‘Parmenides principle’

(The analysis of Aboutness)

Motto:
Es gibt eine und nur eine vollständige Analyse des Satzes
Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 3.25

Pavel Materna Marie Duží

Ueberhaupt ist es unmöglich, von einem Gegenstande zu sprechen, ohne ihn irgendwie zu
bezeichnen oder zu benennen1.

Introduction
The principle somewhat vaguely formulated by Frege (see above) and called
‘Parmenides2 Principle’ in a not published manuscript by Pavel Tichý, can be interpreted in
two mutually complementing ways. First – the way exploited by Frege and Tichý – an
expression cannot be said to speak about something without denoting (naming) this
something; an analysis of an expression must not contain reference to an object that is not
mentioned in the expression. So naming should be a necessary condition of referring to an
object. But here a question can arise: Should naming not be a sufficient condition as well, i.e.,
should the analysis not respect all subsexpressions of an expression that denote an object?
In Section I a closer specification of these two interpretations is given. What is talking
about and denoting is explicated in Section II. Section III proposes an explication of an
analysis of (an expression). Whether it is possible, in general, to connect an expression with
one unambiguous analysis is being answered in the final Section IV. Since all the sections
concern analyses of empirical expressions, an important Appendix tries to answer our
questions for the case of mathematical / logical expressions.

I. A generalisation
Let us talking about X denote Talkx and denoting (”naming”) X by Denx. A standard
‘formalization’ of Parmenides principle (PP) would be
  (Talkx   Denx),
which is equivalent to
(Talkx  Denx).
Verbatim this means that Frege – in particular in the local context of Grundlagen – warns us:
If you do not denote X then you do not talk about X. (In the given context in Grundlagen it
means: whale does not denote particular animals, so the sentence All whales are mammals
does not talk about particular animals.) On the other hand, Frege’s implication could be
reversed (which would be a sort of ‘generalisation’ of Frege’s dictum): If a (sub)expression
names an object (‘denotes it’), then the optimum analysis should construct the respective
object. To adduce an example, consider the sentence Black swans live in Australia. If my
logical analysis of this sentence attaches a simple property to black swans, then I cannot talk
about the two properties black and swan that are denoted by the particular expressions black
and swan, which can influence my deductive ability (can I deduce – under such an analysis –
that some swans live in Australia?).
To realise our generalisation we postulate a rather trivial claim

1
G.Frege: Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik. W.Koebner, Breslau 1884, 60
2
Parmenides: It is not possible to talk about something that does not exist.

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 (Denx  Talkx),
so that PP can be written
(Talkx  Denx).

II. Talking about X and denoting X

a) What do we talk about?
In Tichý (1975) it is convincingly shown that empirical expressions are about (talk
about) intensions. We need not repeat Tichý’s criticism of Putnam’s and Goodman’s
proposals which – if they were correct – would save extensionalism in this respect. Suffice it
to recapitulate the main idea of Tichý’s intensionalism. Empirical expressions like empirical
sentences, common nouns, definite descriptions etc. are unable to talk about truth-values,
classes, individuals etc.: accepting, as we do, that such expressions talk about some criteria
which can be satisfied in the actual world, we have to admit that if these criteria are best
modelled as functions whose values are dependent on possible worlds (and time points) then
such expressions would be able to talk about the values of these functions in the actual world
if the actual world – as the argument of these functions (intensions) – were known. Yet
nobody can know which of the possible worlds is the actual one. A simple argument is that if
the identity of the actual world were known then every expression of the above kind would
determine the value of the respective intension a priori.
To illustrate this argument, consider the expression the highest mountain (HM). Does
HM talk about Mount Everest? If somebody thinks so, then (s)he probably has forgotten that
(s)he has once got another piece of information, viz. The highest mountain is Mount Everest.
The expression alone does not inform us about this contingent (i.e., empirical) fact. If
however the argument of the respective intension (i.e., the actual world) were known we
could compute the respective value in terms of the particular components of HM. Observe
also that from the premise
The highest mountain is in Asia
you cannot logically derive the conclusion
Mount Everest is in Asia.
HM is a semantically self-contained expression that unambiguously determines a
‘role’ an individual has to play to become the highest mountain. (Thus it is no kind of
indexical expressions unless we share – as we do not – D.Lewis’ conception of possible
worlds as indices.) Such individual roles (‘offices’, as they have been called by Tichý) are
what Church (see [1956]) has called ‘individual concepts’; they are kind of intension, viz.
they associate every possible world (and time point) with at most one individual. Talking in
HM about the highest mountain we talk just about such an individual role. The sentence The
highest mountain is Mount Everest talks about the highest mountain and about Mount
Everest.
b) Denotation, reference, sense
We refuse to refer to all these hundreds of books and articles concerning the famous
Frege’s puzzle. Suffice it that we quote a place from Kirkham (1992/1997) where the most
popular and most widespread interpretation of Frege’s problem is articulated.
Since the seminal work of Gottlob Frege (1892) it has been a commonplace (italics
ours) that the meaning of an expression has at least two components: the sense and the
reference. The sense of an expression is often called the connotation or the intension of
the expression, and the reference is often called the denotation or extension of the
expression. The extension of an expression is the object or set of objects referred to,
pointed to, or indicated by, the expression. ... The extension of ‘the morning star’ is a
certain planet, Venus. The extension of a predicate is the set of all objects to which the

