Cases for PALE

After respondent filed his Comment, the Court, in its Resolution of October 24, 2001, referred
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
Manila
recommendation.[2]
EN BANC

CLARITA J. SAMALA, ADM. CASE NO. 5439 The investigation was conducted by Commissioner Demaree Jesus B. Raval. After a series of
Complainant,
Present:
hearings, the parties filed their respective memoranda[3] and the case was deemed submitted for
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING, resolution.
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes prepared the Report and
- versus - CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES, Recommendation[4] dated January 12, 2006. He found respondent guilty of violating Canons 15
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA, and 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended the penalty of suspension
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA, and for six months.
VELASCO, JR., JJ.

In a minute Resolution[5] passed on May 26, 2006, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
ATTY. LUCIANO D. VALENCIA, Promulgated:
Respondent. _______________________ approved the report and recommendation of Commissioner Reyes but increased the penalty of
x-----------------------------------------------------------x
suspension from six months to one year.
RESOLUTION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
We adopt the report of the IBP Board of Governors except as to the issue on immorality and as

to the recommended penalty.

Before us is a complaint[1] dated May 2, 2001 filed by Clarita J. Samala (complainant) against

Atty. Luciano D. Valencia (respondent) for Disbarment on the following grounds: (a) serving on

two separate occasions as counsel for contending parties; (b) knowingly misleading the court by

submitting false documentary evidence; (c) initiating numerous cases in exchange for
On serving as counsel for contending parties.
nonpayment of rental fees; and (d) having a reputation of being immoral by siring illegitimate

children.
Records show that in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch

272, Marikina City, entitled Leonora M. Aville v. Editha Valdez for nonpayment of rentals, herein
respondent, while being the counsel for defendant Valdez, also acted as counsel for the that respondent did not represent Alba, respondent, however, avers that he already severed his

tenants Lagmay, Valencia, Bustamante and Bayuga[6] by filing an Explanation and Compliance representation for Alba when the latter charged respondent with estafa.[14]Thus, the filing of Civil

before the RTC.[7] Case No. 2000-657-MK against Alba.

In Civil Case No. 98-6804 filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 75, Marikina City, Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not

entitled Editha S. Valdez and Joseph J. Alba, Jr. v. Salve Bustamante and her husband represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full

for ejectment, respondent represented Valdez against Bustamante one of the tenants in the disclosure of the facts.

property subject of the controversy. Defendants appealed to the RTC, Branch

272, Marikina City docketed as SCA Case No. 99-341-MK. In his decision dated May 2, A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person

2000,[8] Presiding Judge Reuben P. dela Cruz[9] warned respondent to refrain from repeating the whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client. [15] He may not also undertake to

act of being counsel of record of both parties in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK. discharge conflicting duties any more than he may represent antagonistic interests. This stern

rule is founded on the principles of public policy and good taste.[16] It springs from the relation of

But in Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK, filed in the RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, attorney and client which is one of trust and confidence. Lawyers are expected not only to keep

entitled Editha S. Valdez v. Joseph J. Alba, Jr. and Register of Deeds inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-

of Marikina City, respondent, as counsel for Valdez, filed a Complaint for Rescission of Contract dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which

with Damages and Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 275500 against Alba, is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.[17]

respondent's former client in Civil Case No. 98-6804 and SCA Case No. 99-341-MK. One of the tests of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would

prevent the full discharge of the lawyers duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or

Records further reveal that at the hearing of November 14, 2003, respondent admitted that in invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty.[18]

Civil Case No. 95-105-MK, he was the lawyer for Lagmay (one of the tenants) but not

for Bustamante and Bayuga[10] albeit he filed the Explanation and Compliance for and in behalf The stern rule against representation of conflicting interests is founded on principles of public

of the tenants.[11] Respondent also admitted that he represented Valdez in Civil Case No. 98- policy and good taste. It springs from the attorneys duty to represent his client with undivided

6804 and SCA Case No. 99-341-MK against Bustamante and her husband but denied being the fidelity and to maintain inviolate the clients confidence as well as from the injunction forbidding

counsel for Alba although the case is entitled Valdez and Alba v. Bustamante and her the examination of an attorney as to any of the privileged communications of his client. [19]

husband, because Valdez told him to include Alba as the two were the owners of the

property[12] and it was only Valdez who signed the complaint for ejectment.[13] But, while claiming
An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has represented him but In Gonzales v. Cabucana, Jr.,[27] citing the case of Quiambao v. Bamba,[28] we held that:

also after the relation of attorney and client has terminated.[20] The bare attorney-client
relationship with a client precludes an attorney from accepting professional employment from the
clients adversary either in the same case[21] or in a different but related action.[22] A lawyer is
forbidden from representing a subsequent client against a former client when the subject matter
of the present controversy is related, directly or indirectly, to the subject matter of the previous
The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a
situation where the opposing parties are present clients in the same action
or in an unrelated action. It is of no moment that the lawyer would not be
called upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for
the other client, or that there would be no occasion to use the confidential
information acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other as the two
actions are wholly unrelated. It is enough that the opposing parties in one
case, one of whom would lose the suit, are present clients and the nature or
conditions of the lawyers respective retainers with each of them would affect
the performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients. [29]

litigation in which he appeared for the former client.[23]

Respondent is bound to comply with Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
We held in Nombrado v. Hernandez[24] that the termination of the relation of attorney and client
states that a lawyer shall preserve the confidences and secrets of his client even after the
provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of
attorney-client relation is terminated.
the former client. The reason for the rule is that the clients confidence once reposed cannot be

divested by the expiration of the professional employment.[25] Consequently, a lawyer should not,
The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client, which is one of trust
even after the severance of the relation with his client, do anything which will injuriously affect
and confidence of the highest degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts connected
his former client in any matter in which he previously represented him nor should he disclose or
with his clients case. He learns from his client the weak points of the action as well as the strong
use any of the clients confidences acquired in the previous relation.[26]
ones. Such knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with care.[30]

In this case, respondents averment that his relationship with Alba has long been severed by the
From the foregoing, it is evident that respondents representation of Valdez and Alba
act of the latter of not turning over the proceeds collected in Civil Case No. 98-6804, in
against Bustamante and her husband, in one case, and Valdez against Alba, in another case, is
connivance with the complainant, is unavailing. Termination of the attorney-client relationship
a clear case of conflict of interests which merits a corresponding sanction from this
precludes an attorney from representing a new client whose interest is adverse to his former
Court. Respondent may have withdrawn his representation in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK upon
client. Alba may not be his original client but the fact that he filed a case entitled Valdez and
being warned by the court,[31] but the same will not exculpate him from the charge of
Alba v. Bustamante and her husband, is a clear indication that respondent is protecting the
representing conflicting interests in his representation in Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK.
interests of both Valdez and Alba in the said case. Respondent cannot just claim that the lawyer-

client relationship between him and Alba has long been severed without observing Section 26,
Respondent is reminded to be more cautious in accepting professional employments, to refrain
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court wherein the written consent of his client is required.
from all appearances and acts of impropriety including circumstances indicating conflict of
interests, and to behave at all times with circumspection and dedication befitting a member of

the Bar, especially observing candor, fairness and loyalty in all transactions with his clients. [32] Hence, respondent cannot feign ignorance of the fact that the title he submitted was already

cancelled in lieu of a new title issued in the name of Alba in 1995 yet, as proof of the latter's

ownership.

Respondent failed to comply with Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which

On knowingly misleading the court by submitting false documentary evidence. provides that a lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor

shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be mislead by any artifice. It matters not that the trial court

Complainant alleges that in Civil Case No. 00-7137 filed before MTC, Branch 75 for ejectment, was not misled by respondent's submission of TCT No. 273020 in the name of Valdez, as shown

respondent submitted TCT No. 273020 as evidence of Valdez's ownership despite the fact that a by its decision dated January 8, 2002[36] dismissing the complaint for ejectment. What is decisive

new TCT No. 275500 was already issued in the name of Alba on February 2, 1995. in this case is respondent's intent in trying to mislead the court by presenting TCT No. 273020

despite the fact that said title was already cancelled and a new one, TCT No. 275500, was

Records reveal that respondent filed Civil Case No. 00-7137 on November 27, 2000 and already issued in the name of Alba.

presented TCT No. 273020 as evidence of Valdez's ownership of the subject property.[33] During

the hearing before Commissioner Raval, respondent avers that when the Answer was filed in the In Young v. Batuegas,[37] we held that a lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He swore upon his

said case, that was the time that he came to know that the title was already in the name of Alba; admission to the Bar that he will do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court and he

so that when the court dismissed the complaint, he did not do anything anymore. [34] Respondent shall conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all

further avers that Valdez did not tell him the truth and things were revealed to him only when the good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients.[38] He should bear in mind that as an officer of

case for rescission was filed in 2002. the court his high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case

and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusion.[39] The courts, on the other hand,

Upon examination of the record, it was noted that Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK for rescission of are entitled to expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading before them.

contract and cancellation of TCT No. 275500 was also filed on November 27, 2000,[35] before While a lawyer has the solemn duty to defend his clients rights and is expected to display the

RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, thus belying the averment of respondent that he came to know utmost zeal in defense of his clients cause, his conduct must never be at the expense of truth.

of Alba's title only in 2002 when the case for rescission was filed. It was revealed during the

hearing before Commissioner Raval that Civil Case Nos. 00-7137 and 2000-657-MK were filed

on the same date, although in different courts and at different times.

A lawyer is the servant of the law and belongs to a profession to which society has entrusted the We find the charge to be without sufficient basis. The act of respondent of filing

administration of law and the dispensation of justice.[40] As such, he should make himself more the aforecited cases to protect the interest of his client, on one hand, and his own interest, on

an exemplar for others to emulate.[41] the other, cannot be made the basis of an administrative charge unless it can be clearly shown

that the same was being done to abuse judicial processes to commit injustice.

On initiating numerous cases in exchange for nonpayment of rental fees.

The filing of an administrative case against respondent for protecting the interest of his client and

Complainant alleges that respondent filed the following cases: (a) Civil Case No. 2000-657- his own right would be putting a burden on a practicing lawyer who is obligated to defend and

MK at the RTC, Branch 272; (b) Civil Case No. 00-7137 at the MTC, Branch 75; and (c) I.S. Nos. prosecute the right of his client.

00-4439 and 01-036162 both entitled Valencia v. Samala for estafa and grave coercion,

respectively, before the Marikina City Prosecutor. Complainant claims that the two criminal On having a reputation for being immoral by siring illegitimate children.

cases were filed in retaliation for the cases she filed against Lagmay docketed as I.S. No. 00-

4306 for estafa and I.S. No. 00-4318 against Alvin Valencia (son of respondent) for trespass to We find respondent liable for being immoral by siring illegitimate children.

dwelling.

During the hearing, respondent admitted that he sired three children by Teresita Lagmay who

As culled from the records, Valdez entered into a retainer agreement with respondent. As are all over 20 years of age,[48] while his first wife was still alive. He also admitted that he has

payment for his services, he was allowed to occupy the property for free and utilize the same as eight children by his first wife, the youngest of whom is over 20 years of age, and after his wife

his office pursuant to their retainer agreement.[42] died in 1997, he married Lagmay in 1998.[49] Respondent further admitted that Lagmay was

staying in one of the apartments being claimed by complainant. However, he does not consider

Respondent filed I.S. Nos. 00-4439[43] and 01-036162[44] both his affair with Lagmay as a relationship[50] and does not consider the latter as his second

entitled Valencia v. Samala for estafa and grave coercion, respectively, to protect his client's family.[51] He reasoned that he was not staying with Lagmay because he has two houses, one

rights against complainant who filed I.S. No. 00-4306[45] for estafa against Lagmay, and I.S. No. in Muntinlupa and another in Marikina.[52]

00-4318[46] against Alvin Valencia[47] for trespass to dwelling.

