Naturalising Scientific Content

Scientific Models as Systems of Physical Information

Javier Anta
(LOGOS – Universitat de Barcelona)

1. Introduction. Toward a Typenomics.

It is hard to imagine a researching group of biochemists that are not allowed to use any kind of
model at all. How monosaccharides would be tridimensionally conceived beyond Haworth projection?
Could they have any knowledge of the inner membrane of a mitochondrion without the Crista model? It
would be possible to teach successfully the synthesis of proteins without an illustrative schema? It goes
without saying that all the manifold scientific activity carried by the biochemists would be extremely harder
without any kind of models, if could be any activity at all. And the very same happens with
macroeconomists, particle physicists, neurophysiologists or any other scientific community.
Independently on the position about what scientific praxis consist of, models will always be
considered as highly necessary, or more technically, “indispensable” objects for performing this activity.
In a weaker or quinean sense of indispensability, a broad meaning of “model” would refers to a family of
scientific instruments, like usually-conceived models, simulations, schemas or diagrams among other;
required for managing scientific knowledge. In the strong indispensability sense, as supported by the
semantic conception of scientific theories, a theory is itself a set or system of models, thus without models
there is no science. Then, either scientific theories deeply depends on models (weakly indispensability) or
they are constitutively models (strongly indispensability), the foundational question here is whether it might
be other satisfactory way to do the semantic, pragmatic and epistemic job of models without having models
properly. And it does not seems to be case. Here their relevance (see also Downes; 1992): models will be
directly or indirectly pivotal in any philosophical reflection on what science consist on.

This is an essay on Typonomics. “Typonomics” (“τύπος” [týpos], models, instances;  νόμος,

[nómos], law or regularity) could be defined as the exhaustive analysis and specific study of scientific
models on their ontological, semantic, pragmatic and epistemic dimensions. Everything important deserves
a name, so here it is. Although the previously outlined importance, there are certain cases of scientific
models, specially the non material ones, which are quite ontologically problematic (in the vein of
propositions, possible worlds and the like); from that point we should either remain quiet about their
ontological status (French; 2009) or provide an exhaustive theoretical treatments for accounting them, as
many have done. Here, we choose to follow the latter path because we favor the idea that ontological
descriptions of scientific models are essential for explaining model semantics/epistemology, and so we do
it by developing a naturalistic perspective and an information-based approach on model ontology.
We have two clearly definite purposes, structured argumentatively along four sections. Our first
aims is to explore many possible ways of characterizing scientific models (as real entities, objects, abstracta,
fictions, structures, systems and so on) along different “stages of theoretical description” (STD), which
roughly are families of ontological parameters; in the last two section we will introduce certain ontological
parameters for naturalizing model characterizations. Our first section explore the debate on Model Realism,
which will be analyzed not only for making sense of realistic description of scientific models but also for
pointing out the many possible ontological attitudes toward them. On the other hand, we also will argue for
a particular perspective on the nature of scientific models. In section three we will give a general
characterization of scientific models as systems of information or “Data Architectures” and a specification
of how these have to be properly understood. The last section will be devoted, firstly, to re-describe models
no just as systems of information but as “systems of physical information” or Bounded Data Systems, and
secondly, we will argue for a realist ontological commitment (a sort of Information-Structural Realism)
towards models as systems of physical information. So, let start from the very beginning.

2. The Debate on Model Realism

Newton equation of movement, the Kratky-Porod worm-like chain model of DNA bending, a
human anatomical model, an ancient astrolabe, the Nuclear Shell model or Myron’s thermoeconomic
model. As for a solid starting point, it would required a satisfactory typological system for classify and
categorizing any typonomotheca (collection of scientific models) like the introduced. Frigg (2012)
recognized an exhaustive typology along the existent typonomical literature: probing models,
phenomenological models, computational models, developmental models, explanatory models, testing
models and a further long list of model-types or typonomic types. In fact, beyond any model typologization
there exist a huge manifold of scientific models with different possible ontological characterization, ranging
from material and even living ones, like laboratory rats (Ankeny; 2009), presumably “easy” to characterize
ontologically, to the much more problematic non-material ones, for instance the Nuclear Shell model. The
latter kind of models entails many non-trivial philosophical questions, like what are they composed of (if
they are not material) or where are they located (if they have no spatiotemporal location at all), motivating
the recent debates on model ontology (what scientific models are) and model realism (in which sense should
we be committed to them): both debates will be the vertebral axis along this paper. Nevertheless, our main
task would be to give a satisfactory answer to the modest question of “how models should be characterized”
instead of the more categorical “what are models”. We will refers constantly to non-material models,
although, against what it is widely belief within the model realism (from now on “MR”) debate, we have
good reasons for arguing that models are not problematic just because they are non-material.
It has to be noticed that MR debate is clearly and closely related to the scientific realism hot debate
in many points. Both were developed in order to account for highly problematic cases, SR for non-
observable phenomena and MR for non-material nor observable models, as we have just mentioned above;
both the most empirically distant from ourselves (Chakravarty; 2013). In fact, the purpose of MR is to
develop a suitable model or characterization of what a model is. A meta-model, properly. In this sense, the
(meta-theoretical) target phenomena (SR) would usually be a non-directly observable model (MR). The
key issue here is that the model is not a phenomena posited by a strict scientific theory but by a meta-
scientific/philosophical one; then, from a non-reductive position we might claim that a scientific realist
could be model (meta-scientific) anti-realist, and also the other way around. Although highly interrelated,
we have good reasons to consider both debates as theoretically autonomous ones. Still rest much to be said
about the philosophy of scientific models.
 Axis y represents
Model / Phenomena
Observability: DNA
Newton Nuclear Shell model
Material
Measurable Model Equations of
Human (Commonly Accepted)
 Anatomical
Movement Learned
Indirectly Perceived Astrolabe Region of Ontological
Model Wood-Cooper
 Astrolabe
Problematicity
Senso-Perceived

