MOOT AND ACADEMIC
MODULE 4 – JUDICIAL REVIEW PART 2
I. CONDITION FOR THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW
Before the Courts can exercise the power of Judicial
Review, the following must be present:
A. Actual Case or Controversy
B. Locus Standi or Legal Standing
C. Timeliness (Question of Constitutionality
is raised at the earliest possible opportunity)
D. Lis Mota
A. ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY
Requirement of Ripeness
Article 8, Sec. 1 1987 Constitution – Clearly
mentions ‘actual case’
A contrariety of legal rights or claims which is ‘ripe for
adjudicaiton’
This means that the act has been done by any
branch, presenting an immediate or threatened injury
to the Petitioner.
Negates hypothetical, moot, and academic question,
which merely requires an advisory opinion.
A.MB​: This can be said when something has been
accomplished or performed by the executive and
legislative department and the effect of which is an
existence of immediate or threatened injury to a
person or to a group of people.
There is an actual opposition of legal rights and
claims between the State actor on one hand and the
affected private individuals / person whether natural /
juridical on the other hand.
The injury is actual, hence it is not anticipatory. Why?
Because our Courts only issue decisions, they do not
issue advisory opinions on a hypothetical legal
problem.
In relation to the concept of an actual case, is what
case laws often refer to as a case or question that is
MOOT AND ACADEMIC.
One which ​no longer needs any decision by the
court because, through subsequent development of
events, any decision made by the court would no
longer be needed to resolve the legal question
presented before it.
Ex. You sue someone for non – payment of debt.
However, while the case was ongoing, the debtor paid
you. Hence, the case has become moot and
academic because through subsequent development
of events, the court no longer needs to make any
decision to the issue presented before it.
Once a case is Moot and Academic, the case poses
NO Actual Case or Controversy​.
When you relate this to the concept of Judicial
Review, the Court can no longer exercise such power.
EXCEPTIONS TO THE GENERAL RULE:
a.​ ​Grave Constitutional Violation
b.​ ​Paramount Public Interest
c.​ ​Guidance for the Bench and Bar
d.​ ​Capable of Repetition yet Evading Review
Imbong v. Ochoa
(​This case involves the question of the
constitutionality of the reproductive health law​)
Q1. What facts are relevant to this discussion on
the requirement of “actual case or controversy”?
The increase of the country’s population at an
uncontrollable pace led to the executive and the
legislative’s decision that prior measures were still not
adequate. Thus, Congress enacted R.A. No. 10354,
otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), to provide
Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized,
access and information to the full range of modern
family planning methods, and to ensure that its
objective to provide for the peoples’ right to
reproductive health be achieved. Stated differently,
the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and
make effective the current laws on contraception,
women’s health and population control.
Shortly after, challengers from various sectors of
society moved to assail the constitutionality of RH
Law. Meanwhile, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of
the assailed legislation took effect. The Court then
issued a Status Quo Ante Order enjoining the effects
and implementation of the assailed legislation.
Petitioners question, among others,
constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it
violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution,
prescribing the one subject-one title rule. According to
them, being one for reproductive health with
responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation
violates the constitutional standards of due process
by concealing its true intent – to act as a population
control measure. On the other hand, respondents
insist that the RH Law is not a birth or population
control measure, and that the concepts of
“responsible parenthood” and “reproductive health”
are both interrelated as they are inseparable.
specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature,
as distinguished from an opinion advising what the
law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.
Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or
controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question
is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged
has had a direct adverse effect an the individual
the
challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for
adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has
then been accomplished or performed by either
branch before a court may come into the picture, and
the petitioner must allege the existence of an
immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result
of the challenged action. He must show that he has
sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining
some direct injury as a result of the act complained of
Q3. What case law was used by the Supreme
Court as a basis in deciding the issues on
ripeness here?

Q2. What were the arguments raised but the
proponents of Reproductive Health Law
concerning the requirement of “actual case or
controversy”?
Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subject
petitions do not present any actual case or
controversy because the RH Law has yet to be
implemented. They claim that the questions raised by
the petitions are not yet concrete and ripe for
adjudication since no one has been charged with
violating any of its provisions and that there is no
showing that any of the petitioners' rights has been
adversely affected by its operation. In short, it is
contended that judicial review of the RH Law is
premature.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case
or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the
decision of the court would amount to an advisory
opinion. The rule is that courts do not sit to adjudicate
mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest,
however intellectually challenging. The controversy
must be justiciable — definite and concrete, touching
on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal
interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an
active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the
one hand, and a denial thereof, on the other; that is, it
must concern a real, tangible and not merely a
theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an
actual and substantial controversy admitting of
In T​he Province of North Cotabato v. The
Government of the Republic of the Philippines​,
where the constitutionality of an unimplemented
Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain
(MOA-AD) was put in question, it was argued that the
Court has no authority to pass upon the issues raised
as there was yet no concrete act performed that could
possibly violate the petitioners' and the intervenors'
rights. Citing precedents, the Court ruled that the fact
of the law or act in question being not yet effective
does not negate ripeness. Concrete acts under a law
are not necessary to render the controversy ripe.
