SEPARATION OF PROPERTY OF THE SPOUSES AND ADMINISTRATION OF COMMON

PROPERTY BY ONE SPOUSE DURING THE MARRIAGE

221 (Refer to immediately preceding digest)

222 Adolfo vs Adolfo, GR No. 201427

FACTS:

(2004) Petitioner Teofilo B. Adolfo filed with the RTC Mandaue a Petition for judicial separation of
property against his estranged wife, respondent Fe Adolfo. The petition alleged that the parties
were married, and bore one child, and during the marriage, they acquired through conjugal funds
certain lots, including the one in question. Later on, the parties separated due to irreconcilable
differences. Since reunion was no longer feasible, petitioner suggested a separation of the conjugal
property, but respondent adamantly refused. Respondent denied petitioner's co-ownership of the
subject property, claiming the same as her paraphernal property inheriting it from her mother.
Several earnest efforts to amicably settle the matter between them were proved unavailing; and
that a judicial separation of property is proper under the circumstances and pursuant to
Article 135 (6) of the Family Code.

In her counterclaim, she contends that she remained married to petitioner, the petitioner is a lazy
bum, gambler, drunkard, wife abused and neglectful father, and she was also abandoned because
petitioner transferred somewhere and took a mistress having children with such. (Civil Case No.
MAN-4821)

(1996) Respondent's sister Florencia Tudtud and her husband Juanito Gingoyon (the
Gingoyons) filed a case for partition with damages against respondent. The trial court
rendered its Decision declaring that the subject property constituted conjugal property
of the marriage. (Civil Case No. MAN-2683)

CA declared, among others, that the subject property was respondent's paraphernal property.

While above CA decision is pending and have yet to attain finality, petitioner submitted as part of
his evidence and for marking certified true copies of the Gingoyons' Complaint but respondent
failed to file her answer or response to the request for admission. Petitioner filed a motion for
judgment on the pleadings stating that due to the failure to answer, the respondent is deemed to
have admitted pursuant to Rule 26, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure that the subject
property is conjugal asset of their subsisting marriage which may thus be the subject of his petition
for judicial separation of property. Petitioner thus prayed that the trial court render judgment in his
favor based on the pleadings. RTC granted petitioner' motion for judgement on the pleadings and
treated it as a summary judgement.

The CA said that although respondent was bound by the resulting admission prompted by her
failure to reply to petitioner's request for admission, her claims and documentary exhibits clearly
contradict what petitioner sought to be admitted in his request; that the trial court disregarded the
fact that the issue of whether the subject property is conjugal was still unresolved. Petitioner moved
to consider but denied. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUES:
 1. Whether or not the subject property can be judicially separated between the spouses
under Article 35 (6) or Separation.
2. Whether the subject property is conjugal, or a paraphernal asset of the respondent
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in deciding the case on a question of substance
not in accord with law, Rule 26 of the 1997 Rules, and applicable jurisprudence.

RULINGS:
No. Such property remains to be the paraphernal property of the wife. Therefore, it cannot be
judicially separated even if both of them are separated.

In rendering summary judgment, the trial court relied on respondent's failure to reply to petitioner's
request for admission declaring that the subject property is a conjugal asset. It should have known
that until the appeal is resolved by the appellate court, it would be premature to render judgment on
petitioner's motion for judgment on the pleadings. On the part of petitioner, it must be said that he
could not have validly resorted to a motion for judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment.
While it may appear that under Rules 34 and 35 of the 1997 Rules, he may file a motion for
judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment as a result of the consequent admission by
respondent that the subject property is conjugal, this is not actually the case.

While it is true that a judgment cannot bind persons who are not parties to the action, petitioner
cannot, after invoking the proceedings in Civil Case No. MAN-2683 to secure affirmative relief
against respondent and thereafter failing to obtain such relief, be allowed to repudiate or question
the CA's ruling. The principle of estoppel bars him from denying the resultant pronouncement by the
appellate court, which became final and executory, that the subject property is respondent's
paraphernal property.

Upon the final and executory decision of the CA that the subject property is indeed a paraphernal
property of the wife, petitioner's case is not meritorious anymore. Hence, there being no conjugal
property, the petitioner cannot seek the division of such property. The petition DENIED.

(It’s a super procedural case and I think 2 or 4 cases are consolidated in this case so I tried my
best to make it close to our topic, check out the full text nalang if there are parts you don’t
understand.)

223 AGUSTIN DE LUNA ET AL. vs. JOSE LINATOC, 74 PHIL 15

FACTS: The wife of the petitioner herein, acting as an agent, sold a portion of their conjugal
property to respondent. The parcel of land was the husband’s portion of the conjugal property. The
land was under the name of the husband only because they already partitioned the parcel of land.
The wife, with the knowledge and consent of the husband, sold the lot as evidenced by the deed of
sale and the deed of recognition wherein the husband recognized and reiterated his acquiescence
to the sale.

Claiming that they do not know such prohibition under Article 1432, the spouses assail the validity
of such sale. Under the said article, partitioning the conjugal property during marriage can only be
done if there was a judicial separation of property, or else it would be illegal and void. The sale can
only be valid if the land was sold under the name of the conjugal partnership and not of the
husband only.

ISSUE: WON the sale may be validly annulled by the spouses.

RULING: NO. Mistake of law does not make a contract voidable, because ignorance of the law
does not excuse anyone from its compliance (Art. 2,Civil Code.). That the petitioners did not know
the prohibition against partition of the conjugal partnership property during marriage (Art. 1432, Civil
 Code) is no valid reason why they should ask for the annulment of the sales made.

Moreover, there is the time-honored legal maxim that no man can take advantage of his own
wrong. To repudiate the sales in question, petitioners are setting up their own wrongful act of
partitioning their conjugal property, which violated Article 1432 of the Civil Code. The prohibition in
said article affects public policy, as it is designed to protect creditors of the conjugal partnership and
other third persons.Petitioners shall not, therefore, be allowed thus to rest their cause of action to
recover the lands sold, upon the illegality of the partition which they attempted to make. Otherwise,
they would profit by their own unlawful act.

