Meanings of εἰκός in Plato’s Phaedrus:

criticisms and appropriations of a rhetorical device

María Angélica Fierro | University of Buenos Aires

Abstract

Fierro shows that in the Phaedrus τὸ εἰκός is approached in a complex way and that two
fundamental senses of it can be distinguished in this Platonic dialogue. On the one hand, τὸ εἰκός
is taken in its ordinary sense of “what is plausible/probable/likely,” including things which are
plausible but contrary to what actually happen (Phdr. 273a–c), and is ultimately identified by Plato
with τὰ δόξαντα (appearances) as opposite to τὰ ὄντα (beings; realities) (260a). On the other hand,
τὸ εἰκός can refer to something just resembling reality that the philosopher knowingly makes up
in order to bring someone closer to the understanding of truth (273d–e). In this regard Fierro’s
proposal follows the exegetical lines of authors such as Centrone and Fedele who claim that Plato
actually formulates a new rhetoric which can be described as a positive form of ἀπάτη (ruse) and
whose goal is to persuade someone of the truth when pure dialectical λόγος cannot fulfill this aim.

Introduction

It has been traditionally considered that, insofar as for philosophy’s main concern should be
knowledge of objective truth, Plato had a visceral abhorrence of rhetoric because of its interest in
just persuading on the basis of the mere “appearance of truth” and of sophistic skills, such as
making the weaker argument appear the stronger. Thus to this day Ariston’s son has carried on his
broad shoulders the responsibility of an irreconcilable dispute between philosophy and rhetoric as
well as of the “old contest” between philosophy and poetry. Along these lines it has been argued
that in the Phaedrus,1 in continuity with his developments in the Gorgias, Plato denies that rhetoric
can be a technique or at least that, if it were a τέχνη, it should ultimately be reduced to dialectics
(Guthrie 1971, 177; Murray 1988, 287, n.4; Vallejo Campos 2002). On this point Solana Dueso
has written: “Alongside the positive part, the essential pieces of Platonic philosophy which the
term ‘dialectic’ embraces consists precisely in a refutation of a rival philosophy—the antilogy—

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of which rhetoric is the most important social manifestation. The fact that Plato writes in great
detail about his method, the dialectic, in the Phaedrus is simply that it is the goal of the dialogue”
(Solana Dueso 1994, 236; my trans.). As for τὸ εἰκός, some authors such as Cole have considered
that for Plato, differently from Aristotle’s case, arguments based on it are “purely rhetorical in
character” (1991, 96-97), while Yunis has pointed out Plato’s approach to this rhetorical device in
the Phaedrus as part of his hostility towards sophistic rhetoric as a whole (2011 ad Phdr. 272e1).
Additionally, Gagarin (1994) has denounced the distorting nature of Plato’s criticism of τὸ ἐικός,
insofar as in the Athenian courts the contenders made their arguments based not only on
plausibility but also on concrete facts.

Here I intend to show that in the Phaedrus τὸ ἐικός is approached in a complex way where two
meanings of this concept are involved:
a) On the one hand, εἰκός is taken in its ordinary sense of “what is
plausible/probable/likely” to someone, including things which are plausible but contrary to
what actually happen (Pl. Phdr. 273a-c). From this usual epistemic meaning of the term
Plato builds up a critical approach to it.
b) On the other hand, εἰκός can refer to something just resembling reality that the
philosopher knowingly makes up in order to bring someone closer to the understanding of
truth (273d-e). In this case Plato combines the usual epistemic meaning with its more
etymological sense of “to be like the truth” along with a more explicit introduction of his
own philosophical categories. Thus, τὰ δόξαντα are presented as opposite to the knowledge
of the truth (260a); the rhetorical art of making ἀντιλογικοὶ λόγοι is described as a
manipulation of what is similar and dissimilar to the truth; finally, knowledge of the truth
is described as dialectical knowledge of reality, at different levels, and constitutes, then,
the parameter for the construction of an εἰκός speech.
My proposal, then, follows the exegetical lines on the Phaedrus from authors such as North (1991)2
who considers Plato as the first great theorist of rhetoric, Yunis (2005) for whom in this dialogue
Plato is making the case for philosophy’s absolute priority through the formulation of an absolute
rhetoric, Centrone (2011) who, alongside Fedele (2011) and Murray (1988), claims that Plato
actually formulates a new rhetoric which can be described as a positive form of ἀπάτη whose goal
is to persuade someone of the truth when pure dialectical λόγος cannot fulfill this aim.

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Additionally, Pedersen’s innovate approach to this dialogue should be mentioned, an approach in
which he aims to overcome the hermeneutic dichotomy between “legitmate (Platonic) rhetoric”
and “sophistic rhetoric” and interprets the Phaedrus as expounding the power of rhetoric and its
ability “to shift a person’s entire worldview” (Pedersen 2017, 14).

1. Two meanings of εἰκός in Ancient Greek

The neuter perfect participle εἰκός, together with the masculine and feminine forms εἰκώς and
εἰκυίας, as a resulting nominal formation of ἐοίκα, was related to one of the senses of this verb—
“methinks, to seem to someone”—and so mainly meant “like truth” in the sense of “likely” or
“probable.” Derivatively, εἰκός was also applied more specifically in the intellectual and moral
fields to refer to what is “reasonable” and “equitable.” As all these uses of the term show, the
current meaning of this adjective always conveyed, then, something which someone has concluded
as “probably true” and so referred to an epistemological state.3 However, εἰκός also kept some
connection with the meaning of “resemblance, likeness” which also belonged from its origins to
ἐοίκα and was present as well in other words that share the same root, such as the verb ἐικάζω (“to
represent with an image”) and the noun ἐικών (“image”).4 Through this last meaning of
“resembling” εἰκός would allude to a factual status where the emphasis is put on both the analogous
character of two things and the fact that one is “the real thing” while the other one is something
εἰκός, i.e. something which is just like it; the epistemological sense of εἰκός would, then, come
into play insofar as this relation of similitude between things is perceived, described or created by
someone.5 In the next sections I aim to show that Plato makes use of these two meanings of εἰκός
according to the requirements of the argument, the context, and the state of mind of the recipient
(fictionally, Phaedrus and, indirectly the reader). Thus, on one hand, he leans on the current sense
of “probable, likely” in order to represent the use of this term by sophists and orators while, on the
other hand, he also takes into account the meaning of “like something, resembling,” which the
etymology of the term suggests as well, in order to line it up with his own philosophical categories
and transform it into a virtuous device to bring someone closer to the truth.6

Plato’s use of the current sense of εἰκός in the Phaedrus

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The adjective εἰκός is frequently used throughout the Phaedrus. Given the careful design of each
Platonic dialogue, all its occurrences might be significant, but I will take just three of them which
I regard as particularly meaningful in relation to how Plato represents and appropriates its usual
sense of “probable, likely” in order eventually to criticize the use of εἰκός as a rhetorical device
and develop his reformulation of what εἰκός is, in relation to his own philosophical categories.

