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Disaster Management in Gujarat State (India) (Case Study)
Disaster Management in Gujarat State (India) (Case Study)
(Case study)
5.1 Introduction
The State of Gujarat State was formed by the bifurcation of the erstwhile Bombay State,
which was divided into two parts - Maharashtra and Gujarat on May 1st, 1960.
Subsequent to becommg an independent State, Gujarat has taken massive strides in
industrialization, economic and social developments as well as in infrastructure build-up.
Today, it is a leading State in terms of contribution to India’s GDP as well as for revenue
generation for the national exchequer. Gujarat has also taken significant steps in recent
years to promote and develop the “softer” sectors also like Culture, Tourism and
Management Education, etc. It is also considered to be one of the best-governed States in
the country. Gujarat has a very important strategic significance because of its long
international border with Pakistan.
The State occupies the northern extremity of the western seaboard from between 20.6 and
24.42 degrees north latitude, 68.10, and 74.28 degrees east longitude having a 1600 km
long Arabian sea-coastline almost 1/3 of the total sea-coast of India. Its area of 1, 96,000
sq. km 6.10% of that of the Indian Union comprises of three geographical regions.
The peninsula, traditionally known as Saurashtra; essentially a hilly tract sprinkled with
low mountains.
Kutch on the north-east; barren and rocky containing the famous Rann (desert) of Kutch,
the big Rann in the north and the little Rann in the east. The mainland extending from the
Rann of Kutch and the Aravalli Hills to the river Daman-Ganga, on the whole a level
plain of alluvial soil.
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Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Cambay in the west and the forest covered hills in the east
offers rigorous of climatic extremes. The State has the longest sea coast line of any States
in India, making it potentially the most important Maritime State in our country. On the
other hand, such a long coast line also makes it vulnerable to major natural disasters like
periodic cyclones.
According to the provisional results of the population census 2001, the population of
Gujarat stood at 5.06 crore. The growth rate in the decade 1991-2001 has increased to
22.48 per cent in comparison to 21.19 per cent in 1981-91. Fourteen per cent of the
population lives below the poverty line compared to the national average of 26.01. The
sex ratio of the state is 920 compared national the average of 933.
The density of Gujarat is 258 persons per sq.km, in 2001. The literacy rate in the State
(excluding children in the age group 0-6 years) has increased from 61.29 per cent in 1991
to 69.97 per cent in 2001. About 37.67 per cent population of Gujarat resides in urban
areas (Excluding earthquake affected areas).
G u ja ra t
(D is tric t M ap)
N
G u lf of Kuchchh
tU p a d la 5c»*»
137
Out of the total population of 483.87 lakh in the state (excluding the earthquake affected
areas), 203.7 lakh (42.10 per cent) were workers and 280.2 lakh (57.90 per cent) were
non-workers. According to the provisional results of population census 2001, the total
number of households was 96.44 lakh. The state composes 26 districts, administratively
sub-divided into 226 taluka, having 18618 villages, (13,819 gram Panchayat) and 242
towns. It has a geographical area of 1.96 lakh sq.km, i.e. 6.19 per cent of the area of the
country. The district map of Gujarat is given as above.
The literacy rate in the state 60.97% in 2001. Among males, it has increased from
72.54% in 1991 to 80.5% in 2001. Among females, it has gone up from 48.50% in 1991
to 58.61% in 2001.
Agriculture continues to be the primary occupation of the large majority of its people.
After the formation of the new State, industrial development has also taken rapid strides.
Business enteiprise and long coastline have enabled Gujaraties to carry on brisk maritime
trade with foreign countries. Total of 41 ports —1 major, 11 intermediate and 29 minors—
have contributed very highly to the development of trade and business in the state. This
has resulted in a very high level of industrialization. The State also leads in receipt of
foreign direct investment.
The State also offers very good infrastructure in fonn of an excellent road network -
length exceeding 73,000 km linking all the regions of the State An efficient rail network
connecting all important centers in the state and country having rail length of 531 kms. It
has also the highest number of Airports viz., 10 nos., amongst all the states.
The gross state domestic product at factor cost at constant (1993-94) prices in 2002-03 is
estimated at Rs. 85536 crore which constitutes about 6.15 of the country’s GDP. The per
capita income of the state is Rs. 22,000 (approx.) compared to the national per capita
income of Rs 19,000.
Natural calamities are recurring phenomena in Gujarat. Some 37 talukas of the state
experience drought every two years, while 55 talukas would experience below normal
rainfall during 40-50% years, while 91 talukas are likely to have inadequate rainfall once
138
in four years. The ecological consequence of such abnormal rainfall pattern is obvious.
The State has more than its share of cyclones and other serious natural calamities. Large
areas of the State lie within earthquake prone zones of high seismic activity.
International Experts have identified 30 odd types of disasters, which have been grouped
into 5 categories based on generic considerations. These are Water & Climate Related
Disasters. Geologically Related Disasters, Biologically Related Disasters, Chemical,
Industrial & Nuclear Related Disasters and Manmade or Accident Related Disasters. Not
all disasters as identified above are relevant for Gujarat State because of its unique geo-
climatic features as well as other social and man-made variables. Following is the
description on the disasters as the most pertinent for Gujarat State along with the
deliberation on their impact.
Cyclones
On the western coast of Indian peninsula, a cyclone originates in the Arabian Sea and
usually reaches the coastline of Gujarat. Gujarat lies in the western India with a coast
facing Arabian Sea in the north Indian Ocean cyclone basin. Various regions of Gujarat
fall into Very High (26 per cent), High (27 per cent) and Moderate (47 per cent) Damage
Risk zones by area. A Gujarat specific mitigation strategy will have to focus on warning,
awareness, targeted mitigation interventions, and an effective techno-legal regime to
reduce vulnerability steadily over time. Gujarat has been experiencing storms and
cyclones since many years. After Gujarat became a separate state, cyclones have hit the
State in the years 1975, 1976, 1981, 1982, 1996, 1998 and 1999. The 1998 cyclone
caused considerable destruction, loss of life and unpredictable devastation making
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Gujarat a major cyclone prone region and emphasized increased severity of cyclones
impacting the State.
Kandla Super cyclone (1998) was one of the deadliest and most devastating cyclone of
the recent history of natural disaster in India. The first information regarding likelihood
of a cyclone — that there was a depression in the Arabian Sea at 650 km, southwest of
Goa - was received on 6 June 1998. This was followed by cyclone alert and cyclone
warning messages on the 7 and 8 June. The cyclone crossed the Gujarat coast between
0730 hrs. and 0830 hrs. of 9 June 1998. After crossing, it was located at 0830 hrs. about
50 km. north-west of Porbandar, and later over Kandla at 1430 hrs. on the same day. It
was of the category of a severe cyclonic storm with core of hurricane winds. The cyclone
as against the initial forecast m terms of direction and velocity changed the path and
acquired added velocity. The storm surge, which affected Kandla, was much higher than
the forecast of tidal waves. The last minute change of direction, accelerated velocity, and
storm surge together contributed to the occurrence of a rather unforeseen and
unprecedented situation, particularly in Kutch.
