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Ancient Philosophers on Language

From the Pre-Socratics to the Neoplatonists, ancient Greek philosophers formulated their approaches
on language by focusing, in part, on the relation between language and reality. Their reflections on the
‘natural’ or ‘conventional’ character of language resulted in both extreme and moderate views
concerning the phenomenon of linguistic expression. Philosophical thought later turned to the way
that spoken sounds represent things via concepts, constructing the first semiotic triangles.

Reflection on language is intrinsically related to the concept of philosophy itself, since

it is only via language that statements about reality and knowledge can be
communicated. From the origins of Greek philosophy in the 6th c. BCE to the end of
antiquity, conventionally dated to the 6th c. CE, linguistic thought is constantly
present, as testified by the surviving texts.

The discussion of language in the Greek philosophical tradition addresses linguistic

issues that remain crucial even today. Contemporary historians of linguistics estimate
that in philosophical texts of antiquity there can already be traced speculations that
are examined by independent fields of contemporary linguistics, such as phonology,
morphology, semiotics, semantics and pragmatics.

However, the evaluation of the linguistic approaches formulated by the philosophers of

antiquity is a priori obstructed by an important restriction, which renders any possible
answers to queries on specific research in this area rather relative. The texts, for
instance, written by philosophers during the Archaic age (6th/5th-c. BCE) and also by
the Sophists (5th-c. BCE), as well as by the Hellenistic philosophers (323-31 BCE), are
almost completely lost. With the exception of a few cases of direct tradition, our
knowledge of these philosophers’ views on language is based on indirect tradition: (1)
on a few verbatim fragments, which are mostly given ‒ out of their context ‒ by
authors who often lived centuries later than the thinkers and works they refer to and,
most of all, (2) on ancient evidence and doxographic information. Therefore,
concerning the ‘origins’ of ancient philosophers’ thoughts on language, when reflection
on language was not the purpose of philosophy in its own right, but also during the
Hellenistic age, when language research became a separate discipline (particularly
through the Stoic theories), our views are based on scholars’ reconstructions ― which
are far from agreeing with each other (→ → Philological-Grammatical Tradition in Ancient
Linguistics).

On the other hand, we are lucky enough to have at our disposal the corpus of Platonic
dialogues, which contains the first text focusing on language that survives in its
entirety, namely, the Cratylus. Aristotle’s didactic writings also survive, in which we can
trace several approaches that consider the phenomenon of linguistic expression from
various aspects. Finally, a series of commentaries on Plato and Aristotle survive,
written by philosophers of Late Antiquity; since they comment on the linguistic
approaches of the two thinkers, these scholars ― apart from formulating original and

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interesting views ― combine and adjust various linguistic approaches of antiquity

from their ‘origins’ up to the scholars’ own era.

While attempting to present the Greek philosophers’ views on language, apart from the
chronological factor, one should take into account a thematic approach ― to the
extent that this is possible ― given the fact that these views follow a kind of sequence,
in the sense that they presuppose knowledge and are often a ‘reaction’ to the views of
their antecedents.

1. Pre-Socratic Philosophers
( múthos)
1.1 The ‘Origins’: from Myth (múthos ( lógos)
múthos ) to Reason (lógos
lógos )

Insofar as excerpts from the ‘first philosophers’ (the ‘natural philosophers’) allow us to
make some assumptions about their kind of contemplation on language, it is almost
clear that this reflection was not undertaken for its own purpose, but rather served the
need to examine the extent to which non-linguistic reality can be expressed via
language.

