyalty to the Republic
and culpable violation of the Constitution was filed by Veronico Agatep,
Manuel Mamba and Orlino Agatep, respectively the mayors of the
municipalities of Gattaran, Tuao and Lasam, all in Cagayan, against
petitioner for acts the latter committed during the coup. Petitioner was
required to file a verified answer to the complaint.
On January 5, 1990, the Department of Local Government received a letter
from petitioner dated December 29, 1989 in reply to respondent Secretary’s
December 4, 1989 letter requiring him to explain why he should not be
suspended or removed from office for disloyalty. In his letter, petitioner
denied being privy to the planning of the coup or actively participating in its
execution, though he admitted that he was sympathetic to the cause of the
rebel soldiers. 1

Respondent Secretary considered petitioner’s reply letter as his answer to

the complaint of Mayor Veronico Agatep and others.  On the basis thereof,
2

respondent Secretary suspended

______________

1
 See the text of the letter as quoted in the Decision of respondent Secretary, pp. 4-6.
2
 The validity of respondent Secretary’s action was upheld by this Court in Santos vs.
Villacete, G.R. No. 91522, January 25, 1990.
771
VOL. 212, AUGUST 21, 1992 771
Aguinaldo vs. Santos
petitioner from office for sixty (60) days from notice, pending the outcome of
the formal investigation into the charges against him.
During the hearing conducted on the charges against petitioner,
complainants presented testimonial and documentary evidence to prove the
charges. Petitioner neither presented evidence nor even cross-examined the
complainants’ witnesses, choosing instead to move that respondent
Secretary inhibit himself from deciding the case, which motion was denied.
Thereafter, respondent Secretary rendered the questioned decision
finding petitioner guilty as charged and ordering his removal from office.
Installed as Governor of Cagayan in the process was respondent Melvin
Vargas, who was then the Vice-Governor of Cagayan.
Petitioner relies on three grounds for the allowance of the petition,
namely: (1) that the power of respondent Secretary to suspend or remove
local government officials under Section 60, Chapter IV of B.P. Blg. 337 was
repealed by the 1987 Constitution; (2) that since respondent Secretary no
longer has power to suspend or remove petitioner, the former could not
appoint respondent Melvin Vargas as Governor of Cagayan; and (3) the
alleged act of disloyalty committed by petitioner should be proved by proof
beyond reasonable doubt, and not be a mere preponderance of evidence,
because it is an act punishable as rebellion under the Revised Penal Code.
 While this case was pending before this Court, petitioner filed his
certificate of candidacy for the position of Governor of Cagayan for the May
11, 1992 elections. Three separate petitions for his disqualification were then
filed against him, all based on the ground that he had been removed from
office by virtue of the March 19, 1990 resolution of respondent Secretary.
The Commission on Elections granted the petitions by way of a resolution
dated May 9, 1992. On the same day, acting upon a “Motion to Clarify” filed
by petitioner, the Commission ruled that inasmuch as the resolutions of the
Commission become final and executory only after five (5)days from
promulgation, petitioner may still be voted upon as a candidate for governor
pending the final outcome of the disqualification cases with this Court.
Consequently, on May 13, 1992, petitioner filed a petition for
772
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 772
Aguinaldo vs. Santos
certiorari with this Court, G.R. Nos. 105128-30, entitled Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo
v. Commission on Elections, et al., seeking to nullify the resolution of the
Commission ordering his disqualification. The Court, in a resolution dated
May 14, 1992, issued a temporary restraining order against the Commission
to cease and desist from enforcing its May 9, 1992 resolution pending the
outcome of the disqualification case, thereby allowing the canvassing of the
votes and returns in Cagayan to proceed. However, the Commission was
ordered not to proclaim a winner until this Court has decided the case.
On June 9, 1992, a resolution was issued in the aforementioned case
granting the petition and annulling the May 9, 1992 resolution of the
Commission on the ground that the decision of respondent Secretary has not
yet attained finality and is still pending review with this Court. As petitioner
won by a landslide margin in the elections, the resolution paved the way for
his eventual proclamation as Governor of Cagayan.
Under the environmental circumstances of the case, We find the petition
meritorious.
Petitioner’s re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan has
rendered the administrative case pending before Us moot and academic. It
appears that after the canvassing of votes, petitioner garnered the most
number of votes among the candidates for governor of Cagayan province. As
held by this Court in Aguinaldo v. Comelec et al., supra,:
x x x [T]he certified true xerox copy of the “CERTIFICATE OF VOTES OF
CANDIDATES”, attached to the “VERY URGENT MOTION FOR THE MODIFICATION OF
THE RESOLUTION DATED MAY 14, 1992 [“] filed by petitioner shows that he
received 170,382 votes while the other candidates for the same position received
the following total number of votes: (1) Patricio T. Antonio—54,412, (2) Paquito F.
Castillo—2,198; and (3) Florencio L. Vargas—48,129.
xxx
‘Considering the facts narrated, the expiration of petitioner’s term of office during which
the acts charged were allegedly committed, and his subsequent reelection, the petition
must be dismissed for the reason that the issue has become academic. In Pascual v.
Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, L-11959, October 31, 1959, this Court has ruled:
 773
VOL. 212, AUGUST 21, 1992 773
Aguinaldo vs. Santos
‘The weight of authority, however, seems to incline to the rule denying the right to remove
from office because of misconduct during a prior term to which we fully subscribe.
‘Offenses committed, or acts done, during a previous term are generally held not
to furnish cause for removal and this is especially true where the Constitution
provides that the penalty in proceeding for removal shall not extend beyond the
removal from office, and disqualification from holding office for a term for which the
officer was elected or appointed. (6 C.J.S. p. 248, citing Rice v. State, 161 S.W. 2nd
4011; Montgomery v. Newell, 40 S.W. 23rd 418; People ex rel Bashaw v. Thompson,
130 P. 2nd 237; Board of Com’rs Kingfisher County v. Shutler, 281 P. 222; State v.
Blake, 280 P. 388; In re Fedula, 147 A 67; State v. Wald, 43 S.W. 217)
‘The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms, and that the
reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer’s misconduct to the extent of
cutting off the right to remove him therefor. (43 Am. Jur. p. 45, citing Atty. Gen. v. Kasty,
184 Ala. 121, 63 Sec. 599, 50 L.R.A. [NS] 553). As held in Comant v. Bregan [1887] 6
N.Y.S.R. 332, cited in 17 A.L.R. 63 Sec. 559, 50 [NE] 553 .
‘The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present
term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect
their officers. When the people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed
that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they
disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not
for the court, by reason of such fault or misconduct, to practically overrule the will
of the people.’ (Lizares v. Hechanova, et al. 17 SCRA 58, 59-60 [1966]) (See
also Oliveros v. Villaluz, 57 SCRA 163 [1974]) 3

Clearly then, the rule is that a public official can not be removed for
administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-
election to office operates as a condonation of the officer’s previous
misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The
foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminal cases pending
against
______________

3
 G.R. Nos. 105128-30, Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo vs. Comelec, Florencio Vargas, Luzviminda
Villaflor and Alfonso Purugganan, prom. June 9, 1992, pp. 3, 4-5.
774
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 774
Aguinaldo vs. Santos
petitioner for acts he may have committed during the failed coup.
The other grounds raised by petitioner deserve scant consideration.
Petitioner contends that the power of respondent Secretary to suspend or
remove local government officials as alter ego of the President, and as
embodied in B.P. Blg. 337 has been repealed by the 1987 Constitution and
which is now vested in the courts.
We do not agree. The power of respondent Secretary to remove local
government officials is anchored on both the Constitution and a statutory
grant from the legislative branch. The constitutional basis is provided by
Articles VII (17) and X (4) of the 1987 Constitution which vest in the
President the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and
offices and the power of general supervision over local governments, and by
the doctrine that the acts of the department head are presumptively the acts
of the President unless expressly rejected by him.  The statutory grant found
4

in B.P. Blg. 337 itself has constitutional roots, having been enacted by the
then Batasan Pambansa pursuant to Article XI of the 1973 Constitution,
Section 2 of which specifically provided as follows—
SEC. 2. The National Assembly shall enact a local government code which may not
thereafter be amended except by a majority vote of all its Members, defining a
more responsive and accountable local government structure with an effective
system of recall, allocating among the different local government units their
powers, responsibilities, and resources, and providing for the qualifications, election
and removal, term, salaries, power, functions, and duties of local government
officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local
units. However, any change in the existing form of local government shall not take
effect until ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the
purpose. 5

_______________

4
 Citizen J. Antonio Carpio vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 96409, February 14,
1992; Federation of Free Workers vs. Inciong, 161 SCRA 295 (1988); Villena vs. Secretary of
Interior, 67 Phil. 451 (1951).
5
 Emphasis supplied.
775
VOL. 212, AUGUST 21, 1992 775
Aguinaldo vs. Santos
A similar provision is found in Section 3, Article X of the 1987 Constitution,
which reads:
‘SEC. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a
more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a
system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and
referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers,
responsibilities, and resources, and provide for
the qualifications, election, appointment, and removal, term and salaries, powers
and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the
organization and operation of the local units. 6

Inasmuch as the power and authority of the legislature to enact a local

government code, which provides for the manner of removal of local
government officials, is found in the 1973 Constitution as well as in the 1987
Constitution, then it can not be said that BP Blg. 337 was repealed by the
effectivity of the present Constitution.
Moreover, in Bagabuyo et al. vs. Davide, Jr., et al.,  this Court had the
7

occasion to state that B.P. Blg. 337 remained in force despite the effectivity
of the present Constitution, until such time as the proposed Local
Government Code of 1991 is approved.
The power of respondent Secretary of the Department of Local
Government to remove local elective government officials is found in Secs.
60 and 61 of B.P. Blg. 337. 8

________________
 6
 Emphasis supplied.
7
 G.R. No. 87233, September 21, 1989.
8
 SEC. 60. Suspension and Removal; Grounds.—An elective local official may be suspended
or removed from office on any of the following grounds committed while in office:

1. (1)Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines;

2. (2)Culpable violation of the Constitution;
3. (3)Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office and neglect of duty;
4. (4)Commission of any offense involving moral turpitude;
5. (5)Abuse of authority;
6. (6)Unauthorized absence for three consecutive months.

776
776 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Aguinaldo vs. Santos
As to petitioner’s argument of the want of authority of re-spondent Secretary
to appoint respondent Melvin Vargas as Governor of Cagayan, We need but
point to Section 48 (1) of B.P. Blg 337 to show the fallacy of the same, to wit
—
In case a permanent vacancy arises when a governor . . . refuses to assume office,
fails to qualify, dies or is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise
permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office, the vice-governor
. . . shall assume the office for the unexpired term of the former. 9

Equally without merit is petitioner’s claim that before he could be suspended

or removed from office, proof beyond reasonable doubt is required inasmuch
as he is charged with a penal offense of disloyalty to the Republic which is
defined and penalized under Article 137 of the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioner is not being prosecuted criminally under the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code, but administratively with the end in view of removing
petitioner as the duly elected Governor of Cagayan Province for acts of
disloyalty to the Republic where the quantum of proof required is only
substantial evidence. 10

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the decision of public

respondent Secretary of Local Government dated March 19, 1990 in Adm.
Case No. P-10437-89, dismissing petitioner as Governor of Cagayan, is
hereby REVERSED.
SO ORDERED.
     Narvasa (C.J.), Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla,Bidin, Griño-
Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Ro-meroand Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
     Melo, J., Took no part.
Petition granted; decision reversed.
Notes.—Removal from office should be distinguished from
_______________

 Emphasis supplied.
9

 Ang Tibay vs. CIT, 69 Phil. 635; Air Manila, Inc. vs. Balatbat, 38 SCRA 489.
10

777
VOL. 212, AUGUST 21, 1992 777
People vs. Mallari
termination by abolition of an office (De la Llana v. Alba, 112 SCRA 294).
Summary dismissal of an employee without necessity of a formal
investigation when charge is serious and the evidence of guilt is strong
(Marcelo vs. Tantuico, Jr., 142 SCRA 439).

G.R. No. 198583. June 28, 2017.*

ARLYN ALMARIO-TEMPLONUEVO, petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT and CHITO M. OYARDO, respondents.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Motion for Reconsideration; The
settled rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the
filing of a petition for certiorari; Exceptions.—The settled rule is that a motion for
reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing of a petition for certiorari.
Its purpose is to grant an opportunity for the court to correct any actual or
perceived error attributed to it by reexamination of the legal and factual
circumstances of the case. This rule, however, admits well-defined exceptions, such
as (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no
jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been
duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised
and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the
resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the
Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d)
where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e)
where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for
relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the
granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in
the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceeding
were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where
the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.
 Ombudsman; Doctrine of Finality of Judgments; The Supreme Court (SC),
recognizes only two (2) instances where a decision of the Ombudsman is
considered as final and unappealable and, thus, immediately executory. The first is
when the respondent is absolved of the charge; and second is, in case of conviction,
where the penalty
_______________

*  SECOND DIVISION.
 
 
284
284 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Almario-Templonuevo vs. Office of the Ombudsman
imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than  one (1)
month, or a fine equivalent to one (1) month salary.—In Ombudsman v. Alano, 516
SCRA 18 (2007), the Court stressed that Section 13(8), Article XI of the 1987
Constitution empowers the Office of the Ombudsman to, among others,
“promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such
functions or duties as may be provided by law.” Pursuant to such constitutional
authority, Administrative Order No. 07 (otherwise known as the “Rules of Procedure
of the Office of the Ombudsman”), dated April 10, 1990, was issued. Section 7, Rule
III thereof provides:
SEC. 7. Finality of decision.—Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in
case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand,
suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary,
the decision shall be final and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision shall
become final after the expiration of ten (10) days from receipt thereof by the
respondent, unless a motion for reconsideration or petition for certiorari shall have
been filed by him as prescribed in Section 27 of RA 6770. The Court, in interpreting
the above constitutional and statutory provisions, recognizes only two instances
where a decision of the Ombudsman is considered as final and unappealable and,
thus, immediately executory. The first is when the respondent is absolved of the
charge; and second is, in case of conviction, where the penalty imposed is public
censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent
to one month salary.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; An independent action for
certiorari may be availed of only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law and certiorari is not a substitute for
the lapsed remedy of appeal.—Left without any remedy in the ordinary course of
law, Templonuevo was justified in resorting directly to the CA via a Rule 65 petition.
Indeed, an independent action for certiorari may be availed of only when there is no
appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
and certiorari is not a substitute for the lapsed remedy of appeal. In other words,
because petitioner could not avail a motion for reconsideration or an appeal, her
choice of a Rule 65 petition was proper.
Administrative Law; Condonation Doctrine; The condonation doctrine, despite
its abandonment in Conchita Carpio-Morales v.
 
 
285
 VOL. 828, JUNE 28, 2017 285
Almario-Templonuevo vs. Office of the Ombudsman
Court of Appeals and Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr., 774 SCRA 431  (2015), still
applies in this case as the effect of the abandonment was made prospective in
application.—Templonuevo claimed that the decision of the Ombudsman was null
and void as the penalty imposed could no longer be imposed on account of her
election as Vice Mayor of the same municipality, which to her, operated as
forgiveness by her constituents for the acts done while she was still a  Sangguniang
Bayan Member. This “theory of nullity,” in a sense, does not hold water. The
Ombudsman decided the case prior to the May 2010 elections. At that time,
Templonuevo remained an incumbent and no event had transpired yet which would
have had an effect on her liability for the acts done during her previous term. As the
elections for 2010 did not happen yet, nothing could have substantially changed the
course of action of the Ombudsman. The election of 2010, however, became
material only when the Ombudsman’s decision was on appeal. It is at this stage that
the CA, should have considered Templonuevo’s election as Vice Mayor as rendering
the imposition of administrative sanctions moot and academic on the basis of the
condonation doctrine. Said doctrine, despite its abandonment in Conchita Carpio-
Morales v. Court of Appeals and Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr. (Carpio-Morales), 774
SCRA 431 (2015), still applies in this case as the effect of the abandonment was
made prospective in application.
Same; Same; In Giron v. Ochoa, Jr., 819 SCRA 103 (2017), the Supreme Court
(SC) recognized that the condonation doctrine can be applied to a public officer who
was elected to a different position provided that it is shown that the body politic
electing the person to another office is the same.—In Giron v. Ochoa, Jr., 819 SCRA
103 (2017), the Court recognized that the doctrine can be applied to a public officer
who was elected to a different position provided that it is shown that the body
politic electing the person to another office is the same. Thus, the Court ruled: On
this issue, considering the ratio decidendi behind the doctrine, the Court agrees
with the interpretation of the administrative tribunals below that the condonation
doctrine applies to a public official elected to another office. The underlying theory
is that each term is separate from other terms. Thus, in Carpio-Morales, the basic
considerations are the following: first, the penalty of removal may not be extended
beyond the term in which the public officer was elected for each term is separate
and distinct; second, an elective official’s reelection serves as a condonation of
previous misconduct, thereby cutting the right to remove him
 
 
286
286 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Almario-Templonuevo vs. Office of the Ombudsman
therefor; and third, courts may not deprive the electorate, who are assumed to
have known the life and character of candidates, of their right to elect officers. In
this case, it is a given fact that the body politic, who elected him to
another office, was the same. [Emphasis supplied] In this case, those who
elected Templonuevo into office as Sangguniang Bayanmember and Vice Mayor
were essentially the same. Stated otherwise, the electorate for the Vice Mayor of a
municipality embraces wholly those voting for a member of the Sangguniang
Bayan. Logically, the condonation doctrine is applicable in her case. The Court is,
thus, precluded from imposing the administrative penalties of one month
suspension on account of the same people’s decision to elect her again to office.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
MENDOZA, J.:
 
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeks the review of the February 17, 2011 1 and the September 8,
20112 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 116229.
The CA issuances dismissed the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by
petitioner Arlyn Almario-Templonuevo (Templonuevo), thus, affirming the
January 6, 2010 Decision3 of Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
(Ombudsman) in OMB-L-A-08-0097-B,
_______________

1  Penned by Associate Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion, with Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes,
Jr., and Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao, concurring. Rollo, pp. 25-27.
2  Id., at pp. 28-31.
3  Penned by Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer II, Marietta M. Ramirez, with Acting
Director Evaluation Investigation Office Bureau-A Joaquin F. Salazar, concurring. With the
recommending approval of Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, Victor C. Fernandez and with such
recommendation approved by Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, Mark E. Jalandoni. Id., at pp. 32-41.
 
