Journal of Hellenic Studies 134 (2014) page 1 of 2
1017/S0075426914002407
© The Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies 2014
REVIEWS OF BOOKS
PHILOSOPHY
BRYAN (J.) Likeness and Likelihood in the
Presocratics and Plato. Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 2012. Pp. 210.
£55/$95. 9780521762946.
doi:10.1017/S0075426914002407
This enlightening book is one of the best I’ve read.
Its central topic is the meaning of εἰκώς and related
terms in early Greek philosophy, and its somewhat
complicated thesis is carefully positioned among
many other complicated alternative interpretations
of Xenophanes, Parmenides and Plato. But Bryan’s
lucid prose is not hard to follow and every page has
smaller insights besides the main thesis of the book
as a whole. One might want to read it for the sake
of better understanding Xenophanes or Parmenides
or the Timaeus. For any of these tasks it would be
worth dipping into the relevant chapters. But, in
addition, juxtaposing these thinkers and their
distinctive uses of the notion of ‘likeness’ is more
exciting than you’d think, or so it seemed to me.
The whole is greater than the parts.
At the risk of spoiling the fun, I shall attempt to
summarize Bryan’s conclusions. First, the three
thinkers use the term ‘likely’ in knowledge of, and in
dialogue with, previous thinkers: Hesiod and Homer
before Xenophanes, Xenophanes and Hesiod before
Parmenides, Xenophanes and Parmenides before
Plato. Second, their attitude to the motif differs,
including differing over whether ‘likelihood’ is a
mark of positive value or epistemic doubt. Third, the
term is subtly related to other concepts in the field,
εἰκών = imagemsuch as eikon, and these connections are crucial to
understanding the semantic implications of the
word, particularly in Plato.
In a nutshell, Bryan suggests that Xenophanes’
term ἐοικώς means ‘convincingly like’ the truth,
but with a risk of being wrong. This is a recom-
mendation in favour of the views that he describes
as ‘like the truth’, although it also warns of the risk
of not knowing exactly how like they are.
Parmenides, by contrast, uses the term to refer to
something speciously and subjectively appealing
but ultimately false. This is a negative view,
contrasting the specious appeal with the reliability
of true pistis/aletheia.
doi:10.
In discussing Plato, Bryan shares my view that
εἰκώς is a positive term of approval in the
Timaeus. (I say ‘my view’, because that was the
view that C. Osborne proposed in her ‘Space,
time, shape and direction’ chapter in C. Gill and
M.M. McCabe (eds), Form and Argument in Late
Plato, Oxford 1996, 179–211 – which was long
before Myles Burnyeat popularised it in his 2005
article ‘Εἰκὼς Μῦθος’, Rhizai 2 (2005) 7–29).
Bryan also notes that Plato’s choice of this
term reflects his interest in the likeness relation
between the world and its paradigm. Her special
take on this theme is to suggest that the likely story
effectively reveals the status of its subject as a
‘likeness’. It tells of an eikon, showing that it is an
eikon and how it stands to the original. This is not
about plausibility, similarity, reasonableness or
likelihood; still less does it imply inaccuracy or
mere specious resemblance. It concerns the status
of the subject matter, rather than the epistemic
value of the information conveyed (except in
affirming that the likely account gives reliable
information concerning the iconic status of the
world). On Bryan’s view, a good account reveals
the likeness relation between cosmos and
paradigm. Plato calls such an account εἰκώς
(‘likely’) because it portrays the likeness as a
likeness. This is close to, but subtly different from,
Osborne’s 1996 position, according to which a
good account matches the likeness relation, by
itself being a likeness of the same paradigm, at a
matching ontological level. (On that view Plato
calls such an account εἰκώς (‘exemplary’) because
it is a good likeness of the same model and thereby
exemplifies the likeness relation, while at the same
time creating a parallel world just like the material
cosmos.)
Bryan backs up her ideas with much detailed
work and elegant explorations of their wider
significance. What is particularly striking is just
how important the little word εἰκώς is for grasping
the epistemological positions, with respect to
science and cosmology, of three of the greatest
thinkers of ancient philosophy (and yes,
Xenophanes is one of the greats and is importantly
provoking Parmenides). Bryan brings a combi-
nation of historical, literary and philosophical
sensitivity to her treatment of these thinkers; and
2 REVIEWS OF BOOKS
the results seem to me to be at least plausible,
probably largely likely, subjectively persuasive in
all but a few parts and arguably an approximation
to some part of the truth.
CATHERINE ROWETT
University of East Anglia
C.Osborne@uea.ac.uk