The formulaic phrase ‘from myth (múthos) to reason (lógos)’ represents for scholars the
‘origins’ of philosophy, that is, the emerging tendency to approach reality in a way
different from that suggested by the epic poetry of Homer and Hesiod, the ‘tutors of
Greeks’ (see Xenophon 21B10 DK; Heraclitus 22B57 DK; cf. Pl. Resp. 606e). While there
was no linear development from myth to reason (see Buxton 2001), the old
mythological/theological explanation of cosmos did give way to a new, conceptual
approach based on argument, critical inquiry and evidence. Phúsis is at the very center
of this inquiry and is explained through itself, by the use of physical terms instead of
assumed actions by personalized human-looking creatures (“Indeed not from the
beginning did gods intimate all things to mortals, But at length, as they seek, they
discover better”: Xenoph. 21B18 DK; cf. Lesher 1992:27 and 149-155). This
differentiation from the poet-tutors and the popular mythological tradition, along with
the tendency of philosophy to re-establish itself, led to criticism of the linguistic use of
anthropomorphized natural forces (Morgan 2000:30ff.), which reflected a distorted
concept of cosmos. While attempting to obtain a distinct identity by communicating a
new vision of reality, philosophy at its origins attacks poets and their reality.

A famous fragment by Xenophanes reveals in the most telling way the character of this
altered philosophical orientation, distanced from the mythological explanation
formulated by the poets and reflected in their linguistic use: the poetic ‘messenger of
gods’, Iris, (cf. Hom. Il. 17.547) is nothing but a multicolored cloud (Xenoph. 21B32 DK;
cf. also Α39 DK). The philosophers’ criticism goes beyond that and also attacks the
current spoken language, as they consider it inadequate to conceive of and render
reality ― something that philosophy can definitely achieve.

Among Heraclitus’ (544-484 BCE) oracular sayings, two seem to mainly denote that in
his view, language represents reality only in part (see Kirk 1954:48, 118), and in this

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sense language is ‘insufficient’. In his theory, cosmos is ruled by the principle of ‘the
unity of opposites’ (coincidentia oppositorum). For example, life and death are two
aspects of one singular reality. Therefore, one of the Greek words signifying the ‘bow’
(tóxon), the word biós, refers to the word bίos, the Greek word for ‘life’: “The name of the
bow (tóxon) is life (bíos), its work is death” (Heracl. 22B48 DK). The second fragment may
be explained in the same way (Heracl. 22B32 DK): Zeus, whose name in genitive (Zēnós)
refers to ‘life’, “wishes and does not wish to be called with it.” This means that the
god’s name is only partly informational and therefore partly misleading. Taking for
granted that beneath our human ways of speaking there exists a true nature that
“loves to hide itself” (Heracl. 22B123 DK; see Nussbaum 2001:241), language is only a
pretext for further inquiry: besides, “The Lord, whose is the Oracle at Delphi, neither
speaks nor hides but gives signs, signifies (sēmaίnei)” (Heracl. 22B93 DK). The decisive
meaning of the verb sēmaίnein could be revealed by Heraclitus’ lógos.

However, also according to the philosophers who represent ancient Western

philosophical thought, as opposed to the philosophers of the East (Ionian philosophers,
Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, etc.) and of Southern Italy (Eleatic philosophers such as
Parmenides (c. 490-430 BCE) et al., and Empedocles (c. 495-435 BCE)), ‘names’ (= words)
that people use with the conviction that they represent truth are actually false ‘names’,
because they refer only to the surrounding phenomena and testify to an underlying
ignorance of reality’s true nature. For Parmenides, the names imposed by mortals
(katéthento; see section 2.2 below; 28B 8.34-41, 53-9, 9.1 DK / 28B8.38–41; 28B19 DK) are
false because they simply represent opinions (dóxa), and not truth (alḗtheia) and ‘being’
(ón) (see Sluiter 1990:170; Barney 2001). Similarly, the words ‘birth’ and ‘death’ in the
ordinary vocabulary are used by Empedocles to denote the actual procedures of
‘mixing’ and ‘separating’ the elements, the four rhizṓmata (earth, water, air and fire);
however, he adjusts himself to their law and convention (nómos) (see Emp. 31B9 DK; cf.
fr. B10 DK).

1.2 The Sophists

The Sophists belong to the broader category of the so-called Pre-Socratics (according
to Diels’ classification), and their orientation and scope were completely different from
those of the philosophers discussed so far. The Sophists emerged during the second
half of the fifth century, acting mainly as wandering tutors; it was the age of Athenian
democracy, and the study of linguistic usage was necessary for purposes of rhetoric
and argumentation. These philosophers’ interest in language is variably testified in
sources, particularly by Plato and Aristotle, although the lack of original texts makes
an accurate evaluation of their linguistic concerns difficult. Issues that puzzled two of
the most prominent Sophists, Protagoras (fl. 444 BCE) and Prodicus (fl. 400 BCE), were
the ‘correctness of diction’ (orthoépeia; Pl. Phdr. 267c), which is possibly connected to
poetic linguistic use (Guthrie 1998, 3:205), and the ‘correctness of names’ (orthόtēs tôn
onomátōn; cf. Pl. Crat. 384b, 391c; Euthd. 277e; → Linguistic Correctness (hellēnismόs),
Ancient theories of), which is most likely a reflection upon the connection between
words and things they denote (see section 2.2 below).

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The evidence is richer concerning Protagoras’ views, and this evidence could establish
Protagoras as “the parent of all subsequent study of language ‒ including logic,
grammar, linguistics and semantics” (Schiappa 2003:162). Protagoras traces two ‘errors’
committed by Homer, even in the first two verses of the Iliad: the false use of the
imperative instead of the optative (Aristot. Poet. 1456b15), and the use of the feminine
grammatical gender for a word denoting a ‘male’ attribute (mênis ‘wrath’; he argues the
same about pêlix ‘helmet’; Aristot. Soph. el. 173b17-22). The Protagorean distinction
between grammatical and natural gender seems to be reflected in the parody of
Aristophanes’ Clouds (659-691) through the example of alektruônos/alektruainēs.

According to Aristotle (Rh. 3.5.1407b6 = Prt. 80A27 DK), it was Protagoras who
distinguish the genders of names as being ‘masculine’, ‘feminine’ and ‘those referring
to inanimate objects’, and he was also the first to distinguish what are today called
‘speech acts’ (puthménas lógōn). At the same time, what is mainly testified concerning
Prodicus’ practice towards language is the ‘division of names’ (diaίresis tôn onomátōn;
see Pl. La. 197d; Chrm. 163d), meaning the subtle semantic distinctions between what is
called today ‘near synonyms’: thus, he distinguished, e.g. among ‘pleasure’, ‘delight’,
‘enjoyment’ and ‘gratification’ (Aristot. Top. 2.6 = 122b; = Protagoras 80A19 DK; cf. Pl.
Prt. 358a6-b 2; Alex. Aphr. in Top.181.1-6; see Mayhew 2011:124-31), possibly aiming at
accuracy and, furthermore, at correcting the current linguistic use (Ademollo 2011:28).

(phúsei)
2. Is Language ‘By Nature’ (phúsei
phúsei ) or ‘By Convention’
(nómōi)?
nómōi )?
2.1 The Sophists

The Sophists seem to have applied the ‘nature vs. convention’ controversy to the
reflection on language. This famous debate was dominant during the second half of the
5th c. BCE in fields such as ethics, politics, etc. When it comes to language, this
particular contradiction focuses on the relation between words and things: is this
relation natural, in the sense that ‘names’ (= words) reveal the nature and the
attributes of their referents (‘naturalism’) or are names wholly arbitrary impositions on
objects, the outcome of convention among various linguistic communities
(‘conventionalism’)? Apart from the term nómōi (‘by law/custom’; cf. Empedocles above
and Democritus below), conventionalism is also expressed by the terms éthei (‘by
habit’), sunthḗkēi (‘by contract’), homologίai (‘by agreement’; see Pl. Crat. 384d), katà
sunthḗkēn (Aristot. Int. 16a19), and finally it was the term thései (‘by imposition’; see
Epicur. Ad Herod. 75.7) that prevailed.

Plato’s Cratylus, which has the subtitle “On the correction of names”, explicitly relates
the ‘nature vs. convention’ debate to the Sophists, making specific references to
Prodicus (Crat. 384b) and to the Sophists in general (Crat. 391b), alongside explicit
discussion of Protagoras (Crat. 385e, 391c; cf. Phdr. 267c). Despite the fact that this
dialogue systematizes and represents the reflection of previous thinkers, constituting
our main source of information on some basic parameters of the specific contradiction

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of ‘nature vs. convention’, under no circumstances should this dialogue be considered

as ‘documentary’: the issue of the ‘correctness of names’ is discussed in service to
Plato’s approach to language, which considers words, in their variety, inadequate to
directly render the eternal and uncorrupted idea (Pl. Crat. 398e). Besides, the dramatic
personality of Socrates is clearly distanced from sophistic approaches (see Ademollo
2011:28).

