Case 1

TITLE: NIMFA MITRE REYES, BEATRIZ FELICIANO,

DOLORES "Baby" ALVAREZ, BABY JAVIER,
FERNANDO FRIAS, REMEDIOS MAYMIERO,
ROMULO MARCA, SALVADOR NEBRES, VIVIAN
SAZON and ERLINDA CORONADO vs.HEIRS OF
EUDOSIA D. DAEZ, as represented by CECILIA
D. DAEZ
SOURCE: G.R. No. 155553, August 26, 2008
PONENTE: CARPIO, J.

FACTS:

On September 23, 1997, Cecilia D. Daez filed an Ejectment

case against NimfaMitre Reyes, Pamela Tabon, Allen Pascual,
Erlinda Coronado, Beatriz Feliciano, Dolores Alvarez, Virginia
Ocampo, Federico Mateo, Fernando Frias, Baby Javier, Romulo
Marca, RemediosMaymiero, FlorMasmela, Vivian Sazon, and
Salvador Nebres. The complaint alleged that Plaintiffs are the heirs of
the deceased EUDOSIA D. DAEZ. Part of the estate left by said
deceased is a certain property consisting of a lot and apartment units
and covered by TCT No. 21852 still in the name of deceased
EUDOSIA D. DAEZ; Defendants are the tenants and actual
occupants of the aforesaid apartment units on a verbal lease
agreement on a [month-to-month] basis. The apartment units
consisting of two (2) buildings were erected way back in
[1950s]Ocampo briefly added in her separately filed Answer that the
Heirs of Daez have no cause of action inasmuch as their perceived
motive in requesting for the inspection of the building was only to
obtain a legal basis to eject defendants, and that she must be
reimbursed in the amount of P100,000 for the expenses she incurred
in the repair of the toilet and water drainage, repainting of the walls
and ceiling, and other improvements in her unit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the decision of the three (3) courts which have
passed the issues should be reversed.

HELD:

The petitioners have failed to sufficiently show that the Court of

Appeals committed any reversible error in the assailed decision and
resolution. This petition indicates the failure of petitioners to show any
cogent reason why the actions of the three (3) courts which have
passed upon the same issues should be reversed. They failed to
show that the courts’ factual findings are not based on substantial
evidence or that their decisions are contrary to applicable law and
jurisprudence.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The July 23,

2002 Decision as well as the September 27, 2002 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67300 are hereby AFFIRMED.

Case 2
TITLE: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION), JOSE
L. AFRICA (substituted by his heirs), MANUEL H.
NIETO, JR., FERDINAND E. MARCOS
(substituted by his heirs), IMELDA R. MARCOS,
FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, and POTENCIANO ILUSORIO
(substituted by his heirs)
SOURCE: G.R. No. 152375, December 16, 2011
PONENTE: BRION, J.

FACTS:

The petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, through PCGG, filed

a complaint (docketed as Civil Case No. 0009) against Jose L. Africa,
Manuel H. Nieto, Jr., Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos,
Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Juan Ponce Enrile, and PotencianoIlusorio
(collectively, the respondents) for reconveyance, reversion,
accounting, restitution, and damages before the Sandiganbayan. The
petitioner alleged, inter alia, that the respondents illegally
manipulated the purchase of the major shareholdings of Cable and
Wireless Limited in Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc.
(ETPI), which shareholdings respondents Jose Africa and Manuel
Nieto, Jr. held for themselves and, through their holdings and the
corporations they organized, beneficially for respondents Ferdinand
E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos.

Civil Case No. 0009 is the main case subject of the present
petition spawned numerous incidental cases, among them, Civil Case
No. 0130. The present respondents were not made parties either in
Civil Case No. 0130. The petitioner filed a motion to Admit the Bane
Deposition, the respondents filed their respective Oppositions to the
1st motion; in turn, the petitioner filed a Common Reply to these
Oppositions. Sandiganbayan promulgated a resolution (1998
resolution) denying the petitioner’s 1st motion, stating that the
petitioners prayer therein to adopt the testimonies on oral deposition
of Maurice V. Bane and Rolando Gapud as part of its evidence in
Civil Case No. 0009 for the reason that said deponents according to
the [petitioner] are not available for cross-examination in this Court by
the [respondents]. The petitioner made its Formal Offer of Evidence.
Significantly, the Bane deposition was not included as part of its
offered exhibits. Rectifying the omission, the petitioner filed an Urgent
Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice (2nd motion), with the
alternative prayer that An order be issued re-opening the plaintiff’s
case and setting the same for trial for the sole purpose of introducing
additional evidence and limited only to the marking and offering of the
[Bane deposition] which already forms part of the records and used in
Civil Case No. 0130; On several dates thereafter, the respondents
separately filed their respective demurrers to evidence. On the other
hand, the petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the 2000
resolution, but was rebuffed by the Sandiganbayan in its 2001
resolution . The petitioner filed its 3rd Motion, seeking once more the
admission of the Bane deposition.

