amounted to P-2,734,207.36.
Anna Marie, her mother, and the
[ GR No. 202514, Jul 25, 2016 ]
ANNA MARIE L. GUMABON v. PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL BANK +
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari[1] under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court filed by Anna Marie Gumabon (Anna
Marie) assailing the December 16, 2011 decision[2] and June
26, 2012 resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV. No. 96289. The CA reversed the Regional Trial Court
(RTC)'s ruling[4] in Civil Case No. Q-04-53432 favoring Anna
Marie.
The Facts
On August 12, 2004, Anna Marie filed a complaint for recovery
of sum of money and damages before the RTC against the
Philippine National Bank (PNB) and the PNB Delta branch
manager Silverio Fernandez (Fernandez). The case stemmed
from the PNB's refusal to release Anna Marie's money in a
consolidated savings account and in two foreign exchange time
deposits, evidenced by Foreign Exchange Certificates of Time
Deposit (FXCTD).
In 2001, Anna Marie, together with her mother Angeles and her
siblings Anna Elena and Santiago, (the Gumabons) deposited
with the PNB Delta Branch $10,945.28 and $16,830.91, for
which they were issued FXCTD Nos. A-993902[5] and A-
993992,[6] respectively.
The Gumabons also maintained eight (8) savings accounts[7] in
the same bank. Anna Marie decided to consolidate the eight (8)
savings accounts and to withdraw P-2,727,235.85 from the
consolidated savings account to help her sister's financial needs.
Anna Marie called the PNB employee handling her accounts,
Reino Antonio Salvoro (Salvoro), to facilitate the consolidation
of the savings accounts and the withdrawal. When she went to
the bank on April 14, 2003, she was informed that she could not
withdraw from the savings accounts since her bank records
were missing and Salvoro could not be contacted.
On April 15, 2003, Anna Marie presented her two FXCTDs, but
was also unable to withdraw against them. Fernandez informed
her that the bank would still verify and investigate before
allowing the withdrawal since Salvoro had not reported for
work.
Thus, Anna Marie sent two demand letters[8] dated April 23 and
April 25, 2003 to the PNB.
After a month, the PNB finally consolidated the savings
accounts and issued a passbook for Savings Account (SA) No.
6121200.[9]The PNB also confirmed that the total deposits
1 | Documentary Evidence.Best Evidence Rule.ntsnotes
PNB executed a Deed of Waiver and Quitclaim dated May 23,
2003[10] to settle all questions regarding the consolidation of the
savings accounts. After withdrawals, the balance of her
consolidated savings account was P250,741.82.
On July 30, 2003, the PNB sent letters to Anna Marie to inform
her that the PNB refused to honor its obligation under FXCTD
Nos. 993902 and 993992,[11] and that the PNB withheld the
release of the balance of P-250,741.82 in the consolidated
savings account.[12]According to the PNB, Anna Marie pre-
terminated, withdrew and/or debited sums against her deposits.
Thus, Anna Marie filed before the RTC a complaint for sum of
money and damages against the PNB and Fernandez.[13]
As to the two FXCTDs, Anna Marie contended that the PNB's
refusal to pay her time deposits is contrary to law. The PNB
cannot claim that the bank deposits have been paid since the
certificates of the time deposits are still with Anna Marie.[14]
As to the consolidated savings account, Anna Marie stated that
the PNB had already acknowledged the account's balance in
the Deed of Waiver and Quitclaim amounting to
P2,734,207.36. As of January 26, 2004, the remaining balance
was P250,741.82. PNB presented no concrete proof that this
amount had been withdrawn.
Anna Marie prayed that the PNB and Fernandez be held
solidarily liable for actual, moral, and exemplary damages, as
well as attorney's fees, costs of suit, and legal interests because
of the PNB's refusal to honor its obligations.
In its answer,[15] the PNB argued that: (1) Anna Marie is not
entitled to the balance of the consolidated savings account
based on solutio indebiti; (2) the PNB already paid the
$10,058.01 covered by FXCTD No. 993902; (3) the PNB is
liable to pay only $10,718.87 of FXCTD No. 993992, instead
of the full amount of $17,235.41; and (4) Anna Marie is guilty
of contributory negligence. The PNB's arguments are discussed
below.
First, Anna Marie is not entitled to the alleged balance of
P250,741.82. The PNB's investigation showed that Anna Marie
withdrew a total of P251,246.81[16] from two of the eight
savings accounts and she used this amount to purchase
manager's check no. 0000760633.[17]Hence, P251,246.81
should be deducted from the sum agreed upon in the Deed of
Waiver and Quitclaim. The PNB offered photocopies of the
PNB's miscellaneous ticket[18] and the manager's check as
evidence to prove the withdrawals. The PNB argued that unjust
enrichment would result if Anna Marie would be allowed to
collect P-250,741.82 from the consolidated savings account
without deducting her previous withdrawal of P251,246.81.
Second, Anna Marie is not entitled to receive $10,058.01
covered by FXCTD No. 993902. Based on the PNB's records,
Anna Marie pre-terminated FXCTD No. 993902 on March 11,
2002, and used the deposit, together with another deposit
covered by FXCTD No. 993914 (for $8,111.35), to purchase
a foreign demand draft (FX Demand Draft No. 4699831) evidence rule.
payable to Anna Rose/Angeles Gumabon. The PNB presented
a facsimile copy of Anna Rose's Statement of Account The RTC awarded damages to Anna Marie due to the PNB's
(SOA)[19] from the PNB Bank to prove that the amount covered mishandling of her account through its employee, Salvoro. The
by FXCTD No. 993902 was already paid. RTC also held that the PNB failed to establish Anna Marie's
contributory negligence.
Third, Anna Marie is only entitled to receive $10,718.87
instead of the full amount of $17,235.41 covered by FXCTD In conclusion, the RTC ordered the PNB to pay Anna Marie
No. 993992 because: (a) the amount of $1,950.00 was part of these amounts:
the money used by Anna Marie to purchase the manager's
check; (2) the amount of $2,566.54 was credited to Current (1) Actual damages of:
Account No. 227-810961-8 owned by Anna Marie's aunt, Lolita
Lim; and (3) the amount of $2,000.00 was credited to Current (a) $10,058.01, as the outstanding balance of FXCTD No.
Account No. 2108107498 of Anna Marie and Savings Account 993902;
No. 212-5057333 of Anna Marie/or Angeles or Santiago/or (b) $20,244.42, as the outstanding balance of FXCTD No.
Elena (all surnamed Gumabon). Hence, these amounts should 993992;and
be deducted from the amount payable to Anna Marie. (c) P-250,741.82, as the outstanding balance of SA No.
6121200;
Finally, the PNB alleged that Anna Marie was guilty of
contributory negligence in her bank dealings. (2) P-100,000.00 as moral damages;
(3) P-50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
In her reply,[20] Anna Marie argued that the best evidence of her (4) P150,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
withdrawals is the withdrawal slips duly signed by her and the (5) Costs of suit.
passbooks pertaining to the accounts. PNB, however, failed to
show any of the withdrawal slips and/or passbooks, and also From this ruling, the PNB appealed before the CA.
failed to present sufficient evidence that she used her accounts'
funds.
The CA Ruling
The RTC Ruling The CA reversed the RTC's ruling.[24]
The RTC ruled in Anna Marie's favour.[21] The CA held that the PNB had paid the actual amounts claimed
by Anna Marie in her complaint. The CA noted Anna Marie's
The RTC held that the PNB had not yet paid the remaining suspicious and exclusive dealings with Salvoro and the
balance of $10,058.01 under FXCTD No. 993902. Anna Gumabons' instruction to Salvoro to make unauthorized and
Marie's SOA,[22]which the PNB relied upon, is a mere unrecorded withdrawals. Hence, there are no entries of
photocopy and does not satisfy the best evidence rule. withdrawals reflected in Anna Marie's passbook.
Moreover, there is no indication on the stated amounts in the
SOA that the funds have come from FXCTD No. The CA also considered Anna Rose's SOA as proof that the
993902.[23] The PNB failed to obtain the deposition of a PNC PNB had paid the remaining balance of $10,058.01 on FXCTD
Bank officer or present any other evidence to show that the No. 993902. The CA held that the PNB verified the SOA and it
amounts stated in the SOA came from FXCTD No. 993902. was corroborated by the affidavit[25] of the PNB Branch
The RTC also held that the alleged pre-termination of FXCTD Operations Officer in New York. The CA stated that the RTC
No. 993902 on March 11, 2002, is hard to believe since the should have allowed the taking of the deposition of the PNB
certificate shows that the last entry was made on March 24, bank officer.
2003, with a reflected balance of $10,058.01.
The CA also relied on the PNB's investigation and concluded
On FXCTD No. 993992, the RTC held that the PNB failed to that the PNB had already paid the amounts claimed by Anna
prove Anna Marie's alleged withdrawals. These alleged Marie under FXCTD Nos. 993902 and 993992.
withdrawals are not reflected at the back of the certificate. Anna
Marie's ledger was also not presented as evidence to show that As to Anna Marie's consolidated savings account, the CA gave
several withdrawals had been made against FXCTD No. credence to the miscellaneous ticket and the manager's check
993992. presented by the PNB to prove that it had already paid the
balance.
On the consolidated savings account, the RTC held that the
PNB failed to prove that Anna Marie withdrew the balance of Anna Marie moved but failed to obtain reconsideration of the
P250,741.82. The RTC excluded PNB's evidence, i.e., CA's decision; hence, the present petition.[26]
photocopies of the miscellaneous ticket and manager's
check, to prove the alleged withdrawals, since these documents
were just photocopies and thus failed to satisfy the best
2 | Documentary Evidence.Best Evidence Rule.ntsnotes
 misappreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are
The Petition conflicting; (6) when in making its findings, the same are
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7)
Anna Marie filed the present petition for review to question the when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8)
CA's decision and resolution which reversed the RTC's ruling. when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth
Anna Marie argues that: first, the CA should not have in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs
disregarded the RTC's conclusive findings; second, the CA are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings
erred in considering the PNB New York bank officer's affidavit of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
because it was not formally offered as evidence; third, the CA contradicted by the evidence on record.[29]
erroneously relied on a foreign demand draft[27] to prove the
PNB's payment of the amount due under FXCTD No. The present case falls under two of the exceptions, particularly
993902; fourth, the CA erroneously considered the that the CA's findings are contrary to the RTC's findings, and
miscellaneous ticket and the manager's check because these that the CA's findings of fact are premised on absent evidence
documents are mere photocopies and inadmissible under the and contradicted by the evidence on record.
best evidence rule; and fifth, the CA's conclusion about a
purported "connivance" between Anna Marie and Salvoro has We note that the CA considered pieces of evidence which are
no evidentiary basis. inadmissible under the Rules of Court, particularly the
manager's check and the corresponding miscellaneous ticket,
In its comment, the PNB counters that: first, the CA can rectify Anna Rose's SO A, and the affidavit of the PNB New York's
the RTC's factual findings since the RTC committed errors in bank officer. The inadmissibility of these documents is
its appreciation of the evidence; second, the RTC completely explained more fully in the following discussion.
ignored the PNB's several evidence proving its payment of
Anna Marie's FXCTDs; third, Anna Marie did not refute the PNB failed to establish the fact of
PNB's allegations of payment; fourth, the CA has the right to payment to Anna Marie in FXCTD
review even those exhibits which were excluded by the RTC; Nos. 993902 and 993992, and SA
and fifth, the CA correctly ruled that the PNB should not be No. 6121200.
faulted about the unrecorded transactions, and that the PNB had
done its duty to its depositors when it conducted investigations It is a settled rule in evidence that the one who alleges payment
and an internal audit of Anna Marie's accounts. has the burden of proving it.[30] The burden of proving that the
debt had been discharged by payment rests upon the debtor
The Issues once the debt's existence has been fully established by the
evidence on record. When the debtor introduces some evidence
The issue before this Court is whether Anna Marie is entitled to of payment, the burden of going forward with the evidence - as
the payment of the following amounts: distinct from the burden of proof - shifts to the creditor.
Consequently, the creditor has a duty to produce evidence to
show nonpayment.[31]
(a) $10,058.01 or the outstanding balance under FXCTD No.
