RULE 62:

1) MAKATI DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. TANJUATCO

G.R. No. L-26443, March 25, 1969

FACTS:

On February 21, 1963, said plaintiff and defendant Pedro C. Tanjuatco entered into a contract whereby
the latter bound himself to construct a reinforced concrete covered water reservoir, office and pump
house and water main at Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal, furnishing, inter alia, the materials necessary therefor.
Before making the final payment of the consideration agreed upon, plaintiff inquired from the suppliers
of materials, who had called its attention to unpaid bills therefor of Tanjuatco, whether the latter had
settled his accounts with them. In response to this inquiry, Concrete Aggregates, Inc. — hereinafter
referred to as the Supplier — made a claim in the sum of P5,198.75, representing the cost of transit-mixed
concrete allegedly delivered to Tanjuatco. With his consent, plaintiff withheld said amount from the final
payment made to him and, in view of his subsequent failure to settle the issue thereon with the Supplier,
on September 16, 1955, plaintiff instituted the present action, in the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
against Tanjuatco and the Supplier, to compel them "to interplead their conflicting claims." On October
4, 1965, Tanjuatco moved to dismiss the case, upon the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the
subject-matter of the litigation, the amount involved therein being less than P10,000.00. 1 Finding this
motion "to be well-taken", the lower court granted the same, over plaintiffs opposition thereto, and,
accordingly, issued an order, dated November 16, 1965, dismissing the case, without costs. Hence, this
appeal, in which plaintiff maintains that the subject-matter of this litigation is not the aforementioned
sum of P5,198.75, but the right to compel the defendants "to litigate among themselves" in order to
protect the plaintiff "against a double vexation in respect to one liability."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the object of the action is within the jurisdiction of the lower court.

HELD:

We find no merit in this contention. There is no question in this case that plaintiff may compel the
defendants to interplead among themselves, concerning the aforementioned sum of P5,198.75. The
only issue is who among the defendants is entitled to collect the same. This is the object of the action,
which is not within the jurisdiction of the lower court. As a matter of fact, on May 25, 1966 the Supplier
sued Tanjuatco, in Civil Case No. 149173 of the Municipal Court of Manila, for the recovery of said
amount of P5,198.75, and the decision therein will settle the question as to who has a right to the sum
withheld by plaintiff herein. To begin with, the jurisdiction of our courts over the subject-matter of
justiciable controversies is governed by Rep. Act No. 296, as amended, pursuant to which 2 municipal
courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil cases "in which the demand, exclusive of
interest, or the value of the property in controversy", amounts to not more than "ten thousand pesos."
Secondly, "the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts" belongs
to Congress 3 and is beyond the rule-making power of the Supreme Court, which is limited to matters
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of
law. 4 Thirdly, the failure of said section 19 of Rule 5 of the present Rules of Court to make its Rule 63, on
interpleading, applicable to inferior courts, merely implies that the same are not bound to follow Rule
63 in dealing with cases of interpleading, but may apply thereto the general rules on procedure
applicable to ordinary civil action in said courts.
RULE 62:

2) LUI ENTERPRISES, INC. vs. ZUELLIG PHARMA CORPORATION AND THE PHILIPPINE BANK OF
COMMUNICATIONS

G.R. No. 193494 ; March 07, 2014

Petitioner: Lui Enterprises

Respondent: Zuellig Pharma

FACTS:

On March 9, 1995, Lui Enterprises, Inc. and Zuellig Pharma Corporation entered into a 10–year contract
of lease over a parcel of land. On January 10, 2003, Zuellig Pharma received a letter from the Philippine
Bank of Communications, asking Zuellig Pharma to pay rent directly to it, being the new owner of the lot.
Zuellig Pharma promptly informed Lui Enterprises of the Philippine Bank of Communications’ claim. On
January 28, 2003, Lui Enterprises wrote to Zuellig Pharma and insisted on its right to collect the leased
property’s rent. Due to the conflicting claims of Lui Enterprises and the Philippine Bank of Communications
over the rental payments, Zuellig Pharma filed a complaint for interpleader with the Regional Trial Court
of Makati. In its complaint, Zuellig Pharma alleged that it already consigned in court P604,024.35 as rental
payments. Zuellig Pharma prayed that it be allowed to consign in court its succeeding monthly rental
payments and that Lui Enterprises and the Philippine Bank of Communications be ordered to litigate their
conflicting claims. Lui Enterprises filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Zuellig Pharma’s alleged
representative did not have authority to file the complaint for interpleader on behalf of the corporation.
According to Lui Enterprises, an earlier filed nullification of deed of dation in payment case pending with
the Regional Trial Court of Davao barred the filing of the interpleader case. Lui Enterprises filed this
nullification case against the Philippine Bank of Communications with respect to several properties it
dationed to the bank in payment of its obligations. The property leased by Zuellig Pharma was among
those allegedly dationed to the Philippine Bank of Communications. In the nullification of deed of dation
in payment case, Lui Enterprises raised the issue of which corporation had the better right over the rental
payments. Lui Enterprises argued that the same issue was involved in the interpleader case. To avoid
possible conflicting decisions of the Davao trial court and the Makati trial court on the same issue, Lui
Enterprises argued that the subsequently filed interpleader case be dismissed. As to Lui Enterprises’ claim
that the interpleader case was filed without authority, Zuellig Pharma argued that an action interpleader
“is a necessary consequence of the action for consignation.” With respect to the nullification of deed of
dation in payment case, Zuellig Pharma argued that its pendency did not bar the filing of the interpleader
case. It was not a party to the nullification case. The Regional Trial Court of Makati found that Lui
Enterprises failed to file its motion to dismiss within the reglementary period. Thus, the trial court denied
Lui Enterprises’ motion to dismiss and declared it in default.

ISSUE:

Whether the annulment of deed of dation in payment pending in the Regional Trial Court of Davao barred
the subsequent filing of the interpleader case in the Regional Trial Court of Makati.
HELD:

Under Rule 16, Section 1, paragraph (e) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion to dismiss may be
filed on the ground of litis pendentia. Litis pendentia is Latin for “a pending suit.” It exists when “another
action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action x x x.” The subsequent action is
“unnecessary and vexatious” and is instituted to “harass the respondent [in the subsequent action].”

The requisites of litis pendentia are:

(1) Identity of parties or at least such as represent the same interest in both actions;
(2) Identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and
(3) The identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in one would,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other.

All of the requisites must be present. Absent one requisite, there is no litis pendentia.

In this case, there is no litis pendentia since there is no identity of parties in the nullification of deed of
dation in payment case and the interpleader case. Zuellig Pharma is not a party to the nullification case
filed in the Davao trial court. There is also no identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for. Lui
Enterprises filed the first case to nullify the deed of dation in payment it executed in favor of the Philippine
Bank of Communications. Zuellig Pharma subsequently filed the interpleader case to consign in court the
rental payments and extinguish its obligation as lessee. The interpleader case was necessary and was not
instituted to harass either Lui Enterprises or the Philippine Bank of Communications.

Thus, the pending nullification case did not bar the filing of the interpleader case.

In this case, the nullification of deed of dation in payment case was filed by Lui Enterprises against the
Philippine Bank of Communications. The interpleader case was filed by Zuellig Pharma against Lui
Enterprises and the Philippine Bank of Communications. A different plaintiff filed the interpleader case
against Lui Enterprises and the Philippine Bank of Communications. Thus, there is no identity of parties,
and the first requisite of litis pendentia is absent.

As discussed, Lui Enterprises filed the nullification of deed of dation in payment to recover ownership of
the leased premises. Zuellig Pharma filed the interpleader case to extinguish its obligation to pay rent.
There is no identity of reliefs prayed for, and the second requisite of litis pendentia is absent. Since two
requisites of litis pendentia are absent, the nullification of deed of dation in payment case did not bar the
filing of the interpleader case.

Lui Enterprises alleged that the Regional Trial Court of Davao issued a writ of preliminary injunction against
the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The Regional Trial Court of Davao allegedly enjoined the Regional Trial
Court of Makati from taking cognizance of the interpleader case. At any rate, the Regional Trial Court of
Davao’s order was not a writ of preliminary injunction. It was a mere order directing the Philippine Bank
of Communications to inform Zuellig Pharma to pay rent to Lui Enterprises while the status quo order
between Lui Enterprises and the Philippine Bank of Communications was subsisting. The Regional Trial
Court of Davao did not enjoin the proceedings before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Thus, the
Regional Trial Court of Davao did not enjoin the Regional Trial Court of Makati from hearing the
interpleader case.
RULE 62:

3) BANK OF COMMERCE vs. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK and BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS
x-----------------------x
G.R. Nos. 154589-90

BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS vs. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK

G.R. Nos. 154470-71
September 24, 2012

FACTS:

I. First set of CB bills

Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) was the registered owner of 7
Central Bank (CB) bills with a total face value of Php 70 Million, which were eventually
sold to Bank of Commerce (BOC), which, in turn, sold these CB bills to Planter’s
Development Bank (PDB) as evidenced by a “Detached Assignment”. A week later, PDB
sold to the BOC Treasury Bills worth Php 70 Million as evidenced by a Trading Order and
Confirmation of Sale.

II. Second set of CB bills

RCBC sold 2 CB bills with a total face value of Php 20 Million to the PDB and
delivered to PDB the corresponding Detached Assignment. PDB delivered to Bancap the
2 CB bills which in turn sold the CB bills to Al-Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of the
Philippines, which also sold it to the BOC.

Upon learning of the transfers involving the CB bills, the PDB informed the OIC of the BSP’s Government
Securities Department of the PDB’s claim over these CB bills, based on the detached assignment in its
possession. The requests of PDB were denied by the OIC which prompted the petitioner to file an action
so as to compel the BSP to determine the party legally entitled to the proceeds of the subject CB bills.

Alternatively, the BSP asked that an interpleader suit be allowed between and among the claimants to
the subject CB bills on the position that while it is able and willing to pay the subject CB bills’ face value,
it is duty bound to ensure that payment is made to the rightful owner.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not an action for Interpleader is applicable to the case at bar.

HELD:

The remedy of an action of interpleader is designed to protect a person against double vexation in respect
of a single liability. It requires, as an indispensable requisite, that conflicting claims upon the same subject
matter are or may be made against the stakeholder (the possessor of the subject matter) who claims no
interest whatever in the subject matter or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the
claimants.

Through this remedy, the stakeholder can join all competing claimants in a single proceeding to determine
conflicting claims without exposing the stakeholder to the possibility of having to pay more than once on
a single liability.133

The remedy of interpleader, as a special civil action, is primarily governed by the specific provisions in Rule
62 of the Rules of Court and secondarily by the provisions applicable to ordinary civil actions. Indeed, Rule
62 does not expressly authorize the filing of a complaint-in-interpleader as part of, although separate and
independent from, the answer. Similarly, Section 5, Rule 6, in relation to Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of
Court does not include a complaint-in-interpleader as a claim, a form of defense, or as an objection that
a defendant may be allowed to put up in his answer or in a motion to dismiss. This does not mean,
however, that the BSP’s "counter-complaint/cross-claim for interpleader" runs counter to general
procedures.

Interpleader is a civil action made special by the existence of particular rules to govern the uniqueness of
its application and operation. Under Section 2, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court, governing ordinary civil
actions, a party’s claim is asserted "in a complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, third (fourth, etc.)-party
complaint, or complaint-in-intervention." In an interpleader suit, however, a claim is not required to be
contained in any of these pleadings but in the answer-(of the conflicting claimants)-in-interpleader. This
claim is different from the counter-claim (or cross-claim, third party-complaint) which is separately
allowed under Section 5, par. 2 of Rule 62.

Also mentioned in the ruling the importance of paying the correct amount of docket fee which cannot be
overemphasized:

The matter of payment of docket fees is not a mere triviality. These fees are necessary to defray court
expenses in the handling of cases. Consequently, in order to avoid tremendous losses to the judiciary, and
to the government as well, the payment of docket fees cannot be made dependent on the outcome of
the case, except when the claimant is a pauper-litigant.
RULE 63:

1) DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT (DILG) vs. RAUL V. GATUZ
G.R. No. 191176 ; October 14, 2015

FACTS:

Domingo filed an administrative complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against Gatuz, Barangay
Captain of Barangay Tabang, Plaridel, Bulacan, for Abuse of Authority and Dishonesty. The Ombudsman
found the respondent guilty of Dishonesty and imposed the penalty of three months suspension without
pay. Then, it indorsed its decision to the DILG for immediate implementation. However, after it was
endorsed, the respondent moved for reconsideration, which was later on denied by the Ombudsman.
After its denial, the DILG issued a memorandum addressed to the DILG-RD, directing him to implement
the respondent's suspension. Eventually, Gatuz filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and Injunction with
a Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order or a writ of Preliminary Injunction before the RTC. He argued
that the filing of a motion for reconsideration or an appeal automatically stays the execution of the
Ombudsman's decisions in administrative cases pursuant to Samaniego and Lapid v. Court of Appeals.
Thereafter, the RTC issued a TRO prohibiting DILG from implementing the memorandum.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RTC erred in taking cognizance of the petition for declaratory relief and in restraining
the execution of the Ombudsman's decision.

HELD:

YES. RTC erred in taking cognizance of the petition for declaratory relief and in restraining the execution
of the Ombudsman's decision.

Judicial or quasi-judicial orders or decisions cannot be the subject matter of declaratory relief is the
doctrine of judicial stability or noninterference. Courts and tribunals with the same or equal authority -
even those exercising concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction are not permitted to interfere with each
other's respective cases, much less their orders or judgments.

Where the decisions of certain administrative bodies are appealable to the Court of Appeals, these
adjudicative bodies are co-equal with the Regional Trial Courts in terms of rank and stature; their actions
are logically beyond the control of the RTC, a co-equal body.16 Notably, the decisions of the Ombudsman
in disciplinary cases are appealable to the CA via a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court.17 As a co-equal body, the RTC has no jurisdiction to interfere with or to restrain the execution of
the Ombudsman's decisions in disciplinary cases.

Court orders or decisions cannot be the subject matter of declaratory relief.10 They are not included
within the purview of the words "other written instrument."11 The same principle applies to orders,
resolutions, or decisions of quasi-judicial bodies. The fundamental rationale for this is the principle of res
judicata.12 Parties are not permitted to litigate the same issue more than once. Judgment rendered by a
court or a quasi-judicial body is conclusive on the parties subject only to appellate authority. The losing
party cannot modify or escape the effects of judgment under the guise of an action for declaratory
relief.

Finally, SC already reconsidered the 2008 Samaniego decision in our resolution dated October 5, 2010.18
SC unanimously held en banc that the decisions of the Ombudsman in disciplinary cases are immediately
executory and cannot be stayed by the filing of an appeal or the issuance of an injunctive writ.19 This
legal question has already been settled with finality.
RULE 63:

2) Tambunting vs Baello
September 16, 2005

FACTS:

To secure the payment of a P7,727.95 loan, Spouses Emilio Sumabat and Esperanza Baello mortgaged
their parcel of land situated in Caloocan City to Antonio Tambunting Jr. The Spouses were later informed
that their indebtedness had ballooned to P 15,000 for their failure to pay the monthly amortizations.
When they defaulted in their obligation, Commercial House of Finance, Inc. (CHFI), as assignee of the
mortgage, initiated foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property but the same did not push
through. The Spouses then filed for an action for Declaratory Relief. The CFI of Caloocan ruled in favor of
the spouses however, petitioners claim that the trial court erred when it affirmed the validity of the
consignation. They insist that the CFI was barred from taking cognizance of the action for declaratory relief
since, petitioners being already in default in their loan amortizations, there existed a violation of the
mortgage deed even before the institution of the action.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CFI had jurisdiction and could have rendered a valid judgment on the present
case.

HELD:

No. An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, will, contract or
other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order, regulation or
ordinance before breach or violation thereof.[1] The purpose of the action is to secure an authoritative
statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, contract, etc. for their
guidance in its enforcement or compliance and not to settle issues arising from its alleged breach.[2] It
may be entertained only before the breach or violation of the statute, deed, contract, etc. to which it
refers.[3] Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for
declaratory relief, the court can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action.[4] In other words, a court
has no more jurisdiction over an action for declaratory relief if its subject, i.e., the statute, deed, contract,
etc., has already been infringed or transgressed before the institution of the action. Under such
circumstances, inasmuch as a cause of action has already accrued in favor of one or the other party, there
is nothing more for the court to explain or clarify short of a judgment or final order.

Here, an infraction of the mortgage terms had already taken place before the filing of Civil Case No. C-
7496. Thus, the CFI lacked jurisdiction when it took cognizance of the case in 1979. And in the absence of
jurisdiction, its decision was void and without legal effect.
RULE 63:

3) AQUINO vs. MUNICIPALITY OF AKLAN

G.R. No. 211356 ; September 29, 2014

FACTS:

Petitioner is the president and chief executive officer of Boracay Island West Cove Management
Philippines, Inc. (Boracay West Cove). On January 7, 2010, the company applied for a zoning compliance
with the municipal government of Malay, Aklan. While the company was already operating a resort in
the area, the application sought the issuance of a building permit covering the construction of a three-
storey hotel over a parcel of land measuring 998 sqm. located in Sitio Diniwid, Barangay Balagab,
Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan,which is covered by a Forest Land Use Agreement for Tourism Purposes
(FLAgT) issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in favor of Boracay
West Cove.

Through a Decision on Zoning dated January 20, 2010, the Municipal Zoning Administrator denied
petitioner’s application on the ground that the proposed construction site was within the "no build zone"
demarcated in Municipal Ordinance 2000-131 (Ordinance).

In due time, petitioner appealed the denial action to the Office of the Mayor on February 1, 2010. On May
13, 2010, petitioner followed up his appeal through a letter but no action was ever taken by the
respondent mayor. On April 5, 2011, however, a Notice of Assessment was sent to petitioner asking for
the settlement of Boracay West Cove’s unpaid taxes and other liabilities under pain of a recommendation
for closure in view of its continuous commercial operation since 2009 sans the necessary zoning clearance,
building permit, and business and mayor’s permit. In reply, petitioner expressed willingness to settle the
company’s obligations, but the municipal treasurer refused to accept the tendered payment. Meanwhile,
petitioner continued with the construction, expansion, and operation of the resort hotel.

Subsequently, on March 28, 2011, a Cease and Desist Order was issued by the municipal government,
enjoining the expansion of the resort, and on June 7, 2011, the Office of the Mayor of Malay, Aklan issued
the assailed EO 10, ordering the closure and demolition of Boracay West Cove’s hotel.

EO 10 was partially implemented on June 10, 2011. Thereafter, two more instances followed wherein
respondents demolished the improvements introduced by Boracay West Cove, the most recent of which
was made in February 2014.

Alleging that the order was issued and executed with grave abuse of discretion, petitioner filed a Petition
for Certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief with the CA. He argued that judicial proceedings should first
be conducted before the respondent mayor could order the demolition of the company’s establishment;
that Boracay West Cove was granted a FLAgT by the DENR, which bestowed the company the right to
construct permanent improvements on the area in question; thatsince the area is a forestland, it is the
DENR—and not the municipality of Malay, or any other local government unit for that matter—that has
primary jurisdiction over the area, and that the Regional Executive Director of DENR-Region 6 had officially
issued an opinion regarding the legal issues involved in the present case; that the Ordinance admits of
exceptions; and lastly, that it is the mayor who should be blamed for not issuing the necessary clearances
in the company’s favor.
In its assailed Decision dated August 13, 2013, the CA dismissed the petition solely on procedural ground,
i.e., the special writ of certiorari can only be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions and since the issuance of EO 10 was done in the exercise of executive functions,
and not of judicial or quasi-judicial functions, certiorari will not lie. Instead, the proper remedy for the
petitioner, according to the CA, is to file a petition for declaratory relief with the Regional Trial Court.

ISSUE:

The propriety under the premises of the filing of a petition for certiorari instead of a petition for
declaratory relief;

HELD:

NO. Certiorari, not declaratory relief, is the proper remedy.

An action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instruments
involved or of the rights arising thereunder. Since the purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to
secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, or
contract for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, and not to settle issues
arising from an alleged breach thereof, it may be entertained before the breach or violation of the statute,
deed or contract to which it refers. A petition for declaratory relief gives a practical remedy for ending
controversies that have not reached the state where another relief is immediately available; and supplies
the need for a form of action that will set controversies at rest before they lead to a repudiation of
obligations, an invasion of rights, and a commission of wrongs.4

In the case at bar, the petition for declaratory relief became unavailable by EO 10’s enforcement and
implementation. The closure and demolition of the hotel rendered futile any possible guidelines that may
be issued by the trial court for carrying out the directives in the challenged EO 10. Indubitably, the CA
erred when it ruled that declaratory relief is the proper remedy given such a situation.
RULE 63:

4) ALLIANCE OF GOVT. WORKERS vs. MINISTER OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT

124 SCRA 7

FACTS:

Petitioner Alliance of Government Workers (AGW) is a registered labor federation while the other
petitioners are its affiliate unions with members from among the employees of the following offices,
schools, or government owned or controlled corporations of government.

On February 28, 1983, the Philippine Government Employees Association (PGEA) filed a motion to come
in as an additional petitioner.

They are questioning the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 851 which provides that:

WHEREAS, it is necessary to further protect the level of real f wages from the ravage of
world-wide inflation;

WHEREAS, there has been no increase case in the legal minimum wage rates since 1970;

WHEREAS, the Christmas season is an opportune time for society to show its concern for
the plight of the working masses so they may properly celebrate Christmas and New Year.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the

Constitution do hereby decree as follows:

SECTION 1. All employers are hereby required to pay all their employees receiving a basic
salary of not more than Pl,000 a month, regardless of the nature of their employment, a
13th-month pay not later than December 24 of every year.

SECTION 2. Employers already paying their employees a 13th-month pay or its equivalent
are not covered by this Decree.

SECTION 3. This Decree shall take effect immediately. Done in the City of Manila, this 16th
day of December 1975.

According to the petitioners, P.D. No. 851 requires all employers to pay the 13th-month pay to their
employees with one sole exception found in Section 2 which states that "(E)mployers already paying their
employees a 13th month pay or its equivalent are not covered by this Decree. " The petitioners contend
that Section 3 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree No. 851 included other
types of employers not exempted by the decree. They state that nowhere in the decree is the secretary,
now Minister of Labor and Employment, authorized to exempt other types of employers from the
requirement.

Section 3 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree No. 851 provides:
 Section 3. Employers covered — The Decree shall apply to all employers except to:

a) Distressed employers, such as (1) those which are currently incurring substantial losses
or 112) in the case of non-profit institutions and organizations, where their income,
whether from donations, contributions, grants and other earnings from any source, has
consistently declined by more than forty (40%) per cent of their normal income for the
last two (2) )years, subject to the provision of Section 7 of this issuance.

b) The Government and any of its political subdivisions, including government-owned and
controlled corporations, except)t those corporation, operating essentially as private,
,subsidiaries of the government;

c) Employers already paying their employees 13th-month pay or more in a calendar year
or its equivalent at the of this issuance;

d) Employers of household helpers and persons in the personal service of another in

relation to such workers: and

e) Employers of those who are paid on purely commission, boundary, or task basis and
those who are paid a fixed for performing a specific work, irrespective of the time
consumed in the performance thereof, except where the workers are paid an piece- rate
basis in which case the employer shall be covered by this issuance :insofar ab such
workers are concerned ...

The petition was filed directly before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether action can be directly file before the Supreme Court

HELD:

No. At the outset, the petitioners are faced with a procedural barrier. The petition is one for declaratory
relief, an action not embraced within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. (Remotigue v.
Osmena,, Jr., 21 SCRA 837; Rural Bank of Olongapo v. Commission of Land Registration, 102 SCRA 794; De
la Llana v. Alba, 112 SCRA 294). There is no statutory or jurisprudential basis for the petitioners' statement
that the Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over declaratory relief suits where only
questions of law are involved. Jurisdiction is conferred by law. The petitioners have not pointed to any
provision of the Constitution or statute which sustains their sweeping assertion. On this ground alone, the
petition could have been dismissed outright.

This was not dismissed for the reason that the Court considered the important issues propounded and
the fact, that constitutional principles are involved. Nonetheless, the petition was dismissed.
RULE 63:

5) OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. IBAY

G.R. No. 137538 ; September 3, 2001

FACTS:

Sometime in 1998, petitioner conducted an investigation on the alleged "scam" on the Public Estates
Authority-Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation. The alleged anomaly was committed through the
issuance of checks which were subsequently deposited in several financial institutions.

Ombudsman issued an order directing Lourdes Marquez, Manager of Union Bank of the PH – Julia Vargas
Branch, to produce several bank documents for inspection relative to 4 accounts reportedly maintained
in the said branch. The documents referred to include bank account application forms, signature cards,
transactions history, bank statements, bank ledgers, debit and credit memos, deposit and withdrawal
slips, application for purchase of manager’s checks, used manager’s checks and check microfilms.

Marquez failed to comply with such order, explaining that the subject accounts pertain to Interbank,
which merged with Union Bank, so she has to first verify from the Interbank records in its archives the
whereabouts of said accounts. Ombudsman found Marquez’ reasoning unacceptable and issued another
order to produce the requested documents, with a threat of citing her in contempt should she fails to
comply.

Instead of complying with the order of petitioner, Marquez filed a petition for declaratory relief with an
application for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction before the RTC of Makati.
Marquez said that under Secs. 2 and 3 of R.A. 1405 (Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits), she had the legal
obligation not to divulge any information relative to all deposits of whatever nature with banks in the
Philippines. But petitioner's Order cited Sec. 15 (8) of R.A. 6770 stating that the Ombudsman had the
power to examine and have access to bank accounts and records. Marquez, therefore, sought a definite
ruling and/or guidelines as regards her rights as well as petitioner's power to inspect bank deposits under
the cited provisions of law.

Petitioner moved to dismiss the aforesaid petition for declaratory relief on the ground that the RTC has
no jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof. Judge Ibay denied said motion. Hence, this special civil
action for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not public respondent acted without jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion
in entertaining the cited petition for declaratory relief.

HELD:

Petitioner contends that the RTC of Makati City lacks jurisdiction over the petition for declaratory relief.
It asserts that respondent judge should have dismissed the petition outright in view of Section 14 of R.A.
6770.
Section 14 of R.A. 6770 provides:

Restrictions.—No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation being conducted
by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the
investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.

No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the
Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.

Petitioner’s invocation of the aforequoted statutory provision is misplaced. The special civil action of
declaratory relief falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts.5 It is not among the
actions within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court even if only questions of law are involved.6
Similarly, the Rules of Court is explicit that such action shall be brought before the appropriate Regional
Trial Court. Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Who may file petition.—Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other
governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate
Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of
his rights or duties, thereunder.

The requisites of an action for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the
controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief
has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination.7 In this
case, the controversy concerns the extent of the power of petitioner to examine bank accounts under
Section 15 (8) of R.A. 6770 vis-a-vis the duty of banks under Republic Act 1405 not to divulge any
information relative to deposits of whatever nature. The interests of the parties are adverse considering
the antagonistic assertion of a legal right on one hand, that is the power of Ombudsman to examine bank
deposits, and on the other, the denial thereof apparently by private respondent who refused to allow
petitioner to inspect in camera certain bank accounts. The party seeking relief, private respondent herein,
asserts a legal interest in the controversy. The issue invoked is ripe for judicial determination as litigation
is inevitable. Note that petitioner has threatened private respondent with “indirect contempt” and
“obstruction” charges should the latter not comply with its order.

Circumstances considered, we hold that public respondent has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
petition for declaratory relief. Nor can it be said that public respondent gravely abused its discretion in
doing so. We are thus constrained to dismiss the instant petition for lack of merit.
RULE 63:

6) Multi-Realty Development Corporation vs. Makati Tuscany Condominium Corporation, 491 SCRA 9,
G.R. No. 146726 June 16, 2006

FACTS:

Makati Tuscany consisted of 160 condominium units, with 156 units from the 2nd to the 25th floors, and
4 penthouse units in the 26th floor. Two hundred seventy (270) parking slots were built therein for
apportionment among its unit owners. One hundred sixty-four (164) of the parking slots were so allotted,
with each unit at the 2nd to the 25th floors being allotted one (1) parking slot each, and each penthouse
unit with two slots. Eight (8) other parking slots, found on the ground floor of the Makati Tuscany were
designated as guest parking slots, while the remaining 98 were to be retained by Multi-Realty for sale to
unit owners who would want to have additional slots.

In the meantime, the fair market value of the unallocated parking slots reached P250,000.00 each, or a
total of P18,000,000.00 for the 72 slots.

In September 1989, Multi-Realty, through its President, Henry Sy, who was also a member of the Board
of Directors of MATUSCO, requested that two Multi-Realty executives be allowed to park their cars in two
of Makati Tuscanys remaining 72 unallocated parking slots. In a letter, through its counsel, MATUSCO
denied the request, asserting, for the first time, that the remaining unallocated parking slots were
common areas owned by it. In another letter, MATUSCO offered, by way of goodwill gesture, to allow
Multi-Realty to use two unallocated parking slots, which offer was rejected by the latter.

On April 26, 1990, Multi-Realty, as plaintiff, filed a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 90-1110, against
MATUSCO, as defendant, for Damages and/or Reformation of Instrument with prayer for temporary
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction. The case was raffled to Branch 59 of the Makati RTC.

ISSUE: whether or not Multi-realty have a cause of action for the reformation of the instrument .

HELD:

YES. The concept and meaning of the term cause of action in proceedings for declaratory relief, vis-à-vis
an ordinary civil action, is broadened. It is not, as in ordinary civil action, the wrong or delict by which the
plaintiff’s rights are violated, but it is extended to a mere denial, refusal or challenge raising at least an
uncertainty or insecurity which is injurious to plaintiff’s rights. For a petition for declaratory relief to
prosper, the following conditions sine qua non must concur: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy;
(2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking
declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved must be ripe for
judicial determination.
Multi-Realty reiterated its contentions in the trial court, insisting that it had adduced evidence to prove
all the requisites for the reformation of Section 7(d) of the Master Deed under Article 1359 of the New
Civil Code. It was never its intention to designate the 98 unassigned parking slots as common areas, and,
as shown by the evidence on record, this was known to MATUSCO. Under Article 1364 of the New Civil
Code, an instrument may be reformed if, due to lack of skill on the part of the drafter, the deed fails to
express the true agreement or intention of the parties therein. Since MATUSCO knew that it (Multi-Realty)
owned the 98 parking slots when the Master Deed was executed, its registration did not make Multi-
Realty guilty of estoppel by deed. In fact, MATUSCO failed to object to the sale of some of the parking
slots to third parties. It was also pointed out that Multi-Realty remained in possession thereof.
RULE 64:

1) JEREMIAS V. ESTEVES vs. RENE V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T. FERRER, in their respective and
Member of the Second Division COMELEC, Manila and REYNALDO TEH BITONG (private respondent)
G.R. No. 182374 November 11, 2008

Case brief: Petitioner went straight to the SC after the decision of the COMELEC 2nd Div instead of first
filing an MR to the COMELEC en banc

FACTS:

Petitioner and private respondent both ran for the position of municipal mayor of the Municipality of
Casiguran, Aurora. Private respondent was proclaimed as the duly-elected Mayor. (Bitong – 3,342 votes;
Esteves – 3,294 votes). Petitioner then filed an election protest (EPC No. 99) before the RTC. Private
respondent filed a motion to dismiss the election protest, arguing that it was defective in form and
substance as it did not specify the precincts where fraud and irregularities were committed. However,
said motion was dismissed for lack of merit. Thus, private respondent filed before the COMELEC a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ
of preliminary injunction. COMELEC (2nd Div) granted the application and issued a TRO which directed
the RTC to desist from further hearing the election protest of petitioner.

Thereafter, petitioner filed before this Court a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition and
prayed that a TRO be issued to enjoin the COMELEC from taking cognizance of the case. Said petition
was dismissed for failure to show that any grave abuse of discretion was committed by the COMELEC in
rendering the challenged order.

The COMELEC (2nd Div.) continued with the proceedings in the election protest and rendered the now
assailed resolution dismissing EPC No. 99.

Hence, the instant petition. (special civil action for certiorari and prohibition Rule 65)

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition should be dismissed for being premature?

HELD:

YES. Under the aforequoted constitutional provisions (Sec. 3 Art. IX-C & Sec 7 Art. IX-A), the requirement
that an aggrieved party must first file a motion for reconsideration of a resolution of the Division to the
COMELEC en banc is mandatory and jurisdictional in invoking the power of review of the Supreme
Court. Failure to abide by this procedural requirement constitutes a ground for dismissal of the
petition. All election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, shall be decided by the COMELEC
in division, and the motion for reconsideration shall be decided by the COMELEC en banc. The power of
review of the Supreme Court of the rulings of the COMELEC is limited only to the final decision or
resolution of the COMELEC en banc and not the final resolution of its Division. The Supreme Court has
no power to review, via certiorari, an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of the
Commission on Elections.

The filing of a motion for reconsideration is mandatory because the mode by which a decision, order or
ruling of the COMELEC en banc may be elevated to the Supreme Court is by the special civil action of
certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. It is settled that the filing of a motion for
reconsideration of the order, resolution or decision of the tribunal, board or office is, subject to well-
recognized exceptions, a condition sine qua non to the institution of a special civil action for certiorari.
The rationale therefore is that the law intends to afford the tribunal, board or office an opportunity to
rectify the errors and mistakes it may have lapsed into before resort to the courts of justice can be had.

The unquestioned rule in this jurisdiction is that certiorari will lie only if there is no appeal or any other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against the acts of public
respondent.
RULE 65:

1) CARLITO L. MONTES vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SIXTH DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,
DEPARTMENT OF SCIENCE and TECHNOLOGY ; G.R. No. 143797, May 4, 2006

FACTS:

Imelda D. Rodriguez and Elizabeth Fontanilla filed an administrative complaint against Carlito L. Montes,
Chief of the Legal Division of DOST, for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
service alleging that Montes produced a tape recording of a private conversation he had with the DOST
Secretary. Montes admitted that he had taped the conversation without the DOST Secretary’s knowledge
and consent. Montes likewise admitted that he had also recorded a private conversation he had with
Fontanilla without the latter’s knowledge and consent. Moreover, Montes mentioned the existence of the
tape recordings he had made of his conversations with other people. Montes even re-played the taped
conversations he had with Secretary Padolina and Fontanilla. In addition, PCAGC Prosecutor stated in his
affidavit that Montes submitted to him the tape recordings of Montes had made of his conversations with
Fontanilla.

The Ombudsman found Montes guilty of grave misconduct and suspended him for 1 year without pay. It
held that Montes taping was prohibited by R.A. 4200, the Anti-Wiretapping Law.

The Ombudsman denied Montes motion for reconsideration. Hence, Montes filed a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure before the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals dismissed outright Montes petition failure to state the specific date when he
received a copy of the Ombudsman’s Decision; to attach duplicate originals or certified true copies of the
challenged Decision and Order; and to provide an explanation why the copy of his petition was not served
personally upon therein respondent DOST Secretary.

On motion for reconsideration, however, the appellate court issued a Resolution requiring the
Ombudsman to file his comment.

Meanwhile, the DOST Secretary issued the assailed suspension order which reads as follows:

TO: CARLITO L. MONTES

In compliance with the Indorsement from the Office of the Ombudsman directing this
Office the implementation of the OMB Order, in relation to OMB Decision, wherein you
were found guilty of violation of RA 4200 (THE ANTI-WIRE TAPPING LAW) amounting to
GROSS MISCONDUCT in OMB-ADM-0-98-0556 entitled Imelda D. Rodriguez and Elizabeth
Fontanilla -versus- Carlito L. Montes, you are hereby SUSPENDED FROM THE SERVICE FOR
ONE YEAR WITHOUT PAY EFFECTIVE JULY 16, 2000.

Montes filed a petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure before the Supreme
Court which seeks to prohibit that the implementation of the suspension order on the ground that it is
premature considering the pendency of his petition before the appellate court.
In their Comment, the Ombudsman and the DOST assert that the filing of the instant petition is a violation
of the proscription against forum-shopping.

ISSUE:

Whether Montes is entitled to the issuance of a writ of prohibition enjoining the DOST Secretary from
enforcing the suspension order.

HELD:

No. Montes is not entitled to the issuance of a writ of prohibition enjoining the DOST Secretary from
enforcing the suspension order.

Montes transgressed the proscription against forum shopping.

There is forum shopping when a party seeks to obtain remedies in an action in one court, which had
already been solicited, and in other courts and other proceedings in other tribunals. Forum shopping is
also the act of one party against another when an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum, of
seeking another and possibly favorable opinion in another forum other than by appeal or the special civil
action of certiorari; or the institution of two or more acts or proceedings grounded on the same cause on
the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.

In the case at bar, when Montes filed the petition for prohibition against the suspension order, his motion
for reconsideration of the dismissal of his petition for certiorari was still pending before the appellate
court. In fact, in a Resolution, the Court of Appeals directed the Ombudsman to file his comment indicating
that Montes motion for reconsideration has not been fully resolved.

Montes petition for certiorari prayed that the appellate court issue an order restraining the DOST
Secretary from implementing the Order of suspension. Montes motion for reconsideration likewise
prayed that the implementation of the suspension be restrained. In the present petition for prohibition,
Montes prays that an order be issued to restrain the DOST Secretary from implementing the Suspension
Order.

Clearly, the relief sought from the appellate court is the same as the relief prayed for in the present
petition that an order be issued restraining the DOST Secretary from implementing the Ombudsman’s
Order. In filing the instant petition without awaiting the resolution of his pending motion before the
appellate court, Montes asked for simultaneous remedies in two different fora.

Moreover, the Court find that Montes failed to adequately show that there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to warrant the issuance of a writ of
prohibition.

For a party to be entitled to a writ of prohibition, he must establish the following requisites: (a) it must be
directed against a tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising functions, judicial or ministerial; (b)
the tribunal, corporation, board or person has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion; and (c) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
A remedy is considered plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the
injurious effects of the judgment or rule, order or resolution of the lower court or agency.

When the DOST issued the assailed suspension order, Montes motion for reconsideration was still pending
before the appellate court. Montes thus had the remedy of filing a petition for prohibition before the
appellate court as an incident of the petition for certiorari and motion for reconsideration he had
previously filed therewith. Had Montes brought the instant petition before the Court of Appeals, the same
could, and would, have been consolidated with his petition for certiorari, thereby bringing under the
competence of the said court all matters relative to the action, including the incidents thereof.

Furthermore, Montes disregarded the doctrine of judicial hierarchy. For this reason, the instant petition
should be dismissed.

The Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus and injunction is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with the Regional Trial Courts and the
Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction however should not be taken to mean that the parties
have an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which they will file their application or
petition. There is an ordained sequence of recourse to courts vested with concurrent jurisdiction,
beginning from the lowest, on to the next highest, and ultimately to the highest. This hierarchy is
determinative of the venue of appeals, and is likewise determinative of the proper forum for petitions for
extraordinary writs. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs
should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefore, clearly and specifically
set out in the petition.

The instant Petition for Prohibition is DISMISSED.

RULE 65:

2) CLARK INVESTORS AND LOCATORS ASSOCIATION INC. vs. SECRETARY OF FINANCE AND
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. No. 200670 ; July 6, 2015

Ponente: VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

FACTS:

March 13, 1992, Congress enacted RA No. 7227 which mandated the accelerated conversion of the Clark
and Subic military reservations into special economic zones. Section 12 thereof provides for the creation
of the Subic Special Economic Zone.

Based on Section 12 (c), in lieu of national and local taxes, all businesses and enterprises operating within
the Subic Special Economic Zone shall pay a preferential gross income tax rate of five percent (5%). In
addition, Section 12 (b) also provides that such businesses and enterprises shall be exempt from the
payment of all taxes and duties on the importation of raw materials, capital, and equipment into the Subic
Special Economic Zone.

March 20, 2007, Congress enacted RA No. 9400 which extended the aforementioned tax and fiscal
incentives under RA No. 7227 to the Clark Freeport Zone. By way of amendment, Section 2 states the
businesses and enterprises within the Clark Freeport Zone are similarly exempt from the payment of all
taxes and duties on the importation of raw materials, capital and equipment.

February 17, 2012, the DOF, upon recommendation of the BIR, issued RR 2-2012 which imposed VAT and
excise tax on the importation of petroleum and petroleum products from abroad and into the Freeport or
Economic Zones.

March 8, 2012, petitioner, which represents the businesses and enterprises within the Clark Freeport
Zone, filed the instant petition alleging that respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing
RR 2-2012. It argues that by imposing the VAT and excise tax on the importation of petroleum and
petroleum products from abroad and into the Freeport or Economic Zones, RR 2-2012 unilaterally revoked
the tax exemption granted by RA No. 7227 and RA No. 9400 to the businesses and enterprises operating
within the Subic Special Economic Zone and Clark Freeport Zone.

Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), contend that the petition must be denied
outright because the special civil action for certiorari cannot be used to assail RR 2-2012 which was issued
by the respondents in the exercise of their quasi-legislative or rule-making powers. According to the OSG,
certiorari can only be used against a public officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers. In addition,
the OSG invokes the doctrine of hierarchy of courts and claims that a petition for certiorari cannot be filed
directly to this Court absent highly exceptional reasons which the petitioner failed to adduce. Finally, the
OSG opposes the argument of petitioner that RR 2-2012 unilaterally revoked the tax exemption granted
by RA No. 7227 and RA No. 9400 to the businesses and enterprises operating within the Subic Special
Economic Zone and Clark Freeport Zone by referring to the tax refund under Section 3 of RR 2-2012. It
points out that Section 3 allows the businesses and enterprises operating within the Subic Special
Economic Zone and Clark Freeport Zone to claim for a tax refund upon submission of competent proof
that they used the imported fuel exclusively within the Subic Special Economic Zone and Clark Freeport
Zone. Thus, the OSG claimed that RR 2-2012 is consistent with RA No. 7227 and RA No. 9400.

ISSUES:

(a) Whether or not certiorari is the right remedy of the petitioner, (b) Whether or not the hierarchy of
courts was violated, and (c) Whether or not the case was filed to the right court

HELD:

(a) Incorrect, (b) Yes, it is violated, and (c) incorrect

We deny the petition for being an improper remedy.

Firstly, respondents did not act in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity. A petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, is a special civil action that may be invoked only
against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.

For a special civil action for certiorari to prosper, the following requisites must concur: ( 1) it must be
directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal,
board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Respondents do not fall within the ambit of a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions. They issued RR 2-2012 in the exercise of their quasi-legislative or rule-making powers, and not
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Verily, respondents did not adjudicate or determine the rights of the
parties.

Secondly, while this case is styled as a petition for certiorari, there is, however, no denying the fact that,
in essence, it seeks the declaration by this Court of the unconstitutionality and illegality of the questioned
rule, thus partaking the nature, in reality, of one for declaratory relief over which this Court has only
appellate, not original, jurisdiction. Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus.

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of
Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.
Accordingly, this petition must fail because this Court does not have original jurisdiction over a petition
for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved. The special civil action of declaratory relief
falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts. The Rules of Court is explicit that such
action shall be brought before the appropriate Regional Trial Court. Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court provides:

SECTION 1. Who may file petition. - Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or
any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a
declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.

Lastly, although this Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction
to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such
concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.

The rationale for this rule is two-fold: (1) it would be an imposition upon the precious time of this Court;
and (2) it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of
cases, which in some instances had to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum
under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues because this Court is not a trier
of facts.

We thus affirm the judicial policy that we shall not entertain a direct resort to this Court unless the remedy
cannot be obtained in the apporiate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases
of national interest and of serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ
of certiorari.

In the case at bar, petitioner failed to allege such exceptional and compelling circumstances which justify
a direct resort to this Court.

Dispositive Portion: In view of the serious procedural and technical defects of the petition, we see no
need for this Court to resolve the other issues raised by the petitioner.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. With costs against the petitioner.
RULE 65:
3) ROSALES vs. ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION
G.R. No. 201852; April 5, 2016

FACTS:

This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks to declare the illegality and
unconstitutionality of the Members' Contribution for Capital Expenditures (MCC), later renamed as
Reinvestment Fund for Sustainable Capital Expenditures (RFSC), which is being imposed by on-grid Electric
Cooperatives (ECs), pursuant to the following Rules and Resolution of the Energy Regulatory Commission
(ERC): 1. Rules for Setting the Electric Cooperatives' Wheeling Rates (RSEC-WR), which was adopted in
Resolution No. 20, Series of 2009, issued on September 23, 2009; and 2. Resolution No. 14, Series of
2011, issued on July 6, 2011.

The MCC is envisioned to fund the amortization or debt service of the ECs' indebtedness
associated with the expansion, rehabilitation or upgrading of their existing electric power system in
accordance with their ERC - approved CAPEX Plan. The utilization of the MCC fund shall be subject to the
following conditions: 1. It shall be used solely for CAPEX or any other projects approved by the ERC and
not for any other purpose, even on a temporary basis; 2. The amounts collected for MCC fund shall be
recognized as contribution from member-consumers; 3. The amounts collected for MCC, including
interest income, shall be put in a separate account; and 4. If the member-consumer terminates his
contract with the EC, the said contribution shall not be withdrawn instead the same shall be treated as
CIAC. In the case of ECs registered under the CDA, the said member-contribution shall be converted into
member's share capital.

In the event that the MCC rate caps are insufficient for its purpose, the EC may collect such
additional MCC by securing the consent of its member-consumers for such collection through existing
legal procedures; Provided that, the expenditure was approved by the ERC as part of the EC's CAPEX Plan;
Provided further that, the additional MCC is obtained prior to the incurrence of the indebtedness;
Provided finally that, the collection of said additional MCC shall be subject to the principles of fairness
and equity in accordance with the objective of the EPIRA for the elimination of cross-subsidy.

Petitioners allege, among other things that, the imposition of MCC or RFSC by the energy
regulatory commission as a form of investment solicitation to fund the expansion and other capital
expenditures of ECs is highly irregular, oppressive and unconstitutional as it directly violates the due
process and equal protection clauses on property under Sec. 1 Art. III of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not Rule 65 is the proper remedy.

HELD:

No. Petitioners choice of remedy to question the validity of RSEC-WR and Resolution No. 14 is
inexcusably inapposite.

Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules mandates: SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. - When any tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of its or his jurisdiction, and
there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or
officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

The Court agrees with respondents that RSEC-WR and Resolution No. 14 were issued by the ERC
in its quasi-legislative power.

A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function where he has the power to determine what
the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine these questions
and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties.

Quasi-judicial function, on the other hand, is "a term which applies to the actions, discretion,
etc., of public administrative officers or bodies required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of
facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to exercise
discretion of a judicial nature.

Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is necessary that
there be a law that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property under which adverse claims
to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought before a tribunal, board, or
officer clothed with power and authority to determine the law and adjudicate the respective rights of
the contending parties.

As defined above, the ERC exercised neither judicial nor quasi-judicial function. In issuing and
implementing the RSEC-WR and Resolution No. 14, it was not called upon to adjudicate the rights of
contending parties to exercise, in any manner, discretion of a judicial or quasi-judicial nature. Instead,
RSEC-WR and Resolution No. 14 were done in the exercise of the ERC's quasi-legislative and
administrative functions. It was in the nature of subordinate legislation, promulgated in the exercise of
its delegated power. Quasi-legislative power is exercised by administrative agencies through the
promulgation of rules and regulations within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of
non-delegation of powers flowing from the separation of the branches of the government. Thus, the
petition under rule 65 is inappropriate and must be denied.
RULE 65:

4) FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA, PRESIDING JUDGE, MCTC, COMPOSTELA-NEW BATAAN, COMPOSTELA

VALLEY PROVINCE, vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL
G.R. No. 211833, April 07, 2015

FACTS:

Petitioner was appointed as the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court ( first-level court) at
Poblacion, Compostela Valley Province on September 18, 2012. On the following year September 27, he
applied for the vacant position of Presiding Judge in the following Regional Trial Courts (RTCs): Branch 31,
Tagum City; Branch 13, Davao City; and Branch 6, Prosperidad, Agusan Del Sur.

However, in a letter issued by the JBC’s Office of Recruitment, Selection and Nomination, informed the
petitioner that he was not included in the list of candidates for the said stations. On the same date, the
petitioner sent a letter seeking reconsideration of his non-inclusion in the list of considered applicants and
protesting the inclusion of applicants who did not pass the prejudicature examination.

Consequently, petitioner was informed by the JBC Executive Officer, through that his protest and
reconsideration was duly noted by the JBC en banc. However, its decision not to include his name in the
list of applicants was upheld due to the JBC’s long-standing policy of opening the chance for promotion
to second-level courts to, among others, incumbent judges who have served in their current position
for at least five years, and since the petitioner has been a judge only for more than a year, he was
excluded from the list.

Due to his non-inclusion in the list, petitioner filed Petition for Prohibition, Mandamus, and Certiorari, and
Declaratory Relief under Rules 65 and 63 of the ROC before the SC. He assail the policy of the (JBC),
requiring five years of service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant to second-
level courts, on the ground that it is unconstitutional, and was issued with grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, and declaratory relief commenced
by the petitioner was proper.

HELD:

The remedies of certiorari and prohibition are tenable. However the remedies of mandamus and
declaratory relief is improper.

The present Rules of Court uses two special civil actions for determining and correcting grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. These are the special civil actions for certiorari and
Decision prohibition, and both are governed by Rule 65.
In this case, it is clear that the JBC does not fall within the scope of a tribunal, board, or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In the process of selecting and screening applicants, the JBC neither
acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor assumed unto itself any performance of judicial or quasi-
judicial prerogative. However, since the formulation of guidelines and criteria, including the policy that
the petitioner now assails, is necessary and incidental to the exercise of the JBC’s constitutional mandate,
a determination must be made on whether the JBC has acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing and enforcing the said policy.

Besides, the Court can appropriately take cognizance of this case by virtue of the Court’s power of
supervision over the JBC. Jurisprudence provides that the power of supervision is the power of oversight,
or the authority to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. It ensures that the laws and the
rules governing the conduct of a government entity are observed and complied with. Supervising officials
see to it that rules are followed, but they themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do they have the
discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, they may order the work done or
redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may not prescribe their own manner of execution of the
act. They have no discretion on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed.

The remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by the petitioner in assailing JBC’s policy. It is essential
to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that the applicant should have a clear legal right to the thing
demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required.

Further,, to be included as an applicant to second-level judge is not properly compellable by mandamus

inasmuch as it involves the exercise of sound discretion by the JBC.

The petition for declaratory relief is improper. “An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person
interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written instrument and whose rights are affected by a
statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The relief sought under this remedy includes
the interpretation and determination of the validity of the written instrument and the judicial declaration
of the parties’ rights or duties thereunder.”

“[T]he purpose of the action is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the
parties under a statute, deed, contract,., for their guidance in its enforcement or compliance and not to
settle issues arising from its alleged breach.”

In this case, the petition for declaratory relief did not involve an unsound policy. Rather, the petition
specifically sought a judicial declaration that the petitioner has the right to be included in the list of
applicants although he failed to meet JBC’s five-year requirement policy. Again, the Court reiterates that
no person possesses a legal right under the Constitution to be included in the list of nominees for vacant
judicial positions. The opportunity of appointment to judicial office is a mere privilege, and not a judicially
enforceable right that may be properly claimed by any person. The inclusion in the list of candidates,
which is one of the incidents of such appointment, is not a right either. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim
any right that could have been affected by the assailed policy.

Furthermore, the instant petition must necessarily fail because this Court does not have original
jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief. The special civil action of declaratory relief falls under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the appropriate RTC pursuant to Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended by R.A. No. 7691.
RULE 65:

5) Maria Carolina Araullo vs Benigno Aquino III

July 1, 2014

FACTS:
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish growth of the
economy. The World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio
“Butch” Abad then came up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables the Executive
to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next year’s
appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that if a certain government project is being
undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the
Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as “savings” by the Executive and said funds will
then be reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the economy as
economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by
the Supreme Court).

Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an exposé claiming that he, and other
Senators, received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of
then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken from the DAP but
was disbursed upon the request of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign funds within the
Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for
the CPLA (Cordillera People’s Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front),
P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and several
other concerned citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the
DAP. Among their contentions was:

DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that “no money shall be
paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA (savings and
augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the President to
augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order 292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures and
authority to use savings, respectively).
ISSUES:

Whether or not certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus are proper remedies to assail the constitutionality
and validity of the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP), National Budget Circular (NBC) No. 541,
and all other executive issuances allegedly implementing the DAP. Subsumed in this issue are whether
there is a controversy ripe for judicial determination, and the standing of petitioners.

HELD:

The respondents’ arguments and submissions on the procedural issue are bereft of merit.

Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides that the judicial power shall be vested
in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the
government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question
whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction
or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this
nature.

The present Rules of Court uses two special civil actions for determining and correcting grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. These are the special civil actions for certiorari and
prohibition, and both are governed by Rule 65. A similar remedy of certiorari exists under Rule 64, but the
remedy is expressly applicable only to the judgments and final orders or resolutions of the Commission
on Elections and the Commission on Audit.

Although similar to prohibition in that it will lie for want or excess of jurisdiction, certiorari is to be
distinguished from prohibition by the fact that it is a corrective remedy used for the re-examination of
some action of an inferior tribunal, and is directed to the cause or proceeding in the lower court and not
to the court itself, while prohibition is a preventative remedy issuing to restrain future action, and is
directed to the court itself.32 The Court expounded on the nature and function of the writ of prohibition
in Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Defensor:

A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in the exercise of a quasi-
legislative function. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, ordering said entity
or person to desist from further proceedings when said proceedings are without or in excess of said
entity’s or person’s jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal
or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Prohibition lies against
judicial or ministerial functions, but not against legislative or quasi-legislative functions. Generally, the
purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to
maintain the administration of justice in orderly channels. Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief
against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in
handling matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it
by the law, or where there is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which such
relief can be obtained. Where the principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners’ remedy is an
ordinary action for its nullification, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court. In any case, petitioners’ allegation that "respondents are performing or threatening to
perform functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction" may appropriately be enjoined by the trial
court through a writ of injunction or a temporary restraining order.

With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in
scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction
committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter
does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.

Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and
to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials.
RULE 65:

6) DE LIMA vs REYES
G.R. No. 209330, January 11, 2016

FACTS:

Dr. Gerry Ortega, a veterinarian and radio anchor in Palawan, was shot dead. A suspect was arrested and
implicated a certain Rodolfo Edrad. Edrad alleged that it was former Palawan Governor Mario Joel Reyes
who ordered the killing. On the basis of which, a complaint was filed, but the same was dismissed by the
special panel created to conduct preliminary investigation by Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Leila
De Lima.

Sec. De Lima thereafter created a new panel of investigators through Department Order (DO) No. 710.
The second panel issued a subpoena requiring Reyes to appear and submit his counter-affidavit and
supporting evidence. Reyes filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition for certiorari assailing the
creation of the second panel. The CA rendered a decision declaring DO No. 710 null and void. Sec. De Lima,
subsequently, filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court (SC) assailing the decision
of the CA and arguing that her issuance was a purely executive function, not a quasi-judicial function that
could be the subject of a petition for certiorari or prohibition.

ISSUE:

Whether the issuance of DO No. 710 was an executive function beyond the scope of a petition for
certiorari or prohibition

HELD:

No. Although the determination by the DOJ of the existence of probable cause is not a quasi-judicial
proceeding, the actions of the DOJ Secretary in affirming or reversing the findings of prosecutors
nonetheless may still be subject to judicial review if it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

In one case, the SC dismissed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus against the DOJ
Secretary's issuance of a department order on the ground that petitions for certiorari and prohibition are
directed only to tribunals that exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The issuance of the department
order was a purely administrative or executive function of the DOJ Secretary. While the Department of
Justice may perform functions similar to that of a court of law, it is not a quasi-judicial agency. In addition,
a writ of prohibition is directed against the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. The DOJ is not a court of law
and its officers do not perform quasi-judicial functions. The DOJ Secretary's review of the resolutions of
prosecutors is also not a ministerial function.

However, even when an administrative agency does not perform a judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial
function, the Constitution mandates the exercise of judicial review when there is an allegation of grave
abuse of discretion. Therefore, any question on whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in affirming, reversing, or modifying the
resolutions of prosecutors may be the subject of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.
RULE 65:

7) CASUPANAN vs. LAROYA

G.R. No. 145391 ; August 26, 2002

FACTS:

As a result of a vehicular accident between two vehicles, one driven by Mario Llavore Laroya and the
other owned by Roberto Capitulo and driven by Avelino Casupanan, two cases were filed before the
MCTC of Capas, Tarlac. Laroya filed a criminal case against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting
in damage to property. This case was on its preliminary investigation stage when Casupanan and
Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi-delict. However, upon motion of Laroya on the ground
of forum-shopping, the MCTC dismissed the civil case. On Motion for Reconsideration, Casupanan and
Capitulo insisted that the civil case is a separate civil action which can proceed independently of the
criminal case. Casupanan and Capitulo then filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Capas, Tarlac. But the RTC ruled that the order of dismissal issued by the MCTC is a final order
which disposes of the case and therefore, the proper remedy should have been an appeal. Hence,
Casupanan and Capitulo filed this petition.

Casupanan and Capitulo’s contention: that if the accused in a criminal case has a counterclaim against
the private complainant, he may file the counterclaim in a separate civil action at the proper time. They
contend that an action on quasi-delict is different from an action resulting from the crime of reckless
imprudence, and an accused in a criminal case can be an aggrieved party in a civil case arising from the
same incident. They maintain that under Articles 31 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the civil case can
proceed independently of the criminal action. Finally, they point out that Casupanan was not the only
one who filed the independent civil action based on quasi-delict but also Capitulo, the owner-operator
of the vehicle, who was not a party in the criminal case.

Laroya’s contention: that the petition is fatally defective as it does not state the real antecedents. Laroya
further alleges that Casupanan and Capitulo forfeited their right to question the order of dismissal when
they failed to avail of the proper remedy of appeal. Laroya argues that there is no question of law to be
resolved as the order of dismissal is already final and a petition for certiorari is not a substitute for a
lapsed appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly file,
simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private
complainant in the criminal case.
HELD:

YES,

The Court held that the MCTC dismissed the civil action for quasi-delict on the ground of forum-
shopping under Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94. The MCTC did not state in its order of
dismissal that the dismissal was with prejudice. Under the Administrative Circular, the order of dismissal
is without prejudice to refiling the complaint, unless the order of dismissal expressly states that it is with
prejudice. Thus, the MCTC's dismissal, being silent on the matter, is a dismissal without prejudice.
Section 1 of Rule 41 provides that an order dismissing an action without prejudice is not appealable. The
remedy of the aggrieved party is to file a special civil action under Rule 65. Clearly, the Capas RTC's order
dismissing the petition for certiorari on the ground that the proper remedy is an ordinary appeal, is
erroneous.

Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property based on the
Revised Penal Code while Casupanan and Capitulo filed the civil action for damages based on Article
2176 of the Civil Code. Although these two actions arose from the same act or omission, they have
different causes of action. The criminal case is based on culpa criminal punishable under the Revised
Penal Code while the civil case is based on culpa aquiliana actionable under Articles 2176 and 2177 of
the Civil Code. And par 6, sec 1 of Rule 111.

Since the present Rules require the accused in a criminal action to file his counterclaim in a separate civil
action, there can be no forum-shopping if the accused files such separate civil action.

There is no question that the offended party in the criminal action can file an independent civil action
for quasi-delict against the accused. Section 3 of the present Rule 111 expressly states that the
"offended party" may bring such an action but the "offended party" may not recover damages twice for
the same act or omission charged in the criminal action. Clearly, Section 3 of Rule 111 refers to the
offended party in the criminal action, not to the accused.
RULE 65:

8) REPUBLIC vs. CANTOR

December 10, 2013

FACTS:

The respondent and Jerry were married on September 20, 1997. They lived together as husband and wife
in their conjugal dwelling in Agan Homes, Koronadal City, South Cotabato. Sometime in January 1998, the
couple had a violent quarrel. Thereafter, Jerry left their conjugal dwelling and this was the last time that
the respondent ever saw him. Since then, she had not seen, communicated nor heard anything from Jerry
or about his whereabouts. On May 21, 2002, or more than four (4) years from the time of Jerry's
disappearance, the respondent filed before the RTC a petition for her husband's declaration of
presumptive death. She claimed that she had a well-founded belief that Jerry was already dead. Despite
inquiries from her mother-in-law, her brothers-in-law, her sisters-in-law, as well as her neighbors and
friends, but to no avail. In the hopes of finding Jerry, she also allegedly made it a point to check the
patients directory whenever she went to a hospital. All these earnest efforts, the respondent claimed,
proved futile, prompting her to file the petition in court.

The RTC issued an order granting the respondents petition and declaring Jerry presumptively dead. The
CA through a petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner, Republic of the Philippines affirmed into to the
latter’s order, thus: The petitioner brought the matter via a Rule 45 petition before this Court . It maintains
that although judgments of trial courts in summary judicial proceedings, including presumptive death
cases, are deemed immediately final and executory (hence, not appeal able under Article 247 of the Family
Code), this rule does not mean that they are not subject to review on certiorari. Likewise, petitioner
posited that the respondent did not have a well-founded belief to justify the declaration of her husbands
presumptive death. It claims that the respondent failed to conduct the requisite diligent search for her
missing husband pursuant to the strict standard under Article 41 of the Family Code.

ISSUE:

Whether certiorari lies to challenge the decisions, judgments or final orders of trial courts in petitions for
declaration of presumptive death

HELD:

While jurisprudence tells us that no appeal can be made from the trial court’s judgment, an aggrieved
party may, nevertheless, file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to question any
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction that transpired. As held in De los Santos v.
Rodriguez, et al., the fact that a decision has become final does not automatically negate the original
action of the CA to issue certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in connection with orders or processes
issued by the trial court. Certiorari may be availed of where a court has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and where the ordinary remedy of appeal is not available.
RULE 65:

9) LEYTE IV ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE vs. LEYECO IV EMPLOYEES UNION (not yet submitted)
G.R. No. 157775 ; October 19, 2007

RULE 65:

10) BALANGCAD vs COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 83888 ; February 12, 1998

FACTS:

Private respondent filed a civil case for quieting of title. The subject of the case was a parcel of land
denominated as Lot no. 2858, which they alleged has been illegally registered in the name of Lunesa
Balangcad. After trial, judgment was rendered annulling the defendant’s OCT No. P-152, Free Patent No.
213712, and which the defendant was ordered to vacate.

On appeal to the CA, the latter dismissed the same for non-payment of docket fee. Hence, that dismissal
become final and executor and entry of judgment was made in due course. It was only after nine months
that the petitioner went back to the CA, asking for annulment and/or reformation of the decision of the
Trial Court for lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the judgment of the CA which becomes final and executor can still be annulled or set aside
by the action of the petitioner.

HELD:

No. In people vs. Pareja, a judgment which has become final and executor may be set aside in any of the
following was: (1) by petitioner for relief from judgment under Rule 38; (2) by direct action to annul and
enjoin the enforcement of the judgment where the alleged defect is not apparent on its face from the
recital contained in the judgment; and (3) by direct action, as certiorari, or by collateral attack against the
challenge judgment which is void upon its face or where the nullity of the judgment is apparent from its
own recitals.

In this case, the same does not come under any of these methods. Hence, the judgment of the Trial Court
was not annulled.
RULE 65:

11) St. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME vs. NLRC

295 SCRA 494

FACTS:

Respondent (Arcayos) started working as Operations Manager of petitioner St. Martin Funeral Home on
February 6, 1995. However, there was no contract of employment executed between him and petitioner
nor was his name included in the semi-monthly payroll. He was dismissed by St. Martin Funeral Homes
for misappropriating funds worth Php 38,000 which was supposed to be VAT payment to the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR).Petitioner’s (St. Martin Funeral Homes) contention is that the respondent is not an
employee but only the uncle of Amelita Malabed, the owner of petitioner St. Martin's Funeral
Home. Private respondent, who was formerly working as an overseas contract worker, asked for financial
assistance from the mother of Amelita. Since then, as an indication of gratitude, private respondent
voluntarily helped the mother of Amelita in overseeing the business. When the mother of Amelita passed
away, the latter then took over the management of the business. She then discovered that there were
arrears in the payment of taxes and other government fees, although the records showed that the same
were already paid. Amelita then made some changes in the business operation and private respondent
and his wife were no longer allowed to participate in the management thereof. As a consequence, the
latter filed a complaint charging that petitioner had illegally terminated his employment.

The labor arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner, confirming that indeed, there was no employer-employee
relationship between the two and hence, there could be no illegal dismissal in such a situation. The
respondent appealed to the secretary of NLRC who set aside the decision and remanded the case to the
labor arbiter. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied by the NLRC.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioners petition for certiorari is proper.

HELD:

Yes. The petitioners petition for certiorari is proper. The Court is of the considered opinion that ever since
appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court were eliminated, the legislative intendment was that the
special civil action of certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial review of decisions of the
NLRC. The use of the word "appeal" in relation thereto and in the instances we have noted could have
been alapsus plumae because appeals by certiorariand the original action for certiorari are both modes of
judicial review addressed to the appellate courts.
RULE 65:

12) JESUS G. CRISOLOGO and NANETTE B. CRISOLOGO vs. JEWM AGRO-INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION
G.R. No. 196894 March 3, 2014

FACTS:

Petitioners Spouses Crisologo were the plaintiffs in two (2) collection cases before RTC-Br. 15 Limso, So
Keng Koc, et al. JEWM was the successor-in-interest of one Sy Sen Ben, the plaintiff in another collection
case before RTC-Br. 8 against the same defendants. RTC-Br. 8 rendered its decision based on a
compromise agreement, wherein the defendants in said case were directed to transfer the subject
properties in favor of Sy Sen Ben. The latter subsequently sold the subject properties to one Nilda Lam
who, in turn, sold the same to JEWM in which TCTs were eventually issued in the name of JEWM, both of
which still bearing the same annotations as well as the notice of lis pendens in connection with the other
pending cases filed against So Keng Kok.

After a year, Spouses Crisologo prevailed in the separate collection case filed before RTC-Br. 15 where the
defendants therein were ordered to solidarily pay the Spouses Crisologo. When this decision attained
finality, and a subsequent writ of execution was eventually issued.
Acting on the same, the Branch Sheriff issued a notice of sale scheduling an auction inclusive of the subject
properties awarded to JEWN by RTC Br. 8.

JEWN filed an opposition for the scheduled sale, however, the motion was denied. In turn, the Spouses
Crisologo posted a bond in order to proceed with the execution. JEWM then filed a separate action for
cancellation of lien with prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction before RTC-Br. 14. It prayed
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the public sale of the subject properties
covered in the writ of execution issued pursuant to the ruling of RTC-Br. 15; the cancellation of all the
annotations on the back of the pertinent TCTs; and the issuance of a permanent injunction order after
trial on the merits. John and Jane Does and all persons acting under their direction" were impleaded as
defendants.

At the scheduled hearing before RTC-Br. 14, Spouses Crisologo’s counsel appeared and filed in open court
their Manifestation questioning the authority of the said court to restrain the execution proceedings in
RTC-Br. 15. JEWM opposed it on the ground that Spouses Crisologo were not parties in the case.
Crisologo’s filed an Omnibus Motion praying for the denial of the application for writ or preliminary
injuction filed by JEWM and asking for their recognition as parties. No motion to intervene was, however,
filed as the Crisologo’s believed that it was unnecessary since they were already the John and Jane Does
named in the complaint. RTC-Br. 14 denied Spouses Crisologo’s Omnibus Motion and granted JEWM’s
application for a writ of preliminary injunction. MR was also denied for their lack of legal standing in court
considering that their counsel failed to make the written formal notice of appearance.

Spouses Crisologo filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA assailing the RTC-Br. 14 orders
all of which denied their motion to be recognized as parties. They also prayed for the issuance of a TRO
and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

Pending disposition of the Petition by the CA, JEWM filed a motion before RTC-Br. 14 asking for the
resolution of the case on the merits which the latter ruled in its favor. CA eventually denied Spouses
Crisologo’s Petition filed by Spouses Crisologo for lack of merit. It ruled that the writ of preliminary
injunction subject of the petition was already fait accompli and, as such, the issue of grave abuse of
discretion attributed to RTC-Br. 14 in granting the relief had become moot and academic. It further held
that the failure of Spouses Crisologo to file their motion to intervene under Rule 19 rendered Rule 65
inapplicable as a vehicle to ventilate their supposed right in the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that RTC-Br. 14 acted without grave abuse of discretion in
failing to recognize Spouses Crisologo as indispensable parties in the case for cancellation of lien.

HELD:

No, in an action for the cancellation of memorandum annotated at the back of a certificate of title, the
persons considered as indispensable include those whose liens appear as annotations pursuant to Section
108 of P.D. No. 1529. In Southwestern University v. Laurente, the Court held that the cancellation of the
annotation of an encumbrance cannot be ordered without giving notice to the parties annotated in the
certificate of title itself. It would, thus, be an error for a judge to contend that no notice is required to be
given to all the persons whose liens were annotated at the back of a certificate of title.

Here, Spouses Crisologo’s liens were indeed annotated at the back of TCTs. Thus, as persons with their
liens annotated, they stand to be benefited or injured by any order relative to the cancellation of
annotations in the pertinent TCTs. In other words, they are as indispensable as JEWM itself in the final
disposition of the case for cancellation, being one of the many lien holders. RTC-Br. 14, despite repeated
pleas by Spouses Crisologo to be recognized as indispensable parties, failed to implement the mandatory
import of the aforecited rule. In fact, in Sps. Crisologo v. Judge George E. Omelio, a related administrative
case, the Court found the trial judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law when it disregarded the claims of
Spouses Crisologo to participate. The Court stated:

Clearly, the cancellation of the annotation of the sale without notifying the buyers, Sps.
Crisologo, is a violation of the latter’s right to due process. Since this is the second time
that Judge Omelio has issued an order which fails to notify or summon the indispensable
parties, we find Judge Omelio guilty of gross ignorance of the law, with a warning that
repetition of the same or similar act will merit a stiffer penalty in the future.

Despite the clear existence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of RTC-Br. 14, JEWM asserts technical
grounds on why the CA did not err in dismissing the petition via Rule 65; that Crisologos could have used
other available remedies such as intervention under Rule 19, an appeal of the judgment, or even an
annulment of judgment, which are, by all means, plain, speedy and adequate remedies in the ordinary
course of law; thatCrisologos lack legal standing to file the Rule 65 petition since they were not impleaded
in the Branch 14 case.

The rule is that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is proper only if there is no appeal, or any plain
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In this case, no adequate recourse, at that
time, was available to Spouses Crisologo, except resorting to Rule 65. Neither will appeal prove adequate
as a remedy since only the original parties to an action can appeal. Here, Spouses Crisologo were never
impleaded. Hence, they could not have utilized appeal as they never possessed the required legal standing
in the first place.
RULE 65:

13) SIGUION REYNA MONTECILLO AND ONGSIAKO LAW OFFICES VS. HON. NORMACHIONLO-SIA
February 3, 2016

FACTS:

1. Siguion Reyna Montecillo & Ongsiako Law Offices acted as counsel for Remedios N. Rodriguez
when she commenced an action for intestate settlement of the estate of her deceased husband
Susano J.Rodriguez before the RTC of Lucena City. During the pendency of the intestate
proceedings, Remedios asked for the payment of widow’s allowance.

a. RTC denied such motion. On Appeal, CA granted Remedios a monthly widow’s allowance
of P3,000.

2. On Feb. 29, 1988, while the case was pending with the CA, Remedios executed a Deed of Sale of
Inheritance wherein she agreed to sell all her rights, intestate and participation in the estate of
Susano J. Rodriguez to a certain Remigio M. Gerardo in consideration of P200,000.

3. As a condition subsequent to the sale, Remedios on March 1,1988, executed a special power of
attorney authorizing Gerado to, among others, “receive from any person, entity, government
entity, government agency or instrumentality, or form any court, anyproperty, real or personal
cash, checks or other commercial documents which may be due to me or payable to me by virtue
of any contract, inheritance or any other legal means, and to “receive said property in his own
name and for his own account and to deposit the same at his sole discretion for his own account,
and dispose of the same without any limitation.

a. Gerardo later on executed a document titled as “Substitution of Attorney-in-fact” where he

designated SRMO as substitute attorney pursuant to the power of substitution granted to him in
the earlier SPA. Gerardo subsequently executed his own SPA authorization SRMO to appear and
represent Gerardo in any and all proceedings and incidents in the case.

4. SRMO then filed a motion with the RTC for the payment of the allowance. The RTC ruled in favor
of SRMO. This caused Rodriguez to file an opposition to the order and prayed that she be
reimbursed to the amount.

5. In its Explanation with Motion to Excuse Reimbursement, [SRMO moved to be excused from
reimbursing the Estate. According to SRMO, when it sought the payment of the widow's
allowance, it was merely seeking the enforcement of a judgment credit in favor of its client,
Remedios, who had, in turn, sold her interests to Gerardo, also represented by SRMO.

6. The RTC denied SRMO's motion. It disagreed with SRMO's position because (1) "the sale of
inheritance was never made known" to the RTC and that (2) the sale cannot comprehend a
widow's allowance because such allowance is "personal in nature.

7. Aggrieved by the RTC's orders, SRMO elevated the case to the CA through a petition
 for certiorari. SRMO argued that it merely acted as representative of Gerardo, Remedios'
successor-in-interest, when it received the sum corresponding to the widow's allowance. Without
going into the merits of the case, however, the CA denied SRMO's petition on the ground that the
latter was not a party in the case before the lower court and therefore had no standing to question
the assailed order. The CA later denied SRMO's motion for reconsideration

ISSUE:

Whether or not SRMO has standing to file a petition for certiorari.

HELD:

Yes. The general rule, is that a person not a party to the proceedings in the trial court cannot maintain an
action for certiorari in the CA or the Supreme Court to have the order or decision of the trial court
reviewed. Under normal circumstances, the CA would have been correct in dismissing a petition
for certiorari filed by a non-party. The peculiar facts of this case, however, call for a less stringent
application of the rule. The facts show that SRMO became involved in its own capacity only when the RTC
ordered it to return the money that it received on behalf of its client. The order of reimbursement was
directed to SRMO in its personal capacity—not in its capacity as counsel for either Remedios or Gerardo.
We find this directive unusual because the order for reimbursement would typically have been addressed
to the parties of the case; the counsel's role and duty would be to ensure that his client complies with the
court's order. The underlying premise of the RTC's order of reimbursement is that, logically, SRMO kept
or appropriated the money. But the premise itself is untenable because SRMO never claimed the amount
for its own account. In fact, it is uncontroverted that SRMO only facilitated the transfer of the amount to
Gerardo.

In this case, ordering SRMO to reimburse the widow's allowance from its own pocket would result in the
unjust enrichment of Gerardo, since the latter would retain the money at the expense of his own counsel.
To avoid such injustice, a petition for certiorari is an adequate remedy available to SRMO to meet the
situation presented.

Another important consideration for allowing SRMO to file a petition lor certiorari is the rule on real party
in interest, which is applicable to private litigation. A real party in interest is one "who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit." In Ortigas
& Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, stated:

..."Interest" within the meaning of the rule means material interest, an interest in issue and to be
affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere
incidental interest. By real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from
a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest.

Simply put, a real party in interest is the person who will suffer (or has suffered) the wrong. In this case,
it is SRMO who stands to be injured by the RTC's order of reimbursement considering that it is being made
to return money received on behalf of, and already accounted to, its client.
RULE 65:

14) CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES v. CA

November 10, 2015

FACTS:

A complaint/affidavit was filed by Atty. Renato L. Bondal before the Office of the Ombudsman against
Binay, Jr. and other public officers and employees of the City Government of Makati, for Plunder and
violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,"
in connection with the five (5) phases of the procurement and construction of the Makati City Hall Parking
Building.
The Ombudsman, issued the subject preventive suspension order, placing Binay, Jr., et al. under
preventive suspension for not more than six (6) months without pay, during the pendency of the OMB
Cases.
On even date, Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, seeking the nullification of the
preventive suspension order, and praying for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin its
implementation. The CA issued a Resolution granting Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a TRO. The CA found that it
was more prudent on its part to issue a TRO in view of the extreme urgency of the matter and seriousness
of the issues raised.

The Ombudsman filed the present petition before this Court, assailing the CA's Resolution, which granted
Binay, Jr.'s prayer for TRO. The Ombudsman claims that: (a) the CA had no jurisdiction to grant Binay, Jr.'s
prayer for a TRO, citing Section 14 of RA 6770,or "The Ombudsman Act of 1989," which states that no
injunctive writ could be issued to delay the Ombudsman's investigation unless there is prima facie
evidence that the subject matter thereof is outside the latter's jurisdiction; and (b) the CA's directive for
the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt is illegal and improper, considering that
the Ombudsman is an impeachable officer, and therefore, cannot be subjected to contempt proceedings.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the present petition, and not motions for reconsideration of the assailed CA
issuances is the Ombudsman's plain, speedy, and adequate remedy;

HELD:

YES. A common requirement to both a petition for certiorari and a petition for prohibition taken under
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is that the petitioner has no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Hence, as a general rule, a motion for reconsideration must first be filed with the lower court prior to
resorting to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari or prohibition since a motion for reconsideration may
still be considered as a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The rationale
for the pre-requisite is to grant an opportunity for the lower court or agency to correct any actual or
perceived error attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case.
Jurisprudence states that "it is the inadequacy, and not the mere absence of all other legal remedies and
the danger of failure of justice without the writ, that must usually determine the propriety of certiorari or
prohibition. A remedy is plain, speedy, and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the
injurious effects of the judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court or agency.

In this light, certain exceptions were crafted to the general rule requiring a prior motion for
reconsideration before the filing of a petition for certiorari, which exceptions also apply to a petition for
prohibition. These are: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by
the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an
urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of
the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under
the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of
due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of
arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings
in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings were ex parte or in which
the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where
public interest is involved.

In this case, it is ineluctably clear that the above-highlighted exceptions attend since, for the first time,
the question on the authority of the CA - and of this Court, for that matter - to enjoin the implementation
of a preventive suspension order issued by the Office of the Ombudsman is put to the fore. This case tests
the constitutional and statutory limits of the fundamental powers of key government institutions -
namely, the Office of the Ombudsman, the Legislature, and the Judiciary - and hence, involves an issue of
transcendental public importance that demands no less than a careful but expeditious resolution. Also
raised is the equally important issue on the propriety of the continuous application of the condonation
doctrine as invoked by a public officer who desires exculpation from administrative liability. As such, the
Ombudsman's direct resort to certiorari and prohibition before this Court, notwithstanding her failure to
move for the prior reconsideration of the assailed issuances in the CA, is justified.
RULE 65:

15) BA FINANCE CORP. vs. PINEDA

G.R. No. L-61628 ; December 29, 1982

FACTS:
Private respondent Antonio Sy was adjudged liable in favor of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 7379 of the
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija for damages resulting from a vehicular accident involving a cargo
truck supposedly owned by him. Petitioner BA Finance Corporation was served summons on December
18, 1981. Eleven days later, or on December 29, 1981 petitioner, through counsel, filed a motion for
extension of time to file answer and/or motion to dismiss.

The respondent Judge gave the petitioner a period of 15 days, counted from January 2, 1982 and to expire
on January 18, 1982 (sic), within which to file its answer or motion to dismiss the complaint,
On January 13, 1982, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint states no cause
of action.

Respondent Judge denied the motion to dismiss, for being "devoid of merit."
On March 17, 1982, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order dated March 1, 1982. On
March 24, 1982, petitioner received a copy of private respondent's motion to strike out the petitioner's
motion for reconsideration on the alleged ground that the motion for reconsideration was filed out of
time.

The motion to strike out was granted, and the petitioner was declared in default for having failed to
answer the complaint within the reglementary period, and private respondent was allowed to present his
evidence ex-parte.

Petitioner filed a motion to lift order of default. The Judge denied the petitioner's motion to lift order of
default May 4, 1982.

On May 28, 1982, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order dated May 4, 1982. The
Judge sets aside the declaration of default and ordered petitioner to file its answer to the complaint within
15 days from notice thereof.

on August 12, 1982, it received an order dated July 14, 1982, which reads as follows:

ORDER

For failure to file answer within the reglementary period despite due summons, as prayed for by plaintiff,
defendant Roberto Chua is hereby declared in default and plaintiff is allowed to present evidence ex-parte
against said defendant.
ISSUE:

Whether or not defendant failed to file answer within the reglementary period?

Held:

When the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on March 17, 1982, it was well within the 15-day
period within which to file the answer counted from the date it received notice of the denial of its motion
to dismiss which was on March 8, 1982.

Yet, on the erroneous belief that the petitioner had only to its credit the balance of the period to answer
that it did not consume by the time it filed its motion to dismiss, the respondent Judge ruled that the filing
of the motion for reconsideration on March 17, 1982 was already beyond the reglementary period and
forthwith declared the defendant in default.

The respondent Judge committed error in his computation of the period to file an answer after a motion
to dismiss shall have been denied becomes a necessity in view of the fact that, although the first motion
for reconsideration of the order of default was granted, the respondent Judge subsequently revoked his
favorable action thereon. The motion to reconsider the order of revocation must necessarily invoke the
same ground showing why the ground upon which the default order is based is erroneous.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted.

16) LUZON SURETY CO., INC. vs. FIDELA MORIN DE MARBELLLA, HON. JOSE R. QUERUBIN and
MACARIO OFILADA
G.R. No. L-16088 ; September 30, 1960

FACTS:
In Fidela Morin Vda. de Marbella versus Victorino Kilayko, et al., judgment was rendered finding plaintiff
to be rightful heir to the properties left by the deceased Matias Morin, and ordering defendants to
reconvey and deliver to her all properties belonging to the estate that they might have received, with their
fruits, and in case of defendants' failure to comply, to pay plaintiff their value at the time they were
disposed of. The estate of the deceased was, likewise, ordered placed under receivership.
Defendants Kilaykos, et al., appealed and during the pendency of the appeal, and upon petition of plaintiff
Morin Vda. de Marbella, Leopoldo Anoche was, on June 6, 1956, appointed by the trial court receiver of
the properties under litigation.
On July 2, 1956, receiver Anoche filed a P5,000 bond subscribed by himself as principal and the Luzon
Surety Co. as surety. Whereupon, Anoche took his oath and entered into his duties as receiver.
On March 16, 1959, receiver Anoche filed with the court below his final statement of accounts. On April
21, 1959, plaintiff Morin Vda. de Marbella filed a motion praying among other things, for the confiscation
of the bond of the receiver, because the latter had admitted that part of the money and some titles turned
over to him were missing or unaccounted for. On April 28, 1959, the lower court ordered the receiver to
answer plaintiff's charges, and to deposit with the clerk of court all the cash in his possession. Complying
with this order, the receiver filed his answer, stating among other things that could no longer return any
cash to the court because he had no more money in his possession. Whereupon, on May 20, 1959, the
court issued an order endorsing the case of the provincial fiscal for investigation, with a view to the filing
of a criminal complaint against the receiver for misappropriation; and on August 22, 1959, the court issued
another order, stating that "the defendants are not responsible for the restitution of the amount"
delivered to the receiver, "it appearing that the receiver was appointed at the instance of the plaintiff,"
and ordering that a writ of execution be issued "for the amount posted by the receiver".
Pursuant to this order, the provincial sheriff served on September 28, 1959, upon the Luzon Surety
Company, Inc., the corresponding writ of execution against the receiver's bond, and to enforce said writ,
garnished the account of the surety company with the Philippine Trust Co.
Claiming that the proceedings take against its bond, having been made without prior notice to it and in
violation of the procedure outlined in section 20, Rule 59, in conjunction with section 9, Rule 61, of the
Rules of Court, are null and void, the Luzon Surety Co., Inc., filed on October 16, 1959 the present petition
for certiorari with this Court. Upon petitioner's motion and filing of a bond in the amount of P1,000, we
issued a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the execution proceedings against it in the court below.
ISSUE:
Whether the proceedings leading to the issuance of the writ of execution against the receiver's bond are
null and void in so far as the same is sought to be enforced against it, because of non-compliance with the
procedure laid down in section 20, Rule 59, in conjunction with section 9, Rule 61, of the Rules of Court.

HELD:
No. As correctly pointed out by respondent, this procedure is to be followed only in the execution of a
bond filed by either party in the case where the receiver's bond, which is filed by the receiver himself and
his surety.
In other words, the procedure outlined in Rule 59, section 20, is required to be followed only in
proceedings against the bond filed by the applicant for receivership, which answers for the damages that
the adverse party may sustain by reason of the appointment of a receiver in case the applicant shall have
procured the appointment without sufficient cause, or against the counter bond posted by the party
opposing the appointment of receiver, condition to pay all the damages the applicant may suffer by reason
of the acts, omissions, or other matters in the application for receivership. Bonds filed by the parties to
cases are different and should be distinguished from the bond filed by the receiver under section 5 of Rule
61, "executed to such person and in such sum as the court or judge may direct, to the effect that he will
faithfully discharge the duties of receiver in the action and obey the orders of the court therein." Damages
for improperly procuring a receivership, or on a counterbond, cannot be recovered upon any bond filed
by either party unless they are claimed and ascertained in the same action, with due notice to the surety,
pursuant to section 20, Rule 59.
Where, however, the damages sought to be recovered arose from the misconduct or negligence of the
receiver himself in relation to the discharge of his official duties, no one is responsible therefor but the
receiver and his sureties, and for these damages, the bond given by them is valid and enforceable.
The court below having found in this court or account for certain properties and cash in his official custody,
the petitioner, as surety on the receiver's bond, is of course liable on said bond.
That petitioner is liable on its bond does not, however, mean that execution may issue against it without
prior notice of the action or proceeding to hold it liable on its bond, and without giving it its day in court.
The solidary nature of its liability as surety on the receiver's bond does not imply that it can be condemned
to pay without a hearing. Solidarity simply dispenses with the necessity of levying first upon the property
of the principal (beneficio de excusion). As held by this Court in the case of Agusan vs. Velasquez, 88 Phil.,
357:
. . . It seems elementary that before being condemned to pay, it was the elementary right of the surety to
be heard and to be informed that the party seeking indemnity would hold it liable and was going to prove
the grounds and extent of its liability. This case is different from those in which the surety, by law and/or
by the terms of his contract, has promised to abide by the judgment against the principal and renounced
the right to be sued or cited.
That the liability of the surety and the principal under the term of the bond is joint and severally has
nothing to do with the case. The objection is purely procedural. The materially of the question of joint
and several obligation does not come into play until both principal and surety have legally been adjudged
liable by a lawful judgment entered after due hearing.
Besides, a solidary debtor may avail himself of all defenses which are derived from the nature of the
obligation and of those which are personal to him, or pertain to his own share; and even of those personal
to the other co-debtors, as regards their shares in the debt. If a solidary debtor, such as petitioner herein
under its surety bond, is considered concluded by the judgment against its co-debtor, without even
notifying it of the action or proceeding against the latter, he would be deprived of the right and
opportunity to set up any defenses which it may have against liability on their solidary undertaking.
WHEREFORE, the order of execution against petitioner is hereby set aside for being null and void, and the
records are remanded to the court of origin for a hearing on the question of petitioner's liability under the
receiver's bond. Cost against respondent Fidela Morin de Marbella.
RULE 65:

17) MATUTINA VS. BUSLON

G.R. NO. L-14637; August 24, 1960

FACTS:

In Civil Case No. 384 of the Court of First Instance of Surigao, the respondent judge issued an order,
requiring petitioner Matutina to appear before the Court to show cause why he should not be declared in
contempt of court for employing words derogatory to the dignity of the Court in his pleading dated
October 30, 1958. On November 5, 1985, in response to the above order, petitioner filed a
"Manifestation" stating that the petitioner would like to be informed what particular words, phrases or
portions of his pleading dated October 30, 1958 are considered language derogatory to the dignity of the
court, in order for him to intelligently put up his defense. Also, petitioner stated that after having been
informed what constitutes derogatory language in said pleading, he would like to request for three (3)
days within which to submit his defense or explanation. On the same day (November 5), the respondent
judge, without the attendance of petitioner, issued an order for the latter’s arrest. The Provincial Sheriff,
thru a deputy, went to the house of Matutina to effect the arrest, but this did not materialize as Matutina
was bed- ridden with influenza at the time. The respondent judge then verbally suspended petitioner’s
arrest until further orders. Petitioner prays for a judgment (a) annulling the order of arrest; (b)
commanding respondent judge to specify the words employed by petitioner in his pleading of October
30, 1958, which said respondent considers derogatory to the dignity of the court; (d) granting the
injunction; (e) awarding damages and costs; and (f) for other general relief.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the order of arrest issued by respondent judge was justified.
2. Whether or not the petition should be denied considering that, no Motion for Reconsideration
was filed.

HELD:

1. No. The order of arrest issued by respondent judge was not justified. Petitioner had asked that he
be informed as to the portions of his pleading dated October 30, 1958 which were supposedly
derogatory to the dignity of the court, and for a period of three days thereafter to file his answer.
Because of the length of the pleading, and because the expressions used therein were not
blatantly offensive, since the petitioner’s description of the Court’s action as "vague, uncalled for
and unjust" amounted to no more than saying that the order was erroneous and unjustified, it is
really probable that petitioner was not sure, and, although he might have an inkling, he wanted
to have something more definite than conjecture on which to base his contemplated explanation
or answer. Until his motion was considered and passed upon and petitioner notified, the order of
arrest was not warranted. Contempt of court presupposes a contumacious attitude, a flouting or
arrogant belligerence, a defiance of the court; and it is not evident in this case. The fact that
petitioner was not present in the morning session of November 5, 1958, did not make his actions
contemptuous. As it turned out, Matutina was sick with "influenza", which was precisely why his
arrest was postponed.
2. No. While as a matter of policy, a motion for reconsideration has, in many instances, been
considered necessary before applying for a writ of certiorari, this rule was never intended to be
applied without considering the circumstances. In view of the urgency of petitioner’s
predicament, arising from the order of arrest which was only temporarily suspended until his
recovery, and because the uncompromising attitude of respondent judge rendered improbable
the granting of relief, this case should not be included within the purview of the rule requiring a
previous motion for reconsideration. The order of arrest issued on November 5, 1958 was set
aside.
RULE 65:

18) GULLERMO AMANTE vs. PEDRO MA. SISON, Judge of First Instance of Batangas, and ROSARIO
MANZANERO
G.R. No. L-42625 ; November 26, 1934

FACTS:

Herein petitioner filed an application for the summary settlement and distribution of the estate of the
deceased Leopoldo Laurel, the value of which did not exceed P6,000, and the approval, after hearing, of
his claim for the sum of P850, of Pedro Marile for P870, of Santiago Jazmin for P300, of Cosme Reyes for
P200, and of Juana Mabilañgan for P130. Hearing was held on the appointed date and, after the
presentation of evidence, the court entered the order dated December 21, 1933, approving the aforesaid
claims and directing Ruperto Carpio, who was appointed special administrator, to sell the real estate of
the deceased and with its proceeds pay the claims in question.

On January 5, 1934, the widow of the deceased filed a motion for reconsideration praying the court to set
aside the order of December 21, 1933, and suspend the proceedings of the case. On September 27, 1934,
the court entered the order which is the subject of this petition whereby it set aside the order dated
December 21, 1933, and appointed the widow as regular administratrix.

Instead of filing a motion for reconsideration, herein petitioner filed a petition for certiorari contending
that the court, in entering the order dated December 21, 1933, had acted without and in excess of
jurisdiction. The argument was centered on the court’s alleged loss of jurisdiction, for the reason that the
other order dated December 21, 1933, had already become final and had been fully executed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner’s failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration first is fatal to his cause

HELD:

Yes.

The petition cannot prosper, on the ground that the respondent judge has not been given an opportunity
to reexamine the legal aspect of the case by the filing of a motion for reconsideration. The necessity of
filing a motion for reconsideration, before bringing an action for certiorari and similar special remedies, is
a rule already established in this jurisdiction.

The error or irregularity must be brought to the attention of the inferior court by way of a motion for
reconsideration.

Petition denied.
RULE 65:

19) NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS

126 SCRA 394

FACTS:

Rural Power Corporation, Eusebio E. Ferrer, Lourdes Sison, and Eduardo Ferrer executed a Real Estate
Mortgage in favor of petitioner National Electrification Administration. On the same date, Rural Power
was required to execute two other real estate mortgages to secure two other loans but said amounts
were never released. Of the three deeds of mortgages, only the first has been the object of
implementation. Among the conditions of the mortgage were that the amount to be released to Rural
Power would be utilized for the "purposes therein specified subject to availability of funds", and "that the
respondents shall adhere strictly with the program of work and specifications attached to the deed."
There were violations on the conditions which made the petitioner institute an extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings and a public auction occurred. Judge, Eloy B. Bello, issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
stopping the auction sale and subsequently decided in favor of Rural Power after trial on the merits.
Petitioner filed an appeal which was disapproved for alleged non-compliance with Section 6, Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court which was then corrected later on.

Later on, petitioner instituted a Petition for certiorari and mandamus with Preliminary Injunction before
CA but the latter ruled that the failure of petitioner to ask respondent Judge to reconsider his Order of
before resorting to the remedies of certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction was "fatal" to
petitioner's position.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent trial Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in disapproving petitioner's
Record on Appeal and the subsequent Amended Record on Appeal.

HELD:

YES. The Trial Judge's disapproval of the appeal for alleged non- compliance with Section 6 of Rule 41 were
both considered to be vague because it did not specify the requirements that were not complied with nor
the errors or additions that had to be corrected or added. Moreover, such defects were already cured in
the Amended Record on Appeal filed by the petitioners and so, the disapproval of the Amended Record
on Appeal on the same ground of alleged non- compliance with Section 6, Rule 41 was already arbitrary
and constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
20) ESPERANZA FERNANDEZ vs. HON. HERMOGENES CALUAG, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch IV (Quezon City) and J. M. TUASON & CO., INC.
G.R. No. L-16124, December 30, 1961

PONENTE: PADILLA, J.:

NATURE: Petition for a writ of mandamus with preliminary injunction

FACTS:

Esperanza Fernandez alleges J. M. Tuason & Company, Inc., (respondent) filed a complaint against her in
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IV, Quezon City, for recovery of possession (accion publiciana)
of 100 sq. m. of land situated in barrio North Tatalon, Quezon City, allegedly owned by the respondent
corporation and covered by transfer certificate of title No. 1267 (37686-Rizal) of the Registry of Deeds of
Quezon City, for collection of the sum of P30 monthly from the date of usurpation by her, defendant, and
petitioner herein until restoration of possession to the respondent corporation.

It appears that the summons and the copy of the complaint to be served upon the petitioners were
delivered to and received by petitioner’s lessee Jovita C. Arinas at the premises occupied by (the lessee)
who, however, had not been authorized by the petitioner to receive them; that the lessee handed them
to the petitioners only after the lapse of the reglementary period for filing an answer; that the petitioner’s
verified motion to set aside the order of default was filed within sixty days after she had learned of the
order declaring her in default and six months after the entry of said order; and that attached to the motion
to set aside were affidavits by the lessee and the petitioner showing the excusable negligence relied upon
and the facts constituting the petitioner’s good and substantial defenses.

With these facts, the petitioner prays for a writ of mandamus to be issued directing respondent Court to
allow her to appeal and set aside the order of default. In addition, praying for writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining the lower court to adjudicate on the civil case. The Supreme Court granted the writ of
preliminary injunction.

ISSUE:

Whether motion for reconsideration is necessary in filing the petition for mandamus?

HELD:

Mandamus is the remedy of an aggrieved party whose appeal or record on appeal is erroneously dismiss
or disallowed.
From the order declaring the petitioner in default, she is entitled to appeal. The disallowance of her record
on appeal and dismissal of her appeal by the respondent court constitute an unlawful exclusion of the
petitioner from the use and enjoyment of her statutory right to appeal. The fact that the petitioner had
not sought from the respondent court a reconsideration of its order dismissing her appeal is of no
moment. When a definite question has been properly raised, argued, and submitted to the respondent
court and has been passed upon by it, a motion for reconsideration of the same question is no longer
necessary as a condition precedent to the filing of a petition for mandamus.

In the case at bar the question — whether or not the petitioner is entitled to appeal from the order
denying her motion to set aside the order of default — has been raised, argued and submitted by the
parties to the respondent court in the "opposition to approval of record on appeal and appeal bond and
petition to dismiss appeal filed by the respondent corporation, in the "reply to opposition to the record
on appeal filed by the petitioner, in the "rejoinder to 'reply to opposition to record on appeal filed by the
respondent corporation and in the "surrejoinder to rejoinder to our reply" filed by the petitioner, and
passed upon by the respondent court.

DISPOSITIVE: The writ prayed for is granted.

RULE 65:

21) THE CITY OF MANILA vs. HON. CARIDAD H. GRECIA-CUERDO

G.R. No. 175723 ; February 4, 2014

FACTS:

The City of Manila, through its treasurer Liberty M. Toledo, assessed taxes for the year 2002 against
private respondents SM Mart, Inc., SM Prime Holdings, Inc., Star Appliances Center, Supervalue, Inc., Ace
Hardware Philippines, Inc., Watsons Personal Care Stores Phils., Inc., Jollimart Philippines Corp., Surplus
Marketing Corp. and Signature Lines. In addition to the taxes purportedly due from private respondents
pursuant to Section 14, 15, 16, 17 of the Revised Revenue Code of Manila (RRCM), said assessment
covered the local business taxes petitioners were authorized to collect under Section 21 of the same Code.
Because payment of the taxes assessed was a precondition for the issuance of their business permits,
private respondents were constrained to pay the ₱19,316,458.77 assessment under protest. In 2004,
private respondents filed a complaint before public respondent’s sala (RTC of Pasay City Branch 112) for
"Refund or Recovery of Illegally and/or Erroneously-Collected Local Business Tax, Prohibition with Prayer
to Issue TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction." They alleged that in relation to Section 21 thereof,
Sections 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 of the RRCM were violative of the limitations and guidelines under
Section 143 (h) of Republic Act. No. 7160 (Local Government Code) on double taxation and that petitioner
city's Ordinance No. 8011 which amended pertinent portions of the RRCM had already been declared to
be illegal and unconstitutional by the Department of Justice. The RTC granted private respondent’s
application for a writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals after their Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the RTC. The CA dismissed the
petition for certiorari on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the petition. According to the CA, it is the
Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) that has appellate jurisdiction over the private respondents’ complaint for tax
refund, and therefore, a petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an interlocutory order issued in the
said case should, likewise, be filed with the CTA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory
order issued by the RTC in a local tax case.

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that the issues raised in the present petition, which merely involve the incident
on the preliminary injunction issued by the RTC, have already become moot and academic considering
that the trial court, in its decision on the merits in the main case, has already ruled in favor of respondents
and that the same decision is now final and executory. Well entrenched is the rule that where the issues
have become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, thereby rendering the resolution of
the same of no practical use or value. However, the Court found it necessary to resolve the issue on
jurisdiction raised by petitioners owing to its significance and for future guidance of both bench and bar.
It is a settled principle that courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of
repetition, yet evading review.
With respect to the procedural aspect, petitioners availed of the wrong remedy when they filed the instant
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court in assailing the Resolutions of the CA
which dismissed their petition filed with the said court and their motion for reconsideration of such
dismissal. There is no dispute that the assailed Resolutions of the CA are in the nature of a final order as
they disposed of the petition completely. It is settled that in cases where an assailed judgment or order is
considered final, the remedy of the aggrieved party is appeal. Hence, in the instant case, petitioner should
have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, which is a continuation of the appellate process
over the original case. It is an equally-settled rule that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is
an original or independent action based on grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction and it will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. As such, it cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal. Nonetheless, in accordance
with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of substantial justice, the Supreme
Court has, before, treated a petition for certiorari as a petition for review on certiorari. Because of the
significance of the issue on jurisdiction, the Court deemed it proper and justified to relax the rules and,
thus, treat the instant petition for certiorari as a petition for review on certiorari.

On the issue of whether or not the CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an
interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax case, the SC ruled in the affirmative. Republic Act No.
1125, which created the CTA, provides that the CTA has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over decisions,
orders or resolutions of the RTCs in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise
of their original or appellate jurisdiction. However, there is no categorical statement under RA 1125 as
well as the amendatory RA 9282, which provides that the CTA has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari
assailing interlocutory orders issued by the RTC in local tax cases filed before it. Section 5 (1), Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution grants power to the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, to
issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. With respect to the Court of Appeals, Section 9 (1) of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129) gives the appellate court, also in the exercise of its original jurisdiction,
the power to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
As to Regional Trial Courts, the power to issue a writ of certiorari, in the exercise of their original
jurisdiction, is provided under Section 21 of BP 129. While there is no express grant of such power with
respect to the CTA, Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides, nonetheless, that judicial
power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law and
that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government. On the strength of the above constitutional provisions, it can be fairly interpreted
that the power of the CTA includes that of determining whether or not there has been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory
order in cases falling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax court. It, thus, follows that the
CTA, by constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in these cases.
Furthermore, Section 6, Rule 135 of the present Rules of Court provides that when by law, jurisdiction is
conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it
into effect may be employed by such court or officer.
RULE 65:

22) KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYANG MAHIHIRAP, INC. vs. JESSIE ROBREDO

G.R. No. 200903, July 22, 2014

FACTS:

The members of petitioners Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap as well as the individual petitioners,
Sevilla et al. were/are occupying parcels of land owned by and located in the cities of San Juan, Navotas
and Quezon (collectively, the LGUs1). These LGUs sent the petitioners notices of eviction and demolition
pursuant to Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 in order to give way to the implementation and
construction of infrastructure projects2 in the areas illegally occupied by the petitioners.3

Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 authorize evictions and demolitions without any court order when: (1)
persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks,
shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks, and playgrounds; and (2)
persons or entities occupy areas where government infrastructure projects with available funding are
about to be implemented.

On March 23, 2012, the petitioners directly filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus before the
Court, seeking to compel the Secretary of Interior and Local Government, et al. (the public
respondents)to first secure an eviction and/or demolition order from the court prior to their
implementation of Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279.

The petitioners justify their direct recourse before this Court by generally averring that they have no
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.4 They also posit that the respondents
gravely abused their discretion in implementing Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 which are patently
unconstitutional. They likewise insist that they stand to be directly injured by the respondents threats of
evictions and demolitions. In the alternative, they contend that the transcendental public importance of
the issues raised in this case clothes them with legal standing.5

The petitioners argue that Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 offend their constitutional right to due
process because they warrant evictions and demolitions without any court order. They point out that
Section 6, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution expressly prohibits the impairment of liberty of abode
unless there is a court order. Moreover, Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 violate their right to adequate
housing, a universal right recognized in Article 25 of Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Section
2 (a) of RA 7279. The petitioners further complain that the respondents had previously conducted
evictions and demolitions in a violent manner, contrary to Section 10, Article 13 of the 1987
Constitution.6

The Position of the Mayor of Navotas :

The Mayor of Navotas prays for the outright dismissal of the petition for its serious procedural
defects. First, the petitioners ignored the hierarchy of courts when they directly filed a Rule 65 petition
before the Court.
Second, the petitioners incorrectly availed themselves of a petition for prohibition and mandamus in
assailing the constitutionality of Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279. According to the Mayor of Navotas,
the office of a writ of prohibition is merely to prevent the public respondents usurpation of power or
improper assumption of jurisdiction. On the other hand, a writ of mandamus only commands the public
respondent to perform his ministerial functions.

Third, the petitioners failed to particularly state the grave abuse of discretion that the Mayor of Navotas
allegedly committed. Fourth, the petition does not present any justiciable controversy since the City of
Navotas had already successfully evicted the petitioners in San Roque, Navotas on November 28, 2011.

Fifth, the petition was filed out of time since the petitioners were personally notified of the intended
eviction and demolition on September 23, 2011.8

The Mayor argues that Section 10, Article 13 of the 1987 Constitution allows evictions and demolitions
to be conducted even without a court order provided they are done in accordance with the law and in a
just and humane manner. According to him, RA 7279 is precisely the law referred to by Section 10,
Article 13 of the 1987 Constitution.

The Position of the Mayor of San Juan:

The Mayor of San Juan similarly argues that the petitioners improperly availed themselves of a petition
for prohibition and mandamus before the Court. She contends that she performed neither judicial nor
ministerial functions in implementing RA 7279, the enabling law of Section 10, Article 13 of the 1987
Constitution. She also maintains that the petition has been rendered moot and academic by the
successful eviction of some of the petitioners. in Pinaglabanan, Corazon de Jesus, San Juan. The Mayor
of San Juan further stresses that Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 already lay down the procedure in
evicting informal settlers in a just and humane manner.

The Position of the Mayor of Quezon:

The Mayor of Quezon City holds that the petitioners premature invocation of the Courts power of
judicial review and their violation of the principle of hierarchy of courts are fatal to their cause of action.
. He additionally argues that his faithful implementation of RA 7279, which the legislature enacted in the
exercise of police power, does not amount to grave abuse of discretion.11

The Position of the Secretary of Interior and Local Government and the General Manager of the
National Housing Authority

The position that the petition is procedurally infirm. They further argue that the liberty of abode is not
illimitable and does not include the right to encroach upon other person properties. They also reiterate
that Section 28 of RA 7279 provides sufficient safeguards in ensuring that evictions and demolitions are
carried out in a just and humane manner.12

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not it should be dismissed for serious procedural defects.
2. Whether or not it violates the principle of hierarchy of courts
3. Whether or not RA 7279 sec. 29 (a) and (b) violate sec. 1 and 6 of Art. 3 of the constitution.
HELD:

1. YES! The petitioners wrongly availed themselves of a petition for prohibition

and mandamus. The petitioners seem to have forgotten that a writ of prohibition only lies against the
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or persons exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions.14We issue a writ of prohibition to afford the aggrieved party a relief against the respondents
usurpation or grave abuse of jurisdiction or power.15

On the other hand, a petition for mandamus is merely directed against the tribunal, corporation, board,
officer, or person who unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust or station or who unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled.16 Thus, a writ of mandamus will only issue
to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty. It will not control a public officers exercise of
discretion as where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any
manner in which he is required to act precisely because it is his judgment that is to be exercised, not
that of the court.17

In the present case, the petitioners seek to prohibit the respondents from implementing Section 28 (a)
and (b) of RA 7279 without a prior court order of eviction and/or demolition. In relation to this,
paragraph 1, Section 28 of RA 7279 provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Sec.28. Eviction and Demolition. Eviction or demolition as a practice shall be discouraged. Eviction or
demolition, however, may be allowed under the following situations:

(a) When persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps,
riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks, and
playgrounds;
(b) When government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be implemented; or
(c) When there is a court order for eviction and demolition. (emphasis and underline ours)

ICBR, the provision clearly shows that the acts complained of are beyond the scope of a petition for
prohibition and mandamus. The use of the permissive word may implies that the public respondents
have discretion when their duty to execute evictions and/or demolitions shall be performed. Where the
words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation.18

Consequently, the time when the public respondents shall carry out evictions and/or demolitions under
Section 28 (a), (b), and (c) of RA 7279 is merely discretionary, and not ministerial, judicial or quasi-
judicial. The duty is discretionary if the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right
to decide when the duty shall be performed.

In contrast, a ministerial duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a
prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise
of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.19

On the other hand, both judicial and quasi-judicial functions involve the determination of what the law
is, and what the legal rights of the contending parties are, with respect to the matter in controversy and,
on the basis thereof and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of their respective rights.20

2. The petitioners violated the principle of hierarchy of courts when they directly
filed the petition before the Court. The petitioners appear to have forgotten that the Supreme Court is a
court of last resort, not a court of first instance. The hierarchy of courts should serve as a general
determinant of the appropriate forum for Rule 65 petitions. The concurrence of jurisdiction among the
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction does not give the petitioners the unrestricted
freedom of choice of forum. By directly filing Rule 65 petitions before us, the petitioners have unduly
taxed the Courts time and attention which are better devoted to matters within our exclusive
jurisdiction. Worse, the petitioners only contributed to the overcrowding of the Court's docket. We also
wish to emphasize that the trial court is better equipped to resolve cases of this nature since this Court
is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake an examination of the contending parties
evidence.

3. THE REQUISITES OF JUDCICIAL REVIEW NOT COMPLIED WITH.

Even if we treat the present petition as one for certiorari since it assails the constitutionality of Section
28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279, the petition must necessarily fail for failure to show the essential requisites
that would warrant the Court’s exercise of judicial review.

It is a rule firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence that the courts will not determine the constitutionality
of a law unless the following requisites are present: (1) the existence of an actual case or controversy
involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination;

(2) the existence of personal and substantial interest on the part of the party raising the constitutional
question;

(3) recourse to judicial review is madeat the earliest opportunity;

and (4) the resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary to the decision of the case.21

The Court will not touch the issue of constitutionality because this issue is not the lis mota of this
case. Lis mota literally means the cause of the suit or action; it is rooted in the principle of separation of
powers and is thus merely an offshoot of the presumption of validity accorded the executive and
legislative acts of our co-equal branches of the government.

This means that the petitioner who claims the unconstitutionality of a law has the burden of showing
first that the case cannot be resolved unless the disposition of the constitutional question that he raised
is unavoidable. If there is some other ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, that course
will be adopted and the question of constitutionality should be avoided.22 Thus, to justify the
nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that
is doubtful, speculative or argumentative.The Court concluded that the petition failed to compellingly
show the necessity of examining the constitutionality of Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 in the light of
Sections 1 and 6, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution.24
As ruled in Magkalas v. NHA,25 this Court had already ruled on the validity of evictions and demolitions
without any court order. In that case, we affirmed the validity of Section 2 of Presidential Decree No.
1472 which authorizes the NHA to summarily eject all informal settlers colonies on government
resettlement projects as well as any illegal occupant in any homelot, apartment or dwelling unit owned
or administered by the NHA, the grounds are when persons or entities occupy danger areas such as
esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways and other public places such
as sidewalks, roads, parks and playgrounds, pursuant to Section 28(a) of R.A. No. 7279; and when
government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be implemented pursuant to
Section 28(b) of R.A. No. 7279.26

Section 10, Article 13 of the 1987 Constitution provides that urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be
evicted nor their dwelling demolished, except in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner.
Paragraph 1, Section 28 of RA 7279 allows summary evictions and demolition in cases where persons or
entities occupy danger areas and when persons or entities occupy areas where government
infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be implemented.

To ensure that evictions and demolitions are conducted in a just and humane manner, paragraph 2,
Section 28 of RA 7279 commands the public respondents to comply with the following prescribed
procedure in executing eviction and/or demolition orders:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In the execution of eviction or demolition orders involving underprivileged and homeless citizens, the
following shall be mandatory:

(1) Notice upon the effected persons or entities at least thirty (30) days prior to the date of eviction or
demolition;
(2) Adequate consultations on the matter of settlement with the duly designated representatives of
the families to be resettled and the affected communities in the areas where they are to be
relocated;
(3) Presence of local government officials or their representatives during eviction or demolition;
(4) Proper identification of all persons taking part in the demolition;
(5) Execution of eviction or demolition only during regular office hours from Mondays to Fridays and
during good weather, unless the affected families consent otherwise;
(6) No use of heavy equipment for demolition except for structures that are permanent and of
concrete materials;
(7) Proper uniforms for members of the Philippine National Police who shall occupy the first line of law
enforcement and observe proper disturbance control procedures; and
(8) Adequate relocation, whether temporary or permanent: Provided, however, That in cases of
eviction and demolition pursuant to a court order involving underprivileged and homeless citizens,
relocation shall be undertaken by the local government unit concerned and the National Housing
Authority with the assistance of other government agencies within forty-five (45) days from service
of notice of final judgment by the court, after which period the said order shall be executed:
Provided, further, That should relocation not be possible within the said period, financial assistance
in the amount equivalent to the prevailing minimum daily wage multiplied by sixty (60) days shall
be extended to the affected families by the local government unit concerned.

This Department of the Interior and Local Government and the Housing and Urban Development
Coordinating Council shall jointly promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to carry out the above
provision.

Lastly, the petitioners failed to substantiate their allegations that the public respondents gravely abused
their discretion in implementing Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279. Instead, they merely imputed
jurisdictional abuse to the public respondents through general averments in their pleading, but without
any basis to support their claim.

This is precisely the reason why we frown upon the direct filing of Rule 65 petitions before the Court. To
the point of being repetitive, we emphasize that we are not trier of facts and this applies with greater
force to Rule 65 petitions which are original and independent actions. To justify judicial intrusion into
what is fundamentally the domain of the executive department, the petitioners must establish facts that
are necessarily linked to the jurisdictional problem they presented in this case, i.e., whether the public
respondents exercised their power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility in implementing Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279.

Since the petitioners failed to establish that the public respondents alleged abuse of discretion was so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to
act in contemplation of law, this petition must necessarily fail.
RULE 65:
23) TUASON vs. REGISTER OF DEEDS
157 SCRA 613

FACTS:

Petitioner spouses, the Tuasons, were retired public school teachers.. With funds pooled from their
retirement benefits and savings, they bought from Carmel Farms, Inc. a piece of land in the latter’s
subdivision in Caloocan City. In virtue of this sale, Carmel’s Torrens title was cancelled and a new one
issued in the name of the Tuasons. The Tuasons took possession of their property. Some eight years
thereafter, the Tuasons’ travails began. They woke up one morning to discover that by presidential flat,
they were no longer the owners of the land they had purchased with their hard-earned money, and that
their land and the other lots in the subdivision had been “declared open for disposition and sale to the
members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc., the present bona fide occupants thereof.”

On September 14, 1973-a year almost to the day after the declaration of martial law Mr. Marcos, invoking
his emergency powers, issued Presidential Decree No. 293 with immediate effect. The decree
invalidated inter alia the title of the Tuasons’ vendor, Carmel, which had earlier purchased from the
Government the land it had subsequently subdivided into several lots for sale to the public. Said
Presidential Decree No. 293 made the finding that Carmel had failed to complete payment of the price.

Mr. Marcos disposed of the land of the petitioner spouses and others similarly situated as they, in the
following imperious manner: order and decree that any and all sales contracts between the government
and the original purchasers, are hereby cancelled, and those between the latter and the subsequent
transferees, and any and all transfers are hereby declared invalid and null and void ab initio as against the
Government.

On the strength of this presidential decree, the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City caused the inscription
on the Tuasons’ title, that their certificate of title is declared invalid and null and void ab initio and
considered cancelled as against the Government and the property described herein is declared open for
disposition and sale to the members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc.

The Tuason Spouses thereupon filed with this Court a petition for certiorari assailing the Marcos decree
as an arbitrary measure which deprived them of their property in favor of a selected group, in violation
not only of the constitutional provisions on due process and eminent domain 5 but also of the provisions
of the Land Registration Act on the indefeasibility of Torrens titles; 6 and they prayed that the Register of
Deeds be directed to cancel the derogatory inscription on their title and restore its efficacy.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the remedy of petition for certiorari was proper
HELD:
The decree reveals that Mr. Marcos exercised an obviously judicial function. He made a determination of
facts, and applied the law to those facts, declaring what the legal rights of the parties were in the premises.
These acts essentially constitute a judicial function, or an exercise of jurisdiction — which is the power
and authority to hear or try and decide or determine a cause.

These acts may thus be properly struck down by the writ of certiorari, because done by an officer in the
performance of what in essence is a judicial function, if it be shown that the acts were done without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Since Mr. Marcos was never vested with judicial
power, such power, as everyone knows, being vested in the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as
may be established by law — the judicial acts done by him were in the circumstances indisputably
perpetrated without jurisdiction. The acts were completely alien to his office as chief executive, and
utterly beyond the permissible scope of the legislative power that he had.

The Court has it in its power to treat the petition for certiorari as one for prohibition if the averments of
the former sufficiently made out a case for the latter. It will also appear that an executive officer had acted
without jurisdiction — exercised judicial power not granted to him by the Constitution or the laws — and
had furthermore performed the act in violation of the constitutional rights of the parties thereby affected.
RULE 65:

24) PABLO BURGUETE vs. MAYOR

G.R. No. L-6538, May 10, 1954

EN BANC, JUGO, J.:

FACTS:

Pablo Burguete, is the elected municipal mayor of Badajoz, Province of Romblon in November, 1951;
Jovencio Q. Mayor, is the provincial governor of Romblon; and Esteban B. Montesa, the acting municipal
mayor of Badajoz, Province of Romblon.

A criminal complaint for serious slander was filed against Burguete in the justice of the peace court of
Badajoz and was forwarded to the Court of First Instance of Romblon. On November 13, 1952, Mayor
suspended Burguete on the ground of the pending criminal case as the "standing policy to elective
official with a criminal action involving moral turpitude for adjudication before the competent court."
Mayor directed Montesa, the vice-mayor, to act as mayor.

Burguete now files in this Court a petition for mandamus and quo warranto against Mayor and Montesa.

The case for serious slander against Burguete is still pending in the Court of First Instance. Burguete has
filed a motion to quash, but was denied. The case could not be tried on the merits on account of the
non-appearance of the witnesses for the prosecution. No administrative investigation by the provincial
board has been conducted under section 2188 of the Administrative Code.

ISSUE:

whether the petition for mandamus and quo warranto is proper?

HELD:

Yes because the suspension of the petitioner is illegal and unjustified.

In the case of Lacson vs. Roque, (49 Off. Gaz., 93), it was held that the mere filing of an information for
libel against a municipal officer is not a sufficient ground for dispensing him. The same may be said with
regard to serious slander, which is another form of libel. Libel does not necessarily involve moral
turpitude. Furthermore, it would be an easy expedient to file a criminal complaint or information against
a municipal mayor for the purpose of suspending him, and the suspension would last almost indefinitely,
according to the time that would elapse before the criminal case is finally terminated by conviction or
acquittal. Mayor is ordered to reinstate Burguete in his office, and to oust Montesa, with costs against
the respondents.
RULE 65:

25) GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) VS. FERNANDO P. DE LEON

G.R. No. 186560, November 17, 2010

FACTS:

Respondent Fernando De Leon retired as Chief State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice (DOJ) in
1992 after 44 years of service to the government. He applied for retirement under RA 910 which provides
that Chief State Prosecutors hold the same rank a judges. The application was approved by GSIS. For more
than nine (9) years, respondent continuously received his retirement benefits until 2001, when GSIS
cancelled the payment of his pension because the Department of Budget and Management (DBM)
informed GSIS that respondent was not qualified to retire under RA 910, because the law was meant to
apply only to justices and judges. Respondent filed a Petitioner for Mandamus before the Court of Appeals
(CA) praying that GSIS to continue paying his monthly pension and to pay his unpaid monthly benefits
from 2001. CA granted the petition. GSIS is now before the SC assailing the decision of CA. GSIS argues
the following:

1. CA erred in issuing a writ of mandamus because respondent could not show a clear right to the
relief sought;
2. It had already refunded respondent’s premium payments;
3. CA erred in concluding that respondent would not be unjustly enriched;
4. CA erred in concluding that respondent was not seeking conversion from one point to another;
and
5. The Writ of Mandamus issued by the CA is not proper because it compels petitioner to perform
an act that is contrary to law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Writ of Mandamus issued by the CA is proper.

HELD:
Yes, the issuance Writ of Mandamus is proper. This case involves a former government official who, after
honorably service the office for 44 years, was comfortably enjoying his retirement, but found himself
abruptly denied the benefit and left without means of sustenance. This is a situation that obviously cries
out for the proper application of retirement laws, which are in the class of social legislation. In this case,
respondent was able to establish that he has a clear legal right to the reinstatement of his retirement
benefits. Social legislation must be liberally construed in favor of the beneficiaries. Retirement laws, in
particular, are liberally construed in favor of the retiree because their objective is to provide for the
retirees sustenance and hopefully, even comfort, when he no longer has the capability to earn a
livelihood. Indeed, retirement laws are liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons
tended to be benefited, and all doubts are resolved in favor of the retiree to achieve their humanitarian
purpose.
RULE 65:
26) TAVERA-LUNA, INC. vs. JUDGE MARIANO NABLE
G.R. No. L-45601 April 14, 1939

FACTS:

On December 21, 1936, El Hogar Filipino, as administrator of the Crystal Arcade Building, filed civil case
No. 111246 in the municipal court of the City of Manila to recover the possession of the portion known
as the "Torre of the Crystal Arcade" from the defendant therein, Andres Luna by reason of the latter's
failure to pay the corresponding rentals thereof.

In answer to the complaint, Andres Luna alleged, among other things, that Tavera-Luna, Inc., the
petitioner herein, was the owner of the Crystal Arcade Building, and that El Hogar Filipino, as mere
administrator thereof, had no right to increase the rental of the portion occupied by him, and that there
was pending in the Court of First Instance of Manila, civil case No. 47097, entitled "Tavera vs. El Hogar
Filipino and Tavera-Luna, Inc.", in which the issue involved was the title and ownership over the Crystal
Arcade Building.

On January 7, 1937, the petitioner filed a motion for intervention, which motion was denied by the
respondent judge of the municipal court of Manila. To compel the respondent municipal judge to admit
the intervention, Tavera-Luna, Inc., instituted mandamus proceedings in the Court of First Instance of
Manila. In its petition for mandamus Tavera-Luna, Inc., the petitioner and herein appellant, alleges that
as the registered owner of the Crystal Arcade building, any judgment which might be rendered against
the defendant Andres Luna in civil case No. 111246 would necessarily affect the occupancy and
possession of the tower of that building by Tavera-Luna, Inc., of which Andres Luna was the president,
and that the respondent judge, in refusing to admit its motion for intervention in civil case No. 11246,
had committed an abuse of discretion. Respondent demurred to the petition on the grounds (1) that the
petition did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and (2) that the petitioner had
other plain, adequate and speedy remedy at law. The Court of First Instance of Manila sustained the
demurrer of the respondent. The petitioner having elected to stand on its complaint, the lower court
adverted to in the beginning of this opinion.

Petitioner claims that in illegal detainer proceedings, the defendant or any intervenor therein may,
subject to certain qualifications, raise the question of ownership of the property in litigation. The rule is
that in an action of forcible entry and detainer, instituted to recover possession, the defendant cannot
defeat that action merely by asserting in his answer a claim of ownership in himself. The only exception
to this rule is when the question of ownership is so necessarily involved that it would be impossible to
decide the question of mere possession without first settling that of ownership.

In civil case No. 111246 of the municipal court of the City of Manila, El Hogar Filipino alleged mere
possession of the Crystal Arcade Building of which the tower occupied by Andres Luna is part, and that
Luna failed to pay the rents from November 1, 1936. Both plaintiff and defendant there did not claim
any right of ownership for themselves of the Crystal Arcade Building or of its tower. The sole question
presented was one of possession. The question of ownership of the building was a matter foreign. This
being the case, it is not seen how the petitioner's claim of ownership of the Crystal Arcade Building
could be affected by any decision rendered in the detainer proceedings.
ISSUE:

WON the demurrer interposed by the respondent to the petitioner's petition for mandamus shall
sustain?

HELD:

YES. It is claimed that once the party intervenor has established the necessary requisites for
intervention, that is, after he has shown the required legal interest in the matter in litigation and in the
success of either party or both, it becomes mandatory on the part of the court to admit the motion to
intervene, and that its refusal to admit that motion, after the party intervenor has complied with those
requisites, can be the subject of mandamus proceedings.

Under section 121 of the Code of Civil Procedure, before a party may be allowed to intervene in an
action or proceeding, he must show legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of
the parties, or an interest against both. And the granting or refusal of a motion to intervene is a matter
of judicial discretion, and once exercised, the decision of the court cannot be reviewed or controlled
by mandamus, however erroneous it may be (Otto Gmur, Inc. vs. Revilla, 55 Phil., 627).

The only exception to this rule is when there is an arbitrary abuse of that discretion, in which
case mandamus may issue if there is no other adequate remedy, though the result is that the court will
be called upon to review the exercise of the discretionary power. Such review is allowed because the
power of discretion is not an arbitrary and despotic one, to be exercised at the pleasure of the court, or
from passion, prejudice, or personal hostility. But it has also been held that this abuse of discretion must
be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined or to act all, in contemplation of law.

In this case, the petitioner concedes that the respondent is given discretionary power to admit or not its
motion for intervention, it nevertheless contends that the respondent judge of the municipal court of
Manila abused his discretion in denying the intervention.

Therefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed

RULE 65:

27) AMERICAN INSURANCE CO. vs. REPUBLIC

G.R. No. L-25478 ; October 23, 1967

FACTS:

Sometime in May of 1963, the Bureau of Customs received from SS "Turandot" a cargo of 4 cartons of
oven heaters from New York, consigned to San Miguel Corporation. Subsequently, the Bureau of Customs
failed to deliver 1 carton of 2 pieces of oven heaters worth P690.30. As insurers of the cargo, American
Insurance Co. paid the consignee P690.30. On October 6, 1964, American Insurance Co. filed a complaint
for the recovery of P690.30 against the Republic and the Bureau of Customs in the City of Manila. On
February 18, 1965, answer was filed, denying liability and alleging immunity from suit. On May 22, 1965
the City Court ordered the defendants to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiff P690.00 with legal
interest from October 6, 1964 plus P100 attorney's fees. Defendants appealed to the Court of First
Instance. On October 27, 1965, the date set for pre-trial, only plaintiff's counsel appeared. When the court
asked from counsel of plaintiff the latter's authority to compromise, the counsel could not present such
authority. Whereupon, the Court of First Instance dismissed the complaint for failure of plaintiff to appear.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the dismissal is proper?

HELD:

Yes. in the light of this Court's decision in Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Service
and Bureau of Customs, L-23139, December 17, 1966 where it was held that the Bureau of Customs, as
part of the governmental machinery, operates the arrastre service as an incident of the prime
governmental function of taxation and as such is immune from suit. The same is true of the Republic of
the Philippines in regard to said operation.
RULE 65:

28) UY vs. LEE

G.R. No. 176831, January 15, 2010

FACTS:

Respondent Nixon Lee filed, on May 28, 2001, a petition for mandamus with damages before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, to compel petitioner, Uy Kiao Eng, his mother, to produce the original
holographic will of his deceased father so that probate proceedings for the allowance thereof could be
instituted.

Petitioner denied that she was in custody of the original holographic will and that she knew of its
whereabouts.

The CA initially ruled that the writ of mandamus would issue only in instances when no other
remedy would be available and sufficient to afford redress. However, it set aside its earlier ruling, issued
the writ, and ordered the production of the will and the payment of attorneys fees. It ruled this time that
respondent was able to show by testimonial evidence that his mother had in her possession the
holographic will.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for mandamus is the proper remedy in the instant case.

HELD:
No. The remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by respondent Lee because there lies another
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The Rules of Court, however, does not
prevent him from instituting probate proceedings for the allowance of the will whether the same is in his
possession or not.

An important principle followed in the issuance of the writ is that there should be no plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other than the remedy of mandamus being invoked.
In other words, mandamus can be issued only in cases where the usual modes of procedure and forms of
remedy are powerless to afford relief.

The first paragraph of Section 3 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides that:
 SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus.When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some
other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the
rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of
the wrongful acts of the respondent.

Mandamus will lie if the tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station. The writ
of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or
which it is his duty not to do, or to give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law.

Generally, mandamus will not lie to enforce purely private contract rights, and will not lie against
an individual unless some obligation in the nature of a public or quasi-public duty is imposed. The writ is
not appropriate to enforce a private right against an individual. The writ of mandamus lies to enforce the
execution of an act, when, otherwise, justice would be obstructed; and, regularly, issues only in cases
relating to the public and to the government; hence, it is called a prerogative writ. To preserve its
prerogative character, mandamus is not used for the redress of private wrongs, but only in matters
relating to the public.
RULE 65:

29) BENITA QUIOGUE DE V. DEL ROSARIO vs. Honorable MIGUEL ROMUALDEZ

G.R. No. L-22545 ; October 1, 1924

STREET, J.:

FACTS:

This is an original petition for a writ of mandamus, whereby the petitioner with her husband seeks to
compel Mayor Romualdez of the City of Manila, to accept as deed of conveyance executed by the
petitioner, conveying to the City of Manila certain lands with the buildings thereon at the price of
P346,683.62 in conformity with the alleged terms of a contract of sale between petitioner and the city.

Petitioner is the owner of five school buildings in the City of Manila, with the lots on which the same are
located, and that the city was using said properties for school purposes under a rental contract with the
petitioner. In 1923 the city wanted to purchase the said five properties, and negotiations was conducted
with the result that the petitioner agreed to sell, and the city agreed to buy, the said five properties. In
order to carry this agreement into effect Ordinance No. 1169 was passed. However the respondent Mayor
refuses to accept the deeds submitted by the petitioner, conveying the properties to the city, and likewise
refuses to pay to the petitioner. This refusal on the part of the Mayor is alleged to be based upon the
pretexts that the city has no money with which to meet the obligation and that the properties involved
are not fit for school purposes.

ISSUE:

Whether Mandamus lie to compel the performance of contractual duties.

HELD:

No. Contractual duties are not specifically enjoined by law but by the agreement between the parties. The
proper remedy then of the aggrieved party is to file an ordinary civil action for specific performance.

Writ of Mandamus shall be exercised to cases in which an executive or ministerial officer declines or omits
to perform an act, the performance or omission of which is enjoined by law. It is a special remedy,
although perhaps not an extraordinary one, provided for the purpose of furnishing a speedy method of
obtaining relief against an officer who fails or refuses to perform some duty imposed upon him by law. It
was not contemplated that in cases of this character disputed issues of fact should be settled, but that
the rights of the parties should be determined by such issues of law as might be presented by the
pleadings, or an agreed state of facts, or a state of facts about which there could be little dispute.

"It must, therefore, appear upon every application for a mandamus that it is the legal duty of the
respondent to do that which it is sought to compel him to do, and that he has upon proper application
refused to perform that duty."

It was not intended to aid a plaintiff in the enforcement of a mere contract right, or to take the place of
the other remedies provided by law for the adjudication of disputed claims. Looking at the case from the
standpoint of appellant, it involves nothing more than an ordinary breach of contract. If, as contended,
the appellant had a valid contract with the school board, it also had an adequate remedy at law to recover
damages for its breach; and to permit the writ of mandamus to be used for the purpose of enforcing a
mere contract right would be a wide departure from the settled practice in respect to the character of
cases in which relief by mandamus may be obtained.
RULE 65:

30) RIMANDO vs. NAGUILIAN EMISSION TESTING CENTER

[G.R. No. 198860] (July 23, 2012)

FACTS:

The present controversy stemmed from a petition for mandamus and damages filed before Branch 67 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bauang, La Union, by Naguilian Emission Testing Center, Inc., represented
by its President, Rosemarie Llarenas (respondent) against Abraham P. Rimando (petitioner), who, at the
time material to the case, was the sitting mayor of the Municipality of Naguilian, La Union.

Respondent claimed that its business is being conducted on a parcel of land which formerly belonged to
the national government but later on certified by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) as an alienable and disposable land of the public domain. The respondent had operated its
business of emission testing on the land from 2005 to 2007.

Respondent filed an application for the renewal of its business permit and paid the corresponding fees
therefor. The petitioner, however, refused to issue a business permit unless and until the respondent
executes a contract of lease with the Municipality of Naguilian. The respondent was amenable to signing
such contract subject to some proposed revisions, which, however, were not acceptable to the
petitioner. The parties did not reach a common ground hence, the petition for mandamus.

RTC denied the petition and held that the Municipality of Naguilian is the declared owner of the subject
parcel of land and mayor’s duty to issue business permits is discretionary in nature which may not be
enforced by a mandamus writ.

CA held that the appeal was dismissible on the ground of mootness considering that the period for which
the business period was being sought had already lapsed. However, CA proceeded to resolve the issue
involved in the appeal for academic purposes. CA held that the petitioner may not be held liable for
damages since his action or inaction, for that matter, was done in the performance of official duties that
are legally protected by the presumption of good faith. The CA likewise stressed that the civil action filed
against the petitioner had already become moot and academic upon the expiration of his term as the
mayor of Naguilian, La Union. Hence, this petition praying for the issuance of a writ of mandamus to
compel the petitioner to issue a business permit in favor of the respondent

ISSUE:

Whether or not the filing of Petition for Mandamus is proper.

HELD:

NO. A mayor cannot be compelled by mandamus to issue a business permit since the exercise of the same
is a delegated police power hence, discretionary in nature. This was the pronouncement of this Court
in Roble Arrastre, Inc. v. Hon. Villaflor, 499 SCRA 434 (2006), where a determination was made on the
nature of the power of a mayor to grant business permits under the Local Government Code.
RULE 65:

31) RODRIGUEZ vs. CA (not yet submitted)

June 13, 2013

RULE 65:

32) REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND
HIGHWAYS (DPWH) vs. ST. VINCENT DE PAUL COLLEGES, INC
G.R. No. 192908 August 22, 2012

FACTS:

The Republic sought expropriation of two lots belonging to St. Vincent De Paul Colleges for the
construction of the Manila-Cavite Toll Expressway Project (MCTEP). An amended complaint was filed by
the Republic claiming that the subject lots originated from free patent title and should be adjudicated to
it without payment of just compensation. Subsequently, a motion for issuance of an order of expropriation
was filed and affirmed by the trial court. There was no pronouncement as to just compensation.

Two years later, St. Vincent filed a Motion for Clarification of the Order, contending that although they
did not oppose the expropriation, they are entitled for a just compensation. St. Vincent refused to honor
the Order and demanded Republic, along with its agents, to immediately vacate the subject lots. The trial
court modified the Order and required Republic to pay just compensation to St. Vincent equivalent to the
100% value of the property sought to be expropriated. Republic’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

Republic filed a Motion for Additional Time of 15 days, seeking to avail the extra ordinary remedy of
petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA). The said motion was granted. Within the granted
extended period, Republic filed its petition for certiorari on the ground that the trial court acted in grave
abuse of discretion amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. CA issued a show cause order for the Republic,
why its petition for certiorari should not be dismissed for being filed out of time. The Republic sought
relaxation of the rules by reason of the transcendental importance of the issues involved in the case and
in consideration of substantial justice. St. Vincent opposed, on the ground that the petition for certiorari
is a pro forma due to failure to justify the explanation. CA dismissed the petition for being filed out of
time.

In its motion for reconsideration, the Republic claimed that it merely relied in good faith on the CA’s
resolution granting an additional period of 15 days and that in Domdom case, the extension of filing of
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is allowed. CA denied the motion on the ground that it cannot disobey
the ruling in Laguna Metts Corporation v. Court of Appeals inasmuch as extensions of time are now
disallowed by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Republic’s petition for certiorari should be dismissed for filing out of time.
HELD:

No. The petition should be given due course.

The Court noted that CA granted the motion for additional 15 days on the mistaken notion that the
petition filed by the Republic was one for petition for review as a mode of appeal. CA granted extension
inasmuch as motions for this purpose are allowed by the rules. On this score alone, CA should have
admitted the petition filed by the Republic since the latter merely relied on its Resolution dated granting
the extension prayed for.

The Court clarified that under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and as applied in Laguna Metts
Corporation, the general rule is that a petition for certiorari must be filed within 60 days from notice of
the judgment, order, or resolution sought to be assailed. Under exceptional circumstances, however,
and subject to the sound discretion of the court, said period may be extended pursuant to Domdom,
Labao and Mid-Islands Power cases.

Accordingly, the CA should have admitted the Republic’s petition: first, due to its own lapse when it
granted the extension sought by the Republic; second, because of the public interest involved, i.e.,
expropriation of private property for public use MCTEP; and finally, no undue prejudice or delay will be
caused to either party in admitting the petition.
RULE 65:

33) LAGUNA METTS CORPORATION (LMC) vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ARIES C. CAALAM AND GERALDINE
ESGUERRA
G.R. No. 185220; July 27, 2009

G.R. No. 185220 July 27, 2009

PETITIONER LAGUNA METTS CORPORATION (LMC)
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS, ARIES C. CAALAM AND GERALDINE ESGUERRA
PONENTE CORONA

FACTS:

Private respondents filed an illegal dismissal case before the Labor Arbiter which was decided favorably
for them. However, this was reversed on appeal with the NLRC. Consequently, they filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was only denied.

Private respondents wanted to file a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 but alleging that they cannot
prepare and file the petition within the 60-day reglementary period, they filed a Motion for Extension of
Time with the CA. The CA granted them a non-extendible period of 15 days. This order was opposed by
LMC arguing that extensions of time are no longer allowed under the amendment to Section 4 of Rule 65
effective December 27, 2007. This opposition was denied. Hence, this Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65 filed by LMC against the resolutions of the CA imputing grave abuse of discretion when it granted the
private respondents’ motion for extension of time to file their petition for certiorari.

ISSUE/S:

Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted the private respondents’ motion
for extension of time to file their petition for certiorari?

HELD:

Yes, it did. The amendments to Rule 65 under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC disallowed extensions of time to file a
petition for certiorari with the deletion of the paragraph that previously permitted such extensions.

Section 4, Rule 65 previously read:

“SEC. 4. When and where petition filed. The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60)
days from notice of the judgment or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new
trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be
counted from notice of the denial of said motion.

xxx

No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling reason and in
no case exceeding 15 days.” (Emphasis Supplied)
 With its amendment under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, it now reads:

“SEC. 4. When and where to file petition. The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days
from notice of the judgment or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is
timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted
from the notice of the denial of the motion.

xxx”
If the Court intended to retain the authority of the proper courts to grant extensions under Section 4
of Rule 65, the paragraph providing for such authority would have been preserved. The removal of the
said paragraph simply meant that there can no longer be any extension of the 60-day period within which
to file a petition for certiorari.

As the Rule now stands, petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of
judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration.
RULE 65:

34) NATIONAL WATER RESOURCES BOARD vs. A.L. ANG NETWORK

(GR NO. 186450, 14 APRIL 2010)

FACTS:

A.L. Ang Networkfiled on January 23, 2003 an application for a Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC)
with petitioner to operate and maintain a water service system in Alijis, Bacolod City.

Bacolod City Water District (BACIWA) opposed respondent’s application on the ground that it is the only
government agency authorized to operate a water service system within the city.

By Decision of August 20, 2003, petitioner granted respondent’s CPC application. BACIWA moved to have
the decision reconsidered, contending that its right to due process was violated when it was not allowed
to present evidence in support of its opposition.

Petitioner reconsidered its Decision and allowed BACIWA to present evidence, drawing respondent to file
a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City against petitioner and BACIWA.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that the proper recourse of respondent was to the Court
of Appeals, citing Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

The RTC, by Order of April 15, 2005, dismissed respondent’s petition for lack of jurisdiction, holding that
it is the Court of Appeals which has "exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions,
resolutions, order[s] or awards of . . . quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commission[s] .
. . except those within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court . . . ." Thus the RTC explained:

Art. 89 of P.D. 1067 having been long repealed by BP 129, as amended, which has effectively and explicitly
removed the Regional Trial Courts’ appellate jurisdiction over the decisions, resolutions, order[s] or
awards of quasi-judicial agencies such as [petitioner] NWRB, and vested with the Court of Appeals, very
clearly now, this Court has no jurisdiction over this instant petition.

Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, respondent filed a petition for certiorari at the Court
of Appeals, which, by Decision of January 25, 2008, annulled and set aside the RTC April 15, 2005, holding
that it is the RTC which has jurisdiction over appeals from petitioner’s decisions. Thus the appellate court
discoursed.

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court by Resolution of
February 9, 2009,petitioner filed the present petition for review, contending that:

THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS NO CERTIORARI JURISDICTION OVER THE [PETITIONER] SINCE SECTION
89, PD NO. 1067, REGARDING APPEALS, HAS BEEN SUPERSEDED AND REPEALED BY [BATAS PAMBANSA
BILANG] 129 AND THE RULES OF COURT. FURTHERMORE, PD 1067 ITSELF DOES NOT CONTEMPLATE THAT
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE CERTIORARI JURISDICTION OVER THE [PETITIONER]
Petitioner maintains that the RTC does not have jurisdiction over a petition for certiorari and prohibition
to annul or modify its acts or omissions as a quasi-judicial agency. Citing Section 4 of Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, petitioner contends that there is no law or rule which requires the filing of a petition for certiorari
over its acts or omissions in any other court or tribunal other than the Court of Appeals.

Petitioner goes on to fault the appellate court in holding that Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 (BP 129) or the
Judiciary Reorganization Act did not expressly repeal Article 89 of Presidential Decree No. 1067 (PD 1067)
otherwise known as the Water Code of the Philippines.

Respondent, on the other hand, maintains the correctness of the assailed decision of the appellate court.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction over appeals from decisions, resolutions or orders
of the National Water Resources Board (petitioner).

HELD:

Section 9 (1) of BP 129 granted the Court of Appeals (then known as the Intermediate Appellate Court)
original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus and quo warranto,
and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

Since the appellate court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over quasi-judicial agencies under Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court, petitions for writs of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against the acts and
omissions of quasi-judicial agencies, like petitioner, should be filed with it. This is what Rule 65 of the Rules
imposes for procedural uniformity. The only exception to this instruction is when the law or the Rules
itself directs otherwise, as cited in Section 4, Rule 65. The appellate court’s construction that Article 89 of
PD 1067, which reads:

ART. 89. The decisions of the [NWRB] on water rights controversies may be appealed to the [RTC] of the
province where the subject matter of the controversy is situated within fifteen (15) days from the date
the party appealing receives a copy of the decision, on any of the following grounds: (1) grave abuse of
discretion; (2) question of law; and (3) questions of fact and law (emphasis and underscoring supplied), is
such an exception, is erroneous.

Article 89 of PD 1067 had long been rendered inoperative by the passage of BP 129. Aside from delineating
the jurisdictions of the Court of Appeals and the RTCs, Section 47 of BP 129 repealed or modified:

x x x. [t]he provisions of Republic Act No. 296, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended,
of Republic Act No. 5179, as amended, of the Rules of Court, and of all other statutes, letters of
instructions and general orders or parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this Act x x x.

The general repealing clause under Section 47 "predicates the intended repeal under the condition that a
substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior acts."
In enacting BP 129, the Batasang Pambansa was presumed to have knowledge of the provision of Article
89 of P.D. No. 1067 and to have intended to change it. The legislative intent to repeal Article 89 is clear
and manifest given the scope and purpose of BP 129, one of which is to provide a homogeneous procedure
for the review of adjudications of quasi-judicial entities to the Court of Appeals.

More importantly, what Article 89 of PD 1067 conferred to the RTC was the power of review on appeal
the decisions of petitioner. It appears that the appellate court gave significant consideration to the ground
of "grave abuse of discretion" to thus hold that the RTC has certiorari jurisdiction over petitioner’s
decisions. A reading of said Article 89 shows, however, that it only made "grave abuse of discretion" as
another ground to invoke in an ordinary appeal to the RTC. Indeed, the provision was unique to the Water
Code at the time of its application in 1976.

The issuance of BP 129, specifically Section 9 (Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, then known as
Intermediate Appellate Court), and the subsequent formulation of the Rules, clarified and delineated the
appellate and certiorari jurisdictions of the Court of Appeals over adjudications of quasi-judicial bodies.
Grave abuse of discretion may be invoked before the appellate court as a ground for an error of
jurisdiction.

It bears noting that, in the present case, respondent assailed petitioner’s order via certiorari before the
RTC, invoking grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as ground-basis thereof.
In other words, it invoked such ground not for an error of judgment.

While Section 9 (3) of BP 129 and Section 1 of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court does not list petitioner as
"among" the quasi-judicial agencies whose final judgments, orders, resolutions or awards are appealable
to the appellate court, it is non sequitur to hold that the Court of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction
over petitioner’s judgments, orders, resolutions or awards. It is settled that the list of quasi-judicial
agencies specifically mentioned in Rule 43 is not meant to be exclusive. The employment of the word
"among" clearly instructs so.

WHEREFORE, the challenged Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The April 15, 2005 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City dismissing petitioner’s petition
for lack of jurisdiction is UPHELD.
RULE 65:

35) FESTO R. GALANG, JR. vs. HON. RAMIRO R. GERONIMO

G.R. No. 192793 February 22, 2011

FACTS:

Petitioner was proclaimed winner for the mayoralty race during the May 10, 2010 Automated Elections
for the Municipality of Cajidiocan, Province of Romblon. The proclamation was based on the Certificate
of Canvass (COC), but without the official signed Certificate of Canvass for Proclamation (COCP). This
was done with the approval of the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) Chairman.

Subsequently, private respondent Nicasio Ramos, who was also a mayoralty candidate in the same
election, requested the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to conduct a manual reconciliation of the
votes cast. The manual reconciliation was done on May 20, 2010 at the Sangguniang Bayan Session Hall,
after which proceedings the eight winning Sangguniang Bayan Members were also proclaimed. The
MBOC made erasures and corrections using correction fluid on the COCP for the Sangguniang
Bayan Members to reflect the results of the manual reconciliation. As for the COCP for the previously
proclaimed mayoralty and vice-mayoralty candidates, the total number of votes for each of the
candidates remained the same even after the manual reconciliation; hence, only the date was erased
and changed to read "May 20, 2010" to correspond with the date of the manual reconciliation.

Private respondent filed an election protest case against petitioner before the RTC. The following day,
the court sheriff went to petitioner's residence to serve summons with a copy of the petition. The
Sheriff's Return of Summons stated that the sheriff was able to serve Summons on petitioner by leaving
the same and the attached copy of the protest with a certain Gerry Rojas, who was then at petitioner's
residence.

On June 8, 2010, petitioner, together with his then counsel of record, Atty. Abner Perez, appeared in
court and requested a copy of the summons with a copy of the election protest. During the hearing on
said date, respondent judge directed petitioner to file the proper pleading and, on June 11, 2010,
petitioner filed a Motion to Admit Answer, to which was attached his Answer with Affirmative Defense
and Counterclaim. One of his affirmative defenses was that the electoral protest was filed out of time,
since it was filed more than ten (10) days after the date of proclamation of the winning candidate.

The trial court then issued the assailed Order dated June 24, 2010, finding the service of Summons on
petitioner on May 28, 2010 as valid, and declaring the Answer filed on June 11, 2010, as filed out of
time. Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion but to no avail. Hence, the present petition for certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is correct in filing the petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
HELD:

Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, which provides when and
where a petition for certiorari should be filed, states thus:

SEC. 4. When and where to file petition. – The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from
notice of the judgment or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed,
whether such motion is required or not, the petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days counted
from the notice of the denial of the motion.

If the petition relates to an act or an omission of a municipal trial court or of a corporation, a board, an
officer or a person, it shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial
area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals or with the
Sandiganbayan, whether or not the same is in aid of the court’s appellate jurisdiction. If the petition
involves an act or an omission of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these
rules, the petition shall be filed with and be cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.1awphi1

In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the petition
shall be filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

The question then is, would taking cognizance of a petition for certiorari questioning an interlocutory
order of the regional trial court in an electoral protest case be considered in aid of the appellate
jurisdiction of the COMELEC? The Court finds in the affirmative.

Interpreting the phrase "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction," the Court held in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v.
Jaramillo, et al.6 that if a case may be appealed to a particular court or judicial tribunal or body, then
said court or judicial tribunal or body has jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid
of its appellate jurisdiction. This was reiterated in De Jesus v. Court of Appeals,7 where the Court stated
that a court may issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction if said court has jurisdiction
to review, by appeal or writ of error, the final orders or decisions of the lower court.

Note that Section 8, Rule 14 of the 2010 Rules of Procedure in Election Contests Before the Courts
Involving Elective Municipal Officials states that:

Sec. 8. Appeal. - An aggrieved party may appeal the decision to the COMELEC within five (5) days after
promulgation, by filing a notice of appeal with the court that rendered the decision, with copy served on
the adverse counsel or on the adverse party who is not represented by counsel.

Since it is the COMELEC which has jurisdiction to take cognizance of an appeal from the decision of the
regional trial court in election contests involving elective municipal officials, then it is also the COMELEC
which has jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. Clearly, petitioner
erred in invoking this Court's power to issue said extraordinary writ.
RULE 65:

36) ANSELMO DE LEON CUYO, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 192164 October 12, 2011

FACTS:

Petitioner Anselmo Cuyo filed a complaint for illegal possession of firearms against Alejo Cuyo. Petitioner,
in the course of the proceedings for the application of search warrant for the search of the house of Alejo,
made untruthful statements under oath. Consequently, Alejo filed a complaint for perjury against
petitioner. On August 25, 2009, the MTCC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
of perjury. However, petitioner was not present during the promulgation of the judgment and was
represented only by his counsel. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision, but the
motion was subsequently denied by the MTCC on October 19, 2009. Petitioner received the order denying
the Motion on October 23, 2009. He subsequently filed a Motion for Probation on November 5, 2009 but
was denied on the ground that it was filed beyond the reglementary period of 15 days. Petitioner filed a
Petition under Rule 65 before the RTC but the RTC denied the Petition

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lower court erred in dismissing the petition.

HELD:

The court found some merit in the petition, but only with respect to the additional ground for dismissal
of the certiorari petition cited by the RTC – the failure to implead private complainant as a respondent in
the Petition for Certiorari filed before the RTC in violation of Rule 65, Section 5. This rule mandates that
petitioner should join as private respondent the person interested in sustaining the proceedings of the
court. Nevertheless, the Court agreed with the RTC that the Motion for Probation was filed out of time.
Petitioner was charged with and found guilty of perjury and perjury is not a light felony. It was therefore
mandatory for petitioner to be present at the promulgation of the judgment

Sec. 6 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court provides:

“If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable
cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these Rules against the judgment and the court shall order
his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the accused may surrender
and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence
at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be
allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice.”

Thus, petitioner had only 15 days from 25 August 2009 or until 9 September 2009 to file his Motion for
Probation. The MTCC thus committed grave abuse of discretion when it entertained the motion instead
of immediately denying it.
RULE 66:

1) PABLO BURGUETE vs. MAYOR

G.R. No. L-6538, May 10, 1954

EN BANC, JUGO, J.:

FACTS:

Pablo Burguete, is the elected municipal mayor of Badajoz, Province of Romblon in November, 1951;
Jovencio Q. Mayor, is the provincial governor of Romblon; and Esteban B. Montesa, the acting municipal
mayor of Badajoz, Province of Romblon.

A criminal complaint for serious slander was filed against Burguete in the justice of the peace court of
Badajoz and was forwarded to the Court of First Instance of Romblon. On November 13, 1952, Mayor
suspended Burguete on the ground of the pending criminal case as the "standing policy to elective
official with a criminal action involving moral turpitude for adjudication before the competent court."
Mayor directed Montesa, the vice-mayor, to act as mayor.

Burguete now files in this Court a petition for mandamus and quo warranto against Mayor and Montesa.

The case for serious slander against Burguete is still pending in the Court of First Instance. Burguete has
filed a motion to quash, but was denied. The case could not be tried on the merits on account of the
non-appearance of the witnesses for the prosecution. No administrative investigation by the provincial
board has been conducted under section 2188 of the Administrative Code.

ISSUE:

whether the petition for mandamus and quo warranto is proper?

HELD:

Yes because the suspension of the petitioner is illegal and unjustified.

In the case of Lacson vs. Roque, (49 Off. Gaz., 93), it was held that the mere filing of an information for
libel against a municipal officer is not a sufficient ground for dispensing him. The same may be said with
regard to serious slander, which is another form of libel. Libel does not necessarily involve moral
turpitude. Furthermore, it would be an easy expedient to file a criminal complaint or information against
a municipal mayor for the purpose of suspending him, and the suspension would last almost indefinitely,
according to the time that would elapse before the criminal case is finally terminated by conviction or
acquittal.

Mayor is ordered to reinstate Burguete in his office, and to oust Montesa, with costs against the
respondents.
RULE 66:

2) ABRAHAM C. SISON vs. HON. EPI REY PANGRAMUYEN

G. R. No. L-40295 July 31, 1978

FACTS:

A petition for certiorari us and quo warranto was filed (1) seeking the annulment of the actions of the Civil
Service in attesting and affirming private respondent Eureka F. Maliwanag's appointment as Assistant City
Assessor of Olongapo City; and, (2) assailing the validity of said respondent Commissioner's decision
dismissing petitioner's protest and his resolution denying reconsideration of said decision, and (3) further
asking that respondent Commissioner be mandated to appoint petitioner as such Assistant City Assessor
and that private respondent Maliwanag be declared as unlawfully usurping said position under a void and
illegal appointment.
According to petitioner he was the Chief Deputy Assessor exercising immediate administrative control
and supervision over respondent Maliwanag, who was Senior Deputy Assessor, and inasmuch as he has
superior educational and appropriate civil service eligibilities to those of said respondent, the
appointment aforementioned extended to the latter by respondent City Mayor is illegal and contrary to
law being violative of the rule of next-in-rank.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for certiorari and quo warranto is the correct remedy?

HELD:

No. The allegations supporting petitioner's cause or causes of action boil down to no more than the
removal of respondent Maliwanag from the position to which she has been appointed in order to be
replaced by him, with a new appointment in his favor. Necessarily, the ouster of Maliwanag by quo
warranto has to be based on a nullification of her appointment, which petitioner seeks, albeit
unnecessarily, by certiorari. His ultimate remedy, therefore, is quo warranto. Besides, even if it could be
also viewed as mandamus, it is already settled that his latter remedy prescribes also after one year.
(Cornejo vs. Sec. of Justice, L-32818, June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 663.) And it is of no avail to petitioner that
during the intervening period of more than one year, he was seeking relief from the corresponding
administrative authorities. The resort to such administrative remedy does not abate the period for the
judicial action. (Torres vs. Quintos, 88 Phil. 436; Galano vs. Roxas, G.R. L-31241, Sept. 12, 1975, 67 SCRA
8.)

DISSENTING OPINION OF J AQUINO

Petitioner Abraham C. Sison, as the incumbent chief deputy assessor, is the qualified and competent next-
in-rank employee who should be promoted to the contested position of assistant city assessor. Those
qualifications are required for the position of assistant city assessor.
Respondent Eureka F. Maliwanag is not qualified because she is not a provincial assessor eligible and she
is not a holder of a bachelor's degree. Her appointment to the contested position is in violation of section
23.
Although Sison's petition in this Court is for certiorari, mandamus and quo warranto, he has no cause of
action for quo warranto because Mrs. Maliwanag holds an appointment to the contested position of
assistant city assessor. She cannot be regarded as a usurper of that position. Sison's petition should be
treated as one for certiorari and mandamus only. Those special civil actions are adequate for assailing
the decisions of the Commissioner of Civil Service. The quo warranto aspect of Sisons's petition should be
disregarded.
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court does not fix any period for the filing of a petition
for certiorari and mandamus. The one-year period within which the petition for quo warranto should be
filled does not apply to Sison. His petition was delayed because, as he explained, he is a poor man who
cannot afford to embark on an expensive and protracted litigation.
RULE 66:

2) ABRAHAM C. SISON vs. HON. EPI REY PANGRAMUYEN

G. R. No. L-40295 July 31, 1978
FACTS:
Abraham Sison was Chief Deputy Assessor of Olongapo City, exercising, according to his allegation,
immediate administrative control and supervision over respondent Eureka Maliwanag, who was Senior
Deputy Assessor at the time. On November 23, 1973, Maliwanag was promoted to Assistant City Assessor,
to the ire of Sison. The Civil Service Commission confirmed Maliwanag’s appointment.
Sison claims that he has the appropriate civil service eligibilities and that he has superior educational
qualifications than those of Maliwanag; and further, that the appointment extended to the latter by the
City Mayor of Olongapo City is illegal and contrary to law being violative of the rule of next-in-rank.
Petitioner maintains that he, instead of respondent Maliwanag, should have been appointed/promoted
to the position of Assistant City Assessor.
Sison assailed Maliwanag’s appointment to the CSC, but it was denied; and so was the Motion for
Reconsideration he filed. Hence, this action for certiorari and mandamus, with prayer asking that
respondent Commissioner be mandated to appoint petitioner as Assistant City Assessor and that private
respondent Maliwanag be declared as unlawfully usurping said position under a void and illegal
appointment.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the Commissioner of the CSC committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming
Maliwanag’s appointment; and
Whether or not the suit instituted by Sison is really on for certiorari and/or mandamus.

HELD:
NO. Maliwanag's appointment was recommended by the City Assessor and his reasons therefor are stated
in his official indorsement to the Mayor. The SC cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the
Commissioner of Civil Service who is primarily charged with the administration of the Civil Service Law
and rules and regulations, absent, as in this case, convincing showing of palpable error or grave abuse of
discretion. After all, petitioner rests his case mostly on the organizational chart and the position
description or CSC Form No. 122-D of respondent Maliwanag, which is prepared by petitioner himself,
which do not carry the approval of the Mayor, as Department Head, contrary to requirement of
Memorandum Circular No. 5, S. 1963 of the Commission of Civil Service touching on the basis for
determining the hierarchical relationships of positions, and, therefore, are not necessarily controlling.
NO, this suit is really one for quo warranto under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court. The most fatal drawback
of petitioner's cause is that he came to the courts out of time. The appointment in controversy was made
on November 23, 1973. On the other hand, this petition was filed only on March 13, 1975, clearly more
than one year after the pretended right of petitioner to hold the office in question arose. This single
circumstance has closed the door for any judicial remedy in his favor.
Petitioner contends that since his petition is for certiorari and mandamus, the prescription period in Rule
66 does not apply. Such contention is not correct. The allegations supporting petitioner's cause of action
boil down to no more than the removal of respondent Maliwanag from the position to which she has
been appointed in order to be replaced by him, with a new appointment in his favor. Necessarily, the
ouster of Maliwanag by quo warranto has to be based on a nullification of her appointment, which
petitioner seeks, albeit unnecessarily, by certiorari. His ultimate remedy, therefore, is quo warranto.
Besides, even if it could be also viewed as mandamus, it is already settled that his latter remedy prescribes
also after one year. And it is of no avail to petitioner that during the intervening period of more than
one year, he was seeking relief from the corresponding administrative authorities. The resort to such
administrative remedy does not abate the period for the judicial action.
Therefore, the petition is dismissed.