With the exception of Cratylus himself, there is no evidence for pre-Platonic

philosophers who could be adherents of the ‘by nature’ approach. However, this
particular approach seems to have its origins in the tradition of Homer and Hesiod (cf.
also Pl. Crat. 391c-393b). In Hesiod’s Theogony, the nature and the attributes of a deity
are explained via the etymology of the corresponding name; similar examples also
appear in Aeschylus and Euripides (see Liebermann 1996; Schmitter 2000:347-351;
Ademollo 2011:34), as well as in the famous → Derveni papyrus, where divine names are
explained this way (beginnings of 4th c. BCE; see, e.g., col. XIV, XV: Cronos; XXII:
Dēmḗtēr).

Etymology, i.e. the unfolding of words through which their true meaning is clarified
(see Schol. Dion. Thrax, 14.23-24 Hilgard), was a widespread practice during the age of
the Sophists (see Barney 2001:66-67), which constituted the primary tool used for the
clarification of the words’ original ‘forms’; this practice rendered the actual features of
what was named and, consequently, shed light on the ‘natural’ relation between names
and things. It is worth saying that the Stoics’ valuation of etymology is reflected in
their belief that the ‘first words’ imitated things (see Allen 2005; see also Stoic
etymologies in FDS 650-680 Hülser).

2.2 Democritus

However, concerning the ‘by convention’ approach, Proclus gives evidence that it was
supported by Democritus, who was a contemporary of both the Sophists and of
Socrates (Procl. in Cra. 16.23-47 Pasquali = Democr. 68B26 DK). Democritus defended his
view on the basis of four arguments: 1. Different things bear the same name
(‘homonymy’; Democritus’ term was polúsēmon); 2. Different names are used for one and
the same thing (‘polyonymy’; Democritus’ term was isórropon ‘balanced’); 3. Names can
change (‘transposition of names’; Democritus’ term was metṓnumon); 4. There are cases
where language does not have derivatives in comparison to others (‘lack of the same’,
élleipsis tōn homoίōn; Democritus’ term was nṓnumon).

Proclus has often been questioned by scholars as a reliable source, given his
chronological distance from Democritus. However, in spite of the possibility that the
term thései (‘by imposition/convention’) is Proclean (Democritus himself most probably
used the term nómōi ‘by law/custom’ to denote conventionalism, as is quite evident in
the famous fragment Democritus 68B9 DK, “because by law, he says, sweet and bitter,
by law hot and cold…”), Proclus also uses the terms ‘homonymy’ and ‘polyonymy’, etc.
as equivalents for terms formulated and used by Democritus (see above). Furthermore,
some of the arguments attributed by Proclus to Democritus apparently belonged to the

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standardized supportive material of the ‘by convention’ approach: for instance, the
‘transposition of names’ is used in Plato’s Cratylus by the supporter of conventionalism,
who is Hermogenes.

2.3 Cratylus

The subject in Plato’s Cratylus is, as stated in the work’s subtitle, the ‘correctness of
names’, for which two opposite theories are proposed and discussed. Cratylus claims
that names are correct ‘by nature’, in the sense that words reveal the substance of
things named (Pl. Crat. 383a-384c). However, according to Hermogenes (384c-386e),
names are exclusively the outcome of convention within and among linguistic
communities. Hermogenes is led further to the extreme edge of conventionalism,
supporting even the correctness of a ‘private language’, in contrast to the ‘public
common speech’ (385a: idíai-dēmosíai; 385d-e). It should be noted that although Cratylus
is considered ‘Heraclitean’, he does not necessarily represent the approach to language
formulated by Heraclitus himself (see Kirk 1954:119-120), who believed that language
can only partly render reality. Socrates, who attempts to mediate between the two
opposite views supported in the dialogue by Cratylus and Hermogenes, examines both
in a critical way, tracing their questionable points and concluding that the ‘by nature’
and ‘by convention’ approaches complete each other.

