CRIM PRO DIGEST
SEC 110
PEOPLE vs IBAÑEZ
Zaldy Ibañez y Francisco was charged with three counts of
Rape under three informations, before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Cavite, Branch 21.
When arraigned, appellant entered pleas of not guilty.
Whereupon, trial on the merits ensued.
On the first charge of rape, AAA testified that she was in their
home at xxx, Cavite in June 1997. On the second charge of rape,
AAA testified that appellant raped her eight times from January
to December 1998 in their home and she did not tell her
mother because she was afraid of appellant. AAA testified that
the third rape happened sometime in the morning of April
1999 in their house while her mother was at work.
Appellant denied raping his daughter. As alibi, he claimed that
he was often away from home and usually returned only four
days after because he was hooked on gambling and drugs. He
would usually return home in the morning after his wife had
gone to work to avoid quarrels. By then, AAA would already be
in school. He admitted being in a rehabilitation center for
sometime, but continued to take drugs upon his release. He
also admitted that he would beat and threaten his wife if she
did not give him money for drugs. He testified further that in
January 1999, he left the house, stayed in Pasig and returned
home only to steal his wife’s car. his cousin to return it minus
the stereo. When he returned home, his family After trial, the
lower court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of qualified rape in the first and last but was
acquitted on the second.
ISSUE
should the precise dates of the commission of the rape be
alleged in the information?
Ibanez: informations are not explicit and certain as to the dates
of the rape. Such uncertainties run afoul of the constitutionally
protected right of the accused to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him
HELD:
An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the
elements of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive
thereof. The exact date of the commission of a crime is not an
essential element of the crime charged. Thus, in a prosecution
for rape, the material fact or circumstance to be considered is
the occurrence of the rape, not the time of its commission. The
gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a woman. The
precise time of the crime has no substantial bearing on its
commission. Therefore, it is not essential that it be alleged in
the information with ultimate precision.
Also, it cannot be seriously asserted that appellant was
deprived of his constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him when the
prosecution failed to state the exact date of the commission of
the offense. At any rate, it is now too late for appellant to
question the sufficiency of the criminal informations regarding
the dates of the commission of the offense. Appellant could
have filed a motion for a bill of particulars before his
arraignment22 or a motion to quash on the ground that the
informations alleged erroneous dates prior to his entry of
plea. However, he did not. Instead, he had himself arraigned
and entered a plea of not guilty to the crime of rape. Such being
the case, appellant has waived his right to object to the
informations on the ground of an error as to the time of the
alleged rape.
MACASAET vs PEOPLE
In an Information dated 10 July 1997, Alfie Lorenzo, Allen
Macasaet, Nicolas Quijano, Jr., and Roger Parajes, columnist,
publisher, managing editor, and editor, respectively of the
newspaper 'Abante were charged before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, with the crime of libel against
JOSELITO MAGALLANES TRINIDAD a.k.a. JOEY TRINIDAD a.k.a.
TOTO TRINIDAD, to his damage and prejudice.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the libel case on the
ground that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the
offense charged. According to petitioners, as the information
discloses that the residence of private respondent was in
Marikina, the RTC of Quezon City did not have jurisdiction over
the case pursuant to Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code.
The public prosecutor argued that the RTC, Quezon City, had
jurisdiction over the case. He maintained that during the time
material to this case, private respondent (private complainant
below) was a resident of both 28-D Matino St. corner
Malumanay St., Sikatuna Village, Quezon City and Karen St.,
Paliparan, Sto. Nio, Marikina, Metro , as shown in his Reply-
Affidavit.
For their part, the petitioners and their co-accused countered
that it was incorrect for the public prosecutor to refer to the
affidavit purportedly executed by private respondent as it is
'axiomatic that the resolution of a motion to quash is limited to
a consideration of the information as filed with the court, and
no other. Further, as both the complaint-affidavit executed by
private respondent and the information filed before the court
state that private respondent's residence is in Marikina City,
the dismissal of the case is warranted for the rule is that
jurisdiction is determined solely by the allegations contained
in the complaint or information.
Petitioners presented certifications issued by
barangay captainsof Barangay Malaya, Quezon City
and Barangay Sto. Nio, Marikina City showing that no records
exist for P as a resident and another one showing that Trinidad
is a resident of Marikina and also presented was the editorial
box appearing in page 18 of Abante indicating that the tabloid
maintains its editorial and business offices at Rm. 301/305,
3/F BF Condominium Bldg., Solana cor. A. Soriano Sts.,
Intramuros, .
In his Rejoinder to Supplemental Reply,[14] private
respondent contended that the certification issued by
thebarangay captain of Barangay Malaya was issued after he
had already moved out of the apartment unit he was renting in
Sikatuna Village, Quezon City; that owners of residential
houses do not usually declare they rent out rooms to boarders
in order to avoid payment of local taxes; and that there is no
showing that a census was conducted among the residents
of Barangay Malaya during the time he resided therein.
On 24 November 1997, the trial court rendered an Order
dismissing the case due to lack of jurisdiction.[15]The court a
quo noted that although the information alleged the venue of
this case falls within the jurisdiction of Quezon City, the
evidence submitted for its consideration indicated otherwise.
Private respondent insist that at the time the alleged libelous
article was published, he was actually residing in Quezon City.
According to him, he mistakenly stated that he was a resident
of Marikina City at the time of publication of the claimed
defamatory article because he understood the term 'address' to
mean the place where he originally came from. Nevertheless,
the error was rectified by his supplemental affidavit which
indicated Quezon City as his actual residence at the time of
publication of the 13 July 1996 issue of Abante. He attached an
affidavit executed by a certain Cristina B. Del Rosario, allegedly
the owner of the house and lot in Sikatuna Village, Quezon City,
where private respondent supposedly lived from July 1996
until May 1997
tuallawlibrary
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN RULING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON
CITY HAS TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OVER THE CRIME
CHARGED.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
ADMITTING THE AFFIDAVIT OF CRISTINA B. DEL ROSARIO.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING
RESPONDENT TRINIDAD'S PERSONALITY TO APPEAL A
CRIMINAL CASE.[24]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
HELD
We find merit in the petition and therefore grant the same..
In criminal actions, it is a fundamental rule that venue is
jurisdictional. Thus, the place where the crime was committed
determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential
element of jurisdiction.
The law, however, is more particular in libel cases. The
possible venues for the institution of the criminal and the civil
aspects of said case are concisely outlined in Article 360 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4363.
We summarized the foregoing rule in the following manner:
1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private
person, the criminal action may be filed in the Court of First
Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is
printed and first published.
2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal
action may also be filed in the Court of First Instance of the
province where he actually resided at the time of the
commission of the offense.
3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in at
the time of the commission of the offense, the action may be
filed in the Court of First Instance of .
4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside
of , the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the
province or city where he held office at the time of the
commission of the offense.[39]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the case at bar, private respondent was a private citizen at
the time of the publication of the alleged libelous article, hence,
he could only file his libel suit in the City of where Abante was
first published or in the province or city where he actually
resided at the time the purported libelous article was printed.
