PART TEN

EMPLOYER LOCKOUT OR COUNTER MEASURE TO UNION CONCERTED ACTIVITY

A. BASIS, LIMITATION, AND DEFINITION

Art. [263] 278

Art. [212] 219 (p)

1. Effect on Work Relationship

Art. [212] 219 (p)

2. Ground for Lockout

Art. [263] 278 (c)
BVRXXII S5

3. Prohibited Lockout
Art. [263] 278 (b) (g)

B. PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS
Art. [264] 279 (a) (c) (d)
Art. [263] 278 (e) (f)
BVRXXII S6,7,8,10,11,12

Philtread Tire and Rubber Corporation v. NLRC, 218 SCRA 805 [G.R. No. 102185, Feb. 15, 1993]
The NLRC also found that the company had complied with the procedural requirement of a valid lockout (Art. 263
of the Labor Code) and that in view of the reasons therefor (enumerated on pages 14-19 of the resolution of
February 14, 1991) it was clear to the NLRC that "the company in resorting to lockout wanted to obtain industrial
peace, a peace that seemed unobtainable as long as those locked out obstructively formed part of its operation".
This factual finding was not questioned by any of the parties. The NLRC concluded that the company incurred no
liability to the locked out employees. The NLRC said: "But again, we concede, as this is not even disputed by the
Union, the company complied with the procedural requirements of a valid lockout. In relation, therefore, to the
first question, the company incurred no liability to those employees affected by its lockout."

1. Vote, Conduct of, and Period of Validity

Art. [263] 278 (f)
Art. [264] 279 (a)
BVRXXII S10

C. EFFECT OF ILLEGAL LOCKOUT

Art. [264] 279 (a)
 PART ELEVEN - LABOR INJUNCTION

A. DEFINITION AND NATURE

PAL v. NLRC, 287 SCRA 672 [G.R. No. 120567, March 20, 1998]
Injunction is not a cause of action in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. —Generally,
injunction is a preservative remedy for the protection of one’s substantive rights or interest. It is not a cause of action
in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. It is resorted to only when there is a pressing
necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard of compensation. The
application of the injunctive writ rests upon the existence of an emergency or of a special reason before the main case
be regularly heard. The essential conditions for granting such temporary injunctive relief are that the complaint alleges
facts which appear to be sufficient to constitute a proper basis for injunction and that on the entire showing from the
contending parties, the injunction is reasonably necessary to protect the legal rights of the plaintiff pending the
litigation. Injunction is also a special equitable relief granted only in cases where there is no plain, adequate and
complete remedy at law.

An injunction, as an extraordinary remedy, is not favored in labor law considering that it generally has not proved to
be an effective means of settling labor disputes. It has been the policy of the State to encourage the parties to use the
non-judicial process of negotiation and compromise, mediation and arbitration. Thus, injunctions may be issued only
in cases of extreme necessity based on legal grounds clearly established, after due consultations or hearing and when
all efforts at conciliation are exhausted which factors, however, are clearly absent in the present case.

From the foregoing provisions of law, the power of the NLRC to issue an injunctive writ originates from “any labor
dispute” upon application by a party thereof, which application if not granted “may cause grave or irreparable damage
to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party.” The term “labor dispute” is defined as “any
controversy or matter concerning terms and conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons
in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or arranging the terms and conditions of employment regardless of
whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employers and employees.”

1. General Rule - Prohibition

Art. [254] 266
Art. [218] 225
Caltex Filipino Managers and Supervisors Assn. v. CIR, 44 SCRA 350 [G.R. No. L-30632-33, April 11, 1972]
There can be no injunction issued against any strike except in only one instance, that is, when a labor dispute
arises in an industry indispensable to the rational interest and such dispute is certified by the President of the
Philippines to the Court of Industrial Relations in compliance with Section 10 of Republic Act 875. An injunction in
an uncertified case must be based on the strict requirements of Section 9(d) of Republic Act 875; the purpose of
such an injunction is not to enjoin the strike itself, but only unlawful activities.

HSBC v. NLRC, 370 SCRA 193 [G.R. No. L113541, Nov. 22, 2001]
Here, we see no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent NLRC in giving due course to the petition for
injunction filed by respondent bank. As aptly observed by the Solicitor General, it is not necessary for the
respondent bank to allege in verbatim the requisites for the issuance of the temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction under Article 218 (e) of the Labor Code. In its original and supplemental petition for
injunction, respondent bank made sufficient allegations that members of petitioner union were unlawfully
preventing or obstructing the free ingress to and egress from the respondent bank premises; and disrupting
operations, causing great and continuing damage to the bank in terms of lost revenues. These allegations, as found
by respondent NLRC, were proven by respondent bank during the proceedings for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction. Incidentally, it is not our function in this certiorari proceedings to review the findings of
facts of respondent NLRC since we are confined only to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. Indeed,
this Court is not a trier of facts; factual issues are beyond the ambit of our authority to review on certiorari.
2. Exceptions - When Injunction is Allowed
Art. [254] 266
Art. [218] 225 (e)
Art. [264] 279
Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa v. NLRC, 198 SCRA 586 [G.R. No. 91980, June 27, 1991]
Also untenable is the Union’s other argument that the respondent NLRC Division had no jurisdiction to issue the
temporary restraining order or otherwise grant the preliminary injunction prayed for by SMC and that, even
assuming the contrary, the restraining order had been improperly issued. The Court finds that the respondent
Commission had acted entirely in accord with applicable provisions of the Labor Code. Article 254 of the Code
provides that “No temporary or permanent injunction or restraining order in any case involving or growing out of
labor disputes shall be issued by any court or other entity, except as otherwise provided in Articles 218 and 264 x
x.” Article 264 lists down specific “prohibited activities” which may be forbidden or stopped by a restraining order
or injunction. Article 218 inter alia enumerates the powers of the National Labor Relations Commission and lays
down the conditions under which a restraining order or preliminary injunction may issue, and the procedure to
be followed in issuing the same. Among the powers expressly conferred on the Commission by Article 218 is the
power to “enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of any or all prohibited or unlawful acts or to
require the performance of a particular act in any labor dispute which, if not restrained or performed forthwith,
may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party xx.”

3. Issuing Agency NLRC

Art. [218] 225 (e)

4. Role of the Labor Arbiter

BVRXXII Sec. 14
Rule IX, NLRC Rules
Nat’l Mines and Allied Workers Union v. Vera, 133 SCRA 259 [G.R. No. L-44230, Nov. 19, 1984]
“When the sheriff, acting beyond the bounds of his authority, seizes a stranger’s property, the writ of injunction,
which is issued to stop the auction sale of that property, is not an interference with the writ of execution issued
by another court because the writ of execution was improperly implemented by the sheriff. Under that writ, he
could attach the property of the judgment debtor. He is not authorized to levy upon the property of the third
party claimant.”

Such is the situation obtaining in the case at bar. The NLRC decision sought to be executed is against the Philippine
Iron Mines, the judgment debtor. But the sheriffs levied upon the properties not of said judgment debtor, but of
private respondents, who were not parties in the NLRC case. Decidedly then, private respondents have every right
to file a separate action to vindicate their property rights.

In the instant case, respondent Judge acted within his jurisdiction and did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion in enjoining the auction sale because, as already stated, “a sheriff has no authority to attach the
property of any person under an execution except that of the judgment debtor. If he does so, the writ of execution
affords him no justification for the action is not in obedience to the mandate of the writ. So long as the officer
confines his acts to the authority of the writ, he is not liable but all of his acts which are not justified by the writ
are without authority of law. An injunction is a proper remedy to prevent a sheriff from selling the property of
one person for the purpose of paying the debts of another.”

Nestle Phils. Inc., v. NLRC, 195 SCRA 340 [G.R. No. 85197, March 18, 1991]
The power of the NLRC to enjoin or restrain the commission of any or all prohibited or unlawful acts as provided
in Art. 218 of the Labor Code, can only be exercised in a labor dispute. —Nestlé’s demand for payment of the
private respondents’ amortizations on their car loans, or, in the alternative, the return of the cars to the company,
is not a labor, but a civil, dispute. It involves debtor-creditor relations, rather than employee-employer relations.
x x x The NLRC gravely abused its discretion and exceeded its jurisdiction by issuing the writ of injunction to stop
the company from enforcing the civil obligation of the private respondents under the car loan agreements and
from protecting its interest in the cars which, by the terms of those agreements, belong to it (the company) until
 their purchase price shall have been fully paid by the employee. The terms of the car loan agreements are not in
issue in the labor case. The rights and obligations of the parties under those contracts may be enforced by a
separate civil action in the regular courts, not in the NLRC.

B. PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS AND RULES FOR THE ISSUANCE OF LABOR INJUNCTIONS

Art. [218] 225 (e)
BVRXXIIS14
Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa v. NLRC, 198 SCRA 586 [G.R. No. 91980, June 27, 1991]
As a rule such restraining orders or injunctions do not issue ex parte, but only after compliance with the following
requisites, to wit:
a. a hearing held after due and personal notice thereof has been served, in such manner as the Commission shall
direct, to all known persons against whom relief is sought, and also to the Chief Executive and other public officials
of the province or city within which the unlawful acts have been threatened or committed charged with the duty
to protect complainant’s property;
b. reception at the hearing of testimony of witnesses, with opportunity for cross-examination, in support of the
allegations of a complaint made under oath, as well as testimony in opposition thereto, if offered x x;
c. a finding of fact by the Commission, to the effect:
1. That prohibited or unlawful acts have been threatened and will be committed and will be continued unless
restrained, but no injunction or temporary restraining order shall be issued on account of any threat,
prohibited or unlawful act, except against the person or persons, association or organization making the threat
or committing the prohibited or unlawful act or actually authorizing or ratifying the same after actual
knowledge thereof;
2. That substantial and irreparable injury to complainant’s property will follow;
3. That as to each item of relief to be granted, greater injury will be inflicted upon complainant by the denial of
relief than will be inflicted upon defendants by the granting of relief;
4. That complainant has no adequate remedy at law; and
5. That the public officers charged with the duty to protect complainant’s property are unable or unwilling to
furnish adequate protection.

Bisig ng Manggagawa v. NLRC, 226 SCRA 499 [G.R. No. 105090, Sept. 16, 1993]
Article 218 (e) of the Labor Code must strictly be complied before temporary or permanent injunction can issue in
labor dispute. —In the case at bar, the records will show that the respondent NLRC failed to comply with the letter
and spirit of Article 218 (e), (4) and (5) of the Labor Code in issuing its Order of May 5, 1992. Article 218 (e) of the
Labor Code provides both the procedural and substantive requirements which must strictly be complied with before
a temporary or permanent injunction can issue in a labor dispute, viz:

Art. 218. Powers of the Commission. —The Commission shall have the power and authority:
(e) To enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of any or all prohibited or unlawful acts or to require
the performance of a particular act in any labor dispute which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause
grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party: Provided, That no
temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute as defined in this Code shall
be issued except after hearing the testimony of witnesses, with opportunity for crossexamination, in support of the
allegations of a complaint made under oath, and testimony in opposition thereto, if offered, and only after a finding
offset by the commission, to the effect:
1. That prohibited or unlawful acts have been threatened and will be committed and will be continued unless
restrained but no injunction or temporary restraining order shall be issued on account of any threat, prohibited
or unlawful act, except against the person or persons, association or organization making the threat or committing
the prohibited or unlawful act or actually authorizing or ratifying the same after actual knowledge thereof;
2. That substantial and irreparable injury to complainant’s property will follow;
3. That as to each item of relief to be granted, greater injury will be inflicted upon complainant by the denial of relief
than will be inflicted upon defendants by the granting of relief;
4. That complainant has no adequate remedy at law; and
5. That the public officers charged with the duty to protect complainant’s property are unable or unwilling to furnish
adequate protection. “Such hearing shall be held after due and personal notice thereof has been served, in such
manner as the Commission shall direct, to all known persons against whom relief is sought, and also to the Chief
Executive and other public officials of the province or city within which the unlawful have been threatened or
committed charged with the duty to protect complainant’s property

1. Temporary Restraining Order

Dinio v. Laguesma, 273 SCRA 109 [G.R. No. 108475, June 9, 1997]
It is well to remember that “injunctions or restraining orders are frowned upon as a matter of labor relations
policy,” and as a general reminder: There is no power the exercise of which is more delicate which requires greater
caution, deliberation, and sound discretion, or (which is) more dangerous in a doubtful case than the issuing of an
injunction; it is the strong arm of equity that never ought to be extended unless to cases of great injury, where
courts of law cannot afford an adequate or commensurate remedy in damages. The right must be clear, the injury
impending or threatened, so as to be averted only by the protecting preventive process of injunction.

Petitioners further argue that the elections conducted in the Manila branches were likewise null and void even if
the same were held after the expiration of the temporary restraining order. Petitioners maintain that the 20-day
rule does not apply to labor cases, anchoring its thesis on B.P. Blg. 224 which states that: “nothing herein
contained shall be construed to impair, affect or modify in any way rights granted by, or rules pertaining to
injunctions contained in, existing agrarian, labor or social legislation.” Petitioners seem to have misunderstood
the aforequoted provision. Said provision does not exempt labor cases from the twenty-day limit rule. Rather, it
leaves it up to labor laws to provide their own rules concerning injunctions and temporary restraining orders. If
petitioners took time to peruse the Labor Code, they will ultimately find out, in Article 218 thereof, that temporary
restraining orders issued in labor disputes also have a lifetime of only twenty (20) days. Said rule is in keeping with
the rationale that “a temporary restraining order can no longer exist indefinitely for it has become truly
temporary.” Thus, petitioners’ contention must surely fail.
 PART TWELVE
ALTERNATIVES TO USE OF ECONOMIC FORCE, CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION AS MODES OF LABOR DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT

A. CONCILIATION
Policy Art. [211] 218 (e)
BVRXXII S1&2

1. Conciliation - As Part of the Collective Bargaining Process

Art. [233] 239 Privileged Communication
Art. [250] 261 (c) (d) (e)
Art. [263] 277 (e)
Art. [261] 274

2. Conciliation Agency - National Conciliation and Mediation Board

Rule XXII

B. ARBITRATION

1. Compulsory Arbitration

a. Definition and Nature of Dispute Subject to Compulsory Arbitration

Art. [263] 278 (g)
Caltex Refinery Employees Assn. v Brillantes, 279 SCRA 218 [G.R. No. 123782, Sept. 16, 1997]
No particular setup for a grievance machinery is mandated by law. Rather, Article 260 of the Labor Code, as
incorporated by RA 6715, provides for only a single grievance machinery in the company to settle problems
arising from “interpretation or implementation of their collective bargaining agreement and those arising
from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies.” Article 260, as amended, reads:
Article 260. Grievance Machinery and Voluntary Arbitration. — The parties to a Collective Bargaining
Agreement shall include therein provisions that will ensure the mutual observance of its terms and conditions.
They shall establish a machinery for the adjustment and resolution of grievances arising from the
interpretation or implementation of their Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the
interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies. All grievances submitted to the grievance
machinery which are not settled within seven (7) calendar days from the date of its submission shall
automatically be referred to voluntary arbitration prescribed in the Collective Bargaining Agreement. For this
purpose, parties to a Collective Bargaining Agreement shall name and designate in advance a Voluntary
Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, or include in the agreement a procedure for the selection of such
Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, preferably from the listing of qualified Voluntary
Arbitrators duly accredited by the Board. In case the parties fail to select a Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of
Voluntary Arbitrators, the Board shall designate the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, as
may be necessary, pursuant to the selection procedure agreed upon in the Collective Bargaining Agreement,
which shall act with same force and effect as if the Arbitrator or panel of Arbitrators has been selected by the
parties as described above.”

PAL v NLRC, 180 SCRA 555 [G.R. No. 55159, Dec. 22, 1989]
In the instant case, the stipulation in the 2 March 1977 agreement that Dolina shall be included in the payroll
of PAL until final resolution of the case by arbitration was intended to supersede the order of the Regional
Director which, by stipulation of the parties, was rendered moot and academic. In lieu of reinstatement and
the payment of his backwages, private respondent was included in petitioner’s payroll, effective from the time
he was preventively suspended until final resolution of the case by arbitration, without having to perform any
work for the petitioner. In entering into the agreement, the parties could not have intended to include in the
clause “final resolution of the case by arbitration” the whole adjudicatory process, including appeal. For if it
were so, even proceedings on certiorari before this Court would be embraced by the term “arbitration” and
 private respondent will continue to receive monthly salary without rendering any service to the petitioner
regardless of the outcome of the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter, for as long as one of the parties appeal
to the NLRC and until the case is finally resolved by this Court. This is clearly an absurdity which could not have
been contemplated by the parties.

Neither can proceedings on appeal before the NLRC en banc be considered as part of the arbitration
proceeding. In its broad sense, arbitration is the reference of a dispute to an impartial third person, chosen
by the parties or appointed by statutory authority to hear and decide the case in controversy [Chan Linte v.
Law Union and Rock, Ins. Co., 42 Phil. 548 (1921)]. When the consent of one of the parties is enforced by
statutory provisions, the proceeding is referred to as compulsory arbitration. In labor cases, compulsory
arbitration is the process of settlement of labor disputes by a government agency which has the authority to
investigate and to make an award which is binding on all the parties.

Under the Labor Code, it is the Labor Arbiter who is clothed with the authority to conduct compulsory
arbitration on cases involving termination disputes. When the Labor Arbiter renders his decision, compulsory
arbitration is deemed terminated because by then the hearing and determination of the controversy has
ended. Any appeal raised by an aggrieved party from the Labor Arbiter’s decision is already beyond the scope
of arbitration since in the appeal stage, the NLRC en banc merely reviews the Labor Arbiter’s decision for
errors of fact or law and no longer duplicates the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter. Thus, the clause
“pending final resolution of the case by arbitration” should be understood to be limited only to the
proceedings before the Labor Arbiter, such that when the latter rendered his decision, the case was finally
resolved by arbitration.

GTE Directors Corp. v GTE Directors Corp. Employees Union, 197 SCRA 452 [G.R. No. 76219, May 27, 1991]
To sanction disregard or disobedience by employees of a rule or order laid down by management, on the
pleaded theory that the rule or order is unreasonable, illegal, or otherwise irregular for one reason or another,
would be disastrous to the discipline and order that it is in the interest of both the employer and his employees
to preserve and maintain in the working establishment and without which no meaningful operation and
progress is possible. Deliberate disregard or disobedience of rules, defiance of management authority cannot
be countenanced. This is not to say that the employees have no remedy against rules or orders they regard as
unjust or illegal. They may object thereto, ask to negotiate thereon, bring proceedings for redress against the
employer before the Ministry of Labor. But until and unless the rules or orders are declared to be illegal or
improper by competent authority, the employees ignore or disobey them at their peril. It is impermissible to
reverse the process: suspend enforcement of the orders or rules until their legality or propriety shall have
been subject of negotiation, conciliation, or arbitration.

b. Rationale - Compulsory Arbitration

National Federation of Labor v MOLE, 124 SCRA 612 [G.R. No. L-64183, Sept. 15, 1983]
It is quite apparent, therefore, why this case calls for prompt decision. After this long lapse of time, respondent
Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc. had failed to abide by the clear and mandatory requirement of the law. It
would negate the very purpose of a compulsory arbitration, which precisely is intended to call a halt to a
pending strike by requiring that the status quo prior to its declaration be preserved, if one of the parties fails
to live up to such a norm. The inconsistencies between what was sought by private respondent, namely,
compulsory arbitration, and the failure to admit the striking employees back to work in the meantime, cannot
be countenanced. As noted earlier, time is of the essence as far as the eighty-one petitioners are concerned.
Wherefore, the petition for mandamus is granted. Public respondents are hereby ordered to implement their
return-to work order, and private respondent must respect the right of the eighty-one petitioners to resume
their respective positions as of the time the strike was called. The question as to the back wages and their
seniority rights will be determined in the compulsory arbitration proceeding. This decision is immediately
executory.
 Manila Cordage Co. v CIR, 37 SCRA 288 [G.R. No. L-25943, Jan. 30, 1971]
Putting aside the question of whether or not the alleged return-to-work agreement of October 14th and the
claimed actual termination of the strike on said date should be considered as having foreclosed the legality or
propriety of the issuance of any presidential certification of the dispute between petitioner and the
respondent Union, it being clear that compulsory arbitration may be certified by the President as long as, in
his opinion, a “labor dispute,” which this Court has defined as “any controversy concerning the terms,
conditions and tenure of employment,” exists in an industry indispensable to the national interest, whether a
strike therein be impending, going on or already terminated without a final settlement of the dispute, We are
of the opinion that the conclusion of the negotiations for a collective bargaining agreement on December 23,
1965, if entered into by those properly authorized to do so, could have ousted the jurisdiction of the CIR,
except to determine whether or not said agreement was not contrary to law, morals or public policy, in line
with the dominant policy of the Industrial Peace Act of favoring unionism and free bargaining between labor
and management as against compulsory arbitration with governmental intervention. (Section 1, Republic Act
875.) It does not appear, however, that, although the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was still pending
in the CIR at the time of the said agreement on December 23, the same was brought to its attention, much
less made the basis of any pleading.

Government Insurance System v GSIS Employees Association, 157 SCRA 236 [G.R. No. L-34893, Jan. 22,
1988]
Finally, the third reason fails to appreciate the legal significance of the power of the Court of Industrial
Relations to fix the terms and conditions of employment in compulsory arbitration cases under Section 10 of
the Industrial Peace Act [Republic Act No. 875 (1953)].

The pertinent portion of Section 10, RA 875 reads: “. . . and if no other solution to the dispute is found, the
Court may issue an order fixing the terms and conditions of employment.”

It is clear from the quoted Provision of the law that the fixing by the Court of the terms and conditions of
employment is intended as a solution to the labor dispute which was certified by the President for arbitration.
The fixing of terms and conditions of employment writes finis to the case. The above provision may be
understood to refer to contract negotiation disputes which are disputes as to the terms of a collective
bargaining agreement, as when there is a bargaining deadlock or impasse. [Fernandez and Quiason, THE LAW
OF LABOR RELATIONS 441 (1963)]. It does not encompass incidents of the main controversy like the situation
in the present case where the GSIS management sought the Court’s imprimatur on the management’s
resolution relative to the upgrading of its personnel, which, unquestionably, is not related to the dispute
certified for arbitration.

As stated above, the only reason why the CIR’s approval is necessary before any intended transfer, promotion,
demotion, or separation may be effected pending a dispute, is “to stop acts that mar the process of solving
the labor dispute” and to prevent “further deterioration of the already deteriorated relationship between
employer and employee.” Otherwise, the CIR would not be justified in interfering with what, under normal
circumstances, is purely a management prerogative. In the case at bar, it has not been shown that the GSIS
acted arbitrarily or discriminatorily in fixing the date of effectivity of Roberto’s promotion so as to warrant a
change in said date. Neither was it shown that the change in the date of effectivity of Roberto’s promotion
was necessary in the process of arriving at a solution to the labor dispute, or in maintaining a desirable
industrial atmosphere pending arbitration. On the contrary, to order the change would, as it did, have the
effect of discriminating against the other employees, and formenting unrest, thug resulting in the further
deterioration in the relationship between the GSIS and its employees. To order the change was therefore
unwarranted.

2. Process Initiation - Certification of Dispute

a. Initiating Party
 b. Secretary DOLE
Art [263] 278 (g)

c. President
Art [263] 278 (g)
Union of Filipino Employees v Nestle Phils., 192 SCRA 396 [G.R. Nos. 88710-13, Dec. 19, 1990]

d. Office of the President

Art. [263] 278 (g)
Feati University v Feati University Faculty Club, 18 SCRA 1191 [G.R. No. L-21278, Dec. 27 1966]
Manila Cordage Co. v CIR, 37 SCRA 288 [G.R. No. L-25943, Jan. 30, 1971]

e. Arbitration Agencies
Art. [263] 278 (g)
St. Scholastica’s College v Torres, 210 SCRA 565 [G.R. No. 100158, June 29, 1992]
Union of Filipino Employees v Nestle Phils., 192 SCRA 396 [G.R. Nos. 88710-13, Dec. 19, 1990]

f. Effect of Certification and Violations of Order

Art. [263] 278 (g)
Telefunken v Court of Appeals, 348 SCRA 565 [G.R. Nos. 143013-14, Dec. 18, 2000]
Sarmiento v Tuico / Asian Transmission Corp. v NLRC, 162 SCRA 676 [G.R. Nos. L-75271-73, June 27, 1988]
Baguio Colleges Foundation v NLRC, 222 SCRA 604 [G.R. No. 98043, May 26, 1993]
Philtread, et al v NLRC, 218 SCRA 805 [G.R. No. 102185, Feb 15, 1993]
PAL v Brillantes, 280 SCRA 515 [G.R. No. 11936, Oct. 10, 1997]
Maranaw Hotels v Court of Appeals, 215 SCRA 501 [G.R. No. 103215, Nov. 6, 1992]
San Juan de Dios Educational Foundation Employees Union - AFW v San Juan de Dios Educational
Foundation, 430 SCRA 193 [G.R. No. 143341, May 28, 2004]

g. Awards and Orders

Art [263 (I)] 278 (i)
National Federation of Labor v MOLE, 124 SCRA 612 [G.R. No. L-64183, Sept. 15, 1983]
Gelmart Industries Phils., Inc. v Leogardo, 155 SCRA 403 [G.R. No. 70544, Nov. 5, 1987]
Manila Central Line Corp. v Manila Central Line Free Workers Union,290 SCRA 690 [G.R. No. 109383, June
15, 1998]
Caltex Refinery Employees Assn. v Brillantes, 279 SCRA 218 [G.R. No. 123782, Sept. 16, 1997]
MERALCO v Quisumbing, 326 SCRA 172 [G.R. No. 127598, Feb. 22, 2000]

h. Option - Submit Case to Voluntary Arbitration After Certification

Art. [263] 278 (h)

3. Compulsory Arbitration and Labor Rights

United CMC Textiles Workers Union v. Clave, 115 SCRA 894 [G.R. No. L-52720, Aug. 19, 1982]
Free Telephone Workers Union v. MOLE, 108 SVRA 757 [G.R. No. 58184, Oct. 30, 1981]

Ability to Pay
Caltex Refinery Employees Association v. Brillantes, 279 SCRA 218 [G.R. No. 123782, Sept. 16, 1997]

C. VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION

1. Defined
Luzon Development Bank v. Assn. of Development Bank Employees, 249 SCRA 162 [G.R. No. 120319, Oct. 6,
1995]
2. Basis for Voluntary Arbitration and Rationale
Art. XIII, Sec. 3, 1987 Constitution
Art. [211] 218 (a)
United CMC Textiles Workers Union v. Clave, 115 SCRA 894 [G.R. No. L-52720, Aug. 19, 1982]
Chung Fu v. Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA 545 [G.R. No.96283, Feb. 25, 1992]

3. Establishing Machinery Dispute Settlement - CBA and Time Frame

Art. [260] 273 Grievance Machinery and Voluntary Arbitration

4. Arbitrable Issues
Art. [261] 274
Art. [262] 275 Jurisdiction Over Labor Disputes
Eternity Employees Workers Union v. Voluntary Arbitration 189 SCRA 752 [G.R. No. 50110, Sept. 21, 1990]

5. Arbitrator
a. Selection
Art. [260] 273
Manila Central Line Corp. v. Manila Central Line Free Workers Union, 290 SCRA 690 [G.R. No. 109383, June
15, 1998]

b. Jurisdiction
Art. [261] 274
Art. [262] 275

c. Procedures
Art. [262-A] 276

6. Nature of Office and Function

Art. [260] 273
Oceanic Bic Division (FFW) v. Romero, 130 SCRA 392 [G.R. No. L-43890, July 16, 1984]

7. Awards and Orders

Art. [262-A] 276
Volkschel Labor Union v. NLRC, 98 SCRA 314 [G.R. No. L-39686, June 25, 1980]
Citibank Philippines Employees Union-NATU v. Ministry of Labor, 97 SCRA 52 [G.R. No. 50184, April 11, 1980]

a. Finality and Execution of Awards

Art. [262] 275
BVRXXII Sec. 4
Mantrade/FMMC Division Employees and Workers Union v. Bacunag, 144 SCRA 510 [G.R. No. L-48437,
Sept. 30, 1986]
PLDT v. Voluntary Arbitration, 190 SCRA 424 [G.R. No. 88626, Oct. 12, 1990]

b. Costs
Art. [262-B] 277 Costs of Voluntary Arbitration and Voluntary Arbitrator’s Fee
 LABOR RELATIONS LAW - PUBLIC SECTOR

I. Rights to Organize
a. Constitution
Art. III, Sec. 8
Art. XIII, Sec. 3
Art. IX-B, Sec. 2(5)

Social Security System Employees Assn. v. Court of Appeals, 175 SCRA 686 [G.R. No. 85279, July 28, 1989]
The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that the State “shall
guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful
concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law.”

By itself, this provision would seem to recognize the right of all workers and employees, including those in the
public sector, to strike. But the Constitution itself fails to expressly confirm this impression, for in the Sub-
Article on the Civil Service Commission, it provides, after defining the scope of the civil service as “all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters,” that “[t]he right to self-organization shall not be denied to government
employees” [Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(1) and (5)]. Parenthetically, the Bill of Rights also provides that “[t]he right of
the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or
societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not abridged” [Art. III, Sec. 8]. Thus, while there is no question
that the Constitution recognizes the right of government employees to organize, it is silent as to whether such
recognition also includes the right to strike.

Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in understanding the meaning of these
provisions. A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution
would show that in recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the commissioners intended
to limit the right to the formation of unions or associations only, without including the right to strike.

It will be recalled that the Industrial Peace Act (R.A. No. 875), which was repealed by the Labor Code (P.D.
442) in 1974, expressly banned strikes by employees in the Government, including instrumentalities exercising
governmental functions, but excluding entities entrusted with proprietary functions. No similar provision is
found in the Labor Code, although at one time it recognized the right of employees of government
corporations established under the Corporation Code to organize and bargain collectively and those in the
civil service to “form organizations for purposes not contrary to law” [Art. 224, before its amendment by B.P.
Blg. 70 in 1980], in the same breath it provided that “[t]he terms and conditions of employment of all
government employees, including employees of government owned and controlled corporations, shall be
governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations.”

On June 1, 1987, to implement the constitutional guarantee of the right of government employees to organize,
the President issued E.O. No. 180 which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of
government employees. In Section 14 thereof, it is provided that “[t]he Civil Service law and rules governing
concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed, subject to any legislation that
may be enacted by Congress.” The President was apparently referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987
of the Civil Service Commission under date April 21, 1987 which, “prior to the enactment by Congress of
applicable laws concerning strike by government employees. . . enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions,
all government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other
forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service.” The air was thus
cleared of the confusion. At present, in the absence of any legislation allowing government employees to
strike, recognizing their right to do so, or regulating the exercise of the right, they are prohibited from striking,
by express provision of Memorandum Circular No. 6 and as implied in E.O. No. 180.
The Court is of the considered view that they are. Considering that under the 1987 Constitution “[t]he civil
service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters” [Art. IX (B), Sec. 2(1); see also Sec. 1 of
E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the civil service are denominated as “government employees”] and that
the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created under
R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295, November
24, 1988] and are covered by the Civil Service Commission’s memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the
case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.

Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either petition the Congress for
the betterment of the terms and conditions of employment which are within the ambit of legislation or
negotiate with the appropriate government agencies for the improvement of those which are not fixed by
law. If there be any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to the Public Sector Labor-
Management Council for appropriate action. But employees in the civil service may not resort to strikes,
walkouts and other temporary work stoppages, like workers in the private sector, to pressure the Government
to accede to their demands. As now provided under Sec. 4, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations to Govern the
Exercise of the Right of Government-Employees to Self-Organization, which took effect after the instant
dispute arose, “[t]he terms and conditions of employment in the government, including any political
subdivision or intrumentality thereof and government-owned and controlled corporations with original
charters are governed by law and employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes
thereof.”

Rep. of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 428 [G.R. No. 87676, Dec. 20, 1989]
While NPDC employees are allowed under the 1987 Constitution to organize and join unions of their choice,
there is as yet no law permitting them to strike. In case of a labor dispute between the employees and the
government, Section 15 of Executive Order No. 180 dated June 1, 1987 provides that the Public Sector Labor-
Management Council, not the Department of Labor Employment, shall hear the dispute. Clearly, the Court of
Appeals and the lower court erred in holding that the labor dispute between the NPDC and the members of
the NPDSA is cognizable by the Department of Labor and Employment.

Manila Public School Teachers Assn. v. Laguio, 200 SCRA 323 [G.R. No. 95445, Aug. 6, 1991]
Employees in the public (civil) service, unlike those in the private sector, do not have the right to strike,
although guaranteed the right to self-organization, to petition Congress for the betterment of employment
terms and conditions and to negotiate with appropriate government agencies for the improvement of such
working conditions as are not fixed by law. The Court has not since been presented with any consideration of
law or established fact that would impair the validity of these postulates or preclude continued reliance
thereon for the purpose of resolving the present petitions on their merits.
 Jacinto v. Court of Appeals, 281 SCRA 657 [G.R. No. 124540, Nov. 14, 1997]
Strike, as defined by law, means any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a
result of an industrial or labor dispute. A labor dispute includes any controversy or matter concerning terms
and conditions of employment; or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of employers and employees. With these premises, we now
evaluate the circumstances of the instant petition.

Moreover, the petitioners here, except Merlinda Jacinto, were not penalized for the exercise of their right to
assemble peacefully and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. Rather, the Civil Service
Commission found them guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for having absented
themselves without proper authority, from their schools during regular school days, in order to participate in
the mass protest, their absence ineluctably resulting in the nonholding of classes and in the deprivation of
students of education, for which they were responsible. Had petitioners availed themselves of their free
time—recess, after classes, weekends or holidays—to dramatize their grievances and to dialogue with the
proper authorities within the bounds of law, no one—not the DECS, the CSC or even this Court—could have
held them liable for the valid exercise of their constitutionally guaranteed rights. As it was, the temporary
stoppage of classes resulting from their activity necessarily disrupted public services, the very evil sought to
be forestalled by the prohibition against strikes by government workers. Their act by its nature was enjoined
by the Civil Service law, rules and regulations, for which they must, therefore, be made answerable.

b. Labor Code Art. 254 [244]