224 Maquilan vs. Maquilan, G.R. No. 155409, June 8, 2007

FACTS:
Virgilio Maquilan (petitioner) and Dita Maquilan (respondent) are spouses who had a
blissful married life and were blessed to have a son. Their relationship turned bitter when petitioner
discovered that respondent was having illicit sexual affair with her paramour. Petitioner filed a case
of adultery against respondent and her paramour. Both of them were then convicted of the crime
charged and were sentenced to suffer imprisonment.
Thereafter, Dita, through counsel, filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage,
Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Damages with the RTC, imputing
psychological incapacity on the part of Virgilio. During the pre-trial, Virgilio and DIta entered into a
Compromise Agreement wherein they agreed to partially separate their conjugal properties without
prejudice to the outcome of the pending case of declaration of nullity of marriage. The RTC
approved the compromise agreement.
Virgilio, however, filed an Omnibus Motion, praying for the repudiation of the Compromise
Agreement and the reconsideration of the Judgment on Compromise Agreement. The respondent
judge denied the motion. He then filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied.
The petitioner then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the CA claiming that
the RTC committed grave error and abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess jurisdiction.
The CA dismissed the Petition for lack of merit. The CA held that the conviction of the respondent
of the crime of adultery does not ipso facto disqualify her from sharing in the conjugal property. That
Articles 43 and 63 of the Family Code, which pertain to the effects of a nullified marriage and the
effects of legal separation, respectively, do not apply.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUES: Whether or not the partial voluntary separation of property made by the spouses pending
the petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage is valid?

RULING:
Yes. The Compromise Agreement partially divided the properties of the conjugal
partnership of gains between the parties and does not deal with the validity of a marriage or legal
separation. Moreover, the contention that the Compromise Agreement is tantamount to a
circumvention of the law prohibiting the guilty spouse from sharing in the conjugal properties is
misplaced. Existing law and jurisprudence do not impose such disqualification.
Under Article 143 of the Family Code, separation of property may be effected voluntarily or
for sufficient cause, subject to judicial approval. The questioned Compromise Agreement which was
judicially approved is exactly such a separation of property allowed under the law. This conclusion
holds true even if the proceedings for the declaration of nullity of marriage was still pending.
However, the Court must stress that this voluntary separation of property is subject to the rights of
all creditors of the conjugal partnership of gains and other persons with pecuniary interest pursuant
to Article 136 of the Family Code.
The proceedings pertaining to the Compromise Agreement involved the conjugal properties of the
 spouses. Thus, the settlement had no relation to the questions surrounding the validity of their
marriage. Nor did the settlement amount to a collusion between the parties.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that the subject Compromise Agreement is VALID without prejudice to the rights of
all creditors and other persons with pecuniary interest in the properties of the conjugal partnership
of gains.

225
Benigno Toda, Jr., petitioner vs. Court of Appeals and Rose Marie Tuason-Toda,
respondents

FACTS:

Benigno Toda, Jr. and Rose Marie Tuason-Toda were married on June 9, 1951 and were blessed
with two children.
Individual differences and the alleged infidelity of Benigno, however, marred the conjugal union
thereby prompting Rose Marie to file on December 18, 1979 in the former Court of First Instance of
Rizal, a petition for termination of conjugal partnership for alleged mismanagement and dissipation
of conjugal funds against Benigno.
After hearings were held, the parties in order to avoid further “disagreeable proceedings,” filed on
April 1, 1981 a joint petition for judicial approval of dissolution of conjugal partnership under Art. 191
of the Civil Code which was consolidated with a civil case. This petition which was signed by the
parties, embodied a compromise agreement allocating to the spouses their respective shares in the
conjugal partnership assets and dismissing with prejudice the said civil vase. The said petition and
compromise agreement were approved by the trial court.
Thereafter, several orders were issued by the lower court pertaining to the interpretation and
implementation of the compromise agreement pertaining to the interpretation and implementation of
the compromise agreement.
The compromise agreement was incorporated in the petition for dissolution of conjugal partnership
and was approved by the court below.

ISSUE: When does the compromise agreement became effective?

HELD:

We are in agreement with the holding of the Court of Appeals that the compromise agreement
became effective only on June 9, 1981, the date when it was approved by the trial court, and not on
March 30, 1981 when it was signed by the parties. Under Article 190 of the Civil Code, 14 "(i)n the
absence of an express declaration in the manage settlements, the separation of property between
spouses during the marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial order." Hence, the
separation of property is not effected by the mere execution of the contract or agreement of the
parties, but by the decree of the court approving the same. It, therefore, becomes effective only
upon judicial approval, without which it is void. 15 Furthermore, Article 192 of said Code explicitly
provides that the conjugal partnership is dissolved only upon the issuance of a decree of separation
of property.

EXCLUSIVE COHABITATION OF CAPACITATED PERSONS WITHOUT MARRIAGE;

COHABITATION UNDER A VOID MARRIAGE

226 Belcodero vs CA (227 SCRA 303, GR No. 89667, October 20, 1993)

FACTS:
This case involves the question of ownership over a piece of land acquired by a husband while
living with a paramour and after having deserted his lawful wife and children. The property had
been bought by the husband on installment basis prior to the effectivity of the Civil Code of 1950
but the final deed, as well as the questioned conveyance by him to his common law spouse, has
ensued during the latter Code's regime.

July 27, 1927 – Alayo D. Bosing married Juliana Oday, with whom he had 3 children.

1946 – He left conjugal home and started to live instead with Josefa Rivera, with whom he had one
child, Josephine Bosing Balcobero (petitioner).

August 23, 1949 – Alayo purchased a parcel of land on installment basis from Magdalena Estate,
Inc. where he indicated in the deed his civil status as "married to Josefa R. Bosing," the common-
law wife.

October 6, 1959 – he addressed a letter to Magdalena Estate, Inc. authorizing the latter to transfer
the lot in the name of his "wife Jose:na R. Bosing." The final deed of sale was then executed by
Magdalena Estate, Inc. Subsequently, the Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in the name of
"Josefa R. Bosing, . . . married to Alayo Bosing, . . ."

June 6, 1958 – Alayo married Josefa despite the subsistence of his prior marriage with Juliana.

March 11, 1967 – Alayo died.

September 17, 1970 (3 years later) – Josefa and Josephine executed a document of extrajudicial
partition and sale of the lot in question, which was there described as "conjugal property" of Josefa
and deceased Alayo. In this deed, Josefa's supposed 1/2 interest as surviving spouse of Alayo and
her 1/4 interest as heir, was conveyed to Josephine for a P10,000.00 consideration. Hence,
Josephine acquired “full ownership” of the property (i.e., in addition to her own ¼ interest as the
surviving child of Alayo. The notice of extrajudicial partition was subsequently published; the
inheritance and estate taxes were paid; and in 1974, a new Transfer Certificate of Title was issued
in the name of Josephine.