Pending resolution of the respondents’ demurrers to evidence,

the Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed 2002 resolution,
denying the petitioner’s 3rd motion. The Sandiganbayan ruled that
Resolution rendered on 1998 which already denied the introduction in
evidence of Bane’s deposition and which has become final in view of
plaintiff’s failure to file any motion for reconsideration or appeal within
the 15-day reglementary period. Rightly or wrongly, the resolution
stands and for this court to grant plaintiff’s motion at this point in time
would in effect sanction plaintiff’s disregard for the rules of procedure.
Plaintiff has slept on its rights for almost two years and it was only in
February of 2000 that it sought to rectify its ineptitude by filing a
motion to reopen its case as to enable it to introduce and offer Bane’s
deposition as additional evidence, or in the alternative for the court to
take judicial notice of the allegations of the deposition. But how can
such a motion be granted when it has been resolved as early as 1998
that the deposition is inadmissible. Without plaintiff having moved for
reconsideration within the reglementary period, the resolution has
attained finality and its effect cannot be undone by the simple
expedient of filing a motion, which though purporting to be a novel
motion, is in reality a motion for reconsideration of this court’s 1998
ruling.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the 1998 resolution of the Sandiganbayan is

merely an interlocutory order.

HELD:

A court order is merely interlocutory in character if it leaves

substantial proceedings. It does not end the task of the court in
adjudicating the parties’ contentions and determining their rights and
liabilities as against each other. In this sense, it is basically
provisional in its application.

Under these guidelines, the petitioner is right that the 1998

resolution is interlocutory. The Sandiganbayan’s denial of the
petitioner’s 1st motion through the 1998 Resolution came at a time
when the petitioner had not even concluded the presentation of its
evidence. Plainly, the denial of the motion did not resolve the merits
of the case, as something still had to be done to achieve this end.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the

petition for lack of merit. No costs.

Case 3
TITLE: OFFICE OF THE COURT
ADMINISTRATORvs.JUDGE AUGUSTINE A.
VESTIL, Regional Trial Court, Branch 56,
Mandaue City
OFFICE OF THE COURT
ADMINISTRATORvs.JUDGE JESUS S. DELA
PEÑA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, Oslob,
Cebu
SOURCE: A.M. No. RTJ-06-2030, October 5, 2007
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2032, October 5, 2007
PONENTE: AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

FACTS:

Per Resolution dated May 16, 2005, the Court treated the
Memorandum filed by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
dated January 24, 2004 as administrative complaints against Judge
Jesus S. dela Peña, (Judge dela Peña), Regional Trial Court (RTC)
Branch 62, Oslob, Cebu, also formerly Assisting Judge, RTC Branch
56, Mandaue City; and Judge Augustine A. Vestil, (Judge Vestil),
RTC Branch 56, Mandaue City, for the irregularities and procedural
lapses in the conduct of trial in connection with their handling of Civil
Case No. MAN-3855, a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage,
entitled, "Mary Ann T. Castro-Roa v. Rocky Rommel D. Roa" (Roa
case).

Mary Ann T. Castro-Roa (Castro-Roa), an Assistant City

Prosecutor in Cebu, filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of her
marriage to Rocky Rommel D. Roa (Rocky) before the RTC,
Mandaue City presided by Judge Vestil, but it was Assisting Judge
dela Peña who took cognizance of the case. Rocky filed his Answer
with Counterclaim on August 10, 2000 and the pre-trial was
terminated on December 11, 2000. Castro-Roa testified on January
29, 2001 despite the absence of Rocky. In her cross-examination on
Rocky's counsel, was also absent; thus, it was Public Prosecutor
who conducted the same. Judge dela Peña thereafter issued an
Order declaring Rocky to have waived his right to cross-examine
Castro-Roa. Castro-Roa's witness, Dr. Glenda Ilano, testified, again
despite the absence of Rocky and his counsel. She was cross-
examined by Fiscal Sarino. Judge dela Peña then issued an Order
setting the case for hearing. Judge dela Peña rendered his Decision
declaring the nullity of Castro-Roa's marriage to Rocky. Rocky and
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed to the Court of
Appeals (CA). The CA rendered its Decision declaring the Decision of
Judge dela Peña to be null and void due to the "very apparent fatal
irregularities" in the conduct of the trial of the case which deprived
Rocky of due process of law. The CA ordered the remand of the case
to the court of origin to give Rocky a chance to present evidence.
Castro-Roa filed a Motion to Dismiss Petition (Motion) that she no
longer wished to continue the trial of the petition. The OCA then
recommended that both Judge Jesus S. dela Peña, and Judge
Agustin A. Vestil, be FOUND administratively liable for gross
ignorance of the law or procedure.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial properly conducted in accordance with