In his arguments defending the ‘by nature’ approach, Socrates exploits its typical tool,
etymology, in an extended section of the dialogue which is most often characterized as
parody or joke (for an opposing view, see Sedley 2003, 2006; Ademollo 2011:237-241).
Socrates aims to prove that the meaning of words remains the same despite differences
resulting from linguistic change and owing to linguistic diversity: current words are
traced back to the ‘first (= original) names’, which cannot be deconstructed any further.
Concerning the natural character of the specific ‘first names’, Socrates resorts to a
supplementary argument (Pl. Crat. 423b4ff.), which is ‘phonetic naturalism’ (see Long
2005:43): this, put briefly, focuses on the imitating power of words as expressed by the
imitative potential of a word’s phonetic elements, its simple phonetic sounds (=
‘phonemes’, in contemporary terminology); these phonetic elements are considered as
“phonetic similes of basic qualities things have, such as liquidity, stability, harshness,
magnitude, etc.” (Sedley 2006:220). In the end, this second argument is rejected, and so
is etymology as a method to access knowledge, while, at the same time, the role of
convention is acknowledged.

The conclusion is that although words function to “teach and distinguish reality”
(388b13-c1), they do not reflect things and reality’s structure after all, but rather they
express the name-giver’s (onomatothétēs) concept of the world. Therefore, one should
not give much credit to words, but investigate things themselves instead
(438d2-439b9).

2.4 The Origins of Language

In a different way, only indirectly related to the above opposition, Epicurus and

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Epicureans dealt with the debate of ‘nature vs. convention’, applying the dimension of
‘nature’, used elsewhere in considering the correctness of words, to examine the
origins of words (see Epicur. Ep. ad Herod. 75-6; cf. Lucr. 5.1028-90 and Diogenes
Oenoandensis, 12.2.11-5.14 Smith).

Although evidence suggests that all the philosophers before Epicurus (regardless of
whether they considered the correctness of names as natural or not) took the
imposition (thésis) of names for granted (see, e.g., Pl. Crat. 390d: thésis tôn onomátōn;
397c, 401b; see also 388e-389d: nomothḗtēs, onomatothḗtēs/-ai; cf. also section 1.1 above,
on Parmenides), Epicurus himself rejects the view that language was created ‘by
imposition’ (= thései) and adopts two distinctive stages that concern: 1) the origins and
2) the evolution of language:

1. The origins of language were natural as belonging to human nature (like voice,
vision and hearing; fr. 335 Usener), and also as a reaction to emotions and
impressions, occurring differently in each tribe. Each emotion or impression led
to a peculiar exhalation of breath, in accordance with the different location of
each tribe (Epicur. Ep. ad Herod. 75).

2. The evolution of language, the second stage of its development, occurred in each
tribe when the factor of a common agreement (koinôs) is brought in so that there
can be clarity and accuracy to facilitate verbal communication. This stage seems
to also include the introduction of new words by those ‘savants’ who conceive of
the existence of ‘non-existing’ or abstract things that are not perceived by most
people (polloί; Bailey 1980:1487 claims that this is a third stage).

3. The Semiotic Triangles

The common term ‘semiotic triangle’ is used in contemporary semiotics and linguistics
(after Ogden & Richards 1923:11) to refer to the tripartite structure of the linguistic
sign, that is, to the use of three units for the needs of sēmeίōsis, one of which is the
medium between the other two (Manetti 1993:94). This ‘semiotic triangle’ has its origin
in Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics.

3.1 Plato, Cratylus

The conclusion reached by Socrates in Plato’s Cratylus implies that names do not
illustrate the nature of things after all, but express the name-giver’s concept of the
world (438aff.). Consequently, there relation between a name and what it names is not
direct: rather, a name declares a subjective representation (= meaning) of a thing (see
Manetti 1993:63; see also Oehler 2006:135ff.).

3.2 Aristotle, On Interpretation

Aristotle is considered by ancient ‒ and, partly, by contemporary ‒ scholarship to have

given a clear answer to the ‘nature vs. convention’ debate discussed in Plato’s Cratylus
(see, for example, Dalimier 1998; Struck 2004:83; van den Berg 2008). In Aristotle’s On

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Interpretation, spoken sounds (Aristot. Int. 16a4-9: tà en têi phōnêi), words (16a26-28:
onómata) and speech (17a1-2: lógos) are said to be ‘symbols’, ‘signs’ and ‘by convention’
(see Weidemann 1991:179ff.; Ax 2000:32-33; also Arens 2000:367-368).

Scholars trace the first attempt for a ‘semantic/semiotic’ approach of language, the
first semantic theory on interpreting thoughts by means of words, to the famous
Aristotelian ‘semantic passage’, the text with the greatest influence in the history of
semantics/semiotics (see Kretzman 1974:3; Irwin 1982; Weidemann 1991:170-173 and
176ff.; Manetti 1996; Sedley 1996; Verbeke 1996; Ax 2000:59-63; Arens 2000:367-370;
Modrak 2001:1). Aristotle is considered to have initiated the ‘structuralist’ approach to
language, which is the opposite of functionalism (see Givόn 2001:4). The philosopher
epitomizes the relation between experiential data, mental/psychological states and
language. Aristotle’s belief is that words function as symbols, according to the
conventional way decided by the members of a linguistic community, and that they
signify things via the soul’s pathḗmata, which are the ‘first meanings’ (noḗmata) formed
by the figurative impressions of things, after their sensory perception (see Ax 2000, and
also Weidemann 1991):

“Now spoken sounds are symbols of affections in the soul, and written marks symbols of of
spoken sounds. And just as written marks are not the same for all men, neither are
soull – are
spoken sounds. But what these are in the first place signs of – affections of the sou
the same for all; and what these affections are likenesses of – actual things – are also
a lso the
same” (Arist. Int. 16a4-9, transl. Ackrill)
Ackrill )

Aristotle discusses two levels of ‘semantic’ relations: the first one involves vocal sounds
and mental/psychological states, and the second one involves these states as well as
experiential data, which are neither linguistic nor mental. These three units and their
interrelations form a rather clearly schematized ‘semantic triangle’ (see Manetti
1993:72) and attract the attention of linguistics, psychology, semiotics and logic. The
terms of this text that are considered to epitomize the first attempt towards a
semantic/semiotic approach towards the phenomenon of linguistic expression and
which, at the same time, constitute the three angles of the famous Aristotelian
semantic triangle are the following:

1. ‘Things’ (prágmata) are perceived through senses.

2. The ‘affections of the soul’ (pathḗmata tês psukhês) are the mental states that
follow sensory perception and are formed before linguistic expression; they are
called ‘likenesses’ (homoiṓmata) of things.

3. Vocal sounds (tà en têi phōnêi/taîs phōnaί) follow the formation of the ‘affections of
the soul’, of which they are called ‘symbols’ and ‘signs’. (A fourth term, ‘those that
are written’ (tà graphómena), concerns the graphic representations of spoken
sounds).

The ‘affections of the soul’ are the soul’s mental states (= thoughts) ‒ as noûs belongs to
the Soul according to Aristotle ‒ which means that they are the ‘affections of the

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mental soul’ (see Weidemann 1991). More specifically, they are the ‘first
thoughts/concepts’, formed on the basis of figures that are modeled on imprints
(phantásmata) left in the mind by the sensory perception of things. These ‘affections’
are naturally related to things and are called their ‘likenesses’. So far, the first level of
the semantic passage concerns a natural procedure:

pathḗmata tês psukhês (affections of the soul, ‘first meanings’)

tà en têi phōnêi/taîs phōnaί (vocal sounds) prágmata (‘things’)

The vocal sounds represent things as ‘symbols’ and ‘signs’, and they are conventionally
connected to the ‘affections of the soul’: despite the intensive and controversial
discussion among scholars concerning the possible differentiation between the terms
súmbola and sēmeîa, Aristotle seems to use both terms rather indistinctively, and in
general he formulates the view that things are expressed and represented via
articulate vocal meaningful sounds, which are names (onómata), verbs (rhḗmata),
assertions, negations and, generally, via what the term tà en têi phōnêi comprises (see
Weidemann 1991; Arens 2000). He expresses the view that speakers of the same
language can communicate their thoughts and ideas by means of their vocabulary and
thus can refer to the same things. What is more, in On Interpretation, Aristotle not only
explicitly refers to the three constituents of signification, which are ‘things’, ‘mental
activity’ and ‘linguistic expression’, but he also implies a distinction between
reflexive/direct expression and language.