October 30, 1980 – Juliana (the real widow) and her 3 legitimate children filed an action for
reconveyance of the property.

RTC ruled in favor of Juliana and ordered reconveyance of the property in question to the legal
heirs plus actual, moral, and exemplary damages. The CA affirmed RTC’s decision but modified it
by reversing the award of actual, moral and exemplary damages.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the action for reconveyance had long prescribed. No, prescription is 10
years.
2. Whether or not the action for reconveyance is based upon an implied or constructive
trust. NO
3. Whether or not the property in question belongs exclusively to the petitioners. NO, it
belongs to the conjugal partnership

RULING:

The property in question belongs to the conjugal partnership of Alayo and his legitimate wife
Juliana notwithstanding whether the same was acquired in 1949 (when an agreement for its
purchase on installment basis was entered into between him and Magdalena Estate, Inc.) or in
1959 (when a deed of sale was finally executed by Magdalena Estate, Inc.).
Under both the new and old Civil Code, "all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to
the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
wife." This presumption has not been convincingly rebutted.

It cannot be seriously contended that, simply because the property was titled in the name of Josefa
at Alayo's request, she should thereby be deemed to be its owner. The property unquestionably
was acquired by Alayo. Alayo's letter, dated October 6, 1959, to Magdalena Estate, Inc., merely
authorized the latter to have the title to the property transferred to her name. More importantly, she
implicitly recognized Alayo's ownership when, three years after the death of Alayo, she and
Josephine executed the deed of extrajudicial partition and sale in which she asserted a 1/2 interest
in the property in what may be described as her share in the "conjugal partnership" with Alayo, plus
another 1/4 interest as the "surviving widow," the last one-fourth (1/4) going to Josephine as the
issue of the deceased. Observe that the above adjudication would have exactly conformed with a
partition in intestacy had they been the sole and legitimate heirs of the decedent.

As regards the property relations between common-law spouses, Article 144 of the Civil Code
merely codified the law established through judicial precedents under the old code (Margaret
Maxey vs. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. L-45870, 11 May 1984). In both regimes, the co-ownership
rule had more than once been repudiated when either or both spouses suffered from an
impediment to marry (Jeroniza vs. Jose, 89 SCRA 306). The present provisions under Article 147
and Article 148 of the Family Code did not much deviate from the old rules; in any case, its
provisions cannot apply to this case without interdicting prior vested rights (Article 256,
Family Code).

It was at the time that the adjudication of ownership was made following Alayo's demise (not when
Alayo merely allowed the property to be titled in Josefa's name which clearly was not intended to be
adversarial to Alayo's interest), that a constructive trust was deemed to have been created by
operation of law under the provisions of Article 1456 of the Civil Code: If property is acquired
through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an
implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.

The applicable prescriptive period for an action seeking a reconveyance of the property by
the beneficiaries thereof is ten (10) years (Article 1144, Civil Code). Ordinarily, that period starts
from the establishment of the implied trust being the day when the cause of action would be
considered to have accrued (Article 1150, Civil Code).

Unfortunately for Josefa and Josephine, however, the property involved in this case is a realty
titled
under the Torrens System. The prescriptive period is thus to be counted from the time the
transaction affecting the property is registered with the corresponding issuance of a new
certificate of title. Between the time Transfer Certificate of Title No. 198840 was issued on 06
June 1974, and the :ling of the action for the reconveyance of the property with the court a quo on
30 October 1980, barely a period of six (6) years and four (4) months had elapsed. The case has
accordingly been initiated seasonably.

The four-year prescriptive period, mentioned in passing by the petitioners, would have had some
value and relevance had the private respondents or their predecessor in interest been parties to the
extrajudicial partition and sale. In that event, the latter's action could only then be predicated on a
vitiation of consent 4 where the applicable statutory limitation would be four years.
227 Valdez v RTC of Quezon City GR No. 122749 July 31, 1996

FACTS:
 The case involves a pure question of law.
 Petitioner claims that RTC Branch 102 in QC committed an error in the law it applied
concerning the disposition of the family dwelling in a situation where the marriage was
declared void ab initio in accordance to Art. 36 of the FC.
 Antonio Valdes and Cosnuelo Gomez were married on January 5, 1971 and they had 5
children.
 June 22, 1992: Valdes sought the declaration of nullity of their marriage due to
psychological incapacity of both parties to comply with their essential marital obligations.
 RTC declared the marriage null and void, it also declared that the 3 older children may
choose which parent they want to stay with, the 2 younger children shall be placed in the
custody of their mother.
 RTC also declared that the spouses (ex-spouses?) start proceedings on the liquidation of
their common properties as defined by Art 147 of the FC and to comply with the provisions
of Arts 50, 51, and 52 of the FC, withibn 30 days from notice of this decision.
 Gomez sought a clarification of the portion of the decision directing compliance with Arts
50, 51, and 52 of the FC.
 She claims that FC does ot have any provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of
common property in “unions without marriage”
 The Trial Court in an order made the clarification saying that “considering that Article 147 of
the Family Code explicitly provides that the property acquired by both parties during their
union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through
the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and
defendant will own their 'family home' and all their other properties for that matter in equal
shares. In the liquidation and partition of the properties owned in common by the plaintiff
and defendant, the provisions on co-ownership found in the Civil Code shall apply.
 Petitioner moved for reconsideration. Motion was denied.
 Petitioner raised the issue to the SC.

Issue/s:
 W/N the RTC erred in its ruling.

Held:
 SC held that the RTC was correct in applying the law since the property relations of the
parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Art. 147
 The court stated that properoty acquired by both spouses through their work and industry
shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the
union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts.
 SC also held that the RTC did not err in resolving the matter of who will get the family and
the partition of their common property. SC ruled that the petitioner and respondent are
entitled to equal shares.

Disposition:
 Wherefore, the questioned orders, dated May 5, 1995, and October 30 1995, of the trial
court are affirmed.

228 Repeated case.

229 ELNA MERCADO-FEHR, petitioner, vs . BRUNO FEHR, respondent. [G.R. No. 152716.
October 23, 2003.]

FACTS: This case arose from a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the
Family Code filed by petitioner Elna Mercado-Fehr against respondent Bruno Fehr before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati

After due proceedings, the trial court declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent void
ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code and ordered the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership of property

However, Elna questioned the order of the RTC with respect to the adjudication of Suite 204 to the
husband, LCG Condominium and the support of the children. She alleged that Suite 204 was
purchased on installment basis at the time when she and her husband were still living exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, hence the rules on co-
ownership should apply in accordance with Article 147 of the Family Code.