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 predicate truly applies. The extension of ‘red’ is the set of all red things. The extension
of ‘vertebrate with a liver’ is the set of all vertebrates with liver. ... (p.4)
Thus the traditional scheme looks as follows:
expression  sense = intension  denotation = reference = extension
It is the deep argumentation in Tichý (1988) what makes us have some more thoughts about
this ‘commonplace scheme’. First of all, intension is a widespread explication of Frege’s
sense. But what is an intension? In the quotation above the author (and not only he) uses the
phrase intension of an expression. This reminds us of the way intensions are explicated, e.g.,
in Montague’s work; the consequence is that an expression possesses extension as well as
intension. The problem is that what is the intension of as well as the extension of should be
defined independently of language. Tichý – assuming as we do that language is a kind of code
– formulates this problem succinctly in Tichý (1994):
The notion of a code presupposes that prior to, and independently of, the code itself
there is a range of items to be encoded in it. Hence…meanings cannot be conceived of
as products of the language itself. They must be seen as logical rather than linguistic
structures, amenable to investigation quite apart from their verbal embodiments in any
particular language. To investigate logical constructions in this way is the task of logic.
The linguist‘s brief is to investigate how logical constructions are encoded in various
vernaculars.
As for intensions, this view is shared by possible-world semantics (PWS): there intensions are
conceived of as being functions the arguments of which are possible worlds. For Tichý’s
transparent intensional logic (TIL) they are functions that associate possible worlds as
arguments with chronologies, i.e., functions from time points, to some objects of a given type.
It seems that Kirkham does not accept (in his scheme) this definition but this point is not
important for us now. If we explicate intension in this PWS sense then we get the following
interpretation of the scheme above:
An expression gets its denotation via a function from possible worlds (and times); the
denotation – according to Frege’s conception of the relation between sense and denotation
(die Art des Gegebenseins) – is the value of this function in the actual world. (This is only a
‘contemporary’ interpretation of Frege – not that Frege would accept PWS.)
But then we would be never able to get the denotation, for the relevant argument, viz. the
actual world, is not logically accessible.
The morning star – evening star example shows this consequence very clearly. If the intension
connected as the sense with the expression morning star should lead to Venus (similarly as in
the case of evening star) then the astronomers unnecessarily stated the (‘contingent’) identity
of the celestial body playing the role of morning star with the celestial body playing the role
of evening star: it was a matter of linguistics/semantics to say: These are synonyms!
The solution offered by TIL is simple. It consists in an essential shift of the scheme; as
we already suggested in a) intensions are what the (empirical) expressions denote. (See,
however Appendix.) So the morning star as well as the evening star denotes an individual
role; these roles are, however, distinct. To say that the sentence The morning star is the
evening star is true means to say that among the pairs world, time where the sentence is
true there is the pair the actual world, the present time point. And since we do not know
which world is the actual one the sentence has to be verified empirically (which the
astronomers did) and denotes a proposition rather than its truth-value and is because of this
informative (unlike, e.g., the sentence The morning star is the morning star).
The modified scheme looks now as follows
expression  sense (= ?)  denotation = intension
Now we need to elucidate two terms: sense and reference.