In this case, the admissions made by respondent are more than enough to hold him liable on the

charge of immorality. During the hearing, respondent did not show any remorse. He even

justified his transgression by saying that he does not have any relationship with Lagmay and
 EN BANC
despite the fact that he sired three children by the latter, he does not consider them as his
JOSELANO GUEVARRA, A.C. No. 7136
second family. It is noted that during the hearing, respondent boasts in telling the commissioner Complainant,
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
that he has two houses - in Muntinlupa, where his first wife lived, and in Marikina,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
where Lagmay lives.[53] It is of no moment that respondent eventually married Lagmay after the CARPIO,
versus AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
death of his first wife. The fact still remains that respondent did not live up to the exacting CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
standard of morality and decorum required of the legal profession. AZCUNA,
TINGA,
Under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not engage CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA,
ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL VELASCO, JR., and
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. It may be difficult to specify the degree of
EALA, NACHURA, JJ.
Respondent. Promulgated:
moral delinquency that may qualify an act as immoral, yet, for purposes of disciplining a lawyer, August 1, 2007

immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the DECISION

community.[54] Thus, in several cases, the Court did not hesitate to discipline a lawyer for
PER CURIAM:
keeping a mistress in defiance of the mores and sense of morality of the community. [55] That
Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4, 2002 a Complaint for
respondent subsequently married Lagmay in 1998 after the death of his wife and that this is his
Disbarment[1] before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline
first infraction as regards immorality serve to mitigate his liability.
(CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala (respondent) for grossly immoral

conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyers oath.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds respondent Atty. Luciano D. Valencia GUILTY of misconduct

and violation of Canons 21, 10 and 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following account:
He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years, effective immediately upon
He first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainants) then-fiancee Irene
receipt of herein Resolution.
Moje (Irene) introduced respondent to him as her friend who was married to Marianne

(sometimes spelled Mary Ann) Tantoco with whom he had three children.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant for their information and guidance, and let it
After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant noticed that from January
be entered in respondents personal records.
to March 2001, Irene had been receiving from respondent cellphone calls, as well as messages

some of which read I love you, I miss you, or Meet you at Megamall.
SO ORDERED.

Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early in
the morning of the following day, and sometimes did not go home from work. When he asked
about her whereabouts, she replied that she slept at her parents house in Binangonan, Rizal or
she was busy with her work.
In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and respondent together on two
occasions. On the second occasion, he confronted them following which Irene abandoned the
conjugal house.
On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irenes birthday celebration at which
he saw her and respondent celebrating with her family and friends. Out of embarrassment,
anger and humiliation, he left the venue immediately. Following that incident, Irene went to the
conjugal house and hauled off all her personal belongings, pieces of furniture, and her share of
the household appliances.
Complainant later found, in the masters bedroom, a folded social card bearing the
words I Love You on its face, which card when unfolded contained a handwritten letter
dated October 7, 2000, the day of his wedding to Irene, reading:
My everdearest Irene,
By the time you open this, youll be moments away from walking down the aisle. I will
say a prayer for you that you may find meaning in what youre about to do.
Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for me to find fleeting happiness but
experience eternal pain? Is it only for us to find a true love but then lose it
again? Or is it because theres a bigger plan for the two of us?
I hope that you have experienced true happiness with me. I have done everything
humanly possible to love you. And today, as you make your vows . . . I
make my own vow to YOU!
I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you from the first time I laid eyes on you, to
the time we spent together, up to the final moments of your single life. But
more importantly, I will love you until the life in me is gone and until we are
together again.
Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I have enough memories of us to last
me a lifetime. Always remember though that in my heart, in my mind and in
my soul, YOU WILL ALWAYS
. . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO!
BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL ALWAYS BE YOURS AND
YOURS ALONE!
I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG AS IM
LIVING MY TWEETIE YOULL BE![2]
Eternally yours,
NOLI
Complainant soon saw respondents car and that of Irene constantly parked at No. 71-
B 11th Street, New Manila where, as he was to later learn sometime in April 2001, Irene was
already residing. He also learned still later that when his friends saw Irene on or about January
18, 2002 together with respondent during a concert, she was pregnant.
In his ANSWER,[3] respondent admitted having sent the I LOVE YOU card on which
the above-quoted letter was handwritten.
On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading:
14. Respondent and Irene were even FLAUNTING THEIR ADULTEROUS
RELATIONSHIP as they attended social functions together.For instance, in
or about the third week of September 2001, the couple attended the launch
of the Wine All You Can promotion of French wines, held at the Mega Strip
of SM Megamall B at Mandaluyong City. Their attendance was reported in
Section B of the Manila Standardissue of 24 September 2001, on page
21. Respondent and Irene were photographed together; their picture was
captioned: Irene with Sportscaster Noli Eala. A photocopy of the report is
attached as Annex C.[4] (Italics and emphasis in the original;
CAPITALIZATION of the phrase flaunting their adulterous relationship
supplied),
respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:
4. Respondent specifically denies having ever
flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph
 14 of the Complaint, the truth of the matter being that their relationship inviolable social institution and is the foundation of the family (Article XV,
was low profile and known only to the immediate members of their Sec. 2).[9]
respective families, and that Respondent, as far as the general public
was concerned, was still known to be legally married to Mary
Anne Tantoco.[5] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

And on paragraph 19 of the COMPLAINT reading:

On paragraph 15 of the COMPLAINT reading:

19. Respondents grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the Constitution and the
laws he, as a lawyer, has been sworn to uphold. In pursuing obsessively
15. Respondents adulterous conduct with the complainants wife and his his illicit love for the complainants wife, he mocked the institution of
apparent abandoning or neglecting of his own family, demonstrate his gross marriage, betrayed his own family, broke up the complainants marriage,
moral depravity, making him morally unfit to keep his membership in the commits adultery with his wife, and degrades the legal
bar. He flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage, calling it a piece profession.[10] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),
of paper. Morally reprehensible was his writing the love letter to
complainants bride on the very day of her wedding, vowing to continue his
love for her until we are together again, as now they are. [6] (Underscoring
supplied),
respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:

7. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in

respondent stated in his ANSWER as follows:
5. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 15
of the Complaint regarding his adulterous relationship and that his acts
demonstrate gross moral depravity thereby making him unfit to keep his
membership in the bar, the reason being that Respondents relationship with
Irene was not under scandalous circumstances and that as far as his
relationship with his own family:
paragraph 19 of the Complaint, the reason being that under the
circumstances the acts of Respondent with respect to his purely
personal and low profile special relationship with Irene is neither
under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly
immoral conduct as would be a ground for disbarment pursuant to
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.[11] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

5.1 Respondent has maintained a civil, cordial and peaceful

relationship with [his wife] Mary Anne as in fact they still occasionally
To respondents ANSWER, complainant filed a REPLY, [12] alleging that Irene gave
meet in public, even if Mary Anne is aware of Respondents special
friendship with Irene.
birth to a girl and Irene named respondent in the Certificate of Live Birth as the girls
xxxx
father. Complainant attached to the REPLY, as Annex A, a copy of a Certificate of Live
5.5 Respondent also denies that he has flaunted his
aversion to the institution of marriage by calling the institution of Birth[13] bearing Irenes signature and naming respondent as the father of her daughter Samantha
marriage a mere piece of paper because his reference [in his above-
quoted handwritten letter to Irene] to the marriage between Irene Louise Moje who was born on February 14, 2002 at St. Lukes Hospital.
Complainant and Irene as a piece of paper was merely with respect to
the formality of the marriage contract.[7] (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Complainants REPLY merited a REJOINDER WITH MOTION TO

DISMISS[14] dated January 10, 2003 from respondent in which he denied having personal
Respondent admitted[8] paragraph 18 of the COMPLAINT reading:
knowledge of the Certificate of Live Birth attached to the complainants Reply. [15] Respondent

18. The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support the moved to dismiss the complaint due to the pendency of a civil case filed by complainant for the
Constitution and obey the laws. The Constitution regards marriage as an

annulment of his marriage to Irene, and a criminal complaint for adultery against respondent and
Irene which was pending before the Quezon City Prosecutors Office.
a.k.a. Noli Eala
RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDE, as it is hereby ANNULLED AND
SET ASIDE, the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and
to APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of
merit.[20] (Italics and emphasis in the original)

During the investigation before the IBP-CBD, complainants Complaint-Affidavit

and REPLY to ANSWER were adopted as his testimony on direct examination.[16] Respondents
Hence, the present petition[21] of complainant before this Court, filed pursuant to
counsel did not cross-examine complainant.[17]
Section 12 (c), Rule 139[22] of the Rules of Court.

The petition is impressed with merit.

After investigation, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, in a

12-page REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION[18] dated October 26, 2004, found the charge
Oddly enough, the IBP Board of Governors, in setting aside the Recommendation of
against respondent sufficiently proven.
the Investigating Commissioner and dismissing the case for lack of merit, gave no
The Commissioner thus recommended[19] that respondent be disbarred for
reason therefor as its above-quoted 33-word Resolution shows.
violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility reading:

Respondent contends, in his Comment[23] on the present petition of complainant, that

Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Underscoring supplied),
there is no evidence against him.[24]The contention fails. As the IBP-CBD Investigating

Commissioner observed:

and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code reading:

While it may be true that the love letter dated October 7,
2000 (Exh. C) and the news item published in the Manila Standard(Exh.
D), even taken together do not sufficiently prove that respondent is
Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage
carrying on an adulterous relationship with complainants wife,there are
in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
other pieces of evidence on record which support the accusation of
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
complainant against respondent.
discredit of the legal profession. (Underscoring supplied)
It should be noted that in his Answer dated 17 October
2002, respondent through counsel made the following statements
to wit: Respondent specifically denies having [ever] flaunted an
adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph [14] of the
The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled and set aside the Recommendation Complaint, the truth of the matter being [that] their relationship was low
profile and known only to immediate members of their respective
of the Investigating Commissioner and accordingly dismissed the case for lack of merit, by families . . . , and Respondent specifically denies the allegations in
paragraph 19 of the complaint, the reason being that under the
Resolution dated January 28, 2006 briefly reading: circumstances the acts of the respondents with respect to his purely
personal and low profile relationship with Irene is neither under
scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral conduct .
..
RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-06
CBD Case No. 02-936
These statements of respondent in his Answer are an
Joselano C. Guevarra vs.
admission that there is indeed a special relationship between him
Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala
and complainants wife, Irene, [which] taken together with the
 Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha Louise Irene Moje (Annex H-1)
sufficiently prove that there was indeed an illicit
relationship between respondent and Irene which resulted in the birth
of the child Samantha. In the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha it
should be noted that complainants wife Irene supplied the
information that respondent was the father of the child. Given the
fact that the respondent admitted his special relationship with
Irene there is no reason to believe that Irene would lie or make any
misrepresentation regarding the paternity of the child. It should be
underscored that respondent has not categorically denied that he is
the father of Samantha Louise Irene Moje.[25](Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Indeed, from respondents ANSWER, he does not deny carrying on an adulterous
relationship with Irene, adultery being defined under Art. 333 of the Revised Penal Code as that
committed by any married woman who shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her
husband and by the man who has carnal knowledge of her, knowing her to be married, even if
the marriage be subsequently declared void.[26] (Italics supplied) What respondent denies
is having flaunted such relationship, he maintaining that it was low profile and known only to the
immediate members of their respective families.
In other words, respondents denial is a negative pregnant,
a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading
responded to which are not squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of
the averments it was directed at. Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a
form of negative expression which carries with it in affirmation or at least an
implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial
pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the
pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and
the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, it
has been held that the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while
the fact itself is admitted.[27] (Citations omitted; emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
A negative pregnant too is respondents denial of having personal knowledge of Irenes
daughter Samantha Louise Irene MojesCertificate of Live Birth. In said certificate, Irene named
respondent a lawyer, 38 years old as the childs father. And the phrase NOT MARRIED is
entered on the desired information on DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE. A comparison of the
signature attributed to Irene in the certificate[28] with her signature on the Marriage
Certificate[29] shows that they were affixed by one and the same person. Notatu dignum is that,
as the Investigating Commissioner noted, respondent never denied being the father of the child.
Franklin A. Ricafort, the records custodian of St. Lukes Medical Center, in his January
29, 2003 Affidavit[30] which he identified at the witness stand, declared that Irene gave the
information in the Certificate of Live Birth that the childs father is Jose
Emmanuel Masacaet Eala, who was 38 years old and a lawyer.[31]
Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between respondent and Irene has been
sufficiently proven by more than clearly preponderant evidence that evidence adduced by one
party which is more conclusive and credible than that of the other party and, therefore, has
greater weight than the other[32] which is the quantum of evidence needed in an administrative
case against a lawyer.
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their
own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil and
criminal cases.
. . . of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case,
proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary; in an administrative case for
disbarment or suspension, clearly preponderant evidence is all that is
required.[33] (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent insists, however, that disbarment does not lie because his relationship
with Irene was not, under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, reading:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court,
grounds therefor. ─ A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice,
or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to
practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to
a case without authority so to do.The practice of soliciting cases at law for
 the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a
competent court or other disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where
he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or
suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove
enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency
shall be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied),
[34]
under scandalous circumstances.
The immediately-quoted Rule which provides the grounds for disbarment or
suspension uses the phrase grossly immoral conduct, not under scandalous
circumstances. Sexual intercourse under scandalous circumstances is, following Article 334 of
the Revised Penal Code reading:
ART. 334. Concubinage. - Any husband who shall keep a
mistress in the conjugal dwelling, or, shall have sexual intercourse, under
scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife, or shall
cohabit with her in any other place, shall be punished
by prisioncorreccional in its minimum and medium periods.
x x x x,
an element of the crime of concubinage when a married man has sexual intercourse with a
woman elsewhere.
Whether a lawyers sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of
marriage should be characterized as grossly immoral conduct depends on the surrounding
circumstances.[35] The case at bar involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a
married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial whether the affair was carried out
discreetly. Apropos is the following pronouncement of this Court in Vitug v. Rongcal:[36]
On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that
he had an extra-marital affair with complainant, albeit brief and discreet,
and which act is not so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act
or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree in order to
merit disciplinary sanction. We disagree.
xxxx
While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact
of sexual relations between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to
warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it is not so with
respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not all forms
of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual
relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it
manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the
marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our
laws.[37] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
And so is the pronouncement in Tucay v. Atty. Tucay:[38]
The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not
the respondent did contract a bigamous marriage . . . It is enough that
the records of this administrative case substantiate the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner, as well as the IBP Board of Governors,
i.e., that indeed respondent has been carrying on an illicit affair with
a married woman, a grossly immoral conduct and indicative of an
extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his
profession. This detestable behavior renders him regrettably unfit
and undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges which his
license confers upon him.[39] (Underscoring supplied)
Respondent in fact also violated the lawyers oath he took before admission to practice
law which goes:
I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of
law in the Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme
authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its
Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will
delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer
 according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity
as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this
voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of
evasion. So help me God. (Underscoring supplied)
Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of the Constitution
reading:
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of
the family and shall be protected by the State.
In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes this constitutional
provision, obligates the husband and the wife to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support.[40]
Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct, and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer from
engaging in any conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law.
Clutching at straws, respondent, during the pendency of the investigation of the case
before the IBP Commissioner, filed a Manifestation[41] on March 22, 2005 informing the IBP-CBD
that complainants petition for nullity of his (complainants) marriage to Irene had been granted by
Branch 106 of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, and that the criminal complaint for adultery
complainant filed against respondent and Irene based on the same set of facts alleged in the
instant case, which was pending review before the Department of Justice (DOJ), on petition of
complainant, had been, on motion of complainant, withdrawn.
The Secretary of Justices Resolution of January 16, 2004 granting complainants
Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review reads:
Considering that the instant motion was filed before the final
resolution of the petition for review, we are inclined to grant the same
pursuant to Section 10 of Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000,
which provides that notwithstanding the perfection of the appeal, the
petitioner may withdraw the same at any time before it is finally resolved, in
which case the appealed resolution shall stand as though no appeal
has been taken.[42] (Emphasis supplied by complainant)
That the marriage between complainant and Irene was subsequently declared
void ab initio is immaterial. The acts complained of took place before the marriage was declared
null and void.[43] As a lawyer, respondent should be aware that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife are presumed, unless proven otherwise, to have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage.[44] In carrying on an extra-marital affair with Irene prior to the judicial
declaration that her marriage with complainant was null and void, and despite respondent
himself being married, he showed disrespect for an institution held sacred by the law. And he
betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.
As for complainants withdrawal of his petition for review before the DOJ, respondent
glaringly omitted to state that before complainant filed his December 23, 2003 Motion
to Withdraw his Petition for Review, the DOJ had already promulgated a Resolution
on September 22, 2003 reversing the dismissal by the Quezon City Prosecutors Office of
complainants complaint for adultery. In reversing the City Prosecutors Resolution, DOJ
Secretary Simeon Datumanong held:
Parenthetically the totality of evidence adduced by complainant
would, in the fair estimation of the Department, sufficiently establish all the
elements of the offense of adultery on the part of both respondents. Indeed,
early on, respondent Moje conceded to complainant that she was going out
on dates with respondent Eala, and this she did when complainant
confronted her about Ealas frequent phone calls and text messages to
her. Complainant also personally witnessed Moje and Eala having a
 rendezvous on two occasions.Respondent Eala never denied the fact that
he knew Moje to be married to complainant[.] In fact, he (Eala) himself was this Court in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,[48] held:
married to another woman. Moreover, Mojes eventual abandonment of their
conjugal home, after complainant had once more confronted her about Eala,
only served to confirm the illicit relationship involving both respondents. This Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their
becomes all the more apparent by Mojes subsequent relocation in No. 71-B, own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil and
11th Street, New Manila, Quezon City, which was a few blocks away from criminal cases.
the church where she had exchange marital vows with complainant.

It was in this place that the two lovers apparently

cohabited. Especially since Ealas vehicle and that of Mojes were always
seen there. Moje herself admits that she came to live in the said address
whereas Eala asserts that that was where he held office. The happenstance WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. XVII-2006-06 passed
that it was in that said address that Eala and Moje had decided to hold office
for the firm that both had formed smacks too much of a coincidence. For on January 28, 2006 by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of
one, the said address appears to be a residential house, for that was
where Moje stayed all throughout after her separation from complainant. It the Philippines is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
was both respondents love nest, to put short; their illicit affair that was
carried out there bore fruit a few months later when Moje gave birth to a
girl at the nearby hospital of St. Lukes Medical Center. What finally militates
against the respondents is the indubitable fact that in the certificate of birth
Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly immoral
of the girl, Moje furnished the information that Eala was the father. This
speaks all too eloquently of the unlawful and damning nature of the
adulterous acts of the respondents. Complainants supposed illegal conduct, violation of his oath of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule
procurement of the birth certificate is most certainly beside the point for
both respondents Eala and Moje have not denied, in any categorical 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
manner, that Eala is the father of the child Samantha Irene
Louise Moje.[45] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part of the

records of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines. And

It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense which cannot be let copies of the Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all

prosecuted de oficio and thus leaves the DOJ no choice but to grant complainants motion to courts.

withdraw his petition for review. But even if respondent and Irene were to be acquitted of adultery

after trial, if the Information for adultery were filed in court, the same would not have been a bar to This Decision takes effect immediately.

the present administrative complaint.

SO ORDERED.
Citing the ruling in Pangan v. Ramos,[46] viz:

x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge

is not a bar to these [administrative] proceedings. The standards of legal
profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape
the penalties of x x x criminal law. Moreover, this Court, in disbarment
proceedings is acting in an entirely different capacity from that which courts
assume in trying criminal case[47] (Italics in the original),
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 32329. March 23, 1929.]
In re LUIS B. TAGORDA
Duran & Lim for Respondent.
Attorney-General Jaranilla and Provincial Fiscal Jose for the Government.
SYLLABUS
1. ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; DISBARMENT AND SUSPENSION; SECTION 21 OF THE CODE
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AS AMENDED BY ACT No. 2828, AND CANONS 27 AND 28 OF THE
CODE OF ETHICS ADOPTED BY THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND THE
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION CONSTRUED AND APPLIED; SOLICITATION OF CASES
BY AN ATTORNEY AS GROUND FOR DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION. — Application is
given to section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2828, providing: "The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice," and to Canons 27 and 28 of the Code of Ethics
adopted by the American Bar Association in 1908 and by the Philippine Bar Association in 1917,
to the case of the respondent lawyer.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — The law is a profession and not a business.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment or
suspension.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — Solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements, or by personal
communications or interviews not warranted by personal relations, is unprofessional, and the
commission of offenses of this character amply justices permanent elimination from the bar. But
as mitigating circumstances working in favor of the respondent there are, first, his intimation that
he was unaware of the impropriety of his acts, second, his youth and inexperience at the bar,
and, third, his promise not to commit a similar mistake in the future. As a result, the respondent
attorney is suspended from the practice as an attorney-at-law for the period of one month.
DECISION
MALCOLM, J.:
The respondent, Luis B. Tagorda, a practicing attorney and a member of the provincial board of
Isabela, admits that previous to the last general elections he made use of a card written in
Spanish and Ilocano, which, in translation, reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"LUIS B. TAGORDA
"Attorney
"Notary Public
"CANDIDATE FOR THIRD MEMBER
"Province of Isabela
"(NOTE. — As notary public, he can execute for you a deed of sale for the purchase of land as
required by the cadastral office; can renew lost documents of your animals; can make your
application and final requisites for your homestead; and can execute any kind of affidavit. As a
lawyer he can help you collect your loans although long overdue, as well as any complaint for or
against you. Come or write to him in his town Echague, Isabela. He offers free consultation, and
is willing to help and serve the poor.)"
The respondent further admits that he is the author of a letter addressed to a lieutenant of barrio
in his home municipality written in Ilocano, which letter, in translation, reads as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ECHAGUE, ISABELA, September 18, 1928
"MY DEAR LIEUTENANT: I would like to inform you of the approaching date for our induction
into office as member of the Provincial Board, that is on the 16th of next month. Before my
induction into office I should be very glad to hear your suggestions or recommendations for the
good of the province in general and for your barrio in particular. You can come to my hose at any
time here in Echague, to submit to me any kind of suggestion or recommendation as you may
desire.
"I also inform you that despite my membership in the Board I will have my residence here in
Echague. I will attend the sessions of the Board in Ilagan, but will come back home on the
following day here in Echague to live and serve with you as a lawyer and notary public. Despite
my election as member of the Provincial Board, I will exercise my legal profession as a lawyer
and notary public. In case you cannot see me at home on any week day, I assure you that you
can always find me there on every Sunday. I also inform you that I will received any work
regarding preparations of documents of contract of sales and affidavits to be sworn to before me
as notary public even on Sundays.
"I would like you all to be informed of this matter for the reason that some people are in the belief
that my residence as member of the Board will be in Ilagan and that I would then be disqualified
to exercise my profession as lawyer and as notary public. Such is not the case and I would make
it clear that I am free to exercise my profession as formerly and that I will have my residence
here in Echague.
"I would request your kind favor to transmit this information to your barrio people in any of your
meetings or social gatherings so that they may be informed of my desire to live and to serve with
you in my capacity as lawyer and notary public. If the people in your locality have not as yet
contracted the services of other lawyers in connection with the registration of their land titles, I
would be willing to handle the work in court and would charge only three pesos for every
registration.
"Yours respectfully,
(Sgd.) "LUIS TAGORDA
"Attorney
"Notary Public."cralaw virtua1aw library
The facts being conceded, it is next in order to write down the applicable legal provisions.
Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure as originally conceived related to disbarments of
members of the bar. In 1919 at the instigation of the Philippine Bar Association, said codal
section was amended by Act No. 2828 by adding at the end thereof the following: "The practice
of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice."cralaw virtua1aw library
The statue as amended conforms in principle to the Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by
the American Bar Association in 1908 and by the Philippine Bar Association in 1917. Canons 27
and 28 of the Code of Ethics provide:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"27. ADVERTISING, DIRECT OR INDIRECT. — The most worthy and effective advertisement
possible, even for a young lawyer, and especially with his brother lawyers, is the establishment
of a well- merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced,
but must be the outcome of character and conduct. The publication or circulation of ordinary
simple business cards, being a matter of personal taste or local custom, and sometimes of
convenience, is not per se improper. But solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements,
or by personal communications or interviews not warranted by personal relations, is
unprofessional. It is equally unprofessional to procure business by indirection through touters of
any kind, whether allied real estate firms or trust companies advertising to secure the drawing of
deeds or wills or offering retainers in exchange for executorships or trusteeships to be influenced
by the lawyer. Indirect advertisement for business by furnishing or inspiring newspaper
comments concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interests involved, the
importance of the lawyer’s position, and all other like self-laudation, defy the traditions and lower
the tone of our high calling, and are intolerable.
in favor of the respondent there are, first, his intimation that he was unaware of the impropriety
of his acts, second, his youth and inexperience mistake in the future. A modest period of
suspension would seem to fit the case of the erring attorney. But it should be distinctly
understood that this result is reached in view of the considerations which have influenced the
court to be relatively lenient in this particular instance, and should, therefore, not be taken as
indicating that future convictions of practice of this kind will not be dealt with by disbarment.
In view of all the circumstances of this case, the judgment of the court is that the respondent
Luis B. Tagorda be and is hereby suspended from the practice as an attorney-at-law for the
period of one month from April 1, 1929.
Street, Johns, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

"28. STIRRING UP LITIGATION, DIRECTLY OR THROUGH AGENTS. — It is unprofessional

for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, except in rare cases where ties of blood,
relationship or trust make it his duty to do so. Stirring up strife and litigation is not only
unprofessional, but it is indictable at common law. It is disreputable to hunt up defects in titles or
other causes of action and inform thereof in order to be employed to bring suit, or to breed
litigation by seeking out those with claims for personal injuries or those having any other grounds
of action in order to secure them as clients, or to employ agents or runners for like purposes, or
to pay or reward directly or indirectly, those who bring or influence the bringing of such cases to
his office, or to remunerate policemen, court or prison officials, physicians, hospital attachés or
others who may succeed, under the guise of giving disinterested friendly advice, in influencing
the criminal, the sick and the injured, the ignorant or others, to seek his professional services. A
duty to the public and to the profession devolves upon every member of the bar having
knowledge of such practices upon the part of any practitioner immediately to inform thereof to
the end that the offender may be disbarred."cralaw virtua1aw library

Common barratry consisting of frequently stirring up suits and quarrels between individuals was
a crime at the common law, and one of the penalties for this offense when committed by an
attorney was disbarment. Statutes intended to reach the same evil have been provided in a
number of jurisdictions usually at the instance of the bar itself, and have been upheld as
constitutional. The reason behind statutes of this type is not difficult to discover. The law is a
profession and not a business. The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or
through others for to do so would be unprofessional. (State v. Rossman [1909], 53 Wash., 1; 17
Ann. Cas., 625; People v. Mac Cabe [1893], 19 L. R. A., 231; 2 R. C. L., 1097.)

It becomes our duty to condemn in no uncertain terms the ugly practice of solicitation of cases
by lawyers. It is destructive of the honor of a great profession. It lowers the standards of that
profession. It works against the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of
the bar. It results in needless litigation and in incenting to strife otherwise peacefully inclined
citizens.

The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment or suspension. That

should be distinctly understood.

Giving application of the law and the Canons of Ethics to the admitted facts, the respondent
stands convicted of having solicited cases in defiance of the law and those canons. Accordingly,
the only remaining duty of the court is to fix upon he action which should here be taken. The
provincial fiscal of Isabela, with whom joined the representative of the Attorney-General in the
oral presentation of the case, suggests that the respondent be only reprimanded. We think that
our action should go further than this if only to reflect out attitude toward cases of this character
of which unfortunately the respondent’s is only one. The commission of offenses of this nature
would amply justify permanent elimination from the bar. But as mitigating circumstances working
 Republic of the Philippines Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil.
SUPREME COURT US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
Manila
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy
EN BANC CLINIC, INC.1 Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champterous,
unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community
in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is
Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993
ashamed and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as
hereinbefore quoted.
MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,
vs.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisement at its
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.
instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal
support services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic
R E SO L U T I O N machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal
services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona,2 reportedly
decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.

REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing
advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said petition)
and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to the
exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law."
The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:
Annex A
Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein, we
required the (1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3)
Philippine Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women
Lawyers Association of the Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federacion International de Abogadas
(FIDA) to submit their respective position papers on the controversy and, thereafter, their
memoranda. 3 The said bar associations readily responded and extended their valuable services
and cooperation of which this Court takes note with appreciation and gratitude.
The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services offered by
respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either
case, whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements herein complained of.

SECRET MARRIAGE? Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper and
P560.00 for a valid marriage. enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers adopted by the
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE. aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved
ANNULMENT. VISA. in this bar matter.

THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
am— 6:00 pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.

xxx xxx xxx

Annex B

Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to

GUAM DIVORCE. distinguish the two terms, i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal
services", common sense would readily dictate that the same are essentially
DON PARKINSON without substantial distinction. For who could deny that document search,
evidence gathering, assistance to layman in need of basic institutional
services from government or non-government agencies like birth, marriage,
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through property, or business registration, obtaining documents like clearance,
The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours. passports, local or foreign visas, constitutes practice of law?

Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. xxx xxx xxx
Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with
respondent's foreign citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its
position manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes the view espoused by
respondent (to the effect that today it is alright to advertise one's legal
services).
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to
respondent's act of establishing a "legal clinic" and of concomitantly
advertising the same through newspaper publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this
Honorable Court to perpetually restrain respondent from undertaking highly
unethical activities in the field of law practice as aforedescribed.4
xxx xxx xxx
A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that
respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it renders
legal services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the
public, the advertisements in question give the impression that respondent
is offering legal services. The Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so,
as earlier mentioned, apparently because this (is) the effect that the
advertisements have on the reading public.
The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced,
first of all, to the very name being used by respondent — "The Legal Clinic,
Inc." Such a name, it is respectfully submitted connotes the rendering of
legal services for legal problems, just like a medical clinic connotes medical
services for medical problems. More importantly, the term "Legal Clinic"
connotes lawyers, as the term medical clinic connotes doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements
subject of the present case, appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all
the more reinforces the impression that it is being operated by members of
the bar and that it offers legal services. In addition, the advertisements in
question appear with a picture and name of a person being represented as
a lawyer from Guam, and this practically removes whatever doubt may still
remain as to the nature of the service or services being offered.
It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal
support services" as claimed by it, or whether it offers legal services as any
lawyer actively engaged in law practice does. And it becomes unnecessary
to make a distinction between "legal services" and "legal support services,"
as the respondent would have it. The advertisements in question leave no
room for doubt in the minds of the reading public that legal services are
being offered by lawyers, whether true or not.
B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of
acts contrary to law, morals, public order and public policy.
It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in
question are only meant to inform the general public of the services being
offered by it. Said advertisements, however, emphasize to Guam divorce,
and any law student ought to know that under the Family Code, there is only
one instance when a foreign divorce is recognized, and that is:
Article 26. . . .
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine Law.
It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as
follows:
Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent
union between a man and woman entered into
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal
and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an
inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and
not subject to stipulation, except that marriage
settlements may fix the property relation during the
marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the
message being conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences
of a marriage celebrated in accordance with our law, by simply going to
Guam for a divorce. This is not only misleading, but encourages, or serves
to induce, violation of Philippine law. At the very least, this can be
considered "the dark side" of legal practice, where certain defects in
Philippine laws are exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is outright
malpractice.
Rule 1.02. — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet
activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.
In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as
that shown in Annex "A" of the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor
vehicle with the words "Just Married" on its bumper and seems to address
those planning a "secret marriage," if not suggesting a "secret marriage,"
makes light of the "special contract of permanent union," the inviolable
social institution," which is how the Family Code describes marriage,
obviously to emphasize its sanctity and inviolability. Worse, this particular
advertisement appears to encourage marriages celebrated in secrecy,
which is suggestive of immoral publication of applications for a marriage
license.
If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be
concluded that the above impressions one may gather from the
advertisements in question are accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby
Concepcion example alone confirms what the advertisements suggest. Here
it can be seen that criminal acts are being encouraged or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply
because the jurisdiction of Philippine courts does not extend to the place
where the crime is committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services"
respondent offers do not constitute legal services as commonly understood,
the advertisements in question give the impression that respondent
corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it offers legal services, as
earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical consequence is that, in the eyes of
an ordinary newspaper reader, members of the bar themselves are
encouraging or inducing the performance of acts which are contrary to law,
morals, good customs and the public good, thereby destroying and
demeaning the integrity of the Bar.
xxx xxx xxx
It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing
the publication of the advertisements in question, or any other
advertisements similar thereto. It is also submitted that respondent should
be prohibited from further performing or offering some of the services it
presently offers, or, at the very least, from offering such services to the
public in general.
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research,
electronic data gathering, storage and retrieval, standardized legal forms,
investigators for gathering of evidence, and like services will greatly benefit
the legal profession and should not be stifled but instead encouraged.
However, when the conduct of such business by non-members of the Bar
encroaches upon the practice of law, there can be no choice but to prohibit
such business.
Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better
performed by specialists in other fields, such as computer experts, who by
reason of their having devoted time and effort exclusively to such field
cannot fulfill the exacting requirements for admission to the Bar. To prohibit
them from "encroaching" upon the legal profession will deny the profession
of the great benefits and advantages of modern technology. Indeed, a
lawyer using a computer will be doing better than a lawyer using a
typewriter, even if both are (equal) in skill.
Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or
tolerate the illegal practice of law in any form, not only for the protection of
members of the Bar but also, and more importantly, for the protection of the
public. Technological development in the profession may be encouraged
without tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention of illegal practice.
There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all
of its services, but only if such services are made available exclusively to
members of the Bench and Bar. Respondent would then be offering
technical assistance, not legal services. Alternatively, the more difficult task
of carefully distinguishing between which service may be offered to the
public in general and which should be made available exclusively to
members of the Bar may be undertaken. This, however, may require further
proceedings because of the factual considerations involved.
It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services ought
to be prohibited outright, such as acts which tend to suggest or induce
celebration abroad of marriages which are bigamous or otherwise illegal
and void under Philippine law. While respondent may not be prohibited from
simply disseminating information regarding such matters, it must be
required to include, in the information given, a disclaimer that it is not
authorized to practice law, that certain course of action may be illegal under
Philippine law, that it is not authorized or capable of rendering a legal
opinion, that a lawyer should be consulted before deciding on which course
of action to take, and that it cannot recommend any particular lawyer without
subjecting itself to possible sanctions for illegal practice of law.
If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed
exclusively at members of the Bar, with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer
that it is not authorized to practice law or perform legal services.
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody
should be allowed to represent himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without
such term being clearly defined by rule or regulation, and without any
adequate and effective means of regulating his activities. Also, law practice
in a corporate form may prove to be advantageous to the legal profession,
but before allowance of such practice may be considered, the corporation's
Article of Incorporation and By-laws must conform to each and every
provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules of Court. 5
2. Philippine Bar Association:
xxx xxx xxx.
Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but
engaged in giving legal support services to lawyers and laymen, through
experienced paralegals, with the use of modern computers and electronic
machines" (pars. 2 and 3, Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably,
respondent's acts of holding out itself to the public under the trade name
"The Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting employment for its enumerated
services fall within the realm of a practice which thus yields itself to the
regulatory powers of the Supreme Court. For respondent to say that it is
merely engaged in paralegal work is to stretch credulity. Respondent's own
commercial advertisement which announces a certain Atty. Don
Parkinson to be handling the fields of law belies its pretense. From all
indications, respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." is offering and
rendering legal services through its reserve of lawyers. It has been held that
the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court, but
includes drawing of deeds, incorporation, rendering opinions, and advising
clients as to their legal right and then take them to an attorney and ask the
latter to look after their case in court See Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics,
1984 ed., p. 39).
It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law,
and such limitation cannot be evaded by a corporation employing competent
lawyers to practice for it. Obviously, this is the scheme or device by which
respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the public and solicits
employment of its legal services. It is an odious vehicle for deception,
especially so when the public cannot ventilate any grievance
for malpractice against the business conduit. Precisely, the limitation of
practice of law to persons who have been duly admitted as members of the
Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to subject the members to
the discipline of the Supreme Court. Although respondent uses its business
name, the persons and the lawyers who act for it are subject to court
discipline. The practice of law is not a profession open to all who wish to
engage in it nor can it be assigned to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is
a personal right limited to persons who have qualified themselves under the
law. It follows that not only respondent but also all the persons who are
acting for respondent are the persons engaged in unethical law practice. 6
3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:
The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues
stated herein, are wit:
1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;
2. Such practice is unauthorized;
3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also
misleading and patently immoral; and
4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish the
Legal Clinic and its corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of law
and for its unethical, misleading and immoral advertising.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that
it merely renders "legal support services" to answers, litigants and the
general public as enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of its Article(s)
of Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment). But its
advertised services, as enumerated above, clearly and convincingly show
that it is indeed engaged in law practice, albeit outside of court.
As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons
and Family Relations Law, particularly regarding foreign divorces,
annulment of marriages, secret marriages, absence and adoption;
Immigration Laws, particularly on visa related problems, immigration
problems; the Investments Law of the Philippines and such other related
laws.
Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid
law, the legal principles and procedures related thereto, the legal advices
based thereon and which activities call for legal training, knowledge and
experience.
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the
activities of respondent fall squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and
laymen equally term as "the practice of law."7
4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:
In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount
consideration should be given to the protection of the general public from
the danger of being exploited by unqualified persons or entities who may be
engaged in the practice of law.
At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year
course of study on top of a four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course
and then to take and pass the bar examinations. Only then, is a lawyer
qualified to practice law.
While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid to
the administration of justice, there are in those jurisdictions, courses of
study and/or standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal with the
general public as such. While it may now be the opportune time to establish
these courses of study and/or standards, the fact remains that at present,
these do not exist in the Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable Court
may decide to make measures to protect the general public from being
exploited by those who may be dealing with the general public in the guise
of being "paralegals" without being qualified to do so.
In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the
dangers which may be brought about by advertising of legal services. While
it appears that lawyers are prohibited under the present Code of
Professional Responsibility from advertising, it appears in the instant case
that legal services are being advertised not by lawyers but by an entity
staffed by "paralegals." Clearly, measures should be taken to protect the
general public from falling prey to those who advertise legal services without
being qualified to offer such services. 8
A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however,
seems to give the impression that information regarding validity of
marriages, divorce, annulment of marriage, immigration, visa extensions,
declaration of absence, adoption and foreign investment, which are in
essence, legal matters , will be given to them if they avail of its services.
The Respondent's name — The Legal Clinic, Inc. — does not help matters.
It gives the impression again that Respondent will or can cure the legal
problems brought to them. Assuming that Respondent is, as claimed,
staffed purely by paralegals, it also gives the misleading impression that
there are lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are doctors in
any medical clinic, when only "paralegals" are involved in The Legal Clinic,
Inc.
Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its
President and majority stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on
the structure and main purpose of Respondent corporation in the
aforementioned "Starweek" article."9
5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:
Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit
cases for the purpose of gain which, as provided for under the above cited
law, (are) illegal and against the Code of Professional Responsibility of
lawyers in this country.
Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to
solicit cases, but it is illegal in that in bold letters it announces that the Legal
Clinic, Inc., could work out/cause the celebration of a secret marriage which
is not only illegal but immoral in this country. While it is advertised that one
has to go to said agency and pay P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly
fooling the public for valid marriages in the Philippines are solemnized only
by officers authorized to do so under the law. And to employ an agency for
said purpose of contracting marriage is not necessary.
No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the
trend is towards allowing lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable
people to obtain from qualified practitioners legal services for their particular
needs can justify the use of advertisements such as are the subject matter
of the petition, for one (cannot) justify an illegal act even by whatever merit
the illegal act may serve. The law has yet to be amended so that such act
could become justifiable.
We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret
marriages and divorce are possible in this country for a fee, when in fact it is
not so, are highly reprehensible.
It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go
about having a secret marriage here, when it cannot nor should ever be
attempted, and seek advice on divorce, where in this country there is none,
except under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is also
against good morals and is deceitful because it falsely represents to the
public to be able to do that which by our laws cannot be done (and) by our
Code of Morals should not be done.
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that
solicitation for clients by an attorney by circulars of advertisements, is
unprofessional, and offenses of this character justify permanent elimination
from the Bar. 10
6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:
xxx xxx xxx
1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as
management consultancy firms or travel agencies, whether run by lawyers
or not, perform the services rendered by Respondent does not necessarily
lead to the conclusion that Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law. In
the same vein, however, the fact that the business of respondent (assuming
it can be engaged in independently of the practice of law) involves
knowledge of the law does not necessarily make respondent guilty of
unlawful practice of law.
. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant
can render effective service unless he is familiar with
such statutes and regulations. He must be careful not to
suggest a course of conduct which the law forbids. It
seems . . . .clear that (the consultant's) knowledge of
the law, and his use of that knowledge as a factor in
determining what measures he shall recommend, do
not constitute the practice of law . . . . It is not only
presumed that all men know the law, but it is a fact that
most men have considerable acquaintance with broad
features of the law . . . . Our knowledge of the law —
accurate or inaccurate — moulds our conduct not only
when we are acting for ourselves, but when we are
serving others. Bankers, liquor dealers and laymen
generally possess rather precise knowledge of the laws
touching their particular business or profession. A good
example is the architect, who must be familiar with
zoning, building and fire prevention codes, factory and
tenement house statutes, and who draws plans and
specification in harmony with the law. This is not
practicing law.
But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a
fire tower, replies that it is required by the statute. Or
the industrial relations expert cites, in support of some
measure that he recommends, a decision of the
National Labor Relations Board. Are they practicing
law? In my opinion, they are not, provided no separate
fee is charged for the legal advice or information, and
the legal question is subordinate and incidental to a
major non-legal problem.
It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.
If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on
his land to engage a lawyer to advise him and the
architect in respect to the building code and the like,
then an architect who performed this function would
probably be considered to be trespassing on territory
reserved for licensed attorneys. Likewise, if the
industrial relations field had been pre-empted by
lawyers, or custom placed a lawyer always at the elbow
of the lay personnel man. But this is not the case. The
most important body of the industrial relations experts
are the officers and business agents of the labor unions
and few of them are lawyers. Among the larger
corporate employers, it has been the practice for some
years to delegate special responsibility in employee
matters to a management group chosen for their
practical knowledge and skill in such matter, and
without regard to legal thinking or lack of it. More
recently, consultants like the defendants have the same
service that the larger employers get from their own
specialized staff.
The handling of industrial relations is growing into a
recognized profession for which appropriate courses
are offered by our leading universities. The court should
be very cautious about declaring [that] a widespread,
well-established method of conducting business is
unlawful, or that the considerable class of men who
customarily perform a certain function have no right to
do so, or that the technical education given by our
schools cannot be used by the graduates in their
business.
In determining whether a man is practicing law, we
should consider his work for any particular client or
customer, as a whole. I can imagine defendant being
engaged primarily to advise as to the law defining his
client's obligations to his employees, to guide his
client's obligations to his employees, to guide his client
along the path charted by law. This, of course, would be
the practice of the law. But such is not the fact in the
case before me. Defendant's primarily efforts are along
economic and psychological lines. The law only
provides the frame within which he must work, just as
the zoning code limits the kind of building the limits the
kind of building the architect may plan. The incidental
legal advice or information defendant may give, does
not transform his activities into the practice of law. Let
me add that if, even as a minor feature of his work, he
performed services which are customarily reserved to
members of the bar, he would be practicing law. For
instance, if as part of a welfare program, he drew
employees' wills.
Another branch of defendant's work is the
representations of the employer in the adjustment of
grievances and in collective bargaining, with or without
a mediator. This is not per se the practice of law.
Anyone may use an agent for negotiations and may
select an agent particularly skilled in the subject under
discussion, and the person appointed is free to accept
the employment whether or not he is a member of the
bar. Here, however, there may be an exception where
the business turns on a question of law. Most real
estate sales are negotiated by brokers who are not
lawyers. But if the value of the land depends on a
disputed right-of-way and the principal role of the
negotiator is to assess the probable outcome of the
dispute and persuade the opposite party to the same
opinion, then it may be that only a lawyer can accept
the assignment. Or if a controversy between an
employer and his men grows from differing
interpretations of a contract, or of a statute, it is quite
likely that defendant should not handle it. But I need not
reach a definite conclusion here, since the situation is
not presented by the proofs.
Defendant also appears to represent the employer
before administrative agencies of the federal
government, especially before trial examiners of the
National Labor Relations Board. An agency of the
federal government, acting by virtue of an authority
granted by the Congress, may regulate the
representation of parties before such agency. The State
of New Jersey is without power to interfere with such
determination or to forbid representation before the
agency by one whom the agency admits. The rules of
the National Labor Relations Board give to a party the
right to appear in person, or by counsel, or by other
representative. Rules and Regulations, September
11th, 1946, S. 203.31. 'Counsel' here means a licensed
attorney, and ther representative' one not a lawyer. In
this phase of his work, defendant may lawfully do
whatever the Labor Board allows, even arguing
questions purely legal. (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d
800, cited in Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism
[1974], at pp. 154-156.).
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful
calling (which may involve knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the
practice of law provided that:
(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal
problem;.
(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the
bar; .
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.
All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client
as a whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of
Professional Responsibility succintly states the rule of conduct:
Rule 15.08 — A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation
concurrently with the practice of law shall make clear to his client whether
he is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.
1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding
services (See Annex "A" Petition). Services on routine, straightforward
marriages, like securing a marriage license, and making arrangements with
a priest or a judge, may not constitute practice of law. However, if the
problem is as complicated as that described in "Rx for Legal Problems" on
the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then what
may be involved is actually the practice of law. If a non-lawyer, such as the
Legal Clinic, renders such services then it is engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence,
annulment of marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). Purely
giving informational materials may not constitute of law. The business is
similar to that of a bookstore where the customer buys materials on the
subject and determines on the subject and determines by himself what
courses of action to take.
It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving
information, the Legal Clinic's paralegals may apply the law to the particular
problem of the client, and give legal advice. Such would constitute
unauthorized practice of law.
It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text
which publication of a legal text which purports to say
what the law is amount to legal practice. And the mere
fact that the principles or rules stated in the text may be
accepted by a particular reader as a solution to his
problem does not affect this. . . . . Apparently it is urged
that the conjoining of these two, that is, the text and the
forms, with advice as to how the forms should be filled
out, constitutes the unlawful practice of law. But that is
the situation with many approved and accepted texts.
Dacey's book is sold to the public at large. There is no
personal contact or relationship with a particular
individual. Nor does there exist that relation of
confidence and trust so necessary to the status of
attorney and client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF
LEGAL PRACTICE — THE REPRESENTATION AND
ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR PERSON IN A
PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the book assumes
to offer general advice on common problems, and does
not purport to give personal advice on a specific
problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified
person. Similarly the defendant's publication does not
purport to give personal advice on a specific problem
peculiar to a designated or readily identified person in a
particular situation — in their publication and sale of the
kits, such publication and sale did not constitutes the
unlawful practice of law . . . . There being no legal
impediment under the statute to the sale of the kit, there
was no proper basis for the injunction against
defendant maintaining an office for the purpose of
selling to persons seeking a divorce, separation,
annulment or separation agreement any printed
material or writings relating to matrimonial law or the
prohibition in the memorandum of modification of the
judgment against defendant having an interest in any
publishing house publishing his manuscript on divorce
and against his having any personal contact with any
prospective purchaser. The record does fully support,
however, the finding that for the change of $75 or $100
for the kit, the defendant gave legal advice in the
course of personal contacts concerning particular
problems which might arise in the preparation and
presentation of the purchaser's asserted matrimonial
cause of action or pursuit of other legal remedies and
assistance in the preparation of necessary documents
(The injunction therefore sought to) enjoin conduct
constituting the practice of law, particularly with
reference to the giving of advice and counsel by the
defendant relating to specific problems of particular
individuals in connection with a divorce, separation,
annulment of separation agreement sought and should
be affirmed. (State v. Winder, 348, NYS 2D 270 [1973],
cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).
1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-
diagnostic, non-advisory. "It is not controverted, however, that if the services
"involve giving legal advice or counselling," such would constitute practice of
law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this light that FIDA submits that a factual
inquiry may be necessary for the judicious disposition of this case.
xxx xxx xxx
2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the
impression (or perpetuate the wrong notion) that there is a secret marriage.
With all the solemnities, formalities and other requisites of marriages (See
Articles 2, et seq., Family Code), no Philippine marriage can be secret.
2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second
paragraph thereof (which is not necessarily related to the first paragraph)
fails to state the limitation that only "paralegal services?" or "legal support
services", and not legal services, are available." 11
A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent for the
proper determination of the issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note that the
clause "practice of law" has long been the subject of judicial construction and interpretation. The
courts have laid down general principles and doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of the
term, some of which we now take into account.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform
those acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice
or render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill. 12
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and
counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured,
although such matter may or may not be pending in a court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal
types of professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights
and obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not
possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess
power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to law, in order to
assist in proper interpretation and enforcement of law. 14
When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice
of law. 15 One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the
business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing
law. 16 Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the
conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who renders an opinion as to
the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in several cases, we laid
down the test to determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
 The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of
legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his
consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in
the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and
other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the
preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice
to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in
matters connected with the law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title Abstract and Trust
Co. v. Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person is also considered to be in the
practice of law when he:
. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person,
firms, associations or corporations as to their right under the law, or appears
in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings, pending or
prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body,
committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies and there, in such representative capacity, performs any act
or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients
under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity,
engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law,
or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of
court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel.
Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-
177),stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court;
it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to
actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition,
conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body,
the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters or estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained
legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work
performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to
proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice
on a large variety of subjects and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and
other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection
with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in
litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult
and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or
counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by
the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in
the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which
involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and
drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the
public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons
possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and
acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests
upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules o Court, Vol. 3 [1973
ed.], pp. 665-666, citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194 N. E. 313,
quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A.
139, 144).
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying the
aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and
observations of the aforestated bar associations that the activities of respondent, as advertised,
constitute "practice of law."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously
considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the
services it has been offering, to wit:
Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by
trained paralegals to laymen and lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic,
non-advisory, through the extensive use of computers and modern
information technology in the gathering, processing, storage, transmission
and reproduction of information and communication, such as computerized
legal research; encoding and reproduction of documents and pleadings
prepared by laymen or lawyers; document search; evidence gathering;
locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact finding investigations; and
assistance to laymen in need of basic institutional services from government
or non-government agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or business
registrations; educational or employment records or certifications, obtaining
documentation like clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving
information about laws of other countries that they may find useful, like
foreign divorce, marriage or adoption laws that they can avail of preparatory
to emigration to the foreign country, and other matters that do not involve
representation of clients in court; designing and installing computer
systems, programs, or software for the efficient management of law offices,
corporate legal departments, courts and other entities engaged in
dispensing or administering legal services. 20
While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical
and technical knowhow, such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the
efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids and materials, these
will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and
lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent
than real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and
adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all the respondent corporation will simply do is
look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a
bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the
client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken
as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for the which
services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the
jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that
respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight of
authority holds, is not limited merely giving legal advice, contract drafting and so forth.
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13, 1991
issue of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal
Problems," where an insight into the structure, main purpose and operations of respondent
corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic,
with offices on the seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U. N. Avenue
in Manila. No matter what the client's problem, and even if it is as
complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation, Atty. Nogales
and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors are "specialists" in various fields
can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and
criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation, and family law. These
specialist are backed up by a battery of paralegals, counsellors and
attorneys.
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the
medical field toward specialization, it caters to clients who cannot afford the
services of the big law firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they come, we start
by analyzing the problem. That's what doctors do also. They ask you how
you contracted what's bothering you, they take your temperature, they
observe you for the symptoms and so on. That's how we operate, too. And
once the problem has been categorized, then it's referred to one of our
specialists.
There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up
treatment. These The Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes.
"Things like preparing a simple deed of sale or an affidavit of loss can be
taken care of by our staff or, if this were a hospital the residents or the
interns. We can take care of these matters on a while you wait basis. Again,
kung baga sa hospital, out-patient, hindi kailangang ma-confine. It's just like
a common cold or diarrhea," explains Atty. Nogales.
Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with
accordingly. "If you had a rich relative who died and named you her sole
heir, and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of property, we would refer
you to a specialist in taxation. There would be real estate taxes and arrears
which would need to be put in order, and your relative is even taxed by the
state for the right to transfer her property, and only a specialist in taxation
would be properly trained to deal with the problem. Now, if there were other
heirs contesting your rich relatives will, then you would need a litigator, who
knows how to arrange the problem for presentation in court, and gather
evidence to support the case. 21
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. What
is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it
renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the
advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this proceeding.
Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts
sufficiently establish that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts
for various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple
documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are
undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers
engaged in the practice of law. 22
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which
constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a
member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules
of Court, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. 23
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified
in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and
limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and
professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from
the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the
disciplinary control of the court. 24
The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish to
draw support for his thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is limited to
those who meet the requirements for, and have been admitted to, the bar, and various statutes
or rules specifically so provide. 25 The practice of law is not a lawful business except for
members of the bar who have complied with all the conditions required by statute and the rules
of court. Only those persons are allowed to practice law who, by reason of attainments
previously acquired through education and study, have been recognized by the courts as
possessing profound knowledge of legal science entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect,
or defend the rights claims, or liabilities of their clients, with respect to the construction,
interpretation, operation and effect of law. 26 The justification for excluding from the practice of
law those not admitted to the bar is found, not in the protection of the bar from competition, but
in the protection of the public from being advised and represented in legal matters by
incompetent and unreliable persons over whom the judicial department can exercise little
control.27
We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the United
States of paralegals as an occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in this
jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but be aware that this should first be
a matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption as it has done.
Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are
schools and universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while
there are none in the Philippines. 28As the concept of the "paralegals" or "legal assistant"
evolved in the United States, standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the general
public. One of the major standards or guidelines was developed by the American Bar
Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs
(1973). Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal assistants. There are also
associations of paralegals in the United States with their own code of professional ethics, such
as the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the American Paralegal Association. 29
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be
considered as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to
practice law are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf of another or to render
legal services, but such allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or
regulations granting permission therefor. 30
Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional
or statutory authority, a person who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for
the proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an
unauthorized and unskilled person into the practice of law. 31 That policy should continue to be
one of encouraging persons who are unsure of their legal rights and remedies to seek legal
assistance only from persons licensed to practice law in the state. 32
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true,
honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. 33 He is not supposed to
use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory
or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. 34 Nor shall he pay or
give something of value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for,
publicity to attract legal business. 35 Prior to the adoption of the code of Professional
Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort
to indirect advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring
newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in connection with causes in
which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the
magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-
laudation. 36
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A
lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or skill as in a
manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. 37 The prescription against advertising of
legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the that the
practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the case of The Director of Religious Affairs. vs.
Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are involved in the
present proceeding, 39 was held to constitute improper advertising or solicitation.
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation
by the respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen
solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly
provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his
talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and
not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to
and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or
offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of
justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the
temple of Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective advertisement possible,
even for a young lawyer, . . . . is the establishment of a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be
forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27,
Code of Ethics.).
We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a
well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as
the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the
community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal
by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no
artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference
between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. 40
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the profession
enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define the extent to
which they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories, namely, those
which are expressly allowed and those which are necessarily implied from the restrictions. 41
The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with
the standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative data.
"Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer's name and
the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses;
branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended
with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinction; public or quasi-public
offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in
bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities;
the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with
their written consent, the names of clients regularly represented." 42
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere
supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published
principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief
biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program.
Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management or
contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower the
dignity or standing of the profession. 43
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a
statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone
number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the
opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address,
being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his
name listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. 44
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which
respondent is being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said
respondent corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold that the same definitely do not
and conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.
The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked and
constitutes the justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at
bar. Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer,
as an exception to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of
legal fees for an initial consultation or the availability upon request of a written schedule of fees
or an estimate of the fee to be charged for the specific services. No such exception is provided
for, expressly or impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the present
Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case
contains a proviso that the exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any state unless and
until it is implemented by such authority in that state." 46 This goes to show that an exception to
the general rule, such as that being invoked by herein respondent, can be made only if and
when the canons expressly provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as
in the case at bar.
It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the decision
in Bates, on the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television commercials, it was
found that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to these characteristics of lawyers:
Trustworthy from 71% to 14%
Professional from 71% to 14%
 Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to
allow the publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to
aggravate what is already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity
has consistently been under attack lately by media and the community in general. At this point in
time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to
adopt and maintain that level of professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert all
efforts to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action, to
advertise his services except in allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized
practice of law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime incorporator,
major stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar, he
is hereby reprimanded, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts which are
involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more severely.
While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for
which the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and determined, we are
constrained to refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within the
adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding which is merely administrative in nature. It is,
of course, imperative that this matter be promptly determined, albeit in a different proceeding
and forum, since, under the present state of our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be
organized for or engage in the practice of law in this country. This interdiction, just like the rule
against unethical advertising, cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals
supposedly rendering the alleged support services.
The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and
province of the Solicitor General who can institute the corresponding quo
warranto action, 50 after due ascertainment of the factual background and basis for the grant of
respondent's corporate charter, in light of the putative misuse thereof. That spin-off from the
instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor General for such action as may be necessary under
the circumstances.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal
Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any
form which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition,
and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction proscribed by
law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let copies of this resolution be
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of
the Solicitor General for appropriate action in accordance herewith.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon,
Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. P-220 December 20, 1978
JULIO ZETA, complainant,
vs.
FELICISIMO MALINAO, respondent.
BARREDO, J.:
Administrative complaint against Felicisimo Malinao court interpreter of the Court of First
Instance of Catbalogan, Samar charging as follows:
l — ILLEGALLY APPEARING IN COURT. — MR. Malinao has been
appearing in the municipal court of this town for parties like attorney when
he is not an attorney. Reliable information also says he has been appearing
in the municipal courts of Daram, Zumarraga, Talalora and even Sta. Rita.
He is not authorized to do so we believe. He makes it his means of
livelihood as he collects fees from his clients. He competes with attorneys
but does not pay anything. We believe that his doing so should be stopped
for a good government. These facts can be checked with records of those
municipal courts.
2 — GRAVE MISCONDUCT IN OFFICE. — Being employed in the Court of
First Instance he would instigate persons, especially in his barrio to grab
land rob or coerce. In fact he has cases in the municipal court in this town
involving himself and his men. He incite them telling them not to be afraid as
he is a court employee and has influence over the judges. Those persons
being ignorant would believe him and so would commit crimes. This act of
Mr. Malinao is contrary to good order and peace as he is using his
supposed influences to urge persons to commit crimes.
3 — CRIME OF FALSIFICATION. — Information has it that he is unfaithfully
filing his time record in the CFI. Even he has been out practicing in the
municipal courts sometimes he would fill his time record as present. He
receives salary for those absent days. This can be checked with time record
he has submitted and if he has any application for leave. He may try to cure
it by submitting application for leave but this should not be allowed as he
has already committed crime.
4 — VIOLATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER AND CIVIL SERVICE LAW.-WE
have reliable information it is prohibited for a civil service employee to
engage in private practice any profession or business without permission
from the Department Head. Mr. Malinao we are sure has not secured that
permission because he should not be allowed to practice as he is not an
attorney. If that were so, he violated that Executive Order and Civil Service
Law and we are urgently and earnestly requesting the Commissioner of Civil
 Service to investigate him on this. If warranted he should be given the
corresponding penalty as dismissal because we believe he deserve it.
(Page 2, Record.)
After respondent filed the following 3rd indorsement relative to the above complaint:
Respectfully returned to the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, Manila,
thru the Honorable District Judge, Court of First Instance, Branch I,
Catbalogan, Samar, and thru the Honorable Judicial Superintendent,
Department of Justice, Manila, the undersigned's reply to the preceding
endorsements, to wit: That the alleged letter-complaint of one Julio Zeta is
not inclosed in the first indorsement, which absence has also been noticed
and noted on the right hand corner of the said first indorsement by the Clerk
of Court, of this Court; that despite this absence, and without waiving,
however, his right to any pertinent provision of law, but for respect and
courtesy to a Superior, he hereby states that he has not violated any rule or
law, much less Sec. 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules; that his
participation for defendants' cause was gratuitous as they could not engage
the services of counsel by reason of poverty and the absence of one in the
locality, said assistance has also checked the miscarriage of justice by the
Presiding Municipal Judge, now resigned; that he is attaching herewith a
carbon-original of a pleading submitted by Atty. Simeon Quiachon the
attorney of record for the defendants in Civil Case No. 24, entitled 'Jose
Kiskisan versus Fidel Pacate, et al. for Forcible Entry, in the Municipal Court
of Talalora, Samar, which is a 'Motion To Withdraw Exhibits', as Annex 'A',
as part of this reply. (Page 5, Rec.)
the Department of Justice that had jurisdiction over the matter then, referred the said complaint
and answer to District Judge Segundo Zosa, Court of First Instance, Catbalogan, Western
Samar, for investigation, report and recommendation, and after due hearing, Judge Zosa
submitted his report pertinent parts of which read thus:
Inspite of diligent efforts exerted by the Court to subpoena the complainant,
Julio Zeta, who is said to be a resident of Zumarraga, Samar the same had
failed because the said Julio Zeta appears to be a fictitious person
Inspite of the failure of the complainant to appear in the investigation in
connection with his complaint against Felicisimo Malinao, the Court
nevertheless proceeded to investigate the case against him by calling Judge
Restituto Duran of Sta. Rita, Samar, Judge Juanito Reyes of Zumarraga,
Samar and Judge Miguel Avestruz of Daram, Samar.
Judge Restituto Duran of Sta. Rita, Samar, declared that according to his
docket books the respondent appeared as counsel for Vicente Baculanlan in
criminal case No. 1247 in the Municipal Court of Sta. Rita, Samar, for grave
threats and in criminal case No. 1249 for the same accused and Romulo
Villagracia for illegal possession of firearm on August 5, 1960 and on
September 17, 1970.
Judge Miguel Avestruz of Daram, Samar, declared that the respondent
appeared as counsel in civil case No. 39 in the Municipal Court of Daram,
Samar, entitled Felix Versoza versus Victor Payao, et al., for forcible entry
on December 15, 1962, January 26, 1963, February 18, 1963 and on March
1, 1963.
Judge Juanito Reyes declared that on March 27, 1969, the respondent
appeared as counsel for the defendant in civil case No. 318 of the Municipal
Court of Zumarraga entitled Restituto Centino versus Jesus Tizon for
forcible entry and again on June 17, 1970 in the same case.
From the certification of the Clerk of this Court, it appears that the
respondent had the following entries in his daily time record:
1. Was on leave from office on August 5, 1960 and September 17, 1960;
2. Was present in office on December l5, 1962;
3. Was present in office on January 26, 1963, and present also on February
18, 1963 but undertime by 1 hour;
4. Was on leave from office on March 1, 1963;
5. Was on leave from office on March 27, 1969; and
6. Was present in office on June 17, 1970 but undertime by 5 hours.
Comparing the dates when the respondent appeared before the
aforementioned Municipal Courts with his daily time records, he made it
appear that on December 15, 1962 and February 18, 1963 he was present
in his office although according to the testimony of Judge Miguel Avestruz
he was before his Court on December 15, 1962 as well as on February 18,
1963. Again according to Judge Juanito Reyes the respondent appeared in
his Court on June 17, 1970. The respondent again made it appear in his
daily time record that he was present with an undertime of five hours. The
respondent did not offer any plausible explanation for this irregularity.
xxx xxx xxx
With respect to the crime of falsification of his daily time record as shown by
the evidence, he had made it appear that he was present in his office on
December 15, 1962, February 18, 1963 and June 17, 1970 when as a
matter of fact he was in the Municipal Court of Daram attending to a case
entitled Felix Versoza versus Victor Payao, et al., for forcible entry as well
as in the Municipal Court of Zumarraga attending to Civil Case No. 318
entitled Restituto Centino versus Jesus Tizon for forcible entry. The Inquest
Judge respectfully recommends that he be given stern warning and severe
reprimand for this irregularity.
With respect to the fourth charge, for violation of Section 12, Rule XVIII,
Republic Act 2260, as amended, again the evidence shows that respondent
had been appearing as counsel in the municipal courts of Sta. Rita, Daram
and Zumarraga in violation of the rules of the Civil Service Law. (Pp. 28-31,
Record.)
We have carefully reviewed the record, and We find the conclusions of fact of the Investigator to
be amply supported by the evidence, particularly the documents consisting of public records and
the declarations of the judges before whom respondent had appeared. It is clear to Us that
respondent, apart from appearing as counsel in various municipal courts without prior
permission of his superiors in violation of civil service rules and regulations, falsified his time
record of service by making it appear therein that he was present in his office on occasions
when in fact he was in the municipal courts appearing as counsel, without being a member of
the bar, which, furthermore, constitutes illegal practice of law. We, therefore, adopt the above
findings of fact of the Investigator.
The defense of respondent that "his participation (sic) for defendants' cause was gratuitous as
they could not engage the services of counsel by reason of poverty and the absence of one in
the locality" cannot, even if true, carry the day for him, considering that in appearing as counsel
in court, he did so without permission from his superiors and, worse, he falsified his time record
of service to conceal his absence from his office on the dates in question. Indeed, the number of
times that respondent acted as counsel under the above circumstances would indicate that he
was doing it as a regular practice obviously for considerations other than pure love of justice.
In the premises, it is quite obvious that the offense committed by respondent is grave, hence it
warrants a more drastic sanction than that of reprimand recommended by Judge Zosa. We find
no alternative than to separate him from the service, with the admonition that he desist from
appearing in any court or investigative body wherein Only members of the bar are allowed to
practice.
WHEREFORE, respondent Felicisimo Malinao is hereby ordered dismissed from his position as
interpreter in the Court of First Instance, CFI, Zumarraga, Western Samar with prejudice to
reemployment in the judicial branch of the government.
Castro, C.J., Fernando, Teehankee, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos,
Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
171 Phil. 472
FERNANDO, J.:
This mandamus proceeding seeks to compel respondent Judge Alfredo S. Rebueno of the Court
of First Instance of Naga City, Branch IV, to continue trying a civil case assigned to his sala, [1]
the issue raised being that his Order disqualifying himself amounted to a grave abuse of
discretion based as it was on a ground other than that provided for in the Rules of Court. [2] To
state the proposition is to indicate the weakness of the stand taken by petitioner, the defendant
in such civil case for he would ignore the second paragraph of Rule 137: "A judge may, in the
exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons,
other than those mentioned above."[3] It is by virtue thereof that respondent Judge in the
exercise of sound discretion disqualified himself, granting a motion to that effect of private
respondent, a defendant in such case. In such motion reference was made to certain "attendant
circumstances, particularly the fact that he [respondent Judge] is a townmate and distant relative
of plaintiff, [giving rise to the] strong possibility that whatever his actuations are in the instant
case and any of its incidents, [he] might be suspected of being partial to plaintiff; * * *."[4]
Notwithstanding an opposition filed by petitioner on the ground that the reason alleged is not one
of those provided for by law respondent Judge issued an Order disqualifying himself and
thereafter denied a motion for its reconsideration.
The Order in question reads as follows: "This refers to the motion for inhibition filed by the
plaintiff and the opposition thereto by the defendant. The Court knows from reliable sources that
the defendant has been doubting the actuations of this Court as biased on the belief that the
Presiding Judge is related to the plaintiff. Similarly, however, from reliable sources the Court also
knows that the plaintiff is doubting his actuations because of the defendant's alleged utterances
that he will surely win this case. These circumstances has placed the Court in a very unpleasant
and untenable position, because either way he acts in this case, whether in favor or against the
plaintiff or vice-versa, his actuation will always be tainted and beset with doubt and misgivings
which is highly detrimental to the good name and integrity of the Court. The Judge must maintain
and preserve the trust and faith of the parties litigants. He must hold himself above reproach and
suspicion. At the very first sign of lack of faith and trust to his actions, whether well grounded or
not, the Judge has no other alternative but inhibit himself from the case. A judge may not be
legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation, but when circumstances appear that will induce
doubt to his honest actuations and probity in favor of either party, or incite such state of mind, he
should conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the
people's faith in the Courts of Justice is not impaired. The better course for the Judge under
such circumstances is to disqualify himself. That way, he avoids being misunderstood, his
reputation for probity and objectivity is preserved. What is more important, the ideal of impartial
administration of justice is lived up to."[5] The conclusion set forth in such Order concluded with
this paragraph: "In view of the foregoing considerations, this Court hereby inhibits himself from
further proceedings in this case. Let the record of this case be forwarded to the Honorable
Executive Judge for proper disposition."[6]
That is the order assailed in this proceeding as being contrary to law. Such is not the case. It is
in accordance with the aforesaid rule as well as the doctrines enunciated by this
Court. Mandamus does not lie. What was done by respondent Judge is free from the taint of any
legal infirmity.
1. Respondent Judge, in inhibiting himself, lived up to the ideal of a judiciary striving ever to
preserve public faith in its fairness and objectivity. What better way was there to allay suspicion
and distrust as to a possible bias and prejudice in favor of a party coming into a play. That was
to manifest fealty to a recent pronouncement in Villapando v. Quitain:[7] "The commitment of this
Court to a strict application of the procedural due process mandate of every litigant being
entitled, to follow the language of Gutierrez, to 'nothing less than the cold neutrality of and
impartial judge' is firm and deep-seated."[8] It has found explicit affirmation in the Rule set forth
above. Respondent Judge clearly acted in accordance with its terms. He exercised a discretion
conferred on him. This Tribunal in three cases at least, People v. Gomes,[9] Umale v.
Villaluz,[10] and Palang v. Zosa[11] gave its approval to lower court judges voluntarily disqualifying
themselves as therein provided. We do so again.
2. There is an even more impressive reinforcement to the conclusion thus reached. It is
undeniable that even before the 1964 amendments to the Rules of Court providing for voluntary
disqualification, this Tribunal on at least two occasions sustained the actuation of lower court
judges, who, of their own free will, decided to refrain from trying cases for reasons that did not
call for their inhibition. The first decision of that nature, still by far the most-often quoted,
is Gutierrez v. Santos,[12] referred to in Villapando v. Quitain. The then Judge Arsenio Santos,
now deceased, disqualified himself from a case. He issued such an order not because he had to
do so under the Rules of Court but because as a former private practitioner he had sent a
communication long before to the then Secretary of Interior expressing an opinion favorable to
the contention pressed by one of the parties in the suit pending before him, although not on his
behalf as there never was between them a lawyer-client relationship. A mandamus proceeding
brought against him, similar to this petition, to compel him to try the case failed. A unanimous
Court, speaking through Justice Dizon, could not be any clearer in sanctioning his voluntary
inhibition. Thus: "Petitioner, invoking the provisions of section 1, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court,
argues that the case of the respondent Judge does not fall under any one of the grounds for the
disqualification of judicial officers stated therein. Assuming arguendo that a literal interpretation
of the legal provision relied upon justifies petitioner's contention to a certain degree, it should not
be forgotten that, in construing and applying said legal provision, we cannot disregard its true
intention nor the real ground for the disqualification of a judge or judicial officer, which is the
impossibility of rendering an impartial judgment upon the matter before him. It has been said, in
fact that due process of law requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal, and
that every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge * * *.
Moreover, second only to the duty of rendering a just decision, is the duty of doing it in a manner
that will not arouse any suspicion as to its fairness and the integrity of the Judge. Consequently,
we take it to the true intention of the law stated in general terms that no judge shall preside in a
case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent * * *."[13] That was in
1961, three years before the amended Rules of Court. A year later came Del Castillo v.
Javelona.[14] The voluntary inhibition of respondent Judge, then a justice of the peace, was due
to the fact that a lawyer of one of the parties was his first degree cousin. In dismissing
a certiorari and mandamuspetition assailing such order, this Court with Justice Paredes
as ponente held that the Gutierrez doctrine was applicable. Then came this portion of the
opinion: "Little need be commented on the salutary ruling, just quoted, except to add that if in the
instant case, counsel for respondent company, will win the case, the petitioner could not be
prevented from applying the saying that 'Blood is thicker than water,' and from thinking and
suspecting that respondent Javelona was biased and prejudiced. The courts should administer
justice free from suspicion of bias and prejudice; otherwise, parties litigants might lose
confidence in the judiciary and destroy its nobleness and decorum."[15] The principle was further
stressed in this wise: "In other words, while Rule 126 provides for disqualification, it does not
include nor preclude cases and circumstances for voluntary inhibition which depends upon the
discretion of the officers concerned."[16] To repeat, what was implicit before is now an explicit
provision recognizing the discretion of a judge to disqualify himself from sitting in a case, "for just
and valid reasons" other than those mentioned in the first paragraph of Rule 137.
3. The lack of awareness on the part of counsel of controlling doctrines is thus evident. There is
reference to decisions of this Tribunal, none of which is applicable and one of which, Joaquin v.
Baretto was promulgated way back in 1913, almost 65 years ago.[17] The law, it is not to be
forgotten, is a progressive science. There is then less than full compliance with the demands of
professional competence, if a member of a bar does not keep himself abreast of the trend of
authoritative pronouncements. There is need in this particular case, it would seem, to impress on
counsel of record what was said in the afore-cited case of Palang v. Zosa: "This voluntary
inhibition by respondent Judge is to be commended. He has lived up to what is expected of
occupants of the bench. The public faith in the impartial administration of justice is thus
reinforced. It is not enough that they decide cases without bias and favoritism. It does not suffice
that they in fact rid themselves of prepossessions. Their actuation must inspire that belief. This is
an instance where appearance is just as important as the reality. Like Caesar's wife, a judge
must not only be pure but beyond suspicion. At least, that is an ideal worth striving for. What is
more, there is deference to the due process mandate."[18]
WHEREFORE, petition for mandamus is dismissed. No costs.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988
FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS BERNAL, SR., GLENIA BERNAL, LUIS BERNAL, JR.,
HEIRS OF MARISSA BERNAL, namely, GLICERIA DELA CRUZ BERNAL and LUIS
BERNAL, SR., respondents.
RESOLUTION
CORTES, J.:
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to declare null and void two (2) resolutions of the
Special First Division of the Court of Appeals in the case of Luis Bernal, Sr., et al. v. Felisa
Perdosa De Roy, et al., CA-G.R. CV No. 07286. The first resolution promulgated on 30
September 1987 denied petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration and directed entry of judgment since the decision in said case had become final;
and the second Resolution dated 27 October 1987 denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration
for having been filed out of time.
At the outset, this Court could have denied the petition outright for not being verified as required
by Rule 65 section 1 of the Rules of Court. However, even if the instant petition did not suffer
from this defect, this Court, on procedural and substantive grounds, would still resolve to deny it.
The facts of the case are undisputed. The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners
collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of private respondents,
resulting in injuries to private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Private
respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the
weakened wall but the former failed to do so. On the basis of the foregoing facts, the Regional
Trial Court. First Judicial Region, Branch XXXVIII, presided by the Hon. Antonio M. Belen,
rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence and awarding damages to
private respondents. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court
of Appeals in a decision promulgated on August 17, 1987, a copy of which was received by
petitioners on August 25, 1987. On September 9, 1987, the last day of the fifteen-day period to
file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration,
which was eventually denied by the appellate court in the Resolution of September 30, 1987.
Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration on September 24, 1987 but this was denied in
the Resolution of October 27, 1987.
This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it
denied petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, directed entry
of judgment and denied their motion for reconsideration. It correctly applied the rule laid down
in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, [G.R. No. 70895, August 5, 1985,138 SCRA 461, that
the fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended.
In its Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, promulgated on July 30, 1986 (142
SCRA 208), this Court en banc restated and clarified the rule, to wit:
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced
that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration may be filed with the
Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate
Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of
last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested. (at p.
212)
Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that private respondents had the "last clear
chance" to avoid the accident if only they heeded the. warning to vacate the tailoring shop and ,
therefore, petitioners prior negligence should be disregarded, since the doctrine of "last clear
chance," which has been applied to vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court Resolved to DENY the instant petition for lack
of merit.

Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No.
73146-53, August 26, 1986, 143 SCRA 643], reiterated the rule and went further to restate and
clarify the modes and periods of appeal.

Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 74824, Sept. 15, 1986,144 SCRA
161],stressed the prospective application of said rule, and explained the operation of the grace
period, to wit:

In other words, there is a one-month grace period from the promulgation on

May 30, 1986 of the Court's Resolution in the clarificatory Habaluyas case,
or up to June 30, 1986, within which the rule barring extensions of time to
file motions for new trial or reconsideration is, as yet, not strictly
enforceable.

Since petitioners herein filed their motion for extension on February 27,
1986, it is still within the grace period, which expired on June 30, 1986, and
may still be allowed.

This grace period was also applied in Mission v. Intermediate Appellate Court [G.R. No. 73669,
October 28, 1986, 145 SCRA 306].]

In the instant case, however, petitioners' motion for extension of time was filed on September 9,
1987, more than a year after the expiration of the grace period on June 30, 1986. Hence, it is no
longer within the coverage of the grace period. Considering the length of time from the expiration
of the grace period to the promulgation of the decision of the Court of Appeals on August 25,
1987, petitioners cannot seek refuge in the ignorance of their counsel regarding said rule for
their failure to file a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period.

Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be made to apply
to the case at bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette
as of the time the subject decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated. Contrary to
petitioners' view, there is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the
Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is
the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the
Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and
published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G. R. s) and in such publications
as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.

This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion in
affirming the trial court's decision holding petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code,
which provides that "the proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damage
resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs.