G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967
HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL BECK,
petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE
LUKBAN, in his capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation;
SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL
VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN,
Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila;
JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City
Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of Quezon City,
respondents.
Facts: Petitioners, who have prior deportation cases pending, and the corporation they
form were alleged to committed "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs
Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code,” to which they were served
4 search warrants, directing any peace officer to search petitioners’ persons and/or
premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences for: “books of accounts,
financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios,
credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss
statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).”
The items allegedly illegally obtained can be classified into two groups: (1) those found
and seized in the offices of aforementioned corporations, and (2) those found in
petitioners’ residences.
Petitioners aver that the warrant is illegal for the following reasons: (1) they do not
describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash
money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were
issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed
against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the
documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued
the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law.
Respondent-prosecutors invoke the Moncado vs People’s Court ruling: even if the
searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents,
papers and things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein.
Issue: W/N the search warrants are valid.
Held: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Stonehill and company reversing the
Moncado doctrine. Though Stonehill et. al. are not the proper parties to assail the
validity of the search warrant issued against their corporation and thus they have no
cause of action (only the officers or board members of said corporation may assail said
warrant, and that corporations have personalities distinct from petitioners’
personalities), the 3 warrants issued to search petitioners’ residences are hereby
declared void. Thus, the searches and seizures made therein are made illegal.
The constitution protects the people’s right against unreasonable search and seizure. It
provides:
(1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge
in the manner set forth in said provision; and
(2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
In the case at bar, none of these are met.
The warrant was issued from mere allegation that petitioners committed a “violation of
Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised
Penal Code.” As no specific violation has been alleged, it was impossible for the judges
who issued said warrants to have found the existence of probable
cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party
against whom it is sought has performed or committed violations of the law. In other
words, it would be a legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a “violation
of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised
Penal Code,” — as alleged in the aforementioned applications — without reference to
any determinate provision of said laws or codes. General warrants are also to be
eliminated, as the legality or illegality of petitioners’ transactions is immaterial to the
invalidity of the general warrant that sought these effects to be searched and seized:
“Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ISSUES:
ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers
showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and Whether or not the proposed changes constitute an amendment or revision
related profit and loss statements.”
Whether or not the initiative petition is sufficient compliance with
the constitutional requirement on direct proposal by the people

The Court also holds that the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures is, in the language of the
Federal Supreme Court: If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held
and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th
RULING:
Amendment, declaring his rights to be secure against such searches and seizures, is of
no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken Initiative petition does not comply with Sec. 2, Art. XVII on direct proposal by people
from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to
punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those
great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in
their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land. Sec. 2, Art. XVII...is the governing provision that allows a people’s initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution. While this provision does not expressly state that the
petition must set forth the full text of the proposed amendments, the deliberations of
the framers of our Constitution clearly show that: (a) the framers intended to adopt
relevant American jurisprudence on people’s initiative; and (b) in particular, the people
must first see the full
LAMBINO vs. COMELEC
text of the proposed amendments before they sign, and that the people must sign on a
G.R. No. 174153, Oct. 25, 2006
petition containing such full text.
 Requirements for Initiative Petition

 Constitutional Amendment vs. Constitutional Revision

The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
 Tests to determine whether amendment or revision petition” is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means
two essential elements must be present.

FACTS:
2 elements of initiative
The Lambino Group commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to
change the 1987 Constitution and then filed a petition with COMELEC to hold a 1.First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or
plebiscite for ratification under Sec. 5(b) and (c) and Sec. 7 of RA 6735. The representative can sign on their behalf.
proposed changes under the petition will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential
2.Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.
system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. COMELEC did not give it
due course for lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the
Constitution, pursuant to Santiago v. Comelec ruling.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is
first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal
in a petition. The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the
face of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must stated the fact of
such attachment. This is an assurance that everyone of the several millions of
signatories to the petition had seen the full textof the proposed amendments before –
not after – signing.
Moreover, “an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the nature
and effect of that which is proposed” and failure to do so is “deceptive and misleading”
which renders the initiative void.