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 How to explicate sense will be explained in the next section. As for reference we now
have an opportunity to make a difference between denotation and reference: whereas
denotation is an intension (and is thus attached to the expressions of the given language by
linguistic convention, i.e., relatively a priori) the reference is the value of the respective
intension in the actual world. Logical analyses lead us to intensions, no logical analyses can
lead us to references.
An alternative notion of reference is a relative one: the reference of the expression in
the world W at the time T is the value of the respective intension in W at T.
c) Talking and Denoting
Talking and denoting are relations between an expression E and an object X. But if we
accepted the equivalence between Talkx and Denx, as it has been specified in Section I, we
would get one and the same relation, and we could say that empirical expressions denote (talk
about) intensions. Why then do we distinguish between talking and denoting? Consider, e.g.,
once again Frege’s example All whales are mammals. The sentence denotes a proposition and
talks about this proposition. But the sentence talks also about whales and mammals or, more
precisely, about a property (of being a) whale and mammal. It claims that these properties are
not logically independent, namely the former “implies” the latter, or, in other words, the latter
is a requisite of the former. The sentence talks about whales and mammals because there are
subexpressions of the sentence that denote these properties. Hence we can now reformulate
the ‘Parmenides principle’ as follows:
An empirical expression E talks about all and only those objects that are denoted by some
(sub)expressions SE of E. (We take E being a (sub)expression of E as well.)
‘Formalising’ schematically we get:
(I1) ( (E Talkx)   SE (SE Denx) )
(I2) (  SE (SE Denx)  (E Talkx) )
(EQ) (  SE (SE Denx)  (E Talkx) )
In what follows we adhere to Frege’s principle (I1), which together with the principle of
compositionality eventuates in: A possible analysis of an expression E can combine only
constructions of the objects the expression E talks about. And we will examine particular
possible analyses that more or less neglect the principle (I2) - “omit something”, so as we can
eventually show that the accurate analysis must not omit anything and has thus to follow the
principle (EQ)3.

III Logical analysis

Let us return to the ‘shifted’ scheme
expression  sense (= ?)  intension
All what Frege said about sense, was that it is a mode of presentation (die Art des
Gegebenseins), viz., of what is denoted. We have argued for accepting intensions as what is
denoted (by empirical expressions). One could try to put oneself to Frege’s position and
object: Why should not intensions – as functions from possible worlds – play the role of
sense? Why could not these criteria be just modes of presentation of such ‘extensional’

3
Note that according to (I1) Frege’s sentence All whales are mammals does not talk about truth-function
implication; hence a standard analysis of the form x ( whale(x)  mammal(x) ) does not follow (I1), and (I1)
might seem to be too demanding, too restrictive. Well, Russell claims that when analysing a sentence we have to
discover its logical structure, even if not following its linguistic structure. We deal with this problem in the
Appendix, where we show that an analysis of an unambiguous expression should follow (I1), and if it does not,
then another (albeit equivalent) expression has been analysed. For instance, the above “standard” analysis
corresponds to the sentence If anything is a whale then it is a mammal, which denotes the same proposition as
the original sentence but is not synonymous with it.

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objects like truth-values, classes, individuals, etc.? There are two reasons why not: the first
has been explained in II b) – denotations would not be accessible; a mode of presentation is
powerless as for determining the given state of the world. The second reason is connected
with the problem of structured meanings or hyperintensionality4. Intensions are functions,
mappings, so they are set-theoretical entities and as such they cannot present anything. As
Zalta in (1988) says:
...sets...are not the kind of thing that would help us to understand the nature of
presentation. There is nothing about a set in virtue of which it may be said to present
something to us. (p.183).
Cresswell (as well as Kaplan) tried to solve this problem by modelling meanings as ordered
tuples. Tichý in his (1994) has shown that this attempt is insufficient; his own solution goes
via the notion of construction. The result of an adequate logical analysis cannot be an
intension: there is no possibility how to represent such mappings as intensions are. The
analysis ends with constructing such an intension: from such a construction we can derive the
respective criterion, i.e., say in what kind of worlds and times which object is the reference of
the expressions analysed.
We cannot define constructions here, so we refer to Tichý (1988) and (a modified
version) to Materna (1998). Here only briefly:
First: Constructions are abstract procedures and are defined in a way that is partly
inspired by the typed -calculus. They are, however, no -terms because they are no
expressions. When they are fixed by some artificial symbols then it means only that using
these symbols we speak about the procedures: not about the symbols (these are only used).
Therefore they could correspond to what Frege might have in his mind, since Frege’s realistic
semantics presupposed that senses are extra-linguistic objects.
Further: Constructions ‘work’ over the collection of types defined as sets of all partial
functions over the base consisting of four basic (atomic) types:  (truth-values), 
(individuals),  (time points / real numbers),  (possible worlds). A simple as well as a
ramified hierarchy of types is defined. Functions with arguments in types 1,...,m and values
in  are of the type (1...m). So where  is an arbitrary type, intensions are of the type
(()), abbreviated .
Variables (infinitely many for each type) are not characters but a kind of
constructions, the usual letters like x, y, z, ..., p, q, ..., f, g, ... are names of variables.
Trivialisation is the construction that only constructs the given object without any
change. Where X is an object whatsoever, even a construction, the trivialisation of this object
is denoted by 0X.
The remaining two constructions correspond to well-known -operations: application
of a function to arguments, and creating a function via -abstraction. The former construction
(”composition”) has the form [XX1...Xm] (”the function constructed – maybe dependently on
valuation, ‘v-constructed’ – by X is applied to arguments (v-)constructed by X1,...,Xm,
respectively”), the latter (”closure”) has the form [x1...xm X] (roughly: constructs a function
from those types which the variables range over to the type of what is v-constructed by X).
Intensions – unless they are constructed by trivialisation – are constructed as follows:
wt X,
where w, t are variables ranging over , , respectively, and X constructs for each valuation
concerning w, t at most one object of the given type. If an intension constructed by a
construction C is applied to (what is v-constructed by) w and then to (...) t then this (double)
application (represented by the composition [[Cw]t] ) is abbreviated by Cwt.