Elna then filed a motion for reconsideration of said order. The court held in an order that Art. 147 of
the Family Code should apply, being the marriage void ab initio. However, the court reminded Elna
of the previous agreement in dividing of properties and/or proceeds from the sale thereof
proportionately among them. It also affirmed of the previous ruling regarding the Suite 204. Elna
filed special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals. The CA in its
Decision dismissed the petition for review for lack of merit.

ISSUE: WON the disputed property should be considered as common property of the parties. (Yes)

RULING: SC held that since Suite 204 of LCG Condominium, was purchased on installment basis
on July 26, 1983, at the time when they were already living together then it should be considered as
common property of the parties and the property regime of the parties should be divided in
accordance with the law on co-ownership. Suite 204 was acquired during the parties’ cohabitation.
Accordingly, under Article 147 of the Family Code, said property should be governed by the rules
on co-ownership.

For Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman:

1. must be capacitated to marry each other;

2. live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and

3. their union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void.

All these elements are present in the case at bar.

It has not been shown that they suffered any impediment to marry each other. They lived
exclusively with each other as husband and wife when petitioner moved in with respondent in his
residence and were later united in marriage.

Their marriage, however, was found to be void under Article 36 of the Family Code because of
respondent’s psychological incapacity to comply with essential marital obligations.

The case was REMANDED to the RTC for liquidation of the properties of petitioner and respondent
in accordance with this Court’s ruling.
230 MILAGROS JOAQUINO a.k.a. MILAGROS J. REYES, petitioner, vs . LOURDES REYES,
MERCEDES, MANUEL, MIRIAM and RODOLFO JR. — all surnamed REYES, respondents.
[G.R. No. 154645. July 13, 2004.]

FACTS: Respondents led a Complaint for reconveyance and damages, dated January 23, 1982,
before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, containing the following allegations: The complaint
alleges that [respondent] Lourdes P. Reyes is the widow of Rodolfo A. Reyes who died on
September 12, 1981; that [respondents] Mercedes, Manuel, Miriam and Rodolfo, Jr. are the
legitimate children of [respondent] Lourdes P. Reyes and the deceased Rodolfo A. Reyes; that for
years before his death, Rodolfo A. Reyes had illicit relations with [petitioner] Milagros B. Joaquino;
that before his death, . . . Rodolfo A. Reyes was Vice President and Comptroller of Warner Barnes
and Company and, after retirement received from said company benefits and emoluments. The
respondent wife was not the recipient of any portion of the said amount. The complaint further
alleges that on July 12, 1979, a Deed of Sale of a property consisting of a house and lot at BF
Homes, Parañaque, Metro Manila was executed by the spouses Ramiro Golez and Corazon Golez
in favor of [petitioner] Milagros B. Joaquino for which Transfer Certificate of Title of the Register of
Deeds of Metro Manila was issued in the name of [petitioner] Milagros B. Joaquino. It was alleged
that the funds used to purchase this property were conjugal funds and earnings of the deceased
Rodolfo A. Reyes as executive of Warner Barnes and Company as petitioner Joaquino was without
the means to pay for the same

The complaint finally alleges that the deceased had real and personal properties in petitioner's
possession are conjugal partnership properties of the spouses Lourdes P. Reyes and Rodolfo A.
Reyes and one-half belongs exclusively to respondent Lourdes P. Reyes and the other half to the
estate of Rodolfo A. Reyes to be apportioned among the other respondents as his forced heirs.
Respondents therefore, pray that the property be declared conjugal property of the spouses
Lourdes P. Reyes and Rodolfo A. Reyes and that petitioner be ordered to reconvey the property in
respondents' favor.

Petitioner Milagros B. Joaquino alleges that she purchased the real property in question with her
own exclusive funds and it was only for convenience that the late Rodolfo Reyes facilitated the
mortgage over the same; that although the late Rodolfo Reyes paid the monthly amortization of the
mortgage as attorney-in-fact of petitioner, the money came exclusively from her.

Trial court granted the complaint. Affirming the RTC, the CA held that the property had been paid
out of the conjugal funds of Rodolfo and Lourdes because the monthly amortizations for the loan,
as well as the premiums for the life insurance policy that paid for the balance thereof, came from his
salaries and earnings. Like the trial court, it found no sufficient proof that petitioner was financially
capable of buying the disputed property, or that she had actually contributed her own exclusive
funds to pay for it. Hence, it ordered her to surrender possession of the property to the respective
estates of the spouses. The appellate court, however, held that the trial court should not have
resolved the issue of the liation and the successional rights of petitioner's children. Such issues, it
said, were not properly cognizable in an ordinary civil action for reconveyance and damages and
were better ventilated in a probate or special proceeding instituted for the purpose.

ISSUE: W/N the disputed property is conjugal. Yes it is conjugal.

RULING: It is undisputed that the deceased Rodolfo Reyes was legally married to Respondent
Lourdes Reyes. It is also admitted that for 19 years or so, and while their marriage was subsisting,
he was actually living with petitioner. It was during this time, in 1979, that the disputed house and
lot was purchased and registered in petitioner's name. Plainly, therefore, the applicable law is
the Civil Code of the Philippines. Under Article 145 thereof, a conjugal partnership of gains
(CPG) is created upon marriage and lasts until the legal union is dissolved by death,
annulment, legal separation or judicial separation of property. Conjugal properties are by
law owned in common by the husband and wife.
 Under Article 160 of the Code, all properties of the marriage, unless proven to pertain to the
husband or the wife exclusively, are presumed to belong to the CPG. For the rebuttable
presumption to arise, however, the properties must first be proven to have been acquired during the
existence of the marriage. On the other hand, Article 144 of the Civil Code mandates a co-
ownership between a man and a woman who are living together but are not legally married.
Prevailing jurisprudence holds, though, that for Article 144 to apply, the couple must not be
incapacitated to contract marriage. It has been held that the Article is inapplicable to
common-law relations amounting to adultery or concubinage, as in this case. The reason
therefor is the absurdity of creating a co-ownership in cases in which there exists a prior
conjugal partnership between the man and his lawful wife.

