Professional Documents
Culture Documents
, 19 SCRA 58
Held: The Court held that the corporation herein has violated the law by
engaging in banking without securing the administrative authority required by
RA 337. It is clear that the transactions of respondent corporation partake of
the nature of banking. Indeed, a bank has been defined as
; ... a moneyed institute [Talmage vs. Pell 7 N.Y. (3 Seld.) 328, 347, 348]
founded to facilitate the borrowing, lending and safe-keeping of money (Smith
vs. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 41 S. Ct. 243, 255 U.S. 180, 210, 65 L. Ed.
577) and to deal, in notes, bills of exchange, and credits (State vs. Cornings
Sav. Bank, 115 N.W. 937, 139 Iowa 338). (Banks & Banking, by Zellmann Vol.
1, p. 46).
Thus, the writ prayed for should be, as it is hereby granted and
defendant corporation is, accordingly, ordered dissolved.
2. Bañas vs. Asia Pacific Corp., 343 SCRA 527
Facts: Asia Pacific filed a complaint for a sum of money with prayer for a writ
of replevin against Teodoro Bañas,C.G. Dizon Construction Inc. and Cenen
Dizon. Bañas executed a promissory note in favor of C.G. Dizon Construction.
Later C. G. Dizon Construction endorsed with recourse the promissory note to
Asia Pacific and to secure payment thereof, C.G. Dizon through its
corporate officers executed a Deed of Chattel Mortgage covering three heavy
equipment units of Caterpillar Bulldozer Crawler Tractors in favor of Asia
Pacific. Moreover Cenen Dizon executed a Continuing Undertaking wherein he
bound himself to pay the obligation jointly and severally with C.G. Dizon
Construction. In compliance with the provision of the promissory note, C.G.
Dizon construction made payments by way of Installments to Asia Pacific,
However C.G. Dizon Construction defaulted in the payment of the remaining
installments, prompting Asia Pacific to send a statement of account to Cenen
Dizon for the unpaid balance. As the demand was unheeded, Asia Pacific
sued Teodoro Bañas, C.G. DizonConstruction Inc. and Cenen DizonTeodoro
Bañas, C.G. Dizon Construction Inc. and Cenen Dizon admitted the
genuineness and due execution of the Promissory Note, Deed of Chattel
Mortgage and the Continuing Undertaking, they nevertheless maintained that
these legal documents we never intended to be legal valid and binding but a
mere subterfuge to conceal the loan with usurious interest. Defendants claimed
that since Asia Pacific could not directly engage in banking business, it propose
to them a scheme wherein Asia Pacific could extend a loan to them without
violating banking laws : first,
Cenen Dizon would secure a promissory note from Teodoro Bañas with a
face value of P390,000.00 payable in installments; second, ASIA PACIFIC
would then make it appear that the promissory note was sold to it by Cenen
Dizon with the 14% usurious interest on the loan or P54,000.00 discounted
and collected in advance by ASIA PACIFIC; and, lastly, Cenen Dizon would
provide sufficient collateral to answer for the loan in case of default in payment
and execute a continuing guaranty to assure continuous and prompt payment
of the loan. Sometime in October 1980 Cenen Dizon informed ASIAPACIFIC
that he would be delayed in meeting his monthly amortization on account
of business reverses and promised to pay instead in February 1981. Cenen
Dizon made good his promise and tendered payment to ASIA PACIFIC in an
amount equivalent to two (2) monthly amortizations. But ASIA PACIFIC
attempted to impose a 3% interest for every month of delay, which he flatly
refused to pay for being usurious. Afterwards, ASIA PACIFIC allegedly made
a verbal proposal to Cenen Dizon to surrender to it the ownership of the two (2)
bulldozer crawler tractors and, in turn, the latter would treat the former’s
account as closed and the loan fully paid. Cenen Dizon supposedly agreed and
accepted the offer. Defendants averred that the value of the bulldozer crawler
tractors was more than adequate to cover their obligation to ASIA PACIFIC.
Meanwhile, on 21 April 1981 the trial court issued a writ of replevin against
defendant C. G. Dizon Construction for the surrender of the bulldozer crawler
tractors subject of the Deed of Chattel Mortgage. Of the three (3) bulldozer
crawler tractors, only two (2) were actually turned over by defendants
which units were subsequently foreclosed by ASIA PACIFIC to satisfy
the obligation. On 25 September 1992 the Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of
ASIA PACIFIC holding the defendants jointly and severally liable for the unpaid
balance of the obligation under the Promissory Note. The Court of Appeals
affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.
Issue: Whether the disputed transaction between petitioners and Asia Pacific
violated banking laws, hence null and void.
Held: The Supreme Court ruled and said that an investment company refers to
any insurer which is or holds itself out as being engaged or proposes to engage
primarily in the business of investing, reinvesting or trading in securities. As
defined in Section 2 paragraph (a) of the Revised Securities Act , securities
shall include commercial papers evidencing indebtedness of any person,
financial or non financial entity, irrespective of maturity, issued , endorsed,
sold , transferred or in any manner conveyed to another with or without
recourse such as promissory notes. Clearly the transaction between petitioners
and respondent was one involving not a loan but a purchase of receivables at a
discount well within the purview of investing, reinvesting or trading in
securities which an investment company like the Asia Pacific is authorized to
perform and does not constitute a violation of the General Banking Act.
Moreover Section 2 of the General Banking Act provides:―Only entities duly
authorized by the Monetary Board of the Central Bank may engage in the
lending of funds obtained from the public through the receipt of deposits of any
kind and all entities regularly conducting such operations shall be considered
as banking institutions and shall be subject to the provisions of this Act, of the
Central Bank Act and of other pertinent laws. ―Indubitably, what is prohibited
by law is for investment companies to lend funds obtained from the public
through receipts of deposits which is a function of banking institutions. But in
the case at bar the funds supposedly ―lent‖ to petitioners have not been shown
to have been obtained from the public by way of deposits hence the
applicability of banking laws.
3. Simex International (Manila), Inc. vs. CA, 183 SCRA 360
Facts: The petitioner was a depositor of the respondent bank and maintained a
checking account in its branch at Romulo Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City. On
May 25, 1981, the petitioner deposited to its account in the said bank the
amount of P100,000.00, thus increasing its balance as of that date to
P190,380.74. 1 Subsequently, the petitioner issued several checks against its
deposit but was suprised to learn later that they had been dishonored for
insufficient funds.
In its letter dated June 20, 1981, the petitioner demanded reparation
from the respondent bank for its "gross and wanton negligence." This demand
was not met. The petitioner then filed a complaint in the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal claiming from the private respondent moral damages in the
sum of P1,000,000.00 and exemplary damages in the sum of P500,000.00,
plus 25% attorney's fees, and costs.
Issue: Whether or not that the private respondent was guilty of negligence.
Held: This Court has carefully examined the facts of this case and finds that it
cannot share some of the conclusions of the lower courts. It seems to us that
the negligence of the private respondent had been brushed off rather lightly as
if it were a minor infraction requiring no more than a slap on the wrist
The respondent bank has not even explained why it was committed at
all. It is true that the dishonored checks were, as the Court of Appeals put it,
"eventually" paid. However, this took almost a month when, properly, the
checks should have been paid immediately upon presentment.
As the Court sees it, the initial carelessness of the respondent bank,
aggravated by the lack of promptitude in repairing its error, justifies the grant
of moral damages.
We shall recognize that the petitioner did suffer injury because of the
private respondent's negligence that caused the dishonor of the checks issued
by it. The immediate consequence was that its prestige was impaired because
of the bouncing checks and confidence in it as a reliable debtor was
diminished. The private respondent makes much of the one instance when the
petitioner was sued in a collection case, but that did not prove that it did not
have a good reputation that could not be marred, more so since that case was
ultimately settled.
Facts: In view of the 20th Asian Racing Conference then scheduled to be held in
September, 1988 in Sydney, Australia, the Philippine Racing Club, Inc. (PRCI,
for brevity) sent four (4) delegates to the said conference. Petitioner Gregorio H.
Reyes, as vice-president for finance, racing manager, treasurer, and director of
PRCI, sent Godofredo Reyes, the club's chief cashier, to the respondent bank to
apply for a foreign exchange demand draft in Australian dollars.
