468 Phil.

900

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 145370, March 04, 2004 ]
MARIETTA B. ANCHETA, PETITIONER, VS. RODOLFO S.
ANCHETA, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.: 

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Resolution [1] of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 59550 which dismissed the petitioner’s petition under Rule 47 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure to annul the Order [2] of the Regional Trial Court of
Naic, Cavite, Branch 15 in Special Proceedings No. NC-662 nullifying the marriage
of the petitioner and the respondent Rodolfo S. Ancheta, and of the resolution of
the appellate court denying the motion for reconsideration of the said resolution.

This case arose from the following facts:

After their marriage on March 5, 1959, the petitioner and the respondent resided in
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. They had eight children during their coverture, whose
names and dates of births are as follows:

a. ANA MARIE B . ANCHETA – born October 6, 1959

b. RODOLFO B. ANCHETA, JR. – born March 7, 1961
c. VENANCIO MARIANO B. ANCHETA – born May 18, 1962
d. GERARDO B. ANCHETA – born April 8, 1963
e. KATHRINA B. ANCHETA – born October 29, 1965
f. ANTONIO B. ANCHETA – born March 6, 1967
g. NATASHA MARTINA B. ANCHETA – born August 2, 1968
h. FRITZIE YOLANDA B. ANCHETA – born November 19, 1970 [3]

On December 6, 1992, the respondent left the conjugal home and abandoned the
petitioner and their children. On January 25, 1994, petitioner Marietta Ancheta filed
a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 40, against the
respondent for the dissolution of their conjugal partnership and judicial separation
of property with a plea for support and support pendente lite.  The case was
docketed as Sp. Proc. No. M-3735.  At that time, the petitioner was renting a house
at No. 72 CRM Avenue cor. CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Piñas, Metro
Manila.[4]

On April 20, 1994, the parties executed a Compromise Agreement [5]  where some of
the conjugal properties were adjudicated to the petitioner and her eight children,
including the following:
b. A parcel of land (adjoining the two lots covered by TCT Nos. 120082 and TCT No.
120083-Cavite) located at Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, registered in the name of the
family Ancheta. Biofood Corporation under TCT No. 310882, together with the
resort Munting Paraiso, Training Center, four-storey building, pavilion, swimming
pool and all improvements.  All of the shares of stocks of Ancheta Biofoods
Corporation were distributed one-third (1/3) to the petitioner and the eight children
one-twelfth (1/12) each.[6]
The court rendered judgment based on the said compromise agreement. 
Conformably thereto, the respondent vacated, on June 1, 1994, the resort Munting
Paraiso and all the buildings and improvements thereon.  The petitioner, with the
knowledge of the respondent, thenceforth resided in the said property.

In the meantime, the respondent intended to marry again.  On June 5, 1995, he

filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Naic, Cavite, Branch 15, for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage with the petitioner on the ground of
psychological incapacity. The case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. NC-662.  Although
the respondent knew that the petitioner was already residing at the resort Munting
Paraiso in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, he, nevertheless, alleged in his petition that
the petitioner was residing at No. 72 CRM Avenue corner CRM Corazon, BF Homes,
Almanza, Las Piñas, Metro Manila, “where she may be served with
summons.”[7] The clerk of court issued summons to the petitioner at the address
stated in the petition.[8] The sheriff served the summons and a copy of the petition
by substituted service on June 6, 1995 on the petitioner’s son, Venancio Mariano B.
Ancheta III, at his residence in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite.[9]

On June 21, 1995, Sheriff Jose R. Salvadora, Jr. submitted a Return of Service to
the court stating that the summons and a copy of the petition were served on the
petitioner through her son Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III on June 6, 1995:
RETURN OF SERVICE

This is to certify that the summons together with the copy of the complaint and its
annexes was received by the herein defendant thru his son Venancio M.B. Ancheta
[III] as evidenced by the signature appearing on the summons. Service was made
on June 6, 1995.

June 21, 1995, Naic, Cavite.

(Sgd.) JOSE R. SALVADORA, JR. 

Sheriff[10]
The petitioner failed to file an answer to the petition. On June 22, 1995, the
respondent filed an “Ex-Parte Motion to Declare Defendant as in Default” setting it
for hearing on June 27, 1995 at 8:30 a.m.  During the hearing on the said date,
there was no appearance for the petitioner. The public prosecutor appeared for the
State and offered no objection to the motion of the respondent who appeared with
counsel. The trial court granted the motion and declared the petitioner in default,
and allowed the respondent to adduce evidence ex-parte.  The respondent testified
in his behalf and adduced documentary evidence.  On July 7, 1995, the trial court
issued an Order granting the petition and declaring the marriage of the parties
void ab initio.[11] The clerk of court issued a Certificate of Finality of the Order of the
court on July 16, 1996.[12]

On February 14, 1998, Valentine’s Day, the respondent and Teresita H. Rodil were
married in civil rights before the municipal mayor of Indang, Cavite. [13]

On July 7, 2000, the petitioner filed a verified petition against the respondent with
the Court of Appeals under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, as amended, for the
annulment of the order of the RTC of Cavite in Special Proceedings No. NC-662. The
case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 59550. The petitioner alleged, inter alia, that
the respondent committed gross misrepresentations by making it appear in his
petition in Sp. Proc. No. NC-662 that she was a resident of No. 72 CRM Avenue cor.
CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Piñas, Metro Manila, when in truth and in
fact, the respondent knew very well that she was residing at Munting Paraiso,
Bancal, Carmona, Cavite. According to the petitioner, the respondent did so to
deprive her of her right to be heard in the said case, and ultimately secure a
favorable judgment without any opposition thereto. The petitioner also alleged that
the respondent caused the service of the petition and summons on her by
substituted service through her married son, Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III, a
resident of Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, where the respondent was a resident.
Furthermore, Venancio M.B. Ancheta III failed to deliver to her the copy of the
petition and summons. Thus, according to the petitioner, the order of the trial court
in favor of the respondent was null and void (1) for lack of jurisdiction over her
person; and (2) due to the extrinsic fraud perpetrated by the respondent. She
further contended that there was no factual basis for the trial court’s finding that
she was suffering from psychological incapacity. Finally, the petitioner averred that
she learned of the Order of the RTC only on January 11, 2000. Appended to the
petition, inter alia, were the affidavits of the petitioner and of Venancio M.B.
Ancheta III.

The petitioner prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in her
favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays this Honorable Court to render Judgment
granting the Petition.

1. Declaring null and void the Order dated June 7, 1995 (of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 14,  Naic, Cavite).

2. Ordering respondent to pay petitioner

a. P1,000,000.00 as moral damages;

b. P500,000.00 as exemplary damages;
c. P200,000.00 as attorney’s fees plus P7,500.00 per diem for
every hearing;
d. P100,000.00 as litigation expenses;
 e. Costs of suit.[14]

On July 13, 2000, the CA issued a Resolution dismissing the petition on the
following ground:
We cannot give due course to the present petition in default or in the absence of
any clear and specific averment by petitioner that the ordinary remedies of new
trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available
through no fault of petitioner.  Neither is there any averment or allegation that the
present petition is based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction. Nor yet that, on the assumption that extrinsic fraud can be a valid
ground therefor, that it was not availed of, or could not have been availed of, in a
motion for new trial, or petition for relief.[15]
The petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the said resolution,
appending thereto an amended petition in which she alleged,  inter alia, that:

4. This petition is based purely on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack
of jurisdiction.

5. This petition has not prescribed; it was filed within the four-year period
after discovery of the extrinsic fraud.

6. The ground of extrinsic fraud has not been availed of, or could not
have been availed of in a motion for new trial or petition for relief.

7. The ground of lack of jurisdiction is not barred by laches and/or

estoppel.

8. The ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies were no longer available through no fault of
petitioner; neither has she ever availed of the said remedies. This
petition is the only available remedy to her.[16]

The petitioner also alleged therein that the order of the trial court nullifying her and
the respondent’s marriage was null and void for the court a quo’s failure to order
the public prosecutor to conduct an investigation on whether there was collusion
between the parties, and to order the Solicitor General to appear for the State.

On September 27, 2000, the CA issued a Resolution denying the said motion.

The petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court alleging that
the CA erred as follows:

1. In failing to take into consideration the kind of Order which was sought
to be annulled.

2. In finding that the Petition was procedurally flawed.

 3. In not finding that the Petition substantially complied with the
requirements of the Rules of Court.

4. In failing to comply with Section 5, Rule 47, Rules of Court.

5. In not even considering/resolving Petitioner’s Motion to Admit the

Amended Petition; and in not admitting the Amended Petition.

6. In failing to apply the Rules of Procedure with liberality.[17]

The petition is meritorious.

An original action in the Court of Appeals under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, to annul a judgment or final order or resolution in civil actions of the RTC
may be based on two grounds: (a) extrinsic fraud; or (b) lack of jurisdiction. If
based on extrinsic fraud, the remedy is subject to a condition precedent, namely,
the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. [18] The petitioner
must allege in the petition that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition
for relief from judgment, under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court are no longer
available through no fault of hers; otherwise, the petition will be dismissed.  If the
petitioner fails to avail of the remedies of new trial, appeal or relief from judgment
through her own fault or negligence before filing her petition with the Court of
Appeals, she cannot resort to the remedy under Rule 47 of the Rules; otherwise,
she would benefit from her inaction or negligence.[19]

It is not enough to allege in the petition that the said remedies were no longer
available through no fault of her own. The petitioner must also explain and justify
her failure to avail of such remedies. The safeguard was incorporated in the rule
precisely to avoid abuse of the remedy.[20] Access to the courts is guaranteed. But
there must be limits thereto.  Once a litigant’s rights have been adjudicated in a
valid final judgment of a competent court, he should not be granted an unbridled
license to sue anew.  The prevailing party should not be vexed by subsequent suits.
[21]

In this case, the petitioner failed to allege in her petition in the CA that the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, and petition for relief, were no longer available
through no fault of her own.  She merely alleged therein that she received the
assailed order of the trial court on January 11, 2000. The petitioner’s amended
petition did not cure the fatal defect in her original petition, because although she
admitted therein that she did not avail of the remedies of new trial, appeal or
petition for relief from judgment, she did not explain why she failed to do so.

We, however, rule that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the original petition
and denying admission of the amended petition. This is so because apparently, the
Court of Appeals failed to take note from the material allegations of the petition,
that the petition was based not only on extrinsic fraud but also on lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner, on her claim that the summons and
the copy of the complaint in Sp. Proc. No. NC-662 were not served on her. While
the original petition and amended petition did not state a cause of action for the
nullification of the assailed order on the ground of extrinsic fraud, we rule, however,
that it states a sufficient cause of action for the nullification of the assailed order on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the person of the petitioner,
notwithstanding the absence of any allegation therein that the ordinary remedy of
new trial or reconsideration, or appeal are no longer available through no fault of
the petitioner.

In a case where a petition for the annulment of a judgment or final order of the RTC
filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant/respondent or over the nature or subject of the action, the
petitioner need not allege in the petition that the ordinary remedy of new trial or
reconsideration of the final order or judgment or appeal therefrom are no longer
available through no fault of her own.  This is so because a judgment rendered or
final order issued by the RTC without jurisdiction is null and void and may be
assailed any time either collaterally or in a direct action or by resisting such
judgment or final order in any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked, [22]unless
barred by laches.[23]

In this case, the original petition and the amended petition in the Court of Appeals,
in light of the material averments therein, were based not only on extrinsic fraud,
but also on lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over the person of the petitioner
because of the failure of the sheriff to serve on her the summons and a copy of the
complaint.  She claimed that the summons and complaint were served on her son,
Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III, who, however, failed to give her the said
summons and complaint.

Even a cursory reading of the material averments of the original petition and its
annexes will show that it is, prima facie meritorious; hence, it should have been
given due course by the Court of Appeals.

In Paramount Insurance Corporation v. Japzon,[24] we held that jurisdiction is

acquired by a trial court over the person of the defendant either by his voluntary
appearance in court and his submission to its authority or by service of summons. 
The service of summons and the complaint on the defendant is to inform him that a
case has been filed against him and, thus, enable him to defend himself.  He is,
thus, put on guard as to the demands of the plaintiff or the petitioner. Without such
service in the absence of a valid waiver renders the judgment of the court null and
void.[25] Jurisdiction cannot be acquired by the court on the person of the defendant
even if he knows of the case against him unless he is validly served with summons.
[26]

Summons and complaint may be served on the defendant either by handing a copy
thereof to him in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it
to her.[27] However, if there is impossibility of prompt service of the summons
personally on the defendant despite diligent efforts to find him, service of the
summons may be effected by substituted service as provided in Section 7, Rule 14
of the said Rules:
SEC. 7. Substituted service.— If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be
served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding  section, service may
be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with
some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving
the copies of defendant’s office or regular place of business with some  competent
person in charge thereof.[28]
In Miranda v. Court of Appeals,[29] we held that the modes of service should be
strictly followed in order that the court may acquire jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant.  Thus, it is only when a defendant cannot be served personally
within a reasonable time that substituted service may be made by stating the
efforts made to find him and personally serve on him the summons and complaint
and the fact that such effort failed.[30] This statement should be made in the proof
of service to be accomplished and filed in court by the sheriff.  This is necessary
because substituted service is a derogation of the usual method of service.  It has
been held that substituted service of summons is a method extraordinary in
character; hence, may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances
categorized by statutes.[31]

As gleaned from the petition and the amended petition in the CA and the annexes
thereof, the summons in Sp. Proc. No. NC-662 was issued on June 6, 1995. [32]  On
the same day, the summons was served on and received by Venancio Mariano B.
Ancheta III,[33] the petitioner’s son.  When the return of summons was submitted to
the court by the sheriff on June 21, 1995, no statement was made on the
impossibility of locating the defendant therein within a reasonable time, or that any
effort was made by the sheriff to locate the defendant.  There was no mention
therein that Venancio Mariano Ancheta III was residing at No. 72 CRM Avenue cor.
CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Piñas, where the petitioner (defendant
therein) was allegedly residing. It turned out that Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III
had been residing at Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, and that his father merely showed
him the summons and the complaint and was made to affix his signature on the
face of the summons; he was not furnished with a copy of the said summons and
complaint.

4. From the time my father started staying at Munting Paraiso, Bancal,

Carmona, Cavite, I have been residing on the adjoining land consisting
of two (2) lots later apportioned to my father as his share of the
conjugal partnership. Since then, I have been residing therein up to
the present.

5. On June 6, 1995, at Bancal, Carmona, Cavite (at my residence

situated on my father’s lot), my father came to see me and then asked
me to sign and I did sign papers which he (my father) and the Sheriff
did not allow me to read.  Apparently, these papers are for the
Summons to my mother in the case for annulment of marriage filed by
my father against her.  I was not given any copy of the Summons
and/or copy of the complaint/petition.[34]
We, thus, rule that the Court of Appeals acted arbitrarily in dismissing the original
petition of the petitioner and the amended petition for annulment of the assailed
order grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.

The action in Rule 47 of the Rules of Court does not involve the merits of the final
order of the trial court. However, we cannot but express alarm at what transpired in
the court a quo as shown by the records. The records show that for the petitioner’s
failure to file an answer to the complaint, the trial court granted the motion of the
respondent herein to declare her in default.  The public prosecutor condoned the
acts of the trial court when he interposed no objection to the motion of the
respondent.  The trial court forthwith received the evidence of the respondent ex-
parte and rendered judgment against the petitioner without a whimper of protest
from the public prosecutor. The actuations of the trial court and the public
prosecutor are in defiance of Article 48 of the Family Code, which reads:
Article 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage,
the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on
behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to
take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.

In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based

upon a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment. [35]
The trial court and the public prosecutor also ignored Rule 18, Section 6 of the 1985
Rules of Court (now Rule 9, Section 3[e] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) which
provides:
Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation.— If
the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to
answer, the court shall order the prosecuting  attorney to investigate whether or
not a collusion between the parties exits, and if there is no collusion, to intervene
for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated. [36]
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals,[37] this Court laid down the guidelines in
the interpretation and application of Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of which
concerns the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the State:
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state.  No decision shall be handed down
unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the
case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from
the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court.  The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculicontemplated
under Canon 1095.[38] 
This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin[39] reiterated its pronouncement
in Republic v. Court of Appeals,[40] regarding the role of the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State. [41] The trial court,
abetted by the ineptitude, if not sheer negligence of the public prosecutor, waylaid
the Rules of Court and the Family Code, as well as the rulings of this Court.
The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution requires vigilant
and zealous participation and not mere pro-forma compliance. The protection of
marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine
union but the exposure of an invalid one as well.[42]

A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the

danger of collusion. Hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of
marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to
appear on behalf of the State for the purpose of preventing any collusion between
the parties and to take care that their evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.  If
the defendant-spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot declare him or
her in default but instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to determine if
collusion exists between the parties.  The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose
the application for legal separation or annulment through the presentation of his
own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated.

Our constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic

social institution.  Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere
contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State
can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break-up
of families weakens our social and moral fabric; hence, their preservation is not the
concern of the family members alone.[43] Whether or not a marriage should continue
to exist or a family should stay together must not depend on the whims and
caprices of only one party, who claims that the other suffers psychological
imbalance, incapacitating such party to fulfill his or her marital duties and
obligations.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED.  The Resolutions

of the Court of Appeals dated July 13, 2000 and September 27, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 59550 are hereby SET ASIDE and REVERSED.  Let the records of CA-G.R. SP
No. 59550 be remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings
conformably with the Decision of this Court and Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, as
amended.

SO ORDERED.

Quisumbing, (Acting Chairman), Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur. 

Puno, J., (Chairman),  on leave.

[1]
 Penned by Associate Justice Renato C. Dacudao, with Associate Justices Cancio
C. Garcia (Chairman) and B.A. Adefuin-de la Cruz, concurring.

[2]
  Penned by Judge Enrique M. Almario.

[3]
  CA Rollo, pp. 26-27.
[4]
  Id. at 26.

[5]
  Rollo, pp. 95-102.

[6]
  CA Rollo, pp.  4-5.

[7]
  Id. at 49.

[8]
  Id. at 53.

[9]
  Id.

[10]
 Id. at 54.

[11]
 Id. at 57-59.

[12]
 Id. at 212.

[13]
 Id. at 213.

[14]
 Id. at 21.

[15]
 Id. at 101.

[16]
 Id. at 109.

[17]
 Rollo, p. 36.

[18]
 Rule 47, Section 1.

[19]
 Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 352 SCRA 235 (2001).

[20]
 Herrera, Remedial Law, Vol. III, 1997 ed., p. 549.

[21]
 Pacquing v. Court of Appeals, 115 SCRA 117 (1982).

[22]
 Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 635 (1989).

[23]
 SEC. 3. Period for filing action.—If based on extrinsic fraud, the action must be
filed within four (4) years from its discovery; and if based on lack of jurisdiction,
before it is barred by laches or estoppel.

[24]
 211 SCRA 879 (1992).

[25]
 Umandap v. Sabio, Jr., 339 SCRA 243 (2000).

[26]
 United Coconut Planters Bank v. Ongpin, 368 SCRA 464 (2001).
[27]
 Rule 14, Section 6, Rules of Court.

[28]
 Supra.

[29]
 326 SCRA 278 (2000).

[30]
 Keister v. Navarro, 77 SCRA 209 (1977).

[31]
 Ibid.

[32]
 CA Rollo, p. 53.

[33]
 Ibid.

[34]
 Id.  at 55-56.

[35]
 Supra.

[36]
 Supra.

[37]
 268 SCRA 198 (1997).

[38]
 Id. at 213.

[39]
 355 SCRA 285 (2001).

[40]
 Supra.

[41]
 The procedure has been modified by the Supreme Court in Administrative Matter
No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003.