The clever explanations of the know-it-alls: εἰκός as what is “likely” but trivial

The first occurrence of εἰκός which I will consider takes place in the context of the so-called
“Boreas and Oreithuia episode” (222b4-230a7) which belongs to the “Prologue” (227a1-230e5)
of the Phaedrus. As some interpreters have suggested, the whole opening scene “serves as an
inviting, witty, and eloquent introduction to the dialogue” (Werner 2012, 19) and actually works
as a prelude where all the “themes” of the symphony—the text—are presented (Philip 1981).
Plato’s treatment of εἰκός in this passage can also be taken as one of these leitmotifs.

As has been pointed out (Ferrari, 1987, 4-9; 234-35 n. 12),7 here Socrates is ironically depicting
as σοφοί the “new intellectuals,” such as Lysias and the sophists in general whom Phaedrus
uncritically admires because of their ability to build up clever arguments about any subject. In this
portrayal of them Socrates describes as τὸ εἰκός the kind of explanation which οἱ σοφοί would
give about Boreas’s abduction of Oreithuia as well as about other μυθολογήματα (mythic
explanations). These learned men surely would reduce, he says, the mythical story according to
which the princess, daughter of Erecteo, was kidnapped by the enraged god out of the violence of
his sexual desire for her (Paus. 1.19; Hdt.7.189) to a “likely/reasonable” elucidation of it: the
strength of the northern wind pushed her into the rocks and so she died. Divergently, Socrates
scorns these endless rationalizations of the mythical figures as just some kind of “clumsy wisdom”
which is typical of a skillful, dedicated but unfortunate man:
T1 [I]f someone is skeptical about these [i.e. the mythical explanations], and tries to reduce
each to what is likely (προσβιβᾷ ἕκαστον κατὰ τὸ εἰκός), with his boorish kind of expertise
(ἀγροίκῳ τινὶ σοφίᾳ), he̕ ll need a good deal of leisure. For myself, in no way do I have
leisure for these things, and the reason for it, my friend, is this. I am not yet capable, in
accordance with the Delphic inscription, of “knowing myself.” (Pl. Phdr. 229e2-6)

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To reduce—προσβιβάζειν—this mythical story κατὰ τὸ εἰκός would mean here to make a clever
conjecture of what might actually happen to Oreithuia so that she found her death. Socrates
declares that he has no time to elaborate this kind of explanation, not because they are more or less
true, better or worse than a μυθολóγημα, but because he needs to devote himself to more serious
matters, such as to know and to examine himself. So here, for the first time in the dialogue, the
ἐικότα explanations of the know-it-alls are presented as trivial speculations in opposition to the
inquiry into really serious issues such as self-knowledge. However, significantly, in the following
lines Socrates expands this key idea of the dialogue, i.e. self-knowledge,8 by making reference to
another mythical character—Typhon (Hes. Theog. 869; Apollod. Bibl. 1.6.3)—for which he
himself provides a rational explanation by decoding this μυθολóγημα in terms of whether he,
Socrates, has a wild nature as this hurricane creature does or is rather like a mild, tamed animal.
Thus, through the right use of a mythical figure such as Typhon Socrates introduces the question
about whether the human soul is “typhonic” and/or “untyphonic.” This procedure anticipates his
explanation of the complex structure of our ψυχή through something which it resembles, that is,
the winged chariot (246a3-7: ἐοικέτω συμφύτῳ δυνάμει ὑποπτέρου ζεύγους τε καὶ ἡνιόχου). In
this way, it is suggested that the right use of the ἐικών of Typhon can work as a suitable device in
order to explain something truly important, such as what self-understanding of our human
condition would be like.

From this passage it follows that Socrates is not interested in disqualifying “likely explanations”
as such, nor in promoting naive acceptance of the authority of traditional myths.9 He discredits the
εἰκός speculation of the know-it-alls about the abduction of Oreithuia by Boreas not because it is
a “plausible” speculation, but because it refers to something not worth spending time on, such as
the establishment of the historical truth of irrelevant events.10 The fact that he himself bases his
own explanation of what self-examination would be like on the resemblance between the human
soul and Typhon suggests that his main concern lies in what kind of account can be more effective
in making someone, in this case Phaedrus, reflect on something which truly matters, as in the
nature of one’s own soul. In other words, the use of myth as a form of ψυχαγωγία to lead someone
like Phaedrus to reflect on the nature of the soul is an open possibility for philosophical inquiry
(Werner 2012, 41-42).

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Lysias’s ἐπίδειξις as the εἰκός speech of a rhetorician: the unsuitability of an “unlikely/likely”
argument in form and content

One of the most characteristic devices of the forensic rhetoricians of the time seems to have been
to write “likely” arguments in order to provide their customers with either a successful defense or
a powerful prosecution for the trials they had to face at the Athenian Courts.11 Plato’s choice of
Lysias as the representative of this kind of rhetoric seems to be due to the fact that he was one of
the most recognized forensic authors of the time, and, in the dialogue, Phaedrus as a character
offers the utmost expression of this general admiration for Lysias’ writing skills.12 Plato’s reasons
for attributing to him the Eroticus, which stands outside of the forensic subject matter that
characterizes Lysias’ production, must be found in the context of the dialogue.13 On one hand, the
attribution to Lysias of this kind of argument allows Plato to introduce the subject of ἔρως and to
start the discussion about its ambiguous nature; on the other hand, it also makes it possible to open
the discussion on the other major theme of the Phaedrus, namely the value of discourses in general
and written discourses in particular, without restricting the discussion to forensic speeches. It must
be noted that the term εἰκός in its current meaning of “likely, reasonable” is often used throughout
this speech that Plato ascribes to Lysias. Thus the non-lover argues that:
a) It would not be εἰκός that the beloved would give away his sexual favors to a lover
inasmuch as the lover will maltreat him as soon as he falls in love with someone else
(231c7).
b) It is εἰκός that those in love would boastfully display their conquest while the non-
lovers, who are in control of themselves, would act in the opposite way (231e4).
c) It is εἰκότως for the beloved to be afraid of someone who is in love with him inasmuch
as he will act in a selfish way and harm the beloved (232c2).
d) It is not εἰκός that the non-lover will make his affection less when his sexual desires
ceases (233a2).
These occurrences of εἰκός in Lysias’ speech do not seem casual insofar as his ἐπίδειξις is in fact
a conspicuous example of how, thanks to rhetorical skills, something quite “unlikely” (such as a
beautiful young man preferring to be intimate with a non-lover rather than a lover) turns out to be
the most “likely” thing to do.