993902; In the present case, both the CA and the RTC declared that the
(b) $20,244.42 for FXCTD No. 993992; PNB has the burden of proving payment. The lower courts,
(c) P250.741.82 for SA No. 6121200; and (3) Damages. however, differed in resolving the question of whether the PNB
presented sufficient evidence of payment to shift the burden of
evidence to Anna Marie. The RTC ruled that the PNB failed to
do so, after excluding PNB's evidence, i.e., miscellaneous
Our Ruling ticket, manager's check, and the affidavit of the PNB New York's
bank officer, based on the rules of evidence. The CA, on the
We grant the petition and reverse the CA 's ruling. other hand, considered the excluded evidence and found that the
PNB presented sufficient proof of payment.
The core issue raised in the present petition is a question of fact.
As a general rule, a petition for review under Rule 45 of the i. The PNB's alleged payment of the
Rules of Court covers only questions of law. Questions of fact amount covered by SA No. 6121200
are not reviewable and cannot be passed upon by the Court in
the exercise of its power to review under Rule 45.[28] The PNB alleged that it had already paid the balance of the
consolidated savings account (SA No. 6121200) amounting to
There are, however, exceptions to the general rule. Questions P-250,741.82. It presented the manager's check to prove that
of fact may be raised before this Court in any of these instances: Anna Marie purchased the check using the amounts covered by
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, the Gumabon's two savings accounts which were later part of
surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is Anna Marie's consolidated savings account. The PNB also
manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is a presented the miscellaneous ticket to prove Anna Marie's
grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on withdrawal from the savings accounts.
3 | Documentary Evidence.Best Evidence Rule.ntsnotes
The RTC denied the admission of the manager's check and the
miscellaneous ticket since the original copies were never
presented.[32]The PNB moved to tender the excluded evidence
and argued that even without the presentation of the original
copies, the photocopies are admissible because they have been
identified by Fernandez.[33]
Evidence, to be admissible, must comply with two
qualifications: (a) relevance and (b) competence. Evidence is
relevant if it has a relation to the fact in issue as to induce a
belief in its existence or nonexistence.[34] On the other hand,
evidence is competent if it is not excluded by the law or by the
Rules of Court.[35]
One of the grounds under the Rules of Court that determines the
competence of evidence is the best evidence rule. Section 3,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that the original copy
of the document must be presented whenever the content of the
document is under inquiry.[36]
However, there are instances when the Court may allow the
presentation of secondary evidence in the absence of the
original document. Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
enumerates these exceptions:
(a) when the original has been lost, or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) when the original is in the custody or under the control of
the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter
fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) when the original consists of numerous accounts or other
documents which cannot be examined in court without great
loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is
only the general result of the whole; and
(d) when the original is a public record in the custody of a public
officer or is recorded in a public office.
While the RTC cannot consider the excluded evidence to
resolve the issues, such evidence may still be admitted on
appeal provided there has been tender of the excluded evidence
under Section 40 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.[37]
The PNB cannot simply substitute the mere photocopies of the
subject documents for the original copies without showing the
court that any of the exceptions under Section 3 of Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court applies. The PNB's failure to give a
justifiable reason for the absence of the original documents and
to maintain a record of Anna Marie's transactions only shows
the PNB's dismal failure to fulfill its fiduciary duty to Anna
Marie.[38] The Court expects the PNB to "treat the accounts of
its depositors with meticulous care, always having in mind the
fiduciary nature of their relationship." [39] The Court explained
in Philippine Banking Corporation v. CA,[40] the fiduciary
nature of the bank's relationship with its depositors, to wit:
4 | Documentary Evidence.Best Evidence Rule.ntsnotes
The business of banking is imbued with public interest. The
stability of banks largely depends on the confidence of the
people in the honesty and efficiency of banks. In Simex
International (Manila) Inc. v. Court of Appeals we pointed
out the depositor's reasonable expectations from a bank and
the bank's corresponding duty to its depositor, as follows:
In every case, the depositor expects the bank to treat his
account with the utmost fidelity, whether such account
consists only of a few hundred pesos or of millions. The bank
must record every single transaction accurately, down to
the last centavo, and as promptly as possible. This has to be
done if the account is to reflect at any given time the amount of
money the depositor can dispose of as he sees fit, confident that
the bank will deliver it as and to whomever he directs,
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Consequently, the CA should not have admitted the subject
documents even if the PNB tendered the excluded evidence.
Notably, the PNB clearly admitted in the executed Deed of
Waiver and Quitclaim that it owed Anna Marie P2,734,207.36
under the consolidated savings account. After a number of
uncontested transactions, the remaining balance of Anna
Marie's deposit became P250,741.82. The inevitable conclusion
is that PNB's obligation to pay P250,741.82 under SA No.
6121200 subsists.
ii. The PNB's alleged payment of the
amount covered by FXCTD No. 993902
The PNB claimed that it had already paid the amount of
$10,058.01 covered by FXCTD No. 993902. It presented the
foreign demand draft dated March 11, 2002 which Anna Marie
allegedly purchased with the funds of FXCTD No. 993902. In
addition, the PNB also presented Anna Rose's SOA to show that
there was a fund transfer involving the contested amount. To
further support its claim, the PNB annexed the affidavit of the
PNB New York's branch officer about the fund transfer. The
PNB, however, failed to formally offer the affidavit as
evidence.
Anna Marie moved for the exclusion of the photocopy of Anna
Rose's SOA for failing to conform to the best evidence rule. The
RTC granted her motion and denied its admission. When the
case reached the CA, the CA stated that the RTC should have
considered the evidence in the light of the PNB's identification
of the SOA as an exact copy of the original and the claim that
it is corroborated by the affidavit of the PNB New York's bank
officer.
The PNB explained that its failure to present the original copy
of Anna Rose's SOA was because the original was not in the
PNB's possession.
We rule that the SOA is inadmissible because it fails to qualify
as relevant evidence. As the RTC correctly stated, the SOA
"does not show which of the amount stated therein came from 993992 should only be limited to $5,857.79. It presented the
the funds of Certificate of Time Deposit No. A-993902."[41] manager's check, which admissibility we have heretofore
discussed and settled, and the miscellaneous tickets.
The affidavit of the PNB New York's bank officer is also
inadmissible in the light of the following self-explanatory We cannot absolve the PNB from liability based on these
provision of the Rules of Court: miscellaneous tickets alone. As the RTC correctly stated, the
transactions allegedly evidenced by these tickets were neither
posted at the back of Anna Marie's certificate, nor recorded on
her ledger to show that several withdrawals had been made on
"Sec. 34. Offer of evidence. - The court shall consider no the account.
evidence which has not been formally offered, x x x." [42]
At this point, we remind the PNB of the negotiability of a
certificate of deposit as it is a written acknowledgment by the
Formal offer means that the offeror shall inform the court of the bank of the receipt of a sum of money on deposit which the bank
purpose of introducing its exhibits into evidence. Without a promises to pay to the depositor, to the latter's order, or to some
formal offer of evidence, courts cannot take notice of this other person or the latter's order.[49] To discharge a debt, the
evidence even if this has been previously marked and bank must pay to someone authorized to receive the
identified.[43] payment.[50] A bank acts at its peril when it pays deposits
evidenced by a certificate of deposit, without its production and
In Heirs of Pedro Pasag v. Parocha,[44] we reiterated the surrender after proper indorsement.[51]
importance of a formal offer of evidence. Courts are mandated
to rest their factual findings and their judgment only and strictly Again, as the RTC had correctly stated, the PNB should not
upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. The formal have allowed the withdrawals, if there were indeed any, without
offer enables the judge to know the purpose or purposes for the presentation of the covering foreign certificates of time
which the proponent is presenting the evidence. It also affords deposit. There are no irregularities on Anna Marie's certificates
the opposing parties the chance to examine the evidence and to to justify the PNB's refusal to pay the stated amounts in the
object to its admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates review as the certificates when it was presented for payment.
appellate court will not be required to review documents not
previously scrutinized by the trial court. Therefore, the PNB is liable for Anna Marie's claims since it
failed to prove that it had already been discharged from its
In People v. Napat-a[45] People v. Mate[46] and Heirs of Romana obligation.
Saves, et al. v. Escolastico Saves, et al.[47] we recognized the
exceptions from the requirement of a formal offer of evidence, PNB is liable to Anna Marie
namely: (a) the evidence must have been duly identified by for actual, Moral, and exemplary
testimony duly recorded; and (b) the evidence must have been damages as well as attorney's fees
incorporated in the records of the case. for its negligent acts as a
banking institution.
It is unmistakable that the PNB did not include the affidavit of
the PNB New York's bank officer in its formal offer of evidence Since the PNB is clearly liable to Anna Marie for her deposits,
to corroborate Anna Rose's SOA. Although the affidavit was the Court now determines PNB's liability for damages under
included in the records and identified by Fernandez, it remains existing laws and jurisprudence.
inadmissible for being hearsay. Jurisprudence dictates that an
affidavit is merely hearsay evidence when its affiant or maker Section 2 of Republic Act No. 8791,[52] declares the State's
did not take the witness stand.[48] recognition of the "fiduciary nature of banking that requires
high standards of integrity and performance." It cannot be
In the present case, Fernandez is not the proper party to identify overemphasized that the banking business is impressed with
the affidavit executed by the PNB New York's bank officer public interest. The trust and confidence of the public to the
since he is not the affiant. Therefore the affidavit is industry is given utmost importance.[53] Thus, the bank is under
inadmissible. obligation to treat its depositor's accounts with meticulous care,
having in mind the nature of their relationship.[54] The bank is
Thus, the PNB failed to present sufficient and admissible required to assume a degree of diligence higher than that of a
evidence to prove payment of the $10,058.01.This failure leads good father of a family.[55]
us to conclude that the PNB is still liable to pay the amount
covered by FXCTD No. 993902. As earlier settled, the PNB was negligent for its failure to update
and properly handle Anna Marie's accounts. This is patent from
iii. The PNB's alleged payment of the PNB's letter to Anna Marie, admitting the error and
the amount covered by FXCTD unauthorized withdrawals from her account. Moreover, Anna
No. 993992 Marie was led to believe that the amounts she has in her
accounts would remain because of the Deed of Waiver and
The PNB alleged that Anna Marie's claim over FXCTD No. Quitclaim executed by her, her mother, and PNB.
5 | Documentary Evidence.Best Evidence Rule.ntsnotes
Assuming arguendo that Anna Marie made the contested
withdrawals, due diligence requires the PNB to record the
transactions in her passbooks.
The Court has established in a number of cases the standard of
care required from banks, and the bank's liability for the
damages sustained by the depositor. The bank is not absolved
from liability by the fact that it was the bank's employee who
committed the wrong and caused damage to the
depositor.[56] Article 2180 of the New Civil Code provides that
the owners and managers of an establishment are responsible
for damages caused by their employees while performing their
functions.[57]
In addition, we held in PNB v. Pike,[58] that although the bank's
employees are the ones negligent, a bank is primarily liable for
the employees' acts because banks are expected to exercise the
highest degree of diligence in the selection and supervision of
their employees.
Indeed, a great possibility exists that Salvoro was involved in
the unauthorized withdrawals. Anna Marie entrusted her
accounts to and made her banking transactions only through
him. Salvaro's unexplained disappearance further confirms this
Court's suspicions. The Court is alarmed that he was able to
repeatedly do these unrecorded transactions without the bank
noticing it. This only shows that the PNB has been negligent in
the supervision of its employees.
As to contributory negligence, the Court agrees with the RTC
that the PNB failed to substantiate its allegation that Anna
Marie was guilty of contributory negligence.
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured
party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered,
which falls below the standard to which he is required to
conform for his own protection.[59] Whether contributory
negligence transpired is a factual matter that must be proven.
In the present case, Anna Marie cannot be held responsible for
entrusting her account with Salvoro. As shown in the records,
Salvoro was the bank's time deposit specialist. Anna Marie
cannot thus be faulted if she engaged the bank's services
through Salvoro for transactions related to her time deposits.
The Court also cannot accept the CA's conclusion that there was
connivance between Anna Marie and Salvoro. This conclusion
is simply not supported by the records and is therefore baseless.
In these lights, we hold that Anna Marie is entitled to moral
damages of P-l 00,000.00. In cases of breach of contract, moral
damages are recoverable only if the defendant acted
fraudulently or in bad faith, or is guilty of gross negligence
amounting to bad faith, or in clear disregard of his contractual
obligations.[60] Anna Marie was able to establish the mental
anguish and serious anxiety that she suffered because of the
PNB's refusal to honor its obligations.
Anna Marie is likewise entitled to exemplary damages of P-
50,000.00. Article 2229 of the New Civil Code imposes
6 | Documentary Evidence.Best Evidence Rule.ntsnotes
exemplary damages by way of example or correction for the
public good. To repeat, banks must treat the accounts of its
depositors with meticulous care and always have in mind the
fiduciary nature of its relationship with them. [61] Having failed
to observe these, the award of exemplary damages is justified.
As exemplary damages are awarded herein[62] and as Anna
Marie was compelled to litigate to protect her interests, [63] the
award of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation of
P150,000.00 is proper.
Finally, we impose legal interest pursuant to the guidelines
in Nacar v. Gallery Frames,[64] We held in that case that for
interest awarded on actual and compensatory damages, the
interest rate is imposed as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the
payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of
money, the interest due should be that which may have been
stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself
earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded; In
the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per
annum [changed to 6% per annum starting July 1, 2013] to be
computed from default, i.e., from extrajudicial demand under
and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
x x x x
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money
becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest x x x shall
be 6% per annum frorn such finality until its satisfaction, x x x
We note that pursuant to the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas-
Monetary Board Circular No. 799, the legal interest rate is 6%
per annum effective July 1, 2013. The new rate is applicable
prospectively; thus, the 12% per annum shall still apply until
June 30, 2013.
In the present case, Anna Marie filed her complaint on August
12, 2004. PNB is therefore liable for legal interest of 12% per
annum from August 12, 2004 until June 30, 2013, and 6% per
annum from July 1, 2013, until its full satisfaction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
December 16, 2011 decision and June 26, 2012 resolution of
the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed. The October 26, 2010
decision of the Regional Trial Court is REINSTATED with
MODIFICATIONS. Thus, the Philippine National Bank
is ORDERED to pay Anna Marie Gumabon the following:
(1) Actual damages of:
(a) $10,058.01, as the outstanding balance of FXCTD No.
993902;
(b) $ 20,244.42, as the outstanding balance of FXCTD No.
993992; and
(c) P250/741.82, as the outstanding balance of SA No.
6121200;
(2) Legal interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum of the
total actual damages from August 12, 2004 to June 30, 2013,
and six percent (6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until full
satisfaction;
(3) P100,000.00 as moral damages;
(4) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
(5) P150,000.00 as attorney's fees; and (7) Costs of suit.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Financial
Consumers Protection Department of the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas, for information and possible action in accordance
with the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas' mandate to protect the
banking public.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 117384. October 21, 1998]
HEIRS OF TEODORO DELA CRUZ represented by
EDRONEL DELA CRUZ, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, PACIFICO
MARQUEZ, FILOMENO andGREGORIO, both
surnamed MADRID, respondents.
Petitioners seek the reversal of the decision of the Court of
Appeals,[1] in CA G.R. No. 25339 dated September 27, 1994
affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Isabela in
Civil Case No. 19-219 dated October 9, 1989 which adjudicated
lot Nos. 7036-A-10-A, 7036-A-10-B and 7036-A-10-C to
herein private respondents.[2]
The following facts, concisely related in the petition[3] are not
in dispute.
On November 20, 1986, petitioners filed an action for
reconveyance with damages[4] against private respondents
involving a parcel of land situated in Poblacion, San Mateo,
Isabela with a total area of3,277 square meters. In their
complaint, petitioners assert that the subject land was bought by
their predecessor-in-interest from the private respondents,
Madrid brothers, for P4,000.00 in a deed of sale executed on
May 18, 1959, and since then they have been in actual, physical,
7 | Documentary Evidence.Best Evidence Rule.ntsnotes
continuous and open possession of the property. However,
sometime in October 1986, much to their dismay and surprise,
private respondents managed to obtain a Torrens Title over the
said land.
On the other hand, the Madrids denied having executed
the said deed of sale and assuming that said document exists,
the same is fictitious and falsified. Moreover, while they admit
petitioners possession of the land, they assert that this
possession is in defiance of their repeated demands that the
former relinquish the same. Meanwhile, Pacifico Marquez
contends that he is an innocent purchaser for value of the
property having bought the same from the Madrid brothers in
1976.[5]
During the trial, petitioners were unable to present the
original deed of sale since it was lost. Consequently, they were
constrained to offer, as Exhibit A, a photo copy of the purported
original carbon copy of the deed of sale in an effort to prove the
transaction.
However, in disposing of the case, the trial court ruled that
Exhibit A was inadmissible in evidence, thus:
Since at the time of the execution of Teodoro dela Cruz affidavit
or on June 14, 1966, a duplicate original carbon copy of the
alleged sale was still in his possession, the plaintiffs must have
to account for it.No proof was adduced that this remaining copy
was lost or destroyed. Furthermore, no attempt was done to
produce the copies retained by the notary public although there
is a possibility that the same still exist (sic). Neither was there
any proof that the copy sent to the court as required by the
notarial law is unavailable. Under these (sic) state of facts, the
Court believes that the xerox copy of a certified true copy of the
original issued by the notary public cannot be admitted in
evidence to prove the conveyance of the land in question.
Accordingly, the trial court dismissed petitioners
complaint, the dispositive portion of the decision of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations,
judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Dismissing the complaint;
2. Declaring the defendants the lawful owners of the land in
question insofar as the portion thereof falling or found in their
respective titles are concerned; and
3. Ordering the plaintiffs, their agents, representatives or any
person or persons deriving their title, ownership or possession
from the plaintiffs, to vacate the portions of Lots 7036-A-10-A,
70360A-10-B and 7036-A-10-C, occupied by them and to
deliver the possession thereof to the defendants;
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
 Evidently aggrieved by the decision, petitioners appealed
to the Court of Appeals contending that the trial court erred in
holding that: (1) Exhibit A was inadmissible in evidence to
prove the transaction;(2) there was no valid sale of the land in
question; (3) that they (petitioners) are not entitled to the
improvements they had introduced in the land.
On September 27, 1994, the Court of Appeals rendered its
judgment which ruled that Exhibit A was admissible in
evidence for failure of the private respondents to object when it
was offered during the trial, thus:
It is therefore evident that defendants-appellees never put in
issue the inadmissible nature of Exh. A as a mere secondary
evidence and that the trial judge did not exclude the same when
it was formally offered, only to ultimately exclude it in its
decision. It is true that the originals of Exh. A were never
produced or accounted for by plaintiffs. Yet, notwithstanding
this omission, the defense did not object to its not being the best
evidence when it was formally offered. Had the defendants
interposed an objection to Exh. A on the ground of its
incompetency for not complying with the best evidence rule, it
would have been properly excluded by the trial
court. Defendants omission to object on the proper ground
operated as a waiver, as this was a matter resting on their
discretion.
Unfortunately, petitioners victory was shortlived. For the
Court of Appeals, while ruling that Exhibit A was admissible,
concluded that the same had no probative value to support the
allegation of the petitioners that the disputed land was sold to
them in 1959, viz.:
The lone fact that Atty. Tabangay asserted that he recognized
his signature on the copy shown by Teodoro when the loss of
the originals was just made known to him, does not render Exh.
A trustworthy as to the actual execution of the alleged deed of
sale. Exh. A does not even contain a reproduction of the alleged
signatures of the Madrid brothers for comparison purposes. The
surviving witness to the alleged execution, Constantino
Balmoja was not presented to corroborate Atty. Tabangays
testimony, hinged as the latter was on secondary evidence.
Hence, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision
of the trial court dated October 9, 1989 is
hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the case be
remanded to the court a quo to conduct the proper proceedings
to determine the value of the useful improvements introduced
by appellants for reimbursement by appellees.
SO ORDERED.
Failing in their bid to reconsider the decision, the
petitioners have filed the present petition.
8 | Documentary Evidence.Best Evidence Rule.ntsnotes
Petitioners maintain that even if Exhibit A were a mere
photo copy of the original carbon copy, they had presented
other substantial evidence during the trial to prove the existence
of the sale.[6] First, the testimony of the notary public, Atty.
Tabangay, who acknowledged the due execution of the deed of
sale. Second, their long possession of the land in question,
bolstered by the construction of various improvements gives
rise to the disputable presumption of ownership.
While we concur with the Court of Appeals finding that
Exhibit A does not prove that the sale of the land indeed
occurred, still we are constrained to reverse its decision in view
of the circumstances present in this case.
To begin with, Atty. Sevillano Tabangay, the notary
public who notarized the deed of sale, testified that the
document has about five (5) copies.[7] Hence, it is imperative
that all the originals must be accounted for before secondary
evidence can be presented.[8] These petitioners failed to
do. Moreover, records show that none of these five copies was
even presented during the trial. Petitioners explanation that
these copies were lost or could not be found in the National
Archives was not even supported by any certification from the
said office.
It is a well-settled principle that before secondary
evidence can be presented, all duplicates and/or counterparts
must be accounted for, and no excuse for the non-production of
the original document itself can be regarded as established until
all its parts are unavailable.[9]
Notwithstanding this procedural lapse, when Exhibit A
was presented private respondents failed, not only to object, but
even to cross-examine the notary public, Atty. Tabangay,
regarding its execution.[10] Forthwith, upon private respondents
failure to object to Exhibit A when it was presented, the same
becomes primary evidence.[11] To be sure, even if Exhibit A is
admitted in evidence, we agree with the Court of Appeals that
its probative value must still meet the various tests by which its
reliability is to be determined. Its tendency to convince and
persuade must be considered for admissibility of evidence
should not be confused with its probative value.[12]
As earlier stated, Exhibit A was merely a photocopy lifted
from the carbon copy of the alleged deed of sale. [13] A cursory
glance will immediately reveal that it was unsigned by any of
the parties and undated as to when it was executed. Worse,
when Atty. Tabangay typed Exhibit A, the contents were based
on an alleged carbon original which petitioners predecessor-in-
interest presented to him, without bothering to check his own
files to verify the correctness of the contents of the document
he was copying. In other words, Atty. Tabangays failure to
determine the accuracy of the carbon copy requested by the
petitioners predecessor-in-interest renders Exhibit A unreliable.
However, despite our prescinding discussion, all is not
lost for the petitioner.
The records show that the disputed property has been in
the possession of the petitioners since 1959. They have since
been introducing several improvements on the land which
certainly could not have escaped the attention of the
Madrids. Furthermore, during all this time, the land was
enclosed, thus signifying petitioners exclusive claim of
ownership. The construction of various infrastructure on the
land - rice mill, storage house, garage, pavements and other
buildings - was undoubtedly a clear exercise of ownership
which the Madrids could not ignore. Oddly, not one of them
protested.
We cannot accept the Madrids explanation that they did
not demand the petitioners to vacate the land due to the
unexplained killings within the area.[14] Not a single shred of
evidence was presented to show that these killings were
perpetrated by the petitioners. All told, their remonstration and
fears are nothing but pure speculation. To make matters worse,
the record is bereft of any documentary evidence that the
Madrids sent a written demand to the petitioners ordering them
to vacate the land. Their failure to raise a restraining arm or a
shout of dissent to the petitioners possession of the subject land
in a span of almost thirty (30) years is simply contrary to their
claim of ownership.
Next, the Madrids argue that neither prescription nor
laches can operate against them because their title to the
property is registered under the Torrens system and therefore
imprescriptable.[15] The principles raised, while admittedly
correct, are not without exception. The fact that the Madrids
were able to secure TCT No. 167250, and Marquez, TCT Nos.
167220 and 167256, did not operate to vest upon them
ownership of the property. The Torrens system does not create
or vest title. It has never been recognized as a mode of acquiring
ownership,[16] especially considering the fact that both the
Madrids and Marquezes obtained their respective TCTs only in
October 1986, twenty-seven long (27) years after petitioners
first took possession of the land. If the Madrids and Marquezes
wished to assert their ownership, they should have filed a
judicial action for recovery of possession and not merely to
have the land registered under their respective names. For as
earlier mentioned, Certificates of Title do not establish
ownership.[17]
Even if we were to rule that the Certificates of Title to the
private respondents would ripen into ownership of the land, and
therefore, the defense of prescription would be unavailing, still,
the petitioners would have acquired title to it by virtue of the
equitable principle of laches. The Madrids long inaction or
passivity in asserting their rights over disputed property will
preclude them from recovering the same.[18]
The above ruling was stressed in the following cases:
Miguel v. Catalino[19] declared:
Notwithstanding the errors aforementioned in the appealed
decision, we are of the opinion that the judgment in favor of
defendant-appellee Florencio Catalino must be sustained. For
despite the invalidity of his sale to Catalino Agyapao, father of
defendant-appellee, the vendor Bacaquio suffered the latter to
enter, possess and enjoy the land in question without protest,
from 1928 to 1943, when the seller died; and the appellants, in
turn, while succeeding the deceased, also remained inactive,
without taking any step to reinvindicate the lot from 1944 to
9 | Documentary Evidence.Best Evidence Rule.ntsnotes
1962, when the present suit was commenced in court. Even
granting appellants proposition that no prescription lies against
their fathers recorded title, their passivity and inaction for more
than 34 years (1928-1962) justifies the defendant-appellee in
setting up the equitable defense of laches in his own behalf. As
a result, the action of plaintiffs-appellants must be considered
barred and the Court below correctly so held. Courts can not
look with favor at parties who, by their silence, delay and
inaction, knowingly induce another to spend time, effort and
expense in cultivating the land, paying taxes and making
improvements thereon for 30 long years, only to spring from
ambush and claim title when the possessors efforts and the rise
of land values offer an opportunity to make easy profit at his
expense. x x x.