A perusal, however, of the information involved in this case
easily reveals that the allegations contained therein are utterly
insufficient to vest jurisdiction on the RTC of Quezon City.
Other than perfunctorily stating 'Quezon City at the beginning
of the information, the assistant city prosecutor who prepared
the information did not bother to indicate whether the
jurisdiction of RTC Quezon City was invoked either
because Abantewas printed in that place or private respondent
was a resident of said city at the time the claimed libelous
article came out. As these matters deal with the fundamental
issue of the court's jurisdiction, Article 360 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, mandates that either one of these
statements must be alleged in the information itself and the
absence of both from the very face of the information renders
the latter fatally defective. Sadly for private respondent, the
information filed before the trial court falls way short of this
requirement. The assistant city prosecutor's failure to properly
lay the basis for invoking the jurisdiction of the RTC, Quezon
City, effectively denied said court of the power to take
cognizance of this case.
In order to obviate controversies as to the venue of the
criminal action for written defamation, the complaint or
information should contain allegations as to whether, at the
time the offense was committed, the offended party was a
public officer or a private individual and where he was actually
residing at that time. Whenever possible, the place where the
written defamation was printed and first published should
likewise be alleged. That allegation would be a sine qua non if
the circumstance as to where the libel was printed and first
published is used as the basis of the venue of the
action.[40]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Anent private respondent and OSG's contention that the
supplemental affidavit submitted during the preliminary
investigation of this libel suit cured the defect of the
information, we find the same to be without merit. It is
jurisprudentially settled that jurisdiction of a court over a
criminal case is determined by the allegations of the complaint
or information.[41] In resolving a motion to dismiss based on
lack of jurisdiction, the general rule is that the facts contained
in the complaint or information should be taken as they
are.[42]The exception to this rule is where the Rules of Court
allow the investigation of facts alleged in a motion to
quash[43] such as when the ground invoked is the extinction of
criminal liability, prescriptions, double jeopardy, or insanity of
the accused.[44] In these instances, it is incumbent upon the
trial court to conduct a preliminary trial to determine the merit
of the motion to dismiss. As the present case obviously does
not fall within any of the recognized exceptions, the trial court
correctly dismissed this action..
(regards the Affidavit of Del Rosario) By the very nature of a
supplemental pleading, it only seeks to reinforce and augment
the allegations contained in the principal pleading. It does not
serve to supplant that which it merely supplements; rather, it
ought to co-exist with the latter. Further, the admission of a
supplemental pleading is not something that parties may
impose upon the court for we have consistently held that its
admittance is something which is addressed to the discretion
of the court.
Explicit in the aforequoted provision of the Rules of Court is
the requirement that the contents of a supplemental pleading
should deal with transactions, occurrences or events which
took place after the date of the pleading it seeks to supplement.
A reading of the supplemental motion for reconsideration filed
by private respondent discloses no additional or new matters
which transpired after he filed his original motion for
reconsideration.
Finally, we come to the issue of whether the private prosecutor
and the public prosecutor had the personality to file the notice
of appeal before the trial court.
Petitioners insist that the OSG should have been the one to file
said notice in its capacity as the 'sole representative of the
[g]overnment in the Court of Appeals in criminal cases.
Without doubt, the OSG is the appellate counsel of the People
of the Philippines in all criminal cases. In such capacity, it only
takes over a criminal case after the same has reached the
appellate courts. The next question should then be: when does
the jurisdiction of the trial court end and that of the Court of
Appeals commence? Happily, the Revised Rules of Court is
clear on this point. Rule 41, Section 9 of the Rules states that
'(i)n appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction
over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due
time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other
parties.[49] When a party files a notice of appeal, the trial
court's jurisdiction over the case does not cease as a matter of
course; its only effect is that the appeal is deemed perfected as
to him.[50] As explained by our former colleague, Justice
Florenz Regalado '
. . . [I]n the meantime, the trial court still retains jurisdiction
over the case. However, where all the parties have either thus
perfected their appeals, by filing their notices of appeal in due
time and the period to file such notice of appeal has lapsed for
those who did not do so, then the trial court loses jurisdiction
over the case as of the filing of the last notice of appeal or the
expiration of the period to do so for all the
parties.[51]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Applied to the case at bar, we deem it proper that the notice of
appeal was filed by the private and the public prosecutors
before the trial court. The Rules cannot be any clearer: until the
filing of the last notice of appeal and the expiration of the
period to perfect an appeal by all the parties, the lower court
still has jurisdiction over the case. It is only after the
occurrence of these two incidents when the jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals begins and at which time the OSG is supposed
to take charge of the case on behalf of the government.
BANAL vs PANGANIBAN
A complaint was filed by respondents against P for his articles
entitled “House of the Rising Sun” and “Heist Cold Beer” which
appeared in P “ Breaktime” column in the August 1 and August
12, 2000 issues of the Philippine Daily Inquirer.
Six informations were filed and upon arraignment,
“published in English in the City of Makati, Metro
Manila, Philippines and of general circulation in the Philippines
and abroad:
P entered a plea of not guilty. He filed a motion to quash the six
informations on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. He argued
that the informations failed to allege the actual residence of the
R at the time of the commission of the offense or the place
where the article was printed and first published.
TC granted the motion to quash.
R: it was merely a formal defect
Issue
Whether the RTC of Makati has jurisdiction over the offense
YES
Whether the amendment was formal or substantial FORMAL
HELD
We find that the original information is sufficient in form.
Allowing the amendment does not alter the defense of the
accused. Indeed, it only states with precision that which is
already contained in the original information.
it was clearly stated in the information that the newspaper is
published in Makati City but circulated throughout the country,
which allegation accordingly vests jurisdiction over the offense
charged in the RTC of Makati City.
Moreover, the amendment in the informations was one of form.
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that a
complaint or information may be amended, in form or in
substance, without leave of court, at any time before the
accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a
formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and
when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of
the accused. In the instant case, the amendment was done after
petitioner's arraignment and with prior leave of court. The
amendment which states, 'That the libelous article above-
quoted was printed and first published in the City of Makati,
more particularly at 3817 Mascardo street, Makati City and/or
at 1098 Chino Roces Avenue (formerly Pasong Tamo) corner
Yague and Mascardo Streets, Makati City,is merely formal.
An amendment is only in form when it merely adds
specifications to eliminate vagueness in the information and
not to introduce new and material facts, and merely states with
additional precision something which is already contained in
the original information and which, therefore, adds nothing
essential for conviction for the crime charged.
A look into Our jurisprudence on the matter shows that an
amendment to an information introduced after the
accused has pleaded not guilty thereto, which does not
change the nature of the crime alleged therein, does not
expose the accused to a charge which could call for a
higher penalty, does not affect the essence of the offense
or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity
to meet the new averment had each been held to be one of
form and not of substance ' not prejudicial to the
accused, and therefore, not prohibited by Section 13, Rule 110
(now Section 14) of the Revised Rules of Court
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM vs DOJ
R Martels are directors of R SENCOR, an information
technology firm. P is a GOCC which provides financial benefits
to private sector employees.