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But Lysias’s speech is not intended solely to provide a dramatic representation of the kind of
“likely” arguments made by the rhetoricians of the time. It is also cleverly built up by Plato as an
appropriate target for Socrates in his criticism of this type of argumentative construction both in
its form and in its content. Thus in the first “Interlude,” while Phaedrus claims to be absolutely
amazed at Lysias’s speech and declares that no other discourse could be better written than this
one, Socrates expresses his doubts about both its form (λέξις) and content (τὰ πράγματα) (235a).
Regarding its λέξις the discourse is badly organized insofar as it states at the end what would be
more appropriately put at the beginning, and repeats the same arguments over and over again.
Regarding its reference to τὰ πράγματα Lysias’ speech is also inadequate as it just makes random
remarks, either true or false, about the lover’s harmful effects on the beloved, and the non-lover’s
beneficial impact, without stating firstly what the nature of ἔρως is.14 Socrates’ First Speech works,
then, as a first demonstration of what would be the most direct procedure in both respects, that is
to say, to convey the truth through a proper dialectical argument with a definition of (part) of the
real essence of ἔρως by an organized division into genera and species. However, afterwards,
Socrates himself derives ἐξ ἐικότος (238e2) the likely good or bad consequences which will follow
from this definition if the young boy chooses to be intimate with a lover. In addition to this, as
shown above, Socrates has already made use of the mythical character of Typhon in order to nudge
Phaedrus toward a first understanding of something really important, that is, self-knowledge;
similarly, in his Second Speech, through a fantastic ἐικών of his own invention—the winged
chariot—he will persuade and, at the same time, teach Phaedrus what the soul is “like” (see above
MS 7: 5) and how its understanding is linked to other matters such as the divine side of ἔρως’
nature, its cosmological scope, the soul’s reminiscence of the eidetic realm, the possible
interconnection between our incarnate existence and the disembodied state of our soul. In other
words, Socrates will offer to his friend with whom he shares the madness about λόγοι an attractive
speech which “resembles” the truth about important issues and, simultaneously, is credible to
Phaedrus. Then, although a dialectical description of the nature of something would be the best,
as far as it is possible, it is not the only way to communicate the truth: on occasion an explanation
based on something “like the truth” can be more effective. The argument of Lysias is, then,
condemned by Socrates mainly because of its shortcomings regarding its argumentative structure
and the irrelevance of its content—not just for the εἰκός nature of some of its assertions.

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The use of ἐικοὶ λόγοι at the Athenian courts: “likely” arguments as opposed to facts?

τὰ ἐικότα was a device for all kinds of rhetorical speeches; this we can deduce from Phaedrus’
reference to it as one of the “refinements” which were mentioned in the books περὶ λóγων τέχνης
(266d). However, as can be inferred from Antiphon’s Tetralogies, the ability to make reverse
probability arguments was especially essential for a successful prosecution in the Athenian courts.
Plato does his own recreation of the forensic employment of ἐικοί speeches when Socrates gives
a depiction of them in the following terms:
T2 For they [i.e. the forensic rhetoricians] say that in the law-courts no one cares in the
slightest for the truth (ἀληθείας μέλειν οὐδενί) about these things, but only for what is
convincing (τοῦ πιθανοῦ); and that is what is probable (τὸ εἰκός) […]. For they go on to
say that sometimes one should not even say what was actually done (αὐτὰ πραχθέντα), if
it is improbable (μὴ εἰκότως), but rather what is probable (τὰ εἰκότα), both when accusing
and defending, and whatever one’s purpose when speaking, the probable (τὸ εἰκός) is what
must be pursued, which means frequently saying goodbye to the truth (χαίρειν τῷ ἀληθεῖ).
(Pl. Phdr. 272d7-e5)15
The argument from probability is attributed here to Tisias and, indirectly, to his teacher Corax, to
whom the creation of the τέχνη of model speeches based on τὸ εἰκός is ascribed (cf. also Arist.,
Rhet. 2.24.1402a17). However, as Gagarin (1994, 52) has pointed out, this extreme attribution to
forensic rhetoricians of pursuing ἐικοί arguments and of disdaining the truth might be an invention
of Plato himself or at least an exaggerated representation of their kind of performance, insofar as
the claims at the courts sometimes were argued “not in likelihood but in fact” (ὀυκ ἐκ τῶν ἐικότων
ἀλλ’ ἔργῳ, Antiph. First Tetralogy 2.4.8).16 Notwithstanding, two considerations must be made
about this passage: a) τὸ ἀληθές for which the orators do not care is τὰ πραχθέντα and factual truth
has already been considered as irrelevant by Socrates; b) a “likely” explanation must not always
be preferred, but only when a report of the real events sounds improbable (μὴ εἰκότως).

In any case, as shown in the next section, Plato’s intentions seem to go beyond just presenting a
distorting portrayal of the orators of his time inasmuch as, based on his own philosophical
premises, he aims at both making a critical analysis of the use of εἰκός by the traditional rhetoric
and, simultaneously, reformulating this device in order to transform it into one of the possible

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means to bring someone closer to the truth in a Platonic sense, that is to say, to the real essence of
everything. This goal will also include extending the criticism and virtuous use of plausible
arguments from the limited scope of the courts of justice (the only one imaginable by Phaedrus)
to the use of language in general, both in oral and written form, in the public or private sphere, and
whether performed by an expert or an amateur (Pl. Phdr. 261a; 261e).