Even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the
law is enough to awaken judicial duty.
Q4. Did the Supreme Court find that there was an
actual case here? Why or why not?
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual
case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe
for judicial determination. Considering that the RH
Law and its implementing rules have already taken
effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the
law have already been passed, it is evident that the
subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As
stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch
is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution,
it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the
Judiciary to settle the dispute
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is
so because medical practitioners or medical providers
are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under the
RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly
public health officers who are threatened to be
dismissed from the service with forfeiture of
retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be
heard on the matter NOW.
Belgica v. Ochoa,
(​This case also involves the constitutionality of the
Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) which
is one of the many forms of Pork Barrel in our
country.​)
FACTS:
The “Presidential Pork Barrel” questioned by the
petitioners include the Malampaya Fund and the
Presidential Social Fund. The Malampaya Fund was
created as a special fund under Section 8,
Presidential Decree (PD) 910 by then-President
Ferdinand Marcos to help intensify, strengthen, and
consolidate government efforts relating to the
exploration, exploitation, and development of
indigenous energy resources vital to economic
growth. The Presidential Social Fund was created
under Section 12, Title IV, PD 1869 (1983) or the
Charter of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR), as amended by PD 1993
issued in 1985. The Presidential Social Fund has
been described as a special funding facility managed
and administered by the Presidential Management
Staff through which the President provides direct
assistance to priority programs and projects not
funded under the regular budget. It is sourced from
the share of the government in the aggregate gross
earnings of PAGCOR.
Q1 Did the Supreme Court find that there was an
actual case here? Why or why not?
YES. There exists an actual and justiciable
controversy in these cases. The requirement of
contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the
antagonistic positions of the parties on the
constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System.”
Also, the questions in these consolidated cases are
ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds
and the provisions allowing for their utilization –
such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the
Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD
1993, for the Presidential Social Fund – ​are currently
existing and operational​; hence, there exists an
immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a
result of the unconstitutional use of these public
funds.
Q2. Considering the reforms to the PDAF, were
the issues raised relating thereto considered
moot and academic?
As for the PDAF, the Court dispelled the notion that
the issues related thereto had been rendered moot
and academic by the reforms undertaken by
respondents. ​A case becomes moot when there is
no more actual controversy between the parties
or no useful purpose can be served in passing
upon the merits. The respondents’ ​proposed
line-item budgeting scheme would not terminate the
controversy nor diminish the useful purpose for its
resolution since said ​reform is geared towards the
2014 budget, and ​not the 2013 PDAF Article which,
being a ​distinct subject matter​, ​remains legally
effective and existing. Neither will the President’s
declaration that he had already “abolished the PDAF”
render the issues on PDAF moot precisely because
the Executive branch of government has no
constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal
existence.
Q3. Assuming that the issues in the case were
moot and academic, should the Supreme Court be
dissuaded in resolving the case?
Even on the assumption of mootness, nevertheless,
jurisprudence dictates that “the ‘moot and academic’
principle is not a magical formula that can
automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a case.”
The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if:
i.) There is a grave violation of the Constitution:
This is clear from the fundamental posture of
petitioners – they essentially ​allege grave violations
of the Constitution with respect to the principles
of separation of powers, non-delegability of
legislative power, checks and balances,
accountability and local autonomy.
ii.) The exceptional character of the situation and
the paramount public interest is involved: ​This is
also apparent from the nature of the interests involved
– the ​constitutionality of the very system within
which significant amounts of public funds have
been and continue to be utilized and expended
undoubtedly presents a situation of exceptional
character as well as a matter of paramount public
interest. The present petitions, in fact, have been
lodged ​at a time when the system’s flaws have
never before been magnified​. To the Court’s mind,
the coalescence of the CoA Report, the accounts
of numerous whistle-blowers, and the
government’s own recognition that reforms are
needed “to address the reported abuses of the
PDAF” ​demonstrates ​a prima facie pattern of
abuse ​which only underscores the importance of the
matter.