In the case of the Lambino Group’s petition, there’s not a single word, phrase, or
sentence of text of the proposedchanges in the signature sheet. Neither does the
signature sheet state that the text of the proposed changes is attached to it. The
signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people approve a shift from the
Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral- Parliamentary system of government. The
signature sheet does not show to the people the draft of the proposed changes before
they are asked to sign the signature sheet. This omission is fatal.
An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the people
the full text of the proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and can operate as
a gigantic fraud on the people. That’s why the Constitutionrequires that
an initiative must be “directly proposed by the people x x x in a petition” - meaning that
the people must sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed
amendments. On so vital an issue as amending the nation’s fundamental law, the
writing of the text of the proposed amendments cannot be hidden from the people
under a general or special power of attorney to unnamed, faceless, and unelected
individuals.
The initiative violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution disallowing revision
through initiatives
Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution.
The first mode is through Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The
second mode is through a constitutional convention. The third mode is through a
people’s initiative.
Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to “any
amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution.” In contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII,
referring to the third mode, applies only to “amendments to this Constitution.” This
distinction was intentional as shown by the deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission. A people’sinitiative to change the Constitution applies
only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to its revision. In contrast, Congress
or a constitutional convention can propose both amendments and revisions to the
Constitution.
Does the Lambino Group’s initiative constitute a revision of the Constitution?
Yes. By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential
to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of the Office of the
President and the abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not
a mere amendment.
Amendment vs. Revision
Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment and a revision of a
constitution. Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the
constitution, like altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-
and-balances. There is also revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the
constitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions of the constitution. On
the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes
without altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects several
provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally affects only the specific
provision being amended.
Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the
Constitution without affecting any other section or article, the change may generally be
considered an amendment and not a revision. For example, a change reducing the
voting age from 18 years to 15 years is an amendment and not a revision. Similarly, a
change reducing Filipino ownership of mass media companies from 100% to 60% is an
amendment and not a revision. Also, a change requiring a college degree as an
additional qualification for election to the Presidency is an amendment and not a
revision.
The changes in these examples do not entail any modification of sections or articles
of the Constitution other than the specific provision being amended. These changes do
not also affect the structure of government or the system of checks-and-balances
among or within the three branches.
However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment or a
revision. A change in a single word of one sentence of the Constitution may be a
revision and not an amendment. For example, the substitution of the word “republican”
with “monarchic” or “theocratic” in Section 1, Article II of the Constitution radically
overhauls the entire structure of government and the fundamental ideological basis
of the Constitution. Thus, each specific change will have to be examined case-by-case,
depending on how it affects other provisions, as well as how it affects the structure
ofgovernment, the carefully crafted system of checks-and-balances, and the underlying
ideological basis of the existing Constitution.
Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several provisions of a
constitution, a deliberative body with recorded proceedings is best suited to undertake
a revision. A revision requires harmonizing not only several provisions, but also the
altered principles with those that remain unaltered. Thus, constitutions normally
authorize deliberative bodies like constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions
to undertake revisions. On the other hand, constitutions allow people’s initiatives,
which do not have fixed and identifiable deliberative bodies or recorded proceedings, to
undertake only amendments and not revisions.
Tests to determine whether amendment or revision
In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the
constitution just like in our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test: the
quantitative test and the qualitative test. The quantitative test asks whether the
proposed change is so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the substantial
entirety of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing
provisions. The court examines only the number of provisions affected and does not
consider the degree of the change.
The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the
constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will accomplish such far reaching
changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision.
Whether there is an alteration in the structure of government is a proper subject of
inquiry. Thus, a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan includes change
in its fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its Branches. A change in
the nature of the basic governmental plan also includes changes that jeopardize the
traditional form of government and the system of check and balances.
Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group’s initiative is a
revision and not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group’s proposed
changes overhaul two articles - Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the
Executive - affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire Constitution. Qualitatively,
the proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of government, from
presidential to parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.
A change in the structure of government is a revision
A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the
three great co-equal branches of government in the present Constitution are reduced
into two. This alters the separation of powers in the Constitution. A shift from the
present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a
revision of the Constitution. Merging the legislative and executive branches is a radical
change in the structure of government. The abolition alone of the Office of the President
as the locus of Executive Power alters the separation of powers and thus constitutes a
revision of the Constitution. Likewise, the abolition alone of one chamber of Congress
alters the system of checks-and-balances within the legislature and constitutes a
revision of the Constitution.
The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between amendment and revision is
only one of procedure, not of substance. The Lambino Group posits that when a
deliberative body drafts and proposes changes to the Constitution, substantive changes
are called revisions because members of the deliberative body work full-time on the
changes. The same substantive changes, when proposed through an initiative, are
called amendments because the changes are made by ordinary people who do not make
an occupation, profession, or vocation out of such endeavor. The SC, however, ruled
that the express intent of the framers and the plain language of the Constitution
contradict the Lambino Group’s theory. Where the intent of the framers and the
language of the Constitution are clear and plainly stated, courts do not deviate from
such categorical intent and language
EBRALINAG v. THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU
G.R. No. 95770 March 1, 1993
AMOLO et al vs. THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU and
ANTONIO A. SANGUTAN
G.R. No. 95887 March 1, 1993 ; GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
Facts:
The petitioners in both (consolidated) cases were expelled from their classes by the
public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national
anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265 (An Act
making flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions) of July 11, 1955 , and
by Department Order No. 8 (Rules and Regulations for Conducting the Flag Ceremony
in All Educational Institutions) dated July 21, 1955 of the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (DECS) making the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational
institutions.
Jehovah's Witnesses admitted that they taught their children not to salute the flag,
sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those are
"acts of worship" or "religious devotion" which they "cannot conscientiously give to
anyone or anything except God". They consider the flag as an image or idol
representing the State. They think the action of the local authorities in compelling the
flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on the State's power and
invades the sphere of the intellect and spirit which the Constitution protect against
official control.
Issue:
Whether or not school children who are members or a religious sect may be
expelled from school for disobedience of R.A. No. 1265 and Department Order No. 8
Held:
No. Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority
and the amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man
to his Creator
The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious
freedom is the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and
imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other
legitimate public interest, that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent." Absent such
a threat to public safety, the expulsion of the petitioners from the schools is not
justified. (Teehankee)
The petitioners further contend that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag
ceremony, they do not engage in "external acts" or behavior that would offend their
countrymen who believe in expressing their love of country through the observance of
the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony to show
their respect for the right of those who choose to participate in the solemn proceedings.
Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion.
The Court is not persuaded that by exempting the Jehovah's Witnesses from saluting
the flag, singing the national anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge, this religious
group which admittedly comprises a "small portion of the school population" will shake
up our part of the globe and suddenly produce a nation "untaught and uninculcated in
and unimbued with reverence for the flag, patriotism, love of country and admiration
for national heroes" . What the petitioners seek only is exemption from the flag
ceremony, not exclusion from the public schools where they may study the
Constitution, the democratic way of life and form of government, and learn not only the
arts, sciences, Philippine history and culture but also receive training for a vocation of
profession and be taught the virtues of "patriotism, respect for human rights,
appreciation for national heroes, the rights and duties of citizenship, and moral and
spiritual values (Sec. 3[2], Art. XIV, 1987 Constitution) as part of the curricula.
Expelling or banning the petitioners from Philippine schools will bring about the very
situation that this Court had feared in Gerona. Forcing a small religious group, through
the iron hand of the law, to participate in a ceremony that violates their religious
beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of country or respect for dully constituted
authorities.
Also, the expulsion of members of Jehovah's Witnesses from the schools where they are
enrolled violates their right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to
"protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education . . . and to make such
education accessible to all (Sec. 1, Art. XIV).
Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission
No. L-72119
May 29, 1987
Article II, Sec. 28 (Policy of Full Public Disclosure)
Cortes:
Facts: Petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi files for Mandamus to compel respondent Civil
Service Commission to release information on the civil service eligibilities of persons
employed as sanitarians (Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas) in the Health
Department of Cebu City.
OSG contends that petitioner has no locus standing as he failed to show his actual
interest. The Court ruled however that the petition on mandamus is anchored upon the
right of the people for information on matters of public concern which is a public right.
1. The petitioner being a citizen (hence, part of the public) warrants standing in his
part; and
2. The State and its agents are mandated by the Constitution by virtue of Sec. 7 Article
III and Sec. 28, Article II.
Issue: WON respondent should release the information.
Held: Yes.
The constitutional right to information on matters of public information is grounded
on Sec. 7, Article III and Sec. 28, Article II of the 1987 Constitution. These are self-
executory.
In the case at bar, the government agency Civil Service Commission does not have the
discretion to prohibit the access to information sought. It only has the authority to
regulate the manner of examination (e.g. ensuring that the records are not damaged or
destroyed).
These constitutional guarantees, however, are not absolute as they are “subject to the
limitations as may be provided by law” (Art. III Sec. 7 2nd sentence). The information
sought must be not be exempted by law.
In the case at bar, the information is within the enumerations provided by law. Why/
How?
1.the information sought relates to a public office which can be considered as a
legitimate concern of citizens (public office as public trust);
2.Respondent failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit the
petitioner’s right to know who are, and who are not civil service eligible; and
3.Civil service exams results are released in the public.
Ratio:
Government agencies such as the Civil Service Commission do not have the discretion
in refusing disclosure of, or access to, information of public concern.
What is within the bounds of the agencies then? They still have the authority to
regulate the manner of examining public records.
The authority to regulate the manner of examining public records does not carry with
it the power to prohibit.
The Court provided a distinction between discretion/ prohibition and authority to
regulate.
oRefusal to disclose only the Legislature may impose (Sec. 6, Article III)
oAuthority to regulate the manner of examination done by government agency which
has the custody of public records.
In case of denial by the agency, it must prove that the information is not of public
concern or if it is of public concern, it is within the exemptions (e.g. national security).
Further, every denial is subject to review by courts.
Is the information sought by the petitioner considered “public concern/ interest”
within those mentioned in the articles? YES!
The constitutional guarantees are not absolute as the law may exempt certain types of
information from public scrutiny such as those affecting national security.
There is no rigid test as the term “public concern/ interest” is broad. It is for the
courts to determine if the information falls within “public concern” or “public interest.”
Legal historical background of the right to public information
Right to information on matters of public concern first gained recognition in the 1973
Constitution (Section 6 of Article IV-Bill of Rights).
 This was retained by Article III Section 7 of the 1987 Constitution. Further, such
guarantee was enhanced with the adoption of Section 18, Article II (Policy of Full Public
Disclosure).
Vasquez vs CA
Case digest:
Facts:
In an information filed in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Rodolfo R. Vasquez
was charged with libel for allegedly having made false and malicious imputations that
Barangay Chairman Jaime Olmedo was engaged in land grabbing and was involved in
illegal gambling and stealing of chicken at the Tondo Foreshore Area, Tondo Manila.
The trial court found Vasquez guilty of libel as charged. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed in toto. Hence, this petition.
Issue: W/n a liability can be attached to a citizen if he criticizes or defames a public
official relative to the latter’s official conduct.
Held:
No. Even if the defamatory statement is false, no liability can attach if it relates
to official conduct, unless the public official concerned proves that the statement was
made with actual malice - that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whatever it was false or not. In this case, the prosecution failed to prove
not only that the charges made by petitioner were false but also that petitioner made
them with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard of whether they were
false or not.
A rule placing on the accused the burden of showing the truth of allegations of official
misconduct and/or good motives and justifiable ends for making such allegations
would, above all, infringe on the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.
Without free speech and assembly, discussions of our most abiding concerns as a
nation would be stifled
People vs Genosa
Case digest:
FACTS: This case stemmed from the killing of Ben Genosa, by his wife Marivic Genosa,
appellant herein. During their first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben lived happily but
apparently thereafter, Ben changed and the couple would always quarrel and
sometimes their quarrels became violent. Appellant testified that every time her
husband came home drunk, he would provoke her and sometimes beat her. Whenever
beaten by her husband, she consulted medical doctors who testified during the trial.
On the night of the killing, appellant and the victim were quarreled and the victim beat
the appellant. However, appellant was able to run to another room. Appellant admitted
having killed the victim with the use of a gun. The information for parricide against
appellant, however, alleged that the cause of death of the victim was by beating
through the use of a lead pipe. Appellant invoked self defense and defense of her
unborn child. After trial, the Regional Trial Court found appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide with an aggravating circumstance of
treachery and imposed the penalty of death.
On automatic review before the Supreme Court, appellant filed an URGENT OMNIBUS
MOTION praying that the Honorable Court allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and
the re-examination of the cause of his death; (2) the examination of Marivic Genosa by
qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she
killed her husband; and finally, (3) the inclusion of the said experts’ reports in the
records of the case for purposes of the automatic review or, in the alternative, a partial
re-opening of the case a quo to take the testimony of said psychologists and
psychiatrists. The Supreme Court partly granted the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION of
the appellant. It remanded the case to the trial court for reception of expert
psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the “battered woman syndrome” plea.
Testimonies of two expert witnesses on the “battered woman syndrome”, Dra. Dayan
and Dr. Pajarillo, were presented and admitted by the trial court and subsequently
submitted to the Supreme Court as part of the records.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not appellant herein can validly invoke the “battered woman syndrome”
as constituting self defense.
2. Whether or not treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa.
Ruling: 1. The Court ruled in the negative as appellant failed to prove that she is
afflicted with the “battered woman syndrome”.
A battered woman has been defined as a woman “who is repeatedly subjected to any
forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do
something he wants her to do without concern for her rights. Battered women include
wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to
be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at
least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If
it occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered
woman.”
More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called “cycle
of violence,” which has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute
battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase.
The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the
battered woman syndrome. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be
proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and
her intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of
the batterer must have produced in the battered person’s mind an actual fear of an
imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in
order to save her life. Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed
probable -- not necessarily immediate and actual -- grave harm to the accused, based
on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken altogether,
these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under the existing facts
of the present case, however, not all of these elements were duly established.
The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the “cycle of violence” supposedly
characterizing the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute
battering incidents but appellant failed to prove that in at least another battering
episode in the past, she had gone through a similar pattern. Neither did appellant
proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of the cycle.
In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself establish
the legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be
considered in the context of self-defense. Settled in our jurisprudence, is the rule that
the one who resorts to self-defense must face a real threat on one’s life; and the peril
sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely imaginary. Thus, the
Revised Penal Code provides that the following requisites of self-defense must concur:
(1) Unlawful aggression; (2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel it; and (3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself.
Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It presupposes
actual, sudden and unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life or
safety of a person. In the present case, however, according to the testimony of Marivic
herself, there was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and
her fatal attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from his violent
behavior and escape to their children’s bedroom. During that time, he apparently
ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he
posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented an actual
threat on her life or safety.
The mitigating factors of psychological paralysis and passion and obfuscation were,
however, taken in favor of appellant. It should be clarified that these two circumstances
-- psychological paralysis as well as passion and obfuscation -- did not arise from the
same set of facts.
The first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of the battery
inflicted by the batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over a
period of time resulted in her psychological paralysis, which was analogous to an
illness diminishing the exercise of her will power without depriving her of
consciousness of her acts.
As to the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to
have naturally produced passion and obfuscation, it has been held that this state of
mind is present when a crime is committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst of
passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so
powerful as to overcome reason. To appreciate this circumstance, the following
requisites should concur: (1) there is an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce
such a condition of mind; and (2) this act is not far removed from the commission of
the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the accused might recover her
normal equanimity.
2. NO. Because of the gravity of the resulting offense, treachery must be proved as
conclusively as the killing itself. Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a
killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a
qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be said to have been forewarned
and to have anticipated aggression from the assailant. Moreover, in order to appreciate
alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the aggressor must have been consciously
and deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of accomplishing the unlawful act
without risk from any defense that might be put up by the party attacked.
The appellant acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced
passion or obfuscation. The acute battering she suffered that fatal night in the hands of
her batterer-spouse, in spite of the fact that she was eight (8) months pregnant with
their child, overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid emotional and mental state,
which overcame her reason and impelled her to vindicate her life and that of her
unborn child.
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of appellant for parricide. However,
considering the presence of two (2) mitigating circumstances and without any
aggravating circumstance, the penalty is reduced to six (6) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as
maximum. Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the minimum
penalty hereby imposed upon her, the director of the Bureau of Corrections may
immediately RELEASE her from custody upon due determination that she is eligible for
parole, unless she is being held for some other lawful cause.