Axis x represents Cognitive Access:

External  Internal (Imagination)  Non-Imaginative Mental Representations

Image 1. Empirical Distance between Scientific Models. We can see how the distance vector of the Nuclear
Shell model (measurable and quasi-imaginable), which lays inside the region of Ontological Problematicity,
is much longer than the distance vector of a Human Anatomical model (visually perceived and externally
accessible). Empirical distance remain invariant under different characterization, but not the region of
Ontological Problematicity.

We are going to settle a threefold framework, á la Chakravarty (2015) with SR, focusing on the
ontological dimension of models (what they are, how they should be characterized) but also considering
their semantics (how models refers-represents their target phenomena) and their epistemology (how
knowledge can be obtained via models) in the sense that every proposal of model-characterization must
explanatorily account for model semantics/epistemology. Firstly, for describing models it would be
required to have certain theoretical devices as “Characterization Parameters”. These parameters are given
in the many Stages of (Meta) Theoretical Descriptions (STD), broadly understood as families of interrelated
parameters (See Image 2): in this paper we will analyze three main STDs that are everywhere found within
the MR debate and so we will develop a fourth STD wherein insert our proposal. Every STD is itself a
manner of arranging the many possible ontological characterization of scientific models having parameters
as constitutive rules for describing them, but are not inter-exclusives so certain parameters might be retained
from one STD to another. Let’s now pay attention to our first STD: the foundational STD.

Basic-STD: “Realness” Parameter | (e.g. Criterium of Reality. Psillos; 2011) Models as Entities.
Model can be ontologically characterized, based on the “Realness” parameter within the B-STD,
as (i) real entities. For instance, Psillos’ Criterium of Reality (an entity-model is real if it posits explanatory
advantages) stand as one specific and particular case of what we have called “Reality” parameter.
Otherwise, (ii) models could be conceived oxymoronically as unreal entities or a gap in reality, (iii) as
having a certain degree of reality if one considers that “reality” parameter has continuous values or (iv) just
assigning reality not to the whole model, but to one determined part of it.
The basic STD also encompasses all the possible realistic attitudes toward scientific models (many
of them originally taken from the SR debate) corresponding, in some sense, with the characterizations
above. Consequently, all these attitudes express our ontological commitment when models are concerning:
(a) MR-realism, to be realistically committed to models. Models are Entities (Psillos; 2012)
(b) MR-antirealism, to not be realistically committed to models. Models Not “are” Entities (Frigg; 2011b)
..
(c) MR-selective realism (De Re Commitment), to be realistically committed to some part (e.g. its structure
or the terms used for making novels predictions) of the models. Models are somehow Entities. (SR Worrall)
(d) MR-semirealism (De Dicto Commitment), to be partially committed (e.g. to their explanatory power)
to models. We are somehow committed to models as Entities (SR Chakravarty; 2015)
(e) MR-agnosticism, to not have a theoretical position concerning models.
Taking the Nuclear Shell model as an example, (a) one might be committed to de reality of NSm
(applying this very parameter) or (b) just assume that NSm cannot be not an entity at all. We also (c) can
be fully committed just to the mathematical formulation of NSm, (d) just be explanatorily committed to
how NSm distributes spatially the nuclei or (e) do not having enough intellectual resources for being
somehow committed. This is a core STD for any, either implicit or explicit, theoretical position and
philosophical discussion about the nature of scientific models, but does not give us much information about
what models are or how should we characterize them. Then, it would be necessary to explore further LTDs
but retaining both the “Realness” parameter and the manifold of attitudes-commitments.