Issue: Whether or not the drawer bank exerted the degree of diligence that
banks are required to exert in their commercial dealings.
Held: The respondent bank did everything within its power to prevent the
dishonor of the subject foreign exchange demand draft. The erroneous reading
of its cable message to Westpac-Sydney by an employee of the latter could not
have been foreseen by the respondent bank. Being unaware that its employee
erroneously read the said cable message, Westpac-Sydney merely stated that
the respondent bank has no deposit account with it to cover for the amount of
One Thousand Six Hundred Ten Australian Dollar (AU $1610.00) indicated in
the foreign exchange demand draft. Thus, the respondent bank had the
impression that Westpac-New York had not yet made available the amount for
reimbursement to Westpac-Sydney despite the fact that respondent bank has a
sufficient deposit dollar account with Westpac-New York. That was the reason
why the respondent bank had to re-confirm and repeatedly notify Westpac-New
York to debit its (respondent bank's) deposit dollar account with it and to
transfer or credit the corresponding amount to Westpac-Sydney to cover the
amount of the said demand draft.
Facts: The petitioner United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) granted a loan to
Zamboanga Development Corporation (ZDC) with Venicio Ramos and the
Spouses Teofilo Ramos, Sr. and Amelita Ramos as sureties. The ZDC failed to
pay its account to the petitioner despite demands. The latter filed a complaint
with the RTC against the ZDC, and the sureties for the collection of the
corporation’s account. The RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner
ordering defendant to pay 3,150,000.00. Thereafter, the court issued a writ of
execution for the enforcement of its decision ordering Deputy Sheriff to levy
and attach all the real and personal properties belonging to the aforesaid
defendants to satisfy the judgment. Eduardo C. Reniva, an appraiser found a
residential lot covered by TCT No. 275167 under the name of Teofilo C. Ramos,
President of the Ramdustrial Corporation, married to Rebecca F. Ramos. In
view of appraisal report the Sheriff caused the annotation of a notice of levy on
the said title.
Meanwhile, Ramdustrial Corporation applied for a loan with the UCPB,
using the subject property. The respondent was informed that upon
verification, a notice of levy was annotated in TCT No. 275167 in favor of the
petitioner, because of which the bank had to hold in abeyance any action on its
loan application. Later, The UCPB approved the Ramdustrial Corporation’s
credit line application. As business did not go well, Ramdustrial Corporation
found it difficult to pay the loan. The corporation then applied for a loan with
the Planters Development Bank (PDB), the respondent offered to use the
subject property as collateral for its loan. But the PDB withheld the release of
the loan pending the cancellation of the notice of levy on said property.
Thus, respondent filed a complaint for damages against the petitioner and
Sheriff before the RTC despite the cancellation of the notice of levy, alleging
that without any legal basis, the petitioner and Sheriff caused the annotation of
a notice to levy on the TCT of his aforesaid property which caused his failure to
secure a timely loan from UCPB and PDB. In its answer, the petitioner, while
admitting that it made a mistake in causing the annotation of notice of levy on
the TCT of the respondent, denied that it was motivated by malice and bad
faith and also asserted that it had no knowledge that there were two persons
bearing the same name Teofilo Ramos.
The RTC rendered a decision against UCPB. The CA ruled that the
petitioner was negligent in causing the annotation of notice of levy on the title
of the petitioner. Hence this petition.
Facts: Deceased spouses Jose C. Zulueta and Soledad Ramos obtained various
loans from herein petitioner GSIS secured by real estate mortgages over parcels
of land. The Zuluetas failed to pay their loans to GSIS and the latter foreclosed
the real estate mortgages. The mortgaged properties were sold at public auction
by GSIS submitting a bid price. Not all lots covered by the mortgaged titles,
however, were sold. Ninety-one (91) lots were expressly excluded from the
auction since the lots were sufficient to pay for all the mortgage debts.
Thereafter, An Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership was executed by GSIS
over Zulueta’s lots, including the lots, which were already excluded from the
foreclosure and sold the foreclosed properties to Yorkstown Development
Corporation which sale was disapproved by the President. After GSIS had re-
acquired the properties sold to said Corporation, it began disposing the
foreclosed lots including the excluded ones.
Eduardo Santiago and Antonio Vic Zulueta executed an agreement
whereby Zulueta transferred all his rights and interests over the excluded lots.
They wrote a demand letter to GSIS for the return excluded lots and later filed
with the (RTC) a complaint for reconveyance of real estate against the GSIS. the
petitioner maintains that it did not act in bad faith nor could fraud or malice be
attributed when it erroneously included in its certificate of sale, and
subsequently consolidated the titles in its name over the subject lots despite
the fact that these were expressly excluded from the foreclosure sale, and that
its failure to apprise or return to the Zuluetas, the respondent’s predecessors-
in-interest, the seventy-eight lots excluded from the foreclosure sale cannot be
imputed against them because the petitioner had no such obligation under the
pertinent loan and mortgage agreement. The RTC rendered judgment ordering
the GSIS to reconvey to the respondent herein, the78 lots excluded from the
foreclosure sale. The CA affimed the decision in toto. Hence this petition.
Issue: W/N the GSIS committed an act of negligence amounting to bad faith
when it included the subject properties into the consolidated titles in its name
and its failure to apprise or inform the defendant herein of the exclusion of said
properties from the public sale?
Facts: This action was instituted by Damaso Perez to compel the Monetary
Board, the Superintendent of Banks, the Central Bank and the Secretary of
Justice to prosecute, among others, Pablo Roman and several other Republic
Bank officials for violations of the General Banking Act (Secs. 76-78 & 83) and
the Central Bank Act, and for falsification of public or commercial documents
in connection with certain alleged anomalous loans amounting to P1,303,400
authorized by Roman and the other bank officials.
(a) The Secretary of Justice claimed that it was not their specific duty to
prosecute the persons denounced by Perez.
(b) The Central Bank and its respondent officials, averred that they had already
done their duty under the law by referring to the special prosecutors of the
Department of Justice for criminal investigation and prosecution those cases
involving the alleged anomalous loans.
On January 20, 1964, the Monetary Board of the Central Bank passed
Resolution No. 81 granting the request of Republic Bank (intervenor) for credit
accommodations to cover the unusual withdrawal of deposits by its depositors
in view of the fact that said Bank was under investigation then by the
authorities. The grant, was conditioned upon the execution of a voting trust
agreement in favor of a Board of Trustees to be chosen by the latter with the
approval of the Central Bank. Thus, Pablo Roman and his family (the
controlling stockholders of Republic Bank) then executed a voting trust
agreement, which was then superseded by another one with the Philippine
National Bank as the trustee. In view of these developments, the intervenors-
appellees filed a motion to dismiss before the lower court claiming that the
ouster of Pablo Roman and his family from the management of the Republic
Bank effected by the voting trust agreement rendered the mandamus case
moot and academic. Respondents-appellees also filed motion to dismiss in
which they again raised the impropriety of mandamus. Acting upon the two
motions and the oppositions thereto filed by petitioners, the lower court
granted the motions and dismissed the case. Hence, this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the ouster of Pablo Roman from Republic Bank’s
management and control renders moot the issues in the case, and that the
remedy of mandamus should lie.
Held: No. Damaso Perez and Republic Bank cannot seek by mandamus to
compel respondents to prosecute criminally those alleged violators of the
banking laws. The remedy of mandamus is improper.
Although the Central Bank and its respondent officials may have the
duty under the Central Bank Act and the General Banking Act to cause the
prosecution of those alleged violators, yet nothing in said laws that imposes a
clear, specific duty on the former to do the actual prosecution of the latter.
The Central Bank and its respondent officials have already done all they
could, within the confines of their powers, to cause the prosecution of those
persons denounced by Perez. Annexes show that the cases of the alleged
anomalous loans had already been referred by the Central Bank to the special
prosecutors of the Department of Justice for criminal investigation and
prosecution. For respondents to do the actual prosecuting themselves, as
petitioners would have it, would be tantamount to an ultra vires act already.
As for the Secretary of Justice, while he may have the power to prosecute
— through the office of the Solicitor General — criminal cases, yet it is settled
rule that mandamus will not lie to compel a prosecuting officer to prosecute a
criminal case in court.
Moreover, it does not appear from the law that only the Central Bank or
its respondent officials can cause the prosecution of alleged violations of
banking laws. Said violations constitute a public offense, the prosecution of
which is a matter of public interest and hence, anyone — even private
individuals — can denounce such violations before the prosecuting authorities.
Since Perez himself could cause the filing of criminal complaints against those
allegedly involved in the anomalous loans, if any, then he has a plain, adequate
and speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law, which makes mandamus
against respondents improper.
11. Central Bank vs. Morfe, 20 SCRA 507
versus
Facts: This case involves the question of whether a final judgment for the
payment of a time deposit in a savings bank which judgment was obtained
after the bank was declared insolvent, is a preferred claim against the bank.
In the judgment rendered in that case on December 13, 1972 the Fidelity
Savings Bank was ordered to pay the Elizes spouses the sum of P50,584 plus
accumulated interest.
From the said order, the Central Bank appealed to this Court by
certiorari. It contends that the final judgments secured by the Elizes and
Padilla spouses do not enjoy any preference because (a) they were rendered
after the Fidelity Savings Bank was declared insolvent and (b) under the
charter of the Central Bank and the General Banking Law, no final judgment
can be validly obtained against an insolvent bank.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's orders of August 20, 1973 and February 25,
1974 are reversed and set aside. No costs. SO ORDERED.
12. Serrano vs. CA, 96 SCRA 96
Facts: On October 13, 1966 and December 12, 1966, petitioner made a time
deposit, for one year with 6% interest, of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos
[P150,000.00] with the respondent Overseas Bank of Manila. Concepcion
Maneja also made a time deposit, for one year with 6-½% interest, on March 6,
1967, of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos [P200,000.00] with the same
respondent Overseas Bank of Manila.
Issue: Whether or not Bank deposits are in the nature of irregular deposits.
Held: Bank deposits are in the nature of irregular deposits. They are really
loans because they earn interest. All kinds of bank deposits, whether fixed,
savings, or current are to be treated as loans and are to be covered by the law
on loans. Current and savings deposits are loans to a bank because it can use
the same. The petitioner here, in making time deposits that earn interests with
respondent Overseas Bank of Manila was, in reality, a creditor of the
respondent Bank and not a depositor. The respondent Bank was in turn a
debtor of petitioner. Failure of he respondent Bank to honor the time deposit is
failure to pay its obligation as a debtor and not a breach of trust arising from
depositary's failure to return the subject matter of the deposit
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit, with costs against
petitioner. SO ORDERED.
13. Vitug vs. CA, March 29, 1990
Facts: This case is a chapter in an earlier suit decided by this Court involving
the probate of the two wills of the late Dolores Luchangco Vitug, who died in
New York, U. S.A., on November 10, 1980.
On April 12, 1985, Rowena Corona opposed the motion to sell on the
ground that the same funds withdrawn from savings account No. 35342-038
were conjugal partnership properties and part of the estate, and hence, there
was allegedly no ground for reimbursement. She also sought his ouster for
failure to include the sums in question for inventory and for "concealment of
funds belonging to the estate."
Vitug insists that the said funds are his exclusive property having
acquired the same through a survivorship agreement executed with his late
wife and the bank on June 19, 1970.
The trial courts upheld the validity of this agreement and granted "the motion
to sell some of the estate of Dolores L. Vitug, the proceeds of which shall be
used to pay the personal funds of Romarico Vitug in the total sum of
P667,731.66 ... ."
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals, in the petition for certiorari
filed by the herein private respondent, held that the above-quoted survivorship
agreement constitutes a conveyance mortis causa which "did not comply with
the formalities of a valid will as prescribed by Article 805 of the Civil Code," and
secondly, assuming that it is a mere donation inter vivos, it is a prohibited
donation under the provisions of Article 133 of the Civil Code.
Issue: Whether or not some funds withdrawn from the savings account no.
35342-038 were conjugal partnership properties and a part of the estate.
SO ORDERED.