It is also by this finding that the Court finds petitioners’
claims as not merely theorized, speculative or
hypothetical. Of note is the weight accorded by the
Court to the findings made by the CoA which is the
constitutionally-mandated audit arm of the
government. if only for the purpose of validating the
existence of an actual and justiciable controversy in
these cases, ​the Court deems the findings under
the CoA Report to be sufficient.
iii.) ​When the constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public: This is applicable
largely due to the ​practical need for a definitive
ruling on the system’s constitutionality. There is a
compelling need to formulate controlling principles
relative to the issues raised herein in order to guide
the bench, the bar, and the public, not just for the
expeditious resolution of the anticipated disallowance
cases, but more importantly, so that the government
may be guided on how public funds should be utilized
in accordance with constitutional principles.
iv.) The case is capable of repetition yet evading
review. This is called for by the recognition that ​the
preparation and passage of the national budget is,
by constitutional imprimatur, an affair of annual
occurrence. The myriad of issues underlying the
manner in which certain public funds are spent, if not
resolved at this most opportune time, are capable of
repetition and hence, must not evade judicial review.
DAVID V. ARROYO
(​Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of former
president Gloria Arroyo’s declaration of a State of
National Emergency through various presidential
issuances.​)
Q1. What facts are relevant to the discussion on
the requirement of ‘actual case or controversy’?
● In February 26, 2006, as the nation was about
to celebrate the 20th Anniversary of EDSA,
Pres. Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a State
of National Emergency.
● For the reason that Extreme leftist were alleged
to be plotting of over taking the government
● The President then issued PP 1021 lifting the
state of national emergency on March 3, 2006,
after all the petitions were filed.
○ The petitioners contended that after the
declaration of state of national emergency
through the issuance of PP 1017 there was:
■ Numerous warrantless arrests,
inclusive of:
■ Protesters of KMU (Kilusang Mayo
Uno)
■ Ronal Llamas from Akbayan party list
○ Take over of facilities, including the media
Q2. Respondents OSG argued that the questions
presented here were rendered moot and academic
by the issuance of PP 1021? Explain PP 1021 in
relation to the questions raised by the Petitioners.
The issues raised by the petitioners was with regards
to PP 1017 and not with PP 1021.
Q3. Where the questions presented by the
Petitioner moot and academic?
No, because the court says that there was an actual
case and controversy.
Q4. Assuming that the questions presented were
moot and academic, should the Supreme Court be
dissuaded from resolving the same?
No, because even if it was moot The SC also says
that even if it was moot and academic, the Court will
still need to make a decision if:
i. Grave Violation of the Constitution
• Which was a definite issue because, the petitioners
alleged that there were warrantless arrests of
protesters, which is a violation of the constitution.
ii. Exceptional character of the situation and
paramount to public interest
• It is clear in the case that this was an exceptional
since this was a declaration of state of national
emergency which does not happen all the time and
that
• obviously, it is public interest because it has
something to do with the basic rights of the people.
iii. When constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar and the public.
• It is also to be noted that the Court has the symbolic
function to educate the bench the bar, and in this
case, the police and the military on the extent of the
protection given by constitutional guarantees.
iv. Case it capable of repetition yet evading review
• It is to be known that circumstances that happened
may happen in the future.
 SANLAKAS V. REYES
(​Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of the
presidential declaration of a State of Rebellion​)
. a result of the governmental act that is being
Q1. What facts are relevant to the discussion on
the requirement of ‘actual case or controversy’
On July 27, 2003, some 300 junior officers and
enlisted men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
stormed into the Oakwood Premiere apartments in
Makati City. Bewailing the corruption in the AFP, the
soldiers demanded, among other things, the
resignation of President Gloria Arroyo, Secretary of
Defense Angelo Reyes, and PNP Chief Hermogenes
Ebdane. In the wake of the Oakwood occupation, the
President issued later in the day Proclamation No.
427 ("Declaring a State of Rebellion") and General
Order No. 4 ("Directing the AFP and the PNP to
Suppress the Rebellion"), both declaring “a state of
rebellion” and calling out the Armed Forces to
suppress the rebellion.
By the evening of July 27, 2003, the Oakwood
occupation had ended. After hours-long negotiations,
the soldiers agreed to return to barracks. The
President, however, did not immediately lift the
declaration of a state of rebellion and did so only on
August 1, 2003, through Proclamation No. 435
("Declaring that the State of Rebellion Has Ceased to
Exist"). Subsequently, several petitions have been
filed challenging the constitutionality of the President
Arroyo's declaration of state of rebellion.
Q2. Were the questions raised here moot and
academic?
Yes. The Court held that the case is moot and
academic, judicial power being limited to the
determination of "actual controversies." However, the
Court treated the immediate case as one that is
"capable of repetition yet evading review." Hence, the
discussion of the merits and demerits of the issues
presented
Q3. Could the case have been decided on the
ground that the issue is capable of repetition yet
evading review?
Yes. The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that
the issuance of Proclamation No. 435, declaring that
the state of rebellion has ceased to exist, has
rendered the case moot. As a rule, courts do not
adjudicate moot cases, judicial power being limited to
the determination of "actual controversies."
Nevertheless, courts will decide a question, otherwise
moot, if it is "capable of repetition yet evading review."
The case at bar is one such case.
B. LEGAL STANDING or LOCUS STANDI
Also known as ‘locus standi’. It is the right of
appearance before a court on a given question. Using
the direct injury test, one must have a personal,
substantial, and material interest in the case such that
the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as
challenged.
A.MB​: The petitioner challenging the constitutionality
of a governmental act or law must pass the test of
Direct Injury.
Direct Injury Test
He/she who alleges direct injury must show a
personal, substantial, and material interest in the
outcome of the case. It is not enough that they are
interested for academic or any other reason not
involving the injury sustained or immediately
sustained because of the governmental act.
STANDARDS in DAVID V. ARROYO for a
petitioner to have Legal Standing
Taxpayers
A claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that
the tax measure is unconstitutional.
Voters
A showing of obvious interest in the validity of the
Election law questioned in this specific case.
Concerned Citizens
A showing that the issues raised are of
transcendental importance which must be settled
early.
Legislators
A claim that the official action complained of infringes
upon their prerogatives as legislators.
EXCEPTIONS TO LEGAL STANDING
REQUIREMENT
What this means is that despite the lack of legal
standing on the part of the petitioner, courts may still
pursue the exercise of judicial review when the
following can be shown:
a. ​Case or issues presented are of Transcendental
Importance
b.​ ​Case involves an Assertion of Public Right
c. ​Case involves a Facial Challenge to the validity
of laws that touch on the right to Freedom of
Expression.
CREBA V. ERC
(​Petitioner’s challenged the Constitutionality of Sec.
2.6 of the Distribution Services and Open Access
Rules promulgated by the Energy Regulatory
Commission​)
Q1. What does Section 2.6 of the DSOAR provide?
Q2. How will you characterize the Petitioner and
how did it argue that it has legal standing in the
case?

Q3. Did the SDoes and the Petitioner have legal
standing to assail hte validity of Section 2.6 of the
DSOAR? Did the Supreme Court fund that there
was an actual case here? Why or why not?
Q4. What are the determinants of a matter which
is of transcendental importance?
Q5. If the petitioner lacks legal standing, may the
case still be decided on the ground that the
issues involved in the case is one of
transcendental importance?
ADVOCATES FOR TRUTH V. BSMB
(​Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of the act
of Bangko Sental ng Pilipinas in enforcing Central
Bank Circular 905 which suspended the Usury Law​)
Q1. What facts are relevant leading to the issue of
constitutionality of the continued enforcement of
CB Circular No. 905 and the legal standing of the
Petitioners?
Q2. Do Petitioners have the legal standing o
question the constitutionality of CB Circular No.
905
Q3. If the Petitioner lacks legal standing, may the
case still be decided on the ground that the
issues involved in the case is one of
transcendental importance?
IBP V. ZAMORA
(​Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of former
Erap’s act of deploying the Marines and PNP in
visibility patrols in Metro Manila.​)
Facts:
Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada, as commander in chief of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, directed the AFP
Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each
other for the proper deployment and utilization of the
Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or
suppressing criminal or lawless violence in Metro
Manila in the light of the escalating cases of crime
and lawlessness in the city. The President declared
that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime
campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a
reasonable period only, until such time when the
situation shall have improved. Subsequently, the IBP
filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition
with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining
order seeking to nullify on constitutional grounds the
order of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada
commanding the deployment of the Philippine
Marines (the “Marines”) to join the Philippine National
Police (the “PNP”) in the visibility patrols around the
metropolis.
Q1. How did IBP argue its legal standing to
question the constitutionality of the President’s
act?
The IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged
responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the
Constitution. The invocation by the IBP of its duty to
preserve the rule of law.
The IBP projects as injurious is the supposed
"militarization" of law enforcement which might
threaten Philippine democratic institutions and may
cause more harm than good in the long run.
Q2. Does IBP have the legal standing in relation to
the question raised in this case?
The petition has no merit. The petitioner failed to
sufficiently show that it is in possession of the
requisites of standing to raise the issues in the
petition. The IBP has not sufficiently complied with the
requisites of standing in this case.
In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors its
standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the
rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from this
declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis
in support of its locus standi. The mere invocation by
the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and
nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient
to clothe it with standing in this case. The IBP has
failed to present a specific and substantial interest in
the resolution of the case. Its fundamental purpose
which is to elevate the standards of the law profession
and to improve the administration of justice is alien to,
and cannot be affected by the deployment of the
Marines. The IBP has not shown any specific injury
which it has suffered or may suffer by virtue of the
questioned governmental act. What the IBP projects
as injurious is the supposed "militarization" of law
enforcement which might threaten Philippine
democratic institutions and may cause more harm
than good in the long run. Not only is the presumed
"injury" not personal in character, it is likewise too
vague, highly speculative and uncertain to satisfy the
requirement of standing. Since petitioner has not
successfully established a direct and personal injury
as a consequence of the questioned act, it does not
possess the personality to assail the validity of the
deployment of the Marines.
Q3. Assume that IBP has no legal standing, has it
raised issues of transcendental importance that
would allow judicial review?
The IBP had raised transcendental importance that
would allow judicial review. In this case, a reading of
the petition shows that the IBP has advanced
constitutional issues which deserve the attention of
this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and
weight as precedents. Moreover, because peace and
order are under constant threat and lawless violence
occurs in increasing tempo, undoubtedly aggravated
by the Mindanao insurgency problem, the legal
controversy raised in the petition almost certainly will
not go away. It, therefore, behooves the Court to relax
the rules on standing and to resolve the issue now,
rather than later.
PHILCONSA V. ENRIQUEZ
(​This is a case concerning the constitutionality of a
fund in the appropriation bill which was alleged to be
a form of pork barrel. The issue on legal standing
came about because there was an issue on the
limitation on the power of the president in vetoing an
item in the appropriation bill​.)
FACTS:
House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill
of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed and approved by
both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As
passed, it imposed conditions and limitations on
certain items of appropriations in the proposed budget
previously submitted by the President. It also
authorized members of Congress to propose and
identify projects in the “pork barrels” allotted to them
and to realign their respective operating budgets.
Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and
enactment of bills as prescribed by the Constitution,
Congress presented the said bill to the President for
consideration and approval.
On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill
into law, and declared the same to have become
Republic Act NO. 7663, entitled “AN ACT
APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION
OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
FROM JANUARY ONE TODECEMBER THIRTY
ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES” (GAA of 1994). On
the same day, the President delivered his Presidential
Veto Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he
vetoed and on which he imposed certain conditions.
Q1. Does a legislator have the legal standing to
question the validity of a presidential vote or a
condition imposed on an item in an appropriation
bill? Why or why not?
We rule that a member of the Senate, and of the
House of Representatives for that matter, has the
legal standing to question the validity of a presidential
veto or a condition imposed on an item in an
appropriation bill.
Where the veto is claimed to have been made without
or in excess of the authority vested on the President
by the Constitution, the issue of an impermissible
intrusion of the Executive into the domain of the
Legislature arises (Notes: Congressional Standing To
Challenge Executive Action, 122 University of
Pennsylvania Law Review 1366 [1974]).
To the extent the power of Congress are impaired, so
is the power of each member thereof, since his office
confers a right to participate in the exercise of the
powers of that institution (Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S.
433 [1939]; Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F. 2d 1307
[1973]).
An act of the Executive which injures the institution of
Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless
substantial injury, which can be questioned by a
member of Congress (Kennedy v. Jones, 412 F.
Supp. 353 [1976]). In such a case, any member of
Congress can have a resort to the courts.
AKBAYAN V. AQUINO
(​This case illustrates an exception to the legal
standing requirement, which is when a public right is
asserted by the petitioner. Here, petitioner sought to
obtain from the respondents the full text of the Japan
Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement,
including both countries offers during the negotiation
process.​)
Q1. What facts are relevant to the Supreme
Court’s resolution of the issue on Legal
Standing?
Petitioners seek to obtain from respondents the full
text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership
Agreement (JPEPA) including the Philippine and
Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation
process and all pertinent attachments and annexes
thereto. The JPEPA, which will be the first bilateral
free trade agreement to be entered into by the
Philippines with another country in the event the
Senate grants its consent to it, covers a broad range
of topics which includes trade in goods, rules of origin,
customs procedures, paperless trading, trade in
services, investment, intellectual property rights,
government procurement, movement of natural
persons, cooperation, competition policy, mutual
recognition, dispute avoidance and settlement,
improvement of the business environment, and
general and final provisions.
Congress through the House Committee are calling
for an inquiry into the JPEPA, but at the same time,
the Executive is refusing to give them the said copies
until the negotiation is completed. While the final text
of the JPEPA has now been made accessible to the
public since September 11, 2006, respondents do not
dispute that, at the time the petition was led up to the
ling of petitioners’ Reply—when the JPEPA was still
being negotiated—the initial drafts thereof were kept
from public view
Q2. How did the SC resolve the issue on legal
standing?
In a petition anchored upon the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern, which is a
public right by its very nature, petitioners need not
show that they have any legal or special interest in
the result, it being sufficient to show that they are
citizens and, therefore, part of the general public
which possesses the right. As the present petition is
anchored on the right to information and petitioners
are all suing in their capacity as citizens and groups of
citizens including petitioners-members of the House
of Representatives who additionally are suing in their
capacity as such, the standing of petitioners to le the
present suit is grounded in jurisprudence
Q3. What public right was involved in the present
case?
Right to information
OPOSA V. FACTORAN
(​This case is a novel case where the petitioners were
all minors represented by their parents. They filed for
a class suit which was anchored on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility and intergenerational
justice.
They were praying that all timber licenses agreements
in the country be cancelled and to stop the processing
of all applications for the same​.)
Q1. What facts are relevant to the SC’s resolution
of the issue on legal standing?
Q2. Do Petitioners have legal standing in the
present case? How did the SC decide such issue?
RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS V. REYES
(​This case concerns the legality of a service contract
which allowed the exploration, development, and
exploitation of petroleum services within the Tanyon
Strait.​)
Q1. Who are the Petitioners in this case and how
did they respectively argue relating to their legal
standing to file the petition?
- Petitioners, collectively referred to as the "Resident
Marine Mammals" in the petition, are the toothed
whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean
species, which inhabit the waters in and around the
Tañon Strait.
They are joined by Gloria Estenzo Ramos and
Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio as their legal guardians and
as friends (to be collectively known as "the Stewards")
who allegedly empathize with, and seek the protection
of, the aforementioned marine species.
Also impleaded as an unwilling co-petitioner is former
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, for her express
declaration and undertaking in the ASEAN Charter to
protect Tañon Strait, among others.
Q2. What were the arguments forwarded by the
Respondent to meet the claim that the Petitioners
have legal standing?
The Respondents in both petitions are: the late
Angelo T. Reyes, DOE Secretary; Jose L. Atienza,
DENR Secretary; Leonardo Sibbaluca, DENR-Region
VII Director and Chairman of Tañon Strait PMB;
JAPEX, a Japanese company; and Supply Oilfield
Services, Inc. (SOS) as the alleged Philippine agent
of JAPEX.
Their counter-allegations are:
o The “Resident Marine Mammals” and “Stewards”
have no legal standing to file the petition.
o SC-46 in Constitutional.
o The Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC)
was legally issued.
o The case is moot and academic since SC-46 is
mutually terminated on June 21, 2008.
Q3. Do the Petitioners have the legal standing to
file the petition? Why or why not?
- Yes, the Petitioners have the legal standing to file
the petition. In our jurisdiction, locus standi in
environment case has been given a more liberalized
approach. The Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases allow for a “citizen suit,” and permit any Filipino
citizen to file an action before our courts for violation
of our environmental laws on the principle that
humans are stewards of nature:
“Section 5. Citizen Suit. - Any Filipino Citizen in
representation of others, including minors or
generations yet unborn, may file an action to enforce
rights or obligations under environmental laws. Upon
the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall issue an
order which shall contain a brief description of the
cause of action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all
interested parties to manifest their interest to
intervene in the case within fifteen (15) days from
notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish the order
once in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines or furnish all affected barangays copies of
said order.
Citizen suits filed under R.A. No. 8749 and R.A. No.
9003 shall be governed by their respective provisions.
(Emphasis supplied)”
Although the petition was filed in 2007, years before
the effectivity of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases, it has been consistently held
that rules of procedure may be retroactively applied to
actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage and will not violate any right of a person who
may feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as
there is no vested rights in rules of procedure.
Moreover, even before the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases became effective, the Supreme
Court has already taken a permissive position on the
issue of locus standi in environmental cases. In
Oposa, the Supreme Court allowed the suit to be
brought in the name of generations yet unborn “based
on the concept of intergenerational responsibility
insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology in concerned.”
It is also worth noting that the Stewards in the present
case are joined as real parties in the Petition and not
just in representation of the named cetacean species.
C. TIMELINESS
The issue must be raised in the pleading at the
earliest opportunity before a competent court.
The issue of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest opportunity. The earliest opportunity to raise a
constitutional issue is to raise it in the pleadings
before a competent court that can resolve the same.
A.MB: Take note once again that all judicial bodies
are competent courts, meaning all of them can
exercise the power of judicial review. Other tribunals
not part of the judicial structure are not qualified to
rule on issues pertaining to constitutionality of laws.
MATIBAG V. BENIPAYO
(​This is a case concerning the constitutionality of
appointments of a COMELEC Chairman and 2
COMELEC Commissioners.​)
Q1. What are the facts and dates relevant to the
issue of timeliness in raising the constitutional
issue?
- On February 2, 1999, the COMELEC en banc,
appointed petitioner Ma. J. Angelina G. Matibag as
“Acting Director IV” of the EID.
- Feb. 15, 2000: Chairperson Harriet O. Demetrio
followed by Commissioner Rufino S.B. Javier
renewed the appointment of the petitioner as Director
IV of EID in a “temporary” capacity.
- On March 22, 2001: Pres. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
appointed, ad interim, Benipayo as COMELEC
Chairman, and Borra and Tuason as COMELEC
Commissioners, each for a term of 7 years and all
expiring on Feb. 2, 2008. Benipayo, Borra, and
Tuason took their oath of office respectively and
assumed their positions.
- The Office of the President submitted to the
Commission on Appointments on May 22, 2001 the
ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason for confirmations. However, the Commission
on Appointments did not act on said appointments.
- On June 1, 2001 Pres. Arroyo renewed their ad
interim appointments to the same positions and for
the same term of 7 years expiring on Feb. 2, 2008 for
the second time. They took their oaths to office for the
second time. The Office of the President transmitted
on June 5, 2001 their appointments to the
Commission on Appointments for confirmation. The
Congress adjourned before the Commission on
Appointments could act on their appointments.
- June 5, 2001, Pres. Arroyo again renewed the ad
interim their appointments to the same positions for
the third time. The Office of the President submitted
their appointments for their confirmation to the
Commission on Appointments and they took their
oaths of office again.
- In his capacity as COMELEC Chairman, Benipayo
issued a Memorandum dated April 11, 2001
addressed to petitioner as Director IV of the EID and
to Cinco as Director III also of the EID, designating
Cinco Officer-in-Charge of the EID and reassigning
petitioner to the Law Department.
- On April 16, 2006, the petitioner requested Benipayo
to reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID and
her reassignment to the Law Department. Petitioner
cited Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular
No. 7 dated April 10, 2001.
- Benipayo denied her request for reconsideration on
April 18, 2001, citing COMELEC Resolution No. 3300
dated Nov. 6, 2000.
- Petitioner appealed the denial of her request for
reconsideration to the COMELEC en bank in a
Memorandum dated April 23, 2001 and filed an
administrative criminal complaint with the Law
Department against Benipayo alleging that her
reassignment violated Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus
Election Code, COMELEC Resolution No. 3258, Civil
Service Memorandum Circular No. 07, s. 001, and
other pertinent administrative civil service laws, rules,
and regulations.
- During the pendency of her complaint before the
Law Department, petitioner filed the instant petition
questioning the appointment and the right to remain in
office of the respondents as Chairman and
Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively.
- Petitioner claimed that the ad interim appointments
of the three violate the constitutional provisions on the
independence of the COMELEC, as well as on the
prohibitions on temporary appointments and
reappointments of its Chairman and members.
- Petitioner also assailed as illegal her removal as
Director IV of the EID and her reassignment to the
Law Department.
- On Sept 6, 2001 Pres. Arroyo, for the fourth time ,
renewed the respondents’ ad interim appointments for
a term of 7 years expiring on Feb. 2, 2008 still. They
all took their oaths of office anew.
Q2. What was the theory forwarded by the
Respondent in arguing against the timeliness of
raising the constitutional issue?

- Respondents assert that the petition failed to satisfy
all the 4 requisites before this Court may exercise its
power judicial review in constitutional cases.
- They also urged the Court to refrain from reviewing
the constitutionality of the ad interim appointments
issued by the President to BBT unless all the 4
requisites are present. They argued that the second,
third, and fourth requisites absent in this case and
that the petitioner failed to question the
constitutionality of the ad interim appointments at the
earliest opportunity.
4 REQUISTIES:
1. The existence of an actual and appropriate
controversy.
2. A personal and substantial interest of the party
raising the constitutional issue.
3. The exercise of the judicial review is pleaded at
the earliest opportunity, and the constitutional issue
is the lis mota of the cases.
4. The constitutional issue is the lis mota of the
case
Q3. Was the constitutional issue raised at the
earliest opportunity?
Petitioner questioned the constitutionality of the ad
interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra, and Tuason
when she filed her petition the Court, which is t​he
earliest opportunity for pleading the constitutional
issue before a competent body.
The Court may determine, in the exercise of
sound discretion, the time when a constitutional
issue may be passed upon. ​There is no doubt the
petitioner raised the constitutional issue on time.
The legality of petitioner’s reassignment hinges on the
constitutionality of Benipayo’s ad interim appointment
and assumption of office. Unless the constitutionality
of Benipayo’s ad interim appointment and assumption
of office is resolves, the legality of the petitioner’s
reassignment from the EID to the Law Department
cannot be determined. The lis mota then in this case
is the very constitutional issue raise by petitioner.
The issues raised by petitioner is of paramount
importance to the public and public interest requires
the resolution of the constitutional issue raised by
petitioner. Furthermore, the petitioner has complied
with all the requisite technicalities.
RULING:
Petitioner filed the instant petition only on Aug. 3,
2001, when the first ad interim appointments were
issued as early as March 22, 2001. HOWEVER, ​it is
not the date of filing of the petition that
determines whether the constitutional issue was
raised at the earliest opportunity. The earliest
opportunity to raise a constitutional issue is to
raise it in the pleadings before a competent court
that can resolve the same, ​such that, “if it is not
raised in the pleadings, it cannot be considered at the
trial, and if not considered at the trial, it cannot be
considered on the trial, it cannot be considered on
appeal.”
D. LIS MOTA
Here, one must show that the question of
constitutionality is the very Lis Mota of the case.
One who questions the constitutionality of a law must
show that the case cannot be resolved unless the
disposition of the constitutional question is
unavoidable. Otherwise, the question of
constitutionality must be avoided.
A.MB: This means that the issue of constitutionality is
decisive of the outcome of the case. That is to say,
the resolution of the constitutional question is
unavoidable if only to dispose of the case in court.
Such that, if the case may be decided by simply
looking into statutes, ordinances, or municipal
ordinances, without touching on the Constitution to
solve the issue, then judicial review may NOT
prosper.
KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYANG MAHIHIRAP V.
ROBREDO
(​Here, respondent DILG evicted petitioners from their
dwellings without any Court Order. They used the
Urban Development Housing Act as their legal basis
to carry out the eviction. However, petitioners went to
court to prohibit DILG from carrying out the same and
questioned the constitutionality of Sec. 28 (a) & (b) of
the law.​)
Q1. Is the constitutionality of the aforesaid
provisions the Lis Mota of the case? Why or why
not?
HACIENDA LUISITA, INC. VS. PARC
FACTS: On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc
voted unanimously (11-0) to DISMISS/DENY the
petition filed by HLI and AFFIRM with
MODIFICATIONS the resolutions of the PARC
revoking HLI’s Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and
placing the subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under
compulsory coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP) of the government.
The Court however did not order outright land
distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court noted that there are
operative facts that occurred in the interim and which
the Court cannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court
declared that the revocation of the SDP must, by
application of the operative fact principle, give way to
the right of the original 6,296 qualified
farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether
they want to remain as HLI stockholders or [choose
actual land distribution]. It thus ordered the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to
“immediately schedule meetings with the said 6,296
FWBs and explain to them the effects, consequences
and legal or practical implications of their choice, after
which the FWBs will be asked to manifest, in secret
voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their
signatures or placing their thumbmarks, as the case
may be, over their printed names.”
OPERATIVE FACT DOCTRINE (Controlling
Precept)
- The operative fact doctrine exhorts the recognition
that until the judiciary, in an appropriate case,
declares the invalidity of a certain legislative or
executive act, such act is presumed constitutional and
thus, entitled to obedience and respect and should be
properly enforced and complied with.

The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for
reconsideration of the Court decision.
Q1. Is the constitutionality of Section 31 of RA
6657 the lis mota of the present case? If not, what
is?
CASE: ​ARAULLO VS. AQUINO & CASE: BELGICA
VS. OCHOA
Q1. How did the Supreme Court apply the
Doctrine in the following case?

- The SC said that the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of

R.A. 6657 is not the lis mota of the case and it was
not raised at the earliest opportunity and did not rule
on the constitutionality of the law.

The lis mota in this case, proceeding from the basic

positions originally taken by AMBALA (to which the
FARM members previously belonged) and the
Supervisory Group, is the alleged non-compliance by
HLI with the conditions of the SDP to support a plea
for its revocation. And before the Court, the lis mota is
whether or not PARC acted in grave abuse of
discretion when it ordered the recall of the SDP for
such non-compliance and the fact that the SDP, as
couched and implemented, offends certain
constitutional and statutory provisions. To be sure,
any of these key issues may be resolved without
plunging into the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA
6657. Moreover, looking deeply into the underlying
petitions of AMBALA, et al., it is not the said section
per se that is invalid, but rather it is the alleged
application of the said provision in the SDP that is
flawed.

II. EFFECTS OF DECLARATION OF

UNCONSTITUTIONALITY

A.Two Views: Orthodox & Modern

1. Orthodox View
- Expressed in Article 7 of the Civil Code. It implies
that an unconstitutional act is
not a law; it confers no right; it imposes no duties; it
affords no protection; it creates
no office; it is, in legal contemplation, inoperative, as if
it has not been passed.

2. Modern View
- The court in passing upon the question of
constitutionality does not annul or repeal the statute if
it finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply
refuses to recognize it and determines the rights of
the parties just as if such statute had no existence.

IN OUR JURISDICTION, WE FOLLOW THE: