_about 550 B.C.

whereas the Nyaya-Sutras o f Aksapada

were w r i t t e n about 150 A. D a n d Katyayana ( 4 th c e n t.
B.C.) knew the Nyaya S u t r a s . D asgupta^considering th is ^
re g a rd s Nyaya to be e x i s t e n t i n some form as e a r l y a s
th e 4 t h c e n t . B . C a d m i t t i n g t h a t some of the p r e s e n t
s u t r a s were w r i t t e n sometime i n the second c e n tu r y A. d!

According to K e i t h / Gautama should be regarded

as l a t e r th a n Nagarjuna and e a r l i e r th a n Asariga ( i . e .
about 300-350 A.D.)

V a ts y a y a n a 's Nyaya-Bhasya, the e a r l i e s t commentary

on th e N yaya-Sutra i s a ss ig n e d by K eith and Dasgupta to
A •O • e td
a p e rio d b e fo re the 4 th C e n t. -AB- w hile J a c o b i p l a t e ! i t
i n 30o A. D. He may be p la ce d even about^TJddyotakara
(a b o u t 460- At8-. 600 A.D.) wrote a V a r t t i k a on the BKasya*.
V a c a s p a tis T a tp a r y a tik a on the v a r t t i k a was w r i t t e n i n
about 840 A.D. (according t o some somewhat l a t e r ) . The
P a r is u d d h i of Tldayana (984 A.D.) is w e ll w r i t t e n
commentary on the T a t p a r y a t i k a , which was commented upon
by Yardhamana (1225 A.D.) i n h is N yaya-Nibandha-prakas^.

1. H is to r y o f I n d i a n.j ( i t ^ a t u r e / p p . 4 6 -5 0 .
by Satis^jpndjraTV idyabhusana.
2 . G o ld s tu f k e r ’ s P a n i n i , p . 157.

3. H is to r y o f I n d ia n P h ilo so p h y , p. 279.
4. I b i d , p. 307.
 -Jayanta* s Nyaya-ma'Sjari (900 A .D .) i s a n o th e r well-known
*ork commenting a t le n g th on so ® of the s u tr a s o f Gautama.

A ll th e well-known s i x X s tik a (o rth o d lx ) systems

of In d ia n p h ilo so p h y , i n one way or th e o t h e r , undertake
to h elp one to secu re the a tta in m e n t o f S a lv a tio n or
em an cip atio n ^ p av a rg a), f ^ t h e NSstika (hetero d o x ) system s
o f In d ia n p h ilo so p h y lik e th e J a in a and the ^iddha preached
r e s p e c tiv e ly the s e r i e s of I s r a v a , Samvara N ir ja r a and
Moksa^and duhkha, dr|kkhahetu, duhkhanirodha and duhkhanirodkct
h agam inl/pratipad c a lc u la te d to conduce to th e a tta in m e n t of
em a n cip atio n .

As i t s very name s i g n i f i e s ^ the Nyaya system of

th o u g h t in s p i t e of having S a lv a tio n as i t s f i n a l o b je c t,
seems to r e p r e s e n t more of In d ia n lo g ic th a n of In d ia n
p h ilo so p h y . Bulcke s^ y s, "* NySya is p rim a rily a system
o f lo g ic and d i a l e c t i c s .

I n Ak^apada G autam a's ' Nyaya Sutra'', the b a sic

t r e a t i s e on Nyaya, th e a u th o r p o in ts out th e means o f
s a lv a tio n as c o n s is tin g of r i g h t knowledge which can be
o b ta in e d by a c le a r com prehension of th e fo llo w in g s ix te e n
to p ic s ;’
dL-'-
1. 6 f . n The Theism of N yaya-Y ai^esika”' page 1. by C.Buleke
See a ls o 4 the sta te m e n t of Bodas i n h is in tr o d u c tio n
T<^ aST o ^ USeV'Nyaya is ..............much more a system of d i a l e c t i c s
th a n one of philosophy"*1.
 Ci) "the means o f F i g h t c o g n i t i o n (Praniana) .
( i l ) t h e o b j e c t s o f p l i g h t c o g n i t i o n (Prameya) -
( i i i ) d o u b t (sainsaya)

(iv?-iHotive (Prayojana)
(v> Example ( d r s t a n t a )
(vi) th eo ry (siddhantal

( v i i V f a c t o r s o f I n f e r e n c e (a v a y a v a )

(viii) C o g i t a t i o n ( t arka)
(ix) dem qstrated t r u t h (nirnaya)
(x) d i s c u s s i o n (vada''
(xi) d is p u t a t i o n (jalpa^

( x ii ) w rangling (vitanda)
( x i i i ) F a l l a c i o u s Reasoning (hetvabhasa")
(xiv) quibble (chala)
(xv) fu tile rejoinder (ja ti)

(xvi> g r o u n d o f d e f e a t o r c l i n c h e r ( n i g r a h a s t h a n a )

\'hXXJL-
A f t e r one ha s a c q u i r e d t e know le dge o f t h e above
t o p i c s o r c a t e g o r i e s o f knowledge t h e wrong n o t i o n ( m i t h y a -
jnana) / c e a s e s , and t h e n d e f e c t s (dosas), activity ( p r a v r t t i ’l
birth (j a n m a ) and p a i n (duhkha) a r e a n n i h i l a t e d and t h i s
a n n i h i l a t i o n le a d s to S a l v a t i o n , th e h i g h e s t good.