 
287
VOL. 828, JUNE 28, 2017 287
Almario-Templonuevo vs. Office of the Ombudsman
finding her administratively liable for simple misconduct. The complaint
against her was filed by respondent Chito M. Oyardo (Oyardo).
 
Factual Antecedents
 
Templonuevo was elected as Sangguniang Bayan Member of the
Municipality of Caramoan, Province of Catanduanes, during the May 2007
elections. She served from July 1, 2007 to June 30, 2010. In the elections of
May 2010, she was elected as Municipal Vice Mayor of the same
municipality.
In a complaint, docketed as OMB-L-A-08-0097-B, Oyardo administratively
charged Templonuevo before the Ombudsman for violation of Sec. 2, par. 1
of Republic Act No. 9287.
In its January 6, 2010 Decision, the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found
petitioner guilty of simple misconduct and imposed upon her the penalty of
one month suspension without pay. The dispositive portion of said decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby respectfully recommended
that ARLYN ALMARIO-TEMPLONUEVO be adjudged guilty of violation of simple
misconduct and is hereby imposed a penalty of one (1) month suspension from
office without pay pursuant to Section 7 Rule III of the Administrative Order No. 07
as amended by Administrative Order No. 17 in relation to Republic Act No. 6770.
The Honorable Secretary Ronaldo V. Puno, Department of Interior and Local
Government, is hereby directed to implement this DECISION immediately upon
receipt thereof pursuant to Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07, as
amended by Administrative Order No. 17 (Ombudsman Rules of Procedure) in
relation to Memorandum Circular No. 1, Series of 2006 dated 11 April 2006 and to
promptly inform this office of the action taken hereon.
SO DECIDED. 4

_______________

4  Id., at p. 40.
 
 
288
288 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Almario-Templonuevo vs. Office of the Ombudsman
At the time Templonuevo received her copy of the January 6, 2010
Decision on September 27, 2010, her term as Sangguniang Bayan Member
had expired. She, however, was elected as Vice Mayor of the same
municipality.
Without filing a motion for reconsideration, Templonuevo directly filed
before the CA an original petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court. She claimed that the Ombudsman acted with grave
abuse of discretion in ordering her suspension at a time when her term of
office as Sangguniang BayanMember had already expired and she had been
elected as Vice Mayor in the May 2010 elections.
In its February 17, 2011 Resolution, 5 the CA dismissed outright the petition
on the ground of Templonuevo’s failure to file a motion for reconsideration.
According to the CA, the remedy of certiorariwill not lie if other plain and
speedy remedies in the ordinary course of law such as a motion for
reconsideration are available, which, in this case, was not sought after by
Templonuevo.
Templonuevo moved for reconsideration, but her motion was denied by
the CA in its September 8, 2011 Resolution.
Aggrieved, Templonuevo elevated the case to this Court via Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
Hence, this petition.
Templonuevo asserts that the CA decided questions of substance contrary
to law and the applicable decisions of this Court when her petition was
dismissed outright on the ground of failure to file a motion for
reconsideration. She claims that there was no need to file for reconsideration
considering that the Ombudsman’s decision has become final, executory and
unappealable. She cites, as support, Section 7, Rule III of Administrative
Order No. 07, otherwise known as the Rules of Procedure of the
Ombudsman, as amended by A.O. No. 17, which provides:
_______________
 5  Id., at p. 27.
 
 
289
VOL. 828, JUNE 28, 2017 289
Almario-Templonuevo vs. Office of the Ombudsman
Section 7. Finality and execution of decision.—Where the respondent is
absolved of the charge, and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is
public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine
equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final, executory and
unappealable. In all other cases, the decision may be appealed to the Court of
Appeals in a verified petition for review under the requirements and conditions set
forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the
written Notice of the Decision or Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration.
An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is
suspension or removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered
as having been under preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such
other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal.
A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be
executed as a matter of course. The Office of the Ombudsman shall ensure that the
decision shall be strictly enforced and properly implemented. The refusal or failure
by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Office of the
Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine or censure shall be ground for
disciplinary action against said officer.
 
To Templonuevo, said AO makes a motion for reconsideration unavailable
in cases where a respondent is absolved of the charge or in cases of
conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand,
suspension of not more than one month, or a fine of equivalent to one month
salary. Considering that she was given the penalty of one-month suspension
only, her only remedy then was to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court.
In furtherance of her position, Templonuevo cites Office of
theOmbudsman v. Alano,  wherein the Court ruled that a
6

_______________

6  544 Phil. 709; 516 SCRA 18 (2007).