P filed a complaint against R for non payment of contributions
from January 1991 to May 1997. R offered to assign to P a
parcel of land in Tagaytay City. P accepted the offer subject to
the condition that R will settle their obligation either by way of
dacion en pago or through cash settlement within a reasonable
time.
R then wrote to P offering in lieu of Tagaytay property,
computer related services. P filed with the Pasay Prosecutor
Office a complaint against R this time from Feb 1991 to Oct
2000.
R: P is stopped because it already accepted the offer of
assignment as payment. The relationship was converted into
an ordinary debtor-creditor relationship.
Pasay Prosecutor Puti found probable cause.
R appealed to the DOJ which set aside Puti’s resolution.
CA agreed with DOJ.
ISSUE
Whether the concept of novation serves to abate the
prosecution of R Martels
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in
affirming the DOJ’s rulings because (1) respondent Martels
were charged not with Estafa but with violation of Section
22(a) and (b) in relation to Section 28(e) of RA 1161, as
amended, a special law impressed with public interest; (2)
petitioner did not agree to settle respondent Martels’ criminal
liability; and (3) novation serves only to negate civil, but not
criminal, liability.
Petitioner contended that although respondent
Martels attempted to pay SENCOR’s overdue contributions
through dacion en pago, no payment took place, as evidenced
by respondent Martels’ alternative offer to provide computer
related services to petitioner instead of assigning
the Tagaytay Cityrealty. On respondent Martels’ partial
payment of SENCOR’s liability, petitioner contended that such
does not preclude the resolution of this petition.
In their Comment, respondent Martels countered that the DOJ
correctly applied the concept of novation as they had settled
SENCOR’s liability. Respondent Martels added that as of the
filing of their Comment, they had already paid P17,887,442.54
of SENCOR’s liability.
HELD
We rule in the negative and accordingly grant the petition.
It may be observed in this regard that novation is not one of
the means recognized by the Penal Code whereby criminal
liability can be extinguished; hence, the role of novation
may only be to either prevent the rise of criminal liability or
to cast doubt on the true nature of the original basic
transaction, whether or not it was such that its breach
would not give rise to penal responsibility, as when money
loaned is made to appear as a deposit, or other similar
disguise is resorted to
The facts of this case negate the application of novation. In the
first place, there is, between SENCOR and petitioner, no
original contract that can be replaced by a new contract
changing the object or principal condition of the original
contract, substituting the person of the debtor, or subrogating
a third person in the rights of the creditor. The original
relationship between SENCOR and petitioner is defined by law
– RA 1161, as amended – which requires employers like
SENCOR to make periodic contributions to petitioner under
pain of criminal prosecution. Unless Congress enacts a law
further amending RA 1161 to give employers a chance to settle
their overdue contributions to prevent prosecution, no amount
of agreements between petitioner and SENCOR (represented
by respondent Martels) can change the nature of their
relationship and the consequence of SENCOR’s non-payment of
contributions.
Prosecutors’ Findings Not Conclusive
In dismissing petitioner’s petition, the Court of Appeals held:
[T]his Court has no power to determine whether
probable cause to warrant prosecution exist or not. x x x [T]he
determination of whether or not probable cause exists to
warrant the prosecution in court of [respondent Martels]
should be consigned and entrusted to the Department of
Justice as reviewer of the findings of the public prosecutor x x x.
In this Petition, We are being asked to assume the function of
Public Prosecutor by determining whether probable cause
exists or not. Such is a function that this Court should not be foremost of which is its interest to vindicate the rule of law, the
called upon to perform x x x. bedrock of peace of the people.

This is a misstatement of the law. This Court and the Court of Respondent’s act of allowing the presentation of the defense
Appeals possess the power to review findings of prosecutors in witnesses in the absence of complainant public prosecutor or a
preliminary investigations.[ Although policy considerations call private prosecutor designated for the purpose is thus a clear
for the widest latitude of deference to the prosecutor’s findings, transgression of the Rules which could not be rectified by
courts should never shirk from exercising their power, when subsequently giving the prosecution a chance to cross-examine
the circumstances warrant, to determine whether the the witnesses.
prosecutor’s findings are supported by the facts, or as in this
case, by the law. In so doing, courts do not act as prosecutors Respondent’s intention to uphold the right of the accused to a
but as organs of the judiciary, exercising their mandate under speedy disposition of the case, no matter how noble it may be,
the Constitution, relevant statutes, and remedial rules to settle cannot justify a breach of the Rules. If the accused is entitled to
cases and controversies. Indeed, the exercise of this Court’s due process, so is the State.
review power ensures that, on the one hand, probable
criminals are prosecuted and, on the other hand, the innocent
are spared from baseless prosecution.
SIR: Practical Side
PINOTE vs AYCO Who is assigned to the judge of the numerous prosecutor?
Should he be the same judge who executed preliminary
Facts
investigation?
Judge Ayco allowed the defense in People vs Vice Mayor
IS the one who endorses the information necessarily the
Salvador to present evidence consisting of the testimony of two
one to file the information in court? Not necessarily but it
witnesses even in the absence of State Prosecutor Pinote who
is possible
was prosecuting the case.
Is there a conflict of interest? No, coz its raffled. NO COI in
Pinote was undergoing medical treatment at the Philippine
prosecutors who conducted PI and same also prosecuted
Heart Center hence his absence. On the subsequent hearings,
he refused to cross-examine the two defense witnesses despite
A case is filed and raffled. Prosecutor conducts PI If he
being ordered by the judge, he maintaining that the
prepares a resolution, it doesn’t mean he will prosecute.
bbproceedings conducted in his absence were void.
All the prosecutors are assigned for a distinct judge. It is
possible that one PI, he will also prosecute. Kasi naraffled.
Judge considered the prosecution to have waived it right to
cross examine. Hence, an administrative complaint was lodged
by Pinote against Ayco.

R: considering the prosecution to have waived presenting PEOPLE vs DIMAANO

evidence, respondent justifies the same on complainant’s
failure to formally offer the evidence for the prosecution Facts
despite several extensions of time granted for the purpose. No
Maricar Dimaano charged her father with two counts of rape
substantial prejudice was suffered by the prosecution for
and one count of attempted rape in the complaints.
complainant was permitted to cross examine the two defense
witnesses but he refused to do so.
R pleaded not guilty. R was born on August 26, 1983 and was
10 yrs old when she was first sexually abused.
Office of the Court Administrator: finds respondent to have
breached Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rule on Criminal
Maricar executed and signed a Compromise Agreement and a
Procedure and accordingly recommends that he be
Salaysay sa Paguurong ng Sumbong but wasn’t assisted by a
reprimanded therefor, with warning that a repetition of the
lawyer then.
same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
Issue
Thus, as a general rule, all criminal actions shall be prosecuted
under the control and direction of the public prosecutor.
w/n the voluntary and due execution of the affidavit of
desistance by the private complainant should have been duly
Violation of criminal laws is an affront to the People of the
considered as a factor which put to doubt the reasons behind
Philippines as a whole and not merely to the person directly
the filing of the criminal charges of rape against accused
prejudiced, he being merely the complaining witness. It is on
this account that the presence of a public prosecutor in the trial
HELD
of criminal cases is necessary to protect vital state interests,
Appellant;s reliance on complainant’s affidavit of desistance
deserves scant consideration. A survey of our jurisdicition
reveals that the court attaches no persuasive value to a
desistance, especially when executed as an afterthought. The
unreliable character of this document is shown by the fact that
it is quite incredible that a victim, after going through the
trouble of having the appellant arrested. Too, complainant
repudiated the affidavit stating that no lawyer assisted her
when she affixed her signature. A criminal offense is an outrage
to the sovereign State and to the State belongs the power to
prosecute and punish crimes. By itself, an affidavit of
desistance is not a ground for dismissal.
CRIM PROC relevance:
The complaint for attempted rape quoted:
“xxx the above name accused, TRY and ATTEMPT to rape xxx”
For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the
name of the accused, the designation of the offense given by
the statute, the acts or omissions complained of as constituting
the offense, the name of the offended party; the approximate
time of the commission of the offense; and the place wherein
the offense was committed.
What is controlling is not the title of the complaint nor the
designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part
thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law
made by the prosecutor but the description of the crime
charged and the particular facts therein recited. The acts or
omissions complained must be alleged in such form as is
sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to
know what offense is intended to be charged and enable the
court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a
crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly
allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element of the
offense must be stated in the information. Whet facts and
circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be
determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the
crimes. This is to inform the accused of the nature of the
accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare
his defense. The presumption is that the accused has no
independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.
The complaint upon the accused does not allege specific acts or
omission constituting the elements of rape. The allegation that
R “tried and attempted to rape” does not satisfy the test of
sufficiency of a complaint but is merely a conclusion of law by
the one who drafted the complaint. The insufficiency thereof
violated the right of the appellant to be informed of the nature
of the accusation against him.
SASOT vs PEOPLE
The NBI conducted an investigation pursuant to a complaint by
the NBA Properties, Inc against P for possible violation of Art.
189 of the RPC on unfair competition.
Prosecution Gutierrez recommended the filing of an
Information against P.
P moved to quash the information arguing that the fiscal
should have dismissed the complaint because under the rules,
it must be sworn to before the prosecutor and the copy on
record appears to be only a fax transmittal. It also contended
that the complainant is a foreign corporation not doing
business in the Philippines and cannot be protected by Phil
patent laws. Also they have been using the business name
ALLANDALE SPORTLS LINE Inc and their designs are original.
Prosecutor filed an opposition and contented that the State is
entitled to prosecute the offense even without the participation
of the private offended party, as the crime charged is a public
crime
TC sustained the prosecution’s arguments.
P filed an action for certiorari. CA dismissed the action
Petitioners reiterate the argument that the complaint filed by
Rick Welts of the NBA Properties, Inc., is defective and should
have been dismissed by the fiscal because it should have been
personally sworn to by the complainant before the
investigating prosecutor. They also reiterate the claim that
Welts failed to show any board resolution showing his
authority to institute any action in behalf of the company, and
that the NBA’s trademarks are not being actually used in the
Philippines, hence, they are of public dominion and cannot be
protected by Philippine patent laws. Petitioners further
contend that they have not committed acts amounting to unfair
competition.[18]
The Office of the Solicitor General appeared in behalf of the
People, and filed its Amended Comment to the petition, praying
for its dismissal, arguing that the CA did not commit any grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for reasons stated
in its Decision dated January 26, 2000
HELD
Petition denied
We do not find any justification for the quashal of the info
Nowhere in section 3 Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of CRIMPRO
is there any mention of the defect in the complaint filed before
the fiscal and the complainant’s capacity to sue as grounds for
a motion to quash.
For another, under Section 3, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure, a complaint is substantially sufficient if it
states the known address of the respondent, it is accompanied
by complainant’s affidavit and his witnesses and supporting
documents, and the affidavits are sworn to before any fiscal,
state prosecutor or government official authorized to
administer oath, or in their absence or unavailability, a notary
public who must certify that he personally examined the affiants
and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and
understood their affidavits. All these have been duly satisfied in
the complaint filed before Prosecution Attorney Aileen Marie S.
Gutierrez. It must be noted that even the absence of an oath in
the complaint does not necessarily render it invalid. Want of
oath is a mere defect of form, which does not affect the
substantial rights of the defendant on the merits
In this case, Welts’s Complaint-Affidavit contains an
acknowledgement by Notary Public Nicole Brown of the State
of New York that the same has been subscribed and sworn to
before her on February 12, 1998, duly authenticated by the
Philippine Consulate. While the copy on record of the
complaint-affidavit appears to be merely a photocopy thereof,
Prosecution Attorney Gutierrez stated that complainant’s
representative will present the authenticated notarized
original in court, and Prosecutor Guray manifested that the
original copy is already on handIt is apt to state at this point
that the prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of regularity
in the performance of his duties and functions, which in turn
gives his report the presumption of accuracy
Moreover, records shoes that there are other supporting
documents from which the prosecutor based his
recommendation.
Consequently, if the information is valid on its face, and there is
no showing of manifest error, grave abuse of discretion and
prejudice on the part of public prosecutor, as in the present
case, the trial court should respect such determination
More importantly, the crime of Unfair Competition punishable
under Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code is a public
crime. It is essentially an act against the State and it is the
latter which principally stands as the injured party. The
complainant’s capacity to sue in such case becomes immaterial.
If prosecution follows after the completion of the
preliminary investigation being conducted by the Special
Prosecutor the information shall be in the name of the
People of the Philippines and no longer the petitioner
which is only an aggrieved party since a criminal offense is
essentially an act against the State. It is the latter which is
principally the injured party although there is a private
right violated. Petitioner's capacity to sue would become,
therefore, of not much significance in the main case. We
cannot allow a possible violator of our criminal statutes to
escape prosecution upon a far-fetched contention that the
aggrieved party or victim of a crime has no standing to sue.
LASOY vs ZENAROSA
An information was filed against the accused for unlawfully
selling a total of “42.410 grams of marijuana”. On arraignment,
they entered a plea of guilty.
The Prosecutor filed two separate motions 1. To admit the
amended information and 2. To set aside the arraignment of
the accused. The amended information changed the weigh
from GRAMS to KILOS. For failing to reflect the true quantity of
drugs caught in the possession of the accused, the first
information is invalid.
Both accused filed a motion to quash. Tc denied the motion to
quash and scheduled the arraignment of the accused under the
amended information.
TC: This fraudulent alteration necessarily vitiated the integrity
of the proceedings such that despite the plea of guilt made by the
accused it would not bar a subsequent prosecution for the
correct offense.
Generally speaking to entitle accused to the plea of former
jeopardy, the prior proceedings must have been valid, and the
lack of any fundamental requisite which would render void the
judgment would also make ineffective a plea of jeopardy based
on such proceedings.
Fraudulent or collusive prosecution. A verdict of acquittal
procured by accused by fraud and collusion is a nullity and does
not put him in jeopardy; and consequently it is no bar to a second
trial for the same offense.
Similarly, a conviction of a criminal offense procured
fraudulently or by collusion of the offender, for the purpose of
protecting himself from further prosecution and adequate
punishment, is no bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same
offense, either on the ground that the conviction is void because
of the fraud practiced, or that the state is not in any sense a
party to it and therefore not bound by it.
It is impossible to believe that the accused were not aware of the
deceitful maneuvering which led to the erasure of the true
weight of the marijuana fruiting tops as alleged in the
information.
They cannot pretend not to know the exact amount of prohibited
stuff for which they were charged before the information was
tampered with.
They could not feign innocence when they participated in that
charade when they pleaded guilty upon arraignment.
Consequently, their plea to the lesser offense considering the
decreased weight in the now altered information which merited
a much lighter penalty was irregularly obtained. Hence, they
cannot be considered as put in jeopardy by the proceedings in
court which was tainted with fraud.
Issue
After an information has been filed and the accused had been
arraigned, pleaded guilty and were convicted and after they
had applied for probation, may the information be amended
and the accused arraigned anew on the ground that the
information was allegedly altered/tampered with?
P: WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT
COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE IS NO VALID
INFORMATION AND, THEREFORE, THE ACCUSED CANNOT
CLAIM THE RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY
HELD
To invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following
requisites must be present: (1) a valid complaint or
information; (2) the court has jurisdiction to try the case; (3)
the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (4) he has been
convicted or acquitted or the case against him dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent
WE DO NOT AGREE WITH THE TRIAL COURT
First question to ask is whether the first information is invalid:
No
An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the
statutory designation of the offense and the acts or omissions
constitutive thereof.[35]
In other words, if the offense is stated in such a way that a
person of ordinary intelligence may immediately know what is
meant, and the court can decide the matter according to law,
the inevitable conclusion is that the information is valid. It is
not necessary to follow the language of the statute in the
information. The information will be sufficient if it describes
the crime defined by law.[36]
Applying the foregoing, the inescapable conclusion is that the
first information is valid inasmuch as it sufficiently alleges the
manner by which the crime was committed. Verily the
purpose of the law, that is, to apprise the accused of the nature
of the charge against them, is reasonably complied with.
Furthermore, the first information, applying Rule
110,[37] Section 6, shows on its face that it is valid.
Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. –
complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of
the accused; the designation of the offense by the statute; the
acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the
name of the offended party; the approximate time of the
commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense
was committed.
Second, and with respect specifically to the trial court’s point of
view that the accused cannot claim their right against double
jeopardy because they “participated/acquiesced to the
tampering,” we hold that while this may not be far-fetched,
there is actually no hard evidence thereof.[38] Worse, we cannot
overlook the fact that accused were arraigned, entered a plea
of guilty and convicted under the first information. Granting
that alteration/tampering took place and the accused had a
hand in it, this does not justify the setting aside of the
decision. The alleged tampering/alteration allegedly
participated in by the accused may well be the subject of
another inquiry.
Indeed, the belated move on the part of the prosecution to have
the information amended defies procedural rules, the decision
having attained finality after the accused applied for probation
and the fact that amendment is no longer allowed at that stage.
Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure is emphatic:
Sec. 14. Amendment. – The information or complaint may be
amended, in substance or form, without leave of court, at any
time before the accused pleads; and thereafter and during the
trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of
the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the
rights of the accused.
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has
been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall
dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of
a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with Rule
119, Section 11, provided the accused would not be placed
thereby in double jeopardy, and may also require the
witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.
The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is
when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the
prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or
where the trial was a sham.
The Constitution is very explicit. Article III, Section 21,
mandates that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. In this case, it bears
repeating that the accused had been arraigned and
convicted. In fact, they were already in the stage where they
were applying for probation. It is too late in the day for the
prosecution to ask for the amendment of the information and
seek to try again accused for the same offense without
violating their rights guaranteed under the Constitution.
A There is, therefore, no question that the amendment of an
information by motion of the prosecution and at the time when
the accused had already been convicted is contrary to
procedural rules and violative of the rights of the accused.
RICARZE vs COURT OF APPEALS
P was collector-messenger by City Service Corporation, a
domestic corporation engaged in messengerial services. He
was assigned to the main office of Caltex Philippines, Inc.
(Caltex) in Makati City. His primary task was to collect checks
payable to Caltex and deliver them to the cashier.
Caltex filed a criminal complaint against P for estafa through
falsification of commercial documents. It was discovered that a
check payable to Dante Gutierrez had been cleared through
PCIB. It was also found out that two checks were missing and
that the signatures were forgeries. The checks were deposited
at BDO in the name of a regular customer of Caltex named
Gutierrez. Gutierrez however disowned the savings account.
Further investigation revealed that the account was actually
opened by P.
In the meantime, PICB credited the amount of the check to
Caltex. However, the city prosecutor was not informed of this
development. After the requisite PI, two informations for estafa
was filed.
Petitioner was arraigned on August 18, 1998, and pleaded not
guilty to both charges.[6] Pre-trial ensued and the cases were
jointly tried. The prosecution presented its witnesses, after
which the Siguion Reyna, Montecillio and Ongsiako Law Offices
(SRMO) as private prosecutor filed a Formal Offer of
Evidence.[7]Petitioner opposed the pleading, contending that
the private complainant was represented by the ACCRA Law
Offices and the Balgos and Perez Law Office during trial, and it
was only after the prosecution had rested its case that SRMO
entered its appearance as private prosecutor representing the
PCIB. Since the ACCRA and Balgos and Perez Law Offices had
not withdrawn their appearance, SRMO had no personality to
appear as private prosecutor. Under the Informations, the
private complainant is Caltex and not PCIB; hence, the Formal
Offer of Evidence filed by SRMO should be stricken from the
records.
Petitioner further averred that unless the Informations were
amended to change the private complainant to PCIB, his right
as accused would be prejudiced. He pointed out, however, that
the Informations can no longer be amended because he had
already been arraigned under the original Informations.[8] He
insisted that the amendments of the Informations to substitute
PCIB as the offended party for Caltex would place him in
double jeopardy.
PCIB, through SRMO, opposed the motion. It contended that
the PCIB had re-credited the amount to Caltex to the extent of
the indemnity; hence, the PCIB had been subrogated to the
rights and interests of Caltex as private complainant.
Consequently, the PCIB is entitled to receive any civil
indemnity which the trial court would adjudge against the
accused. Moreover, the re-credited amount was brought out on
cross-examination by Ramon Romano who testified for the
Prosecution. PCIB pointed out that petitioner had marked in
evidence the letter of the ACCRA Law Office to PCIBank
dated October 10, 1997 and the credit memo sent by PCIB to
Caltex
Petitioner filed a Motion to Expunge the Opposition of
SRMO. In his Rejoinder, he averred that the substitution of
PCIB as private complainant cannot be made by mere oral
motion; the Information must be amended to allege that the
private complainant was PCIB and not Caltex after the
preliminary investigation of the appropriate complaint of PCIB
before the Makati City Prosecutor.
In response, the PCIB, through SRMO, averred that as provided
in Section 2, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the erroneous designation of the name of the
offended party is a mere formal defect which can be cured by
inserting the name of the offended party in the Information.
P: THE SUBSTITUTION OF PCIBANK WILL SUBSTANTIALLY
PREJUDICE THE RIGHTS OF THE PETITIONER HENCE, IT IS
PROHIBITED BY SEC. 14 OF RULE 110.
: CHARGES SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE THE
ALLEGATIONS FAILED TO NAME PCIB AS TRUE OFFENDED
PARTY
HELD
Under Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Rules, all
criminal actions covered by a complaint or information shall be
prosecuted under the direct supervision and control of the
public prosecutor. Thus, even if the felonies or delictual acts of
the accused result in damage or injury to another, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability based on the said
criminal acts is impliedly instituted, and the offended party has
not waived the civil action, reserved the right to institute it
separately or instituted the civil action prior to the criminal
action, the prosecution of the action (including the civil)
remains under the control and supervision of the public
prosecutor. The prosecution of offenses is a public function.
Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure,
the offended party may intervene in the criminal action
personally or by counsel, who will act as private prosecutor for
the protection of his interests and in the interest of the speedy
and inexpensive administration of justice. A separate action
for the purpose would only prove to be costly, burdensome
and time-consuming for both parties and further delay the final
disposition of the case. The multiplicity of suits must be
avoided
On the other hand, the sole purpose of the civil action is for the
resolution, reparation or indemnification of the private
offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by reason
of the delictual or felonious act of the accused. Under Article
104 of the Revised Penal Code, the following are the civil
liabilities of the accused:
ART. 104. What is included in civil liability. – The civil liability
established in Articles 100, 101, 102 and 103 of this Code
includes:
1. Restitution;
2. Reparation of the damage caused;
3. Indemnification for consequential damages.
On the other hand, Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure states:
Section 14. Amendment or substitution. – A complaint or
information may be amended, in form or in substance, without
leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea.
After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may
only be made with leave of court and when it can be done
without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the
nature of the offense charged in or excludes any accused from
the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion
by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with
leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the
motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties,
especially the offended party.
Thus, before the accused enters his plea, a formal or
substantial amendment of the complaint or information may
be made without leave of court. After the entry of a plea, only
a formal amendment may be made but with leave of court and
if it does not prejudice the rights of the accused. After
arraignment, a substantial amendment is proscribed except if
the same is beneficial to the accused.
A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts
constituting the offense charged and determinative of the
jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of
form.[24] The following have been held to be mere formal
amendments: (1) new allegations which relate only to the
range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of
conviction; (2) an amendment which does not charge another
offense different or distinct from that charged in the original
one; (3) additional allegations which do not alter the
prosecution’s theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the
accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume;
(4) an amendment which does not adversely affect any
substantial right of the accused; and (5) an amendment that
merely adds specifications to eliminate vagueness in the
information and not to introduce new and material facts, and
merely states with additional precision something which is
already contained in the original information and which adds
nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged.[25]
The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the
amendment is whether a defense under the information as it
originally stood would be available after the amendment is
made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would
be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in
the other. An amendment to an information which does not
change the nature of the crime alleged therein does not affect
the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the
accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had each
been held to be one of form and not of substance.[26]
In the case at bar, the substitution of Caltex by PCIB as private
complaint is not a substantial amendment. The substitution did
not alter the basis of the charge in both Informations, nor did it
result in any prejudice to petitioner. The documentary
evidence in the form of the forged checks remained the same,
and all such evidence was available to petitioner well before
the trial. Thus, he cannot claim any surprise by virtue of the
substitution.
Petitioner’s argument on subrogation is misplaced. The Court
agrees with respondent PCIB’s comment that petitioner failed
to make a distinction between legal and conventional
subrogation. Thus, petitioner’s acquiescence is not necessary
for subrogation to take place because the instant case is one of
legal subrogation that occurs by operation of law, and without
need of the debtor’s knowledge
Thus, being subrogated to the right of Caltex, PCIB,
through counsel, has the right to intervene in the proceedings,
and under substantive laws is entitled to restitution of its
properties or funds, reparation, or indemnification
Petitioner’s gripe that the charges against him should be
dismissed because the allegations in both Informations failed
to name PCIB as true offended party does not hold water.
Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
states:
Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. – A complaint
or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused;
the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name
of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission
of the offense; and the place wherein the offense was
committed.
When the offense is committed by more than one person, all of
them shall be included in the complaint or information.
On the other hand, Section 12 of the same Rule provides:
Section. 12. Name of the offended party. –The complaint or
information must state the name and surname of the person
against whom or against whose property the offense was
committed, or any appellation or nickname by which such
person has been or is known. If there is no better way of
identifying him, he must be described under a fictitious name.
(a) In offenses against property, if the name of the offended
party is unknown, the property must be described with such
particularity as to properly identify the offense charged.
(b) If the true name of the person against whom or against
whose property the offense was committed is thereafter
disclosed or ascertained, the court must cause such true name
to be inserted in the complaint or information and the record.
(c) If the offended party is a juridical person, it is sufficient to
state its name, or any name or designation by which it is
known or by which it may be identified, without need of
averring that it is a juridical person or that it is organized in
accordance with law.
In Sayson v. People,[33] the Court held that in case of offenses
against property, the designation of the name of the offended
party is not absolutely indispensable for as long as the criminal
act charged in the complaint or information can be properly
identified:
TORRES vs AGUINALDO
Facts
R spouses filed a complaint against P for falsification of public
document. They alleged that titles to their properties were
transferred without their knowledge and consent in the name
of Torres through a forged Deed of Sale.
Torres denied the allegations of forgery and claimed that
Aguinaldo sold the subject properties to him as evidenced by
the Deed of Absolute Sale
Finding probable cause, the OCP recommended the filing of an
information for falsification of public document against Torres
On appeal, the Secretary of Justice reversed the findings of the
investigating prosecutor and ordered the withdrawal of the
information.
A Motion to Withdraw Information] was filed which the MTC
granted It should be noted that petitioner has not been
arraigned
Meanwhile, Aguinaldo filed before the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari which was granted in the assailed
decision
ISSUE
I. Whether the order of the MTC-Manila dated June 11, 2003
granting the motion to withdraw the information rendered
moot the petition for certiorari filed by Aguinaldo for the
purpose of reinstating the resolution of the OCP of Manila; and
in the alternative, whether the rule on provisional dismissal
under Section 8, Rule 117 applies. NO
II. Whether Aguinaldo committed forum shopping. NO, distinct
causes of action
III. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the
Secretary of Justice gravely abused his discretion in reinstating
the April 30, 2001 order of the OCP of Manila finding probable
cause against petitioner. YES
HELD
I. A motion to withdraw information differs from a motion to
dismiss. While both put an end to an action filed in court, their
legal effect varies. The order granting the withdrawal of the
information attains finality after fifteen (15) days from receipt
thereof, without prejudice to the re-filing of the information
upon reinvestigation.