Sec. 8. Answer.—(1) The respondent shall file his answer within fifteen days from
service of summons, or within thirty days from the last issue of publication in case
of service of summons by publication. The answer must be verified by the
respondent himself and not by counsel or attorney-in-fact.

(2) If the respondent fails to file an answer, the court shall not declare him or her in
default.

(3) Where no answer is filed or if the answer does not tender an issue, the court
shall order the public prosecutor to investigate whether collusion exists between the
parties.

Sec. 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor.—(1) Within one month after

receipt of the court order mentioned in paragraph (3) of Section 8 above, the public
prosecutor shall submit a report to the court stating whether the parties are in
collusion and serve copies thereof on the parties and their respective counsels, if
any.

(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state the basis
thereof in his report. The parties shall file their respective comments on the finding
of collusion within ten days from receipt of a copy of the report. The court shall set
the report for hearing and, if convinced that the parties are in collusion, it shall
dismiss the petition.

(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the court shall set the
case for pre-trial. It shall be the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the
State at the pre-trial.

[42]
 See note 39.

[43]
 Tuason v. Court of Appeals, 256 SCRA 158 (1996).

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319 Phil. 572

EN BANC
[ A.M. No. MTJ-92-716, October 25, 1995 ]
MA. BLYTH B. ABADILLA, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE JOSE C.
TABILIRAN, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE, 8TH MCTC, MANUKAN
AND JOSE DALMAN, 9TH JUDICIAL REGION, MANUKAN,
ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, RESPONDENT. 

DECISION

PER CURIAM: 

"We have a list of these crooked judges whose actuations have been found to be
patently wrong and indefensible.  There ought to be no objection or compunction in
weeding them out from the service.  If they are not booted out now, it will take
from here to eternity to clean this Augean stable." [1]

Indeed, our judicial structure is supposed to be manned by magistrates chosen for

their probity, integrity, impartiality, dedication and learning.  And so, any judge
wanting in any of these qualities should be broomed off and out of the bench in
order to improve the judicial landscape.  Screening off the misfits, considering the
great number of judges and justices in the country at present, is the arduous and
Herculean task of this Court.  The effort if dramatized with rectitude and sincerity
should bring about the strengthening of the people's abiding faith in democracy and
the integrity of our courts of justice.

The herein administrative case arose from complaint, dated September 8, 1992,
filed by Ma. Blyth B. Abadilla, a Clerk of Court assigned at the sala of respondent,
Judge Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr., of the 8th Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Manukan,
Zamboanga del Norte.  Respondent stands charged with "gross immorality,
deceitful conduct, and corruption unbecoming of a judge."

In her verified complaint, complainant Abadilla, in respect to the charge of gross

immorality on the part of the respondent, contends that respondent had
scandalously and publicly cohabited with a certain Priscilla Q. Baybayan during the
existence of his legitimate marriage with Teresita Banzuela.  Adding ignominy to an
ignominious situation, respondent allegedly shamefacedly contracted marriage with
the said Priscilla Baybayan on May 23, 1986.  Complainant claims that this was a
bigamous union because of the fact that the respondent was then still very much
married to Teresita Banzuela.

Furthermore, respondent falsely represented himself as "single" in the marriage

contract (Exh. "A") and dispensed with the requirements of a marriage contract by
invoking cohabitation with Baybayan for five years.

Of persuasive effect on the charge of immorality is the fact that, earlier,

respondent's wife filed a complaint in the case entitled, Teresita B. Tabiliran vs.
Atty. Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr., 115 SCRA 451. Respondent stood charged therein for
abandoning the family home and living with a certain Leonora Pillarion with whom
he had a son.

In respect of the charge of deceitful conduct, complainant claims that respondent

caused to be registered as "legitimate", his three illegitimate children with Priscilla
Baybayan, namely:

Buenasol B. Tabiliran         born on July 14, 1970

Venus B. Tabiliran              born on Sept. 7, 1971

Saturn B. Tabiliran             born on Sept. 20, 1975

by falsely executing separate affidavits stating that the delayed registration was
due to inadvertence, excusable negligence or oversight, when in truth and in fact,
respondent knew that these children cannot be legally registered as legitimate.

The following acts are alleged to have constituted the charge of corruption:

(1)   Utilizing his office time, while being a judge, in the private practice of law by
the preparation and notarization of documents, out of which he charged fees
beyond the authorized rates allowed as Ex-Officio Notary Public.  These acts which,
according to the charge, amount to the private practice of law, prejudice public
interest.

Complainant submitted the following documents in support of these allegations:

a)  Affidavit of Ponciana Geromo (Annex "B"), attesting to the fact that respondent
Judge Tabiliran prepared a Simultaneous Deed of Sale, (Annex "C", Doc. No. 901,
Page No. 77, Book No. V, Series of 1991 of Ex-Officio Notary Public Jose C.
Tabiliran, Jr.) and collect P600.00 from the vendees (par. 10(a) a-1 Complaint, p. 9
records);
b)  Receipt prepared under instruction of the respondent showing that he received
P250.00 thru MCTC Aide Ely O. Inot for preparation and notarization of Joint
Affidavit declaring the correct ages of Carlo Manzano, Lodmila Cinco, Kadapi Amad,
Jul Samud and Amman Eddai dated November 12, 1991, when the legal fees
therefor should have been P10.00 only (Annex "D") (par. 10(a) a-2 Complaint, p. 9
records);

c)  Another receipt (Annex "E") prepared thru the direction of the respondent dated
November 12, 1991, showing that said respondent received from Reynaldo Subebe
the sum of P150.00 for preparation and notarization by him of a Joint Affidavit
declaring the correct age of Agata Luna, Rosie Miranda and Jose Juneser Adrias
(par. 10 (a) a-c Complaint, p. 9 records);

d)  Still another receipt (Annex "F") dated November 12, 1991, signed by the
respondent himself showing that he received from Nelly Baradas the sum of P50.00
for preparation and notarization of Joint Affidavit attesting to the correct age of one
Luzviminda Jacoba (par. 10(a) a-d Complaint, p. 9 records);

e)  Another receipt (Annex "G" dated November 12, 1991, issued by the
respondent, showing that he received from Torres P. Modai the sum of P50.00, thru
the same Ely O. Inot, MCTC Aide, for preparation of Joint Affidavit attesting to the
correct age of Flores Jalampangan (par. 10 (a) a-e Complaint, pp. 9 & 10 records).

(2)   Accepting bribes from parties-litigants in his Court as supported by an affidavit

(Annex "M") executed by a certain Calixto Calunod, a court aide, stating that he
saw Edna Siton, complainant in a criminal case tried by respondent, hand over to
the latter a bag of fish and squid which respondent Judge received.

(3)   Preparing an Affidavit of Desistance in a case filed with his sala out of which he
collected the amount of P500.00 from the accused Antonio Oriola, as supported by
the affidavits of Arcelita Salvador, the complainant therein, and Benito Sagario, one
of the persons present when the accused perpetrated the acts aforesaid. 
(Submitted as Annexes "I" and "J", respectively.)

Complainant manifests that the commission by the respondent of the foregoing acts
renders him unfit to occupy the exalted position of a dispenser of justice.  By the
example shown by the respondent, the public had allegedly lost confidence in the
administration of justice, perceiving as is evident to see that the person occupying
the position of a judge lacks the morality and probity required of one occupying
such a high office.

Respondent, in his comment, dated December 25, 1992, declared that his
cohabitation with Priscilla Baybayan is not and was neither bigamous nor immoral
because he started living with Priscilla Baybayan only after his first wife had already
left and abandoned the family home in 1966 and, since then, and until the present
her whereabouts is not known and respondent has had no news of her being alive. 
He further avers that 25 years had already elapsed since the disappearance of his
first wife when he married Priscilla Baybayan in 1986.

Respondent cited Sec. 3(w), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court and Art. 390 of the Civil
Code in order to show the legality of his acts:

"After the absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee
still lives, he is considered dead for all purposes except for those of
succession." (Rule 131, Sec. 3(w), Rules of Court.)

"After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee
still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of
succession." (Art. 390, Civil Code.)

The case of Jones vs. Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 179, where this Court held that for the
purpose of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse
judicially declared an absentee is to respondent's mind, a case in point.

He admits that he indicated in his marriage contract that he was then "single", but
he denied the charge that he acted with deceit or false misrepresentation, claiming
that, since there were only three words to choose from, namely:  Single, Widow or
Divorced, he preferred to choose the word "single", it being the most appropriate. 
Besides, both he and Priscilla executed a joint affidavit wherein his former marriage
to Banzuela was honestly divulged.

On the charge of corruption, respondent submitted certifications (Annexes "4" &

"5") from the Mayor of Manukan, Zamboanga del Norte, attesting to the fact that
there was no Notary Public in Manukan and, as such, respondent may be allowed to
notarize documents.  He denied having charged exorbitant fees.  He claims that all
the amounts received by him were used to subsidize office expenses, since the
funds he had been receiving from the municipal government were not enough to
cover expenses in maintaining his office.  Respondent submitted a certification
(Annex "6") from the Accounting Department of the Municipal Government of
Manukan to the effect that his yearly expenditures were more than the yearly
appropriations.

Respondent finds support in Canon 4, Rule 4.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
which states:

"A Judge may, with due regard to official duties, engage in activities to improve x x
x the administration of justice."

Respondent vehemently denies the charge of bribery claiming that it was

inconceivable for him to receive a bag full of fish and squid since his residence was
42 kilometers from Jose Dalman where his courtroom or office was located.  It
takes one an hour and a half by bus to reach Katipunan and so, by the time he
reaches his house, the fish and the squid should have become rotten. In support of
his denials, respondent submitted as Annex "8", an affidavit of Ely D. Inot, their
court Interpreter who declared:

xxx                               xxx                               xxx

"3.  That last June 6, 1991, I was with the Municipal Judge, Jose C Tabiliran, Jr.,
from the morning until we went home in the afternoon and we in fact dined
together in the local Carenderia of Jose Dalman as it is the usual ways of the Judge
to eat lunch together with the court personnel;

4.  That when we went home in the afternoon of that day we were also together
riding in a bus, the Lillian Express and until I drop in Roxas and he proceeded to
Katipunan where his residence is;

5.  That all the time during that day I did not noticed him bringing anything except
his `Hand Bag' which he used to carry in going to the office;" (Annex "8", Affidavit
of Ely O. Inot, December 17, 1992.)

xxx                               xxx                               xxx

Finally, respondent tags as a fabricated lie the charge that he prepared an Affidavit
of Desistance in a case pending in his sala and thereafter charged the accused,
Antonio Oriola, the sum of P500.00 for legal services.  The complainant, he said,
was the one who induced Arcelita Salvador (the complainant in the rape case) to
execute an affidavit (Annex "I") in support of the charge of corruption against
respondent.

Complainant's filing of the present case was motivated by revenge and resentment
because, earlier, respondent filed an administrative case (A. M. No. P-91-597)
against her for "Insubordination and Serious Misconduct".  The Supreme Court
decided to reprimand her with a warning that a repetition of her acts will be
severely dealt with.  Respondent claims that the complainant had nevertheless
repeatedly continued to do acts of insubordination in the following manner:

1)   She continues to keep court records and has kept refusing to hand them over
to respondent inspite of verbal and written orders;

2)   She refused to receive a memorandum from the Vice-Mayor requiring the Clerk
of Court to submit an Annual report;

3)   She refused to prepare the said annual report required of her as Clerk of Court;
4)   She continue to refuse to obey just and lawful orders of the Court.

On April 12, 1993, by resolution of this Court En Banc, the herein administrative
case was referred to Executive Judge Jesus O. Angeles of the Regional Trial Court,
Dipolog City, for investigation, report and recommendation.  Judge Angeles found
respondent guilty only on two (2) counts of corruption:  (1) for acting as notary
public and collecting fees for his services; and (2) for preparing an affidavit of
desistance in a case pending in his Court and receiving payment for it.

In his report and recommendation dated August 3, 1993, Executive Judge Angeles
found that:

ON GROSS IMMORALITY:

In contracting marriage with Priscilla Q. Baybayan on May 23, 1986, (p. 13 of the
records), respondent did not hide the fact that he was married to Teresita T.
Banzuela, having disclosed it in his affidavit jointly executed with Priscilla Q.
Baybayan on May 23, 1986 (p. 115 of the records), particularly paragraph 4 thereof
which reads:

"4. That affiant Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr., was formerly married to Teresita T. Banzuela
but who left and abandoned their family home sometime in 1965 in Katipunan,
Zamboanga del Norte, and until now at present her whereabouts is not known."

It was therefore a marriage contracted under Article 83 (2) of the Civil Code which,
although bigamous, remains valid until automatically terminated by the recording of
the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse (Art. 42, Family Code). 
Respondent's assertion that since 1965 to the present, his first wife Teresita T.
Banzuela had left their conjugal dwelling and did not return, her whereabouts being
unknown, was not controverted.  Living as husband and wife pursuant to an
authorized bigamous marriage, respondent cannot be said to be acting in an
immoral and scandalous manner, and the immoral stigma of extra-marital union
since 1969 duly declared in their aforesaid joint affidavit, may be considered
cleansed by their marriage in 1986, if Art. 1395 of the Civil Code on ratification on
contracts in general is allowed to be applied, it being ratification of marital
cohabitation.  Article 76 of Civil Code, now Art. 34 of the Family Code was intended
to facilitate and encourage the marriage of persons who have been living in a state
of concubinage for more than five years (Tolentino, Civil Code, Book I, 1974 Ed., p.
245, cited in Ernesto L. Pineda, Family Code, 1992 Ed., p. 38). Indicating his civil
status in the marriage contract as "single" is hardly considered a misrepresentation
of fact, specially to the solemnizing officer, Municipal Mayor Jacinto C. Ruedas, Jr.
to whom the aforesaid joint affidavit was submitted.

ON DECEITFUL CONDUCT:
Respondent's children begotten with Priscilla Q. Baybayan, namely:  Buenasol B.
Tabiliran, Venus B. Tabiliran and Saturn B. Tabiliran, all of whom were born before
their marriage, were disclosed and made known to the solemnizing officer and the
latter himself, in his affidavit dated May 23, 1986 (p. 116 of the records) which
supports the marriage contract of respondent with Priscilla Q. Baybayan, having
shown such fact.

Exhibit P which purports to be an affidavit of Lydia T. Zanoria dated May 27, 1993,
consisting of three pages, was submitted by the complainant for the purpose of
proving her charge that the respondent falsely executed his three separate
affidavits, namely:  Exhibit K dated May 24, 1983 regarding the late registration of
birth of his daughter Buenasol B. Tabiliran; Exhibit M dated May 28, 1988 regarding
the late registration of birth of his third child Saturn B. Tabiliran; and his affidavit
dated May 27, 1988, Exhibit O, in reference to the late registration of birth of his
second child Venus B. Tabiliran, stating inadvertence, excusable negligence or
oversight as the reasons for the delayed registration of their births, without
however presenting said affiant Mrs. Zanoria, consequently denying respondent the
opportunity to cross examine her.  Her affidavit is not among those brought out in
the pre-hearing conference, and was not discussed during the hearing itself,
submitting it only after the investigation proper was terminated.  The supposed
affiant claimed she was the government midwife who attended to the births of
respondent's three children, denying, as the affidavit shows, negligence,
inadvertence or oversight on her part to register their birth on time.  Not having
been presented for respondent to confront her, or an opportunity to do so, Exhibit P
cannot be considered evidence of the charge.  An affidavit is hearsay unless the
affiant is presented (People vs. Villeza, 127 SCRA, 349), or admitted by the party
against whom it is presented.

ON CORRUPTION:

1.  Acting as Notary Public during office hours, and collecting fees:

Respondent has admitted having prepared the documents and collected fees, in the
instances specified in par. 10 of the complaint, namely:  (1) affidavit of Ponciana
Geromo; (2) Joint Affidavit of Carlo Manzano, Lodmila Cinco, Kadapi Amad, Jul
Samud and Amman Eddai; (3) Joint Affidavit of Agata Luna, Rosie Miranda and Jose
Juneser Adrias; (4) Joint Affidavit on the correct age of Luzviminda Jacoba; and (5)
Joint Affidavit on the correct age of Flores Jalampangan, but not necessarily on the
accuracy of the amounts therein stated as having been collected by him from them
(please see Pre-Hearing Order of May 20, 1993 of the Investigating Judge). 
Seeking justification of his acts, respondent submitted Annexes 4 & 5 of his
comments (pp. 118 and 119, records) which are certifications of Manukan Mayor
Eugene U. Caballero attesting that in the absence of a Notary Public in Manukan
town, respondent who is a Judge thereat was allowed "to prepare and ligalize (sic)
documents."
He declared "the fees derived from the preparation and notarization of documents
were mostly used by respondent to buy supplies and materials of his Office",
explaining that his office needs cannot be sustained by the appropriations of the
local government which are inadequate.  On page 120 of the records, his Annex 6
shows a shortage in his appropriations for supplies.  And supplies from the
Supreme Court can only be obtained if secured personally but has to assume the
expenses for transportation, freight and handling.

Respondent Judge maintains that the Code of Judicial conduct does not prohibit him
from acting as Notary Public, and the fees he has received were much lower than
the rates prescribed by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Zamboanga del Norte
Chapter, submitting Annex 3, p. 117 of the records, to prove it.

Further justifying his act under Canon 4, Rule 4.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
which provides that a judge may, with due regard to official duties, engaged in
activities to improve the administration of justice, respondent claims that due to his
efforts, he was able to secure an extension room of his office covering a floor area
of 24 square meters, from the Sangguniang Pampook of Region IX based in
Zamboanga City, costing P19,000.00 per certification shown in his Annex 7 (page
121 of the records).

In the light of 1989 Code of Judicial Conduct vis a vis the power of Municipal Trial
Court Judges and Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judges to act in the capacity of
Notary Public Ex-Officio, the Honorable Supreme Court in A.M. No. 89-11-1303,
MTC, Dec. 19, 1989, has ruled:

"MTC and MCTC Judges assigned to municipalities or circuits with no lawyers or

notaries public may, in their capacity as notary public ex-officio perform any act
within the competency of a regular Notary Public, provided that:  (1) all notarial
fees charged be for the account of the Government and turned-over to the
municipal treasurer (Lapeña, Jr. vs. Marcos, Adm. Matter No. 1969-MJ, June 29,
1982, 114 SCRA 572); and (2) certification be made in the notarized documents
attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary public in such municipality or circuit."

Although absence of a notary public commissioned for, and residing in Manukan

town, even in Jose Dalman which is within his circuit is confirmed, respondent
Judge while he may be justified in so acting as notary public, did not, however,
comply with requirement No. 1 which obliged him to charge for the account of the
Government and turn-over to the municipal treasurer all notarial fees.  And there is
no way of determining the truth of his assertion that the notarial fees he collected
were "mostly used" to buy supplies and materials for his office, absent any
accounting.

2.  Accepting Bribe from Parties-litigants:

Admitting the existence of Annex H found on page 21 in the records, respondent,
however, denied the imputation therein contained by affiant Calixto Calunod that he
received a sando bag full of fish and squid from a certain Edna Siton who had a
case with respondent's court as complainant in a certain criminal case.  Instead of
calling the affiant himself, complainant presented the Court Interpreter Ely O. Inot,
who "confirmed that there was squid and fish contained in a plastic bag which was
left in Aseniero Carenderia by a person unknown to her and some members of the
Court staff.  When informed by the carenderia owner that the stuff was intended for
Judge Tabiliran, the latter told them to cook it, and they afterwards partook of it
without the Judge who already boarded the passenger bus". (Record of
Proceedings, p. 1, par. No. 1, dated June 11, 1993).  Being her witness,
complainant is bound by her testimony.  This particular charge is, therefore, not
proved.

3.  Preparing Affidavit of Desistance and Collecting Fee for his Services:

Under this count, two affidavits both sworn before 2nd Asst. Provincial Fiscal
Valeriano B. Lagula were submitted:  one by Arcelita Salvador, complainant in an
attempted rape case who was categorical in her declaration that respondent Judge
asked and received from Pitoy Oriola, brother of accused Antonio Oriola the amount
of P500.00 after the Judge prepared the affidavit of desistance and motion to
dismiss which he made her sign (Annex I, p. 40 records).  Benito Sagario who was
present executed another separate affidavit, Annex J found on page 41 in the
records, confirming it.  In admitting the affidavit, respondent, however, denied the
imputation, asserting that it is false, but without confronting them or presenting
witnesses to dispute their accusation.  He could have demanded that the affiants,
including the persons they mentioned were present in the transaction, namely: 
accused Antonio Oriola, his brother Pitoy Oriola, Ignacio Salvador, and INC Minister
Antonio Caluña be required to appear for his confrontation, but respondent chose
not, contented himself only with the explanation that it was just the handiwork of
complainant Abadilla and her husband, a major in the military who is an active
member of the Iglesia Ni Cristo of which affiant Arcelita Salvador also belonged,
which is bare and unsubstantiated.  No other conclusion can be drawn other than
holding, as the Investigating Judge does, that this particular charge is true. 
Evidently, Judge Tabiliran wants to avoid meeting them by way of confrontation.  If
he is innocent, and is certain the charge is fabricated, he will surely raise hell to
insist that he confronts them face to face.  Clearly, his deportment betrays his
insistence of innocence.

On Respondent's Counterclaim:

It was not proven.  On the contrary, the controverting evidence shows that the
records of Criminal Case No. 2279 referred to in his Annex 9, p. 123 of the records,
were not in the possession of complainant.  Quite obviously, Ely O. lnot,
respondent's Court Interpreter tried to cover up the fact that the same were
already being kept by Judge Tabiliran before he issued the memorandum, Annex 9. 
Complainant, who is respondent's Clerk of Court was not, therefore, in a position to
comply with his Order.

Also, Mrs. Abadilla's failure to prepare the annual report of the Court in 1992 as
called for in Annexes 10 and 10-A was, contrary to respondent's claim, not by
reason of her obstinate refusal to obey her superior but, by sheer impossibility to
comply, considering that monthly reports upon which the annual report shall be
based, were not prepared by her, not because of her refusal to do so which is
among those included in her job description, but because the Judge himself took
the work from her for no other reason than to establish the false impression that
the complainant is disobedient to the Judge, and does not attend to her duties.

By and large, there is no harmony in their office.  Complainant and respondent are
not in talking terms.  They are hostile to each other.  Respondent's complaint that
Mrs. Abadilla spat saliva in front of him whenever they meet each other; destroying
the Court dry seal by throwing it at him one time she was mad; showing face; and
sticking out her tongue to him, are all puerile acts which the undersigned cannot
conclude as sufficiently established even with the testimony of Mrs. Ely O. Inot
which is far from being definite and categorical, whose actuation is understandable
because Judge Tabiliran, being her superior, has moral ascendancy over her
(Record of Proceedings, June 11, 1993).

The undersigned believes that the problem is on Judge Tabiliran, and not on Mrs.
Abadilla, who has been in the service as Clerk of Court under a previous Judge of
the same Court for quite long without any complaint having been filed.  The
evidence disputing his counterclaim tends to show that respondent tried to build up
a situation of undesirability against his Clerk of Court whom he wanted pulled out
from her position in his Court.

Other Matters Not Covered By The Complaint And Comments:

The authority to investigate being confined only to matters alleged in the complaint
on the basis of which respondent filed his comments, other matters not therein
covered which complainant brought out by way of presenting documentary exhibits,
(from Exhibit AAA to HHH), are not subject of this report and recommendation.

RECOMMENDATION:

The charge of GROSS IMMORALITY and DECEITFUL CONDUCT have not been
proven, but the undersigned believes evidence is sufficient to sustain a
pronouncement of guilt on two counts of CORRUPTION, namely:  acting as notary
public and collecting fees for his services in preparing affidavit of desistance of a
case in his Court.  Likewise, acts of oppression, deceit and false imputation against
his Clerk of Court are found duly established.

WHEREFORE, suspension of the respondent Judge from the service for a period of
three months is recommended.

THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, We hold the respondent culpable for gross

immorality, he having scandalously and openly cohabited with the said Priscilla
Baybayan during the existence of his marriage with Teresita B. Tabiliran.

Contrary to his protestations that he started to cohabit with Priscilla Baybayan only
after his first wife, Teresita Tabiliran, had long abandoned him and the conjugal
home in 1966, it appears from the record that he had been scandalously and openly
living with said Priscilla Baybayan as early as 1970 as shown by the fact that he
begot three children by her, namely Buenasol, Venus and Saturn, all surnamed
Tabiliran.  Buenasol was born on July 14, 1970; Venus was born on September 7,
1971; while Saturn was born on September 20, 1975.  Evidently, therefore,
respondent and Priscilla Baybayan had openly lived together even while
respondent's marriage to his first wife was still valid and subsisting.  The provisions
of Sec. 3(w) of the Rules of Court and Art. 390 of the Civil Code which provide that,
after an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still
lives, the absent spouse shall be considered dead for all purposes, except for those
of succession, cannot be invoked by respondent.  By respondent's own allegation,
Teresita B. Tabiliran left the conjugal home in 1966.  From that time on up to the
time that respondent started to cohabit with Priscilla Baybayan in 1970, only four
years had elapsed.  Respondent had no right to presume therefore that Teresita B.
Tabiliran was already dead for all purposes.  Thus, respondent's actuation of
cohabiting with Priscilla Baybayan in 1970 when his marriage to Teresita B.
Tabiliran was still valid and subsisting constitutes gross immoral conduct.  It makes
mockery of the inviolability and sanctity of marriage as a basic social institution. 
According to Justice Malcolm:  "The basis of human society throughout the civilized
world is that of marriage.  It is not only a civil contract, but is a new relation, an
institution on the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. 
Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony."
(Civil Code 1993 Ed., Volume 1, p. 122, Ramon C. Aquino).

By commiting the immorality in question, respondent violated the trust reposed on

his high office and utterly failed to live up to the noble ideals and strict standards of
morality required of the law profession.  (Imbing v. Tiongson, 229 SCRA 690).

As to respondent's act of eventually marrying Priscilla Baybayan in 1986, We are

not in a position to determine the legality thereof, absent all the facts for a proper
determination.  Sufficient for Our consideration is the finding of the Investigating
Judge, that the said marriage is authorized under Art. 83 (2) of the Civil Code.

With respect to the charge of deceitful conduct, We hold that the charge has
likewise been duly established. An examination of the birth certificates (Exhs. "J",
"L", & "M") of respondent's three illegitimate children with Priscilla Baybayan clearly
indicate that these children are his legitimate issues.  It was respondent who
caused the entry therein.  It is important to note that these children, namely,
Buenasol, Venus and Saturn, all surnamed Tabiliran, were born in the year 1970,
1971, and 1975, respectively, and prior to the marriage of respondent to Priscilla,
which was in 1986.  As a lawyer and a judge, respondent ought to know that,
despite his subsequent marriage to Priscilla, these three children cannot be
legitimated nor in any way be considered legitimate since at the time they were
born, there was an existing valid marriage between respondent and his first wife,
Teresita B. Tabiliran.  The applicable legal provision in the case at bar is Article 269
of the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. 386 as amended) which provides:

Art. 269.  Only natural children can be legitimated.  Children born outside of
wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not
disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, are natural.

Legitimation is limited to natural children and cannot include those born of

adulterous relations (Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855).  The Family Code (Executive
Order No. 209), which took effect on August 3, 1988, reiterated the above?
mentioned provision thus:

Art. 177.  Only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at
the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment
to marry each other may be legitimated.

The reasons for this limitation are given as follows:

1)  The rationale of legitimation would be destroyed;

2)  It would be unfair to the legitimate children in terms of successional rights;

3)  There will be the problem of public scandal, unless social mores change;

4)  It is too violent to grant the privilege of legitimation to adulterous children as it

will destroy the sanctity of marriage;

5)  It will be very scandalous, especially if the parents marry many years after the
birth of the child.  (The Family Code, p. 252, Alicia V. Sempio Diy).

It is clear, therefore, that no legal provision, whether old or new, can give refuge to
the deceitful actuations of the respondent.

It is also erroneous for respondent to state that his first wife Teresita disappeared
in 1966 and has not been heard from since then.  It appears that on December 8,
1969, Teresita filed a complaint against respondent entitled, Tabiliran vs. Tabiliran
(G.R. No. 1155451) which was decided by this Court in 1982.  In the said case,
respondent was sued for abandonment of his family home and for living with
another woman with whom he allegedly begot a child.  Respondent was, however,
exonerated because of the failure of his wife to substantiate the charges. However,
respondent was reprimanded for having executed a "Deed of Settlement of Spouses
To Live Separately from Bed", with a stipulation that they allow each of the other
spouse to live with another man or woman as the case may be, without the
objection and intervention of the other.  It was also in the same case where
respondent declared that he has only two children, namely, Reynald Antonio and
Jose III, both surnamed Tabiliran, who are his legitimate issues.  Thus, his
statements in his affidavits marked as Exhs. "M-4" and "O-4" that Saturn and
Venus are his third and second children respectively, are erroneous, deceitful,
misleading and detrimental to his legitimate children.

With respect to the charge of corruption, We agree with the findings of the
Investigating Judge that respondent should be found culpable for two counts of
corruption:  (1) acting as Notary Public; and (2) collecting legal fees in preparing an
Affidavit of Desistance of a case in his court.

Respondent himself admitted that he prepared and notarized the documents

(Annexes "C", "D", "E", "F" and "G") wherein he charged notarial fees.  Though he
was legally allowed to notarize documents and charge fees therefor due to the fact
that there has been no Notary Public in the town of Manukan, this defense is not
sufficient to justify his otherwise corrupt and illegal acts.

Section 252 of the Notarial Law expressly provides thus:

SEC. 252.  Compensation of Notaries Public - No fee, compensation, or reward of

any sort, except such as is expressly prescribed and allowed by law, shall be
collected or received for any service rendered by a notary public. Such money
collected by notaries public proper shall belong to them personally.  Officers acting
as notaries public ex-officio shall charge for their services the fees prescribed by
law and account therefor as for Government funds.  (Notarial Law, Revised
Administrative Code of the Philippines, p. 202.)

Respondent's failure to properly account and turn over the fees collected by him
as Ex-Officio notary to the municipal government as required by law raises the
presumption that he had put such fund to his personal use.

With respect to the charge that respondent prepared an Affidavit of Desistance in a

rape case filed before his sala for which he collected the amount of P500.00 from
the complainant therein, respondent merely denied the said imputation but failed to
offer any evidence to support such denial.  Denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, is a negative and self-serving evidence which deserves no
weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of
credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters (People v. Amaguin, 229
SCRA 166).  It is unfortunate that respondent had failed to adhere to, and let this
remind him once again of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, to wit:

Canon 2

A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr. guilty of
gross immorality, deceitful conduct and corruption and, consequently, orders his
dismissal from the service.  Such dismissal shall carry with it cancellation of
eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and disqualification
from re-employment in the government-service, all without prejudice to criminal or
civil liability.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Panganiban, J., no part.

[1]
 Justice Juvenal K. Guerrero in De La Llana vs. Alba, G.R. No. 57883, 12 March
1982.

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SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R.. No. 214529, July 12, 2017 ]
 JERRYSUS L. TILAR, PETITIONER, V. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.: 

Before us is a direct recourse from the Decision [1] dated June 3, 2014 and the
Order[2] dated August 19, 2014, both issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14,
Baybay City, (RTC) in Special Proceeding (SP) No. B-10-11-39 dismissing the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter, and denying reconsideration thereof, respectively.

The factual antecedents are as follows:

On November 4, 2010, petitioner filed with the RTC a petition [3] for declaration of
nullity of marriage on the ground of private respondent's (respondent)
psychological incapacity based on Article 36 of the Family Code. He alleged that he
and respondent were married on June 29, 1996 in a Catholic Church in Poro, Poro
Camotes, Cebu with Rev. Fr. Vicente Igot as the solemnizing officer; that a son was
born of their marriage; that their marriage went well in the first few months but
respondent later became an extremely jealous, violent person which resulted to
frequent quarrels and petitioner being threatened and physically harmed; that she
is a happy-go-lucky and extravagant type of person and a gambler; that they
eventually separated in 2002; and, that respondent is now living with another man
in Cebu City. Petitioner consulted a clinical psychologist and respondent was said to
be suffering from "aggressive personality disorder as well as histrionic personality
disorder" which made her psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential
marital obligations.

Respondent failed to file her Answer despite being served with summons. The RTC
then required the Public Prosecutor to conduct an investigation whether collusion
existed. In his Manifestation and Compliance, the Public Prosecutor certified as to
the absence of collusion between the parties.[4] Trial, thereafter, ensued with
petitioner and his witness testifying.

On June 3, 2014, the RTC issued its assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this case is ORDERED DISMISSED for lack

of jurisdiction over the subject matter.[5]

In so ruling, the RTC ratiocinated in this wise:

x x x the lingering issue that confronts this Court, whether it can validly [pass]
upon the validity of church marriage in the light of the separation of the Church and
the State as enunciated in Section 6 of Art. (sic) of the 1987 Constitution. Withal,
marriage is a sacrament according to the teaching of the Catholic Church. Being a
sacrament, the same is purely religious. Declaration of nullity, which is commonly
called an annulment in the Catholic Church, is a judgment rendered by an
ecclesiastical tribunal determining that the sacrament of marriage was invalidly
contracted. The procedure is governed by the Church's Canon Law not by the civil
law observed by the State in nullity cases involving civil marriages. Ergo, the
principle of separation of Church and State finds application in this case. x x x

xxxx

Clearly, the State cannot encroach into the domain of the Church, thus, resolving
the validity of the church marriage is outside the province of its authority. Although
the Family Code did not categorize the marriage subject of the petition for nullity or
annulment, the Constitution as the fundamental law of the State laid down the
principle of separation, ergo, it is beyond cavil that nullity of a church marriage
cannot be taken out of the church jurisdiction. The court being an entity of the
State is bereft of any jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case.

As the second issue hinges on the affirmative resolution on the jurisdiction of this
Court, the same becomes moot due to the non-affirmance of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case.[6]

Petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration, which the RTC denied in an Order
dated August 19, 2014.

In denying the motion for reconsideration, the RTC said:

Marriages solemnized and celebrated by the Church are [per se] governed by its
Canon Law. Although the Family Code provides for some regulations, the same
does not follow that the State is authorized to inquire to its validity, The
Constitution is supreme to the Family Code. Under the doctrine of constitutional
supremacy, the Constitution is written in all laws, acts and transactions, hence, the
same must be upheld.[7]

Petitioner filed the instant petition for review on the sole ground that:

The Regional Trial Court erred in dismissing the case on the ground that the validity
of church marriage is outside of the province of its authority. [8]

Petitioner contends that the RTC had rendered judgment principally on the ground
that the validity of church marriage is outside the province of its authority,
however, it is the civil law, particularly the Family Code, which principally governs
the marriage of the contracting parties.
The Solicitor General filed a Manifestation in Lieu of Comment on the petition for
review arguing that the courts have jurisdiction to rule on the validity of marriage
pursuant to the provision of the Family Code, and that the RTC has exclusive
jurisdiction over cases involving contracts of marriage and marital relations.

We find merit in this petition.

Section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution provides:

Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the

family and shall be protected by the State.

Our Constitution clearly gives value to the sanctity of marriage. Marriage in this
jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution the
maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.[9] Thus, the State is mandated
to protect marriage, being the foundation of the family, which in turn is the
foundation of the nation.[10] The State has surrounded marriage with safeguards to
maintain its purity, continuity and permanence. The security and stability of the
State are largely dependent upon it. It is the interest of each and every member of
the community to prevent the bringing about of a condition that would shake its
foundation and ultimately lead to its destruction.[11]

Our law on marriage, particularly the Family Code, restates the constitutional
provision to protect the inviolability of marriage and the family relations. In one of
the whereas clauses of the Family Code, it is stated:

Whereas, there is a need to implement policies embodied in the New Constitution

that strengthen marriage and the family as a basic social institution and ensure
equality between men and women.

Accordingly, Article 1 of the Family Code pertinently provides:

Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a

woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and
family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution
whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during
the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.

As marriage is a special contract, their terms and conditions are not merely subject
to the stipulations of the contracting parties but are governed by law. The Family
Code provides for the essential[12] as well as formal[13] requisites for the validity of
marriage. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the
marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2). A defect in any of the
essential requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or
parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable.[14] No prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization
of the marriage is required. It shall be necessary, however, for the contracting
parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in the
presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as
husband and wife. This declaration shall be contained in the marriage certificate
which shall be signed by the contracting parties and their witnesses and attested by
the solemnizing officer. A marriage license shall be issued by the local civil registrar
of the city or municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, except
in marriages where no license is required.[15] The rationale for the compulsory
character of a marriage license is that it is the authority granted by the State to the
contracting parties, after the proper government official has inquired into their
capacity to contract marriage.[16]

The Family Code also provides on who may solemnize and how marriage may be
solemnized, thus:

Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:

xxxx

(2) Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or religious sect duly
authorized by his church or religious sect and registered with the civil registrar
general, acting within the limits of the written authority granted by his church or
religious sect and provided that at least one of the contracting parties belongs to
the solemnizing officer's church or religious sect;

xxxx

Article. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge
or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-
general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in
cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places in
accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both of the parties request the
solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a
house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.

Thus, the contract of marriage is entered into by complying with the requirements
and formalities prescribed by law. The marriage of petitioner and respondent which
was solemnized by a Catholic priest and was held in a church was in accordance
with the above-quoted provisions. Although, marriage is considered a sacrament in
the Catholic church, it has civil and legal consequences which are governed by the
Family Code. As petitioner correctly pointed out, the instant petition only seeks to
nullify the marriage contract between the parties as postulated in the Family Code
of the Philippines; and the declaration of nullity of the parties' marriage in the
religious and ecclesiastical aspect is another matter.[17] Notably, the proceedings for
church annulment which is in accordance with the norms of Canon Law is not
binding upon the State as the couple is still considered married to each other in the
eyes of the civil law. Thus, the principle of separation of the church and state finds
no application in this case.
As marriage is a lifetime commitment which the parties cannot just dissolve at
whim, the Family Code has provided for the grounds[18] for the termination of
marriage. These grounds may be invoked and proved in a petition for annulment of
voidable marriage or in a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, which can
be decided upon only by the court exercising jurisdiction over the matter. Section
19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, otherwise known as the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980 provides:

Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction:

xxxx

(15) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations;

Hence, a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, which petitioner filed before
the RTC of Baybay City, falls within its exclusive jurisdiction; thus, the RTC erred in
dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Regional Trial

Court, Branch 14, Baybay City, Leyte is ORDERED to PROCEED with the resolution
of the case based on the sufficiency of the evidence presented.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Mendoza, Leonen  and Martires, JJ., concur. 

Carpio, J., certify that J. Leonen  left his vote concurring with this ponencia. 

[1]
 Penned by Judge Carlos O. Arguelles; rollo, pp. 18A-22.

[2]
 Id. at 31.

[3]
 Id. at 14-18.

[4]
 Id. at 19.

[5]
 Id. at 22.

[6]
 Id. at 20-21.

[7]
 Id. at 31.

[8]
 Id. at 8.

[9]
 Mariategui v. Court of Appeals, 282 Phil. 348, 356 (1992).
[10]
 Section 1, Art. XV, Constitution, thus:

Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development.

[11]
 Jimenez v. Cañizares, 109 Phil. 273, 276 (1960).

[12]
 Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites are present:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female; and
(2) Consent freely given in the presence of a solemnizing officer.

[13]
 Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer; 

(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this
Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting
parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take
each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of
legal age.

[14]
 Art. 4.

[15]
 Art. 9.

[16]
 See Republic v. Dayot, 573 Phil. 553, 569 (2008).

[17]
 Rollo, p. 9-A.

[18]
 Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the
consent of parents or guardians; 
(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages
unless such marriages were contracted with either or both parties believing in good
faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so; 
(3) Those solemnized without license, except those covered the preceding Chapter; 
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing under Article 41; 
(5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of
the other; and
(6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after
its solemnization. (As amended by Executive Order 227)

Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the
beginning, whether relationship between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate:

(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and 

(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.

Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of
public policy:

(1) Between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the

fourth civil degree;
(2) Between step-parents and step-children; 
(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child; 
(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child; 
(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter; 
(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter; 
(8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and
(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that
other person's spouse, or his or her own spouse.

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous

marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead.
In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances
set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two
years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in
this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.

Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the
time of the marriage:

(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was
eighteen years of age or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was
solemnized without the consent of the parents, guardian or person having
substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the
age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived
together as husband and wife;
(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to
reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife; 
(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party
afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited
with the other as husband and wife; 
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue
influence, unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter
freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with
the other, and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or 
(6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease found to be
serious and appears to be incurable.

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516 Phil. 130

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. NO. 155733, January 27, 2006 ]
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE
DECEASED JOSEFA DELGADO AND GUILLERMO RUSTIA
CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA AND OTHER HEIRS
OF LUIS DELGADO, NAMELY, HEIRS OF CONCHA VDA. DE
AREVALO, HEIRS OF LUISA DELGADO VDA. DE DANAO,
ANGELA DELGADO ARESPACOCHAGA, TERESA DELGADO
PERLAS, CAROLINA DELGADO-ARESPACOCHAGA, RODOLFO
DELGADO, BENJAMIN DELGADO, GLICERIA DELGADO AND
CLEOFAS DELGADO; AND HEIRS OF GORGONIO DELGADO,
NAMELY, RAMON DELGADO CAMPO, CARLOS DELGADO
CAMPO, CLARITA DELGADO CAMPO-REIZA, YOLANDA
DELGADO ENCINAS, FELISA DELGADO CAMPO-ENCINAS AND
MELINDA DELGADO CAMPO-MADARANG, PETITIONERS, VS.
HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN, NAMELY,
GUILLERMO R. DAMIAN AND JOSE R. DAMIAN; HEIRS OF
HORTENCIA RUSTIA CRUZ, NAMELY, TERESITA CRUZ-SISON,
HORACIO R. CRUZ, JOSEFINA CRUZ-RODIL, AMELIA CRUZ-
ENRIQUEZ AND FIDEL R. CRUZ, JR.; HEIRS OF ROMAN
RUSTIA, SR., NAMELY, JOSEFINA RUSTIA ALBANO, VIRGINIA
RUSTIA PARAISO, ROMAN RUSTIA, JR., SERGIO RUSTIA,
FRANCISCO RUSTIA, LETICIA RUSTIA-MIRANDA; AND
GUILLERMINA RUSTIA, AS OPPOSITORS;[1]AND GUILLERMA
RUSTIA, AS INTERVENOR,[2] RESPONDENTS.[3] 

DECISION

CORONA, J.: 

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to reinstate the May 11,
1990 decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 55, [4] in SP Case
No. 97668, which was reversed and set aside by the Court of Appeals in its
decision[5] dated October 24, 2002.

FACTS OF THE CASE

This case concerns the settlement of the intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and
Josefa Delgado.[6] The main issue in this case is relatively simple: who, between
petitioners and respondents, are the lawful heirs of the decedents. However, it is
attended by several collateral issues that complicate its resolution. 

The claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado may be divided
into two groups: (1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her half- and
full-blood siblings, nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, and
(2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his sisters, [7] his nephews and
nieces,[8] his illegitimate child,[9] and the de facto adopted child[10] (ampun-
ampunan) of the decedents.

THE ALLEGED HEIRS OF JOSEFA DELGADO

The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa [11] Delgado by one Lucio
Campo. Aside from Josefa, five other children were born to the couple, namely,
Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, and Gorgonio, all surnamed Delgado. Felisa
Delgado was never married to Lucio Campo, hence, Josefa and her full-blood
siblings were all natural children of Felisa Delgado.

However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only man in Felisa Delgado's life.
Before him was Ramon Osorio[12] with whom Felisa had a son, Luis Delgado. But,
unlike her relationship with Lucio Campo which was admittedly one without the
benefit of marriage, the legal status of Ramon Osorio's and Felisa Delgado's union
is in dispute. 

The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio ever got married is
crucial to the claimants because the answer will determine whether their
successional rights fall within the ambit of the rule against reciprocal intestate
succession between legitimate and illegitimate relatives. [13] If Ramon Osorio and
Felisa Delgado had been validly married, then their only child Luis Delgado was a
legitimate half-blood brother of Josefa Delgado and therefore excluded from the
latter's intestate estate. He and his heirs would be barred by the principle of
absolute separation between the legitimate and illegitimate families. Conversely, if
the couple were never married, Luis Delgado and his heirs would be entitled to
inherit from Josefa Delgado's intestate estate, as they would all be within the
illegitimate line. 

Petitioners allege that Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado were never married. In
support thereof, they assert that no evidence was ever presented to establish it,
not even so much as an allegation of the date or place of the alleged marriage.
What is clear, however, is that Felisa retained the surname Delgado. So did Luis,
her son with Ramon Osorio. Later on, when Luis got married, his Partida de
Casamiento[14] stated that he was "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the natural child
of Felisa Delgado),[15] significantly omitting any mention of the name and other
circumstances of his father.[16] Nevertheless, oppositors (now respondents) insist
that the absence of a record of the alleged marriage did not necessarily mean that
no marriage ever took place. 

Josefa Delgado died on September 8, 1972 without a will. She was survived by
Guillermo Rustia and some collateral relatives, the petitioners herein. Several
months later, on June 15, 1973, Guillermo Rustia executed an affidavit of self-
adjudication of the remaining properties comprising her estate.

THE MARRIAGE OF GUILLERMO RUSTIA AND JOSEFA DELGADO

Sometime in 1917, Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado [17] but

whether a marriage in fact took place is disputed. According to petitioners, the two
eventually lived together as husband and wife but were never married. To prove
their assertion, petitioners point out that no record of the contested marriage
existed in the civil registry. Moreover, a baptismal certificate naming Josefa
Delgado as one of the sponsors referred to her as "Señorita" or unmarried woman. 

The oppositors (respondents here), on the other hand, insist that the absence of a
marriage certificate did not of necessity mean that no marriage transpired. They
maintain that Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado were married on June 3, 1919
and from then on lived together as husband and wife until the death of Josefa on
September 8, 1972. During this period spanning more than half a century, they
were known among their relatives and friends to have in fact been married. To
support their proposition, oppositors presented the following pieces of evidence: 

1. Certificate of Identity No. 9592 dated [December 1, 1944] issued to

Mrs. Guillermo J. Rustia by Carlos P. Romulo, then Resident
Commissioner to the United States of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines;

2. Philippine Passport No. 4767 issued to Josefa D. Rustia on June 25,

1947;

3. Veterans Application for Pension or Compensation for Disability

Resulting from Service in the Active Military or Naval Forces of the
United States- Claim No. C-4, 004, 503 (VA Form 526) filed with the
Veterans Administration of the United States of America by Dr.
Guillermo J. Rustia wherein Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia himself [swore] to
his marriage to Josefa Delgado in Manila on 3 June 1919; [18]

4. Titles to real properties in the name of Guillermo Rustia indicated that

he was married to Josefa Delgado.

THE ALLEGED HEIRS OF GUILLERMO RUSTIA

Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children. With no children of
their own, they took into their home the youngsters Guillermina Rustia Rustia and
Nanie Rustia. These children, never legally adopted by the couple, were what was
known in the local dialect as ampun-ampunan. 

During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo Rustia did manage to father an
illegitimate child,[19] the intervenor-respondent Guillerma Rustia, with one Amparo
Sagarbarria. According to Guillerma, Guillermo Rustia treated her as his daughter,
his own flesh and blood, and she enjoyed open and continuous possession of that
status from her birth in 1920 until her father's demise. In fact, Josefa Delgado's
obituary which was prepared by Guillermo Rustia, named the intervenor-respondent
as one of their children. Also, her report card from the University of Santo Tomas
identified Guillermo Rustia as her parent/guardian.[20] 

Oppositors (respondents here) nonetheless posit that Guillerma Rustia has no

interest in the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia as she was never duly
acknowledged as an illegitimate child. They contend that her right to compulsory
acknowledgement prescribed when Guillermo died in 1974 and that she cannot
claim voluntary acknowledgement since the documents she presented were not the
authentic writings prescribed by the new Civil Code.[21] 

On January 7, 1974, more than a year after the death of Josefa Delgado, Guillermo
Rustia filed a petition for the adoption[22] of their ampun-ampunan Guillermina
Rustia. He stated under oath "[t]hat he ha[d] no legitimate, legitimated,
acknowledged natural children or natural children by legal fiction." [23] The petition
was overtaken by his death on February 28, 1974.