3. Main Stages in the Meta-Theoretical Description of Scientific Models

It goes without saying that the very battlefront of Model Realism debate during the last decades
rest on on either considerer scientific models as works-of-fiction-like (fictions, narratives, etc.) or/and as
abstract objects of different sorts. This argumentative scenario, with their own parameters, is settled on
what we will denominate as Philosophical Level of Theoretical Description (P-STD):

Philosophical-STD: Fictoabstracta Spectrum: Parameters of Spatiotemporal Location; Causal Efficacy;

Cognitive Channel; Mental Dependency | (e.g. Criterium of Abstracta (The Negation Way). Lewis; 1981)
Models as Objects.
There is a stunning amount of recent philosophical literature considering scientific models as works
of fiction: Godfrey-Smith (2006, 2009), Contessa (2010) and Frigg (2010a, 2010b) among others, all of
them rooted, in some sense, on Cartwright’s dictum of “a scientific model is a work of fiction” (1981).
Generally, as Frigg noticed, models as works of fiction have two notably separated considerations: on one
hand, models might be taken as fictional entities to pejoratively outline their unreality, orthogonal to the
unrealistic view within B-LTD. This is the negative view toward fictional models, theoretically close to
what is known as “Revolutionary Fictionalism” (Yablo; 2002) as well as other eliminativistic positions
within general fictionalism debate (Ecklund; 2012). On the other hand, the fictive character of models meant
to be other way to say that models are “imagined” entities, meaning that non-directly observable models
(NS for instance) information is acquired not via perceptual system but via imagination system (parameter
of Cognitive Channel) as well as depends ontologically on mental systems (parameter of Cognitive
Dependency), as it happens with Star Wars or other works of fictions. This is, by contrast, the positive view
of fictional models, more affine with a not revolutionary but hermeneutical kind of general fictionalism.
(1) The negative view of fictional models posits really serious problems both for model semantics
and model epistemology, and therefore, for the prospects of scientific realism itself: it is controversial how
something can fail in referring to a non-existent (we will use existent and real interchangeably) entity but,
how on earth “something” that do not actually exists can refers to something that does (presumably) exist?
Here we are not talking of transfictional reference/knowledge (Frigg; 2010), instead we are neutraly
conceiving semantics as a function from non-existent objects to possibly existent objects. And the same
happens in the epistemological dimension: how can we know anything about “something” that do not exist?
The only way this characterization makes ontosemantic sense is either assuming a meinongian framework
(existing as a property is distinguishable from just “being”) or giving up with the idea that science refers or
obtain knowledge via models: the former too much theoretically expensive, the latter too much anti-
intuitive. Anyhow, the negative view of fictional models is, or as least still remain as, an intellectual maze.
(2) A vast majority of the authors supporting the positive view of fictional models constantly insist
on the idea that imaginary objects (models) used in the scientific praxis could be characterized in the very
same manner than the imaginary objects used in other cultural realms like literature or art. While the two
family of objects shared their imaginary constitution and their dependence on cognitive (mental) systems
(the two parameters used for characterize fictional objects), they differs in two essential points. (i) Their
contents: each object is inserted on a very distinct inferential system. (ii) Their (cultural/cognitive)
functions. Beside these points, the positive view of fictive model seem to be very theoretically fruitful; the
semantics/epistemology of fictions (do not confuse it with fictional semantics/epistemology) is an example
of it (Frigg; 2012). A brief parenthesis: this STD, altogether with the following STD, introduce the question
of whether scientific models should be defined (i) functionally, according to its semantic/epistemic role in
the scientific praxis, or (ii) structurally, how the subcomponents of a model are interrelated, or even (iii)
functo-structurally or (iv) neither functional nor structurally. The knowledge we can acquire via work of
fictions depends on their structural connections with reality: we cannot know anything about wookies
anatomy or lightsaber engineering, precisely because they do not stand for anything real, but we can obtain
good-quality knowledge about friendship through a work of fiction (García-Carpintero; 2016) like for
instance Star Wars, as long as the friendship depicted is semantically/epistemologically connected with real
friendship as we experience it.
Hard fictionalism aside and without any doubt, model-qua-abstracta characterizations stand as the
best allies of realistic attitudes towards scientific models in the P-STD and beyond; so it totally excludes
the negative view about fictional models and might be even compatible (as we will see later) with the
positive fictionalist view developed previously. Due to their highly complexity and inaccessibly, generic
abstracta (and specifically models-as-abstracta) are quite difficult to be characterized; they can be either
formally introduced á la Zalta (1989), via axiomatic procedures, or informally defined á la Lewis (1986).
This latter popularized the well-known “Negative Way” as a paradigmatic criterion of abstract object that
posed two controversial parameters: (a) the (lack of) spatiotemporal location of the object and (b) their
causal inefficacy. Among the head proposers of models-qua-abstracta, Psillos (2017) suggest to develop
further ontological characterization on this line in order to solve hard metaphysical problems like the multi-
location of non-material models; scientific models as particular abstracta or tropes.
Psillos properly distinguished between abstract objects ontology and abstract processes ontology,
as the difference between the product (of an abstraction process) and the process itself. Scientific modelling