On the other hand, the order granting a motion to dismiss
becomes final fifteen (15) days after receipt thereof, with
prejudice to the re-filing of the same case once such order
achieves finality
In the case at bar, a motion to withdraw information was filed
and not a motion to dismiss. Hence, Bañares II v. Balising
would not apply. Unlike a motion to dismiss, a motion to
withdraw information is not time-barred and does not fall
within the ambit of Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure
Even assuming that the Motion to Withdraw Information is the
same as a Motion to Dismiss, we do not find that it complied
with the above requisites. The Motion to Withdraw
Information was filed by the Assistant City Prosecutor and
approved by the City Prosecutor without the conformity of the
accused, herein petitioner Torres. Thus, it cannot be said that
the motion was filed with his express consent as required
under Section 8, Rule 117.
III
In sum, prosecutors control and direct the prosecution of
criminal offenses, including the conduct of preliminary
investigation, subject to review by the Secretary of Justice.
While his resolution is persuasive, it is not binding on the
courts. The trial court must at all times make its own
independent assessment of the merits of each case.
Thus, it is only where the decision of the Justice Secretary, or
the trial court, as the case may be, is tainted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction that
the Court of Appeals may take cognizance of the case in a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure whose decision may then be appealed to this
Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari.
The Court of Appeals held that the Justice Secretary committed
grave abuse of discretion because he based his findings on the
lack of probable cause on the 1991 Deed of Sale when what
was assailed was the 1979 Deed of Sale.[30] It ruled that the
defenses raised by Torres should not have been considered
during the preliminary investigation but should be threshed
out only during trial.[31] Only the evidence presented by the
complainant should be considered in determining probable
cause or the lack thereof.
We are not persuaded.
The Court of Appeals erred in relying solely on the affidavit-
complaint and the NBI report[32] and disregarding totally the
counter-affidavit and documentary evidence of petitioner.
It is well to note that Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure not only requires the submission of the
complaint and the affidavits of the complainant and his
witnesses, as well as other supporting documents, but also
directs the respondent to submit his counter-affidavit and that
of his witnesses and other supporting documents relied upon
for his defense. Section 4 thereof also mandates the
investigating prosecutor to certify under oath in the
information that the accused was informed of the complaint
and the evidence against him, and that he was given an
opportunity to submit controverting evidence.
Thus, in determining the existence or absence of probable
cause, the investigating officer shall examine the complaint and
documents in support thereof as well as the controverting
evidence presented by the defense. While the validity and
merits of a party’s defense or accusation and the admissibility
of the testimonies and evidence are best ventilated in a full
blown trial, still, in a preliminary investigation, a proper
consideration of the complaint and supporting evidence as well
as the controverting evidence, is warranted to determine the
persons who may be reasonably charged with the crime. The
determination must be based on the totality of evidence
presented by both parties.
Prescinding from these premises, we find that the Justice
Secretary did not abuse his discretion in examining both the
evidence presented by the complainant and the accused in
determining the existence or the lack of probable cause.
There is basis in his finding that no probable cause exists. The
complaint and the 1979 Deed of Sale do not connect petitioner
with the crime of falsification. While the NBI report showed
that the 1979 Deed of Sale was falsified, there is no showing
that petitioner was the author thereof. We cannot discern
direct and personal participation by the petitioner in the
alleged forged deed. While a finding of probable cause rests on
evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been
committed and was committed by the accused, the existence of
such facts and circumstance must be strong enough to create a
rational and logical nexus between the acts and omissions and
the accused.
The allegation that petitioner effectuated the illicit transfer of
the disputed properties in his name is without factual basis. He
was not in possession of the alleged forged deed which does
not even bore his signature. We find merit in his contention
that the subject properties were sold to him on March 10, 1991
considering that the new TCTs were issued in his name only on
March 26, 1991. His address mentioned in the 1979 Deed of
Sale was non-existent yet in 1979, thus giving the impression
that it was executed on a later date. It would be absurd for
petitioner to use the 1979 Deed of Sale to facilitate the transfer
on March 26, 1991 considering his possession of the March 10,
1991 Deed of Sale.
Torres has no reason to falsify the 1979 Deed of Sale when he
had in his possession the 1991 Deed of Sale which he claims to
be authentic. By presenting the alleged forged deed of sale,
respondents cast a cloud of doubt on petitioner’s title. While
motive is not reasonable basis in determining probable cause,
the absence thereof further obviates the probability of
petitioner’s guilt.
The Secretary of Justice did not whimsically and capriciously
exercise his discretion. His findings was grounded on sound
statutory and factual basis. Chief Justice Andres Narvasa in his
separate opinion in Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals[37]
declared that the determination of probable cause to warrant
the prosecution in court should be consigned and entrusted to
the Department of Justice, as reviewer of the findings of the
public prosecutors. To do otherwise is to usurp a duty that
exclusively pertains to an executive official.
"the power of control therein contemplated means to alter,
modify, or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had
done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter." For, while it is
the duty of the fiscal to prosecute persons who, according to
evidence received from the complainant, are shown to be
guilty of a crime, the Secretary of Justice is likewise bound by
his oath of office to protect innocent persons from groundless,
false or serious prosecution. He would be committing a serious
dereliction of duty if he orders or sanctions the filing of an
information based upon a complaint where he is not convinced
that the evidence warrants the filing of the action in court.
SOBERANO vs PEOPLE
Facts
The prominent Public relations practitioner, Salvador Dacer,
together with his driver was abducted along Zobel Roxas St.
Manila. They were killed by strangulation and their charred
remains were later found in Cavite.
An information was filed by the prosecutors charging a
number of accused some of whom are public officers of double
murder.
The prosecution filed a motion to admit amended information
which was granted and admitted by the trial court.
The Amended information read:
xxx “,abduct SALVADOR (Bubby) DACER and EMMANUEL
CORBITO at the corner of Osmeña Highway (formerly South
Super Highway) and Zobel Roxas Street in Manila, and later
brought them to Indang, Cavite”
Meanwhile, Villanueva filed a motion for reinvestigation
asserting that he was mistakenly identified as a participant in
the double murder. This was granted.
A Manifestation and Motion to Admit Amended
Information[13] dated 17 September 2001 was filed by the
prosecution. The Amended Information ---
(1) discharged accused Jimmy L. Lopez, Alex B. Diloy, William
L. Lopez and Glen Dumlao as they are now witnesses for the
State;
(2) substituted SPO3 Allan Villanueva for P/Insp. Danilo
Villanueva; and
(3) charged as additional accused P/Supt. Michael Ray Aquino,
P/Supt. Cezar Mancao II and P/Sr. Supt. Teofilo Viña.
ISSUE
the fundamental issue that must be resolved concerns the duty
of a trial court judge when confronted with a motion to admit
amended information excluding some of the accused named in
the original information for utilization as witnesses for the
State.
HELD
The key lies in the correct interpretation of two pertinent
provisions of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, i.e.,
Section 14 of Rule 110 on amendment of information and
Section 17 of Rule 119 on the discharge of an accused as state
witness.
Section 14, Rule 110 states
Section 14. Amendment or substitution. – A complaint or
information may be amended, in form or in substance, without
leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea.
After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may
only be made with leave of court and when it can be done
without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused
However, any amendment before plea, which
downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or excludes
any accused from the complaint or information, can be made
only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the
offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its
reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be
furnished all parties, especially the offended party.
On the other hand, Section 17, Rule 119 provides:
Section 17. Discharge of accused to be state witness. –
When two or more persons are jointly charged with the
commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution
before resting its case, the court may direct one or more of the
accused to be discharged with their consent so that they may
be witnesses for the state when, after requiring the
prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of
each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the
discharge, the court is satisfied that:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the
accused whose discharge is requested
(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the
proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the
testimony of said accused
(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially
corroborated in its material points;
(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty;
and
(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of
any offense involving moral turpitude.
Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall
automatically form part of the trial. If the court denies the
motion for discharge of the accused as state witness, his sworn
statement shall be inadmissible in evidence.
There can be no quarrel as to the fact that what is involved
here is primary an amendment of an information to exclude
some accused and that the same is made before plea. Thus, at
the very least, Section 14, Rule 110 is applicable which means
that the amendment should be made only upon motion by the
prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of
court. What seems to complicate the situation is that the
exclusion of the accused is specifically sought for the purpose
of discharging them as witnesses for the State. The
consequential question is, should the requirements for
discharge of an accused as state witness as set forth in Section
17, Rule 119 be made as additional requirements (i.e., Section
14, Rule 110 and Section 17, Rule 119) or should only one
provision apply as ruled by the trial court and the Court of
Appeals (i.e., Section 14, Rule 110 or Section 17, Rule 119)?
An amendment of the information made before plea which
excludes some or one of the accused must be made only upon
motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party
and with leave of court in compliance with Section 14, Rule
110. Section 14, Rule 110 does not qualify the grounds for the
exclusion of the accused. Thus, said provision applies in equal
force when the exclusion is sought on the usual ground of lack
of probable cause, or when it is for utilization of the accused as
state witness, as in this case, or on some other ground.
At this level, the procedural requirements of Section 17, Rule
119 on the need for the prosecution to present evidence and
the sworn statement of each state witness at a hearing in
support of the discharge do not yet come into play. This is
because, as correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals,
the determination of who should be criminally charged in court
is essentially an executive function, not a judicial one.[29] The
prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department
of government whose principal power and responsibility is to
see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary
component of this power to execute our laws is the right to
prosecute their violators. The right to prosecute vests the
prosecutor with a wide range of discretion – the discretion of
whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of which
depends on a smorgasbord of factors which are best
appreciated by prosecutors.[30] By virtue of the trial court
having granted the prosecution’s motion for reinvestigation,
the former is deemed to have deferred to the authority of the
prosecutorial arm of the Government.[31] Having brought the
case back to the drawing board, the prosecution is thus
equipped with discretion -- wide and far reaching – regarding
the disposition thereof.
Thus, as in almost all things, the prosecution’s discretion is not
boundless or infinite. The prosecution must satisfy for itself
that an accused excluded from the information for purposes of
utilizing him as state witness is qualified therefor.
The situation is different in cases when an accused
is retained in the information but his discharge as state
witness is sought thereafter by the prosecution before it rests
its case, in which event, the procedural (in addition to the
substantive) requirements of Section 17, Rule 119
apply. Otherwise stated, when no amendment to the
information is involved as a by-product of reinvestigation and
trial proceeds thereafter, the discharge of the accused falls
squarely and solely within the ambit of Section 17, Rule 119.
 Prescinding from the foregoing, it is in a situation where the
accused to be discharged is included in the information that
the prosecution must present evidence and the sworn
statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in
support of the discharge in order to convince the judge, upon
whom discretion rests, as to the propriety of discharging the
accused as state witness.
Having thus ruled, it now behooves upon this Court to
determine whether the Court of Appeals was correct in
admitting the amended information insofar as the discharge of
JIMMY L. LOPEZ, WILLIAM LOPEZ and ALEX B. DILOY is
concerned.
It is undisputed that the motion to admit amended information
seeking the exclusion of the above-named accused (together
with P/Sr. Supt. GLEN G. DUMLAO) was with notice to the
offended party and was set for hearing. The Court of Appeals
held that the trial court’s grant of the prosecution’s motion for
reinvestigation operates as leave of court to amend the
information, if the situation so warrants.
c) he or any member of his family within the second civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity is subjected to threats to his
life or bodily injury or there is a likelihood that he will be killed,
forced, intimidated, harassed or corrupted to prevent him from
testifying, or to testify falsely, or evasively, because or on
account of his testimony; and
d) he is not a law enforcement officer, even if he would be
testifying against other law enforcement officers. In such a case,
only the immediate members of his family may avail
themselves of the protection provided for under this Act.
If the Department, after examination of said applicant and
other relevant facts, is convinced that the requirements of this
Act and its implementing rules and regulations have been
complied with, it shall admit said applicant to the Program,
require said witness to execute a sworn statement detailing his
knowledge or information on the commission of the crime, and
thereafter issue the proper certification. For purposes of this
Act, any such person admitted to the Program shall be known
as the Witness.

Under the circumstances obtaining herein, we agree with
the Court of Appeals considering that we do not perceive here
any impairment of the substantial rights of all the accused or
the right of the people to due process.
As we have discussed earlier in this decision, the trial court is
with discretion to grant or deny the amendment of the
information. In general, its discretion is hemmed in by the
proscription against impairment of the substantial rights of the
accused or the right of the People to due process of law. In this
case, in denying the motion to admit amended information, the
trial court simply said that the same was violative of Section 17,
Rule 119 without stating the reasons therefor. And for this
lapse, the trial court has indeed erred
It must be stressed that Section 3 of Rep. Act No. 6981
enumerates the requirements before a person may be
admitted to the WPP. It does not state that if an accused
cannot be admitted to the WPP, he cannot be discharged as a
witness for the state. Admission to the WPP and being
discharged as an accused are two different things. Dumlao’s
being a law enforcement officer and, thus, disqualified to be
under the WPP, do not in any way prohibit him to be
discharged from the information.

One final point. In the Decision of the Court of Appeals, it

held that the discharge or exclusion of P/Sr. Supt. Glen Dumlao
from the Amended Information finds no legal basis under
Republic Act No. 6981[35] for he is a law enforcement officer.
The original information, according to the Court of Appeals,
should stand insofar as Dumlao is concerned.

Section 3, Rep. Act No. 6981 provides:

SEC. 3. Admission into the Program. – Any person who

has witnessed or has knowledge or information on the
commission of a crime and has testified or is testifying or about
to testify before any judicial or quasi-judicial body, or before
any investigating authority, may be admitted into the Program:

Provided, That

a) the offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave

felony as defined under the Revised Penal Code, or its
equivalent under special laws;

b) his testimony can be substantially corroborated in its

material points;