4
See Carnap (1947) and his intensional isomorphism, Cresswell (1975), Cresswell (1985) and his tuples.

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Definition 1
(From the viewpoint of TIL) a logical analysis of an expression E consists in finding a
construction C such that every closed (sub-)construction of C is a ‘minimal’ construction
that constructs an object denoted by the respective (sub-)expression of E.
We will call any such construction C an analysis of E. –
Constructions, as abstract procedures, are complex (unlike, e.g., intensions), and they
share this feature, in general, with expressions. Thus the structure of a construction should as
much as possible correspond to (and, therefore, in principle be derivable from) the respective
expression. Clearly, constructions are ‘international’ in the sense that they are not language
specific: the structure of a construction is never identical with the corresponding grammatical
structure; there must be, however, some rules – specific for each particular language – which
‘translate’ the grammatical structure into the ‘constructional structure’5.
We adduce an example of an analysis. (Not defining any set of rules; such a task is
extremely more difficult and its solution is not important for our purpose.)
Consider the sentence
The highest mountain is in Asia.
The first step we make is a type-theoretical analysis:
mountain denotes an intension, say, M; it is a property of individuals, so a function from  to
a chronology of classes of individuals, so the type of M is (). (We write M/().); (is) in
Asia denotes again a property of individuals, say, A. We have A/(). Now highest denotes
the following intension H: when applied in W at T to a class of individuals, H selects that
individual (if any) which is the highest one in W at T. Thus we have H/(()). The whole
sentence denotes a proposition, i.e., an object of the type .
Now the synthesis comes. Our task can be formulated as follows:
Let us combine M/(), A/(), H/(()) so as to obtain a construction that will construct
a proposition P/ true at such pairs <W,T> where that individual which is the highest
mountain has the property A (being_in_Asia).
So we have: w t [ [ [0A w] t] [ [ [0H w] t] [ [0M w] t]]]
(   ) ( ()) ( )


abstraction over  ()
abstraction over  (())
(Abbreviated notation: w t [0Awt [0Hwt 0Mwt]] )
Returning to PP:
Expressions talk about just those objects that are denoted by them and by their (meaningful)
components.
From our viewpoint a general principle (concerning not only empirical expressions) says:
Being denoted by E means being constructed by an analysis of E.
Now it could seem that together with PP we could formulate the following claim:
An expression E talks just about those objects that are constructed by an analysis of E and by
subconstructions of this analysis.

5
A question may arise whether an “ideal translation” from a language A to a language B without breaking
Parmenides principle is possible. It might be performed as follows: Using ‘rules for A’ “translate” an expression
E of A into a construction C. Now using ‘reverse rules for B’ “translate” the construction C into (encode C by)
an expression E’ of B. Can’t it happen now that grammatical rules of B do not make it possible to “directly re-
translate” C into E’ (encode C by an E’) without breaking Parmenides principle?

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But then an important problem comes into being.

IV. The analysis?

The problem begins as soon as we become aware of the fact that one and the same
expression can be analysed in more than one way. A simple example: take the sentence
Black swans are rare.
We now offer two analyses:
1) BS/() (black_swan is a property BS of individuals), R/(()) (rare is a property
R of properties; observe that the type of a property of objects which are of the type  is
()).
w t [0Rwt 0BS]
2) B/(() ()) (black – as what is denoted by the adjective black – is a function B which
associates with every W, T the function which associates every property P of individuals with
a class, viz. with the class of those objects with the property P that are (at <W,T>) black; we
will call such objects adjectival modifiers), S/() (swan is a property S of individuals), R
as above.
w t [0Rwt wt [0Bwt 0S]].
Now what does our sentence talk about? It talks about a proposition, about the properties
black_swan, rare, swan, and the adjectival modifier black. Our first analysis neglects
black and swan, whereas the second analysis respects all the objects our sentence talks about
(the property black_swan is here constructed by wt [0Bwt 0S]).
Hence according to the first analysis it seems as if the sentence did not talk, e.g., about the
property swan, which is surely suspect.
Theoretically, the solution is easy (unlike its feasibility): an expression E talks just about
those objects that are constructed by the (most adequate, most accurate, best) analysis of E.
Now we have two problems:
i) Given an expression E, does the analysis of E exist?
(The question of unique existence - QUE)
ii) If so, according to which criterion can such an analysis be found?
Obviously, if we defend the positive answer to QUE we cannot convince anybody unless we
suggest a convincing answer to ii). Our defence of the positive answer to QUE will therefore
begin with suggesting the criterion in question.
Let us return to the sentence
The highest mountain is in Asia.
Our analysis was
w t [0Awt [0Hwt 0Mwt]] .
0
The A in this analysis constructs the property being_in_Asia. No doubt, the sentence surely
talks about this property. Yet we would like to admit that it also talks about Asia and the
relation represented by being in. One reason is very clear. Let our sentence be a premise of an
argument whose second premise is
Asia is the greatest continent.
If the first premise talks – according to our analysis – about being_in_Asia only, not about
Asia, then the analysis does not make possible the obvious conclusion
The highest mountain is in the greatest continent.
Our analysis is not fine-grained enough; we did not respect semantically self-contained sub-
expressions being in and Asia.
There are two mutually dependent criteria leading to the ‘ideal’ choice.

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Criterion 1: An analysis A is worse than an analysis B iff using A blocks some inferences
made possible by B.
Criterion 2: An analysis A of an expression E is worse than an analysis B iff some
semantically self-contained subexpression of E has not been analysed in A and –
ceteris paribus – has been analysed in B.
We can accept a very natural assumption:
Satisfying Criterion 2 we eo ipso satisfy Criterion 1.
It seems now that we can formulate the definition of the (most adequate) analysis of an
expression E:
Definition 2
A is the analysis of E iff there is a one-to-one function f such that f associates every
(occurrence of) semantically self-contained (sub-)expression SE of E with a (occurrence of)
(sub-)construction C of A and C is an analysis of SE. –
Now when the sought-for definition came into being we can sigh with relief, can’t we?
Not at all: Now some complications can be observed.
First: Our definition does not automatically answer the question QUE. For this
question to be answered positively we would have to prove existence of f.
Second: The term semantically self-contained expression (sse) might be not
intelligible enough. To adduce an example, we could doubt whether prepositions are sses; in
our example with being in Asia we could accept that not only being in but also being and in
are sse. Then our analyses would have to essentially change.
Third: Let us accept that closed constructions (i.e. constructions without any
occurrence of a free variable) are concepts (see Materna (1998)). Then a very important
complication can be formulated as follows: It is not the case that analysing a simple (mostly
one-word) expression we get a simple concept (see Materna (2000)). Simple concepts are
trivialisations of an object; it means that the construction does not contain any other
construction. To use the trivialisation symbol, i.e., 0X is the trivialisation of X, we are always
tempted to analyse simple expressions in this way, for example the analysis of the word whale
would be simply 0whale. But then our Criterion 1 cannot be preserved: the analysis of the
sentence Whales are mammals would not discover that the sentence is – respecting the
contemporary language – analytic. Indeed, if we take the word whale to be an abbreviation for
some zoological definiens then the analytic character of the sentence above becomes obvious.
This problem is deeper than it could seem. It could be solved if we relativised our
Definition to a conceptual system, i.e. to such a collection of constructions which is based on
a set of primitive concepts, i.e., of such simple concepts which are – within the given
conceptual system – taken as basic, no more analysable. Since the task of determining for the
given natural language the ‘absolute conceptual system’ is not feasible, what remains is, as it
seems, to offer various analyses of the expression E and show that each of them is the
analysis of E with respect to a conceptual system. The unicity of the analysis is so preserved;
the price to be paid is a kind of relativisation.
Keeping in mind this relativity, let us still try to answer the question QUE, in other
words, we will prove the existence of the function f. Let us make some simplifications and /
or idealisations. First, let us suppose that the set of sses of a given expression E has been
determined, for instance, by a linguist. Second, let us first suppose that we “finish the
analysis” of a simple expression by trivialising the object denoted by this simple sse. In other
words, we do not take into account possible ontological definitions of the denoted object by
means of primitive concepts of a more “fine-grained” conceptual system.
Definition 3: Let C = {C1,…,Cn} be the set of all possible analyses of E. We define a partial
ordering  on C: Ci  Cj iff either Cj is worse than Ci (according to Criterion 2) or Ci and Cj