 
 
290
290 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Almario-Templonuevo vs. Office of the Ombudsman
resolution or order of the Ombudsman becomes final and unappealable in
the instances mentioned by her. The effect of such finality, in her view, is
simple — that the motion for reconsideration is not required before resorting
to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. This was, according to her, the
same conclusion reached by the Court in Reyes, Jr. v. Belisario.7 There, it was
held that the complainant therein was not entitled to any corrective
recourse, whether by motion for reconsideration, or by appeal to the courts,
to effect a reversal of the exoneration. The Court further held that despite
such a fact, courts are still empowered by the Constitution to determine
whether there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
Templonuevo, thus, believes that because the decision of the Ombudsman
in her case was immediately final, executory and unappealable, the same
could no longer be reviewed by the said office and as such a motion for
reconsideration would be an exercise in futility. The CA should have taken
note of that fact and such a failure amounts to an error, says petitioner.
Templonuevo likewise calls the Court’s attention to the fact that the
misconduct for which she was penalized was committed when she was still
a Sangguniang Bayan Member. As she was elected Vice Mayor of the same
municipality in 2010, she claims that such election resulted in the
condonation of her administrative liability on acts committed during her
previous post. She cites the case of Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board of
Nueva Ecija,8 where this Court held that the reelection to office operates as a
condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off
the right to remove him therefrom. Consequently, the decision of the
Ombudsman is in her view a patent nullity.
_______________

7  612 Phil. 937; 596 SCRA 31 (2009).

8  106 Phil. 466 (1959).
 
 
291
VOL. 828, JUNE 28, 2017 291
Almario-Templonuevo vs. Office of the Ombudsman
On November 16, 2011, the Court resolved to require the respondents to
comment on the petition and also issued a Temporary Restraining Order
enjoining the respondents from implementing the Decision of the Office of
the Ombudsman.9
On December 2, 2011, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a
Manifestation and Motion (in Lieu of Comment),10 stating that the arguments
raised by it in its Manifestation and Motion (in Lieu of Comment), dated April
26, 2011 and filed on April 28, 2011 with the CA, was exhaustive enough to
serve as its comment on the present petition. The OSG in the pleadings it
filed with the CA took the side of Templonuevo. It, thus, asserts that by
virtue of AO No. 7, as amended, a decision of Ombudsman imposing a
penalty of not more than one (1) month is final, executory and unappealable
and, as such, a motion for reconsideration or appeal is not an available
remedy. It also claimed that the subsequent reelection of Templonuevo
precludes the imposition and execution of the penalty by virtue of the long
standing doctrine of condonation.
 In its Comment on the Petition For Review on Certiorari with Leave of
Court (With Motion to Recall the Temporary Restraining Order with
Opposition to the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction), 11 the
Ombudsman submits that Section 7, Rule III, Administrative Order No. 07, as
amended, allows the filing of motions for reconsideration on its decisions
that impose one month suspension; that a plethora of jurisprudence reveals
that the Condonation Doctrine was applied by the Supreme Court only in
cases where there was reelection to the same position; and that, the
issuance of a temporary restraining order was erroneous and the error
should not be extended with the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
which the law proscribes.
_______________

9   See Rollo, pp. 86-90.

10  Id., at pp. 91-115.
11  Id., at pp. 141-163.
 
 
292
292 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Almario-Templonuevo vs. Office of the Ombudsman
In the meantime, Templonuevo filed a Manifestation in Lieu of
Compliance12 with the January 25, 2012 Resolution which ordered her to
furnish this Court with the current address of Oyardo. She stated therein that
she did not know the present address of Oyardo, who was not a permanent
resident of Caramoan, and that no forwarding address was left behind.
In its July 18, 2012 Resolution,13 the Court noted the manifestation and
required the Ombudsman to furnish the address of Oyardo. This was
complied with.14
Oyardo still failed to file his Comment on the petition. As such, in the
Court’s September 14, 2015 Resolution, 15 Oyardo’s right to file his comment
was deemed waived. In the same Resolution, the Court required
Templonuevo to file her Reply to the manifestation and motion of the OSG,
dated December 1, 2011, and to the Comment on the Petition for Review
on Certiorari with Leave of Court filed by the Ombudsman.
 
Until now, no reply has been filed by Templonuevo. She is deemed to have
waived her right to file it.
 