the rules.

HELD:

Judge dela Peña flagrantly violated the basic order of trial

provided for in Section 5, Rule 30 of the Rules of Court, which
provides that after the plaintiff has adduced evidence in support of his
complaint, the defendant (in this case, Rocky) shall then adduce
evidence in support of his defense and his counterclaim.

It is very glaring that Judge dela Peña scandalously acted with such
alarming undue haste in rendering a decision in favor of Castro-Roa
on the same day that the latter purportedly offered her exhibits,
without first affording Rocky the opportunity to present his own
evidence; and, as noted by the OCA, without requiring the
submission of the certification of the OSG as to whether he was
objecting to or was in agreement with the petition, as then required in
Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals.Republic of the
Philippines v. Court of Appeals.

A judge should observe the usual and traditional mode of

adjudication which requires that he should hear both sides with
patience and understanding to keep the risk of reaching an unjust
decision at a minimum. A judge must neither sacrifice for
expediency's sake the fundamental requirements of due process nor
forget that he must conscientiously endeavor each time to seek the
truth, to know and aptly apply the law, and to dispose of the
controversy objectively and impartially. This is especially so since
marriage, which is the subject of the case before Judge dela Peña, is
legally inviolable; thus, it is protected from dissolution at the whim of
the parties.

WHEREFORE, Judge Augustine A. Vestil, RTC, Branch

56, Mandaue City, is found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and
procedure. He is imposed a penalty of FINE in the amount
of P21,000.00 to be deducted from his accrued leave credits.
 
Judge Jesus dela Pea, RTC, Branch 62, Oslob, Cebu, is
found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and jurisprudence
tantamount to grave abuse of authority. He is imposed a penalty
of FINE in the amount of P40,000.00 with a stern warning that a
repetition ofthe same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
 
Atty. Emeline Bullecer-Cabahug, Branch Clerk of Court,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 56, Mandaue City, is required to SHOW
CAUSE why no disciplinary action should be taken against her for
issuing a Constancia on February 6, 2004, motu propriosubmitting for
resolution the Motion to Dismiss Petition in Civil Case No. MAN-3855,
entitled Mary Ann T. Castro-Roa v. RockyRommel D. Roa. Let
the administrative matter against Atty. Bullecer-Cabahug be given a
separate docket number and raffled for assignment to a Justice of the
Court.

Case 4
TITLE: NATIVIDAD E. BAUTISTA, CLEMENTE E.
BAUTISTAand SOCORRO L. ANGELESvs.THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, MANILA
PAPERMILLS, INTERNATIONAL, INC., ADELFA
PROPERTIES, INC. and SPOUSES RODOLFO
JAVELLANA and NELLY JAVELLANA
SOURCE: G.R. No. 157219, May 28, 2004
PONENTE: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

FACTS:

Petitioners Natividad E. Bautista, Clemente E. Bautista and

Socorro L. Angeles filed a complaint against respondent Manila
Papermills, International, Inc., before the RTC of Imus, Cavite,
Branch 22, docketed as Civil Case No. 1948-99, for quieting of title.
This complaint was later amended to implead respondents Adelfa
Properties, Inc. and the spouses Rodolfo and Nelly Javellana.
Petitioners alleged in their Amended Complaint that they have been
in actual and uninterrupted possession of Lot 5753 of the Imus
Estate; that they discovered that the land was covered by a
reconstituted title in the name of respondents; and that the said title
and the derivatives thereof are spurious. Hence, they prayed that
they be declared the absolute owners of the land in dispute.

After several delays spanning more than two years, the case
was finally set for trial. However, on May 2, 2002, petitioners filed an
Urgent Motion for Postponement to cancel the hearing on the ground
that Atty. Michael Macaraeg, the lawyer assigned to the case was in
the United States attending to an important matter.