140
<Source: www.gsdma.org)
The damage caused by the cyclone was extensive. It caused death of human beings
and livestock. There were extensive damages to roads, electricity installations, ports,
water supply schemes and so on. As on 29 July, 1998, the death toll was 1,241 persons.
The single most affected district was Kutch with a death toll of 936 persons followed by
189 in Jamnagar, 64 in Rajkot, and 27 in Porbandar. In the Kandla-Gandhidham area of
Kutch district alone, 918 persons have died. It can be seen that 74 per cent of the deaths
have occurred in Kandla-Gandhidham area. The coastal area of Navlakhi in Rajkot
district in the Gulf of Kutch accounted for the death of 64 persons. Thus 79 per cent of
the deaths have occurred primarily due to storm surge in the Kandla and Navlakhi areas.
About 9,000 people was sustained minor and major injuries. The number of missing
persons was reported to be 1,652 out of which 1,585 were from the Kandla-Gandhidham
area. Among the others, 24 were from Jamnagar district, 39 from Rajkot, and 4 from
Porbandar taluka. The number of livestock died was 21,993.
141
Floods
In the southern part of the State major rivers are spread throughout. These rivers originate
in Madhya Pradesh and merge with the sea at Gulf of Cambay. During the monsoon
months due to heavy rainfall m Madhya Pradesh, these rivers overflow causing floods
that affect the major portion of south Gujarat. Heavy rams in the whole region during the
monsoon months also cause situation of floods in the State. Gujarat has seen many
damaging floods. Almost all the major rivers in the state pass through a wide
stretch of very flat terrain (often more than 50 km) before reaching the sea. These
flat low lands of the lower river basins are prone to flooding from occasional
heavy rainstorm s in the m iddle and upper basins. Fairly im pervious catchments
(rocky or black cotton soils) and steep sloping u p p er catchments can concentrate
runoff to cause heavy short duration floods which can be devastating in the
small river basins of Saurashtra and Kutch.
142
s
G ujarat Flood Hazard Risk Zonation: Settlement-wise Flood Frequency
(Source: mow.gsilnm.org)
Floods are reported almost ever}' third year in the less developed districts of
Gujarat, located in Saurashtra, Kutch and northern Gujarat. Ahmedabad, Surat
and Bharuch cities are also located on the flat alluvial plains of large rivers.
143
Surat had been struck by floods in 1959, 1968, 1994, and 1998. The 1998 flood
level recorded at the Hope Bridge was 102' 7" as against 96'8" in year 1994 due to
which 60 per cent of the city is affected during the present flood against 20 per
cent in 1994. The water level recorded in various parts of the city during the
flood of 1994 was 5 to 8 feet, whereas during 1998 flood it was 12' to 15'. The
number of person registered officially as affected during the 1994 flood was
50,000 whereas the same figure crossed the 9,50,000 mark in 1998. The number of
relief camps in 1998 has been 194 as compared to 35 in 1994.
Reason behind Surat Flood- The heavy downpour in the catchment area of the
Ukai dam resulted in release of water from the Ukai reservoir at a short notice.
So incessant was the rainfall that within a span of 18 to 24 hours, the outflow
from the reservoir increased from four lakh cusecs to six lakh cusecs (release of
3.66 cusecs being the danger line causing floods). The result was that widespread
areas in Surat were marooned under water. The emergency discharge was least
expected at a time when the monsoon was fast receding. Hundreds of houses
collapsed, a large number of roads were damaged; and people were rendered
homeless and destitute overnight.
Losses -As per survey done so far 1647 huts were totally destroyed and 10647
were partially destroyed by the floods. The total value of the damage to huts and
pucca residential houses was Rs.243 lakh. The total number of families affected
by the damage to houses and huts was 61605. No quantified figures for this loss
can be given, but the estimates were approximately Rs.10 crore.
Sixty per cent are of Surat was submerged under water. The most affected area
was in Hajira where heavy engineering plants of ONGC, RELIANCE, ESSAR,
and NTPC are based. The Gas Authority India Ltd. had to shut down its
operations as critical installations were under water. This was the matter of great
144
alarm as GAIL was supplying gas through the HBJ pipeline to major industries
in other parts of India. In rural areas of Choryasi, Karnrej, Olpad, Mandvi,
Bardoli, and Songadh talukas were affected. Water levels, in certain areas went
up to height of 9 to 10 feet causing total damage to houses, appliances, furniture,
and paraphernalia. Industries in Surat District suffered very heavy loss due to
flood in the River Tapi and waterlogging. The damage to fixed assets was
assessed at Rs. 21.45 crore and damage to current assets has been assessed at Rs.
17.15 crore, amounting to total loss of Rs. 38.6 crore. Standing crops of paddy,
cotton, pulses, maize, bajra, etc. were extensively damaged. A total of 153 survey
teams were immediately put into action to survey the damage incurred in the
agriculture Sector in Surat, Bharuch, Kheda, Vadodara, and Panchmahal
districts. An area of 2, 16,491 ha suffered loss of Rs. 5177.24 lakh. Damage to
horticultural crops and vegetables was estimated Rs. 544.42 lakh. Important
roads outside the limits of Surat Municipal Corporation were completely washed
away and damaged beyond repairs. In the rural areas also, 119.82 km of roads
falling within the jurisdiction of the district Panchayat were damaged. The
district Panchayat also reported damages to flood protection walls, check dams,
and primary school buildings. The Surat Electricity Company and the Gujarat
Electricity Board suffered major damages as more than 250 electric substations
were submerged and a number of street light installations were damaged.
Droughts
Since last many years rainfall in Gujarat has been very less. Gujarat suffers from intense
droughts, which has resulted in severe scarcity and water shortages. With large parts of
north Gujarat and Saurashtra having no sources of alternative imgation, drought
vulnerability increases with groundwater overexploitation. In large parts of central and
northern Gujarat, groundwater is the main source of irrigation, and those areas may not
get affected by drought compared to predominantly rain-fed regions. This is the main
145
reason for the higher impact of droughts in Saurashtra compared to north Gujarat. The
average rainfall in Gujarat is about only 700 mm with more than half of the talukas of
Gujarat receiving rainfall within the range of 200-400mm, which is insufficient even for
millets and other dry land crops.
Table 5.4: Major Draughts in Gujarat State during Last 200 Years
Ironically State faces opposite extremities at the same time draught in Saurashtra, Kutch
and North Gujarat region whereas at the same period the southern part of the State faces
problem of floods due to heavy rainfall m Madhya Pradesh. Also, till now there was no
water conservation methodology adopted on a widespread scale in the rural areas, for
conserving the scant amount of ram received. All these factors with the extreme hot
climatic condition of the State results into the scarcity of water and then drought
conditions. Whenever the Government declares the year as a drought-hit year, it is on the
basis of the crop yield in area of 1 sq. km farm, the system is called Annawari system. If
the yield is less than four annas that is less than or equal to the 33% of the normal crop
the area is declared the drought hit. Between four to six annas i.e. (33% to 50%
approximately), the area is declared scarcity zone. If the yield is above six annas, the year
is termed the normal year (GSRM, 1966)’.
Draught during 1999-2000 -The state experienced severe drought during 1999 - 2000
and 9449 villages were declared affected. After observing the pattern of rainfall and
agricultural crop position as well as the reports of the provisional ‘Annawan’, the state
government declared 10431 villages of 169 talukas of 20 districts as scarcity/semi-
scarcity affected area. On considering of the final annawari of Kharif -1 crop and on
146
considering the detailed reports of collectors in the affected districts, Kharif-2 and rabi
crop villages were added for declaration of scarcity. The state government declared
12240 villages as scarcity/semi-scarcity affected and decided to implement relief
measures.
Chemical Hazards
Gujarat, one of the most industrialized States m the country, is known for its large
concentration of chemical industries, particularly, in a stretch of 400 kilometers from
Ahmedabad to Vapi, known as the ‘Golden Corridor. In Bharuch district, Ankleshwar
situated on the Narmada estuary, is Asia’s largest chemical zone.
Gujarat has a very wide manufacturing base including world-scale petroleum refinery and
petrochemical complexes. Chemical industry occupies a pre-eminent pride position m the
industrial sector of Gujarat, contributing to more than 40% of industrial output. Gujarat
contributes more than 20% of the country’s chemical production. More than 50% of the
new investments in the State are in chemical and petrochemical sectors. Almost the entire
range of chemical process industry exists in Gujarat, including hydrocarbon
processing/refining products, petrochemicals-polymers and man-made fibers, fertilizers,
health care products, plant protection chemicals, dyes, pigments and intermediates, fine
chemicals, surface coating products, salt and salt-based products, ceramics, glass, cement,
vegetables oils, fats and detergents. So called golden corridor of Gujarat is practically
infected with chemical industries starting from Vadodra to Maharastra boarder.
Earthquake
According to the studies undertaken by the India Meteorological Department (IMD), the
whole State falls in the seismically active zone. The major parts of the State have been
declared as seismic zone III or above. Gujarat lies in the intra-plate region of the
Indian plate and the Kutch region is less them 500 km from the tri-junction of the
Indian, Arabian, and African plates off the M akran coast of Pakistan.
147
Gujarat Earthquake Hazard Risk Zonation: 200-year return period
Estimated Mean Taluka Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) (in g) [€> ]
GSDMA
n
ID
IV
Sl * VddorAmJDCO
TABU 2004
TABU Gupm larJxu^ki [ 2004
( SOS Nnunl lnOag^r InfonoaboaCan . 1973-200)
ANSS CoopoM rmta«uc. I9T5-2C0)
tmhqMAr m baiia A V
Mm Doagtaa (2004) Gna
1964-200). Inpcnal CoUf*e
The fault plane solutions for these earthquakes indicate that the reported
earthquakes in Gujarat are due to thrust faulting. There are a few earthquakes
along the plate boundary that are gravity faults and partly strike-slip faults.
These fault planes solutions indicate that western Gujarat is under a
compressional regime. Entire Kutch region falls in seismic zone V.
148
Table 5.5: Major Earthquakes in Kutch (Gujarat) and adjoining Regions
149
1970 NA NA Vadodara, Surat, Bhavnagar, Ukai, Rajpipla
1975 NA NA
1978 NA NA Amreli and Surendranagar
1979 NA NA Bhavnagar and Maliya
1981 4.1 NA
1982 NA 4.8
1985 NA 4.4
1991 NA 4.7
1993 4.7 4.9 Rajula
1996 NA 4.5
1999,
2000 NA NA Rajkot, Bhavnagar
2001 76 7
150
26 January 2001 Bhuj Earthquake -The 2001 Bhuj earthquake is considered as the
most devastating disaster in the recent history. It began on January 26, 2001 at 8:46 in the
morning and lasted 110 seconds, centered near Bhuj. The earthquake is considered an
intraplate earthquake because it occurred a great distance from any plate boundary. This
area was not completely prepared for an earthquake of such size, causing much of
devastation.
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Bhuj- Epicentf o> tho Earthquake Dam an
The epicenter of the quake was 23.6° north latitude and 69.8° east longitude, 20
kilometers northeast of Bhuj. The tremors were felt in major parts of the country,
all the way to Mumbai, Ahmedabad, and Surat. Although the official reading of
this quake was 6.9 on the Richter scale, some Western geologists reported a
magnitude up to 7.9, ten times greater.
SE IS M O T E C T O N IC MAP OF KUTCH AREA
T e c to n ic fra m e w o rk
1 T r a n s g r e s s iv e cc
SEISM ICITY
A llu v ia l c o v e r data pe » oo hist om c - BOO
i
^ F o c a l m e c h a n is m s o lu tio n - T h r u s t
N ot Determined □ □ □ □ 0 to A 0 -4 0 • •
» ir B o u g u e r g r a v it y a n o m a l y (m G a l) 71-150 O
s-'ooa B a s e m e n t d e p t h (m )
E p ic e n tre of Bhuj E a rth q u a k e , 2 6 .1 .2 0 0 1
152
Because o f its size and location, this quake was very destructive in terms o f lives lost
and damage to property. All the deaths occurred in India's western state of Gujarat,
near the Pakistan border. Bhuj, only 20 kilometers (14 miles) from the epicenter, was
the most devastated town. In one of the most heartbreaking events, about 400 school
children offering a Republic Day march through a street lost their lives. Many others
153
The quake destroyed 90 percent of the homes in Bhuj, several schools and the hospital
were flattened. Considerable damage occurred also at Bhachau. The destruction was
widespread and the area affected was vast. As per the notification of the Revenue
Department, 21 districts out of 25 were affected in varying degrees. Over 7,000 villages
were affected. The population affected was 28 million. Five districts, namely, Kutch,
Jamnagar, Surendranagar, Rajkot and Patan, were severely affected. In addition, there
was huge destruction and casualties in Ahmedabad city and to some extent in Surat.
The final death figure, based on the GSDMA report, w as given as 13,805: 3,743
men, 5,184 w om en an d 4,878 children. District-wise details of the death toll are
given below.
154
The Kutch district accounted for about 88 per cent of the deaths. The num ber of
people injured was estimated to be about 167.000.
According to the WB/ADB Joint Assessment Team, asset losses were estimated at Rs
9,909 crore and reconstruction cost at Rs 10,575 crore. On the other hand, the
Government of Gujarat placed the losses at Rs 15,308 crore and reconstruction cost at Rs
11,499 crore. The difference was mainly due to the estimated loss m respect of the
housing sector, which, according to the Government of Gujarat estimate, was Rs 10,000
crore against the WB estimate of Rs 5,166 crore. The total financial loss includes primary
loss (loss of assets), secondary loss (loss of output due to disruption of economic
activities), and tertiary loss because of the long-term effects on the economy.
Damage Assessment
Housing - A preliminary assessment by the Joint Assessment Team of the World Bank
and Asian Development Bank indicated that about 400,000 dwelling units had collapsed
and about 500,000 were partially damaged. A subsequent estimate by the government of
Gujarat put the partially damaged houses at 800,000. The figures were refined from time
to time. It was found that a number of commerci al premises had initially been counted as
dwelling units. There were also changes in the category on account of re-survey of
structures in many cases. The latest numbers of collapsed and damaged dwelling units are
215,255 and 928,369 respectively.
It was estimated that losses due to damage and destruction of houses including the value
of household goods would be to the extent of Rs 5,166 crore (US $1.1 billion). According
to an estimate by the government of Gujarat, it was Rs 10,000 crore. The cost of
reconstruction was estimated to be Rs 5,148 crore.
Immediate steps which were required to be taken below in the context of widespread
damage to housing included:
• careful and transparent damage assessment
155
• provision of temporary shelters
• debris removal
• consultation with the people to decide whether they will reconstruct in-situ or
relocate themselves
• arrangements for construction of hazard-resistant houses.
Health -There was extensive damage to the health infrastructure. Two district hospitals
(at Bhuj and Gandhidham), 21 Community Health Centers (CHCs), 48 Primary Health
Centers (PHCs), 227 sub-centers, 800 anganwadis, six Integrated Child Development
Schemes (1CDS) godowns, 11 Chief District Project Offices (CDPOs), 96 ayurveda
dispensanes, 21 homeopathic dispensaries, and one food laboratory were completely
destroyed. In addition, a number of buildings suffered major and minor damages. The
total damage was estimated at Rs 219 crore. The cost of reconstruction was estimated to
be Rs 279 crore. Some details are given below.
Number of facilities Rs
Type of facility
Complete Partial (Million)
Sub-center 227 357 362
PHC 48 118 550
CHC 21 46 671
D istrict/ taluka hospital 5 26 317
ICDS 0
(i) Anganwadi center 800 2,180 122
(ii) CDPO office 11 4 2
(iii) Godown 6 4 4
Ayurvedic 110 8 30
hospital/ dispensary
District TB H ospital/training 8 10
center
Adm. building/training center - 14 20
Food and drug laboratory 1 1 5
156
Medical colleges and speciality - 15 55
hospitals
M unicipal (including AMC) - 10 53
hospitals
157
Dam and Irrigation facilities:
There are many small and medium earthen dams and reservoirs in Kutch and Saurashtra,
which are arid zones with low rainfall. These dams and reservoirs facilitate storage and
availability of water for the purpose of drinking and irrigation. There are 20 medium
irrigation schemes and 165 minor irrigation schemes in Kutch. There was widespread and
extensive damage to earthen dams. In most cases there was cracking and displacement of
the upstream sides of the dam slopes. Of 20 medium dams, 16 suffered damage, out of
which five were severely damaged. Similarly, 80 out of 165 minor dams were damaged,
out of which 14 were severely damaged. In Saurashtra, 61 dams suffered minor to
moderate damage.
It was necessary to identify the dams which had become unsafe for impounding water, so
as to undertake urgent repair before the monsoon. The repair of other dams was also
necessary in order to ensure supply of drinking water. This work was undertaken on an
urgent basis. The total cost of the damages was estimated to be Rs 186 crore. In order to
repair and strengthen the dams and make them earthquake resistant it was estimated that
an amount o f Rs 419 crore would be required.
Rural Water Supply- The drinking water supply system was adversely affected in 1,340
villages of the following five districts: Banaskantha, Jamnagar, Kutch, Rajkot and
Surendranagar. Out of these, 1,100 villages, particularly in Kutch, Rajkot and Jamnagar,
were severely affected. In Kutch, water supply depends mainly on groundwater,
supplemented by surface water from Tappar and Shivlakha dams. Rajkot and Jamnagar
depend on the Machhu-II dam and a few groundwater schemes. Surface water schemes
(dams, pumping stations, pipelines, and water treatment plants) as well as groundwater
schemes (121 regional schemes covering 693 villages and 191 individual schemes) were
affected to varying degrees. The most severely damaged facilities were: two dams, two
water treatment plants, over 350 tube wells with pumping equipment and pump houses,
and over 1500 km of pipelines. The RCC underground tanks and overhead tanks could
158
withstand the impact, whereas masonry structures collapsed. Other damages were
ruptures and dislocation of transmission pipelines, resulting in leakages. The total amount
of damage was estimated to be Rs 233 crore. The estimated cost of reconstruction
including upgrading for hazard resistant construction was around Rs 451 crore.
Municipal Infrastructure - There are six municipal corporations and 143 municipalities
in Gujarat. Five municipal corporations and 57 municipalities were affected by the
earthquake. There were damages to urban and environmental infrastructure such as water
supply, storage system, sanitation, solid waste management, municipal roads, municipal
dispensaries, street lighting, municipal administrative buildings, and other buildings such
as laboratories, town halls, and municipal markets. Severe damage occurred in 14 towns
of Kutch, Rajkot and Surendranagar districts. The worst affected towns were: Anjar,
Bhachau, Bhuj, Gandhidham, and Rapar m Kutch district, and Morbi in Rajkot district.
The municipal infrastructure in Ahmedabad city suffered damage. Other towns which
suffered losses were Mandvi (Kutch district), Wankaner (Rajkot district), Dhrangadhra,
Halvad, Limdi, Surendranagar, Thangadh and Wadhwan (Surendranagar district). The
damage was estimated to be Rs 140 crore and the replacement cost with upgrading Rs
209 crore.
Public Buildings and Historic Monuments-As in the case of housing, most of the public
buildings destroyed were located in Kutch district. At least 12 court buildings and 12 jails
and sub-jails were badly damaged. The buildings that collapsed were mostly old, one or
two-storeyed structures with masonry walls. The damage was estimated at Rs 339 crore.
The cost of reconstruction of public buildings was estimated at Rs 442 crore.
There are 212 protected monuments with the Archaeological Survey of India out of
which 69 structures were affected. Two of them completely collapsed, 25 had major
damage, and 42 monuments had minor damage. One of the collapsed monuments was
Maharao Lakhpatji’s Chhatri m Bhuj. The State Department of Archaeology has
indicated 330 monuments as protected monuments, out of which 101 were moderately
159
damaged, 32 had major damage and one monument collapsed. Among these are the old
temples of Kutch at Pumeshwar, Kanthkot, Bhubaneshwar Mahadev and Kera, as well as
other structures such as Lakhota in Jamnagar. There are many heritage buildings used for
public purposes such as schools, hospitals, administrative buildings, museums, rest
houses, police stations and officers’ bungalows. There were about 3,000 such
administrative buildings, out of which 954 were damaged and 194 were destroyed. As
regards residential quarters, about 1,000 were damaged and 250 were destroyed.
In addition to the above categories, there are a large number of monuments which are
unprotected and unrecognized, most of which are privately owned. Reliable data on such
monuments are not available. According to an estimate by INTACH, at least 10,000 such
buildings and sites, which include palaces, old havelis, wells, chhattries, places of
religious significance, clock towers, gateways, and pavilions, located in 250 towns and
many villages, were affected by the earthquake. Some important ones are the Darbargarh
of Kutch, Aina Mahal, Prag Mahal, the Vegetable Market, Taksal Mosque and Rudrani
temple in Bhuj, and the Green Tower, Ram Malhol temple, Morvi Palace, Pratap Vilas
and Sai School in Jamnagar.
According to the World Bank and ADB joint assessment report, out of the 329
monuments protected by the Government of Gujarat, 33 suffered major damage and 100
suffered damage such as major and minor cracks. Many unprotected historic buildings
and monuments have been damaged or destroyed.
Power - The earthquake caused extensive damage to the power supply facilities in Kutch
and other districts such as Banaskanta, Jamnagar, Rajkot and Surendranagar. Some power
stations sustained minor losses, but transmission and distribution systems suffered severe
damages. The Kutch Lignite Thermal Power Station at Panandro in Kutch district
sustained some minor damage. The building housing the diesel generator set in Bhuj was
also damaged. Cracks developed in the Sikka Thermal Power Station building, damaging
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equipment and overhead tanks. There was also some damage at the Dhuvaran Thermal
Power Station.
There was damage to the 220-KV sub-stations at Anjar, Nakhatrana and Nani Kakhar,
two 132-KV sub-stations at Samakhiyali and Bhuj and 44 sub-stations of 66 KV in Bhuj,
Rajkot, Surendranagar and Jamnagar circles. The most severe damage was to the 220 KV
sub-station at Anjar and about 20 66-KV sub-stations in the Bhuj circle. The control
rooms collapsed damaging the control panels and battery banks underneath. Power
transformers were detached and toppled over.
In addition to the power transmission system there was extensive damage to the
distribution system affecting most of the villages in the region. The loss to the power
sector was estimated to be Rs 186 crore. The cost of reconstruction and upgradation was
estimated at Rs 456 crore.
The railway infrastructure suffered relatively minor destruction. Most of the damage was
to buildings— stations and staff quarters—with some minor damage to structures and
signaling infrastructure. Rail links were restored quickly.
There was significant damage to the Kandla port. Five of the 10 dry cargo jetties
developed major cracks. The oil jetty and a small wharf were damaged. Some mechanical
and electrical equipment were also damaged. Twelve of the 40 ports managed by the
Gujarat Maritime Board were damaged; the Navlakhi port was the most affected. Most of
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the marine structures, cargo handling equipment, storage facilities, residential office
buildings, roads, bridges, etc. were destroyed.
The airport at Bhuj suffered some damage to the runway and major damage to the old
terminal building. However, a new terminal building was under construction, which was
made operational in September 2003. There was some damage to the terminal building at
the airport at Kandla and very minor damage to other airports such as those at Rajkot and
Porbandar.
The damage to the transport sector was assessed at about Rs 233 crore for roads; Rs 79
crore for railways; Rs 198 crore for ports; and Rs 19 crore for airports.
Agriculture and Livestock- Agriculture had been severely affected by two consecutive
years of drought. The earthquake added to the plight of the farmers. According to the
estimate of the government of Gujarat, total loss of assets was estimated at Rs 544 crore.
The Joint Assessment Team estimated the loss of assets in private sector agriculture and
livestock at Rs 509 crore. Major losses related to irrigation assets such as bore wells,
pump houses and water storage tanks. There was damage to storage bins, farm
implements, plant protection equipment, stored output and mputs, and livestock. The
damage to public sector assets was estimated at Rs 35 crore, which included public
buildings of the Agriculture Department, Gujarat Agricultural University, and animal
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husbandry units. Output losses due to the earthquake were estimated to be about Rs 228
crore. Such losses were due to the delay in picking the standing crops of cotton and
castor, lack of irrigation at a critical stage, and lack of farm storage facilities.
Service Sector - The five most affected districts, namely, Kutch, Rajkot, Jamnagar, Patan
and Surendranagar, have a large number of commercial and trade establishments. They
include wholesale and retail shops, restaurants and hotels. There are large shopping areas
in Gandhidham. All these establishments were damaged. The losses were estimated at Rs
1,163 crore. The output loss was estimated at Rs 1,748 crore.
2001 Bhuj Earthquake & Overall Assessment of Losses and Cost of Reconstruction
According to the WB/ADB Joint Assessment Team, asset losses were estimated at Rs
9,909 crore and reconstruction cost at Rs 10,575 crore. On the other hand, the
government of Gujarat placed the losses at Rs 15,308 crore and reconstruction cost at Rs
11,499 crore. The difference was mainly due to the estimated loss in respect of the
housing sector, which, according to the government of Gujarat estimate, was Rs 10,000
crore against the WB estimate of Rs 5,166 crore.
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The actual expenditure on housing is likely to be much less than what is estimated. This
is because housing packages envisage assistance to the extent of the minimum
requirement for housing. They do not compensate the entire loss.
The total loss includes primary loss (loss of assets), secondary loss (loss of output due to
disruption of economic activities), and tertiary loss because of the long-term effects on
the economy.
Gujarat has also periodically suffered from major and minor riots, in view of its typical
social factors. The recent manmade disaster includes terrorist attack on Swaminaryan
temple (Gandhinagar) and senal bomb explosions in various cities of Gujarat (July 2008).
Sardar Sarovar Narmada Canal system running across the state of Gujarat. This is one of
the largest canal systems in the world and carries and store huge amount of water. All
districts falling in the vicinity of main canal and major branch canals are prone to related
emergencies. Radhanpur, Patan and Surendranagar districts may add on to the above list
to cover canal related emergency response requirements. The above criterion and factors
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are important form the view of planning for Communication for Disaster Management
As can be seen from the history of the disasters described above and based on other
information one can state that, unfortunately, the State of Gujarat has had its undue share
locations, one can identify the relatively more disaster prone districts of Gujarat. A
primary list of such disaster prone districts is given below (GSDMA, 2002).
The Drought and scarcity Rules 1885 of Bombay state (GSRR, 1993) provided
guidelines on definition of disaster (drought and scarcity), types of the relief works,
remunerations and aids, exemption from the land taxes, forest rules and relaxations
therein during drought etc. These rules were designed by the British Raj and states like
Vadodra, Bhavnagar etc. adopted these rules for disaster or relief management under
their jurisdictions. These rules were subsequently modified in the year 1927.
After independence, in the year 1952-53 the Drought and Scarcity Rules were replaced
by the Relief Rules by the Government of India. The Drought & scarcity Rules and
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various modifications / amendments were subsequently compiled & produced in the form
of “Blue Book” (GSRR, 1993).
Disaster management is one of the basic responsibility of the State Government and
Government of India would supplement state Government’s efforts by providing
financial assistances under the provisions of the rules / policies. Finance Commission of
India under the policy drafted in the year 1966 - provisioned for supplementing 75 % (50
% as grant and 25 % as loan) of the expenditure above the limit of Rs 80 Lak allocated
for relief works. The state would bear rest 25 % through their own non-plan budget
allocation. Government of Gujarat constituted a committee under the chairmanship of
relief commissioner to review and revise state relief rules under the recommendations of
the sixth Finance Commission of India. The State Government came out with the revised
Gujarat State Relief Rules in the year 1976 and 1993. Schemes for enhancing relief
expenditure in the wake of natural calamities are governed by a Finance Commission
appointed by the Government of India every five years. Under the existing scheme, each
state has a fund called the Calamity Relief Fund (CRF), administered by a state-level
committee, and headed by the Chief Secretary of each state. The size of fund is
determined by taking into consideration the expenditure normally incurred by relief and
rehabilitation over the previous ten years. In case the funds m the CRF are not sufficient
to meet the specific requirements, state governments can seek assistance from the
National Calamity Contingency Fund (NCCF) - a fund established at national level.
Traditionally disaster management and emergency response work has been handled by
the revenue department due to its well defined and deep reach upto the village level. The
system is in place since the creation of Gujarat state.
State level: Relief commissioners, under state revenue department, are in charge of relief
and rehabilitation measures in the wake of natural disasters in their respective states.
There use to be a position of Director (Voluntear Agencies) who will interface between
various NGOs - Government for relief and rehabilitation work. The Chief Secretary is in
overall charge of relief operations in the state. The relief commissioner and the additional
relief commissioners function under his or her direction and control. In many states, the
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secretary of the revenue department is also in charge of relief. Disaster management
organization hierarchy at state level is as given below-
Tahika Control rooms under mamlatdar are activated during emergency response
Tefati Is the last Government official at village level belonging to revenue department
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Gujarat state had position of Director (Volunteer Agencies) responsible for coordination
between VA, Government and Public during the time of need. The same has since been
abandoned and non-functional.
State had Disaster Management Plan for flood, cyclone, draught and scarcity to some
extent. But these Emergency Response plans were capable to operate only for a short
while and were not capable to handle extreme incidents like 26th Jan 2001 Bhuj
earthquake.
The response at state level is governed by annual contingency plans. The Contingency
Action Plan (CAP) identifies the initiatives to be taken by various central ministries and
public departments in the wake of natural calamities. It sets down the procedures and
determines the focal points in the administrative machinery to facilitate relief and rescue
operations, especially in perennially flood-prone states. Prepared with a response and
relief-oriented approach, these plans have limited scope for mitigation and preparedness
activities. Relief codes or manuals in different states determine the amount of and
procedure for relief distribution...
District Level : The District Magistrate or District Collector (DM or DC) is responsible
for overall management of disasters in his or her particular district. All disaster
management activities are undertaken by the state and district administration and are put
into operation on the basis of provisions laid down in state disaster management manuals.
In the event of a disaster, a district collector (DC) has the authority to mobilize the
response machinery immediately. Disaster Management organization hierarchy at the
district and below levels is as follows -
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DC has financial autonomy to withdraw money under the provisions of the general
financial rules or treasury code. The district collector has the authority also to request the
armed forces for assistance if circumstances demand. Thus the nodal authority to respond
to a disaster rests with the district collector of the affected district. Other bodies, such as
the armed forces and non-government organizations, complement the efforts of the state
government. The armed forces can mobilize and coordinate rescue and relief in the
shortest possible time and non-govemment organizations are useful for communicating
with the community.
Early warning for natural disasters was / is mainly possible with the help of satellite and
remote sensing observations and requires both technological and interpretational skills.
Infrastructure for the same is built up by the Central Govt, through the agencies like the
Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO), India Meteorological Deptt. (I.M.D.)
Central Water Commission (CWC)’s Flood forecasting Units etc. State Government will
receive advance information from the central Government agencies (IMD, CWC etc) on
weather related parameters, from time to time, so as necessary action can be taken in
view of the given situation. A.I.R. (All India Radio) and Doordarshan (TV) Networks
were the main resources for dissemination of public alerts and warnings till recent past.
Gujarat State Relief Manual 1976 (GSRM,1993,P25) has special mention about the
importance of the flood warnings and emphasized on the need for arrangements for
disseminating flood warnings to inhibits at taluka and below. Under the arrangements for
flood management, as described in the manual, all cities / towns located on the banks of
major rivers will have police wireless stations with wireless monitoring control rooms
operating at police head quarters in Ahmedabad, Himatnagar, Kheda, Bharuch, Surat,
Vadodra and Godhra. Chief engineers and district collectors are entrusted with powers to
issue flood warning notification through All India radio transmission under the provisions
of the state relief manual (1976).
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Revenue control room will be operational during monsoon period i.e. from June -
September every year, at Secretariat and under the charge of Director (Relief). Like vise
all District Collectorate will make the district control rooms operational during the same
period. All district control room will have hot line connectivity taken from Department of
Telecom (DoT) with the Revenue control room at secretariat 24*7. Indian Meteorological
Department (IMD) will communicate weather bulletins to the revenue control room
through fax, which will be further disseminated to all district control rooms through hot
lines as well as facsimile. State Police wireless will establish wireless stations at all Dam
sites and establish communication with the state police control as well as the district
control rooms. Irrigation department will also commission their flood control rooms and
will take inputs from central Water Commission CWC). State has flood memorandum
with guidelines on flood management.
Earthquake)
Earthquake struck without any warning and hence no advance preparation could be done.
However, the traditional disaster management structure got into action spontaneously.
This was a massive disaster and state had no experience of handling such an incident. The
situation turned from bad to worst in absence of -
t • Total Communication black out between the affected areas & rest of world
• Absence of resources to meet such a huge calamity
• Absence of established emergency operation center for resource and response
coordination
• Collector/DM had no legislative powers conferred to him empowering him to take
control of resources belonging to Govemment/public or corporate in the area for
emergency response.
• Absence of Organisation for disaster management with adequate backups.
Disaster management organization (collector's office and staff) got severely
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impacted by the earthquake. District Collector himself was under severe traumatic
condition.
Situation at the state level was also not very encouraging. Domain managers
were waiting for inputs on damages / losses so as resources could be
coordinated and deployment can be arranged. But majority of Government
offices were among affected and all linkages were lost (road, telecommunication
etc..) and there was non to go to sites of incidents for such assessment. State
Government did not have any GIS / GPS application with support database for
running a simulation on loss assessment. Coordination work started in
anticipation. Majority of NGOs approaching Government offering assistance
work has no prior experience. They were new to the geography. Valuable man
hours of the local officers in the affected areas were wasted in navigating and
introducing NGOs. Central Government offered all support - but they did not
have a virtual assessment system for guiding states on resource requirement
during such calamities. Government of India was more then willing to assist
Gujarat state in responding to the emergency, but they were not prepared. To
summaries the situation - there was no preparation to respond to such a massive
earthquake at any level within and out side the Governance system.
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Birth of Gujarat State Disaster Management Agency
After the Gujarat earthquake ot year 2001, there was a change in the policy of the
government. Looking at the extensive damage and destruction spread throughout the
state, it was decided that the role of government will not be limited to only relief and
rescue, but the perception of the disaster as a whole would be taken into consideration
and the affected population will be provided help for rehabilitation. With these views in
sight, the Gujarat State Disaster Management Authority (GSDMA) was established.
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172
The main objectives of GSDMA are to undertake social and economical activities
for rehabilitation and resettlement of the affected people; to prepare programmes
and plans to mitigate losses on account of disaster as a strategy for long term
disaster preparedness; to manage the Gujarat Earthquake Rehabilitation and
Reconstruction Fund; to act as nodal agency, and to co-ordinate various issues
relating to deserving victims, out of the funds, either directly or through a
common fund, created for these purpose in any other feasible mode; etc. As part
of its long-term disaster management mandate GSDMA has taken some
revolutionary steps which would help in vulnerability reduction.
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• To ensure that arrangements are in place to mobilize the resources and
capability for relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction and recovery from disasters
• To create awareness and preparedness and provide advice and training to the
agencies involved in disaster management and to the community
• To strengthen the capacities of the community and establish and maintain
effective systems for responding to disasters
• To ensure coordination with agencies related to disaster management in other
Indian states and those at the national and international level
• To ensure relief/assistance to the affected without any discrimination of
caste, creed, community pr sex
• To establish and maintain a proactive program of risk reduction, this
program being implemented through existing sect oral and inter-sect oral
development programs and being part of the overall development process in
the state
• To develop and implement programs for risk sharing and risk transfer for all
types of disasters
• To address gender issues in disaster management with special thrust on
empowerment of women towards long-term disaster mitigation
• To develop disaster management as a distinct management discipline and
creation of a systematic and streamlined disaster management cadre
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• No statutory empowerment for principal authorities such as GSDMA, State
Relief Commissioner (SRC), district collector, etc.
• Roles, functions, and powers not clearly defined
• Largely reactive approach and less emphasis on mitigation activities
• No integration between planning and disaster management activities
The purpose of the act is to provide for effective management of disaster, for
mitigation of effects of disaster, for administering emergency relief dining and
after occurrence of disasters and for implementing, monitoring and coordinating
measures for reconstruction and rehabilitation in the aftermath of disasters, in
the state of Gujarat and for these purposes to establish the Gujarat State Disaster
Management Authority and to specify other agencies and for matters connected
therewith or incidental thereto.
The act has incorporated best practices from a variety of sources as described in
Table below.
The act
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• Enables appropriate entities to use existing powers, authority, and resources
to implement disaster management framework and provides additional
powers wherever necessary
• Provides a framework for sourcing and utilizing funds
• Supplements existing legislation,
As per the Gujarat State Disaster Management Act, 2003, long-term disaster
management planning and capacity building is one of the major mandates of the
GSDMA. GSDMA has taken several initiatives on this front and some are
envisaged in future. These initiatives have been classified broadly under three
heads namely techno-legal regime, structural measures and non-structural
measures.
Techno-legal regime
Several initiatives have been taken by the government of Gujarat under the
techno-legal regime. A few notable ones are given below:
Certification of Masons and Engineers: It has been well established that many
buildings collapse in earthquake because of faulty structural design of buildings
and poor construction. This is due to the fact that there is no system in Gujarat
for ensuring that only masons and engineers having necessary competency are
involved in actual construction work. Hence competency based certification of
masons, based on written and practical test, and has been initiated in the state.
For licensing of engineers a process has been initiated.
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Syllabus Revision of Technical Institutions: The existing for syllabus for civil
the engineering colleges and polytechnics has been revised by experts. The
revised syllabus incorporates the techniques of multihazard resistant
construction.
Revision of Relief Manual for the State: The state has a relief manual for
undertaking relief measures in the case of natural disasters. A committee has
been appointed to review this manual and incorporate provisions for all types of
disasters and to prepare a new state disaster manual.
Structural measures
State Government has take several initiative as per the advice / guidelines issued by the
Government on restructure /re-group the officers/staff within the Department of Disaster
Management with definite functions to pursue the holistic approach to disaster
management. The four functional groups, as advised by the Government of India, to be
assigned with specific tasks within the departments are as indicted below -
1. Hazard Mitigation
2. Preparedness and Capacity Building
3. Relief and Response
4. Administration and Finance
At the district level, the District Magistrate who is the chief coordinator will be the focal
point for coordinating all activities relating to prevention, mitigation and preparedness
apart from his existing responsibilities pertaining to response and relief. The District
Coordination and Relief Committee is being reconstituted/re-designated into Disaster
Management Committees with officers from relevant departments being added as
members. Because of its enhanced mandate of mitigation and prevention, the district
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heads of the departments engaged in development are now being included in the
Committee so that mitigation and prevention is mainstreamed into the district plan.
Similarly, sub-divisional and Block/Taluka level Disaster Management Committees are
also being constituted. At the village level Disaster Management Committees and
Disaster Management Teams are being constituted. Each village in multi-hazard prone
district will have a Disaster Management Plan.
Some of the major initiatives under structural measures taken in Gujarat are as
follows:
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Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) - Government of India has advised all
states to establish Emergency Operation Centers (EOC) to facilitate effective
emergency response management. Such EOCs would be complied with the
following requirements
(i) Multi-hazard resistant construction.
(ii) Communication system linkages.
(iii) Mobile EOC for on-site disaster management information
The Gujarat state is in advance stage of commissioning EOC at State, District and
Taluka level.
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observatories and 40 strong motion accelerographs is being established for
continuous monitoring of the seismic activity.
Retrofitting of public buildings - There were some public buildings which were
not completely destroyed at the time of the earthquake of 2001. These buildings
are being strengthened by appropriately retrofitting them depending on the
earthquake zone in which they are located. Retrofitting of critical public
buildings like hospitals, health sector buildings, and other public infrastructure
buildings has been initiated.
Non-structural Initiatives
Training of Masons and Engineers: Engineers and masons have been trained in
multi-hazard resistant construction and retrofitting of building.
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Community-based Disaster Risk Management Programmed: A community
based disaster risk management programme is being implemented in 14 most
hazard prone districts. The aim is long-term capacity building of the community
and reduction of dependence on external sources. The programme focuses on
capacity building of community through awareness, training, and institutional
arrangements. It is based on large-scale involvement of village youth.
It envisages that, youth volunteers from villages are identified and prepare
different teams for community level disaster response. This team, Early Warning
Group, First Aid & Medical Group, Evacuation Group, Rescue Group, Shelter
Management Group, will be responsible for different tasks assigned to them for
disaster preparedness.
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(Bhavai, etc), a shake table demonstration, and other similar activities have been
carried out a wide scale for awareness creation and capacity building on
disasters.
State Disaster Resource Network: To cater to the need for collating all resources
available starting from the block or taluka to state level for disaster response and
putting it in a centralized database, namely the state disaster resource network
(SDRN), a web portal for collection and compilation of resources inventory from
the block or taluka level to state level has been prepared. The resource network
has data of all villages. This system presents many advantages such as easy
availability of information at all levels, minimum duplication, time saving, and
finally visual data report generation that assist in gap analysis and resource
mobilization.
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This is important to have reliable inventory data base and access to authorized
personnel to such data base at Local, State, National and International level.
Global Disaster Information Network (GDIN) initiative by G7 countries will
prove as an asset once "realised in its full sense".
Gujarat State Disaster Management Agency has under taken initial steps toward
setting up district EOCs as per Government of India's guidelines. The State
Emergency & Disaster Management Information and Communication Network
System are under design and implementation.
Pre-disaster stage can be defined a stage or situation closest to the onset of a disaster. Pre
preparations or the activities closest to the onset of the disaster which minimizes disaster
damages and enhance disaster response operations. Usually this phase of management
involves planning, warning and often public information and training activities (Drabek,
1983) . Response includes those activities undertaken most closely after the disaster
occurs. These activities may consists of evacuation (although evacuation may also occur
prior to disaster), mobilization, emergency assistance for victims, and so forth (Perry &
Mushkatel, 1985).
Third phase of emergency management is recovery-both short and long term. The
activities undertaken during this phase are designed to return the affected community to
normal conditions existing prior to the advent of disaster. These activities may be short
term restoration activities and long term reconstruction efforts (Perry & Mushkatel,
1984) . The final phase of emergency management is mitigation. Mitigation entails those
activities undertaken before the disaster to lessen its effects. Mitigation may involve
modifying the cause of the hazard, or the vulnerability to the event, or distributing the
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losses. These types of mitigational activities may be structural or non-structural, i.e.,
dams vs. land-use ordinance.
The policy process has been described as consistmg of a variety of different stages
(Jones, 1970). The policy system consist of stages: formulation, adoption,
implementation, and evaluation. Policy formation refers to necessary planning and
information gathering by which policy options are developed and attention of decision
makers gained. The second stage of process involves adoption and its transformation into
policy. The implementation of the policy or actual carrying out the policy is an area
which has only recently received the increased attention and scrutiny it deserves (Olson
& Nilson, 1982). The final element of the policy process is evaluation of the effectiveness
of the policies. The evaluation phase permits management to make adjustments in
practices and policies permitting better performance. Weather referring to policies,
practices, or management, the real referent is the four phases of emergency management.
Hence, some policies or practices will be designed to promote better mitigation measures,
other to advance preparedness and planning, and still others to facilitate response and
recovery (Mushkatel & Weschler, 1985). Most of the Indian States are passing through
the second phase of policy process, i.e. adoption with some exception like Gujarat State
where implementation has been triggered. Disaster Management Policy Process is
sensitive to implementation style (influenced by Bureaucratic norms) and would produce
different results in different setups. There is still a long way to go, policies and their
imbalances would be visible only when they are practiced during incidents.
• The state followed age old “relief codes” while reacting to any natural disaster;
• Mitigational efforts were totally absent;
• There was no plan and preparation for earthquake related emergency;
• State had neither a dedicated organization nor a policy supported by appropriate
legislation for managing disasters;
• Construction practices in the affected area were not akin to favorable seismic
behavior.
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• The important public buildings, including schools, were not as per the seismic
standards.
• All bridges were designed without keeping the seismic conditions into
considerations in the affected area.
• All utility installation were designed and implemented without considering area
seismic conditions.
• There was systemic plan, design and Integeration of modem technology in the
emergency and disaster response.
One of the mitigation work book published by the emergency management division of
the Washington Military department states - Disaster occurs when a hazard crosses
paths with the human made environment, such as buildings, roads, pipelines, crops. It
is a disaster when the floods invade low-lying homes or the unregulated buildings in
identified seismic zones collapse due to earthquakes. If only wetlands and floodplains
that are not developed were flooded, rather then home and businesses, we would hardly
take notice. This is a common knowledge that - this not earthquake but the poorly built
structures cause killings and losses. The natural environment takes care. The human
made environment, in contrast, often needs assistance. The b est m itigational
strateg ies would address environm ental protection as a first step followed by
various o th er preparedness m easures, b u t th is is some thing easy to be “said
th e n done”. Third world is facing a typical situ atio n of increased resource
requirem en ts and unchecked poverty b ringing more vulnerability to th eir
eco-system.
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need to be adopted, im plem ented and evaluated, m highly cooperative
environm ent in hierarchical G overnm ent system.
Advance ale rt and w arnings can save lives and property and n atio n al and
state policies need to address public alert and w arning system s in more
detailed and elaborated m anner. This needs to ta k e a new approach and
address “custom alert and w arn in g system based on the area v u ln erab ilities”.
Traditional approach of using All India radio, TV and other portable
announcem ent system may not prove effective for all identified areas and
communities. The design of such system need to consider th a t none of the
facilities would be accessible by th e inhibits m th e risk zones.
Gujarat state has capabilities and first hand leammg from various disasters and should
strive to evolve and establish a model emergency & disaster management system which
can be replicated by other states. Effectiveness and efficiency of newly conceived and
developed state disaster management framework would only be known during next
incident as no tool can simulate patterns of the future disasters. All what is simulated is -
based on previous happenings and experience
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