T h e r e a r e i n a l l f o u r pramanas ( s o u r c e s of v a l i d
k n o w l e d g e ) a c c o r d i n g t o Gau tam a. They a r e u e r a e p t i o n
 /

(p ra ty a k s a ), fnference (anumaha) , a n a l o g y (upamanajt and

v e r b a l t e s t i m o n y (-/abda) .

P e r c e p t i o n i s d e f i n e d as u n c o n t r a d i c t e d d e t e r m i n a t e
k n o w l e d g e , p ro d u c e d by t h e c o n t a c t o f t h e o b j e c t w i t h the

s e n s e - o r g a n and f r e e f r o m v e r b a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . I n f e r e n c e
is of th re e kinds (i) from cause t o e f f e c t (P urva^aD
(ii) f r o m e f f e c t t o c a u s e ( ^ e s a v a t ) a nd ( i l l ) inference
f r o m common c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s C S a m a n y a t o d r s t a ) . Ana logy i s
t h e knowing o f one t h i n g t h r o u g h k n ow le dge o f i t s r e s e m b -
lanc~ ^ —

uk. o f a r e l i a b l e p e r so n (S p ta) i s word or

v e r b a l te s tim o n y ) (Sabda) .

A f t e r e n u m e r a t i n g and d e f i n i n g t h e p r a m a n a s , Gautama
t u r n s t o t h e p r a m e y a s , w h i c h a r e t w e l v e i n number.

They a r e CD S o u l (atm an )
(ii) body ( ^ a r i r a )
(iii) sense-organs (indriya)
(iv) things or o b je c ts (artha)

(v) a p p r e h e n s i o n (b u d d h i )
(Vi's mind (manas)
(v iD A ctivity (p ra v rtti)
( v i i i ) d e f e c t ( d o s a ’!)
 (ix ) r e b i r t h (p re ty a ^ b h s iv a )
(x) f r u itio n (p la la )
( x i ) p a i n (d u h k h a )

( x i i ) e m a n c i p a t i o n o r u l t i m a t e good. (apavarga'>

T h e re a r e s i x i n d i c a t i o n s o f s o u l . , d e s i r e , a v e r s i o n ,
e f f o r t , p l e a s u r e , p a i n and c o g n i t i o n . The body i s th e
v e h i c l e o f o r g a n i c a c t i o n s , th e s e n s e - o r g a n s and o b j e c t s .
The f i v e s e n s e - o r g a n s a r e p ro d u c e d fro m t h e f i v e m a t e r i a l
s u b s 4' --------

»»^vcx’ , f i r e , a i r and e th e r ^ . S m e ll ( o r o d o u r)
c k^\.CLc,¥ejuis+ic4
t a s t e , c o l o u ^ to u c h and sound a r e t b J f i v e ^ q u a l i t i e s o f
t h e s a i d f i v e e l e m e n t s and t h e s e a r e a l s o t h e o b j e c t s o f
th e s e n s e s . A p p r e h e n s io n ( u p a l a b d h i ) ^ c o g n i t i o n ( j n a n a )

and i n t e l l e c t i o n ( b u d d h i) a r e synonymous t e r m s . Remembrance,

i n f e r e n c e , i n t u i t i o n , d re a m , i m a g i n a t i o n j t h e p e r & f p t i o n
o f n l e a s u r e , p a i n , d e s i r e e t c . and th e n o n - a p p r e a r a n c e o f
1
sim u lta n e o u s c o g n itio n s a r e t h e i n d i c a t i v e s o f m in d .
A c t i v i t y c o n s i s t s i n th e o p e r a t i n g o f s p e e c h , o f m ind,

and o f B o d y .

D e f e c t s a r e t h o s e w h ic h c a u s e th e a c t i v i t y o f man
to w a rd s v i r t u e s o r v i c e s . R e b i r t h c o n s i s t s i n b e in g b o r n

1. cf. imdwf-c i N .S . 1 . 1 . 1 6 .
 again, fruit is something produced by activity and defect.

Pain is that which causessuffering. Absolute freedom from

the aforesaid (pain etc,) is the ultimate good or final

Release.

After the prameyas, Gautama defines §aro^aya or doubt*

Doubts is the wavering judgment in which the -cognition of

the specific character of any object.is wanting. It arises

when-through confusion of similar qualities or conflicting

opinions one wants to settle ane of the two alternatives.

'T’he object aiming at which one acts* is called 'Motive*.

E'xample, theory or doctrine, factors of inference, cogitation

and demonstrated truth are then defined and here ends the
first Ahnika (Daily Portion or Section) of the first

Adhyaya.

The second Ahnika, after defining the three kinds of

controversy viz. discussion^disputation and wrangling, goes

on to describe hetvabhasas (fallacious reasons) which are

of five-iypes-savyabhicara (inconclusive), viruddha
k
(contradictory) , prakaranasama (neutralised) sa^asama,

(unreal or unproved) and kalatita (mistimed).

Quibble, fmtile rejoinder and clinchers are then

defined at the end of the first Adhyaya.

 Ths sec o n d Adhyaya s t a r t s w i t h a d e t a i l e d e x a m i n a t i o n
o f d o u b t s T h en we f i n d th e Pu rv ap afcsa o f t h e M&jhiyamika
I ^ d d h a ( - a c c o r d i n g t o T a c a s p a t i h T a t p a r y a t l k a - ) who
s a y s t h a t p e r c e p t i o n and t h e r e s t c a n n o t be r e g a r d e d a s

in s tru m e n ts of c o g n itio n in account of th e im p o s s i b ility

o f c o n n e c t i n g them w i t h any o f t h e t h r e e p o i n t s o f t i « .