The trial court denied petitioners motion for postponement and

considered them as having waived the presentation of their evidence.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied.
Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 72307. On February 17, 2003,
the Court of Appeals denied due course to the petition for certiorari
and dismissed the same.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Petitioners claim that the arbitrary acts of

the trial court have resulted in the denial of their right to due process.

HELD:

Petitioners’ contention that they were denied due process is not

correct. Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in
the proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot complain of deprivation
of due process. Due process is satisfied as long as the party is
accorded an opportunity to be heard. If it is not availed of, it is
deemed waived or forfeited without violating the constitutional
guarantee.

Moreover, the grant of a motion for continuance or

postponement is not a matter of right. It is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court. Action thereon will not be disturbed by
appellate courts, in the absence of clear and manifest abuse of
discretion resulting in a denial of substantial justice. In other words,
we cannot make a finding of grave abuse of discretion simply
because a court decides to proceed with the trial of a case rather
than postpone the hearing to another day, because of the absence of
a party. That the absence of a party during trial constitutes a waiver of
his right to present evidence and cross-examine the opponent’s
witnesses is firmly supported by jurisprudence. To constitute grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the
refusal of the court to postpone the hearing must be characterized by
arbitrariness or capriciousness.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is

DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
72307 which dismissed the special civil action for certiorari, is
AFFIRMED.

Case 5
TITLE: LAMBERTO CASALLAvs.PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, and MILAGROS S. ESTEVANES
SOURCE: G.R. No. 138855, October 29, 2002
PONENTE: QUISUMBING, J.

FACTS:

The petitioner LambertoCasalla issued two (2) Bank of

Commerce checks in payment of the obligation of his wife, TERESITA
CASALLA, to private respondent MILAGROS SANTOS-
ESTEVANES, in order to avert a court litigation. The two (2) checks,
however, were dishonored by the drawee bank for reason of
insufficiency of funds. Subsequently, private respondent filed two (2)
criminal complaints against petitioner for violation of the Bouncing
Checks Law (BP 22).

The MTC of Pasig City rendered a decision convicting the

accused (petitioner herein) of the crime charged on two (2) counts.
Aggrieved by the decision of the trial court, petitioner interposed an
appeal to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. On January
18, 1995, the court a quo rendered its decision affirming the judgment
of the lower court with the modification that appropriate subsidiary
imprisonment be imposed on the accused in case of insolvency.
Dissatisfied with the decision of the court a quo, petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration on February 8, 1995. In an Order dated
February 9, 1995, the lower court denied the motion for
reconsideration on account of the absence of a notice of hearing and
because the issues raised therein have already been passed upon in
its decision. On February 22, 1995, petitioner filed a second motion
for reconsideration. On February 24, 1995, private respondent filed
with the RTC a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution.
Opposition to the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution was
filed by petitioner on March 3, 1995.

In an Order dated March 13, 1995, the court a quo denied

petitioner's second motion for reconsideration and granted the motion
for the issuance of a writ of execution. On March 21, 1995, a writ of
execution was issued by the court. Petitioner interposed an appeal
via a petition for review with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order. On November 17, 1998, the appellate
court promulgated its decision denying the appeal for lack of merit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the notice of hearing is complied properly.

HELD:

Petitioner received a copy of the decision of the Regional Trial

Court on February 1, 1995. From that date, he had 15 days, or until
February 16, 1995, to file a motion for reconsideration. On February
8, 1995, petitioner did file a motion for reconsideration of the trial
court's decision. The motion, however, lacked a notice of hearing.

The notice of hearing is expressly made a requirement. In this

case it is undisputed that the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner with the Regional Trial Court did not contain any notice of
hearing. It was therefore pro forma; hence, it did not suspend the
running of the prescriptive period. This defect was not cured by the
filing of a second motion for reconsideration, which is prohibited
under the rules.

The appellate court did not err in denying said petition for
review. The RTC's issuance of a writ of execution, petitioner filed a
petition for review under Rule 45 with the Court of Appeals. This was
improper. What it should have filed was a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Under the Rules, no
appeal may be taken from an order denying a motion for new trial or
reconsideration and an order of execution. Instead, where the
judgment or final order may not be appealed, the appropriate
recourse is a special civil action under Rule 65. Thus, the appellate
court did not err in denying said petition for review.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of

merit. The decision dated November 17, 1998 and the resolution
dated May 25, 1999, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
37031 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.