NOTE: After this case was decided by the Supreme Court, R.A. 9262, otherwise known
as Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004 was enacted. Sec. 26 of
said law provides that "xxx. Victim-survivors who are found by the courts to be
suffering from battered women syndrome do not incur any criminal and civil liability
nothwithstanding the absence of any of the elements for justifying circumstances of
self-defense under the Revised Penal Code.xxx"
Stonehill vs Diokno
Case digest:
Facts:
Upon application of the prosecutors (respondent) several judges (respondent) issued on
different dates a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners (Stonehill et. al.) and/or
corporations of which they were officers to search the persons of the petitioner and/or
premises of their officers warehouses and/or residences and to seize and take
possession of the personal property which is the subject of the offense, stolen, or
embezzled and proceeds of fruits of the offense, or used or intended to be used or the
means of committing the offense, which is described in the application as violation of
Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code and the Revised
Penal Code.
Petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus and injunction and prayed that, pending final disposition of the case, a
writ of preliminary injunction be issued against the prosecutors, their agents and
representatives from using the effect seized or any copies thereof, in the deportation
case and that thereafter, a decision be rendered quashing the contested search
warrants and declaring the same null and void. For being violative of the constitution
and the Rules of court by: (1) not describing with particularity the documents, books
and things to be seized; (2) money not mentioned in the warrants were seized; (3) the
warrants were issued to fish evidence for deportation cases filed against the petitioner;
(4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents
paper and cash money were not delivered to the issuing courts for disposal in
accordance with law.
In their answer, the prosecutors (respondent) alleged; (1) search warrants are valid and
issued in accordance with law; (2) defects of said warrants, were cured by petitioners
consent; and (3) in any event the effects are admissible regardless of the irregularity.
The Court granted the petition and issued the writ of preliminary injunction. However
by a resolution, the writ was partially lifted dissolving insofar as paper and things
seized from the offices of the corporations.
Issues:
1.) Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to assail the legality of search
warrants issued against the corporation of which they were officers.
2.) Whether or not the search warrants issued partakes the nature of a general search
warrants.
3.) Whether or not the seized articles were admissible as evidence regardless of the
illegality of its seizure.
Held:
I
Officers of certain corporations, from which the documents, papers, things were seized
by means of search warrants, have no cause of action to assail the legality of the
contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple
reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct
from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock
or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they
hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be
contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the
objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of
by third parties.
Officers of certain corporations can not validly object to the use in evidence against
them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the
corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers
in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong,
and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their
individual capacity.
II
The Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue
but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely:
(1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge
in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant
shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
Search warrants issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person
therein named had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs
Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words,
no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with
respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for
the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for
the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom
it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a
given provision of our criminal laws.
General search warrants are outlawed because the sanctity of the domicile and the
privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or
passion of peace officers.
To prevent the issuance of general warrants this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3
of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court by providing in its counterpart, under the
Revised Rules of Court that "a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offense." Not satisfied with this qualification, the
Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall issue for more
than one specific offense."
Seizure of books and records showing all business transaction of petitioners persons,
regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal contravened the explicit
command of our Bill of Rights - that the things to be seized be particularly described -
as well as tending to defeat its major objective the elimination of general warrants.
III
Most common law jurisdiction have already given up the Moncado ruling and
eventually adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means
of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In
the language of Judge Learned Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which
has been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing
the constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending
official may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the
prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their
wrong will that wrong be repressed.
The non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of
the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if
the applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause
of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended,
then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of
the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then
it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no
justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not
justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a
crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to
establish a probable cause.
The Court held that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby,
abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein
petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the
searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction
heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus
seized in said residences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs
prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects so seized in
the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the aforementioned motion for
Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and that the
petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents,
papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other
premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to
costs.
CASE DIGEST
WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA. MESA
TOURIST & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE CASTRO, MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM,
Respondent
FACTS:
On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ordinance 7774 entitled “An
Ordinance” prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension
houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila. White Light Corp is an
operator of mini hotels and motels who sought to have the Ordinance be nullified as
the said Ordinance infringes on the private rights of their patrons. The RTC ruled in
favor of WLC. It ruled that the Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the
individual guaranteed by the Constitution. The City maintains that the ordinance is
valid as it is a valid exercise of police power. Under the LGC, the City is empowered to
regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants,
beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar
establishments, including tourist guides and transports. The CA ruled in favor of the
City.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ordinance 7774 is valid.
HELD:
The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes upon
individual liberty. It also violates the due process clause which serves as a guaranty for
protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. The said ordinance invades private
rights. Note that not all who goes into motels and hotels for wash up rate are really
there for obscene purposes only. Some are tourists who needed rest or to “wash up” or
to freshen up. Hence, the infidelity sought to be avoided by the said ordinance is more
or less subjected only to a limited group of people. The SC reiterates that individual
rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the
legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.
*****************************
Legaspi vs. CSC
G.R. No. L-72119, May 29, 1987
Facts:
The respondent CSC had denied petitioner Valentin Legaspi’s request for information
on the civil service eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas who were
employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. Sibonghanoy and Agas
had allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the civil
service examinations for sanitarians.
Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Sibonghanoy and Agas is
guaranteed by the Constitution, and that he has no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy to acquire the information, petitioner prays for the issuance of
the extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the respondent CSC to disclose said
information.
The respondent CSC takes issue on the personality of the petitioner to bring the suit. It
is asserted that the petition is bereft of any allegation of Legaspi’s actual interest in the
civil service eligibilities of Sibonghanoy and Agas.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to bring the suit
Held:
The petitioner has firmly anchored his case upon the right of the people to information
on matters of public concern, which, by its very nature, is a public right. It has been
held in the case of Tanada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27, that when the question is one of
public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public
duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest, and the person at whose
instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or
special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such
interested in the execution of the laws.
It becomes apparent that when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a
public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the
petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general public which possesses the
right.
The petitioner, being a citizen who as such, is clothed with personality to seek redress
for the alleged obstruction of the exercise of the public right.
*****************************
LA BUGAL-B’LAAN
VS DENR SECRETARY RAMOS
GR No. 127882 December 1, 2004
Facts:
The Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before the Court challenges the
constitutionality of (1) Republic Act No. [RA] 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act of 1995);
(2) its Implementing Rules and Regulations (DENR Administrative Order No. [DAO] 96-
40); and (3) the FTAA dated March 30, 1995,6 executed by the government with
Western Mining Corporation (Philippines), Inc. (WMCP). On January 27, 2004, the
Court en banc promulgated its Decision granting the Petition and declaring the
unconstitutionality of certain provisions of RA 7942, DAO 96-40, as well as of the
entire FTAA executed between the government and WMCP, mainly on the finding that
FTAAs are service contracts prohibited by the 1987 Constitution. The Decision struck
down the subject FTAA for being similar to service contracts, which, though permitted
under the 1973 Constitution, were subsequently denounced for being antithetical to
the principle of sovereignty over our natural resources, because they allowed foreign
control over the exploitation of our natural resources, to the prejudice of the Filipino
nation. The Decision quoted several legal scholars and authors who had criticized
service contracts for, inter alia, vesting in the foreign contractor exclusive management
and control of the enterprise, including operation of the field in the event petroleum
was discovered; control of production, expansion and development; nearly unfettered
control over the disposition and sale of the products discovered/extracted; effective
ownership of the natural resource at the point of extraction; and beneficial ownership
of our economic resources. According to the Decision, the 1987 Constitution (Section 2
of Article XII) effectively banned such service contracts. Subsequently, respondents filed
separate Motions for Reconsideration. In a Resolution dated March 9, 2004, the Court
required petitioners to comment thereon. In the Resolution of June 8, 2004, it set the
case for Oral Argument on June 29, 2004.
Issue:
Whether or not the FTAA issued were valid.
Held:
Yes. The notion that the deliberations reflect only the views of those members who
spoke out and not the views of the majority who remained silent should be clarified. We
must never forget that those who spoke out were heard by those who remained silent
and did not react. If the latter were silent because they happened not to be present at
the time, they are presumed to have read the minutes and kept abreast of the
deliberations. By remaining silent, they are deemed to have signified their assent to
and/or conformity with at least some of the views propounded or their lack of
objections thereto. It was incumbent upon them, as representatives of the entire
Filipino people, to follow the deliberations closely and to speak their minds on the
matter if they did not see eye to eye with the proponents of the draft provisions.
In any event, each and every one of the commissioners had the opportunity to speak
out and to vote on the matter. Moreover, the individual explanations of votes are on
record, and they show where each delegate stood on the issues. In sum, we cannot
completely denigrate the value or usefulness of the record of the ConCom, simply
because certain members chose not to speak out.
However, it is of common knowledge, and of judicial notice as well, that the government
is and has for many many years been financially strapped, to the point that even the
most essential services have suffered serious curtailments — education and health
care, for instance, not to mention judicial services — have had to make do with
inadequate budgetary allocations. Thus, government has had to resort to build-operate-
transfer and similar arrangements with the private sector, in order to get vital
infrastructure projects built without any governmental outlay.
The drafters — whose ranks included many academicians, economists, businessmen,
lawyers, politicians and government officials — were not unfamiliar with the practices
of foreign corporations and multinationals.
Neither were they so naïve as to believe that these entities would provide “assistance”
without conditionality or some quid pro quo. Definitely, as business persons well know
and as a matter of judicial notice, this matter is not just a question of signing a
promissory note or executing a technology transfer agreement. Foreign corporations
usually require that they be given a say in the management, for instance, of day-to-day
operations of the joint venture. They would demand the appointment of their own men
as, for example, operations managers, technical experts, quality control heads, internal
auditors or comptrollers. Furthermore, they would probably require seats on the Board
of Directors — all these to ensure the success of the enterprise and the repayment of
the loans and other financial assistance and to make certain that the funding and the
technology they supply would not go to waste. Ultimately, they would also want to
protect their business reputation and bottom lines.
Morales Dev’t v CA [G.R. No. L-26572 March 28, 1969]
Petitioner Morales seeks to review on certiorari a decision of CAreversing
CFIRespondents Deseo, brought an action to annul sale to Morales ofa lot in
Quezon and to secure the registration of a deed ofconveyance of said lot in
their favour Land used to belong to Montinola (Alleging that his
owner'sduplicate copy of said certificate had been lost, Montinolasucceeded
in securing, from the Court above mentioned, an orderfor the issuance of a second
owner's duplicate) who sold it toReyes, who sold it to Abellas, who sold it to
Deseos.It appears that the first owners duplicate was neither lost nor
found, Montinola used it to mortgage the land to PNB for 700. Then he sold it to
Morales. Morales was advised by registry ofdeeds hat his TCT was cancelled and
property sold to Reyes andthen Abellas. Morales filed a petition for the
annulment andcancellation of the second owner's copy of TCT. After due noticeto
Reyes and the Abellas, but not to the Deseos, said petition wasgranted on March 12,
1956.Unable to register, Deseos commenced, in the courtaforementioned, the
present action against Morales, for theannulment of the subsequent sale thereto
by Montinola, and theregistration of said deed of conveyance in their (Deseos)
favor,alleging that the same enjoys preference over the sale to Morales,the Deseos
having, prior thereto, bought lot No. 2488 in good faithand for value, and having
been first in possession of said lot,likewise, in good faith.Upon the other hand,
Morales claimed to have a better right uponthe ground that it (Morales) had bought the
property in good faithand for value, relying upon the first owner's duplicate copy of
TCTCFI: IFO MORALESCA: IFO DESEO, to be the lawful and absolute owners of Lot
No.2489.
Morales maintains that the sale by Montinola to Reyes and thatlater made
by Reyes to the Abellas are "suspicious"; that,consequently, Reyes and the
Abellas were not purchasers in goodfaith and for value; and that these two (2)
premises, in turn, lead tothe conclusion that both sales are "null and void."It is not
unusual, however, in deeds of conveyance adhering to theAnglo-Saxon practice of
stating that the consideration given is thesum of P1.00, although the actual
consideration may have beenmuch more. Moreover, assuming that said consideration
of P1.00is suspicious, this circumstance, alone, does not necessarily justifythe
inference that Reyes and the Abellas were not purchasers in good faith and for value.
Neither does this inference warrant theconclusion that the sales were null and void ab
initio.

Indeed, badfaith and inadequacy of the monetary consideration do not rendera

conveyance inexistent, for the assignor's liberality may be sufficient cause for
a valid contract, whereas fraud or bad faithmay render either resistible or
voidable although valid untilannulled, a contract concerning an object certain,
entered into witha cause and with the consent of the contracting parties, as in thecase
at bar. What is more, the aforementioned conveyance maynot be annulled, in the case
at bar, inasmuch as Reyes and theAbellas are not parties therein.