Professional Documents
Culture Documents
199
BARRERA, J.:
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201
"* * * What the Court has found very difficult to resolve is the
debate on the termination pay. All the contracts were executed
prior to June 12, 1954, when Republic Act 1052 was approved;
and by decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Lara vs. Del
Rosario, 94 Phil., 778; 50 Off. Gaz., 1975, which was promulgated
less than two months before the approval of that law, it was held
that the right of employees to the Mesáda provided by Article 302
of the Code of Commerce had been repealed by the New Civil
Code; and as the New Civil Code became effective on August 30,
1950, technically from August 30, 1950, up to June 12, 1954, there
was no law on mesada existing in the Philippines; * * *. It is
contended for the defendants that since all the contracts entered
into with plaintiffs were executed before June 12, 1954, when
Republic Act 1052 became effective, said Act cannot be given such
effect as to make it applicable even to contracts already existing
upon its approval as were the contracts here for if that were the
case, the law would become unconstitutional under the rule
prohibiting impairment of contracts. The trouble, however, is that
the law, Republic Act 1052, makes it clearly effective beginning
June 12, 1954; that was an indication of the Legislative will that
it was to be made effective even as to contracts executed before
but not yet terminated at the time of its approval; and the
presumption is always in favor of constitutionality."
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2 With the exception of the employees, numbering 20, who, the Court
found, have already been given their corresponding 1-month separation
pay.
202
"As to the month's pay (mesada) under Article 302 of the Code of
Commerce, Article 2270 of the new Civil Code (Republic Act 386)
appears to have repealed said Code of Commerce governing
Agency. This repeal took place on August 30, 1950, when the new
Civil Code went into effect, that is, one year after its publication
in the Official Gazette."
4
As a consequence thereof, the legislature enacted Republic
Act 1052 which, in full, reads:
"AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR THE MANNER OF
TERMINATING EMPLOYMENT WITHOUT A
DEFINITE PERIOD IN A COMMERCIAL,
INDUSTRIAL, OR AGRICULTURAL
ESTABLISHMENT OR ENTERPRISE.
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203
VOL. 110, NOVEMBER 29, 1960 203
Abe vs. Foster Wheeler Corporation
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5 " "Art. 1700. The relations between capital and labor are not merely
contractual. They are so impressed with public interest that labor
contracts must yield to the common good. * * *." (New Civil Code)
6 St. etc. R. Co. vs. Paul, 173 US 404, 43 L ed 746; 19 Sup Ct Rep 419,
and others, cited in II Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, p. 1236.
204
206
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207
that his motion for extension of the period to file the record
on appeal and pay the appeal bond would be granted, but
should have taken upon himself the duty to inquire, before
the original period has lapsed, what action the court took
on his said motion. In this case, the order partly denying
the requested extension was issued on October 25, or the
day after the motion was filed. Counsel could have easily
informed himself of such fact, had he only tried to do so,
considering that his office (in the Doña Mercedes building,
Plaza Miranda, Quiapo, Manila) is practically only a few
blocks away from where the court is housed. This he could
have done before the deadline, October 27. Instead, he
waited for the delivery of the notice to him on October 31,
which is too late. Even then, it took him another seven (7)
days before he filed his appeal bond on November 7.
There is, similarly, no basis for the granting of the relief
prayed for by the plaintiffs-appellants. The motion for relief
was based on the alleged excusable negligence of counsel,
consisting of the latter's failure to know of the existence of
the Opinion of the Secretary of Justice, dated July 28, 1958
(Op. No. 149, series of 1958), interpreting the 1-month
salary provided under Republic Act 1052 to mean 30
working days. The finding of the aforecited Opinion by
chance, to our mind, does not partake of the nature of
"discovery" of evidence as contemplated under Rule 38 of
the Rules of Court. It must be remembered that aside from
the acknowledged doctrine that the Opinion of the
Secretary of Justice is not binding upon the courts, the
matters expressed therein are not evidentiary facts, but
dissertations or discussion of the nature, extent and effect
of a given legal issue.
Wherefore, the main decision, insofar as it relates to
those of the plaintiffs-employees who were dismissed after
June 12, 1954, is hereby affirmed, as well as the orders of
November 12, and 27, 1958, appealed from. Costs are taxed
in G.R. No. L-14785 against appellants Foster
209
Judgment affirmed.
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RESOLUTION
BARRERA, J.:
Motions denied.
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