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James Chin
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Reproduced from Southeast Asian Affairs 2010 edited by Daljit Singh (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,
2010). This version was obtained electronically direct from the publisher on condition that copyright is not infringed. No
part of this publication may be reproduced without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Individual articles are available at < http://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg >
MALAYSIA
The Rise of Najib and 1Malaysia
James Chin
The year 2009 will be remembered for Malaysia’s first political dynasty coming
to fruition. Najib Tun Razak, the son of Abdul Razak who was Malaysia’s second
Prime Minister, became Malaysia’s sixth PM. His predecessor paid the price for
losing the March 2008 General Elections and was forced to resign. At the start of
the year, the People’s Pact (PR or Pakatan Rakyat) under Anwar Ibrahim appeared
to still have the political momentum generated by the general elections. However,
as the year progressed, it was clear that Najib managed to get the upper hand
over Anwar and the opposition.
JAMES CHIN is Head, School of Arts and Social Sciences, Monash University, Malaysian
campus.
and the State Secretary. It was clear that key institutions such as the civil service
and the police were still loyal to the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO)
and actively helped to undermine and remove the PR administration. A new BN
state was duly installed along with a new speaker from the BN.2
Najib’s ability to remove the PR government sent a clear signal to the PR
alliance that unlike his predecessor he was no pushover and was willing to play
hardball. This action destabilised the PR as there were rumours that Najib was
close to overthrowing the PR-led Selangor State Government through defections
as well.
preferential policies and special rights of the Malays and bumiputeras would stay
in spite of 1Malaysia.6
As part of the “People First, Performance Now” component, Najib announced
a Government Transformation Programme (GTP), consisting of six National Key
Results Areas (NKRA): accessibility to quality and affordable education; crime
reduction; battling graft; improvement of living standards; rural development; and
improvement of public transportation. To show his seriousness, he brought in Idris
Jala, an outsider and non-politician, as a Minister in charge of the NRKA. Jala,
a Kelabit from Sarawak, was known as a turnaround specialist who had made a
name for himself by successfully rescuing Malaysian Airlines from insolvency.
The NKRA was popular with the polity and a poll showed Najib’s popularity had
risen despite constant attacks from political bloggers and the opposition.7
Like other economies in the region, the Malaysian economy was stagnant and
estimated to contract by about 2 per cent in 2009. The most serious contraction
occurred in the first half of the year with exports dropping by about 30 per cent.
However, exports and the stock market recovered somewhat by the end of the
year. The government’s stimulus package, worth about RM 67 billion (US$18
billion) appears to be slowly working and the economy is expected to post
growth of between 4 and 7 per cent in 2010. The new Najib administration also
liberalized twenty-seven services sub-sectors, allowing for majority ownership
without bumiputera shareholdings,8 to improve economic competitiveness. Foreign
corporate finance and financial planning companies will be allowed to set up
operation in Malaysia without local shareholding. For unit trust segments, the
foreign shareholding limit will be raised from 49 per cent to 70 per cent and
foreign shareholding in existing stock broking companies will be increased from
49 per cent to 70 per cent. To the disappointment of many, Najib retained the 30
per cent cap on local commercial banks. A single foreign investor can now only
own up to 20 per cent in a single stake in a commercial bank, while the overall
limit stays at 30 per cent for foreign ownership.
To ensure that bumiputera interests were kept, a new vehicle, Ekuiti Nasional
Berhad (Ekuinas), with an initial funding of half a billion ringgit (eventually going
up to RM 10 billion), focusing on helping bumiputera entrepreneurs who have the
potential and capability to develop into global players, was launched.9
Despite earlier optimism, Malaysia was unable to close the deal on the
free trade agreement (FTA) with the United States in 2009. Najib’s much talked
about New Economic Model (NEM), based on innovation, creativity, and high-
value-added activities, was also postponed to 2010. The NEM will help Malaysia
avoid being caught in the middle-income country trap. The NEM was delayed
power was to join forces. They announced a “Greater Unity Plan” (GUP), but
this was rejected by about a quarter of the central committee who wanted fresh
elections to select a completely new leadership. This group was led by Liow
Tiong Lai, a MCA Vice President and Wee Ka Siong and Chew Mei Fun, from
the Youth and Women’s wing respectively. With the crisis affecting BN’s public
persona and increasing pressure on UMNO to intervene,15 Najib told the two
MCA factions that fresh elections was the only option. The party election will
take place in early 2010. UMNO’s very public intervention is bound to affect
MCA’s credibility in the next GE, and confirms the critic’s view that MCA is
merely a political tool for UMNO to get Chinese support.
While MCA replaced its leadership after the 2008 GE, it was the reverse for
MIC. Samy Vellu’s feudal-like grip on the party saw him re-elected unopposed
for his eleventh term as MIC President. First elected as President in 1979, he is
the longest serving president in MIC and this feat can never be replicated. This
is despite an open plea from Najib for the MIC delegates to replace Vellu with a
new team of leaders.16 While Najib was more diplomatic,17 former PM Mahathir
was blunt telling delegates to “throw out” Samy Vellu and his team and support a
rival team led by S. Subramaniam.18 Despite this, delegates voted for all of Samy
Vellu’s men. Samy’s win gave him a new level of confidence and he announced
that he will lead the “rebranding” of MIC. However, nobody seriously believed that
the MIC could regain Indian support as long as Samy Vellu held on to power.
The inability of MIC to bring in new leadership forced Najib to look outside
of MIC for Indian support. In October, Najib launched a new Indian-based party,
Makkal Sakti,19 hoping that the party would help the BN recover its Indian support.
Unfortunately, the Makkal Sakti party imploded two months later in December
when its central committee tried to sack its President for, ironically, behaving like
Samy Vellu, that is, running the party like a feudal lord.20
residential area. This shocked the nation as the cow is sacred to the minority
Hindus. Initially, the Home Minister, Hishamuddin Hussein, the first cousin of
Najib, defended the protestors, many of whom were UMNO members. However,
the huge public outcry compelled the Home Minister to order the ringleaders to
be charged under the Sedition Act. To add insult to injury, one of the ringleaders,
Ahmad Mahayuddin Abd Manaf, said this outside the court as a reminder to the
non-Malay population: “It’s proven historically that this is Tanah Melayu. Others
are categorised as second-class citizens.”21
The same month saw a young Malay mother, Kartika Sari Dewi Shukarno,
sentenced to six strokes of the cane for drinking beer by the Pahang Syariah Court.
In an unusual twist, she refused to appeal and said she wanted to be caned. It
created a huge furore among women’s groups around the world as no Muslim
woman had ever been caned for drinking in Malaysia. The controversy forced
the court to postpone the caning several times using all sorts of excuses, and the
PM even asked her to appeal her sentence. At the year’s end, the sentence had
yet to be carried out.22
The rise of Islamic fundamentalism went beyond the cow-head issue as
radical Muslims became bolder during the year. PKR’s MP Zulkifli Noordin
submitted a private member’s bill to amend Article 3 of the Federal Constitution
to clearly define Malaysia as an Islamic state.23 Although the private member’s
bill had no chance to become law, it nevertheless gave comfort to the Islamists
that there are fundamentalists among lawmakers. This was soon followed up by
another controversy when Selangor PartiIslam Semalaysia (PAS) Commissioner
Hasan Ali championed banning the sale of beer in Muslim-majority areas.24 This
has wide ranging implications given that there are very few locations where the
Muslims are in a minority. In another blatant incident, two Muslim journalists
acting on false information that the Catholic Church was converting Muslims into
Christians and the word “Allah” was being used in church services, participated in
a Catholic mass where they took the communion,25 considered sacred by Catholics.
The men later wrote about their experience in an article entitled “Tinjaun Al Islam
Dalam Gereja: Mencari Kesahihan Remaja Murtad” (Observation of Al Islam in
Church: Searching for the Truth About Apostasy among Muslim Youth) which
was published in the May 2009 issue of the Al Islam magazine. Despite several
police reports, no action was taken against the journalists or the magazine. If
the reverse had occurred, if non-Muslims had taken part in an Islamic ritual in a
mosque, the government would have taken action immediately.
There was also a dispute over the use of the word “Allah” by non-Muslims,
with the government taking the position that only Muslims can use that word
even though Christians in the Middle-East have been using “Allah” for many
years without any problems. When a lower court ruled on 31 December 2009
that a Catholic newspaper could use the word “Allah” for its Bahasa Melayu
section, Muslim groups promised demonstrations in the new year.26 The increasing
intolerance towards non-Islamic faiths in Malaysia is a trend that is worrying to
many given that the government appears unwilling to confront the Islamists for
fear of losing Malay support.
For most of the second half of the year, the opposition successfully put the
government on the defensive over National Civics Bureau (BTN or Biro Tata
Negara) courses. The Selangor Government started the assault by ruling that
Selangor civil servants were banned from BTN courses.27 The BTN courses were
said to spread racism towards the non-Malays, promote the concept of Ketuanan
Melayu (Malay Supremacy), and “brainwash” participants into supporting UMNO.
Previously all civil servants, students in public universities, and holders of
government overseas scholarships were required to attend BTN courses, usually
held in a camp over several days. Despite overwhelming evidence that BTN
courses catering to Malay-Muslim participants were encouraging racism,28 the
government refused to scrap the courses, arguing that BTN programmes were
useful nation-building courses. Najib side-stepped the issue by ordering BTN to
have more elements on 1Malaysia while his deputy, Muhyiddin Yassin, maintained
that there was nothing wrong with the existing BTN.29
In July, after six years, the government reversed the policy of teaching
science and mathematics in English. The policy was introduced by then Prime
Minister Mahathir Mohamad to improve the standard of English in the country.
The policy reversal was due to intense pressure from the unlikely alliance
between Malay nationalist Gapena (Gabungan Penulis Nasional or National
Writers Union) and Chinese educationists who argued that teaching science
and mathematics in English would make no difference to the overall standard
of English in the country. At a demonstration organized by the Abolish PPMSI
(Pengajaran dan Pembelajaran Sains dan Matematik dalam Bahasa Inggeris or
Teaching and Learning of Science and Mathematics in English) Movement in
Kuala Lumpur on 7 March, the police had to use water cannons and tear gas
to disperse thousands of protesters. Mahathir tried to reverse the decision by
running a poll on his popular blog, Che-Det.com, which showed overwhelming
support for the continuation of the policy.30 But the government stuck to its
decision and it is certain the standard of English in Malaysia, already low, will
get worse with this decision. This was also the first reversal of a major policy
put in place by Mahathir. Beginning in 2012 the teaching of both subjects in
primary schools will revert to Bahasa Melayu for national schools and Chinese
and Tamil in vernacular schools.
to a head when Tok Guru called for a special muktamar to sack what he called
“problematic leaders” — meaning Hadi and his group. Hadi Awang and Isa were
strong enough to stop the EM but agreed to a one-day “seminar”. The seminar
reaffirmed PAS’s commitment to PR and no more “unity talks” with UMNO.38
Towards the end of the year, the pro-UMNO faction launched an internal assault
on Tok Guru using political blogs, attacking his deputy Husam Musa and his
son-in-law.39 They also forced Tok Guru to cancel a trip to Mecca which was
sponsored by a businessman. However, given Tok Guru’s personal popularity, it
is unlikely that they can force him from office.
PKR had an eventful year primarily because Anwar Ibrahim, its defacto
leader, faced his second sodomy trial. After several delays, the court refused to
throw out the case but adjourned it to 2010. Internal politicking was intense and
some saw Anwar losing control of the party during several internal spats. For
example, Anwar could not control the internal criticism against Zaid Ibrahim, one
of PKR’s most prominent members. In the end, Zaid announced that he would go
“on leave” from PKR and concentrate on PR’s common platform (see below). In
East Malaysia, Anwar was unable to quell a rebellion when his nominees, who
were to lead the state PKR, were rejected by the locals. In the end Anwar was
forced to appoint Baru Bian to lead Sarawak PKR, while in Sabah Jeffrey Kitingan
emerged as a key power broker after challenging Anwar’s nominee.
Among the three PR parties, DAP had a relatively quiet year politically. Other
than the defection of its state assemblyman in Perak, which caused the downfall of
the Perak PR government, the party was relatively united. Penang residents were
generally happy with Lim Guan Eng’s tenure as Chief Minister, although there
were complaints that he had become more arrogant since assuming the post.
The common problem faced by the opposition-held states was the civil
service and other state institutions. Many civil servants were still loyal to the
BN and actively sabotaged the work of PR governments. The PR government
had to be careful as the police and MACC were used to harass and investigate
the PR governments. The year saw several high profile investigations against the
Selangor MB and other executive councillors.40 The MACC and police regularly
investigate other PR politicians, and even threatened to charge Lim Guan Eng
with sedition.41 There appears to be a deliberate attempt to destabilize the PR-
led state governments by constantly investigating its members for corruption and
other offences.
On 19 December, PR made a significant political move forward when it held
its first convention, with delegates from all three parties. A significant document,
the Common Policy Framework (CPF), was adopted.42 It explicitly rejects the racial
politics of the BN and stresses on good governance and social justice. Although
it was less detailed than the original draft submitted by Zaid Ibrahim, it was
nevertheless a major achievement for the alliance given the completely opposite
aims of PAS (which wants an Islamic state) and DAP (which wants a secular
state). Although contentious issues such as an Islamic state were purposely left
out, there was enough in the CPF to send a message to the polity that PR was
capable of holding together if they were to win in the next GE.
was no more talk of Anwar taking power through defections. In summary, 2009
was Najib’s year.
Notes
1
There is a lot of controversy over the Sultan’s decision. He was heavily criticized
primarily because he was the former Lord President (Chief Justice) and had written
that under normal circumstances the constitutional monarch must always accept the
political advice of the incumbent political head. Read the opinion of BN Chan, a widely
respected former court of appeal judge, “The pretended power of dispensing with the
law by regal authority as perceived in the tussle between the Sultan of Perak and the
Mentri Besar” <http://english.cpiasia.net/images/sultan_of_perak_mb.pdf> (accessed
on 1 December 2009). Among the chattering class, the explanation for the Sultan’s
action was a threat from the BN that they would not guarantee that the Perak throne
would pass to Sultan Azlan’s son, Raja Nazrin Shah, as there are other claimants.
This threat is credible given that in December 2008 a new ruler was elected as the
Yang-di-Pertuan Besar of Negri Sembilan, bypassing the eldest son of the previous
ruler.
2
“No Dissolution, New MB to be Sworn In”, Malaysiakini, 5 February 2009; “Pathetic
Police Play Politics in Perak”, Malaysiakini, 3 November 2009; “Shame of the Decade:
The Perak Power Grab”, Malaysian Insider, 30 December 2009. The government told
the mainstream media not to air any pictures or video of the Perak Speaker being
dragged out of the Assembly.
3
Among the key PR people were an American company, APCO Worldwide. APCO’s
strategic role was confirmed when they opened an office in Kuala Lumpur in August
2009, five months after Najib became PM.
4
The NEP is hugely unpopular with the Chinese and other non-Malays as many feel
that the NEP has rendered them as “second-class” citizens. See James Chin, “The
Malaysian Chinese Dilemma: The Never Ending Policy (NEP)”, Chinese Southern
Diaspora Studies 3 (2009): 167–82.
5
“Najib: New Category of Merit-Based PSD Scholarships”, The Star, 27 June 2009.
6
“Najib Assures Bumis, Malays of Their Rights”, New Straits Times, 13 June 2009.
7
“Najib Popularity Surges in First 100 Days: Poll”, Malaysiakini, 8 July 2009.
8
However, critics pointed out that there was no real “liberalization” given that there
was no bumiputera participation in the twenty-seven subsectors in the first place.
9
“Ekuinas Aims for Double-digit Returns on Investments”, Bernama, 4 September
2009.
10
“Why it is Time to Review the NEP”, Malaysiakini, 24 April 2009.
11
“Harvard Business School to Study ‘Najibnomics’”, The Star, 25 September 2009.
12
“Property Tax Let-off for Owners”, The Star, 23 December 2009; “Najib Plumps for
GST to Fill Revenue Hole”, Business Times (Singapore), 25 November 2009.
13
“Najib Braces Country for Severe FDI Drop”, Malaysian Insider, 11 June 2009.
14
Chua Soi Lek was secretly videotaped having sex with his mistress, and the video
was widely distributed to the public prior to the 2008 GE. Chua was forced to resign
from the MCA vice-presidency as well as his post as Health Minister, and he did not
stand in the 2008 GE.
15
In two previous serious leadership tussles, UMNO intervened as MCA’s “big brother”
and imposed a peace plan. See James Chin, “New Chinese Leadership in Malaysia:
The Contest for the MCA and Gerakan Presidency”, Contemporary Southeast Asia
28, no. 1 (April 2006).
16
“In MIC, Samy Vellu Shows Who’s the Boss”, The Malaysian Insider, 12 September
2009.
17
“Najib: Party Leaders Must Be Popular with People, Not Just Party Members”, The
Star, 12 September 2009.
18
See the exclusive interview with Mahathir in Makkal Osai, 10 September 2009.
The interview was conducted two days before the MIC convention and it was clear
Mahathir wanted to send a message to the MIC delegates.
19
“Najib Launches Malaysia Makkal Sakti Party”, The Star, 10 October 2009.
20
“Revolt in Makkal Sakti over Samy Vellu-style Leader”, The Malaysian Insider,
28 November 2009.
21
“‘Cow Heads’ Launch Racist Rant”, Malaysian Insider, 8 December 2009.
22
“Kartika Spared Caning, But Only Until after Ramadan”, Malaysian Insider,
24 August 2009; “Whipping Kartika”, Nut Graph, 1 September 2009.
23
“Zul Noordin Wants Constitution Amended to Clarify Country’s Status”, Malaysian
Insider, 21 October 2009.
24
“Hassan Ali’s Religious Police to Nab Errant Muslims”, Malaysian Insider, 24 August
2009.
25
The men had consumed the “communion” which is a white wafer that is blessed by
the priest. Catholics believe the blessing supernaturally transforms the white wafer
into Jesus Christ’s body.
26
“PM Calls for Calm as Debate Rages On”, Malaysian Insider, 4 January 2009.
27
“Selangor Moves to Unveil BTN Inner Workings”, Malaysian Insider, 30 November
2009.
28
“Inner Details of BTN Reveal Past Transgressions”, Malaysian Insider, 8 December
2009; “BTN’s Stolen Malaysians”, Nut Graph, 23 December 2009; “PKR to Dissect
BTN with Aid of Insiders”, Malaysian Insider, 27 November 2009.
29
“BTN Course to Inculcate Nationalism Not Political Indoctrination Says Muhyiddin”,
Bernama, 26 November 2009.
30
“Dr M: 80% of Poll Respondents Oppose PPSMI Abolishment”, Bernama, 10 July
2009.
31
See the report “Position Review of Port Klang Free Zone Project and Port Klang
Free Zone Sdn Bhd”, PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC), 3 February 2009.
32
“PM: No Cover Up Over Missing Jet Engine”, The Star, 21 December 2009.
33
There was widespread disgust with the head of MACC, Ahmad Said Hamdan, when
it was revealed that his son was found guilty of importing child pornography into
Australia. When asked about it, he was quoted as saying “I can bet with you that
it’s something that you will find on most men’s handphones.” “Ahmad Said: Not
Fair to Link Me to Son’s Offence”, The Star, 1 March 2009. In December, it was
announced that Ahmad Said Hamdan would retire from MACC five months early.
The government obviously felt that public confidence could not be regained with him
at the helm of the MACC.
34
One DAP member commented cynically to this writer that Teoh’s death “saved” the
Selangor government as the huge public outcry forced the BN to rethink its strategy
of using corruption to bring down the Selangor government in 2009.
35
“Thai Expert Says Teoh’s Death ‘80pc’ Homicide”, Malaysian Insider, 21 October
2009.
36
The Erdogan faction, named after Turkey’s Islamist PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan, as a
source of inspiration. They are known also as strong Anwar supporters in PAS. They
believe that the only way to defeat the BN is to join forces with DAP and PKR.
37
Nik Aziz’s strong opposition to PAS-UMNO unity was due in part to his experience
in the early 1970s when PAS joined the BN. In the mid-1970s UMNO caused a
split in PAS Kelantan and engineered PAS’s ouster from BN in 1978. “Nik Aziz
Calls for EGM to Dispose Pas President and Problematic Leaders!” Sin Chew Daily,
23 October 2009.
38
“Hadi: PAS Committed to Pakatan”, The Star, 7 November, 2009.
39
Nik Aziz’s son-in-law held the position as CEO Kelantan Menteri Besar Incorporated,
a company owned by the state government. He was forced to resign. See “Nik Aziz
Tells Son-in-law to Step Down as Kelantan MB Inc’s CEO”, The Star, 23 November,
2009.
40
“MACC Goes after Another Selangor Exco”, Malaysian Insider, 5 August 2009;
“Selangor MB Sues Govt, MACC and Its Chief, The Star, 28 April 2009; “MACC
Quizzes Selangor Exco Member Ronnie Liu”, The Star, 23 October 2009; “MB:
MACC on Fishing Trip in Selangor”, Malaysiakini, 8 September 2009.
41
“Kit Siang Claims IGP [Inspector General of Police] Out to Get Him, Pakatan Leaders”,
Malaysian Insider, 2 August 2009; “DAP Backs Guan Eng against Cops”, Malaysian
Insider, 26 December 2009.
42
A copy of the CPF can be downloaded from <http://dapmalaysia.org/repository/
The_Policies_of_Pakatan_Rakyat-EN.pdf>.
43
“BN Will Win Elections If Held Today”, Malaysiakini, 15 November 2009.
44
“Poll Shows Strong UMNO Backing For Najib”, Malaysian Insider, 30 December
2009.