2. Plato’s criticisms and reformulation of τὸ ἐικός: a philosophical appropriation of

rhetorical device

While Phaedrus can only conceive the employment of persuasive speeches in the political arena
(261b), Socrates moves further and explores the possibility of a ῥητορικὴ τέχνη as a “universal art
of discourse” (Yunis, 2005, 103-104; see also White 1993, 179). Plato’s movement to this wider
and critical appraisal on this topic is also reflected in his approach to the ἐικός arguments which
characterized the traditional rhetoric of his time.

The ἐικός as πιθανόν and δοξαστόν: what is “likely” from an epistemological point of view

Insofar as in T2 τὸ ἐικός is described as often opposite to the actual truth and at the same time as
τὸ πιθανόν, Plato’s recreation of the argumentative procedures at the Athenian Courts makes the
emphasis fall on the epistemological effect that the speeches should have on the jury, namely, on
the fact that the arguments should be “credible” to them independently of the objective truth, and
in that sense “likely.”17

In order to achieve a better understanding of how τὸ ἐικός is associated with τὸ πιθανόν and a few
lines later to τὸ τῷ πλήθει δοκοῦν (273b1), we must move back to an earlier section of the Second
Part of the dialogue where Plato introduces τὸ δοξαστόν in order to analyze and criticize, from this
philosophical category of his own, how logographers—but also orators, politicians, lawgivers,
poets—conceive their mastery in the use of language. Thus, when Socrates claims that a mind
which knows the truth (διάνοιαν ἐιδυῖαν τὸ αληθές) is a necessary requirement “in order to speak
and write well (καλῶς λέγειν τε καὶ γράφειν)” about any subject, Phaedrus answers:
T3 What I have heard about this, my dear Socrates, is that there is no necessity for the man

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 who intends to be an orator to understand what is really just (τὰ τῷ ὄντι δίκαια
μανθάνειν) but only what would appear so to the majority (τὰ δόξαντα πλήθει) of those
who will give judgement, and not what is really good or fine (τὰ ὄντως ἀγαθὰ ἢ καλά) but
whatever will appear so (ὅσα δόξει); because persuasion comes from that and not from the
truth (ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας). (259e7-260a4)
Phaedrus’s character, then, offers a description of the procedures of traditional rhetoric which he
translates into Platonic terms:18 the successful orator does not need to know how things actually
are, but just what seems to be true to his listeners in order to persuade them and be able to
manipulate their beliefs. As far as Socrates’ previous remark is concerned, one might say that he
is just distinguishing between the realm of thought and the realm of language by establishing that
“the well-articulated speeches must contain the thought of the one who speaks and knows the
truth” (Fedele 2011, 83; my trans.), without taking into account epistemological problems such as
how to access the knowledge of truth. However, through Phaedrus’ reply, the typical Platonic
dichotomy between knowing “what ‘really’ is” (τῷ ὄντι ὄντως)—truth—and understanding “what
appears to be” (τὰ δόξαντα)— non-truth—is already introduced, together with a concern for the
essence of moral values such as what is just, beautiful, and good rather that for the veracity of
specific events.

Through a funny example, Socrates brings to light why such lack of commitment to the truth is
dangerous not only for the audience but even for the rhetorician himself in pragmatic as well as in
moral terms. Thus, if the orator or one of his listeners were going to war on a mule based on the
misconception that it has the qualities of a horse, he would be at higher risk of being caught and
hurt by his enemy and of dying on the battlefield. However, as Socrates points out, it is even more
dangerous for both the orator and his audience if they happen to have and share this kind of
erroneous conception about notions such as what is “just,” “unjust,” “good,” “bad,” since their
individual existences as well as their community might take an overall wrong direction. Then the
good orator should not make use of the beliefs of his audience in order to persuade them but needs
as a minimum a right understanding about his subject matter and above all knowledge about the
real essence of moral values in order not to inflict harm on them and also on himself (260b1-d2).19

Thus a first point of Plato’s criticisms of sophistic rhetoric arises from holding that, according to

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his philosophical analysis, insofar as τὸ ἐικός can be identified with τὸ πιθανόν and τὸ δοξαστόν,
persuasive arguments which are based on “the likely” cannot be part of good rhetoric since they
would only take into account what seems to be the case to most of the people instead of knowing
the truth. Thus these arguments have serious epistemological and moral shortcomings. On the other
hand, it is stated that knowledge of the truth is a necessary requirement for rhetoric to be a τέχνη.

τὸ ἐικός and the ἀντιλογικοὶ λόγοι: the successful manipulation of what is similar/dissimilar to the
truth

A second step in Plato’s philosophical criticism and appropriation of τὸ ἐικός takes place through
his analysis of how “opposite speeches” are and should be formulated.

The ability to make ἀντιλογικοὶ λόγοι (opposite speeches) on any subject was also an essential
element for success either in the Assembly or in private and public trials. Aristophanes’ Wasps
and Clouds, the anonymous Díssoi lógoi and again Antiphon’s Tetralogies can be mentioned as
examples of it. Socrates starts by describing the employment of opposite arguments in Athenian
political life as “technically” (τέχνῃ) executed when someone makes “the same things appear
(δοκεῖν) at one time good, at another the opposite,” “at one time just, but at any other time […],
unjust” (Pl. Phdr. 261c11-12; d3-4). So now the ability of producing τὰ δόξαντα in opposite ways,
especially regarding moral values such as the good and the just, is somehow included in the art of
rhetoric.

Socrates moves next to a more general reference to the use of ἀντιλογικοὶ λόγοι by the Eleatic
Palamedes who could “make the same things appear like and unlike, one and many, at rest and in
motion” (261d6-8). This allusion to Zeno’s philosophical paradoxes, and perhaps internally also
to Plato’s Parmenides, broadens the scope of what the antithetical speeches could be about and
paves the way to Plato’s explanation of how opposite speeches are actually made and how they
should be made. To this end he employs two of his more crucial philosophical categories: the
similar and the dissimilar.