Issues
 
A reading of the pleadings filed by the parties reveals that the issues are
as follows:
1. Whether the CA committed an error in dismissing outright the petition
filed by Templonuevo on the ground of failure to file a motion for
reconsideration from the decision of the Ombudsman finding her
 administratively liable and imposing upon her a penalty of one month
suspension.
2. Whether the CA committed an error in not treating the election of
Templonuevo as Vice Mayor of the
_______________

12  Id., at pp. 165-167.

13  Id., at pp. 170-171.
14  Id., at pp. 193-194.
15  Id., at pp. 210-211.
 
 
293
VOL. 828, JUNE 28, 2017 293
Almario-Templonuevo vs. Office of the Ombudsman
same municipality as an event that precludes the imposition of the one
month suspension penalty following the doctrine of condonation.
 
The Ruling of the Court
 
The Court grants the petition.
 
A motion for reconsideration is not
required where the penalty imposed
by the Ombudsman is one month
suspension before a petition under
Rule 65 can be filed.
 
The settled rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua
non for the filing of a petition for certiorari.16 Its purpose is to grant an
opportunity for the court to correct any actual or perceived error attributed
to it by reexamination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case.17
This rule, however, admits well-defined exceptions, such as (a) where the
order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b)
where the questions raised in the certiorariproceedings have been duly
raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised
and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity
for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the
interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the
action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for
reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due
process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a crimi-
_______________

16  Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Tax Appeals, 695 Phil. 55, 61; 680 SCRA
617, 623 (2012); Medado v. Heirs of Late Antonio Consing, 681 Phil. 536, 548; 665 SCRA 534, 547
(2012), citing Pineda v. Court of Appeals (Former Ninth Division), 649 Phil. 562, 571; 635 SCRA
274, 281 (2010).
 17  Id.
 
 
294
294 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Almario-Templonuevo vs. Office of the Ombudsman
nal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such
relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower
court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceeding were ex
parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where
the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.18
Templonuevo contended that her non-filing of a motion for reconsideration
of the assailed Ombudsman decision was justified because it would be
useless. She claims that the assailed decision was final, executory and
unappealable, hence, beyond the ambit of a motion for reconsideration
following Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07. She also argued
that the Ombudsman’s decision was a patent nullity considering that her
election as Vice Mayor of the same municipality precluded the attachment to
her of any administrative liability arising from the acts done while she was
a Sangguniang Bayan Member.
The Court agrees with Templonuevo on her first position.
In Ombudsman v. Alano,19 the Court stressed that Section 13(8), Article XI
of the 1987 Constitution empowers the Office of the Ombudsman to, among
others, “promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or
perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law.” Pursuant to
such constitutional authority, Administrative Order No. 07 (otherwise known
as the “Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman”), dated April 10,
1990, was issued. Section 7, Rule III thereof provides:
_______________

18  Siok Ping Tang v. Subic Bay Distribution, Inc., 653 Phil. 124, 137; 638 SCRA 457, 470
(2010). See also Republic v. Pantranco North Express, Inc. (PNEI), 682 Phil. 186, 194; 666 SCRA
199, 205-206 (2012). See also Domdom v. Third and Fifth Divisions of the Sandiganbayan, 627
Phil. 341, 346; 613 SCRA 528, 533 (2010), citing Tan v. Court of Appeals, 341 Phil. 570, 576-578;
275 SCRA 568, 574-575 (1997).
19  Office of the Ombudsman v. Alano, supra note 6.
 
 
295
VOL. 828, JUNE 28, 2017 295
Almario-Templonuevo vs. Office of the Ombudsman
SEC. 7. Finality of decision.—Where the respondent is absolved of the
charge, and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public
censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine
equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final and unappealable.
In all other cases, the decision shall become final after the expiration of ten
(10) days from receipt thereof by the respondent, unless a motion for
reconsideration or petition for certiorari shall have been filed by him as
prescribed in Section 27 of RA 6770.
 
The Court, in interpreting the above constitutional and statutory
provisions, recognizes only two instances where a decision of the
Ombudsman is considered as final and unappealable and, thus, immediately
executory. The first is when the respondent is absolved of the charge;
and second is, in case of conviction, where the penalty imposed is public
censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine
equivalent to one month salary.
In this case, Templonuevo was meted with a penalty of one month
suspension. Accordingly, the decision of the Ombudsman is final,
unappealable and immediately executory.
Being the case, the Ombudsman’s decision was beyond the reach of an
appeal or even of a motion for reconsideration. This was the same ruling
in Reyes v. Belisario,20 where the Court explained that a complainant was not
entitled to any corrective recourse by motion for reconsideration in the
Ombudsman, or by appeal to the courts if the penalty imposed was higher
than public censure, reprimand, one-month suspension or a fine equivalent
to a one month salary. It was further written:
The clear import of Section 7, Rule III of the Ombudsman Rules is to deny the
complainant in an administrative complaint the right to appeal where the
Ombudsman has exonerated the respondent of the adminis-
_______________