Then f o l l o w s th e q u e s t i o n o f th e c o r r e c t n e s s o f t h e
d e f i n i t i o n o f p e r c e p t i o n * D i s c u s s i n g r w-f e e-h , Gautama w h ile

re iu tin g t h e view o f t h e B u d d h i s t , who r e j e c t e d t h e e x i s t e n c e

o f th e w h o le s ( a v a y a v i r r i , s a y s t h a t th o u g h we p e r c e i v e o n ly
p a r t s o f t h i n g s , y e t s i n c e t h e r e i s a w h o le , t h e p a r t w i l l
n a t u r a l l y r e f e r oo t h e w h o le . S i n c e we c a n p u l l and draw
t h i n g s , w h o le s e x i s t and t h e w hole i s n o t m e re ly p a r t s
c o l l e c t e d t o g e t h e r f o r i f i t w ere s o , one c o u ld s a y , "We
have p e r c e i v e d t h e u l t i m a t e p a r t s o r ato m s"’. Gautama t h e n
g o e s on t o exam ine i n f e r e n c e , t h e n a t u r e o f t i m e , s p e c i a l l y
th e p r e s e n t ( ) •> A n a lo g y and v e r b a l
te stim o n y .

The sec o n d Ahnifea o f t h e sec o n d A dhyaya d e a l s w i t h

t h e e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e e x a c t number o f t h e p ra m a n as and
d i s c u s s e s w h e th e r th e y s h o u ld be r e g a r d e d a s f o u r o n ly

s, i ns. 2 .1 .8 .
 1

ot more and whether word Is eternal or non-eternal; the

meaning of words Is then said to refer to l^idua! t

(yyaktil^ configuration (akrtl) a^djuft'i), Akrtl Is that

by which tne class notion is manif’c.c+o-i T—j_. •
x -Li3 ®aniiested. Jati is defined
as that which produces the notion of sameness!

The third Adhyaya beings with the examination of the

first prameya, the soul, it is proved here that the soul

something distinct from the sense organs, body and mind

and also that it is eternal. The body is, according to
Gautama, constituted of earth.

It is tnen established that the sense-organs are made

of material substances and are operative by contract and

that there are diverse sense-organs (i. e. they are five)

since the objects of the sense oi^gans are five-fold, in-

asjnuch as they have their existence indicated by the

perceptions of odour, taste, colour, touch and sound, pointing

out the objects of the sense-organs, Gautama says that

odour, taste colour and touch belong to Earth; taste,

colour and touch belong to watery colour and touch belong

to fire, touch belongs to air and sound to ether.

The second Ahnika of "the third Adhyaya starts with

a discussion regarding the non-eternity of Cognition

i. irfcr: NS. 2. 2. 69.

 (buddhi), C o g n i t i o n is a q uality of the soul and not of

the mind, nor can it su b s i s t i n the sense-organs or the

o b je c ts. A fte r e s ta b lis h in g th a t c o g n itio n is evanescent

i t i s shown t h a t c o n s c i o u s n e s s i s n o t a q u a l i t y o f t h e
body. The mind i s t h e n s a i d t o be one and a t o m i c , s i n c e
1
t h e r e i s n o n —s im u lta n e ity o f c o g n i t i o n s .

I n ohe l a s t p o r t i o n o f th e t h i r d A dhyaya we f i n d
s e v e r a l p r o o f s to th e e f f e c t t h a t t h e body i s fo rm ed
2
u n d e r th e in f lu e n c e o f a d r s t a .

The f i r s t A hnika o f th e f o u r t h Adhayaya a f t e r

d e fin in g a c t i v i t y and d e f e c t s e x am in es r e b i r t h . P e b i r t h
Can be e s t a b l i s h e d o n ly i f t h e s o u l i s r e g a r d e d a s
e te rn a l. Then i n th e c o u r s e o f e x p l a i n i n g t h a t t h e
p r o d u c t i o n o f p e r c e p t i b l e t h i n g s i s fr o m p e r c e p t i b l e
t h i n g s , G autama comes t o n o te some v ie w s r e g a r d i n g t h e
Wv Vafsqcw curia
p r o d u c t i o n o f t h i n g s and t h e s e a r e r e f e r r e d to i a s b e in g
3 3
t h e v ie w s o f some ^ ra v a d u k a s . as

T h is p o r t i o n d e a l s w i t h th e f o l l o w i n g t h e o r i e s : ^
tfea4i)the t h i n g s o f t h e w o rld a r e p r o d u c e d o u t o f Sunya

1 . NS. 3 . 2 . 5 6 ,
NS. 3 . 2 . 5 9 .
ajqfacf& rW TSiTO T!
2. c f . 3 . ^2. 6^-72.

3 . c f . The i n t r o d u c t o r y b hasjra on NS. 4 , 1 . 1 4 .

set: ■qf srren^rnf jm jrf i
 " 11
(V oia^j ( i : 0 tfetfk God i s t h e c a u s e o f th e u n iv e rse^ f±44-)

t h e w o r ld i s t h e r e s u l t o f c h a n c e 5( i v ) fea-fc a l l
t h i n g s a r e n o n - e t e r n a l , ( v l ttea$ a l l t h i n g s a r e e t e r n a l ,

(va^ tfea-t a l l a re d i v e r s e >( v i: i' bfes-t e v e r y t h i n g i s n e g a -

ti o n « l a nd ( v l i i ) c e r t a i n sw eeping a s s e r t i o n s i n r e g a r d
t o t h e e x a c t number o f t h i n g s . At th e end o f t h i s n o r t i o n ,
/ r u i t i o n , p a i n and u l t i m a t e good o r f i n a l . ‘t l i U S ^ a r e
ex am in ed .