3.3 The Stoics

After Aristotle, the Stoics claimed that names are ‘by nature’ and their views have
many similarities with those expressed by Cratylus (for the influence of the Platonic
dialogue on the Stoics, see Barwick 1957:70-79). However, the Stoic semiotic triangle is
considered to be a development of the Aristotelian one.

Our main source for the specifically Stoic approach is Sextus Empiricus (Sext. Emp.
8.11-12). Starting from the basic distinction between unarticulated phonetic matter and
structured linguistic form, as formulated by Aristotle (Aristot. Hist. an. 488a31-32,
535a30-31; PA 659b27-30; An. 420b12ff.; Int. 17b13-17), the Stoics schematize the act of
signification using the terms ‘what is signified’ (tò sēmainómenon) in the vocal sounds
(phōnḗ), which is also a concrete state of affairs (autò tò prâgma), ‘that which signifies’
(tò sēmaînon) and the object of reference (tò tunkhánon). These three units are linked
with each other: the spoken word indicates what is signified and the object of reference
is the existing thing itself. What is unique in this approach is that the ‘state of affairs’ is
not a ‘body’ (in Stoic theory, ‘bodies’ are not only material substances, but also
qualities and several states), but a ‘sayable’ (lektón), which is either true or false. The
Stoic approach thus contains:

sēmainómenon (signified)

lektón (sayable)

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sēmaînon (signifier)

tunkhánon (existing object)

Lektón is what exists in phantasía and can be expressed in words (Diog. Laert. 7.63.5-6
Long = von Arnim, SVFII.181 = Hülser 696; Sext. Emp. 8.69.6-8 = von Arnim, SVFII.187 =
Hülser 326). This term concerns the “sense of significant discourse” (see Sedley
1996:94), the semantic realization itself. The Stoic ordering of lektá is one of the crucial
linguistic approaches in ancient Greek thought. The earlier surviving source about lektá
is Diocles of Magnesia in the so-called ‘Diocles fragment’, preserved in Diogenes
Laertius (7.66 Long; on lektá see in general Long 1986:131ff.; Egli 1986; Frede 1987:343ff.;
Householder 1994:217).

4. Neoplatonic Commentators on Aristotle: Ammonius (of

Hermeias)
The Neoplatonic commentaries on Aristotle belong to the long commentatory tradition
inaugurated by Plotinus, when philosophy began to be identified with commentating
the writings of the two great thinkers. These philosophers’ exḗgēsis is directed in
accordance with the crucial ‘principle of agreement’ between Plato and Aristotle (see
Karamanolis 2006): it is the commentators’ belief that reading Aristotle (Plato’s best
‘student’) contributed to the deepest understanding of Plato’s philosophy (see Kotzia
2007:194-201).

4.1 Language is Both ‘By Nature’ and ‘By Convention’

Ammonius, son of Hermeias (end of 5th- beginning of 6th c.; see Blank 1996:1), the
student of Proclus in the Athenian School (founded by Plutarch of Athens; it was closed
by Justinian’s order in 529 CE: see Beaucamp 2002; Sorabji 2005:9), was the Head of the
School in Alexandria (see Sorabji 1990:1-30; Westering, Trouillard and Segonds
2003:x-xlii; Blumenthal 1993:307-325). Ammonius’ commentary on Aristotle’s On
Interpretation is the only surviving Greek Neoplatonic commentary on that ‘linguistic
text’ of antiquity; Proclus (whose commentary on Plato’s Cratylus survives) commented
on it but did not publish his commentary.

When commenting on Aristotle’s ‘semantic passage’ (see section 3.2 above), Ammonius
exploits the Socratic distinction between the ‘creation’ and the ‘use’ of a name (see Pl.
Crat. 389a2ff. 390c10-11), as well as the concept of the Platonic ‘name-giver’ (see section
2.2 above), in order to explain Aristotle’s characterization of onómata as súmbola:
according to Ammonius, the name-giver is thoroughly aware of the nature of a thing,
and he thus imposes the appropriate name. This means that a name is katà sunthḗkēn
(‘by convention’) as Aristotle claims, but only from the point of view of its ‘imposition’,
as well as its later established use by the members of a linguistic community (Ammon.
in Int. 35.17ff.). However, since this imposition takes place according to the knowledge
of the nature of things, the name is also an homoίōma (‘likeness’), not a natural one, but
one katà tékhnēn (‘according to some art’; for the term tékhnē in name-giving see Pl.

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Crat. 389a2, 390e1-4, 393d4; see also Procl. in Cra. 123.1-6). For Ammonius, the terms
homoíōma katà tékhnēn and súmbolon are not incompatible, because when a name is
imposed without aiming at genuinely representing a thing, then it is imposed askópōs
(‘without any purpose’) and it is a simple súmbolon; nevertheless, when it is imposed
‘according to reason’ (katà lógon tethén), it is, of course, a symbol, because it can be
represented by a variety of spoken sounds, but it is also a homoíōma, to the extent that
it represents the substance of what it named (Ammon. in Int. 40.18-22).

It is worth noting that in this approach, the representation through spoken sounds is
identified with the symbolic nature: a name can be a ‘likeness’, but its linguistic
realization through spoken sounds is not naturally connected with its substance
(Socrates in Pl. Crat. 431e9-432e2 also says that a name can be composed of various
elements, stoikheîa; Proclus refers to the variety of sounds when representing things: in
Crat. 51.21ff.). The view that the spoken sounds that compose a word are not naturally
connected to its meaning is commonly accepted by the Neoplatonic commentators on
Aristotle, starting with Porphyry: it is not the ‘signified’ (sēmainόmenon) that connects
(sundeî/sunáptei) the syllables of the word with each other (Porph. in Cat. 102.2-8; Simpl.
in Cat. 89.32-90.2, 124.14-19; on the ‘arbitrariness’ of the linguistic sign according to
Neoplatonics, see Chriti 2011).

According to Ammonius, the imposition and use of names is only one of the various
aspects we should take into account when approaching language: Ammonius argues
that language is not ‘by convention’ in an absolute way, observing that Aristotle
himself, when creating new words, followed some ‘guidelines’ of derivation and
composition of the language he used so that his new words could be recognizable
(Ammon. in Int. 37.18-27; see Aristot. Cat. 7a5-7; Eth. Nic. 1108a17-19).

In his effort to reconcile Plato and Aristotle according to the ‘principle of agreement’
(see section 4 above), Ammonius creates new terms for ónoma: homoíōma katà tékhnēn
and súmbolon katà lógon/mḕ askópōs tethén, having assimilated interconnected
philosophical views from Plato, Aristotle and Neoplatonism, but he constructs a more
elaborated theoretical basis concerning language, revealing his awareness that it is a
rather complicated phenomenon which can’t be approached in an absolute way.

5. Conclusion
In general, if we made an attempt to render an overall approach of ancient Greek
philosophical reflection on language, it would not be inappropriate to say that ancient
Greek philosophy on language, beyond specific schools and philosophers, is
multileveled in its entirety. Apart from challenging the relation of linguistic thought to
myth, the views formulated by ancient Greek philosophers from the Pre-Socratics to
the Neoplatonists constructed the basis for grammar and rhetoric during the Middle
Ages and constituted a key frame for the development of contemporary linguistics.

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Pre-Socratics, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Sophists, Protagoras, Plato's Cratylus, Aristotle's On
Interpretation, Democritus, origins of language, semiotic triangles, Stoics

PARASKEVI KOTZIA ✝
MARIA CHRITI

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