Thus, when a common-law couple have a legal impediment to marriage, only the property acquired
by them — through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry — shall be owned
by them in common and in proportion to their respective contributions. The present controversy
hinges on the source of the funds paid for the house and lot in question. Upon the resolution of this
issue depends the determination of whether the property is conjugal (owned by Rodolfo and
Lourdes) or exclusive (owned by Milagros) or co-owned by Rodolfo and Milagros. Indeed, a
preponderance of evidence has duly established that the disputed house and lot was paid by
Rodolfo Reyes, using his salaries and earnings.

Respondents have shown that the property was bought during the marriage of Rodolfo and
Lourdes, a fact that gives rise to the presumption that it is conjugal. More important, they have
established that the proceeds of the loan obtained by Rodolfo were used to pay for the property;
and that the loan was, in turn, paid from his salaries and earnings, which were conjugal funds under
the Civil Code. In contrast, petitioner has failed to substantiate either of her claims — that she was
financially capable of buying the house and lot, or that she actually contributed to the payments
therefor. Indeed, it does not appear that she was gainfully employed at any time after 1961 when
the property was purchased.

Under the circumstances, therefore, the purchase and the subsequent registration of the realty
in petitioner's name was tantamount to a donation by Rodolfo to Milagros. By express
provision of Article 739(1) of the Civil Code, such donation was void, because it was "made
between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation."
The prohibition against donations between spouses must likewise apply to donations
between persons living together in illicit relations; otherwise, the latter would be better
situated than the former.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

231
LUPO ATIENZA v YOLANDA DE CASTRO G.R. NO. 169698 : November 29, 2006

FACTS:

Sometime in 1983, petitioner Lupo Atienza, then the President and General Manager of Enrico
Shipping Corporation and Eurasian Maritime Corporation, hired the services of respondent Yolanda
U. De Castro as accountant for the two corporations. In the course of time, the relationship between
Lupo and Yolanda became intimate. Despite Lupo being a married man, he and Yolanda eventually
lived together in consortium beginning the later part of 1983. Out of their union, two children were
born. However, after the birth of their second child, their relationship turned sour until they parted
ways.

May 28, 1992, Lupo filed in the RTC of Makati City a complaint against Yolanda for the judicial
partition between them of a parcel of land with improvements located in Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati
City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 147828 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.
In his complaint, docketed in said court as Civil Case No. 92-1423, Lupo alleged that the subject
property was acquired during his union with Yolanda as common-law husband and wife, hence the
property is co-owned by them.

the property in question was acquired by Yolanda sometime in 1987 using his exclusive funds and
that the title thereto was transferred by the seller in Yolanda's name without his knowledge and
consent. He did not interpose any objection thereto because at the time, their affair was still
thriving. It was only after their separation and his receipt of information that Yolanda allowed her
new live-in partner to live in the disputed property, when he demanded his share thereat as a co-
owner.

In her answer, Yolanda denied Lupo's allegations. According to her, she acquired the same
property for Two Million Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,600,000.00) using her exclusive funds.
She insisted having bought it thru her own savings and earnings as a businesswoman.

In a decision dated December 11, 2000, the trial court rendered judgment for Lupo by declaring the
contested property as owned in common by him and Yolanda and ordering its partition between the
two in equal shares.

Yolanda went on appeal to the CA, therein arguing that the evidence on record preponderate that
she purchased the disputed property in her own name with her own money. She maintained that
the documents appertaining to her acquisition thereof are the best evidence to prove who actually
bought it, and refuted the findings of the trial court, as well as Lupo's assertions casting doubt as to
her financial capacity to acquire the disputed property.

The Appellate Court reversed and set aside that of the trial court and adjudged the litigated property
as exclusively owned by Yolanda.

Lupo is now with this Court via the present recourse arguing that pursuant to Article 1446 of the Civil
Code, he was in no way burdened to prove that he contributed to the acquisition of the subject
property because with or without the contribution by either partner, he is deemed a co-owner
thereof, adding that under Article 484 of Civil Code, as long as the property was acquired by either
or both of them during their extramarital union, such property would be legally owned by them in
common and governed by the rules on co-ownership, which apply in default of contracts, or special
provisions.

ISSUE: WON the disputed property as claimed exclusively by Yolanda is meritorious

RULING:

YES.

It is not disputed that the parties herein were not capacitated to marry each other because
petitioner Lupo Atienza was validly married to another woman at the time of his cohabitation with
the respondent. Their property regime, therefore, is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code,
which applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of
concubinage, relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons, and multiple
 alliances of the same married man.

Here, although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties commenced in 1983, or way before the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1998, Article 148 thereof applies because this provision
was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code.

Only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. Proof of actual contribution is required. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of
the proven actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof,
their contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.

Contrary to the disquisition of the trial court, [Lupo] failed to overcome this burden. Perusing the
records of the case, it is evident that the trial court committed errors of judgment in its findings of
fact and appreciation of evidence with regard to the source of the funds used for the purchase of
the disputed property and ultimately the rightful owner thereof.

Petitioner's claim of co-ownership in the disputed property is without basis because not only did he
fail to substantiate his alleged contribution in the purchase thereof but likewise the very trail of
documents pertaining to its purchase as evidentiary proof redounds to the benefit of the
respondent. In contrast, aside from his mere say so and voluminous records of bank accounts,
which sadly find no relevance in this case, the petitioner failed to overcome his burden of proof.

In contrast to petitioner's dismal failure to prove his cause, herein respondent was able to present
preponderant evidence of her sole ownership. There can clearly be no co-ownership when, as here,
the respondent sufficiently established that she derived the funds used to purchase the property
from her earnings, not only as an accountant but also as a businesswoman engaged in foreign
currency trading, money lending and jewelry retail. She presented her clientele and the promissory
notes evincing substantial dealings with her clients. She also presented her bank account
statements and bank transactions, which reflect that she had the financial capacity to pay the
purchase price of the subject property.

232
Josefina Franciso vs Master Iron Works & Construction Corp and Roberto V. Alvejo

Facts:

Josefina Castillo and Franciso Eduardo got married in 1983. A little more than a year into the
marriage, she bought two parcels of land worth 320,000.

Eduardo would later on waived his claims over the property, saying that they were purchased by
Josefina before the marriage with her own savings. Josefina then mortgaged the property. It
appears that Eduardo affixed his marital conformity to the deed.