is widely recognized as a complex process between abstractions (the omission of some properties of the
phenomena modelled) and idealization (the distortion of the values of some phenomena’s properties
modelled) as Jones (2008) analyzed them, from the target phenomena to the produced model. The fact is
that while a restricted abstraction from M to M’ might be considered as semantic and epistemic-properties
preserving, in the sense that if we refers effectively to M we can refers in the same manner to M’, an
idealization on the other hand, is neither semantic nor epistemically-preserving so it irrevocably leads to
misrepresentation of the target phenomena.
As intermediate cases within the fictoabstracta spectrum, by recombining the parameters analyzed
up to here, we might come up with a wide collection of possible gerrymandered fictoabstracta objects
standing as scientific models. Let’s suppose for illustrative purposes a type fictoabstacta models called
“Mobius Fictoabstracta” which is both an external abstracta (neither spatiotemporal location nor causal
efficacy, but mental independent) an internal imagined object, because the exclusive way to have access to
cognitive manipulation of the model is via introspective imagination. The name is due to the topological
object called “Mobius strip”, with only one face and only one boundary. It remarks the correspondence
between external and the internal character this kind of fictoabstracta object, wherein to fictively create a
scientific model (as Cartwright would claim), is truly equivalent to abstractly discover it (in Psillos’ sense).
Other author, for instance De Donato and Falguera (Santiago de Compostela; 2017), have explored
the richness and complexity of fictoabstracta characterizations. They assume that scientific models have to
be depicted as sort of peircean threefold objects, with one physical instantiation of an abstract dimension
that refers to the external real target phenomena (successful representation) or to one adjoined fictional
system (unsuccessful representation). Thought its richness, It can be noticed immediately the high
theoretical cost of complex fictoabstacta characterization. Other proposed philosophic-typonomic views on
how model should be depicted would conflates in some point within the Fictoabstracta Spectrum, like
models as descriptions (Achinstein; 1968) or models as narratives, precisely because it is not required
further parameters for understanding the ontological character of those linguistic-like characterization (e.g.
assuming fregean “senses” as external abstracta or syntactic/semantic/phonological objects as fictive
components of cognitive systems). Nevertheless, other mixed proposals like the one of Morgan (2001),
who characterizes models as “stories plus structures” need of other kind of parametrization (and therefore,
an additional STD) like the followings:
Structural-STD: Structures (Parameter: Structural Domain). Models as Structures (plus Interpretation).
There have been a very long tradition in characterizing scientific theories as logical or mathematical
structures, for instance set-theoretical constructions by the structuralist brunch of the semantic view on
scientific theories (Suppes, Giere or Suppe) or model-theoretical architectures (Sneed, Moulines or Balzer;
1989) and even as systems of logical formulas by the logical positivism and the received view. Apart from
these views in the philosophy of science, it is also controversially assumed that mathematical expression,
especially equations, can work as models. The semantic counterpart of all these characterizations has been
very prolific, in the sense that scientific representation could be described as a similarity relation,
homeomorphism, isomorphism, diffeomorphism or more recently, as a partial structure relation between
the model itself and the target phenomena.
Obviously, the realistic commitment toward each of these structural characterization, linking the
vast variety of structural proposals in S-STD with both attitudes from B-STD and characterizations from
P-STD, may range (i) on one hand from a hard full-blooded Platonic theoretician regarding structured
abstracta to a radical nominalist one (the structural counterpart of fictionalism), and on the other hand (ii)
from models as unstructured-unstructurable objects to an structurally enriched characterization of scientific
model, if parameters from S-STD are omitted or required, respectively.
The two STD presented along this section are not that separated as it may intuitively seems:
structures, abstracta and physical objects would interact in the nature of models in extremely interesting
manners. That why model ontology (as a typonomical field) stands nowadays as a real challenge for the
most hard metaphysicians. As Psillos (2011) pointed out, Dummet (1993) broke the settled dogma that
separates physical and abstract objects, mainly because of the non-spatiotemporal parametrization of the
latter, leading to the very possibility of characterizing models as “physical abstract objects” as abstracta
ontologically rooted (dependent) on concrete physical objects in contrast with other objects that are far from
been considered dependent on physical particulars like “mathematical abstracta” or “pure structures”. We
will intend to develop this path in our last section.
As it might be noticed, the straightforward purpose of exploring all the three previous B/P/S-STD
is to develop a sort of “Characterization Space” within all the possible ontological characterization of
scientific models, given the set of parameters in each STD, are regarded (See Image 2). Once we have the
Characterization Space and, afterwards, we can make the diagnosis that there is no ontological description
that can offers both a satisfactory explanation and a successful description of the real semantic and epistemic
role of models in the scientific praxis, then, we only have two solutions: either (a) giving up in the Model
Realism debate, the silent path of French (2008); or (b) settling new enriched Stages of Theoretical
Descriptions as some others have done (Magnani; 2012). We choose the second one, and let see now how
much it worth.

4. A Daring but Worthy Proposal: Models as Data Architectures

Let’s begins in this scenario:
Once, there was a concrete astronomical device called “astrolabe” (A m) located during the 11th’s
century Bagdad in the Bayt al-Hikma “House of Wisdom”, an extremely weight and enormous (8’x 12’)
mechanism, made up of cedar wood and cooper, used by the House’ scholars for calculating-computing the
positions of many celestial bodies. Sind ibn Ali was an important astronomer of the House who had to travel
to Isfahan for didactic purposes, but Am couldn’t be translated to this Persian city because of its material
condition. After 10 years of hard study, Sind succeeded in learning and memorizing completely how Am
works, so he could use their complex mechanisms everywhere for processing the very same data, for instance
the position of Leo constellation on the winter sky, as the astrolabe in Bagdad; any other House’ scholars
would need to manipulate Am in the very room where Am was located.

Many problems concerning models ontology, unresolved by the previous STDs, came up in the
scenario here displayed. How many models are there in the scenario? There are two separated models, the
material astrolabe (Am) and the learned one (Bm)? Or they are one and the same, but in different contexts?
How it should be characterized the learned (or maybe mental) model in contrast with the characterization
of the House’ model? Under any possible answer to these question, what is very clear is the very same
information (namely the position of Leo constellation) is computed and obtained from both Am and Bm by
manipulating bodily the device pieces and by manipulating cognitively the imagined device, respectively.
So, although their ptolemaic framework might be retrospectively considered as false, they both (Am and
Bm) faithfully represents the very same celestial movements. In conclusion, both Am and Bm are
semantically and epistemically equivalent; then, something decisive for characterizing scientific models at
their joints remain invariant under the ontological transformation observable from Am to Bm.
Our next task at this point is to develop an enriched STD, namely a family of parameters for
managing model ontologies, wherein insert immediately our “Proposed Characterization” in two steps: a
main general characterization using the parameters and a suggested specific one, with some particularities
on it but optionally interchangeable. Here it is:
Naturalistic-STD: (Parameters: Measurable Properties). Models as Systems.
Proposal-A Generic Ontological Characterization of Scientific Models as (DA):
Scientific Models should be ontologically characterized as “Data Architectures” (DA) in
which a determined system of Informational (Semantic/Epistemic) Properties “I” remain invariant
under some Abstraction Processes.
Data Architectures could be specifically described as:
Proposal-A1 Specific Ontological Characterization of Scientific Models as (DA):
(a) DA Composition: A quantifiable amount of non-redundant Statistical (Ross, Ladyman, Kinkaid; 2013)
Semantic Information, well-formed and truth-functional, with a certain fine-coarse degree of “Granularity”
(what Floridi calls “Level of Abstraction” [LoA]; 2007). Information Granularity determines qualitative
and quantitative values among the many sub-states of the model (the Data, properly) and informationally
modulates the accuracy-precision in which the many elements of the target phenomena are rejected,
discriminated and or represented in DAs.
(b) Infoprocessual Behavior: An adjoin (Deductive, Inductive and/or abductive) Inferential Rules System
(Suárez; 2004) wherein the Statistical-Semantic Data (Deterministic, Probabilistic or Plausibilistic,
respectively) is cognitively processed/computed in order to obtain knowledge.
(c) DA Structure: An highly complex Information-Theoretical Structure, both internal, integrating
systemically each particular Data Architecture, as well as external, relating the model towards other
neighboring architectures, and hierarchical, organizing the different levels of DA structuration.
(d) DA Code: A codified syntax/algebra of both well-formed compressible information (Data) and
Information Processes carried in the Data Architecture.
(e) Statistical Morphism: A systemic a functional capacity for representing (under a certain rate of
success) their target phenomena via a sort of “Statistical Morphism”, in which one sub-state of the model
Sm is semantically correlated (homeo/iso/diffeo-morphically) to one sub-state of the target phenomena Sp.
Statistical Morphism ranges over the many possible configurations of the phenomena modelled.
Here we have just sketched a core proposal of how model should be characterized, namely as Data
Architectures, and (a-e) one possible way to understand DA, and of course there can be other alternative
options. Floridi (2007) offers an explicit and exhaustive description of scientific models as informational
systems (DA) alternative to one proposed above. He regards scientific models, roughly, as DA-like system
(the ontology committed) generated through a theoretical process in which the well-formed information
acquired from the target phenomena system is granulated on what he calls “Level of Abstraction” (the
ontology committing), therefore determining qualitative and quantitative informational values in the
generated model and fixing its structure. In Floridi’s view, models as Informational Systems are dually and
“indirectly” related to their target phenomena, on one hand by the data acquired on the LoA, and on the
other by the structure attributed to them. Within the advantages of our proposed description of DA against
Floridi’s, the LoA / Informational Granularity neither precede nor theoretically generate-produce the model
because it is yet integrated on it; in the same way that the DA refer directly to its target phenomena via
statistical morphism due to the fact that there is no semantic intermediaries.
In order to contemplate how this proposed characterization works, let’s take again our previous
case. The material astrolabe Am is composed of a manifold of sub-states, the different positions of their
woody-cooper pieces, some of them are semantically correlated with the position of stars and constellations
on the sky, under some specified conditions (observer’ hemisphere, season, etc.). It describes the Statistical
Morphism between the astrolabe configuration (relations among astrolabe sub-states) and the celestial
sphere configuration (relations among stars and constellations). There also exist a code of all the
(syntactically) correct configurations and bodily movements of the astrolabe Am in order to be semantically
effective, as well as a pragmatic code (or Inferential Rules System) of how from these correct and sound
configurations-movements the right amount of data have to be abductively inferred in to obtain knowledge
about Leo’s position. All these elements encompasses the Astrolabe as a DA. The moral here is that, it does
not ontologically matter at all whether the astrolabe-as-a-model sub-states are composed of wood-and-
cooper (Am) or mental states (Bm): Information Granularity (a), Inferential Rules System (b), Information-
Theoretical Structure (c), Data Code (d) and the very same capacity of representing and generating
knowledge remains totally invariant from the wood-and-cooper astrolabe Am to the mental-state astrolabe
Bm. Thus, we have good reasons to think that what really ontologically matters within the astrolabe, as a
scientific model, is nothing above and beyond its Data Architecture or at least so should be characterized.
Our proposal give us immediately a Criterion of Models Individuation based on this idea:

Models-as-DA Individuation: If DA(Am)  DA(Bm), then Am def Bm

Thought the issue is far more complex as to be expressed on a formula. The wood-and-cooper
astrolabe (Am) and the learned astrolabe (Bm) should be regarded as the very same model with different
compositions, the fact is that those different composition do not alter the core ontological character of the
model. Obviously, they are not all things considered completely identical (Sind was able use the “mental”
astrolabe in many other circumstances than any other scholar could use the wood-and-cooper astrolabe,
Sind could eventually forget how the learned astrolabe works or the House’s astrolabe might be destroyed
when Bagdad were conquered, and so on) but strongly equivalent on its foundational aim: to produce and
manage scientific content. For instance the material astrolabe Am, not as a scientific model but as a weapon
or as an ornamental object, might be used to hit an enemy on his/her head or to decorate a big room
respectively, precisely because of its material constitution. Thus, material constitution would be considered
highly irrelevant for ontologically considering any of them (Am and Bm) as scientific models.
Scientific models do not just have information, in fact, scientific model are information.
Among the many virtues of the models-as-DA proposed characterization is that it “dissolves” (not
meta-philosophically the MR debate itself, but certain of its regulative parameters) the dichotomy between
“problematic” non-material models as Bm and “non-problematic” material models as Am, both becoming
equally problematically characterizable precisely because they as scientific models do not depend
ontologically on theirs material constitution, although all they have an evident materialistic constitution.
Among the many problems of our proposal there is a key one: how to think about information in ontological
terms, within the vast variety of possible definitions of the concept “information”. In our proposal we have
advocated for both a semantic (linguistic-logical) and an entropic (information-theoretical, shannongian)
picture, but still left much to be said about it. We have just sketched the material dimension of DAs, but,
when the questionable physical constitution of DAs along the casuistic is concerned, the issue become much
more complex as we will see in the next and last section.

5. Data Architectures in the Physical Realm and the Realistic Commitment.

Our previous proposal might be considered as a trivial thesis if we misunderstand that scientific
models do not have to be considered as having Data Architectures but properly as being Data Architectures.
DTs have been specified alternatively to Floridi as: (a) a Data basis of Codified Semantic (well-formed and
truth-valuable) Information, with a defined (b) Information Granularity (determining quantitative and
qualitative properties of the Data), an adjoin (c) Inferential System (for processing the Data in order to
obtain knowledge), integrated in a (d) complex Information-Theoretical Structure and (d) representing the
configuration of target phenomena via Statistical Morphism.
This specific characterization of Models-as-DA within a Naturalistic STD will be strongly reinforced by
our following proposals:
Weak Proposal 2: DA needs to be processed/computed on Physical Systems;
 Informational Properties of DA strongly depends on Physical Properties
Strong Proposal 2: DA are (at least Minimal) Physical Systems, modulo certain properties;
Some Informational Properties of DA (Shannon Entropy) are Physical Properties
Firstly, these two proposals should not being considered as physicalist thesis. Our naturalistic
pretension do not conflate on either methodological nor reductive physicalism: the main argument here is,
very broadly, that models-as-DA have some immediate (weaker or stronger) physical requirements to take
into account on their ontology for fully understanding the general nature of scientific models, while no
specific material condition is necessary for that purpose, as we have already notice. Then, we may argue
that the transition from a wood-and-cooper astrolabe to a learned astrolabe is the transition from a material
and physical DA to an also physical DA.
The hypothetical bedrock on which laid this very section is that every well-definable information
process (what really constitutes DAs) needs to be somehow physically implemented for being computed; it
seems to not be a very radical assumption. In the case of material models as the wood-and-cooper astrolabe,
its physical implementation happens, presumably, in the very physical and material object. Otherwise, non-
material models posit many questions. Does the physical implementation of non-material models-as-DAs
only happens on a neural system? Or in easier words, does the physical implementation of the learned
astrolabe happens on Sind’s brain? In positively answer to this question we will be depicting Data
Architectures as fully (Structured) Fictional Systems, refining in the naturalistic frame some of the
ontological parameters (specially cognitive dependency) we found in P-STD. In the same way, by
negatively answering the same question, Data Architectures could be re-characterized as (Structured)
Physical Abstract Systems; being any non-materially implemented DA physically implemented somewhere
out of biological brains. But there are many more possible answer to this foundational question. We could
adopt an extended mind position (mind and cognitive process might be implemented out of the brain) and
simultaneously be fictionalist regarding non-materially implemented DAs, in order to regards an external
physical system wherein the DA is implemented and also consider DA as a mental dependent system. Thus,
introducing meta-cognitive parameters within the Naturalist-STD is essential for understanding the physical
nature of models-as-Data Architectures.
Beyond the common-ground and basic implementation requirement, there are other theoretical
positions (hypo-thesis) concerning the entanglement between informational and physical properties. Now
we will just briefly sketch the pivotal theoretical strategist that supports our argument.
(a) Dependence Strategy (Landauer Principle): logically-irreversible informational processes entails
entropy increasing. Or in the Neumann stronger formulation: every act of information processing is
accompanied by some level of energy dissipation (1949). These statements are the very foundational bricks
of the recent controversial field knows as “Thermodynamics of Computation”. Some, or every in the
Neumann formulation, inferential operations carried by the DA entails an increasing of entropy or
“disorder” (the term is used just for illustrative purposes and with high-inaccuracy) among the many
substates of the physical system implementing DA. The variation of entropic properties is (covariantly or
contravariantly) systematically related with the variation of the values belonging to other properly physical
“state properties” or “state functions” like internal energy, heat or pressure.
(b) Equivalence Strategy (Grand Unification): Shannon Informational Entropy is identifiable with
Thermodynamic (either boltzmannian or gibbsian) Entropy (Zureck; 1989), what is called “Grand
Unification” hypothesis (Ladyman&Ross; 2007). It have to be noticed the enormous theoretical strength of
this hypothesis. It presupposes not just that there exist a strong ontological dependence between
informational systems and their physical implementations (as the required physical computing or the
Landauer principle) but a real identity between informational systems as DA and physical systems modulo
physic-informational properties as the
These are the main strategies (ordered from the theoretically weakest to the strongest:
Computational Implementation, Landauer Principle or Grand Unification) in order to understand how
informational systems, DAs in our case, should be described as having or depending on physical variables
therefore as being, at least, “minimally” physical systems. It is captured by the very concept of “Bound
Information” (Brillouin; 1951) or “Physical Information” (Floridi; 2011). The, Statistical Morphism stand
as a function from the Semantic Information contained in the physical states of the models to the
Information contained in the physical states of the target phenomena. The proposed characterization of
scientific models as DAs becomes theoretically enriched by the previous idea with a re-characterization of
models as “Bounded Data Architectures” wherein the physical “Bounding” depends on each particular
model. Concluding with a synthetic moral:
Scientific Models-as-BDA: Models do not just have information, models are physical information.
…
Once we have finished our twofold proposal of how scientific models should be characterized, we
need to be clear about the other side of Model Realism debate, namely, how we should be ontologically
(and even ideologically, in quinean terms) committed to the suggested specific characterization. Well, there
are, at least, two quite affine precedent theoretical commitments in Scientific and even Philosophical
Realism to what will be our one (specifically) toward Model Realism. The first one is due to Floridi (2007),
ubiquitous along the previous section of this paper, who proposed an Information Structural Realism (ISR).
The other one is Ladyman and Ross’ Information-Theoretical Structural Realism (ITSR; 2007) latter
developed into a sort of Statistical Structural Realism (2013).
Straightforwardly: we should be realistically committed to scientific model as DAs. We cannot
misunderstand our realistic commitment by somehow hypostatizing information: there is no such a thing
as information-stuff in the world; information, in the sense we have previously specified, must be always
assumed as a relational phenomenon from one system’s sub-state and other system’s sub-state, and
therefore, as having a structural nature. To be ontologically committed to informational systems as BDAs
is to be ontologically committed to complex structures and the systems they structured instead of just
individuals (a particular data, for instance). The realist part of the story laid on the physical character of
BDAs within the N-STD, precisely because this picture do not forces us to hold full-Platonic positions
concerning abstracta or information-theoretic structures for being committed to BDAs; becoming a
naturalistic ontological characterization somehow compatible for both hard nominalists or abstracta-
friendly perspectives. It has to be regarded as a benefit derived from our proposed characterization, and not
the other way around: our word’s description precedes our attitudes toward it. Although we have very good
explicit reasons for both accepting and having a realistic commitment to our second proposal (any scientific
model is, at least, a minimally physical information system), it might be also the case that someone would
prefer to accept and to be committed just to the first proposed characterization (any scientific model is a
data system) and reject our second one.
Before ending with this last section, we have voluntarily obviated other possible naturalistic
characterizations apart from the previous suggested ones due to the limited extension of this paper. Just to
mention the prospects of models-as-Virtual Systems, namely a naturalistic characterization of scientific
models without having any physical value (unbounded informational systems) but a clear well-formed
informational condition.
 6. Conclusion. Models as Systems of Physical Information.
Our two first sections have been devoted to study systematically, within what we have label
“Typonomics”, the many possible ontological characterization of scientific models (i) to answer the
question of what models really are, as well as (ii) to give a satisfactory account of how models refers their
target phenomena and (iii) how we can obtain knowledge through them. All these possible characterization
are arranged within a Model Space obtained from the so called Stages of Theoretical Description (STD),
which are families of parameters used for describing what a model so that we can also explain how they
semantically and epistemically works. We have explore three of them (Basic, Philosophical and Structural)
and suggested a fourth one, the Naturalistic-STD, in which we have located a privileged general
characterization (a region within the Model Space) of Models as Data Architectures (DA). In addition, we
also have both specify some of the main features of these particular Informational Systems (data
constitution, inferential character, codification, syntactic behavior and statistical morphism) and inserted
them in the very physical realm by re-characterizing models as Bounded Data Architectures (BDA) via
certain physical principles liking informational with physical properties.

Ontological Characterization Space Stages of Theoretical Description (STD)

(Scientific Models as …) ( Parameter of Characterization)

Basic Stage (and Ontological Commitment)

Partial Entity Not Entity Parameter of Reality
Entity

Philosophical Stage (and O.C.)

Fictoabstracta Spectrum
Parameter of Spatiotemporal Location
Full Narratives - Full
-Tropes Parameter of Causal Efficacy
Abstract -Universals Figures - Fictional
b Parameter of Cognitive Accessibility
Object a c Object Parameter of Mental Dependency
(…)
d Nominalist
Platonic Structural Stage (and O.C.)
Structure
Structure
-Classes / Sets - Logical Formulas - Equations Parameter of Structural Domain
Physical (…)
Abstract
Object Naturalistic Stage (and O.C.)
Bounded e Virtual Parameter of Quantifiable Information
Informational Informational Parameter of Data Codification
System f Architectures System Parameter of Inferential System
Parameter of Physical Bounding
(…)

Image 2. Ontological Characterization Space and the Stages of Theoretical Description. Some recent main
characterizations are located within the OCS; a: (Psillos; 2011), b: (Frigg; 2010a), c: (Godfrey-Smith; 2009), d:
(Morgan; 2001); e: (Floridi; 2007) and f, the one here proposed.
 The proposal of models, like the Nuclear Shell model or an Astrolabe, as DA would favor a
selective realistic commitment to the NS model or the Astrolabe as an Informational System disregarding
their material constitution. Models are, if something, information. But not merely information, it is what it
is called “bounded information” or “physical information”, so this characterization would be poorly
recognizable or translatable to the language of non-naturalistic philosophical literature as Physical Abstract
Objects á la Dummet (1993). Concluding this modest inquiry, our complete proposal would be to
naturalistically characterize scientific models as Bounded Data Architectures, as well as to be strongly
realistically committed to the physical information they contain in order to truly understand the real physical
relation existent between model and phenomena, so to appreciate the useful scientific knowledge we have
acquired from them since the ancient times.

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