Thus, Socrates states that, if there were an ἀντιλογικὴ τέχνη, the man who possesses it should be

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able to proceed in relation to everything that is said as follows:
T4 [A] person will be able to liken (ὁμοιοῦν) everything to everything of the things that
are able [to be likened to something] and to which things it is possible [for something to be
likened] and [a person will be able] to expose when another person likens (ἄλλου
ὁμοιοῦντος) [something to something] while keeping hidden [what he is doing, i.e. his use
of the art]. (261e2-3; trans. Yunis 2011, 186)
So rhetoric as the skill in the production of opposite speeches, which makes “appear” (δοκεῖν) one
thing in one way and the opposite, is redescribed here in terms of “likening /resembling (ὁμοιοῦν)
one thing to another,” more precisely, of making use of “similarity” (ὁμοιότηϛ) and “dissimilarity”
(ἀνομοιότηϛ) in dribs and drabs (κατὰ σμικρὸν) so that the audience does not notice that the
rhetorician is doing so, especially in the case of things which are not distinctively different such
as moral values. But if someone wishes to do this and to deceive the audience in an efficient way,
without also producing self-deception, once again that person needs first to have knowledge of the
truth, which here means more specifically to get “a precise understanding of the resemblance and
dissimilarity of things that are” (τὴν ὁμοιότητα τῶν ὄντων καὶ ἀνομοιότητα ἀκριβῶς διειδέναι).
By contrast, those who are ignorant of the truth and hunt appearances (ὁ τὴν ἀλήθειαν μὴ
εἰδώς, δόξας δὲ τεθηρευκώς) will be unable to make such distinctions and so might fail in
deceiving as well as in not being deceived themselves, especially if the object of discussion, such
as moral values or love, is a controversial one. Thus the production of τὰ δόξαντα in the form of
ἀντιλογικοὶ λόγοι is criticized only if someone does it randomly and is deprived of the knowledge
of how far these speeches resemble the real thing.

Later on, through a fictional dialogue with Tisias, Socrates will say that he and Phaedrus have
previously agreed that τὸ ἐικός “comes about in the minds of ordinary people because of
resemblance to the truth (δι’ ὁμοιότητα τοῦ ἀληθοῦς)” (273d3-4). If we read these words in the
light of these previous developments it can be said that τὸ ἐικός can be interpreted in
epistemological terms as “what seems or appears to someone like,” as well as in ontological terms
as “what resembles or is like something.”20 Thus, two different kinds of rhetoric emerge from
Plato’s analysis so far. On one hand, there is the traditional rhetoric, which he criticizes for being
unscientific in its making of opposite arguments, inasmuch as it randomly manipulates the beliefs
of the majority and unknowingly produces simulacra which are taken by the hearers —and even

12
by the rhetorician— for the real things; in this case the use of τὸ ἐικός is condemned. On the other
hand, Plato depicts a new rhetoric according to which good orators will have an adequate
comprehension of what is the case and of what is “similar/dissimilar” to it, i.e. what is “like” it, so
that, on the basis of this right understanding they will be able to produce convincing “likely”
arguments which present opposite views; here τὸ ἐικός is rehabilitated as far as it is subordinated
to knowledge of the truth.21

Knowledge of the truth and appropriation of the ἐικός: the rhetorical-philosophical construction of
something “credible” and “like the truth”

The scope for the right production of something ἐικός and, more generally, for rhetoric being a
τέχνη, is intrinsically linked for Plato, then, to knowledge of the truth and of what resembles it, as
Socrates asserts through his imaginary dialogue with Tisias:
T5 Tisias, we have for some time been saying […] that this “probability” (τὸ ἐικός) comes
about in the minds of ordinary people because of a resemblance to truth (δι`ὁμοιότητα τοῦ
ἀληθοῦς); and we showed only a few moments ago that in every case it is the man who
knows the truth who knows best how to discover resemblances (τὰς ὁμοιότητας). So […]
unless someone counts up the various natures of those who are going to listen to him, and
is capable of dividing up the things that are according to forms and embrace each thing one
by one under one kind, he will never be an expert in the science of speaking to the degree
possible for mankind. (273d3-e3)
As Socrates points out here, knowledge of the truth22 which is needed to produce something similar
to it is not concerned with the accuracy or distortion in the report of actual facts, as might be the
case with forensic rhetoric, but rather with the distinction according to forms and kinds about the
subject matter to be developed and the kind of soul to be addressed.

The method through which knowledge of the truth can be attained as far as possible by a human
being would be, then, dialectic, which in the Phaedrus has been understood as it is stated in this
passage in the following ways:
1. The method of collection and division applied to the definition of Forms and the
interconnection between them.

13
 2. The method of collection and division applied to anything that can be unified under a
universal concept and classified within a broader genus. As stated at 273e above,
dialectics would also include distinguishing, in addition to the Forms, the kinds of
human soul and also the kind of speech appropriate for each kind of soul, and in a more
general sense the provision of an organized speech and not a mere sum of parts.23
However, some interpreters have suggested that the main meaning of dialectic in this dialogue
would be:
3. The reflective face-to-face exchange in the form of διαλέγεσθαι beyond dialectic in
senses 1 and 2, both of which just consist in a τέχνη that organizes unreflective δόξα
by providing as a context a collected field of objects which is afterwards organized
through division (Griswold, 1986, 173-186).
4. Any philosophical argument that makes it possible to think and speak orderly and
correctly (259e) together with any articulation of multiple elements under any
intelligible unity (Dixsaut, 2001, 9; 103-32).
In fact, all these forms of dialectic can be recognized at different stages of the dialogue and the
employment of one or the other depends on several factors, such as the ontological status of the
subject matter which is addressed, the state of mind of the interlocutor, and/or the range of scope
which the discussion achieves. Thus, along the lines of what was previously said in the dialogue
about the art of making opposite speeches, “similarity and dissimilarity” will need to be handled
appropriately in order to proceed dialectically in any of these senses. As the Sophist makes clear,
“identity and difference” together with “being” and “movement” are the μέγιστα γένη (Pl. Soph.
249d-259e) that transcend all the ontological levels and a right understanding of these meta-forms
is required to distinguish between true and false judgements about anything and also to produce
knowingly true as well as false judgements on any field. Thus Plato’s conception of truth implies
at any level to achieve, as far as possible, an adequatio intellectus et rei which can be expressed
through language, although the ultimate foundation of any speech, including the accounts that
appear in the Phaedrus itself, lies in the understanding of the structure of reality, i.e. the συμπλοκὴ
ἐιδῶν (Soph. 259e) from which everything derives its reality and on which language bases the
adequate description of reality (Ackrill, 1955; White, 1993, 277-92).

However, even the adequatio intellectus et rei which is achieved through dialectics is just

14
something ἐικός compared to two other ways of understanding “knowledge of the truth” that can
be found in the Phaedrus:
5. Catching sight of the truest reality, that is, the whole eidetic realm, which is the truest
kind of knowledge and is available only to the gods.
6. “Partially/hardly” (μόγις; Phdr. 247b and 248a; cf. also 249e; see Steinhal 1993, 101)
catching sight of the Forms, especially of Beauty itself, which is the highest kind of
knowledge available to human souls through a restrictive contact with the truest reality
in their discarnate existence and through a process of ἀνάμνησις in our incarnate
condition.24

But why would the philosopher, then, need to apply “similarity” and “difference” in order to
produce something ἐικός, just “resembling the truth” instead of providing straightforward
knowledge of the actual truth? The main reasons for doing so would lie in:
i. either the issuer’s epistemic limitations; or
ii. the recipient’s epistemic limitations and psychological characteristics; or
iii. the nature of the object to be explained.
Examples of these three scenarios can be found in the Phaedrus itself. I will address each kind of
limitation separately, although they can interact and be combinable.

As is often stated in the dialogue, for a right and noble use of speech the issuer of it must be
someone who knows the truth about the subject he is going to address. Ideally this role should be
assumed by a philosopher with dialectical knowledge whose object can be understood, as has been
pointed out above, in different ways, namely:
 the ultimate principles on which all reality, including the Forms, is grounded;
 the Forms and the interconnection between them;
 something which is not a Form but can be unified under a universal;
 the rules for handling a discussion in such a way as to help to think and speak more
and better about any issue.
In a more general sense it could be said that acquisition of information about what someone intends

15
to speak and persuade others about would be a necessary minimum requirement. However, even
in the case of the best kind of dialectician knowledge of the Forms and/or the ultimate principles
beyond them will be limited, restricted, since in their incarnate existence dialecticians can only
reconstruct—remember—bit by bit the eidetic geography and represent it through the employment
of thought and language. And as far as the attainable knowledge in both their incarnate and
disincarnate existence, philosophers will only be able to grasp “partially” and “strenuously” the
whole eidetic realm and barely express this experience due to the limits of human reason and verbal
communication (see White 1993, 225). Thus even the highest kind of human knowledge would
just resemble the direct and full grasping of the eidetic geography which can only be achieved by
the gods (247e).25 In this sense the most knowledgeable productions of human thought and speech
can be described as ἐικός compared with a complete and immediate access to true reality in both
senses: it just resembles the noetic knowledge of the gods and is a likely reconstruction of such
knowledge.26

ii

As for the limitations concerning the recipient, the wise author of the speech needs to evaluate
what kind of λόγος is appropriate according to the epistemic level and psychological characteristics
of the person being addressed, that is to say, to take into account the auditor’s “psychagogic”
conditions for the speech’s performance, particularly the auditor´s erotic disposition (Yunis, 2005,
117-121). Ideally the recipient must be an individual, as the conversations between Socrates and
someone else which are portrayed in the Platonic dialogues; however, similar considerations can
also be applied to the case of a wider audience, although the results might not be equally successful.
Taking all these factors into account the rhetorician-philosopher will decide how to create the best
ἐικός speech for that soul and little by little manipulate it by the employment of similarity and
dissimilarity in order to draw that person as far as possible to the understanding of the actual truth.
Thus in the case of someone like Phaedrus, who is just uncritically repeating out of admiration
whatever he hears from some famous rhetoricians such as Lysias, Socrates replies by producing
his First Speech in which he starts to introduce some rationale in form and content27 and thus calls
into question Phaedrus’ unreflecting δόξα (see Fedele, 2011, 77). Then, in his palinode, Socrates,
on one hand, will take care to deliver something which seduces Phaedrus’s ποικίλος soul (256e)

16
and, on the other hand, will provide some key philosophical concepts which are presented as an
organized whole through the myth of the winged chariot, either because a full explanation of them
is not possible at the moment (see MS 7: 5, above, and n.8), or because only some general
speculation is possible as will be shown in (iii). Instead, in the Second Part of the dialogue,
Phaedrus’s soul seems to be ready for a different kind of speech and so Socrates will mainly apply
dialectics in the different ways mentioned above and even take Phaedrus to have a first
understanding of the nature of the dialectical method itself in terms of right collections and
divisions. In other words, unless a dialectical explanation in some of the senses pointed out above
can be provided, the philosopher will knowingly build up a δόξα which is founded on the best
possible grounds in order to bring someone closer to the truth. Thus, through the analysis of τὸ
ἐικός according to Plato’s philosophical categories it is possible to distinguish between, on the one
hand, a δόξα which is a random, unfounded understanding just based on sense-perception and
common sense and is reproduced by sophistic rhetoric in its ἐικοί speeches and, on the other hand,
the δόξα as something which the really skillful rhetorician (the philosopher) can bolster, challenge
and/or rebuild in the minds of the listeners through an ἐικός speech which resembles the truth
thanks to the philosopher’s knowledge about the subject-matter, the kind of psychological
disposition of the auditors, and the kind of speeches appropriate to each soul and circumstance.

iii

Sometimes, due to the limitations of human understanding, purely dialectical argument is just not
possible about certain topics and only an account of what would be likely can be given in relation
to them. This is especially the case with Plato’s eschatological myths: given that nothing certain
can be stated about the post-mortem life, just some reasonable general assumptions about the after-
life condition of the soul can be expressed through an imaginative narrative which resembles
somehow what that condition might be like. Thus this kind of myth in particular aims at both
arousing and controlling the desires, emotions, and appetites of the audience’s soul (Yunis, 2005,
112)—in other words, at enchanting and soothing “the fearful child within us” (Phd. 77e5; Vallejo
Campos, 2005, 128)—and at suggesting, according to a previous rational analysis, 28 the best
possible hypothesis about the after-life integrated through the imagery in an overall picture which
challenges our ordinary understanding of ourselves and reality.29 In this sense it is possible to say

17
that the myth of the winged chariot in Socrates’ Second Speech provides, among other things, an
ἐικός representation of this eschatological dimension concerning the itineraries of human souls in
their disincarnate and incarnate condition within the framework of cosmic justice. The fantastic
journey of the divine winged chariot-souls above the heavenly realm of the Forms and the
strenuous, sometimes hopeless, effort to follow them with our “human too human” chariot, tries
to offer a synthetic account which resembles the essential truth regarding our present condition
with its projection into a wider, transcendental scope and, at the same time, its overwhelming
imagery intends to subdue our ἔρωϛ by seducing us and directing it towards the best possible goal
(Fierro 2015). As Yunis suggests, the tremendously imaginative account of the palinode would be
quite “unlikely” in the traditional sense of ἐικός but is a good resemblance of the truth that matters
to Plato (2005, 116), that is to say, the essence of what we are and of reality as a whole. Its very
implausibility from an ordinary point of view seems to intend to inspire desire for beauty and
understanding of its meaning and, at the same time, to bewitch the “many-colored” part of our
soul. That is also probably why Socrates states on the speech in which the argument for the
immortality of the soul together with the apotheotic myth are about to be developed: “The proof
will be disbelieved (άπιστος) by the clever (δεινοῖς), believed (πιστή) by the wise (σοφοῖς).” (Pl.
Phdr. 245c1-2)

Conclusions

To sum up: in the first place I have examined how the term ἐικός is used in its current meaning of
“likely, probable” in the Phaedrus. I have shown that it can refer to trivial explanations such as
the endless and irrelevant intellectualization regarding traditional mythical accounts as it is the
case of the story about Orythia’s abduction by Boreas. Lysias’ speech also works as an example
of how sophistic rhetoric can argue in a “likely” way the quite “unlikely” case that a handsome
young boy should choose as his mate someone who does not love him rather than someone who
loves him. The Phaedrus also depicts how forensic rhetoric made use of reverse probability
arguments which often contradicted the actual facts. However, even in these cases, the ἐικότα
explanations are not rejected in absolute terms. Socrates makes use of the myth of Typhon and
decodes it for the elevated purpose of showing the importance of self-knowledge. In addition to
this, although he plays off his own dialectical account of love against Lysias’ random, likely

18
assertions about it, he also draws ἐξ ἐικότος, according to his definition of ἔρως, the bad
consequences for the beloved one who chooses to be intimate with a lover. Moreover, factual truth
which forensic rhetoric despises is actually uninteresting for Socrates who rather cares for the
essential truth, for example, about the real nature of his soul.

In the second place I have shown how Plato employs his philosophical categories in order to
criticize, analyze, and reinstate this rhetorical device as a powerful tool for a noble and good
production of speeches not only in the political sphere but in any cultural activity, especially in the
philosophical field. A first Platonic turn of the screw takes place when Socrates identifies τὸ ἐικός
with τὸ πιθανόν and τὸ δοξαστόν and argues that inasmuch as speeches based on “the likely” only
take into account what seems to be the case to most of the people instead of knowing the truth,
they have serious epistemological and moral shortcomings and cannot be part of good rhetoric. A
second Platonic maneuver which occurs when he bases rhetorical efficacy in the production of
“opposite arguments,” that is, arguments about similarity (ὁμοιότηϛ) and dissimilarity
(ἀνομοιότηϛ), intending to deceive the interlocutor about the truth. And here, of course, the
speakers themselves need to know the truth about the subject matter (Phdr. 261e2-262a8). Thus
τὸ ἐικός is associated not only with what is credible to most people, in its usual meaning of
“likelihood,” but also with its meaning of “likeness”—the likeness of the resemblance to that
which it resembles. Finally, insofar as the right use of this rhetorical device requires the speaker
to know the truth, the Platonic appropriation and use of τὸ ἐικός becomes dependent on the kind
of knowledge at stake (a grasp of the ultimate principles of reality, or, at least, a comprehension of
whatever the subject matter is) as well as on the audience’s readiness and ability to understand the
truth (273d3-e3). Thus, if the issuer of the speech knows the truth because of attaining dialectically
either a grasp of the ultimate principles of reality (including the Forms and the interconnection
between them), or, at least, because of a comprehension of whatever the subject matter is which
can be unified under a universal, or, in a more general sense, the possession of the best information
about it, the knowledgeable speaker might choose not to impart the straightforward truth to the
audience but to present a likely explanation which resembles the real thing in order to persuade
the auditors and, if possible, gradually lead them to a better and higher comprehension of the truth.
However, on some topics, such as the after-life of the soul, only an ἐικός account would be
possible. In addition to this, inasmuch as human dialectical knowledge just resembles the full

19
noetic knowledge of the eidetic realm which is only available to the gods, the face-to face
dialectical exchange and the Platonic dialogues as an image of it should be considered as
something ἐικός in comparison to divine wisdom in both senses: as the most “likely” rationale
about this highest and truest kind of knowledge and as the most resembling representation of it.30

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Notes

1
For the Greek texts I follow the TLG’s editions which for Plato is the OCT by Burnet (1900-
1907); for the Phaedrus I have used Rowe’s translation (1986) unless otherwise indicated; for the
rest of the dialogues I have employed the edition by Cooper (1997).

2
Brady also reconstructs a possible Platonic defense of rhetoric after she outlines the main lines
of Plato’s criticisms to it in the Gorgias and the Republic (2002, 8-14).

3
On what follows in this section see LSJ s.v. εἰκός and ἐοίκα and Bailly (2000) s.v. *ἐίκω. Based
on its current sense Aristotle will use it in order to refer technically, from a logical point of view,
to what is just probable as opposite to what is necessary (e.g. An. pr. 70a4 and Rh. 1357a34).

4
For the purpose of the present work I distinguish just these two meanings of εἰκός but its
etymology is quite complex as it can be seen at Chantraine (1968) s.v ἐοίκα.

5
A reunion of both senses of εἰκός can be found in its translation by Spanish vero-símil, Italian
vero-simile, or French vrai-semblable which might refer to what is similar to what is real as well
as what seems likely or probable.

6
Along similar lines, according to Des Places the adjective εἰκώς in Plato’s works needs to be
understood in three senses: a) “ressemblant”; b) “naturel, raisonnable”; c) “vraisemblable,” while
as a noun τὸ εἰκός would usually mean “vraisemblance” (1964, s.v. εἰκώς).

7
So here σοφός describes someone able to express himself “cleverly” (σοϕιζόμεος, Pl. Phdr.
229c7) such as these “know-it-alls” (cf. also 258a8; 260a6; 267b6; 273b3). However, in a more

24
Platonic sense, σοφός refers to those who have full knowledge of the Forms, that is, the gods
(278d3-6); παλαίοι σοφοί such as Anacreon and Sapho (235b6; cf. also 244b6-7 and 274c1-2) are
also presented as people really wise in contrast to the “new intellectuals” who just pretend to be
wise.

8
Self-knowledge is undoubtedly one of the main topics which runs across the dialogue. In fact,
for some authors, it is actually the foremost theme that interweaves the whole text of the Phaedrus
(Griswold 1986, 2-9).

9
As Werner suggests, the point in this passage is that “self-knowledge should be our true concern,
and not the attempt to verify or rectify myth” (2012, 41).

10
Socrates’s topographic remarks about the possibility that Oreithuia’s abduction could have taken
place from the Areopagus and not in the vicinity of where they are shows that he is “aware of the
contingent limitations on our knowledge of historical truth” (Ferrari, 1987, 11). On the other hand,
he considers anyway speculations about this kind of events as a worthless business since he is
interested in universal truths about important issues such as knowing oneself.

11
On the context and the utilitarian purpose of forensic speech writing in the time of Lysias see
the classic work by Lavency (1958). As Kennedy already pointed out, the use of “probability”
arguments was one of the characteristic features of this kind of rhetoric (1963, 32), although
authors like Gagarin (1994) consider it one of Plato’s distortions of the actual performance by
earlier and contemporary rhetoricians.

12
In the first century BCE Dionysius of Halicarnassus in his On the Ancient Orators 4.2. mentions
Lysias as an excellent example of the purest Attic prose. At 228a 1-2 Phaedrus describes Lysias
as “the δεινότατος of present writers”.

13
On the discussion on whether the Eroticus would have been actually written by Lysias or is
rather a parodic Platonic invention see e.g. Dover (1968), De Vries (1969) and Rowe (1986). I

25
have a preference for the second interpretation as Lysias’s speech fits so well with its use by Plato
in different parts of the dialogue.

14
However, perhaps the greatest shadow of suspicion on the truth value of Lysias’ speech lies in
that the issuer of it is in fact a cunning lover instead of a non-lover who just tries to persuade the
handsome boy χαρίζεσθαι him (237b3).

15
The example which Socrates attributes to Tisias, who was considered together with his teacher
Corax, the founder of forensic rhetoric runs as follows: if a weak but brave man beats a strong but
coward man and steals his cloak and both of them are taken to the law-courts, neither party should
speak the truth but lie (273b-c).

16
Arist., Rh. 2.24.1402a17 actually seems to echo Phdr. 273b-c. At Rh. 2.24.1400b1 Aristotle
describes Theodorus’s use of εἰκός in similar terms to what he says about Corax. At Phdr. 267a it
is stated that not only for Tisias but also for Gorgias τὰ ἐικότα should be given precedence over
truths. On Gorgias’s association with Tisias vid. Preus (2017).

17
In Gorgias the pair ἐικός-πιθανόν speech is also presented as a synthesis of the ideal of
traditional rhetoric through the character of Calicles (Pl. Grg. 486a2).

18
Fedele regards Plato’s treatment of rhetoric here as an “arbitraria riduzione […] nella δόξα della
folla” (Fedele 2011, 79). However, it is not exactly arbitrary but aims at a critical analysis by
Plato’s employment of his philosophical categories.

19
A similar criticism to sophistic rhetoric can be found in the Gorgias insofar as in that dialogue
Socrates also condemns “the persuasion that arises from manipulating the beliefs of ignorant
masses (Grg. 454e-459c) and the harm that is inflicted by politicians who use such rhetoric (Grg.
463c-465e, 502d-520b)” (Yunis 2011 ad Phdr. 260c7-d1).

20
On how Plato treats μίμησις in a similar way vid. Halliwell (2002, 37-48), Janaway (1995, 69-
73) and Marcos (2006, 74-88).

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21
Similarly, Centrone distinguishes two meanings of ἀπάτη in the Phaedrus: a) “deception” in the
negative sense of leading someone into falsehood; b) “diversion” in the positive sense of moving
someone away from a wrong views towards beliefs more similar to the truth (2011, 45-46). Vid.
also Murray (1988, 279-289) on how a “true/philosophical art” may employ opposite arguments
and Fedele (2011, 75-92) on how Socrates himself applies to his own speeches this technique in
the Phaedrus to make opposite discourses.

22
On what this knowledge involves in Plato, see Halliwell 1994, 233.

23
On Plato’s different approaches to the concept of “dialectics” vid. Hackforth (1952, 136).

24
On the similarity between the ἀνάμνησις in Socrates’ Second Speech and the description of
dialectic vid. Griswold (1986, 111-21). Only when a philosopher falls in love and contemplates
his beloved one’s beautiful face or body which imitates well beauty itself (κάλλος εὖ μεμιμημένον,
251a), he recollects it immediately, although he cannot clearly explain what is happening to him
(249d-251a).

25
In addition to this, the best sort of written speech can only be an image (εἴδωλον) of oral
dialectical discussion as it is suggested through the criticism of writing (276a).

26
Along these lines the written speech is considered just an εἴδωλον of the live activity of
διαλέγεσθαι (276a; Griswold, 1986, 178), “a simulacrum of philosophical discourse” (White 1993,
179).

27
He organizes his speech by applying the method of “division” and “union” in order to distinguish
different types of ἐπιθυμία and to get a first definition of ἔρως from which he deduces the (bad)
consequences of the lover’s actions on the beloved one.

28
Vid. Vallejo Campos (2005, 130 nn. 28 and 29) about some exegetical lines which advocate for
a rationale behind the eschatological myths.

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29
The Platonic myth does not promote then a passive attitude in its recipients, but active reflection
which takes the listeners to a more transcendental comprehension of themselves and of reality
(Griswold, 1986, 147-56; contra Vallejo Campos, 2005, 131).

30
Similarly Centrone states: “É dunque possibile interpretare molti dialoghi come esempi di
retorica filosófica […] nel senso cioè di uno sviamento che avviene a piccoli passi, di un “inganno”
positivo orientato alla conversione dell’interlocutore” (2011, 54-55).

28