8
are equal, i.e. identical up to “renaming” -bound variables (0Ci = 0Cj, or they differ only in -
bound variables). If Cj is worse than Ci, we will also say that Ci is better than Cj. –
Claim: The poset (C, ) is a complete lattice L. The greatest element 1 of this lattice is the
worst analysis of E, namely trivialisation of the object denoted by E, the least element 0 is the
best analysis of E, i.e. the concept expressed by E (with respect to a conceptual system CS). –
Proof (outline)6:
We will prove that for any semantically self-contained (sub-)expression SE of E there is a
complete (finite) lattice of analyses with the greatest and least element. Hence every subset of
C has an infimum and a supremum within C, and the claim is proved by induction. Since the
poset (C, ) is finite, we obtain a complete lattice with the elements 1 and 0.
Let {S1,…,Sm} be the set of simple sses of E, and let D1,…,Dm be their respective denotations.
Let us further denote (schematically for any i, j, …) by Sij a composite sse of E such that Sij is
compound of Si, Sj, and by Dij the denotation of Sij. This denotation can be either constructed
by its trivialisation 0Dij, or defined by a composed construction of 0Di, 0Dj. If it is an
intension, then this definition is of the “form” (omitting “index” t) [w[0Diw0Djw]], we will
denote it schematically by [DiDj]. If the respective Sij occurs de re in E, the denotation Dij is
used and its occupant is constructed either by [DiDj]w or i-equivalently by a reduced form
[DiDj]. (We will now omit trivialisation and (possible) application of Dij to w.)
a) For Sij the lattice is: Dij  [DiDj].
b) Let Sijk consist of Si, Sj, Sk, Sij.
1) If Sij occurs de dicto (in Sijk), the lattice is: Dijk  [DijDk]  [[DiDj]Dk].
2) If Sij occurs de re (in Sijk), the lattice is: Dijk  [DijDk]  [[DiDj]wDk],
Dijk  [[DiDj]Dk]  [[DiDj]wDk].
(Note that [DijDk], [[DiDj]Dk] are incomparable, for the intension Dij is not
constructed by the latter, only its value in w, t is v-constructed.)
c) Let Sijkl consist of Si, Sj, Sk, Sl, Sij, Skl.
1) If one of Sij, Skl occurs de re (in Sijkl), the lattice is obtained in an analogous way as
in b)2), (combined with a)).
2) If both Sij, Skl occur de dicto (or if we use only non-reduced forms of analysis -
[DiDj]), the lattice is: Dijkl

[DijDkl]

[[DiDj]Dkl] [Dij[DkDl]]

[[DiDj] [DkDl]]
3) If both Sij, Skl occur de re, the lattice is: Dijkl

[[DiDj][DkDl]]

[[DiDj]w [DkDl]] [[DiDj][DkDl]w]

[[DiDj]w [DkDl]w]

Example: Let us analyse the sentence (a de re attitude)7:

6
A substantial role in the proof is played by the de dicto / de re distinction and i-equivalent reduction rule. An
exhaustive study on these problems is provided in Duží (2002).

9
 Charles believes of the richest man that he is in danger
or, reformulating it as synonymous:
(S) The richest man is believed by Charles to be in danger.
a) Type-theoretical analysis of the objects denoted by semantically self-contained sub-
expressions of S:
(S)  RMBCD / 
Charles  C / 
believe  B / (  )
richest  R / ( ())
man  M / ()
being in danger  D / ()
the richest man  RM / 
being believed by Charles to be in danger  BCD / ()
b) Possible analyses:
C0 0RMBCD
C1 wt [ [x [ 0Bwt 0C wt [0Dwt x]]] 0RMwt ]
C2 wt [ 0BCDwt 0RMwt ]
C3 wt [ 0BCDwt [0Rwt 0Mwt] ]
C4 wt [ [x [ 0Bwt 0C wt [0Dwt x]]] [0Rwt 0Mwt] ]
C5 wt [ [wt [x [ 0Bwt 0C wt [0Dwt x]]]]wt 0RMwt ]
C6 wt [ 0BCDwt [wt [0Rwt 0Mwt]]wt ]
C7 wt [ [x [ 0Bwt 0C wt [0Dwt x]]] [wt [0Rwt 0Mwt]]wt ]
C8 wt [ [wt [x [ 0Bwt 0C wt [0Dwt x]]]]wt [0Rwt 0Mwt] ]
C9 wt [ [wt [x [ 0Bwt 0C wt [0Dwt x]]]]wt [wt [0Rwt 0Mwt]]wt ]
c) The respective lattice:
C0