The sec o n d A h n ik a c o n t a i n s a s h o r t d i s c u s s i o n r e g a r d i n g
t h e way i n w h ich e g o ism c e a s e s v i a . w i t h th e p i s e o f the
t r u e k n o w led g e o f t h e c a u s e s o f d e f e c t s o f t h e n a t u r e o f
p a s s i o n a t e a t t a c h m e n t t o t h i n g s and o b s e s s i o n w i t h them .
The v iew o f th e N i h i l i s t s t h a t # a l l t h i n g s a r e n o n - e x i s t e n t " '
is th en in c id e n t~ a lly re fu te d ; and so a l s o t h e t h e o r y o f
t h e I d e a l i s t Bauddhas d e n y in g t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d . The p r o c e s s
o f th e d e v e lo p m e n t o f t r u e know ledge i s t h e n d e a l t * w i t h
i n c i d e n t a l m e n tio n b e in g made o f Yoga a s a means o f r i g h t
( t r u e ’s k n o w le d g e .

The w h o le o f th e f i f t h d d h y a y a t r e a t s d i f f e r e n t k i n d s
of f u t i l e (-R e jo in d e rs ( J a tiA and g ro u n d s o f d e f e a t '(ifig r a h a

sth a n a ).

\ ; 1

n .
 12
We t h u s see t h a t t h e c h a p t e r s on P r a m ln a s o r means
o f k n o w led g e (and m a tte rs? c o n n e c te d w i t h th e m ) , and
P ram ey as o r o b j e c t s o f know ledge com prehend m ost o f t h e
p h i l o s o p h y o f G au tam a. H ow ever, as P r o f . Max M u lle r
re m a rk s : "! Nor i s l o g i c th e s o le o r c h i e f e n d o f G a u ta m a 's
p h ilo so p h y . I t s c h ie f end; lik e t h a t of th e o th e r d a r /a n a s
i s s a l v a t i o n w h ic h i s p ro m is e d t o a l l " ' . B u t in asQ nuch as
Nyaya i s "! a r e a l i s t i c p h i l o s o p h y b a s e d m a in ly on l o g i c a l
2
g r o u n d s / ' 123, ^ i t i n t r o d u c e s t h e s o u r c e s o f t r u e know ledge
and d e a l s w i t h them l o g i c a l l y d e p i c t i n g t h e s e i n severy
m in u te p-oj-niH details.

I n o r d e r t o g e t a c q u a i n t e d w i t h G a u ta m a 's p h i l o s o p h i c a l
v ie w s, i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o s tu d y c a r e f u l l y h i s d e t a i l e d
tre a tm e n t of so u l, th e f i r s t and f o r e m o s t o f t h e tw e lv e
p ram ey as ( o b j e c t s o f knowledge'* .

l!!T h e re a r e " ’,
as i s n o te d by C h a t t e r j e e and D a t t a ,
3
f o u r v ie w s o f t h e s e l f ( s o u l ) i n I n d i a n p h i l o s o p h y " . The
C a r v a k a s h av e a m a t e r i a l i s t i c c o n c e p t i o n o f th e s e l f and
-tut
in t h e i r v ie w _ ,^ S e lf i s t h e l i v i n g body w i t h i t s co n sc io u sn ess.

1. o f . Max M u l l e r ' s 'T h e S i x Systems o f I n d i a n

p h i l o s o p h y " ’f p . 3 6 9 - 3 7 0 .
2. An i n t r o d u c t i o n t o I n d i a n p h i l o s o p h y , p . 37
by C h a t t e r j e e & Da t t a .
3 . ,uAn I n t r o d u c t i o n t o I n d i a n p h i l o s o p h y " ', p p . 2 3 3 -2 3 4 .
 13
Ttue ^auddhas accept only a series of point instants of
aV?d'M6
eonsciousness(self other than this stream. The Vedantic

conception of the self is an idealistic one inasmuch as

Advaitavadins hold the self either to be unchanging and

self shining intelligence which is neither a subject nor

an object or to be an intelligent subject called the

’I' (according to Vis'istadvaita and others) The Nyaya,

instead adopts a realistic view.

The existence of the soul, according to Gautama is

fc ^Vs

proved by Inference. According t6 him_, aesire3 (Aversion,

Bffort, pleasure, pain and cognition/ are the indicatives

of the soul.

When a person desires a thing, he strives to obtain

it as something pleasurable. While desiring itj he judges

it to be similar to such objects as were found pleasurable
in the past. This wish to acquire is possible only in one

who, while remaining one and the same, perceives several

things, since such a desire arises from his remembrance

of a previous perception'only; and thus that desire

becomes an indicative of the soul. The same is the case

with the aversion which he has towards certain things. And

also, if no such one agent were there, who, perceiving a

number of things and recollecting his past perceptions,

makes an attempt to obtain a thing, effort would never be
 14
p o ssib le . Hence a s o u l i s e s t a b l i s h e d , who n e r c e i v e s a
t h i n g , and b e in g p e r m a n e n t, r e c o l l e c t s th e p e r c e p t i o n .
The p r e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e s o f p l e a s u r e and p a i n , t h u s b e i n g
remem bered, i t i s e s t a b l i s h e d I h a t t h e s o u l i s t h e e x p e r i e n c e r
o f p l e a s u r e and p a i n i n t h e p a s t , t h e i r rem em berer and t h e i r
e x p e r i e n c e r i n th e p r e s e n t . The d e s i r e t o know}-.,i .-e-.
c-e g i ' i t i -e-n , a l s o p r o v e s t h e same a g e n t a s h a v in g th e p r e v i o u s
d e s i r e t o knowj and the c o n s e q u e n t p o n d e r i n g s and becomes
a n i n d i c a t i v e o f the p r e s e n c e o f t h e common a g e n t i n t h e
s h a p e o f t h e 1s o u l ' .

The body w h ich i s t h e r e c e p t a c l e o f t h e soul* s

e x p e r i e n c e s o f p l e a s u r e and p a in } is th e v e h i c l e o f
1
a c tio n s, o f t h e s e n s e - o r g a n s and o f o b j e c t s .

The q u e s t i o n a r i s e s : ^ I s th e s o u l (w hich i s s p o k e n
of as ' I ' ) only, an a g g r e g a t e o f feody, th e s e n s e - o r g a n s ,
t h e i M i n d , th e I n t e l l e c t and S & r-satio n s ? Or i s i t s o m e th in g
d i f f e r e n t fro m t h e s e ?

I n f a c t , i t o f t e n h a p p en s t h a t one t h i n g , h a v in g b e e n
a p p re h e n d e d by s i g h t , t h a t same t h i n g i s a p p r e h e n d e d by
to u c h a l s o , and t h e p e r c e i v e r h a s th e i d e a i n h i s mind
thvat t h a t t h i n g w h ic h I saw w i t h ny e y e s , I now t o u c h

l. i NS. 1 . 1 . 1 1
 w ith th e organ of to u c h ”;! or t h a t w hich I touched w ith '
the organ of to u ch , I now see i t w ith my e y e s”', which
means t h a t the l a t e r id e a re c o g n ise s or r e c a l l s the
two p e rc e p tio n s as apprehending one and th e same o b je c t
as 1
and faaSJing belonging to one and th e same a g e n t. This
a g en t cannot be an A ggregate (composed of the feodv and
th e Sense -organs) , or the S^ense—
organs • Hence the agent
i s som ething e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t from th e com posite o r th e
S e n se -o rg a n s and t h i s i s th e s o u l.

So a l s o , the so u l i s d i s t i n c t from th e feody. I f th e

body were th e s o u l, th e re would be no s i n (pat&te%) a c c ru -
2
ing from the burning ( k i l l i n g ) of a l i v i n g body . To
e x p la in } t when th e 'b o d y 12 of a liv in g c re a tu re i s b u rn t
by a p e rso n ; th ere a c c ru e s to him the 'Sin* of k i l l i n g
a liv in g c re a tu re and i t i s t h i s '.g in ' th a t is c a lle d
'p a ta k a ' in the s u t r a . Now i f the S oul were th e same
a s th e feody, th e re co u ld be no c o n n e c tio n between such
's in * and th e a g e n t who d id th e a c t . Because in t h a t
case, th e ag g reg ate of th e feody e t c . which d id th e
k illin g j would no t have any co n n ectio n * w ith th e r e s u l t
o f k i l l i n g as i t would p e r is h ; and w hat would be connected

1. I - NS. 3 . 1 . 1 .

2. ^ ifrx ^ T l HTcRfTHTsrpg i “N S. 3 . 1 . « .
 16
w ith the r e s u l t s , would not be t h a t by whom the k i l l i n g
1
was done. Thus, the doer and the e x p e rie n c e r o f r e s u l t s
being e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t , i t comes to t h i s t h a t the one
who d id the a c t becomes d is s o c ia te d from what i t d id and
from i t s consequences, while the one who did not perform
2
the a c t becomes saddled w ith the a c t and i t s r e s u l t s . And
i f the said ‘Creature* i s one th a t is l i a b l e to b i r t h and
d e s t r u c t i o n , the b i r t h o f such a c re a tu re would not be
diie to i t s p a s t a c t io n s , and t h i s would mean t h a t th e re
could be no p©int i n leading the l i f e , of a ’ r e l i g io u s
s tu d e n t' (brahmacaryavasa) f o r th e purposes of r e le a s e
3
from b i r t h and r e b i r t h .

Thus, such a s t a t e being most u n d e s ir a b le , i t

fo llo w s t h a t the so u l must be something d i f f e r e n t from
th e aggregate of body e t c .

That the so u l is something d i s t i n c t from the aggregate

of th e body i s a lso i n f e r r e d from th e e x c i t a t i o n appearing

1. w srfcT t r r f ^ n c r : wrftn^crf f^srr ^ f f c r nrcr?

f^ n w f ^ ^ fa fmr fen i
- N. B. 3 . 1 . 4 .
2. fcrwT^fcn^PFr: i _ n#b> 3.1.4.

3. srfcT^ w t w f ' ^ anpfPrPf?: ixwf:

- Ibid.
 5
in another Sense-organ ( than the one that brought about
1
the preceding perception^. So also, since there is

recognition with the other Eye of what has been seen with

the left Eye, in the form: "T see now what I had cognised

(seeft) previously^! the soul must be regarded as something

distinct from the body.

The fact that pleasure etc. are not cognised by means

of visual and other organs, leads one to conclude that

there is a distinct organ for the perceiving of pleasure

etc. and this organ is the one whose existence is indicated

2
by the non-simultaneity of cognitions. This organ is Mind,

an ‘Instrument1 , by means' of which the eonceiver does

the conceiving of all things and thus the eonceiver or

the cogniser, ■ i. e. the '"soul1* is distinct from the

instrument of p cognising; i. e. the "Hind"1.

M doubt now arises as to whether such a soul, is

eternal or or non-eternal.

The answer to this is that thos-e Base arguments that

h e ^ prove# the Soul's existence, also go to prove its

it>a. pcupljadcu M y
previous existence/ as is clear from the modifications
^ 3
undergone by this body.
1. ff^ r ^ lw r iT g i - ns. 3. i 12 .
2. iprr^qfsr: t o T f<prg i - ns. i. i 16.

3 . , v . . . sm'^T^ipr f^ig
Introductory NB. on 3. 1. 18.
 18
And t h i s s o u l must e x i s t even a f t e r t h e p e r i s h i n g
o f t h i s body. B ec a u se , the new -born i n f a n t e x p e r i e n c e s
j o y , f e a r and s o rro w , w hich co u ld f o ll o w o n ly from th e
c o n t i n u i t y of remembrance of what has b e en r e p e a t e d l y
gone th r o u g h b e f o r e . Such c o n tin u ity o f remembrance
c o u ld not b u t be due to p r e v io u s r e p e a t e d e x p e r i e n c e ,
w hich i s p o s s i b l e on ly d u rin g a p r e v io u s l i f e , , So t h a t
from a l l t h i s , i t i s p ro v ed t h a t a f t e r th e d e s t r u c t i o n
of t h a t p r e v io u s body, t h e s o u l c o n tin u e d t o e x i s t .

Here i s a n o t h e r argum ent which p ro v e s t h e e t e r n i t y

o f th e s o u l . I n th e i n f a n t j u s t b o r n , we p e r c e i v e a
d e s i r e f o r t h e m o th e r 's m ilk , such a d e s i r e being i n d i ­
c a t e d by th e c h i l d ' s a c t i v i t y . T h is d e s i r e co u ld not
a r i s e e x c e p t ,f r o m r e p e a t e d e x p e r ie n c e i n th e p a s t . I t
i s hence i n f e r r e d t h a t the i n f a n t had a bodjr p r e v io u s
t o t h i s p r e s e n t o n e, i n w hich body, i t M-d-g^isne th ro u g h
r e p e a t e d e x u e r ie n c e s o f f e e d in g which 4»ra#-girve-n r i s e
2
t o i t s n r e s e n t d e s i r e f o r m ilk . T h e r e f o r e , i t f o ll o w s
t h a t what happens i s ^ t h e s o u l , having d e p a r t e d from h i s
p r e v io u s body has become endowed w ith a new b o dy, and
,o n bein g a f f l i c ^ t e d w i t h h u n g e r, remembers h i s r e p e a t e d
f e e d i n g s i n t h e p a s t and a c c o r d i n g l y d e s i r e s th e milk

1. i 'J v j i n I
—
NS. 3 . 1 . I S .
2. feriTxT'^rnefcrTg i
-NS. 3. 1. 21
 fro m t h e b r e a s t , . And. i t roust be th e |3sme s o u l t h a t c o n t i n u e s
to e x i s t , evenjafter th e p e r is h in g o f th e fo rm er body.

And a l s o , th e e t e r n i t y of' t h e s o u l i s p ro v e d b e c a u s e
1
p e r s o n s f r e e fro m l o n g i n g ! a r e n e v e r fo u n d t o be b o r n . When
a p e rso n is born, he i s b o r n as b e s e t w i t h l o n g i n g s , t h i s
l o n g i n g c o u l d be due o n ly t o t h e r e c a l l i n g - e J ^ i n d o f t h i n g s
p r e v i o u s l y e x p d r i e n c e d and t h i s 'p r e v io u s e x p e r ie n c e ' of
th in g s i n a p re c ed in g l i f e c o u ld n o t be p o s s i b l e w i t h o u t a
b o d y , Hence w hat h a p p en s i s t h a t th e s o u l , rem em bering t h e
t h i n g s e x p e r i e n c e d and fo u n d p l e a s a n t by him i n h i s p r e v i o u s
body comes t o ' l o n g ' f o r th e m . T h e re a r e s i m i l a r l i n k s
b e tw e e n h i s p r e v i o u s l i f e and h i s l i f e p r e c e d i n g t h a t , and

b e tw e e n t h a t and a l i f e p r e c e d i n g t h a t and so o n , w h ich shows

t h at th e c o n n e c tio n of th e s o u l w ith b o d ie s has been w ith o u t
b eg in n in g and h i s c o n n e c t i o n w i t h l o n g i n g s a l s o i s w i t h o u t
b e g i n n i n g and fro m t h i s b e g i n n i n g l e s s s e r i e s o f a t t a c h m e n t s
and e o n s e a u e n t b o d i e s , i t fo llo w s t h a t th e . so u l i s e t e r n a l .
2
T h is e t e r n a l s o u l i s r e g a r d e d - as v ib h u ( ~ a l l - p e r v a d i n g ) .

The N y iy a a c c e p t s d i f f e r e n t s o u l s i n d i f f e r e n t b o d i e s .
W h e th e r t h e body, w h ich i s t h e r e s e p t a c l e o f t h e H o u l ’ s
e x p e rie n c e s o f p le a s u r e and p a in | i s fo rm e d due t o m a n 's

1. | NS. 3 . 1 . 2 4 .

2. S e e NS. 3 . 2 . 1 8 -1 9 and t h e B h asy a on i t .

'acts (karman) or is the product of the substances, independ­

ently of any karman is discussed by Gautama in the *Nyaya-

sutra^ He is of the opinion that The formation of the

Body is due to the persistence of the effect of previous

2
acts.

The actions in the shape of the 'Activity of Speech,

thought and todily activities^', done by the person in his

previous bodyj- produce the effect which is in the form of

Merit and demerit (dharmadharman). This effect of the

previous actions, continues as subsisting i n t h e soul, and

the formation of the body is out of the material substances

as detemined by the said persistence of n'vt®rit and demerit1',

and not out of the material substances by themselves

independently.