20  Reyes, Jr. v. Belisario, supra note 7.

 
 
296
296 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Almario-Templonuevo vs. Office of the Ombudsman
trative charge. The complainant, therefore, is not entitled to any corrective
recourse, whether by motion for reconsideration in the Office of the Ombudsman, or
by appeal to the courts, to effect a reversal of the exoneration. Only the respondent
is granted the right to appeal but only in case he is found liable and the penalty
imposed is higher than public censure, reprimand, one-month suspension or fine
equivalent to one month salary. 21

 
Left without any remedy in the ordinary course of law, Templonuevo was
justified in resorting directly to the CA via a Rule 65 petition. Indeed, an
independent action for certiorari may be availed of only when there is no
appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law and certiorari is not a substitute for the lapsed remedy of appeal. 22 In
other words, because petitioner could not avail a motion for reconsideration
or an appeal, her choice of a Rule 65 petition was proper.
 
The decision of the Ombuds-
man was not a patent nullity;
Condonation doctrine applies.
 
Templonuevo claimed that the decision of the Ombudsman was null and
void as the penalty imposed could no longer be imposed on account of her
election as Vice Mayor of the same municipality, which to her, operated as
forgiveness by her constituents for the acts done while she was still
a Sangguniang Bayan Member. This “theory of nullity,” in a sense, does not
hold water. The Ombudsman decided the case prior to the May 2010
elections. At that time, Templonuevo remained an incumbent and no event
had transpired yet which would have had an effect on her liability for the
acts done during her previous term. As the elections for 2010 did not
_______________

21  Id., at p. 954; p. 45.

22  RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, Section 1.
 
 
 
297
VOL. 828, JUNE 28, 2017 297
Almario-Templonuevo vs. Office of the Ombudsman
happen yet, nothing could have substantially changed the course of action of
the Ombudsman.
The election of 2010, however, became material only when the
Ombudsman’s decision was on appeal. It is at this stage that the CA, should
have considered Templonuevo’s election as Vice Mayor as rendering the
imposition of administrative sanctions moot and academic on the basis of
the condonation doctrine. Said doctrine, despite its abandonment
in Conchita Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals and Jejomar Erwin S. Binay,
Jr., (Carpio-Morales),23 still applies in this case as the effect of the
abandonment was made prospective in application.
In Giron v. Ochoa, Jr.,24 the Court recognized that the doctrine can be
applied to a public officer who was elected to a different position provided
that it is shown that the body politic electing the person to another office
is the same. Thus, the Court ruled:
On this issue, considering the ratio decidendi behind the doctrine, the
Court agrees with the interpretation of the administrative tribunals below
that the condonation doctrine applies to a public official elected to another
office. The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms.
Thus, in Carpio-Morales, the basic considerations are the following: first, the
penalty of removal may not be extended beyond the term in which the public
officer was elected for each term is separate and distinct; second, an elective
official’s reelection serves as a condonation of previous misconduct, thereby
cutting the right to remove him therefor; and third, courts may not deprive
the electorate, who are assumed to have known the life and character of
candidates, of their right to elect officers. In this case, it is a given fact
that the body politic, who elected him to another office, was the
same. [Emphasis supplied]
_______________

23  G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015, 774 SCRA 431.

24  G.R. No. 218463, March 1, 2017, 819 SCRA 103.
 
 
298
298 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Almario-Templonuevo vs. Office of the Ombudsman
In this case, those who elected Templonuevo into office as Sangguniang
Bayan member and Vice Mayor were essentially the same. Stated otherwise,
the electorate for the Vice Mayor of a municipality embraces wholly those
voting for a member of the Sangguniang Bayan. Logically, the condonation
doctrine is applicable in her case. The Court is, thus, precluded from
imposing the administrative penalties of one month suspension on account
of the same people’s decision to elect her again to office.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The February 17, 2011 and
September 8, 2011 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No.
116229 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The act committed by
petitioner Arlyn Almario-Templonuevo is deemed CONDONED.
SO ORDERED.
Peralta** (Acting Chairperson), Leonen and Martires, JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., On Official Leave.
Petition granted, resolutions reversed and set aside.
Notes.—The condonation doctrine does not apply to a criminal case.
(Salumbides, Jr. vs. Office of the Ombudsman, 619 SCRA 313 [2010])
The Supreme Court’s (SC’s) abandonment of the condonation doctrine
should be prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall
form part of the legal system of the Philippines. (Carpio-Morales vs. Court of
Appeals [Sixth Division], 774 SCRA 431 [2015])