C1 C2 C3

C4

C5 C6

C7 C8

C9

7
For the sake of simplicity, we take into account here only an implicit attitude to a proposition.

10
 Which of these analyses is the accurate, the most adequate analysis of our sentence
(S)? In other words, which of C1,…,C9 is the concept expressed by (S)? We can see that C2
reveals the logical structure of (S) in an easy-to-survey way: The sentence claims that the
holder of the office RM has the property BCD. But it is too coarse-grained, because the other
denoted objects (C, B, R, M, D) are not constructed by any sub-construction of C2. On the
other hand, C4 is composed from simple concepts of C, B, R, M, D, but the construction of the
office RM, as well as the construction of the property BCD are missing. Similarly, all the
other Ci, except C9, are not sufficiently detailed and extended, there are always some ”missing
concepts, missing sub-analyses of the sses” here. But the analysis C9 is the only one that is in
compliance with our definition 2 of the most adequate analysis. All semantically self-
contained sub-expressions of (S) are analysed here, all the objects denoted by these sses are
constructed: either by simple concepts (0C, 0B, 0D, 0R, 0M) or by complex concepts, namely
the property BCD is constructed by [wt [x [ 0Bwt 0C wt [0Dwt x]]]] and the office RM is
constructed by [wt [0Rwt 0Mwt]]. The analysis of E, i.e. C9, respects the strongest form (EQ)
of Parmenides principle.
Note that the analysis of E is the concept expressed by E (the canonical form Horák
(2001) of the QUID-related constructions Materna (1998)), up to -equivalency, because -
equivalent constructions are equal with respect to the “quality” of analysis; -equivalent
‘non-minimal’ constructions are excluded according to Definition 1.
The sublattice L’ of the lattice L, which consists only of those analyses that are not
reduced with respect to i-equivalence [Duží 2002] is a distributive lattice. In our example L’
consists of C0, C2, C5, C6 and C9.
Now you may ask: Well, but how would we infer from C9 a consequence of our
sentence S, namely that Some rich man is believed by Charles to be in danger? The answer is
simple. The set of sses has not been stated correctly. ‘The richest man’ should be analysed as
‘the most rich man’ (denoting the office RM), and the adjusted set of sses should contain
instead of ‘the richest’ two other sses, namely ‘rich’ and ‘most’, that denote the adjectival
modifier Rich / ( () () ) and the function Most / ( ()), respectively, and the sse
‘rich man’ that denotes the property of being a rich man. The office RM would now be
constructed by composing constructions of these objects and of the property M (Man):
wt [0Mostwt [wt [0Richwt 0M]]wt]. Still, the above principles of creating the respective
lattice and obtaining the most adequate analysis would hold. (This is just an illustration of our
principles. A possible semantic objection might be – the richest man does not have to be
rich!)
Anyway, there is another problem. The simple concepts 0C, 0B, 0D, 0R, 0M, that have
been used in our analysis to construct the respective denoted objects, do not have to be the
primitive concepts of the conceptual system CS in use. If we analysed (S) over a more fine-
grained conceptual system, in which some of these objects were defined (constructed) using
”more primitive” concepts, we would simply replace the above trivializations in all the nodes
of the lattice (where they occur) by the respective definitions, obtaining thus a deeper
analysis. For instance, 0M might not be the primitive concept of CS, but the intension M could
be defined as ‘human being’, and constructed by [wt [0Humanwt 0Being]].
In the above considerations we generally made another simplification. We tacitly
presupposed that the expressions we analyse are already disambiguated. It means we did not
deal with, e.g., such sentences in which something „known from the context“ is concealed,
with the anaphora problem, ‘topic-focus’ articulation, and the like. Anyway, we are
convinced that on the assumption that an unambiguous expression is analysed, the accurate
analysis obeying the generalised ‘Parmenides principle’ exists and can be found using the
above described method.