In 1990, Master Iron Works & Construction Company (MIWCC) filed a complaint against Eduardo
for failing to pay for 7,500 bags of cement worth 768,750 he bought in his capacity as the General
Manager and President of Reach Out Trading International. The court rendered judgment in favor
of MIWCC and ordered Eduardo to replace the bags of cement or pay back the amount he owed
MIWCC.

To satisfy his civil liability, Sherrif Alejo levied on the two parcels of land earlier mentioned.

Josefina filed a third party claim in which she claimed that they were her paraphernal properties
bought through her own money and that Eduardo had no interest over them, as evidenced by the
waiver he executed. However, the public auction proceeded, and the property was sold to MIWCC
as the highest bidder.

Josefina then filed a complaint against MIWCC and Sheriff Alejo, praying for damages and that
whatever entries appearing in the title as a result of the levy be canceled. However, before she
could commence presenting her evidence, she filed a petition to annul her marriage with Eduardo
on the ground that Eduardo had a valid subsisting marriage with one Carmelita Carpio. During the
trial of this case, Josefina declared that she bought the property through the help of her sisters and
brother and that Eduardo had no participation in the said acquisition.

In the meantime, he insisted in her case against MIWCC that she purchased the property when she
was single with her mother's financial assistance.

In 1996, the RTC declared Josefina and Eduardo's marriage null and void for being bigamous.

In 1997, the trial court found the levy and sale of the contested property to be null and void as the
property was the sole and exclusive property of Josefina, applying 144, 160, 175, and 485 of the
New Civil Code.

The Court of Appeals reversed this an ruled that the property was presumed to be conjugal
property of Eduardo and Josefina and that the latter failed to rebut such presumption. The waiver
was also void for being contrary to Article 146 of the New Civil Code.

Josefina petitioned for review before the SC.

Issue:

WON the subject property is the conjugal property of Josefina and Eduardo and, therefore, can be
held liable to answer for the personal obligations of the husband.

Ruling:

Subject properties are not paraphernal properties of the wife and can be held to answer the
liabilities of the husband.

Article 148 of the Family Code, stating that "only the properties acquired by both of the parties
through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common," governed Josefina and Eduardo's property relationship. It could be applied retroactively
to their marriage as Josefina failed to prove that she had vested right of the property.

There is no conjugal property in their marriage but only a co-ownership based on actual
contribution.

In Josefa's case, she failed to prove by preponderance of evidence that she acquired the properties
with her personal funds and, hence, is not a co-owner of the property.

Her conflicting testimonies regarding the time (note that she had both said that she purchased the
property before and during the marriage) and the source of funds used to acquire the property (she
implied in her third party claim that she used her own money but later said that she was helped by
her mother and sister) did not help in persuading the court.

The SC also doubted that she had enough funds of her own to purchase the property as she was
only 23 years old when the sale supposedly happened. Her claim that the funds were provided by
 her mother and sister was just an afterthought.

Josefa’s petition is denied for lack of merit. CA’s decision was affirmed

233 ALAIN M. DIÑO vs. MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO G.R. No. 178044 January 19, 2011
FACTS:

Alain M. Diño (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Diño(respondent) got married on 14 January 1998
before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Piñas City.
On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent,
citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag) submitted a psychological report establishing that respondent was
suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was incurable and deeply ingrained in her
system since her early formative years.
The trial court granted the petition on the ground that respondent was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration of the marriage and
declared their marriage void ab initio. It ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall
only be issued upon compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code.
Trial court, upon motion for partial reconsideration of petitioner, modified its decision holding that a
decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued after liquidation, partition and distribution of
the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.

ISSUE:

Whether the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only
be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of
the Family Code.

HELD:

YES. The trial court’s decision is affirmed with modification. Decree of absolute nullity of the
marriage shall be issued upon finality of the trial court’s decision without waiting for the liquidation,
partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.

RATIO:

The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC that in a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property
relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article
148 of the Family Code. Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is
nonetheless void, such as petitioner and respondent in the case before the Court.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:

1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.

All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the Family
Code applies to the property relations between petitioner and respondent.
The trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued only
after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family
Code. The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed
under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. Section 19(1) of the Rule provides:
 Sec. 19. Decision. – (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein
that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after
compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule on
Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages
which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the
Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are
declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without
waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.
In both instances under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are governed either by absolute
community of property or conjugal partnership of gains unless the parties agree to a complete
separation of property in a marriage settlement entered into before the marriage. Since the property
relations of the parties is governed by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of
gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a decree of
annulment could be issued. That is not the case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code because the marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.
In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 36 of the Family
Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in
common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that
the property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed
either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and the
properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-
ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, “[p]artition may be made by agreement between the
parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x.” It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the
spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.

DOCTRINE:

Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under
Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of
the properties of the parties. In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void
under Article 36 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the
liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-
ownership.

OTHER KINDS OF COHABITATION

234 ERLINDA A. AGAPAY vs.CARLINA (CORNELIA) V. PALANG and HERMINIA P. DELA CRUZ
G.R. No. 116668 July 28, 1997
FACTS:
Miguel Palang and Carlina (Cornelia) were married on 1949 then after a few months Miguel left to
work in Hawaii leaing Cornelia with their one hild. Miguel returned but he stayed in Zambales with
his brother, not in Pangasinan with his wife and child. The trial court found evidence that as early as
1957, Miguel had attempted to divorce Carlina in Hawaii. When he returned for good in 1972, he
refused to live with private respondents, but stayed alone in a house in Pozorrubio, Pangasinan. On
1973 Miguel 63 years contracted his second marriage with Erlinda Agapay 19 years old, herein
petitioner. Consequently, two land were acquired during the second marriage, an agricultural land
named for both and a residential lot named only for Erlinda. Both land are within Pangasinan. Then,
Miguel and Cornelia Palang executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement to
settle and end a case filed by the latter.The parties therein agreed to donate their conjugal property
consisting of six parcels of land to their only child, Herminia Palang but Miguel died years later.
Carlina Palang and her daughter Herminia Palang de la Cruz, herein private respondents, instituted
 the case at bar, an action for recovery of ownership and possession with damages against
petitioner before the Regional Trial Court in Urdaneta, Pangasinan (Civil Case No. U-4265). Private
respondents sought to get back the riceland and the house and lot both located at Binalonan,
Pangasinan allegedly purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner. Petitioner, as
defendant below, contended that while the riceland covered by TCT No. 101736 is registered in
their names (Miguel and Erlinda), she had already given her half of the property to their son
Kristopher Palang. She added that the house and lot covered by TCT No. 143120 is her sole
property, having bought the same with her own money. Erlinda added that Carlina is precluded
from claiming aforesaid properties since the latter had already donated their conjugal estate to
Herminia. After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered its decision on June 30, 1989
dismissing the complaint after declaring that there was little evidence to prove that the subject
properties pertained to the conjugal property of Carlina and Miguel Palang. The lower court went on
to provide for the intestate shares of the parties, particularly of Kristopher Palang, Miguel's
illegitimate son. On appeal, respondent court reversed the trial court's decision. hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the property acquired during the illicit cohabitation or subsequent void
marriage (Erlinda and Miguel) belongs to conjugal property of the first and valid marriage (Carlina
and Miguel).
RULING: YES.
The provision of law applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code providing for cases of
cohabitation when a man and woman who are not capacitated to marry each other live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage.
While Miguel and Erlinda contracted marriage, said union was patently void because earlier
marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still subsisting and unaffected by the latter’s de facto
separation.
Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is required by this provision, in
contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and
household, are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no
salary or income or work or industry. If the actual contribution of the party is not proved, there will
be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.
Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the business of buy-and-sell and
had a sari-sari store but failed to persuade the SC that she actually contributed money to buy the
riceland. Since petitioner failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of the
riceland, SC finds no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the same.

235
Jacinto Saguid vs CA, et Al. , GR. NO. 150611

FACTS:
Gina S. Rey, private respondent, a married woman but separated de facto from her husband,
cohabited with petitioner, Jacinto Saguid in a house built on a lot owned by Jacinto's father. The two
were able to acquire properties during their cohabitation. Subsequently, the couple decided to
separate.

Private respondent filed a complaint for Partition and Recovery of Personal Property with
Receivership against petitioner. She alleged that from her salary as entertainer in Japan, she was
able to contributein the completion of their unfinished house. Also, from her own earnings as an
entertainer and fish dealer, she was able to acquire and accumulate appliances, pieces of furniture
and household effects. She prayed that she be declared the sole owner of these personal
properties, representing her contribution to the construction of their house, be reimbursed to her.
 Private respondent testified that she deposited part of her earnings in her savings account with First
Allied Development Bank based on her passbook.

This was refuted by the petitioner, claiming that the expenses for the construction of their house
were defrayed solely from his income as a captain of their fishing vessel. He averred that private
respondent's meager income as fish dealer rendered her unable to contribute in the construction of
said house, that she did not continuously work in Japan and that the income in fishing business was
placed in their joint account deposit.

The trial court declared petitioner in default for failure to file a pre-trial brief and decided the case in
favor of private respondent. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the trial court erred in allowing private respondent to present evidence ex
parte;
2. Whether or not the trial court's decision is supported by evidence.
1. Whether or not the properties acquired by both of the parties through their
cohabitation shall be owned by them in common

RULINGS:
Yes, but only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry in proportion to their respective contributions.

The Court ruled that since the private respondent and the petitioner were not capacitated to marry
each other because the former was validly married to another man at the time of her cohabitation
with the latter, their property regime is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code. Under this
regime, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. Proof of actual contribution is required. In the absence of proof of extent of the
parties' respective contributions, their share shall be presumed equal. Here, the disputed personal
properties were valued at P111,375.00, the existence and value of which were not questioned by
the petitioner. Hence, their share therein is equivalent to one-half, i.e., P55,687.50 each

Although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties commenced before the date of the effectivity of
the Family Code Article 148 thereof applies because this provision was intended precisely to fill up
the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code. Before Article 148 of the Family Code was enacted, there
was no provision governing property relations of couples living in a state of adultery or
concubinage. Hence, even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the property occurred before the
Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs.

236 CAMILO F. BORROMEO vs. ANTONIETTA O. DESCALLAR, G.R. No. 159310. February 24,
2009

FACTS: Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, arrived in the Philippines in 1983 after he was assigned by
his employer to work at a project in Mindoro. In 1984, he transferred to Cebu to work. There, he met
respondent Antonietta, a separated mother of two boys who was working as a waitress in a hotel.
Jambrich befriended respondent and asked her to tutor him in English. In dire need of additional
income to support her children, respondent agreed. The tutorials were held in Antonietta's
residence. Jambrich and respondent fell in love and decided to live together in a rented house.
Later, they transferred to their own house and lots at Agro-Macro Subdivision, Cabancalan,
Mandaue City. In the Contracts to Sell, covering the properties, Jambrich and respondent were
referred to as the buyers. A Deed of Absolute Sale was likewise issued in their favor. However,
when the Deed of Absolute Sale was presented for registration before the Register of Deeds,
registration was refused on the ground that Jambrich was an alien and could not acquire alienable
lands of the public domain. Consequently, Jambrich's name was erased from the document. But it
could be noted that his signature remained beside respondent's signature as buyer. TCT over the
properties were issued in respondent's name alone.

Jambrich also formally adopted respondent's two sons. By then, respondent found a new boyfriend
while Jambrich began to live with another woman. Jambrich supported respondent's sons for only
two months after the break up. Later on, Jambrich met petitioner Camilo. Petitioner was engaged in
the real estate business. He also built and repaired speedboats as a hobby. Jambrich purchased an
engine and some accessories for his boat from petitioner, for which he became indebted to the
latter. To pay for his debt, he sold his rights and interests in the Agro-Macro properties to petitioner
for P250,000, as evidenced by a "Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment". When petitioner sought to
register the deed of assignment, he discovered that titles to the three lots have been transferred in
the name of respondent, and that the subject property has already been mortgaged. Petitioner filed
a complaint against respondent for recovery of real property. Petitioner alleged that the Contracts to
Sell and the Deed of Absolute Sale over the properties which identified both Jambrich and
respondent as buyers do not reflect the true agreement of the parties since respondent did not pay
a single centavo of the purchase price and was not in fact a buyer; that it was Jambrich alone who
paid for the properties using his exclusive funds; and, that petitioner acquired absolute ownership
by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment which Jambrich executed in his favor.

In her Answer, respondent claimed that she "solely and exclusively used her own personal funds to
defray and pay for the purchase price of the subject lots in question", and that Jambrich, being an
alien, was prohibited to acquire or own real property in the Philippines.

The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff on the basis that it is highly improbable and impossible
that she could acquire the properties under litigation or could contribute any amount for their
acquisition when while she was working as a waitress earning P1,000.00 a month as salary, she
could not even provide for the daily needs of her family.

Respondent appealed to the CA. The CA reversed the decision of the trial court ruling that the title
of the subject property is not in the name of Jambrich but in the name of defendant. Thus, Jambrich
could not have transferred a property he has no title thereto.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
1. WON the CA erred in holding that Jambrich has no title to the properties in question and
may not therefore transfer and assign any rights and interests in favor of petitioner.
2. WON respondent's argument that Jambrich is prohibited from acquiring private land here in
the Philippines is meritorious.

RULING:
1. YES. Jambrich has all authority to transfer all his rights, interests and participation over the
subject properties to petitioner by virtue of the Deed of Assignment he executed. The fact
that the disputed properties were acquired during the couple's cohabitation also does not
help respondent. The rule that co-ownership applies to a man and a woman living
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, but are
otherwise capacitated to marry each other, does not apply.

In the instant case, respondent was still legally married to another when she and Jambrich
lived together. In such an adulterous relationship, no co-ownership exists between the
parties. It is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the
acquisition of property in order to be able to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of
co-ownership and equal contribution do not apply.
 2. NO. The fundamental law explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos from acquiring or holding title to
private lands, except only by way of legal succession or if the acquisition was made by a former
natural-born citizen. Therefore, in the instant case, the transfer of land from Agro-Macro
Development Corporation to Jambrich, who is an Austrian, would have been declared invalid if
challenged, had not Jambrich conveyed the properties to petitioner who is a Filipino citizen.

Applying United Church Board for World Ministries, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioner
that while the acquisition and the purchase of Jambrich of the properties under litigation
were void ab initio since they were contrary to the Constitution of the Philippines, he being
a foreigner, yet, the acquisition of these properties by plaintiff who is a Filipino citizen from
him, has cured the flaw in the original transaction and the title of the transferee is valid.

The rationale behind the Court's ruling in United Church Board for World Ministries, as
reiterated in subsequent cases, is this — since the ban on aliens is intended to preserve
the nation's land for future generations of Filipinos, that aim is achieved by making lawful
the acquisition of real estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization or
those transfers made by aliens to Filipino citizens. As the property in dispute is already in
the hands of a qualified person, a Filipino citizen, there would be no more public policy to
be protected. The objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino
hands has been achieved.

237 Edilberto U. Ventura, Jr. vs. Spouses Paulino and Evangeline Abuda, G.R. No. 202932,
October 23, 2013

FACTS:
Socorro and Esteban were married, but did not have common children, though both of them
had children from prior marriages. Esteban had a daughter name Evangeline Abuda, and Socorro
had a son, who was the father of Edilberto Ventura, Jr.
Socorro had a prior subsisting marriage to Crispin when she married Esteban. This
marriage was not annulled, and Crispin was alive at the time of Socorro’s marriage to Esteban.
Esteban’s prior marriage was dissolved by the virtue of his wife’s death.
Sometime in 1968, Esteban purchased a portion of a lot in Tondo, Manila while the
remaining portion was purchased by Evangeline on her father’s behalf (Vitas Property). In 1978,
Esteban and her daughter operated small business establishments located in Tondo (Delpan
Property). When Esteban was diagnosed with Colon cancer, he decided to sell the Delpan and
Vitas properties to Evangeline.
Esteban passed away on 1997 while Socorro passed away on 1999. Sometime in 2000,
Leonora, the mother of Edilberto, discovered the sale. Thus, Edilberto, represented by Leonora,
filed a Petition for Annulment of Deeds of Sale before the RTC-Manila on the ground that the sale
of the properties was fraudulent because Esteban’s signature on the deeds of sale was forged. The
respondents, Spouses Abuda, contended because of Socorro’s prior marriage to Crispin, her
subsequent marriage to Esteban was null and void. Thus, Socorro nor her heirs can claim any right
or interest over the said properties.
The RTC-Manila dismissed the petition for the lack of merit. The RTC-Manila ruled that the
marriage between Socorro and Esteban was void from the beginning. According to the RTC-Manila,
the Vitas and Delpan properties are not conjugal, and are governed by Articles 144 and 485 of the
Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not
married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both
of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership.
Art. 485. The share of the co-owners, in the benefits as well as in the charges, shall be
proportional to their respective interests. Any stipulation in a contract to the contrary shall
 be void.
The portions belonging to the co-owners in the co-ownership shall be presumed equal, unless the
contrary is proved. The RTC-Manila concluded that Socorro did not contribute any funds for the
acquisition of the properties. Hence, she cannot be considered a co-owner, and her heirs cannot
claim any rights over the Vitas and Delpan properties. Edilberto then filed an appeal before the CA.
However, the CA sustained the decision of the RTC-Manila. The CA ruled, however, that the RTC-
Manila should have applied Article 148 of the Family Code, and not Articles 144 and 485 of the Civil
Code. Article 148 of the Family Code states that in unions between a man and a woman who are
incapacitated to marry each other:
x x x only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their
contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and
presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.

The CA found that Edilberto failed to prove that Socorro contributed to the purchase of the Vitas
and Delpan properties. Edilberto was unable to provide any documentation evidencing Socorro’s
alleged contribution.
Edilberto filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the CA. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Edilberto is entitled to the sold properties by virtue of Socorro’s marriage to
Esteban.

RULING:
No. The SC held that the title itself shows that the Vitas property is owned by Esteban
alone. The phrase "married to Socorro Torres" is merely descriptive of his civil status, and does not
show that Socorro co-owned the property. The evidence on record also shows that Esteban
acquired ownership over the Vitas property prior to his marriage to Socorro, even if the certificate of
title was issued after the celebration of the marriage. Registration under the Torrens title system
merely confirms, and does not vest title.
Edilberto claims that Esteban’s actual contribution to the purchase of the Delpan property
was not sufficiently proven since Evangeline shouldered some of the amortizations. Thus, the law
presumes that Esteban and Socorro jointly contributed to the acquisition of the Del pan property.
The SC, however, cannot sustain Edilberto’s claim. Both the RTC-Manila and the CA found that the
Delpan property was acquired prior to the marriage of Esteban and Socorro. Furthermore, even if
payment of the purchase price of the Delpan property was made by Evangeline, such payment was
made on behalf of her father and the parties intended that the Delpan property would be owned by
and registered under the name of Esteban.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

THE FAMILY AS AN INSTITUTION

238 Arroyo, Jr. vs CA,

*refer to case no. 182