Pabalete v. Echarri[20] stated:
Upon a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances, we
are constrained to find, however, that while no legal defense to
the action lies, an equitable one lies in favor of the defendant
and that is, the equitable defense of laches. We hold that the
defense of prescription or adverse possession in derogation of
the title of the registered owner Domingo Mejia does not lie,
but that of the equitable defense of laches. Otherwise stated, we
hold that while defendant may not be considered as having
acquired title by virtue of his and his predecessors long
continued possession for 37 years, the original owners right to
recover back the possession of the property and the title thereto
from the defendant has, by the long period of 37 years and by
patentees inaction and neglect been converted into a stale
demand. (Quoting Mejia de Lucas v. Gamponia, 100 Phil. 277).
xxxxxxxxx
This defense is an equitable one and does not concern itself with
the character of the defendants title, but only with whether or
not by reason of the plaintiffs long inaction or inexcusable
neglect he should be barred from asserting this claim at all,
because to allow him to do so would be inequitable and unjust
to the defendant. x x x.
Lastly, Marquez claim that he is a purchaser in good faith
and for value does not inspire any merit. In his testimony, he
admitted that he knew the land in question.[21] Curiously, in his
Answer[22] to the complaint filed by the petitioners, he stated
that he has been aware that the former were in possession of the
land since 1959. Where a purchaser was fully aware of another
persons possession of the lot he purchased, he cannot
successfully pretend later to be an innocent purchaser for
value.[23] Moreover, one who buys without checking the
vendors title takes all the risks and losses consequent to such
failure.[24]
In fact, it would have been expected that in the normal
course of daily life, both the Madrids and Marquezes talked
about the status of the property. This being so, it would be
difficult to imagine that the latter were not made aware of the
petitioners possession of the land. Armed with such
information, they should have acted with the diligence of a
prudent man in determining the circumstances surrounding the
property. Otherwise, the law does not give him the benefit
afforded to an innocent purchaser for value. [25]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of
the Court of Appeals dated September 24, 1994 in CA - G.R.
No. 25339 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Instead,
petitioners are hereby declared as the legal owners of the subject
land. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 108630. April 2, 1996]
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS and LORETO TAN,respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; A
DEBT IS PAID BY COMPLETE DELIVERY OF
THE THING OR RENDITION OF SERVICE. - There
is no question that no payment had ever been made to
private respondent as the check was never delivered to
him. When the court ordered petitioner to pay private
respondent the amount of P32,480.00, it had the obligation
to deliver the same to him. Under Art. 1233 of the Civil
Code, a debt shall not be understood to have been paid
unless the thing or service in which the obligation consists
has been completely delivered or rendered, as the case
may be.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; BURDEN OF PROOF
OF PAYMENT OF OBLIGATION LIES WITH THE
DEBTOR; PAYMENT NOT PROVED IN CASE AT
BAR. - The burden of proof of such payment lies with the
debtor. In the instant case, neither the SPA nor the check
issued by petitioner was ever presented in court. The
testimonies of petitioners own witnesses regarding the
check were conflicting. Tagamolila testified that the check
was issued to the order of Sonia Gonzaga as attorney-in-
fact of Loreto Tan, while Elvira Tibon, assistant cashier of
PNB (Bacolod Branch), stated that the check was issued
to the order of Loreto Tan. Furthermore, contrary to
petitioners contention that all that is needed to be proved
is the existence of the SPA, it is also necessary for
evidence to be presented regarding the nature and extent
of the alleged powers and authority granted to Sonia
Gonzaga; more specifically, to determine whether the
document indeed authorized her to receive payment
intended for private respondent. However, no such
evidence was ever presented.
3. ID.; ID.; BEST EVIDENCE RULE; WHEN
SECONDARY EVIDENCE IS ALLOWED. - Section
4, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court allows the presentation
of secondary evidence when the original is lost or
destroyed.
10 | Documentary Evidence.Best Evidence Rule.ntsnotes
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PAYMENT OF OBLIGATION NEGATED
BY FAILURE TO PRESENT SPECIAL POWER OF
ATTORNEY IN CASE AT BAR. - Considering that the
contents of the SPA are also in issue here, the best
evidence rule applies. Hence, only the original document
(which has not been presented at all) is the best evidence
of the fact as to whether or not private respondent indeed
authorized Sonia Gonzaga to receive the check from
petitioner. In the absence of such document, petitioners
arguments regarding due payment must fail.
5. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; ATTORNEYS FEES;
AVAILABLE TO PARTY WHO WAS
COMPELLED TO LITIGATE. - Regarding the award
of attorneys fees, we hold that private respondent Tan is
entitled to the same. Art. 2208 of the Civil Code allows
attorneys fees to be awarded if the claimant is compelled
to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect
his interest by reason of an unjustified act or omission of
the party from whom it is sought.
6. ID.; ID.; EXEMPLARY DAMAGES; WHEN
RECOVERABLE. - Under Art. 2232 of the Civil Code,
exemplary damages may be awarded if a party acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent
manner. However, they cannot be recovered as a matter of
right; the court has yet to decide whether or not they
should be adjudicated.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUIREMENTS FOR GRANT.
- Jurisprudence has set down the requirements for
exemplary damages to be awarded: 1. they may be
imposed by way of example in addition to compensatory
damages, and only after the claimants right to them has
been established; 2. they cannot be recovered as a matter
of right, their determination depending upon the amount
of compensatory damages that may be awarded to the
claimant; 3. the act must be accompanied by bad faith or
done in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent
manner.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; CANNOT BE RECOVERED WHERE
THERE IS NO CLEAR BREACH OF OBLIGATION
TO PAY OR THAT A PARTY ACTED IN
FRAUDULENT, WANTON, RECKLESS OR
OPPRESSIVE MANNER. - As for the award of
exemplary damages, we agree with the appellate court that
the same should be deleted. In the case at bench, while
there is a clear breach of petitioners obligation to pay
private respondents, there is no evidence that it acted in a
fraudulent, wanton, reckless or oppressive manner.
Furthermore, there is no award of compensatory damages
which is a prerequisite before exemplary damages may be
awarded. Therefore, the award by the trial court of
P5,000.00 as exemplary damages is baseless.
Petitioner Philippine National Bank (PNB) questions the
decision1 of the Court of Appeals partially affirming the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, Bacolod City.
The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby renders
judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants as
follows:
1) Ordering defendants to pay plaintiff jointly and severally the
sum of P32,480.00, with legal rate of interest to be computed
from May 2, 1979, date of filing of this complaint until fully
paid;
2) Ordering defendants to pay plaintiff jointly and severally the
sum of P5,000.00 as exemplary damages;
3) Ordering defendants to pay plaintiff jointly and severally the
sum of P5,000.00 as attorneys fees;
4) To pay the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.2
The facts are the following:
Private respondent Loreto Tan (Tan) is the owner of a
parcel of land abutting the national highway in Mandalagan,
Bacolod City. Expropriation proceedings were instituted by the
government against private respondent Tan and other property
owners before the then Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, Branch IV, docketed as Civil Case No. 12924.
Tan filed a motion dated May 10, 1978 requesting
issuance of an order for the release to him of the expropriation
price of P3 2,480.00.
On May 22, 1978, petitioner PNB (Bacolod Branch) was
required by the trial court to release to Tan the amount of
P32,480.00 deposited with it by the government.
On May 24, 1978, petitioner, through its Assistant Branch
Manager Juan Tagamolila, issued a managers check for P3
2,480.00 and delivered the same to one Sonia Gonzaga without
Tans knowledge, consent or authority. Sonia Gonzaga
deposited it in her account with Far East Bank and Trust Co.
(FEBTC) and later on withdrew the said amount.
Private respondent Tan subsequently demanded payment
in the amount of P32,480.00 from petitioner, but the same was
refused on the ground that petitioner had already paid and
delivered the amount to Sonia Gonzaga on the strength of a
Special Power of Attorney (SPA) allegedly executed in her
favor by Tan.
On June 8, 1978, Tan executed an affidavit before
petitioners lawyer, Alejandro S. Somo, stating that:
1) he had never executed any Special Power of Attorney in
favor of Sonia S. Gonzaga;
2) he had never authorized Sonia Gonzaga to receive the sum
of P32,480.00 from petitioner;
11 | Documentary Evidence.Best Evidence Rule.ntsnotes
3) he signed a motion for the court to issue an Order to release
the said sum of money to him and gave the same to Mr. Nilo
Gonzaga (husband of Sonia) to be filed in court. However, after
the Order was subsequently issued by the court, a certain
Engineer Decena of the Highway Engineers Office issued the
authority to release the funds not to him but to Mr. Gonzaga.
When he failed to recover the amount from PNB, private
respondent filed a motion with the court to require PNB to pay
the same to him.
Petitioner filed an opposition contending that Sonia
Gonzaga presented to it a copy of the May 22, 1978 order and
a special power of attorney by virtue of which petitioner
delivered the check to her.
The matter was set for hearing on July 21, 1978 and
petitioner was directed by the court to produce the said special
power of attorney thereat. However, petitioner failed to do so.
The court decided that there was need for the matter to be
ventilated in a separate civil action and thus private respondent
filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court in Bacolod
City (Branch 44) against petitioner and Juan Tagamolila, PNBs
Assistant Branch Manager, to recover the said amount.
In its defense, petitioner contended that private respondent
had duly authorized Sonia Gonzaga to act as his agent.
On September 28, 1979, petitioner filed a third-party
complaint against the spouses Nilo and Sonia Gonzaga praying
that they be ordered to pay private respondent the amount of
P32,480.00. However, for failure of petitioner to have the
summons served on the Gonzagas despite opportunities given
to it, the third-party complaint was dismissed.
Tagamolila, in his answer, stated that Sonia Gonzaga
presented a Special Power of Attorney to him but borrowed it
later with the promise to return it, claiming that she needed it to
encash the check.
On June 7, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment
ordering petitioner and Tagamolila to pay private respondent
jointly and severally the amount of P32,480.00 with legal
interest, damages and attorneys fees.
Both petitioner and Tagamolila appealed the case to the
Court of Appeals.
In a resolution dated April 8, 1991, the appellate court
dismissed Tagamolilas appeal for failure to pay the docket fee
within the reglementary period.
On August 31, 1992, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court against petitioner, with the
modification that the award of P5,000.00 for exemplary
damages and P5,000.00 for attorneys fees by the trial court was
deleted.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner PNB states that the issue in this case is whether
or not the SPA ever existed. It argues that the existence of the
SPA need not be proved by it under the best evidence rule
because it already proved the existence of the SPA from the
testimonies of its witnesses and by the certification issued by
the Far East Bank and Trust Company that it allowed Sonia
Gonzaga to encash Tans check on the basis of the SPA.
We find the petition unmeritorious.
There is no question that no payment had ever been made
to private respondent as the check was never delivered to him.
When the court ordered petitioner to pay private respondent the
amount of P3 2,480.00, it had the obligation to deliver the same
to him. Under Art. 1233 of the Civil Code, a debt shall not be
understood to have been paid unless the thing or service in
which the obligation consists has been completely delivered or
rendered, as the case may be.
The burden of proof of such payment lies with the
debtor.3 In the instant case, neither the SPA nor the check issued
by petitioner was ever presented in court.