11
Appendix. Non-empirical expressions.
Mathematical expressions. In general we could accept that even here the expression E
talks about just those objects that are denoted by E and its components. This time no
intensions are denoted: mathematics does not know (and does not need) possible worlds.
A simple example: (real) numbers greater than 0.
An analysis (again: it can be the analysis w.r.t. ...) will be
x [ 0 x 00].
Our expression (and its components) denotes (and, therefore, talks about) , 0 and
the_class_of_numbers_greater_than_0. This seems to be acceptable. Take, however, a
simple arithmetic sentence
7 + 5 = 12
(in honour of Kant). The simple corresponding construction shows that the sentence talks
about 7, 5, 12, +, 7+5, = and the truth-value True. But this time the result is a little bit
counterintuitive. We surely do not learn arithmetic in order to learn talking about truth-values.
It rather seems that the only kind of object denoted by mathematics are constructions (see
Tichý (1995)). In this case we would have to revise the semantic scheme from section 2 either
for mathematics or even universally8. Nothing what would correspond to Frege’s Sinn would
be then present; expressions would simply denote constructions. Whether the minimum
proposal or Tichý’s radical proposal are welcome in the context of logical analysis is, in our
opinion, an open question.
Note: The authors do not share the same opinion here. MD supposes that the same conception
as in case of empirical expressions can be kept for mathematical expressions as well. Don’t
we, after all, learn arithmetic in order to learn that 7 + 5 = 12 denotes the truth-value True,
whereas 7 + 5 = 13 the truth-value False? Yes, meanings of (empirical as well as
mathematical) expressions are constructions, but the constructed objects are ‘important’ as
well even in the case of mathematical expressions. Yes, as Tichý claims constructions are the
subject matter of mathematics, but in mathematics we actually „learn to talk about“ truth-
values, numbers, functions, etc. in different ways, using different constructions. The only
‘counterintuitive’ consequence is the fact that applying this conception consequently we
would have to admit that, e.g., 9  4 talks about (is another name of) 36. But this is just a
terminological problem.
Logical expressions. Empirical expressions frequently contain expressions denoting
logical objects like truth functions, quantifiers, identity etc. Constructions of such objects
enter, of course, into any analysis as well. Since we usually construe these objects as having
‘only’ instrumental character, it could seem as if ‘talking about them’ were not very apt. All
the same, there are reasons for using this phrase even for them. Let us give an example.
Some dogs are dangerous.
Here some denotes an existential quantifier, . Some is a semantically self-contained
expression:  can be conceived of as a member of the type ((()) ()) (in the area of
individuals; in general,  is type-theoretically polymorph): applied to a class K it returns the
class of all classes whose intersection with K is not empty. Let dog denote the property
D/(), dangerous the property, say, Dn (the same type), and some the above function .
Our analysis will be:
w t [[0 0Dwt] 0Dnwt]
Thus the sentence talks about (the proposition, of course, and) the properties D, Dn, about the
class of classes constructed by [0 0Dwt] that is denoted by the sse ‘some dogs’, but also about
. Do we really talk about the abstract object called ‘quantifier’ in the logical jargon? We

8
The former proposed by Materna in [1984], the latter by Tichý, see his [1988, p. 224]

12
think we do. Otherwise we could not refer to it saying, e.g., Don’t fear, I said ‘some’, not
‘all’! Note that the sentence does not talk about conjunction. Hence a “standard” analysis
using the “classical” quantifier ‘/(())
wt [0‘ x [0 [0Dwt x] [0Dnwt x]]]
corresponds to another (albeit equivalent but not synonymous) sentence There is something
(0‘ x) that is a dog and is dangerous.
Similarly Frege’s sentence All whales are mammals will be analysed using a general
quantifier  (denoted by all) of a type (((()) ()) – a function that applied to a class K it
returns the class of all classes that contain K as a subset:
w t [[0 0Whwt] 0Mamwt].

Acknowledgement: An inspiration for analysing the problems in the paper can be ascribed to Jaroslav Peregrin.

Marie Duží Pavel Materna

VŠB-Technická universita Ostrava Filosofický ústav AV ČR
tř. 17. listopadu 15 Jilská 1
708 33 Ostrava-Poruba 110 00 Praha 1
marie.duzi@vsb.cz materna@lorien.site.cas.cz

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
This work has been supported by the grant projects of GAČR: 401/03/1403 – Principles of Logical analysis of
language expressions and Intensional Logic, 401/02/1157 – Conceptual Systems.

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