":The feody is produced out of material substances,

independently of karma and accomplishes the purposes of

man, just like the material bodies, in the shape of the

}i
grains of sand, Pebbles, Stones^ etc.- This cannot be

accented as a reason, as what is urged here is still to

be proved. And in fact, the material bodies like sand etc.

i. fsFgf srfrxspf: srnrf

? SfcT I
Introductory Nyaya Bhlsya on 3. 2. 60.

NS. 3.2.60.
a r e p roduced w ith o u t s e e d s , w h ile th e body i s always
p ro d u c e d .fro m seed i n th e form of b lo o d , semen, e t c . o f
cwuL
th e m o t h e r - f a t h e r . And what b rin g a b o u t th e b i r t h of th e
feody o u t of th e m a t e r i a l s u b s ta n c e s i n t h e m o th e r 's womb
a r e ( i ) t h a t 'Karman' o f - p e r s o n h i m s e l f , which i s conducive
t o th e e x p e r i e n c e s t o be gone th ro u g h by him i n th e m o th e r 's
womb, and ( i i ’) th e gKarman* of the p a r e n t s w hich i s conducive
1
t o th e e x p e r i e n c e s r e s u l t i n g from t h e b i r t h o f th e c h i l d .

So a l s o , the f o o d , t h a t i s t o say what i s e a t e ^ n and

2
d r u n k , i s a l s o th e cau se of t h e f o r m a t i o n o f th e Body.
M oreover, e v e r y c o p u l a t i o n o f t h e p a r e n t s does n o t b rin g
about co n ce p tio n . I t i s e x p l a i n e d t h a t i n th e absence of
th e n e c e s s a r y i n f l u e n c e o f karm an, no c o n c e p t i o n ta k e s
p l a c e , and when such an i n f l u e n c e i s t h e r e , c o n c e p tio n
does t a k e p l a c e . If the m a t e r i a l s u b s t a n c e s be i n d e p e n d e n t ,
o f any such i n f l u e n c e t h e r e sh o u ld be c e r t a i n l y o f c o n c e p tio n -
is 1234
b u t i t $ n o t the c a s e . F u r t h e r m ore, j u s t as karman) i s th e
cau se o f t h e f o r m a t i o n of the Body, so i s i t a l s o of t h e
4
c o n n e c tio n of th e feody (with- a p a r t i c u l a r sou3J, Only a
p a r t i c u l a r s o u l i s c o n n e c te d w ith a p a r t i c u l a r febdy, due

1. 6 f . NS, 3 . 2. 63 and t h e Bhasya on i t .

2 . <$f. NS. 3 . 2. 64.
3. 6 f. T T fB W g - NS. 3 . 2. 65
and th e Bhasya on th e same.
4. ifrx f^ W frfw g i - NS* 3 - 2 - 66 •
 to the karman of that soul, This Destiny, as we might call

it, determines the exact body fit for the experiences of

that particular soul in which the karmic residuum subsists

and connects that body with that soul. And also, the

separation (freedom) of the soul from the Body is rendered

possible only by che possibility of the exhaustion of karma.

Some assert that the formation of the body is, like

d o -U c c fllffU A /Tt <l o a ± l .
the blacknos-s/due to/very nature or the Mnseen (adrsta’i

(-according to Vatiyayana) of the atoms, but in that case

even after final release there would be likelihood of a

Body being produced. And they hold that .just as the dark

colour of the Atom ( of day) is eternal and yet when it

is set aside by fire contact (in baking), it does not
appear again,- in the same manner, the Body, through formed

(by the Unseen of the Atoms) would not appear again after
1
final Release.

u
But this would involve the accusing of what is not
2 s'l-tU-O-bigm
earned because in the g-os-
it-ten mentioned above, one would

have to experience pleasure and pain, without having done

acts which would lead to the same, and then this would be

contradictory to perception, inference and scripture.

i. i - ns . 3 . 2. 71.
O t ''■"n ___ | r q Q p 7 9
 We perceive that the pleasure or pain experienced by
SO
each individual soul is distinct. It would not be s«e4i if
V O tA J L
there would,be no speciality in the cause. In fact, if

the advent of pleasure and pain is regarded as due to

' destiny/ the actions being strong or xreak, their karmic

residuum being correspondingly more or less potent, and

acts being of diverse or uniform character, there is the

distinction such as strong and weak, belated and quick etc.

in the pleasures and pains experienced by each individual

soul, and this is not contrary to our experience.

We see that an intelligent person having recognised

a certain pleasure as brought about by a certain means,
desires the pleasure, makes an effort to obtain the means

and thereby obtains that pleasure, and does not obtain

otherwise, Similarly a person having recognised a certain

pain, makes an4 effort to avoid the means and thereby
-

avoids the means _,and thereby avoids the pain_,and not

otherwise. But we also find that there are certain pleasures

and pains that aecmue to a person without any effort on his

part, and on the strength of the well known facts just

mentioned we infer that the accruing Sf these pleasure and

pains also must be due to some other quality of the intelli­

gent beings and this quality is merit or demerit constituting

the persohs Destiny. This inference would be contradicted

if the accruing of pleasure and pain were held to be not due
to destiny.
 O M ± W jt> h S -\ c d jY Z uooA,l«
So also there are S-oTlptares written by several sages

containing the instructions imparted by those sages, in

regard to the performance and avoidance of actions and

the resultant activities of men consisting of performance,

or their cessation from activity consisting of their

avoidance of action. Both these kinds of action, good or

evil* would be impossible under the philosophy of the

opponent, whose philosophy is contrary to the view (which

CUnftOJA/folu'-a +<wfcs
is in consonance with the jS-e-ripturog.) that the accruing
of pleasure and pain to persons is due to Destiny.

Rebirth (pretyabhlva) is the eighth prameya and as

the definition goes: "■ Rebirth consists in being born

2
again"'.

Some may say that inasmuch as the Ryaya school

rega r d ^ the soul as eternal^ it cannot explain pretye*_-

bhavaj an eternal thing never departs and hence is never

reborn. The answer to this is : Ml Rebirth is possible

only because the soul 4&® sawi

3
is eternal"*. In fact, it is the eternal soul that departs,

abandons the former body, and having thus departed, having

1. 6 f . NB on 3. 2. 78.

2. fTTcqfsr ScW^r: I^ - NS. 1. 1. 13.

3. ’ftTRpS ! - NS. 4. 1. 10.

 abandoned the former body, takes up another one, and it

is these two ( - departing and coming')£)* that have been

spoken as Rebirth. Those, in whose philosophy Rebirth

!

consists of the birth of one entity and destruction of

another entity, xrould be faced with che absurdity that

one entity would be deprived of the fruit of its deeds •

while another one would be saddled with the fruits of the

actions rot done by him. And in the theory of those who

hold that there are causes bringing about destruction of

the Being in the body, the teachings of the sages would
1 "

be entirely useless.

Now, as .rebirth does not consist of "-'destruction

and production" it becomes necessary to determine the
exact nature of the production.

The production of perceptible (vyakta) things is

from perceptible things. We actually see that out of

such substances as the clay and the like, which are
endowed with the qualities of colour and the rest are

produced objects of the same kind/ (i. e. possessed of

the qualities of colour etc.') - and from this fact ^

/perceived in connection with visible objects) we infer

: ^wpnrhr: cm f d im -
ffS -P ^ F F T ^ crf-q-: ( -fi^W iT ^T d^frr
WfcT I
N B . 4. 1. 10.
 . 26
the same in connection with invisible things also, Ihat
+o scty
is£in the case of the clay etc., we find that the presence

of colour and other qualities is common to the material

cause as well as its product and from this we deduce the

dame in regard to the e-ar&a-arl nature of the eternal super-

sensuous things ttefe&s (eLtomsJ also.

H esie, we see that the Nyaya theory of causation at

the time of its origin stands midway between the Satkar-

yavada of Samkhya and the Pratityasamutpada based on the

KsanikavSda of the Bauddhas. Buddhists do not recognise

any permanent substratum. Things wxist only for a moment

in this viexi?. At every moment a new entity is produced,

the former one is destroyed and the only reality in this

situation is a perpetual flux of phenomena. The Samkhya

c
maintained the manifestation of the effect from a nerm^ment

material cause; and no new entity is produced in his view,

only the one which was already there is manifested.

But for the follower of the Nyaya system the effect

is something new, which did not exist before. In^s~~much

as it upholds the production of a thing which was non­

existent before, it is called aF\t~Tcaryavada. But the

substratum, viz. the eternal atoms, of which ail things
are made*, are permanent, so the effect is made up of

the atoms of its material cause with their eternal specific

ccl-
vi yuab be s o U 4 +© fee
qualities; and these qualities aot newly produced, but
 27
only manifested in the various nerceptible products.

The ultimate material cause therefore remains the same

be s c u d d-o on cutce-pKvl3
but a new effedt can^come into existence only after the

evanescence of the proximate material cause the component

atoms therein are rearranged. The new effect and its inherent

cause are quite different. The effects inheres in the cause.

_ OMA.
The cause (karma) is that which invariably and necess­

arily precedes the effect (karya-niyata-purva-vrtti), exclu­

ding all that does not directly contribute to the result.

Three kinds of causes are here distinguished:

The inherent cause (samavayi karana) can only be a

substance. It is the material out of which a product is

made or a substance in which a quality or a movement inheres.

The non-inherent cause c(asamavayi ki.r®?a) is either

a quality or a movement which inheres in the inherent cause.

The third one is the efficient or operative cause, (nimitta

OMA
karma) and all those causes that cannot be included under

the two previous headings are included here. It is sub-

_ avun
divided into general efficient causes (samanya nimitta karsa),

which include God, this knowledge desire and activity, space

and time, adrsta etc.) and particular efficient causes

1. if. US. 3. 2. 16; NB. 4. 1. 18.

■(- the agent 5 and the insturaental cause or karana), which

by its operation produces the effect). Causality is thus

first and foremost a relation of inherence (Samavaya).

Nyaya Sutra /-4.1.11, as we saw above, describes the

production of perceptible things from perceptible causes.

Then it proceeds to discuss some theories or views of oppo­

nents regarding the causation of things. There are, as
said above, eight such views, put forth for discussion (ITS.
4. 1. 14-43) and Yatsyayana calls them pravaduka“drsti-s

(heterodox or heretical views) .

How such a portion of philosophical discussion was

placed in the midst of the exposition of the topics of the

Nyaya system is itill a riddle. Scholars like Prof. Jacobi

aee apt to believe that this portion of the work was a

1
later addition and Dasgupta also agrees.

***'Hence$ Bodas comes to the conclusion The

aphorisms of Gotama and the works founded on them treat

no doubt of metaphysical and theological questions

occasionally but they come in rather as digressions than
2
as inseparable parts of the system!?

1. <cf. A History of Indian Philosophy p.278- by Dasgupta.

2. ^Introduction (pp.XIIT-XY) to Tarkasa-^lgraha by Bodas.