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The Intersection of Agenda-Setting, the Media Environment, and Election Campaign Laws

Author(s): John A. Fortunato and Shannon E. Martin


Source: Journal of Information Policy, Vol. 6 (2016), pp. 129-153
Published by: Penn State University Press
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The Intersection of Agenda-Setting,
the Media Environment, and Election
Campaign Laws
John A. Fortunato and Shannon E. Martin

Abstract
Media theory helps the process of understanding the complex political communi-
cation environment. Agenda-setting research examines the transfer of topic salience
from the media agenda to the public agenda. This process is ­important to discuss in
the policy context of election campaigns. In an election campaign ­context, agenda-
setting has been altered considerably since its early research studies by the technol-
ogy that allows individuals and organizations to use social media to communicate
directly to an audience and by the campaign finance structure created by the Citizens
United ruling with money that provides for greater message exposure through adver-
tising serving as an agenda-setter.
Keywords: campaign finance reform, agenda-setting, social media, information
policy, Citizens United

Introduction

The political communication environment today is the convergence


of (1)  media organizations’ content selection and framing decisions,
(2)  ­individuals and organizations with agendas to promote, (3) techno-
logical capabilities of communication platforms to distribute and retrieve
messages, (4) audiences motivated to seek information, and (5) laws
­
­governing election campaign policy. Understanding the political commu-
nication environment relies on knowledge of all of these variables.
The role of media in a democracy to inform citizens, in a dynamic now
being altered by social media, has become very complicated and more
challenging to navigate for all entities. Media theory helps the process
of understanding this complex political communication environment.

John A. Fortunato: Fordham University


Shannon E. Martin: Indiana University

Journal of Information Policy, Volume 6, 2016


This work is licensed under Creative Commons Attribution cc-by-nc-nd

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130 JOURNAL OF INFORMATION POLICY

The  mass media have the function of selecting and framing messages.
One ­prominent theoretical model of the late twentieth century that cap-
tures this primary decision-making function of the media and their influ-
ence on the audience is agenda-setting research identified by McCombs and
Shaw. The core concept of agenda-setting is the transfer of topic salience
from the media agenda to the public agenda. Agenda-setting research
­initially tested the transfer of topic salience based on the amount of cover-
age a topic received (media selection and repeated exposure of topics), and
evolved to include questions of transfer of salience through how the issue
was presented (media framing of topic attributes).1 Agenda-setting posits
the media may be successful in influencing what the public thinks about
and how the public thinks about those particular topics.2
The agenda-setting process is important to discuss in the policy govern-
ing election campaigns. In an election campaign context, agenda-setting
has been altered considerably since its early research studies by the technol-
ogy that allows individuals and organizations to use social media to com-
municate directly to an audience and by the campaign finance structure
created by the Citizens United ruling with money that provides for greater
message exposure through advertising serving as an agenda-setter.
Every time the communication environment changes, individuals
and organizations have to adjust their communication strategy to reach
the audience. There is a need to understand the message distribution
system capabilities and an understanding of how the audience seeks
and retrieves information. Agenda-setting researchers have consistently
questioned how public agendas are constructed. Traditionally, this
research acknowledges the media power to select and frame content,
but recognizes individuals and organizations that have an agenda to
promote try to influence media content decision making.3 The question
of how public agendas are constructed now must include individuals’
and organizations’ use of social media. These technological communi-
cation options now combine with the distribution of messages through
the traditional mass media and advertising to influence the agenda-­
setting process. In performing an a­genda-setting function, however,
social media postings and advertising by campaigns have the advantage

1. McCombs, Shaw, and Weaver, Communication and Democracy.


2. McCombs, “A Look at Agenda-Setting”; McCombs, Setting the Agenda; McCombs, Shaw,
and Weaver, “New Directions.”
3. Maher; Fortunato; Ragas, Kim, and Kiousis; McCombs, Shaw, and Weaver, “New ­Directions.”

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The Intersection of Agenda-Setting 131

of controlling the message content, potentially making these forms of


­communication uniquely designed to be an effective producer of an
agenda-setting effect.
In a political communication environment there is a need to under-
stand the laws governing the storage, flow, and presentation of informa-
tion. The laws regarding election campaign policy continue to evolve.
One notable area is campaign finance with the legal question of money
equating to free speech continuing to be at the core of the debate. The
2010 Citizens United ruling held that the First Amendment prohibited the
government from restricting spending on political speech. The question of
how public ­agendas are constructed must include this law that in essence
permits money to fund advertising and generate repeated message content
exposure.
The agenda-setting framework that has as its foundation the important
role of the media in the transfer of topic salience process has to recognize
the other key variables that continue to change the political communica-
tion environment, technology, and campaign finance laws. The purpose
of this line of research is to discuss the intersection of agenda-setting,
the media environment, and election campaign laws. This article will
­specifically present the variables that have altered the agenda-setting trans-
fer of salience process in an election campaign context, most notably the
technological communication environment led by social media that allows
individuals and organizations to communicate directly with audiences and
the campaign finance laws that enable money to fund repeated message
exposure through advertising to serve as an agenda-setter. The article con-
cludes with how these changing dynamics provide opportunities for future
research.

Mass Media and Democracy

The means by which information moves around leadership and constit­


uents, from one activist group to another, through enforcement agencies,
and back to the public all are part of the hallmarks of a working democracy.
The mass media performing the duty of informing the citizenry is a core
component of that needed communication. Bogart states, “representative
democracy is inconceivable without forms of mass communication—to
create awareness of public issues that face a society whose members are not
personally in touch with each other, who lack common geographic points,
and whose central institutions are remote from the people they serve or

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132 JOURNAL OF INFORMATION POLICY

exploit.”4 Schudson provides seven goals that a media system within a


democracy can aspire. He claims the media should:
1) Provide citizens fair and full information so that they can make sound
decisions as citizens.
2) Provide coherent frameworks to help citizens comprehend the complex
political universe. They should analyze and interpret politics in ways
that enable citizens to understand and to act.
3) Serve as common carriers of the perspectives of the varied groups in
society.
4) Provide the quantity and quality of news that people want; that is, the
market should be the criterion for the production of news.
5) Represent the public and speak for and to the public interest in order to
hold government accountable.
6) Evoke empathy and provide deep understanding so that citizens at large
can appreciate the situation of other human beings in the world and so
elites can come to know and understand the situation of other human
beings, notably nonelites, and learn compassion for them.
7) Provide a forum for dialogue among citizens that not only informs
democratic decision making but is, as a process, an element in it.5
Even if performing these functions, the effect of these mass media
­messages to influence audience thinking and behavior is a primary topic
of debate for media researchers.6 The core of mass media effect studies
remains the same—evaluating how the independent variable of exposure
to media messages influences the dependent variable of audience behavior.
As ­Shoemaker and Reese parsimoniously state, “media content is the basis
of media impact.”7 Schudson offers a unique perspective on media effects,
stating, “the news gains power not in its direct impact on audiences but in
the belief, justified in viable democracies, that the knowledge of ­citizens
can from time to time be effective. The power of the press grows in a
­political culture characterized by this belief.”8
In an election campaign context, studying the process of how informa-
tion is provided and consumed has heightened importance. Bogart simply

4. Bogart, 4.
5. Schudson.
6. For succinct summaries that address the critical issues of the media effects debate, see, for
example, Lowery and DeFleur; Dennis and Wartella; Perse; O’Neill.
7. Shoemaker and Reese.
8. Schudson, 30.

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The Intersection of Agenda-Setting 133

contends that “all democracies share certain important precepts—open


debate, with sufferance of unpopular opinions, and decisions taken by
­honest voting and thereupon accepted.”9 Dimitrova, Shehata, S­ tromback,
and Nord explain the role of the media to inform the citizenry is “even
more crucial during election campaigns when voters need to know about
the political issues and platforms of the competing parties and candi-
dates.”10
Media effects campaign studies have focused on the media influencing
such characteristics as political knowledge, intention to vote, and political
participation.11 This line of inquiry grew to include the effects of digital
media use. Several researchers have reported a relationship between the
use of digital media to obtain news with political knowledge and partici-
pation during election campaigns.12 The results of digital media use effects
studies are not unanimous. Although finding a positive relationship to
political knowledge, Zhang, Johnson, Seltzer, and Bichard found social
network sites to have no effect on political participation.13 Groshek and
Dimitrova also reported no impact of social media use on voter inten-
tion.14 A meta-analysis by Boulianne did, however, find that the number of
studies producing a positive effect from digital media use did significantly
outnumber the studies that produced no effect.15
Bucy and Gregson explain the primary advantage of digital media use
is “rather than being proscribed a passive role in the political process, the
electorate is symbolically or materially empowered.”16 Dimitrova et al.
contend, “digital media contribute to strengthening democracy through
increasing political participation and diffusion of knowledge in general
or during election campaigns.”17 They highlight the advantages of digital
media as offering multiple and diverse interactive opportunities for politi-
cal engagement through online polls and discussion blogs, that the cost for
participation in time and effort is low, and that there is access to numerous
news sources at any time. Dimitrova et al. even go so far as to claim that

9. Bogart, 4.
10. Dimitrova et al., 98.
11. Chaffee, Zhao, and Leshner; Scheufele; Bimber and Davis; Dimitrova et al.
12. Tolbert and McNeal; Kenski and Stroud; Dalrymple and Scheufele; Mossberger, Tolbert,
and McNeal; Boulianne; Groshek and Dimitrova.
13. Zhang et al.
14. Groshek and Dimitrova.
15. Boulianne.
16. Bucy and Gregson, 368.
17. Dimitrova et al., 95.

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134 JOURNAL OF INFORMATION POLICY

even if digital media use does not produce direct behavior, they are an
important part of the political communication process because they make
a “sometimes exclusionary political system more accessible.”18 They state,
“even if such activity is only perceived and not truly realized, the very per-
ception of opportunities to participate may contribute to higher internal
and external self-efficacy. In this sense, digital media use may be highly
empowering and psychologically rewarding, making the public feel more
engaged in the political process.”19

Agenda-Setting: Selection

The agenda-setting theoretical model is intended to capture the effects of


the media decision-making process. The core concept of agenda-setting
research inspired by McCombs and Shaw is the transfer of topic salience
from the media agenda to the public agenda.20 The original agenda-­setting
study by McCombs and Shaw found that the amount of media expo-
sure given to a topic influences the public salience of that topic.21 It is the
repeated media exposure that causes the public to deem a topic important
and allows it to transfer from the media agenda to the public agenda.
Because of the limits of media time and space, topics compete to be a
part of the media agenda, with the theory implying that the lack of media
exposure given to a topic hinders the opportunity for that topic to become
an item of importance on the public agenda.22 Shaw and Martin explain,
“the press may, unconsciously, provide a limited and rotating set of public
issues, around which the political and social system can engage in dia-
logue.”23 Wanta and Wu add, “if the news media do not devote coverage to
issues, individuals will perceive these issues to be less salient than the issues
that do receive coverage.”24 Transfer of salience based on selection could
include the variable of story placement.25

18. Ibid., 97.


19. Loc. cit.
20. McCombs, “A Look at Agenda-Setting”; McCombs, Setting the Agenda; McCombs,
Shaw, and Weaver, “New Directions.”
21. McCombs and Shaw, “The Agenda-Setting Function.”
22. Shaw and Martin; Wanta and Wu; Lasorsa; McCombs and Reynolds.
23. Shaw and Martin, 903.
24. Wanta and Wu, 849.
25. Carroll and McCombs; Kiousis.

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The Intersection of Agenda-Setting 135

Social media’s expansive palette of topic availability alleviated some of the


concern over lack of coverage for both content providers and ­consumers.
McCombs, Shaw, and Weaver describe a social media issue agenda that is far
greater than the prioritized agenda of issues found in the earlier a­ genda-setting
studies with less commonality as to issue salience. They explain, “the size of
the social media issue agenda is much greater and a high degree of corre-
spondence between two very large sets of issues is very unlikely.”26

Agenda-Setting: Framing

Similar to the selection phase of content decision-making, even once the


topic is chosen for coverage, the media are limited by time and space in
presenting every aspect of a story. Just as some stories will not be covered
at all, the nature of media content production does not permit even the
topics that are covered to be done so with the same standard. Therefore,
the media function not only includes the topics that receive exposure,
but is extended to include the selection of the facts or highlights that will
be presented in that particular story—a process referred to as framing.
Schudson contends that “the journalist has the opportunity, indeed the
professional obligation, to frame the message.”27 Entman explains, “to
frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more
salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular
problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treat-
ment recommendation for the item described.”28 He adds that frames “call
attention to some aspects of reality while obscuring other elements, which
might lead audiences to have different reactions.”29
Extending from the original agenda-setting idea of media exposure
alone influencing the public salience of topics, agenda-setting studies
have focused on the transfer of salience of topic attributes, characteris-
tics, or qualities that can be presented in the media coverage.30 It is the
emphasized attributes in the coverage that can more easily transfer from

26. McCombs, Shaw, and Weaver, “New Directions,” 790.


27. Schudson, 29.
28. Entman, 52.
29. Ibid., 55.
30. McCombs, Shaw, and Weaver, Communication and Democracy; McCombs, “A Look
at ­Agenda-Setting”; McCombs, Setting the Agenda; McCombs, Shaw, and Weaver, “New ­Directions.”

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136 JOURNAL OF INFORMATION POLICY

the media agenda to the public agenda.31 The agenda-setting function is,
thus, ­summarized as a process in which the media can influence the topics
that the public thinks about and the attributes of that topic that they deem
important.32 Similar to providing mere exposure for some issues, social
media provide an opportunity for a more expansive conversation about
topic attributes with more aspects of a topic able to be discussed.
While the framing of an issue is now recognized in agenda-setting
research as a potential influencing factor about how the public thinks
about an issue, Ghanem still emphasizes exposure, contending that “the
frequency with which a topic is mentioned probably has a more powerful
influence than any particular framing mechanism, but framing mecha-
nisms could serve as catalysts for frequency in terms of agenda-setting.”33

Agenda-Setting Contingency Characteristic: Audience

While acknowledging the media function to select and frame, there are
contingency characteristics to any agenda-setting effect.34 The audience
is one notable contingency with the agenda-setting researchers making
it clear that any effect of media messages that results from the selection
and framing process is not unanimous.35 A vital mitigating factor for any
media message effect is the audience’s motivation to obtain and evalu-
ate information. Agenda-setting studies have consistently focused on the
audience need for orientation.36 The need for orientation is based on the
combination of an individual’s relevance and uncertainty toward an issue.
Low levels of relevance correspond directly to a low need for orientation.
A high level of relevance and a low level of uncertainty correspond to a
moderate need for orientation. A high level of relevance and a high level of
uncertainty correspond to a high need for orientation.
The need for orientation could lead to consulting media about that topic.
An initial contingency to agenda-setting could include the mere ability of the

31. Ghanem; McCombs and Shaw, “The Evolution”; McCombs and Reynolds.
32. McCombs, Shaw, and Weaver, Communication and Democracy; McCombs, “A Look at
­Agenda-Setting”; McCombs, Setting the Agenda; McCombs, Shaw, and Weaver, “New ­Directions.”
33. Ghanem.
34. Winter.
35. McCombs and Shaw, “The Agenda-Setting Function”; McCombs, Setting the Agenda.
36. Weaver; Chevrov, Valenzuela, and McCombs; Camaj; McCombs and Stroud.

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The Intersection of Agenda-Setting 137

audience to access certain media.37 Another contingency raises the question


of the type of media the audience seeks. Coleman and McCombs examined
media use and the agenda-setting process in a comparison of three different
age groups. They begin by simply pointing out that there are many more
agendas available through online media popular with younger audiences.38
They found that despite the younger generations engaging in more Inter-
net media use, there was still a high degree of consensus across generations
regarding topic salience. The younger generations did not rank the topics
in the same order as the media or the other generations, but Coleman and
McCombs did conclude that “even the young, with their different interests
based on personal relevance, are still likely to be exposed to the main issues of
mainstream society and media.”39 Agenda-setting researchers have explained
that one reason for this generational topic salience symmetry is that Internet
content is redundant to traditional media content. McCombs points out that
many popular Internet sources are merely additional offerings of traditional
media sources.40 So instead of going to the CNN television channel, some in
the audience are obtaining information from CNN’s website or Twitter feed.
The reputation of the media outlet might also factor into the evaluation
of messages.41 In a competitive environment, media outlets have branded
themselves as a way to establish an expectation with the audience about the
nature of their content.42 The audience contingency factors can be com-
bined with the type of media sought, as some recent studies found that
individuals who were high in relevance and low in uncertainty were more
likely than other groups to participate in partisan news.43

How Agendas Are Constructed

Agenda-setting researchers have questioned how media agendas are


­constructed. Individuals and organizations are constantly trying to receive
exposure and have these stories framed from their perspective. F­ ortunato

37. Carroll.
38. Coleman and McCombs.
39. Ibid., 505.
40. McCombs, Setting the Agenda.
41. Golan; Keen; Ragas, Kim, and Kiousis.
42. Chan-Olmsted, Competitive Strategy; Chan-Olmsted and Cha; Chan-Olmsted, “Media
Branding”; Siegert, Gerth, and Rademacher; Stipp.
43. Camaj; McCombs and Stroud.

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138 JOURNAL OF INFORMATION POLICY

contends that accepting the media as the sole agenda-setting power w


­ ithout
recognizing the important role that individuals and organizations with an
agenda to promote and transfer to the public is to neglect a critical phase
of the creation of media content.44 Researchers, for example, have even
noted that the access provided to the media by political candidates can be
a determinant of the positive coverage they receive.45
The question of how public agendas are constructed used to mean
only individuals and organizations trying to influence media selection
and framing decisions. This question now needs to recognize the tech-
nological communication environment. Social media enables individ-
uals and organizations to go directly to the public and circumvent the
media ­decision-making process. Any communication by the individuals
and organizations posted on social media will be favorable to their cause.
McCombs et al. concede, “agenda setting has expanded to include many
other channels of communication—political advertising, conversations,
and social media—as well as content other than public issues that ranges
from major news events to cultural topics.”46 With the audience receiving
so many messages they refer to this as agenda-melding, “the process by
which we borrow from a variety of agendas to find, or create, the personal
communities in which we choose to live.”47 McCombs et al. also high-
light the role of the audience, adding, “some of the messages that define
the social media issue agenda originate in citizens’ longstanding-and often
passionate-interest in particular issues.”48 Social media are then used by
citizens to obtain more information or provide comment themselves about
these issues.49

How Agendas Are Constructed: Election Campaigns

In an election campaign context agenda-setting has been altered con-


siderably since its early research studies through the technology that
allows individuals and organizations to use social media to communicate
directly to an audience and by the campaign finance structure created by

44. Fortunato.
45. Dunn; Niven and Sandu.
46. McCombs, Shaw, and Weaver, “New Directions,” 788.
47. Ibid., 794.
48. Loc. cit.
49. Vargo et al.

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The Intersection of Agenda-Setting 139

the Citizens United ruling with money that provides for greater message
exposure through advertising serving as an agenda-setter.

Technology

Social media have provided politicians and political organizations


­communication opportunities through their own Internet sites and social
media postings where anyone can directly go and learn about candidate
personal backgrounds and their issue positions. The distinction between
media organization produced content and campaign or political party–
based produced content is important because it raises the question of the
type of knowledge being exposed, with the campaign websites and social
media postings obviously being controlled by the campaign itself. This is a
major advantage as it eliminates concerns about whether content is going
to be selected or how it is going to be framed by the media. By circumvent-
ing the mass media, various types of organizations can provide unfiltered
content directly to their audience. Social media have ramped up the soft-
ware templates to make their sites inviting and easy to use so that handheld
devices and mega screens alike present their sites’ messages.
Foot and Schneider identify four functions of digital media campaigns:
informing voters, involving supporters, connecting online users with polit-
ical actors, and mobilizing citizens.50 Message effects studies have been
conducted regarding whether voters obtained information on the Internet
from media sources or from campaign-sourced information. Some stud-
ies find consultation of information produced by the campaign did lead
to increased political knowledge.51 Dimitrova et al. found that the use of
online news websites produced higher levels of political knowledge, while
party websites and social media did not. Conversely, they found that the
use of political party websites, and especially participation in social media,
had a positive effect on political participation, while the use of online news
sites did not.52
Researchers do caution that political participation and knowledge are
determined by factors other than technology.53 The motivation of voters
precipitates knowledge acquisition.54 This reflects the need for orientation

50. Foot and Schneider.


51. Bimber and Davis; Kenski and Stroud.
52. Dimitrova et al.
53. Bimber; Prior.
54. Prior; Dimitrova et al.

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140 JOURNAL OF INFORMATION POLICY

characteristic highlighted in many agenda-setting studies. Dimitrova et al.


state, “while digital media have increased citizens’ opportunities to learn
and participate in politics, ultimately the degree of learning and partici-
pation depends on whether citizens have the motivation and the abilities
to learn and participate.”55 They claim, “what matters more for political
learning is political interest, prior political knowledge, and attention to
politics in traditional media forms.”56

Political Advertising and Agenda-Setting

The final aspect of the agenda-setting process in the political communica-


tion environment is the laws governing election campaign policy. In the
United States, campaign finance laws are certainly among the most contro-
versial, as one of the fundamental principles, freedom of speech, converges
with the role of money to fund campaigns and the appearance of impro-
priety in influencing eventual governing decisions.57 The core of the cam-
paign finance debate is that the money needed for advertising exacerbates
an inequity as individuals and organizations with the financial resources
can continuously communicate their political position. The media fram-
ing paradigm also asserts that these advertisements are not objective, but
clearly presented in a manner that favors a particular candidate or position.
It is the need for fund-raising and the potential financial impact on
the electoral process where mass media effects and the First Amendment
converge in addressing the issue of campaign finance reform. The money
raised allows for repeated exposure through advertising. Advertising is sim-
ply defined as “a paid, mass-mediated attempt to persuade.”58 Alp defines
political advertising as “communication planned and implemented by
a political party or candidate by purchasing advertising time and space
in communication media and in various forms of media content such as
radio and television to deliver political messages to influence the attitudes,
behaviors and political beliefs of voters.”59 Sweetster, Golan, and Wanta
claim “the very nature of political advertising is based on its attempt to
shape public discourse and opinion.”60

55. Dimitrova et al., 101.


56. Ibid., 110.
57. For a scathing criticism of the role of money in politics, see Nichols and McChesney.
58. O’Guinn, Allen, and Semenik.
59. Alp.
60. Sweetser, Golan, and Wanta.

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The Intersection of Agenda-Setting 141

Theoretically, repeated exposure through advertising can help produce


an agenda-setting transfer of topic salience effect. Agenda-setting research-
ers identify the similarity between advertising, which is designed to focus
consumers’ attention on brands and their attributes, and the agenda-­
setting function in a political context.61 Sutherland and Galloway analyzed
an agenda-setting effect from an advertising exposure perspective, stating,
“products that are advertised heavily have a status conferred upon them—
i.e., they are felt by consumers to be ‘the more popular’ products.”62 Golan,
Kiousis, and McDaniel add, “political ads attempt to identify certain can-
didate issues and attributes as more salient than others.”63 Alp highlights
that indecisive voters in particular may be influenced by agenda-setting
strategic efforts.64
As a theory that focuses not only on repeated exposure to transfer topic
salience, but also has an emphasis on exposure of certain topic attributes
to transfer the salience of those attributes, advertising may be uniquely
designed to be an effective producer of an agenda-setting effect. ­Obviously,
political advertising is just one form of influence, but as a vehicle of the
agenda-setting process advertising is appealing because of two primary
advantages: control over the placement of the message and control over
the content of the message.65 Johnston and Kaid explain, “two of the most
important functions (of advertising) are helping the candidate define or
redefine his or her image and providing a forum where campaign issues
can be explained or developed.”66 In advertising payment is made for a
certain media placement, providing access to the audience that partici-
pates in that mass media organization’s content. Advertisers pay large sums
of money because their investment guarantees them exposure at the time
that provides the best opportunity to reach their desired target audience.
This allows for efficiency in spending in reaching the target audience. For
example, advertising expenditures in a presidential election can be greater
in a swing-state as opposed to a state with a likely election outcome.
The financial investment for commercial time or space gives the adver-
tiser control of the content within that time or space, similar to the content

61. Sutherland and Galloway; Ghorpade; Roberts and McCombs; Golan, Kiousis, and
McDaniel.
62. Sutherland and Galloway, 27.
63. Golan, Kiousis, and McDaniel, 433.
64. Alp.
65. Fortunato.
66. Johnston and Kaid.

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142 JOURNAL OF INFORMATION POLICY

control that campaigns receive through Internet and social media postings.
With this control, the campaign can emphasize any aspects of the candi-
date or an issue that it wants to convey to the audience and ignore aspects
that are not as favorable.
Roberts and McCombs refer to political advertising as “the agenda set
and paid for by the campaigns.”67 They contend that candidates’ political
commercials are “the most visible indicator available of the agenda that the
candidates wish to advance.”68 Through advertising, campaigns have the
opportunity to address a wide range of issues that may not at that time be
a part of the media agenda.69
Several researchers provide evidence that political advertising can influ-
ence public issue and attribute salience.70 Researchers have also found
that political advertising can influence media agendas.71 Influencing the
media agenda is particularly valuable when recognizing the intermedia
­agenda-setting effect, the “instances when the media agenda is shaped by
other media.”72 Several researchers have reported the occurrence of inter-
media agenda-setting.73 Tedesco also found that there could be an inter-
candidate agenda-setting effect, when one candidate is setting the agenda
for his or her opponent.74
Communicating directly through advertising or social media means
candidates’ desired messages can reach voters with fewer mediators than
ever before. Again, the value of these advertising or social media messages
is that they are controlled by the campaign and the candidate. Through
advertising and social media, this favorable message content at the very
least has an opportunity to be a part of the overall dialogue surrounding
the campaign.
Even in an environment that features social media opportunities, it
must be noted that this technology has not supplanted television adver-
tising. Currently, one estimate is that more American adults watch on
average 36 hours of television per week compared to 16 hours spent on

67. Roberts and McCombs, 260.


68. Ibid., 250.
69. Sweetser, Golan, and Wanta.
70. Bowers; McClure and Patterson; Ghorpade; Roberts and McCombs; McCombs et al.;
Ridout et al.; Golan, Kiousis, and McDaniel.
71. Roberts and McCombs; Sweetser, Golan, and Wanta.
72. Sweetser, Golan, and Wanta, 199.
73. Reese and Danielian; Roberts and McCombs; Boyle; Golan; Sweetser, Golan, and Wanta.
74. Tedesco.

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The Intersection of Agenda-Setting 143

digital media sources. Political spending has reflected this behavior. Digital
media spending by candidates and other groups for 2016 is projected to be
$1.1 billion, a 700 percent increase from 2012. This digital spending is still
considerably less than the almost $6 billion estimated for television adver-
tising. Television advertising spending was up approximately 900 percent
in mid-August of 2015 from the same time period in 2011.75 It must be
noted that because of FCC regulations television stations have to charge
candidates the lowest advertising rate for the time period that the commer-
cial airs, continuing to make television advertising a cost-effective promo-
tional communication method.76 The legal environment conditions that
allow for money to be raised and used for mass advertising and achieve the
desired agenda-setting effect thus become an important factor to discuss
and analyze.

Campaign Finance Laws

Two recent Supreme Court decisions, McConnell v. FEC and C ­ itizens


United v. FEC, demonstrate the controversial nature of campaign
77

finance laws. Both cases were decided by a 5 to 4 vote. On March


27, 2002, ­President George W. Bush signed into law The Bipartisan
­Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002, the campaign finance reform
legislation commonly referred to as McCain/Feingold. The BCRA
amended the F ­ ederal Election Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971 by pro-
hibiting candidates and officeholders in connection with federal elec-
tions from soliciting, receiving, directing, transferring, or spending soft
money, unregulated money given to a political party for the purposes of
party building. The BCRA does allow for an increase in the total amount
of hard money, federally regulated money given to all federal candidates,
political parties, and political action committees (PACs). To comply
with the BCRA, corporations and unions could not use their general
treasury funds, but could form PACs to finance election-oriented com-
munication. Hasen explains, “PACs were limited in both the amount
that could be contributed to candidates and who could be solicited to
contribute.”78

75. O’Connor.
76. Federal Communications Commission.
77. For a detailed summary of campaign finance court rulings since the 1976 Buckley v. Valeo
decision, see Hasen.
78. Hasen, 588.

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144 JOURNAL OF INFORMATION POLICY

The BCRA included new provisions regarding when money can be


used for certain broadcast, cable, and satellite election-oriented advertising
communications. The BCRA created a new term called “electioneering
communications.” These electioneering communications refer to a clearly
identified candidate for federal office and are distributed to a relevant
­electorate, defined as communications that reach at least 50,000 voters,
within 60 days prior to a general election and 30 days prior to a primary.
Electioneering communication must be financed with federal or hard
money. PACs could still advertise, but had to do so within the electioneer-
ing communication rules.
The BCRA also prominently focused on disclaimers to identify the
source of the advertisement. All public communications by PACs needed
to have a clear disclaimer indicating who paid for the advertisement and
whether or not it was authorized by a candidate. Under the BCRA, can-
didates and committees are required to “stand by their ads,” as television
and radio communications that are authorized by a candidate must feature
the voice (and image for television) of the candidate identifying himself or
herself and stating that he or she has approved the message.
Fortunato and Martin discuss the issue of media effects and campaign
finance using the arguments of the Supreme Court presented in the rul-
ing in McConnell v. FEC.79 They explain that even if the Supreme Court
believes that advertising can produce a powerful effect, the central ques-
tion for the Court in McConnell “was essentially whether the donation of
money that funds advertisements and gives an appearance of impropri-
ety is enough to subjugate the freedom of speech guaranteed in the First
Amendment. The Court’s ruling would not only validate new election
practices (those established in the BCRA), but also provide an argument
on media effects from the highest perch of the judicial branch.”80
Fortunato and Martin argue that “by placing limitations on advertis-
ing, the Court provided its perspective on media effects.”81 They contend
that any analysis of the Court’s ruling begins with an assumption that
advertisements can potentially influence an election. They argue “an adver-
tised message is produced and designed to promote and persuade with
only the interests and perspectives of that entity being provided. One of
the reasons why politicians and interest groups use advertising strategies

79. Fortunato and Martin.


80. Ibid., 206.
81. Ibid., 213.

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The Intersection of Agenda-Setting 145

is the complete control of the frequency with which the message airs, its
media placement in relation to an important target audience, and the con-
tent of the message. Advertising appears to be an effective tool in cam-
paigns to persuade voters, otherwise more money would be spent on other
election-oriented endeavors, such as get-out-the-vote efforts.”82 Supreme
Court Justice Antonin Scalia even explicitly commented on the value of
advertising in the McConnell ruling, stating, “evidently, however, these ads
do persuade [no emphasis added] voters, or else they would not be so rou-
tinely used by sophisticated politicians of all parties.”83 By upholding the
financial limits of the BCRA, Fortunato and Martin conclude that “the
Supreme Court obviously believes that repeated exposure to framed polit-
ical advertisements can cause a change, a media effect, in how people view
a candidate or issue and can impact the behavior of how they will vote.”84
The laws governing campaign finance and political speech were again
amended in Citizens United v. FEC. In Citizens United, the US Supreme
Court held that the First Amendment prohibited the government from
restricting spending on political speech. The principles articulated by the
Supreme Court in the case were extended to for-profit corporations, labor
unions, and other associations. Because spending money is essential to
disseminating speech, as established in Buckley v. Valeo, the Court ruled
in Citizens United that a restriction on a corporation’s ability to spend
money is unconstitutional because it limits the ability of its members to
associate effectively and to speak on political issues.85 Hasen characterizes
the decision in Citizens United as “the trumpeting of an absolutist vision
of the First Amendment that allows corporations to spend unlimited sums
independently to support or oppose candidates for office.”86
In Citizens United, the Court overruled the “electioneering commu-
nication” provision of the BCRA. This verdict allows corporations and
unions to spend unlimited sums of money independently to directly advo-
cate for the election and defeat of candidates as well as other political issue
advocacy. The Citizens United ruling led to the creation of Super Pacs,
which cannot contribute to candidates or parties, but can accept unlim-
ited money from individuals, unions, and corporations for political expen-
ditures. The Super Pacs are not permitted to coordinate with candidate

82. Loc. cit.


83. McConnell v. FEC, 540U.S. 93, 124 (2003) at 261.
84. Fortunato and Martin, 214.
85. For an analysis of the positive ramifications of the Buckley decision, see Smith.
86. Hasen, 582.

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146 JOURNAL OF INFORMATION POLICY

campaigns. By the end of July 2015, Super Pacs had raised more than
$258 million for presidential candidates in the 2016 race.87 The Court did
uphold by an 8 to 1 vote the need for public disclosure. The Court felt this
identification of who is providing the message to be valuable information
for the voter and is “a less restrictive alternative to more comprehensive
regulations on speech.”88
The ruling in Citizens United also addressed the concern of impropri-
ety due to campaign contributions. On this point, the Court essentially
followed the text in Buckley, which states, “the absence of prearrange-
ment and coordination of an expenditure with the candidate or his
agent not only undermines the value of the expenditure to the candi-
date, but also alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a
quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate.”89 In the
Citizens United ruling, the Court held, “the appearance of influence
or access . . . will not cause the electorate to lose faith in our democ-
racy. By definition, an independent expenditure is political speech pre-
sented to the electorate that is not coordinated with a candidate. The
fact that a corporation, or any other speaker, is willing to spend money
to try to persuade voters presupposes that the people have the ultimate
influence over elected officials. This is inconsistent with any suggestion
that the electorate will refuse to take part in democratic governance
because of  additional political speech made by a corporation or any
other ­speaker.”90
Hasen contends the Court is downplaying the prospect of impropriety
in the Citizens United ruling and that the Court has been inconsistent
in the language it has used on the issue of corruption and influence. He
explains, “in its most important compromise, the Court held that cam-
paign contributions could be limited to prevent corruption or the appear-
ance of corruption, but limits on spending could not be justified by those
same interests due to a lack of evidence that independent spending could
corrupt candidates.”91 Hasen even questioned the inconsistency of the
Court’s language on political corruption in the context of possible for-
eign donations. He wrote, “the Court could state that the threat from
foreign spending influencing U.S. elections is one different in kind than

87. Wall Street Journal.


88. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct., 914.
89. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) at 47.
90. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct., 910.
91. Hasen, 586.

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The Intersection of Agenda-Setting 147

that posed by domestic corporate spending, and that when it comes to


protecting the country from foreign influence, the First Amendment must
give way.”92 Hasen suggests, “the Court could (and should) apply a single
definition of corruption and impose on the state a single evidentiary bur-
den for proving the existence or appearance of corruption, and then judge
the constitutionality of contributions and expenditures under that single
standard.”93

Discussion

The agenda-setting theoretical model is interested in how public agendas


are formulated, with a focus on the role of the media in that process. The
transfer of topic salience process has drastically changed since the orig-
inal agenda-setting study. This is not to say that the core proposition of
agenda-setting is not valid (transfer of salience due to media selection
and framing). One prominent agenda-setting option that will remain is
selected and framed content by branded media that have largely defined
themselves by catering to a certain audience’s political perspective. It is
necessary to recognize that transfer of topic salience is achieved through
multiple sources. McCombs et al. state, as “emerging agendas are defined
by wider ranges of content and communication channels, agenda setting
as we have known it—the flow of salience of the top issues of the moment
from the news media to the public agenda—will be only one of numerous
agenda setting processes.”94
In this light, the question of how public agendas are constructed
becomes more relevant, especially in an election campaign context. How
agendas are constructed used to mean only individuals and organizations
trying to influence media selection and framing decisions. Now, it must
include understanding a dynamic, digital communication environment
with new methods of retrieval and dissemination of messages as well as
understanding the campaign finance laws.
A core tenet of agenda-setting is repeated exposure of a message to
increase public salience. Social media provide the opportunity for mes-
sages to widely circulate from the campaigns themselves without any

92. Ibid., 610.


93. Ibid., 584.
94. McCombs, Shaw, and Weaver, “New Directions,” 788.

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148 JOURNAL OF INFORMATION POLICY

i­nterference from the media. Also, the money that is needed to fund
the advertising  that provides that repeated message exposure is enabled
by the Citizens United ruling. The Buckley v. Valeo ruling paved the way
for this essential money to distribute political speech and this position
was ­reaffirmed by the Court in its Citizens United ruling. Although the
­controversial nature of the Citizens United ruling must be noted with its
5  to 4 Supreme Court decision, it appears that individuals and organi-
zations that are well-funded have an advantaged position for their per-
spective and can use money to facilitate any agenda-setting effect. Again,
similar to social media postings, through advertising the campaigns have
the advantage of controlling the message content, potentially making these
forms of communication uniquely designed to be an effective producer of
an agenda-setting effect.
The emergent issue, then, becomes how an understanding of
agenda-setting theory and its application, specifically in a political
­
­communication context, can be a core mechanism for policy direction.
Information policy and legal adjudications have attempted to provide an
answer to the critical question of whether a balance can be reached on
this dilemma between spending and First Amendment principles. The
opinions on this question may be separated into three types. Those (1) so
bothered by the influence of money that this type of political speech needs
to be regulated even if subverting the First Amendment. Another group
(2) is bothered by the influence of money on political speech, but it is not
enough to overcome the fundamental principle of the First Amendment.
The final group (3) can be thought of as First Amendment absolutists with
there being no legal restrictions on speech and the amount given to candi-
dates, political parties, and PACs. From this perspective, the First Amend-
ment is such a defining principle of the country, it must be said, that any
repercussions from a system of unfettered spending on political speech are
meaningless.
All involved in the political communication process need to understand
the convergence of (1) media organizations content selection and framing
decisions, (2) individuals and organizations with agendas to promote, (3)
technological capabilities of communication platforms to distribute and
retrieve messages, (4) audiences motivated to seek information, and (5)
laws governing election campaign policy. With this article capturing the
changing complexity of the agenda-setting process in an election campaign
context, several opportunities for research emerge.

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The Intersection of Agenda-Setting 149

The most notable research question surrounds how these ­communication


technology and campaign finance law changes will influence voters’
knowledge and behavior. To ascertain any insight into that f­undamental
question, researchers must first continue to monitor audience usage of
traditional media, social media, and advertising exposure in an election
context. It is the total communication environment that produces polit-
ical knowledge—neither traditional media, nor digital media, nor adver-
tising operates in a vacuum. This collective exposure to political messages
needs to be studied to capture which forms of communication people
are using to obtain political information. The forms of media usage will
continue to evolve as future generations have more comfort obtaining
­information through digital media. Research studies can examine which
types of ­message formats (social media, traditional media, and advertising)
influence the audience’s topic salience—which forms of media are indeed
serving as the most effective agenda-setter?
Beyond mere exposure, studies can examine issues related to message
content. Does the content differ based on the media format? Are voters
specifically attending to a certain media format because of the type of
content they will obtain? Similarly, in regard to message content, studies
need to continue to examine the message source being sought. Do ­voters
prefer messages from the campaign itself, and thus prefer social media
and advertising, or from a branded media organization? Also, from an
audience perspective, digital media messages are easily transportable. Do
people find messages that are passed along from a person they know to be
more ­credible?
From a campaign planning perspective with the law allowing for greater
fund-raising capabilities, how is this money being used? Are campaigns
and PACs using money for more advertising, more effective social media
messaging, or perhaps get-out-the-vote efforts? How are campaigns coordi-
nating their total content output between social media, traditional media,
and advertising? Are campaigns using different types of content messaging
for different forms of media?
Finally, these campaign questions are tempered by the candidates them-
selves and the specific election environment. Each campaign has some
unique characteristics beyond media capabilities and fund-raising laws,
ranging from candidate personalities to the emergent issues defining the
campaign. The multitude of variables and the importance of the election
campaign process necessitates continuous study into these questions.

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150 JOURNAL OF INFORMATION POLICY

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