The testimonies of petitioners own witnesses regarding
the check were conflicting. Tagamolila testified that the check
was issued to the order of Sonia Gonzaga as attorney-in-fact of
Loreto Tan,4 while Elvira Tibon, assistant cashier of PNB
(Bacolod Branch), stated that the check was issued to the order
of Loreto Tan.5
Furthermore, contrary to petitioners contention that all
that is needed to be proved is the existence of the SPA, it is also
necessary for evidence to be presented regarding the nature and
extent of the alleged powers and authority granted to Sonia
Gonzaga; more specifically, to determine whether the
document indeed authorized her to receive payment intended
for private respondent. However, no such evidence was ever
presented.
Section 2, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states that:
SEC. 2. Original writing must be produced; exceptions.
- There can be no evidence of a writing the contents of which is
the subject of inquiry, other than the original writing itself,
except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost, destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court;
(b) When the original is in the possession of the party against
whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it
after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original is a record or other document in the
custody of a public officer;
(d) When the original has been recorded in an existing record a
certified copy of which is made evidence by law;
(e) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other
documents which cannot be examined in court without great
12 | Documentary Evidence.Best Evidence Rule.ntsnotes
loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is
only the general result of the whole.
Section 4, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court allows the
presentation of secondary evidence when the original is lost or
destroyed, thus:
SEC. 4. Secondary evidence when original is lost or destroyed.
- When the original writing has been lost or destroyed, or cannot
be produced in court, upon proof of its execution and loss or
destruction, or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a
copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document,
or by the recollection of witnesses.
Considering that the contents of the SPA are also in issue
here, the best evidence rule applies. Hence, only the original
document (which has not been presented at all) is the best
evidence of the fact as to whether or not private respondent
indeed authorized Sonia Gonzaga to receive the check from
petitioner. In the absence of such document, petitioners
arguments regarding due payment must fail.
Regarding the award of attorneys fees, we hold that
private respondent Tan is entitled to the same. Art. 2208 of the
Civil Code allows attorneys fees to be awarded if the claimant
is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses
to protect his interest by reason of an unjustified act or omission
of the party from whom it is sought.6
In Rasonable v. NLRC, et al.,7 we held that when a party
is forced to litigate to protect his rights, he is entitled to an
award of attorneys fees.
As for the award of exemplary damages, we agree with
the appellate court that the same should be deleted.
Under Art. 2232 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages
may be awarded if a party acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner. However, they
cannot be recovered as a matter of right; the court has yet to
decide whether or not they should be adjudicated.8
Jurisprudence has set down the requirements for
exemplary damages to be awarded:
1. they may be imposed by way of example in addition to
compensatory damages, and only after the claimants right to
them has been established;
2. they cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their
determination depending upon the amount of compensatory
damages that may be awarded to the claimant;
3. the act must be accompanied by bad faith or done in a
wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner.9
In the case at bench, while there is a clear breach of
petitioners obligation to pay private respondents, there is no
evidence that it acted in a fraudulent, wanton, reckless or
oppressive manner. Furthermore, there is no award to
compensatory damages which is a prerequisite before
exemplary damages may be awarded. Therefore, the award by
the trial court of P5,000.00 as exemplary damages is baseless.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED with the modification that the award by the
Regional Trial Court of P5,000.00 as attorneys fees is
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
RICO ROMMEL ATIENZA, G.R. No. 177407
Petitioner,
- versus - Promulgated:
BOARD OF MEDICINE and
EDITHA SIOSON, February 9, 2011
Respondents.
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----x
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision[1] dated September
22, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
87755. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by
petitioner Rico Rommel Atienza (Atienza), which, in turn,
assailed the Orders[2] issued by public respondent Board of
Medicine (BOM) in Administrative Case No. 1882.
The facts, fairly summarized by the appellate court, follow.
Due to her lumbar pains, private respondent Editha Sioson
went to Rizal Medical Center (RMC) for check-up on February
4, 1995. Sometime in 1999, due to the same problem, she was
referred to Dr. Pedro Lantin III of RMC who, accordingly,
ordered several diagnostic laboratory tests. The tests revealed
that her right kidney is normal. It was ascertained, however, that
her left kidney is non-functioning and non-visualizing. Thus,
she underwent kidney operation in September, 1999.
On February 18, 2000, private respondents husband, Romeo
Sioson (as complainant), filed a complaint for gross negligence
and/or incompetence before the [BOM] against the doctors who
allegedly participated in the fateful kidney operation, namely:
Dr. Judd dela Vega, Dr. Pedro Lantin, III, Dr. Gerardo Antonio
Florendo and petitioner Rico Rommel Atienza.
It was alleged in the complaint that the gross negligence and/or
incompetence committed by the said doctors, including
petitioner, consists of the removal of private respondents fully
functional right kidney, instead of the left non-functioning and
non-visualizing kidney.
The complaint was heard by the [BOM]. After complainant
Romeo Sioson presented his evidence, private respondent
Editha Sioson, also named as complainant there, filed her
formal offer of documentary evidence. Attached to the formal
offer of documentary evidence are her Exhibits A to D, which
she offered for the purpose of proving that her kidneys were
both in their proper anatomical locations at the time she was
operated. She described her exhibits, as follows:
13 | Documentary Evidence.Best Evidence Rule.ntsnotes
EXHIBIT A the certified photocopy of the X-ray Request form
dated December 12, 1996, which is also marked as Annex 2 as it
was actually originally the Annex to x x x Dr. Pedro Lantin, IIIs
counter affidavit filed with the City Prosecutor of Pasig City in
connection with the criminal complaint filed by [Romeo Sioson]
with the said office, on which are handwritten entries which are
the interpretation of the results of the ultrasound examination.
Incidentally, this exhibit happens to be the same as or identical
to the certified photocopy of the document marked as Annex 2
to the Counter-Affidavit dated March 15, 2000, filed by x x x Dr.
Pedro Lantin, III, on May 4, 2000, with this Honorable Board in
answer to this complaint;
EXHIBIT B the certified photo copy of the X-ray request form
dated January 30, 1997, which is also marked as Annex 3 as it
was actually likewise originally an Annex to x x x Dr. Pedro
Lantin, IIIs counter-affidavit filed with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Pasig City in connection with the criminal
complaint filed by the herein complainant with the said office,
on which are handwritten entries which are the interpretation
of the results of the examination. Incidentally, this exhibit
happens to be also the same as or identical to the certified
photo copy of the document marked as Annex 3 which is
likewise dated January 30, 1997, which is appended as such
Annex 3 to the counter-affidavit dated March 15, 2000, filed
by x x x Dr. Pedro Lantin, III on May 4, 2000, with this
Honorable Board in answer to this complaint.
EXHIBIT C the certified photocopy of the X-ray request form
dated March 16, 1996, which is also marked as Annex 4, on
which are handwritten entries which are the interpretation of the
results of the examination.
EXHIBIT D the certified photocopy of the X-ray request form
dated May 20, 1999, which is also marked as Annex 16, on
which are handwritten entries which are the interpretation of the
results of the examination. Incidentally, this exhibit appears to
be the draft of the typewritten final report of the same
examination which is the document appended as Annexes 4 and
1 respectively to the counter-affidavits filed by x x x Dr. Judd
dela Vega and Dr. Pedro Lantin, III in answer to the complaint.
In the case of Dr. dela Vega however, the document which is
marked as Annex 4 is not a certified photocopy, while in the
case of Dr. Lantin, the document marked as Annex 1 is a
certified photocopy. Both documents are of the same date and
typewritten contents are the same as that which are written on
Exhibit D.
Petitioner filed his comments/objections to private respondents
[Editha Siosons] formal offer of exhibits. He alleged that said
exhibits are inadmissible because the same are mere
photocopies, not properly identified and authenticated, and
intended to establish matters which are hearsay. He added that
the exhibits are incompetent to prove the purpose for which
they are offered.
Dispositions of the Board of Medicine
The formal offer of documentary exhibits of private respondent
[Editha Sioson] was admitted by the [BOM] per its Order dated
May 26, 2004. It reads:
The Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence of
[Romeo Sioson], the Comments/Objections of [herein
petitioner] Atienza, [therein respondents] De la Vega
and Lantin, and the Manifestation of [therein]
respondent Florendo are hereby ADMITTED by the
[BOM] for whatever purpose they may serve in the
resolution of this case.
Let the hearing be set on July 19, 2004 all at 1:30 p.m.
for the reception of the evidence of the respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the
abovementioned Order basically on the same
reasons stated in his comment/objections to
the formal offer of exhibits.
The [BOM] denied the motion for
reconsideration of petitioner in its Order
dated October 8, 2004. It concluded that it
should first admit the evidence being offered
so that it can determine its probative value
when it decides the case. According to the
Board, it can determine whether the evidence
is relevant or not if it will take a look at it
through the process of admission. x x x.[3]
Disagreeing with the BOM, and as previously
adverted to, Atienza filed a petition for certiorari with the CA,
assailing the BOMs Orders which admitted Editha Siosons
(Edithas) Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence. The CA
dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit.
Hence, this recourse positing the following issues:
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE:
WHETHER PETITIONER ATIENZA AVAILED OF
THE PROPER REMEDY WHEN HE FILED THE
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI DATED 06
DECEMBER 2004 WITH THE COURT OF
APPEALS UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF
COURT TO ASSAIL THE ORDERS DATED 26
MAY 2004 AND 08 OCTOBER 2004 OF
RESPONDENT BOARD.
II. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR
AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN
A WAY NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND
THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE
14 | Documentary Evidence.Best Evidence Rule.ntsnotes
HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT UPHELD THE
ADMISSION OF INCOMPETENT AND
INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE BY RESPONDENT
BOARD, WHICH CAN RESULT IN THE
DEPRIVATION OF PROFESSIONAL LICENSE A
PROPERTY RIGHT OR ONES LIVELIHOOD.[4]
We find no reason to depart from the ruling of the CA.
Petitioner is correct when he asserts that a petition
for certiorari is the proper remedy to assail the Orders of the
BOM, admitting in evidence the exhibits of Editha. As the
assailed Orders were interlocutory, these cannot be the subject
of an appeal separate from the judgment that completely or
finally disposes of the case.[5] At that stage, where there is no
appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, the only and remaining remedy left to
petitioner is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
However, the writ of certiorari will not issue absent a
showing that the BOM has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Embedded in the
CAs finding that the BOM did not exceed its jurisdiction or act
in grave abuse of discretion is the issue of whether the exhibits
of Editha contained in her Formal Offer of Documentary
Evidence are inadmissible.
Petitioner argues that the exhibits formally offered in
evidence by Editha: (1) violate the best evidence rule; (2) have
not been properly identified and authenticated; (3) are
completely hearsay; and (4) are incompetent to prove their
purpose. Thus, petitioner contends that the exhibits are
inadmissible evidence.
We disagree.
To begin with, it is well-settled that the rules of
evidence are not strictly applied in proceedings before
administrative bodies such as the BOM.[6] Although trial courts
are enjoined to observe strict enforcement of the rules of
evidence,[7] in connection with evidence which may appear to
be of doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or admissibility, we
have held that:
[I]t is the safest policy to be liberal, not
rejecting them on doubtful or technical
grounds, but admitting them unless plainly
irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for the
reason that their rejection places them
beyond the consideration of the court, if they
are thereafter found relevant or competent;
on the other hand, their admission, if they
turn out later to be irrelevant or incompetent,
can easily be remedied by completely
discarding them or ignoring them.[8]
From the foregoing, we emphasize the distinction between the
admissibility of evidence and the probative weight to be
accorded the same pieces of evidence. PNOC Shipping and
Transport Corporation v. Court of Appeals[9] teaches:
Admissibility of evidence refers to the
question of whether or not the circumstance
(or evidence) is to be considered at all. On the
other hand, the probative value of evidence
refers to the question of whether or not it
proves an issue.
Second, petitioners insistence that the admission of
Edithas exhibits violated his substantive rights leading to the
loss of his medical license is misplaced. Petitioner mistakenly
relies on Section 20, Article I of the Professional Regulation
Commission Rules of Procedure, which reads:
Section 20. Administrative
investigation shall be conducted in
accordance with these Rules. The Rules of
Court shall only apply in these proceedings
by analogy or on a suppletory character and
whenever practicable and convenient.
Technical errors in the admission of evidence
which do not prejudice the substantive rights
of either party shall not vitiate the
proceedings.[10]
As pointed out by the appellate court, the admission of the
exhibits did not prejudice the substantive rights of petitioner
because, at any rate, the fact sought to be proved thereby, that
the two kidneys of Editha were in their proper anatomical
locations at the time she was operated on, is presumed under
Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. The
following presumptions are satisfactory if
uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and
overcome by other evidence:
xxxx
(y) That things have happened according to
the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary
habits of life.
The exhibits are certified photocopies of X-ray
Request Forms dated December 12, 1996, January 30, 1997,
March 16, 1996, and May 20, 1999, filed in connection with
Edithas medical case. The documents contain handwritten
entries interpreting the results of the examination. These
exhibits were actually attached as annexes to Dr. Pedro Lantin
IIIs counter affidavit filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Pasig City, which was investigating the criminal complaint
for negligence filed by Editha against the doctors of Rizal
Medical Center (RMC) who handled her surgical procedure. To
lay the predicate for her case, Editha offered the exhibits in
15 | Documentary Evidence.Best Evidence Rule.ntsnotes
evidence to prove that her kidneys were both in their proper
anatomical locations at the time of her operation.
The fact sought to be established by the admission of
Edithas exhibits, that her kidneys were both in their proper
anatomical locations at the time of her operation, need not be
proved as it is covered by mandatory judicial notice.[11]
Unquestionably, the rules of evidence are merely the
means for ascertaining the truth respecting a matter of
fact.[12] Thus, they likewise provide for some facts which are
established and need not be proved, such as those covered by
judicial notice, both mandatory and discretionary.[13] Laws of
nature involving the physical sciences, specifically
biology,[14] include the structural make-up and composition of
living things such as human beings. In this case, we may take
judicial notice that Edithas kidneys before, and at the time of,
her operation, as with most human beings, were in their proper
anatomical locations.
Third, contrary to the assertion of petitioner, the best evidence
rule is inapplicable. Section 3 of Rule 130 provides:
1. Best Evidence Rule
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced;
exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document
itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or
under the control of the party against whom
the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to
produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous
accounts or other documents which cannot be
examined in court without great loss of time
and the fact sought to be established from
them is only the general result of the whole;
and
(d) When the original is a public record in the
custody of a public officer or is recorded in a
public office.
The subject of inquiry in this case is whether respondent doctors
before the BOM are liable for gross negligence in removing the
right functioning kidney of Editha instead of the left non-
functioning kidney, not the proper anatomical locations of
Edithas kidneys. As previously discussed, the proper
anatomical locations of Edithas kidneys at the time of her
operation at the RMC may be established not only through the
exhibits offered in evidence.
 Finally, these exhibits do not constitute hearsay
evidence of the anatomical locations of Edithas kidneys. To
further drive home the point, the anatomical positions, whether
left or right, of Edithas kidneys, and the removal of one or both,
may still be established through a belated ultrasound or x-ray of
her abdominal area.
In fact, the introduction of secondary evidence, such as copies
of the exhibits, is allowed.[15] Witness Dr. Nancy Aquino
testified that the Records Office of RMC no longer had the
originals of the exhibits because [it] transferred from the
previous building, x x x to the new building. [16] Ultimately,
since the originals cannot be produced, the BOM properly
admitted Edithas formal offer of evidence and, thereafter, the
BOM shall determine the probative value thereof when it
decides the case.
of a temporary restraining order and injunction, filed by
petitioners, for having been filed beyond the reglementary
period within which to file said recourse.
The antecedent facts of the present petition are:
On 20 April 2001, private respondent Dr. Celia P.
Morales (Morales) filed an Affidavit-Complaint[4] against
petitioners Leoncio D. Mangahas, Zaldy G. Matias, Orlando O.
Oanes, Dante Y. Arcilla and Jocelyn R. de la Cruz (Mangahas,
et al.) for violation of Sec. 3 (f) of Republic Act No. 3019 before
the Office of the Ombudsman. The complaint was docketed as
OMB-1-01-0382-D.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The

Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87755 In her complaint, private respondent Morales basically
is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. alleged that:

SO ORDERED.
1. On June 27, 1998, the Sangguniang Bayan (SB for brevity)
LEONCIO D. MANGAHAS, G. R. No. 173375 of the Municipality of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, thru the initiative of
ZALDY G. Councilor Zaldy G. Matias (nephew of Mr. and Mrs. Edgardo
MATIAS, ORLANDOO. Manalastas), seconded by Councilor Carlos R. Malaca,
OANES, DANTE Y. persuaded to pass and enact Kapasyahan Blg. 39, taon 1998,
ARCILLA AND JOCELYN granting the request of Mr. and Mrs. Edgardo Manalastas for
R. DELA CRUZ, the conversion of their agricultural land covered by Transfer
Petitioners, Certificate of Title No. NT-125720 into a memorial garden
despite insufficiency of the requirements thereof as provided by
Promulgated: law x x x;
- versus -

September 25, 2008 xxxx

THE COURT OF APPEALS,
THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF GAPAN CITY,
BRANCH 35, THE PEOPLE 3. x x x after receiving a copy of the said Kapasyahan,
OF THE PHILIPPINES AND it appeared that the conversion of the agricultural land
DR. CELIA MORALES, of Mr. and Mrs. Edgardo Manalastas (Manalastas for
brevity) into a memorial garden was hurriedly done
Respondents. and apparently not in accord with the necessary legal
x------------------------------------------ requirements based on their failure to: (a) notify the
--------x adjacent residential lot owners of the said plan and/or
development; (b) secure proper recommendation(s)
and permit from different government departments,
Assailed in the instant Petition for Review bureaus and agencies concerned; and (c) follow and
on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is comply with the proper procedures as prescribed by
(1) the Resolution[2] dated 23 February 2006 of the Court of law;
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 93272, entitled Leoncio D.
Mangahas, Zaldy G. Matias, Orlando O. Oanes, Dante Y.
Arcilla and Jocelyn R. de la Cruz v. 4. In questioning the same, my son sent a letter dated
The Regional Trial Court ofGapan City (Nueva Ecija), Branch 13 April 1999 addressed to the SB and prayed, among
35, the People of the Philippines and Dr. Celia Morales; and (2) others the immediate REVOCATION and
the Resolution[3] dated 13 June 2006 of the same court denying CANCELLATION of the said Kapasyahan x x x;
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of its earlier
resolution. In both assailed resolutions, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the Petition for Certiorari, with prayer for issuance
16 | Documentary Evidence.Best Evidence Rule.ntsnotes
 5. x x x Secretary of the Sanggunian, x x x
admitted therein that Kapasyahan Blg. 39,
taon 1998 was only a DRAFT RESOLUTION
x x x;
6. On 20 April 1999, another Kapasyahan Blg. 34,
taon 1999 was issued by the SB refraining or stopping
the Manalastas to further develop their project without
first securing the proper permits and certification from
the different government departments and bureaus
concerned, unfortunately, however, the same was
never implemented x x x;
7. On 14 May 1999, my son decided to send another
letter addressed to the SB and prayed x x x the issuance
of a permanent revocation of Kapasyahan Blg. 39,
taon 1998 in lieu of a temporary revocation previously
issued x x x;
8. x x x my daughter, Felicitas Morales sent another
letter dated 28 September 2000 addressed to the SB,
informing them of the presence of persons who had
continued and still continue to develop the project of
Manalastas despite the prohibition previously issued
to that effect. However, to our prejudice, no action
whatsoever was taken by the said public officials
concerned, thereby extending undue favor to the
Manalastas;
9. x x x the undersigned was forced to send another
letter dated 24 January 2001 addressed to the SB x x
x;
10. On 12 March 2001, another letter was sent by the
undersigned addressed to the SB, requesting that I be
given a chance to be heard in a form of public hearing
in order to air my grievances against the illegal
conversion of the land x x x and for the unfair, unjust
and oppressive treatment which we suffered and
continue to suffer up to the present x x x;
11. Four (4) days prior to the scheduled public hearing
on 6 April 2001, the Office of the Sanggunian headed
by Hon. Vice-Mayor Marcelino D.I. Alvarez sent a
notice to all the members of the SB, namely, Leoncio
D. Mangahas, Zaldy G. Matias, Danilo A. de Guzman,
Carlos R. Malaca, Orlando Q. Oanes, Dante Y.
Arcilla, Jocelyn dela Cruz, Crisanto V. Velayo II,
Alfredo M. Alejandria, Jr. and Alejandro C. Velayo,
for purpose(s) of informing them of the said public
hearing;
17 | Documentary Evidence.Best Evidence Rule.ntsnotes
12. When the notice was served to the following
councilors, namely: Leoncio D. Mangahas, Zaldy G.
Matias, Carlos R. Malaca, Orlando Q. Oanes, Dante
Y. Arcilla and Jocelyn R. dela Cruz, I was informed
by the Hon. Vice-Mayor Marcelino D.L. Alvarez and
the Secretary of the Sanggunian, Mr. Eduardo H.
Almera, that the said councilors have maliciously
refused to sign the said notice, thereby giving undue
advantage in favor of the Manalastas who up to this
present time has been continuously developing their
project despite the prohibition thereof x x x;
13. However, despite the fact that they were properly
notified, the above-named councilors in the preceding
paragraph have deliberately and maliciously neglected
and/or refused to attend the scheduled public hearing
last 6 April 2001, thereby unjustly and oppressively
discriminating the undersigned without sufficient
justification whatsoever;
14. Due to the unlawful acts committed by the six (6)
councilors, the undersigned most respectfully submits
that they be prosecuted for violation of Sec. 3(f) of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice Act (R.A. 3019 as
amended by R.A. 3047, P.D. 77 and B.P. 195) which
provides that:
Xxx Neglecting or refusing, after due demand
or request, without sufficient justification, to
act within a reasonable time on matter
pending before him for purpose of obtaining,
directly or indirectly, from any person
interested in the matter some pecuniary or
material benefit or advantage, or for the
purpose of favoring his own interest or giving
undue advantage in favor of or
discriminating against any other interested
party. xxx
15. As of this date, no public hearing yet has ever been
conducted, hence, to the prejudice of the undersigned;
16. With full sincerity and honesty, I believe that there
will be no more public hearing that will be conducted
due (to) the admission made by Hon. Vice-Mayor
Marcelino D.L. Alvarez and Mr. Eduardo H. Almera
as contained in their Joint Affidavit.
In their joint counter-affidavits, petitioners denied
the accusations of private respondent Morales. They
argued that the assailed Kapasyahan Blg.
39, taon 1998, was unanimously approved by the
Municipal Councilors and was thereafter approved by
the Provincial Councilors of Nueva Ecija.
[5]
In a Resolution dated 27 June 2001, the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon resolved to dismiss the
complaint for lack of probable cause.
Upon motion of private respondent Morales, however, said
Office, in another Resolution,[6] reconsidered its earlier finding
of lack of probable cause. It held that there was further need for
preliminary investigation to determine the criminal liabilities of
petitioners in deliberately absenting themselves from the public
hearing of the SangguniangBayan held on 6 April 2001.
On 8 November 2001, an Order[7] was issued by the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon re-opening the
case for further preliminary investigation.
In a Resolution[8] dated 5 June 2002, the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon recommended that (1)
petitioners be charged with and prosecuted for violation of Sec.
3 (f) of Republic Act No. 3019; and (2) the corresponding
Information be filed in court.
On 18 July 2002, an Information[9] dated 5 June
2002, was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
34, Gapan, Nueva Ecija, charging petitioners with the violation
of Sec. 3(f) of Republic Act No. 3019. The accusatory portion
thereof states:
That on or about 11 April 2001 or sometime
prior or subsequent thereto in Gapan, Nueva
Ecija, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, all public officers, being then the
incumbent Councilors of the Municipality of
Gapan, Nueva Ecija, committing the crime
herein charged in relation to and in the
performance of their official function, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally neglect and refuse after due
demand or request, without sufficient
justification, to act within a reasonable time
on a matter pending before them by absenting
themselves in the public hearing of
Kapasyahan Blg. 39, knowing fully well that
their presence are indispensable, necessary to
justify the development of the proposed
memorial garden thereat, for the
development of (sic) discriminating against
one Celia Morales, the other interested party.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No.
10926.
On 28 October 2002, petitioners filed with the RTC
a Motion for Reinvestigation with Prayer to Suspend
18 | Documentary Evidence.Best Evidence Rule.ntsnotes
Proceedings[10] since the Information had already been filed
with the said trial court.
In an Order[11] dated 26 March 2003, the RTC denied
petitioners motion for lack of merit.
Warrants[12] for the arrest of petitioners were
subsequently issued by the RTC, but the former, without more
ado, posted personal cash bail bonds to secure their provisional
liberty.[13]
In a last ditch effort to defer the proceedings before the
RTC, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Order dated March 26, 2003 with Prayer for Inhibition.[14]
On 1 July 2003, Hon. Rodolfo Beltran, Presiding
Judge of RTC- Branch 34, recused himself from the case
without resolving the latest motion filed by petitioners.[15]
In an Order[16] dated 5 August 2003, Hon. Victoriano
B. Cabanos, Presiding Judge of RTC-Branch 87, resolved the
above motion by denying the same.
In the interim, before petitioners could be arraigned,
the prosecution filed with the RTC a Motion to Suspend
Accused from Public Office;[17] which petitioners countered by
filing with the same court a Motion to Quash with Urgent
Prayer to Defer Arraignment and Issuance of Order of
Suspension.[18]
In an Order[19] dated 16 June 2005, the RTC granted
the prosecutions prayer to suspend petitioners from public
office for sixty (60) days in view of Sec. 63 (b) of the Local
Government Code[20]; thus, effectively denying
petitioners Motion to Quash with Urgent Prayer to Defer
Arraignment and Issuance of Order of Suspension. Petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of suspension but
it was also denied by the RTC in another Order[21] dated 25
November 2005, but this time issued by RTC Branch
35,[22] Gapan, Nueva Ecija.
Imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in (1)
suspending them for sixty (60) days from public office; and (2)
denying the motion to quash, as well as their prayer to defer
their arraignment, petitioners filed a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court
before the Court of Appeals.
On 23 February 2006, the Court of Appeals issued
a Resolution dismissing the Petition. It ruled that:
The petition alleges that petitioners
received on December 9, 2005 a copy of the
Order dated November 25, 2005, which
denied their motion for reconsideration of the
Order dated June 16, 2005. Consequently, the
sixty (60) day period within which to file a
petition for certiorari expired on February 7,
2006. However, the instant petition was filed
 only on February 8, 2006, as shown by the a. FIRST, THE REGISTRY
post office stamp on the envelope, and was, RECEIPT BOOK OF
therefore, late by one (1) day. The assailed THE CABANATUAN CITY
Orders had thus (sic) already attained POST OFFICE SHOWED AND
finality.[23] THE ASSISTANT POSTMASTER
STATED THAT THE MAIL
Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the MATTER ADDRESSED TO THE
appellate courts dismissal of their petition. They claimed that, COURT OF APPEALS WAS
in actuality, their petition was mailed on 7 February 2006and MAILED BY THE PETITIONERS
not on 8 February 2006. Attached to petitioners motion for ON 7 FEBRUARY 2006 AND
reconsideration was a certification by one Marita Pangandian, NOT ON 8 FEBRUARY 2006.
Assistant Postmaster of Cabanatuan City Post Office, Nueva
Ecija, as well as a simple photocopy of the page of the registry b. SECOND, THE PETITIONERS
receipt book of said post office showing that that subject mail ARE NOW SUBMITTING A
matters addressed to the Court of Appeals were received for CERTIFIED COPY OF THE
mailing on 7 February 2006. REGISTRY RECEIPT BOOK
AND AN AFFIDAVIT OF THE
The Court of Appeals, however, in a Resolution dated CLERK CONCERNED WHO
13 June 2006 found no cogent reason to disturb its original STAMPED THE NOTATION
conclusion that the petition was filed beyond the reglementary THAT IT WAS MAILED ON 8
period within which to avail of the extraordinary writ FEBRUARY 2006 AND
of certiorari. The appellate court held that: INSTEAD OF 7 FEBRUARY
2006.
Settled is the rule that a xerox copy
of any document is without evidentiary 2. WITH DUE RESPECT, THE
weight or value (citation omitted). Moreover, HONORABLE COURT OF
the clerk of the post office who allegedly APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING
failed to stamp the date February 7, 2006 and, THE MOTION FOR
instead, stamped the date February 8, 2006 on RECONSIDERATION ON THE
the envelope containing the mail matter GROUND THAT NO COPY OF
addressed to this Court did not execute an THE PETITION FOR
affidavit to that effect, so that the allegations CERTIORARI WAS FURNISHED
in the affidavit of Mrs. Pangandian are TO THE OFFICE OF THE
hearsay.[24] SOLICITOR GENERAL.
PETITIONERS ARE NOW
Further, the Court of Appeals took exception to the fact that the SUBMITTING A COPY OF THIS
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), being the official PETITION AND THE OTHER
counsel of the People of the Philippines in appeals before the PLEADINGS ARE NOW BEING
appellate court and the Supreme Court, was not served a copy FURNISHED TO THE OFFICE OF
of said petition. In its place, the Provincial Prosecutor was the THE SOLICITOR GENERAL.
one furnished a copy thereof.
B. WITH REGARD TO THE
Hence, petitioners come to this Court, challenging the ACTUATIONS OF THE TRIAL
dismissal by the Court of Appeals of their Petition anchored on COURT:
the following arguments:
1. WITH DUE RESPECT, THE
A. WITH REGARD TO THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT
ACTUATIONS OF THE COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
OF APPEALS: DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO
LACK OF JURISDICTION,
1. WITH DUE RESPECT, THE WHEN IT DENIED THE MOTION
HONORABLE COURT OF TO QUASH AND WHEN IT
APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERED THE SUSPENSION
DISMISSING THE PETITION OF THE PETITIONERS
FOR CERTIORARI FOR CONSIDERING THAT:
ALLEGEDLY HAVING BEEN
FILED ONE DAY LATE, a. FIRST, THE SUBJECT
CONSIDERING THAT: INFORMATION DATED 5 JUNE
2002 WAS AN INVALID
INFORMATION, CONSIDERING
19 | Documentary Evidence.Best Evidence Rule.ntsnotes
 THAT IT WAS NOT SIGNED BY the issue of whether the Petition for Certiorari filed with the
THE GOVERNMENT Court of Appeals was indeed mailed on 7 February 2006. And
PROSECUTOR CONCERNED only when the foregoing issue is resolved in the affirmative, is
ON THE DATE IT WAS FILED it still relevant for us to proceed to the legal question of whether
ON 18 JULY 2002; the trial court erred in denying petitioners motion to quash and
granting the Peoples motion to suspend them from public
b. SECOND, EVEN IF IT WAS office.
BELATEDLY SIGNED, THE
SAME INFORMATION Factual issues are not the proper subject of this Courts
REMAINED AS INVALID AND discretionary power of judicial review under Rule 45 of the
WAS NOT CURED BY THE Revised Rules of Court. We have defined a question of law as
FACT OF SIGNING AND COULD distinguished from a question of fact, to wit:
NOT BE GIVEN A
RETROACTIVE EFFECT AS IF
IT WERE VALID AT THE TIME A question of law arises when there
IT WAS ORIGINALLY FILED; is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state
of facts, while there is a question of fact when
c. THIRD, EVEN IF IT WAS the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the
RENDERED VALID BY THE alleged facts. For a question to be one of law,
FACT OF ITS BELATED the same must not involve an examination of
SIGNING BY THE the probative value of the evidence presented
GOVERNMENT PROSECUTOR by the litigants or any of them. The resolution
CONCERNED, THE SAID of the issue must rest solely on what the law
INFORMATION HAS provides on the given set of circumstances.
INSUFFICIENT ALLEGATIONS Once it is clear that the issue invites a review
IN IT AND SUCH, THE SAME of the evidence presented, the question posed
SHOULD BE QUASHED; is one of fact. Thus, the test of whether a
question is one of law or of fact is not the
d. FOURTH, THE TRIAL COURT appellation given to such question by the
HAS NO JURISDICTION TO TRY party raising the same; rather, it is whether
AND HEAR THIS CASE, MUCH the appellate court can determine the issue
MORE IMPOSE SUSPENSION raised without reviewing or evaluating the
AGAINST THE PETITIONERS. evidence, in which case, it is a question of
law; otherwise it is a question of fact.[26]
e. FIFTH, WITH DUE RESPECT,
IT WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE
PRUDENT IF THE TRIAL
COURT HAD CONDUCTED A Under Rule 45, only questions of law may be raised in
PRE-SUSPENSION HEARING IN a petition for review on certiorari before this Court as we are
ACCORDANCE WITH THE not a trier of facts. Our jurisdiction in such a proceeding is
RULING OF THE SUPREME limited to reviewing only errors of law that may have been
COURT IN THE CASE committed by the lower courts. Consequently, findings of fact
OF SANTIAGO V. of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are final and
SANDIGANBAYAN, 356 SCRA 636. conclusive, and cannot be reviewed on appeal.[27] It is not the
function of this Court to reexamine or reevaluate evidence,
f. SIXTH, WITH DUE RESPECT, whether testimonial or documentary, adduced by the parties in
THE HONORABLE COURT the proceedings below.[28] The preceding rule however, admits
FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT of certain exceptions and has, in the past, been relaxed when the
THE ACCUSED ARE ALREADY lower courts findings were not supported by the evidence on
SERVING DIFFERENT TERMS record or were based on a misapprehension of facts,[29] or when
OF OFFICES AND THAT THE certain relevant and undisputed facts were manifestly
ALLEGED ACTS COMPLAINED overlooked that, if properly considered, would justify a
OF WERE COMMITTED different conclusion.[30]
DURING THEIR PAST
TERMS.[25] Be that as it may, we are hard pressed to apply any of
the exceptions to the case at bar.
Cutting through the issues, it would appear that
ultimately, the central question and bone of contention in the Timeliness of an appeal is a factual issue. It requires a
petition before us boils down to the appreciation and review or evaluation of evidence on when the present petition
determination of factual matters, first and foremost of which is
20 | Documentary Evidence.Best Evidence Rule.ntsnotes
was actually mailed and received by the appellate court. In the
case at bar, to prove that they mailed their Petition
for Certiorari addressed to the Clerk of Court of the Court of
Appeals on 7 February 2006 instead of 8 February 2006 as
shown by the stamped date on the envelope, petitioners initially
submitted (1) a photocopy of the pertinent page of the Registry
Book of the Cabanatuan Post Office sans any official guarantee
that it was a faithful reproduction of the original; (2) an
Affidavit of Service executed by one Lolita S. Rase stating
under oath that she was the one who served copies of the
Petition for Certiorari, by registered mail, to the parties of the
subject case, including that intended for the Court of Appeals,
with an attached photocopy of the registry receipt
corresponding to the mail sent to the appellate court; and (3) an
Affidavit of Merit/Certification made under oath by one Marita
Pangandian, claiming to be the Assistant PostMaster of
Cabanatuan City Post Office, which stated that said office
received for mailing on 7 February 2006 four (4) parcels/mail
matters addressed to (a) Atty. Romeo Viloria; (b) the Clerk of
Court of RTC-Br. 87, Gapan, Nueva Ecija; (c) the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor; and (d) Court of Appeals Clerk of
Court. To be precise, the supposed Assistant PostMaster
attested in her affidavit that:
1. Based on our records, we received in our
office on 7 February 2006 for
mailing as registered mail four (4)
parcels/envelopes addressed to the
following persons, namely:
a) Atty. Romeo Viloria 2092
b) The Clerk of Court, Gapan 2093
c) The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
2094
d) The Clerk of Court, Manila A-2094 (for
the Court of Appeals)
2. As a practice, mail matters are dispatched
in the morning. If the mail matters
are received in the afternoon, then
they are dispatched on the next day.
As such, of the said registered mail
matters were received in the
afternoon of 7 February 2006, then
they were dispatched on the next
day or on 8 February 2006;
3. Unknown to me, the registered mail matter
for The Clerk of Court of Court of
Appeals, manila may not have been
stamped when it was received on 7
February 2006 and/or may have
been stamped with an erroneous
date on 8 February 2006 when it was
about to be dispatched.
4. When I examined the Registry Book, it
appeared to be that there was some
confusion on the part of our new
clerk Lorena Datus, as the registered
mail matter for the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor was also
entered as 2094 while the one
intended for The Clerk of Court,
21 | Documentary Evidence.Best Evidence Rule.ntsnotes
Manila in the Registry Receipt Book
was marked as A-2094. With two
(2) registered mail matters with
Nos. 2094, it may possibly occur
that the other parcel intended for the
Clerk of Court, Manila was not
stamped with the date February 7,
2006 when it was received by our
Post Office. The fact that it was not
stamped may have gone unnoticed
until that time that the said matters
were about to be dispatched on
February 8, 2006 and possibly, one
of our staff might have stamped the
copy for the Court of Appeals with
the date 8 February 2006.
5. This oversight on the erroneous stamping
of the date was clearly unintentional
and not deliberate on our part.
6. I am executing the foregoing for the
purpose of attesting to the truth of
the foregoing and upon the request
of Atty. Christian B. Flores for the
purpose of proving that the
registered mail matter A-2094 was
received by our Post Office on 7
February 2006.[31]
Both of the affidavits submitted by petitioners were
notarized by Atty. Bener Ortiz Bauto of Bauto, Bauto and
Flores Law Offices - evidently, the same law firm as that of the
counsel of petitioners.
Based on the foregoing documents, nevertheless, the
Court of Appeals stood pat in its dismissal of the petition. When
petitioners came to this Court via the present petition for review
on certiorari, they attached thereto the same photocopy of the
pertinent page of the Registry Book of the Cabanatuan City
Post Office, but this time with a typewritten notation certified
true copy signed by one Lorena Gatus, purportedly a clerk of
such post office. Likewise, petitioners annexed to their present
petition, the additional affidavit of the same clerk Lorena Gatus
attesting to the fact that she erroneously stamped on the
envelopes of petitioners mails the date 8 February 2006 instead
of 7 February 2006.
Upon closer examination of the aforementioned
documents, including those submitted before the appellate
court, this Court finds no evidentiary basis to reverse the
dismissal by the Court of Appeals of petitioners petition
for certiorari for being belatedly filed.
True, petitioners sent the Court of Appeals a registered
mail containing seven (7) copies of their Petition for Certiorari.
But the envelope in which the copies of the petition were
contained bore the notation 8 February 2006 as the date of
mailing. Such date fell beyond the reglementary period within
which to file such a petition.

To dispute the date of mailing as stamped on the
envelope of their mail, petitioners presented the attestation,
under oath, of the supposed Assistant Postmaster of
the Cabanatuan City Post Office that the subject registered mail
was received in our office on 7 February 2006 for mailing x x
x; as well as that of the purported clerk of the same post office
admitting to having mistakenly stamped the envelope of the
subject registered mail with the date 8 February 2006.
There is a presumption that official duties have been
regularly performed.[32] On this basis, we have ruled in previous
cases that the Postmasters certification is sufficient evidence of
the fact of mailing. This presumption, however, is disputable.
In this case, the Affidavit/Certification of the alleged Assistant
Postmaster cannot give rise to such a presumption, for not only
does it attest to an irregularity in the performance of official
duties (i.e., mistake in stamping the date on the registered mail),
it is essentially hearsay evidence.
Though notarized, we cannot give the affidavits of the
Assistant Postmaster and the clerk any probative value, since
they were both notarized by a lawyer belonging to the same law
firm as petitioners counsel and, as such, are self-serving
assertions not corroborated by any other evidence. Considering
the interest of his law firm in the case, we cannot rely solely on
the jurat of the notary public that the affiants/certifiers are
indeed who they say they are. The affiants/certifiers herein
claimed to be officers or employees of the Cabanatuan City Post
Office, but this Court has no way of ensuring the veracity of
such claim.
It would have been different had petitioners presented
an Official Receipt as evidence of payment of appropriate fees
corresponding to the issuance of such certifications by the
Assistant Postmaster and the clerk, who certified that the
photocopy of the pertinent page of the Registry Book was a
faithful reproduction of the original and that she was the one
who erroneously made the notation 8 February 2006 on the
envelope addressed to the Clerk of Court of the Court of
Appeals. Under PhilPost Administrative Order No. 05-17
dated 20 December 2005, in relation to Department of
Transportation and Communications Memorandum Circular
No. 2000-17 dated 18 February 2000, concerning fees for
administrative services rendered, a fee of Php25.00 is imposed
for certification of every document or information based on
record. Without such receipt, plus the fact that the jurats of the
affidavits/certifications were made by a lawyer from the same
law firm as petitioners counsel, we cannot help but doubt that
the said documents were issued by the officers of the
Cabanatuan City Post Office.
22 | Documentary Evidence.Best Evidence Rule.ntsnotes
In addition, petitioners could have easily presented the
original Registry Receipt No. A-2094. It would have
constituted the best evidence of the fact of mailing on 7
February 2006, even if a different date had been stamped on the
envelope of the subject registered mail. Regrettably, petitioners
have not seen fit to present such original. Their continued
failure to present the original receipt can only lead one to
remember the well-settled rule that when the evidence tends to
prove a material fact which imposes a liability on a party, and
he has it in his power to produce evidence which from its very
nature must overthrow the case made against him if it is not
founded on fact, and he refuses to produce such evidence, the
presumption arises that the evidence, if produced, would
operate to his prejudice, and support the case of his
adversary.[33] Mere photocopy of Registry Receipt No. A-2094
militates against their position as there is no indicium of its
authenticity. A mere photocopy lacks assurance of its
genuineness, considering that photocopies can easily be
tampered with.
Given the foregoing, we find no reason to reverse the
assailed resolutions of the Court of Appeals and disturb its
conclusions therein. Petitioners miserably failed to adduce
credible and sufficient substantiation that any inadvertence was
committed by the Post Office of Cabanatuan City, Nueva
Ecija. Instead of supporting their cause, the affidavits submitted
by petitioners, taken together with the mere photocopy of
Registry Receipt No. A-2094 without the presentation of the
original thereof, actually lead this Court to doubt whether
petitioners counsel has been sincere in his dealings with the
courts. Needless to stress, a lawyer is bound by ethical
principles in the conduct of cases before the courts at all
times.[34]
It has been said time and again that the perfection of
an appeal within the period fixed by the rules is mandatory and
jurisdictional.[35] But it is always in the power of this Court to
suspend its own rules, or to except a particular case from its
operation, whenever the purposes of justice require it.[36] This
Court is mindful of the policy of affording litigants the amplest
opportunity for the determination of their cases on the
merits[37] and of dispensing with technicalities whenever
compelling reasons so warrant or when the purpose of justice
requires it.[38]
Assuming that we suspend the rules, in the interest of
justice, and direct the Court of Appeals to admit petitioners
Petition for Certiorari even if it was one day late, we would still
affirm the dismissal of said Petition by the appellate court
considering petitioners failure to serve the OSG with a copy of
the same.
In addressing the issue, petitioners exploit the oft used
defense in the interest of justice; and the fact that they have now
furnished the OSG copies of the present petition, as well as
other pleadings.
Failure to furnish the OSG a copy of the petition filed
before the Court of Appeals was a fatal defect.
We agree with the disposition of the Court of Appeals
in that we have stated in Salazar v. Romaquin[39] that Section 5,
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 5. Who must prosecute
criminal actions. All criminal actions
commenced by a complaint or information
shall be prosecuted under the direction and
control of the prosecutor. However, in the
Municipal Trial Courts or Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts when the prosecutor assigned
thereto or to the case is not available, the
offended party, any peace officer, or public
officer charged with the enforcement of the
law violated may prosecute the case. This
authority shall cease upon actual intervention
of the prosecutor or upon elevation of the
case to the Regional Trial Court.
The authority of the Provincial Prosecutor to appear
for and represent the respondent People of the Philippines is
confined only to the proceedings before the trial court.
We further elucidated in the same case that:
The pleadings of the accused and
copies of the orders or resolutions of the trial
court are served on the People of
the Philippines through the Provincial
Prosecutor. However, in appeals before the
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court
either (a) by writ of error; (b) via petition for
review; (c) on automatic appeal; or (d) in
special civil actions where the People of the
Philippines is a party, the general rule is that
the Office of the Solicitor General is the sole
representative of the People of the
Philippines. This is provided for in Section
35(l) Chapter 12, Title III of Book IV of the
1987 Administrative Code, viz:
(l) Represent the
Government in the
Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals in all
criminal proceedings;
represent the Government
23 | Documentary Evidence.Best Evidence Rule.ntsnotes
and its officers in the
Supreme Court, the Court
of Appeals, and all other
courts or tribunals in all
civil actions and special
proceedings in which the
Government or any officer
thereof in his official
capacity is a party.
A copy of the petition in such action
must be served on the People of
the Philippines as mandated by Section 3,
Rule 46 of the Rules of Court, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (citation
omitted). The service of a copy of the petition
on the People of the Philippines, through the
Provincial Prosecutor would be inefficacious.
The petitioners failure to have a copy of his
petition served on the respondent, through the
Office of the Solicitor General, shall be
sufficient ground for the dismissal of the
petition as provided in the last paragraph of
Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court.
Unless and until copies of the petition are
duly served on the respondent, the appellate
court has no other recourse but to dismiss the
petition.
The purpose of the service of a copy
of the petition on the respondent in an
original action in the appellate court prior to
the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person
of the respondent is to apprise the latter of the
filing of the petition and the averments
contained therein and, thus, enable the
respondent to file any appropriate pleading
thereon even before the appellate court can
act on the said petition, or to file his comment
thereon if so ordered by the appellate court.
But if a copy of the petition is served on the
Provincial Prosecutor who is not authorized
to represent the People of the Philippines in
the appellate court, any pleading filed by the
said Prosecutor for and in behalf of the
People of the Philippines is unauthorized,
and may be expunged from the records.[40]
In the more recent case of Go v. Court of
Appeals,[41] this Court, through Mr. Justice Quisumbing, once
again made clear that Section 1, Rule 65 in relation to Section
3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court, clearly states that in a petition
filed originally in the Court of Appeals, the petitioner is
required to serve a copy of the petition on the adverse party
before its filing (citation omitted). If the adverse party appears
by counsel, service shall be made on such counsel pursuant to
Section 2, Rule 13. Since the OSG represents the Republic of
the Philippines once the case is brought before this Court of the
Court of Appeals, then service of the petition should be made
on that office (citation omitted).
As a last ditch effort, petitioners hark on a liberal
construction of the rules of procedure in order to bring about
substantial justice and appeal to this Courts exercise of equity
jurisdiction.
We are not convinced.
It must always be remembered that the liberality with
which we exercise our equity jurisdiction is always anchored on
the basic consideration that the same must be warranted by the
circumstances obtaining in each case. Aside from the above
disquisition, there is no showing herein of any exceptional
circumstance that may rationalize a digression from the rule on
timely filing of appeals.
Court is obliged to adhere austerely to the procedural rules on
the timeliness of submission before the court.
All told, We find that the Court of Appeals did not err
in dismissing the petition for (1) being filed beyond the
reglementary period within which to file the same; and (2)
failure to observe the requirement of service upon the OSG as
counsel for the People of the Philippines.
In view of the foregoing, this Court sees no need to
discuss the second assigned error.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed 23 February
2006 Resolution and 13 June 2006 Resolution, both of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 93272, are
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners Leoncio D.
Mangahas, Zaldy G. Matias, Orlando O. Oanes, Dante Y.
Arcilla and Jocelyn R. de la Cruz.
SO ORDERED.

Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the orderly

administration of justice and the protection of substantive rights
in judicial and extrajudicial proceedings. It is a mistake to
suppose that substantive law and adjective law are
contradictory to each other; or, as has often been suggested, that
enforcement of procedural rules should never be permitted if it
will result in prejudice to the substantive rights of the litigants.
This is not exactly true; the concept is much misunderstood. As
a matter of fact, the policy of the courts is to give effect to both
kinds of law, as complementing each other, in the just and
speedy resolution of the dispute between the parties.
Observance of both substantive and procedural rights is equally
guaranteed by due process, whatever the source of such rights,
be it the Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of court.[42]
As we have put it long before:
For all its conceded merits, equity is
available only in the absence of law and not
as its replacement. Equity is described as
justice outside legality, which simply means
that it cannot supplant although it may, as
often happens, supplement the law. We said
in an earlier case, and we repeat it now, that
all abstract arguments based only on equity
should yield to positive rules, which pre-empt
and prevail over such persuasions. Emotional
appeals for justice, while they may wring the
heart of the Court, cannot justify disregard of
the mandate of the law as long as it remains
in force. The applicable maxim, which goes
back to the ancient days of the Roman jurists-
and is now still reverently observed- is
`aequetas nunquam contravenit legis.[43]

Having found the explanation of petitioners less than

worthy of credence and lacking in evidentiary support, this
24 | Documentary Evidence.Best Evidence Rule.ntsnotes