Like Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia died without a will. He was survived by his
sisters Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz, and by the
children of his predeceased brother Roman Rustia Sr., namely, Josefina Rustia
Albano, Virginia Rustia Paraiso, Roman Rustia, Jr., Sergio Rustia, Francisco Rustia
and Leticia Rustia Miranda.[24] 

ANTECEDENT PROCEEDINGS

On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, the daughter of Luis Delgado, filed
the original petition for letters of administration of the intestate estates of the
"spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia" with the RTC of Manila, Branch 55.
[25]
 This petition was opposed by the following: (1) the sisters of Guillermo Rustia,
namely, Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz;[26] (2) the
heirs of Guillermo Rustia's late brother, Roman Rustia, Sr., and (3) the ampun-
ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia. The opposition was grounded on the theory
that Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao and the other claimants were barred under the
law from inheriting from their illegitimate half-blood relative Josefa Delgado. 

In November of 1975, Guillerma Rustia filed a motion to intervene in the

proceedings, claiming she was the only surviving descendant in the direct line of
Guillermo Rustia. Despite the objections of the oppositors (respondents herein), the
motion was granted. 

On April 3, 1978, the original petition for letters of administration was amended to
state that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia were never married but had merely
lived together as husband and wife.

On January 24, 1980, oppositors (respondents herein) filed a motion to dismiss the
petition in the RTC insofar as the estate of Guillermo Rustia was concerned. The
motion was denied on the ground that the interests of the petitioners and the other
claimants remained in issue and should be properly threshed out upon submission
of evidence.

On March 14, 1988, Carlota Delgado  vda. de de la Rosa substituted for her sister,
Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, who had died on May 18, 1987. 

On May 11, 1990, the RTC appointed Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa as

administratrix of both estates.[27] The dispositive portion of the decision read:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, petitioner and her co-claimants to the
estate of the late Josefa Delgado listed in the Petitions, and enumerated elsewhere
in this Decision, are hereby declared as the only legal heirs of the said Josefa
Delgado who died intestate in the City of Manila on September 8, 1972, and
entitled to partition the same among themselves in accordance with the proportions
referred to in this Decision.

Similarly, the intervenor Guillerma S. Rustia is hereby declared as the sole and only
surviving heir of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia, and thus, entitled to the entire
estate of the said decedent, to the exclusion of the oppositors and the other parties
hereto. 

The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of the estate of Josefa Delgado executed by the

late Guillermo J. Rustia on June 15, 1973 is hereby SET ASIDE and declared of no
force and effect. 

As the estates of both dece[d]ents have not as yet been settled, and their
settlement [is] considered consolidated in this proceeding in accordance with law, a
single administrator therefor is both proper and necessary, and, as the petitioner
Carlota Delgado Vda. de dela Rosa has established her right to the appointment as
administratrix of the estates, the Court hereby APPOINTS her as the
ADMINISTRATRIX of the intestate estate of the decedent JOSEFA DELGADO in
relation to the estate of DR. GUILLERMO J. RUSTIA.

Accordingly, let the corresponding LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION issue to the

petitioner CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA upon her filing of the requisite
bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).

Finally, oppositor GUILLERMINA RUSTIA RUSTIA is hereby ordered to cease and

desist from her acts of administration of the subject estates, and is likewise ordered
to turn over to the appointed administratix all her collections of the rentals and
income due on the assets of the estates in question, including all documents,
papers, records and titles pertaining to such estates to the petitioner and appointed
administratix CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA, immediately upon receipt
of this Decision. The same oppositor is hereby required to render an accounting of
her actual administration of the estates in controversy within a period of sixty (60)
days from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.[28]
On May 20, 1990, oppositors filed an appeal which was denied on the ground that
the record on appeal was not filed on time.[29] They then filed a petition for
certiorari and mandamus[30] which was dismissed by the Court of Appeals.
[31]
However, on motion for reconsideration and after hearing the parties' oral
arguments, the Court of Appeals reversed itself and gave due course to oppositors'
appeal in the interest of substantial justice.[32] 

In a petition for review to this Court, petitioners assailed the resolution of the Court
of Appeals, on the ground that oppositors' failure to file the record on appeal within
the reglementary period was a jurisdictional defect which nullified the appeal. On
October 10, 1997, this Court allowed the continuance of the appeal. The pertinent
portion of our decision[33] read:
As a rule, periods prescribed to do certain acts must be followed. However, under
exceptional circumstances, a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on
grounds of substantial justice. 

xxx xxx xxx

The respondent court likewise pointed out the trial court's pronouncements as to
certain matters of substance, relating to the determination of the heirs of the
decedents and the party entitled to the administration of their estate, which were to
be raised in the appeal, but were barred absolutely by the denial of the record on
appeal upon too technical ground of late filing. 

xxx xxx xxx

In this instance, private respondents' intention to raise valid issues in the appeal is
apparent and should not have been construed as an attempt to delay or prolong the
administration proceedings.

xxx xxx xxx

A review of the trial court's decision is needed.

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court

hereby AFFIRMS the Resolution dated November 27, 1991 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 23415, for the APPROVAL of the private respondents' Record on
Appeal and the CONTINUANCE of the appeal from the Manila, Branch LV Regional
Trial Court's May 11, 1990 decision.

SO ORDERED.
Acting on the appeal, the Court of Appeals[34] partially set aside the trial court's
decision. Upon motion for reconsideration,[35] the Court of Appeals amended its
earlier decision.[36] The dispositive portion of the amended decision read:
With the further modification, our assailed decision
is RECONSIDEREDand VACATED. Consequently, the decision of the trial court
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is hereby RENDERED declaring: 1.) Dr.
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado Rustia to have been legally married; 2.) the
intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia, Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the children of
Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) entitled to partition among themselves the intestate
estate of Josefa D. Rustia in accordance with the proportion referred to in this
decision; 3.) the oppositors-appellants as the legal heirs of the late Dr. Guillermo
Rustia and thereby entitled to partition his estate in accordance with the proportion
referred to herein; and 4.) the intervenor-appellee Guillerma S. Rustia as ineligible
to inherit from the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia; thus revoking her appointment as
administratrix of his estate.

The letters of administration of the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia in

relation to the intestate estate of Josefa Delgado shall issue to the nominee of the
oppositors-appellants upon his or her qualification and filing of the requisite bond in
the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).

Oppositor-appellant Guillermina Rustia Rustia is hereby ordered to cease and desist

from her acts of administration of the subject estates and to turn over to the
appointed administrator all her collections of the rentals and incomes due on the
assets of the estates in question, including all documents, papers, records and titles
pertaining to such estates to the appointed administrator, immediately upon notice
of his qualification and posting of the requisite bond, and to render an accounting of
her (Guillermina Rustia Rustia) actual administration of the estates in controversy
within a period of sixty (60) days from notice of the administrator's qualification
and posting of the bond. 

The issue of the validity of the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Dr.

Guillermo Rustia on June 15, 1973 is REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings to determine the extent of the shares of Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and
the children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) affected by the said adjudication.
Hence, this recourse. 

The issues for our resolution are: 

1. whether there was a valid marriage between Guillermo Rustia and

Josefa Delgado;

2. who the legal heirs of the decedents Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado are;

3. who should be issued letters of administration.

THE MARRIAGE OF GUILLERMO RUSTIA AND JOSEFA DELGADO 

A presumption is an inference of the existence or non-existence of a fact which

courts are permitted to draw from proof of other facts. Presumptions are classified
into presumptions of law and presumptions of fact. Presumptions of law are, in
turn, either conclusive or disputable.[37]

Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides: 

Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are satisfactory if
uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence: 

xxx xxx xxx

(aa) That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage;
xxx xxx xxx

In this case, several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid
marriage existed between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their cohabitation
of more than 50 years cannot be doubted. Their family and friends knew them to be
married. Their reputed status as husband and wife was such that even the original
petition for letters of administration filed by Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao in 1975
referred to them as "spouses." 

Yet, petitioners maintain that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia had simply lived
together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. They make much of
the absence of a record of the contested marriage, the testimony of a
witness[38]attesting that they were not married, and a baptismal certificate which
referred to Josefa Delgado as "Señorita" or unmarried woman. [39] 

We are not persuaded.

First, although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of marriage,

its absence is not always proof that no marriage in fact took place. [40] Once the
presumption of marriage arises, other evidence may be presented in support
thereof. The evidence need not necessarily or directly establish the marriage but
must at least be enough to strengthen the presumption of marriage. Here, the
certificate of identity issued to Josefa Delgado as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia, [41] the
passport issued to her as Josefa D. Rustia, [42] the declaration under oath of no less
than Guillermo Rustia that he was married to Josefa Delgado [43] and the titles to the
properties in the name of "Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa Delgado," more than
adequately support the presumption of marriage. These are public documents
which are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.[44] No clear and
convincing evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of the truth of the
recitals therein was presented by petitioners. 

Second, Elisa vda. de Anson, petitioners' own witness whose testimony they

primarily relied upon to support their position, confirmed that Guillermo Rustia had
proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado and that eventually, the two had "lived
together as husband and wife." This again could not but strengthen the
presumption of marriage. 

Third, the baptismal certificate[45] was conclusive proof only of the baptism

administered by the priest who baptized the child. It was no proof of the veracity of
the declarations and statements contained therein,[46] such as the alleged single or
unmarried ("Señorita") civil status of Josefa Delgado who had no hand in its
preparation. 

Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of Guillermo Rustia and

Josefa Delgado. In this jurisdiction, every intendment of the law leans toward
legitimizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together apparently in marriage are
presumed to be in fact married. This is the usual order of things in society and, if
the parties are not what they hold themselves out to be, they would be living in
constant violation of the common rules of law and propriety. Semper praesumitur
pro matrimonio. Always presume marriage.[47]

THE LAWFUL HEIRS OF JOSEFA DELGADO

To determine who the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado are, the questioned status of
the cohabitation of her mother Felisa Delgado with Ramon Osorio must first be
addressed. 

As mentioned earlier, presumptions of law are either conclusive or disputable.

Conclusive presumptions are inferences which the law makes so peremptory that no
contrary proof, no matter how strong, may overturn them. [48] On the other hand,
disputable presumptions, one of which is the presumption of marriage, can be
relied on only in the absence of sufficient evidence to the contrary.

Little was said of the cohabitation or alleged marriage of Felisa Delgado and Ramon
Osorio. The oppositors (now respondents) chose merely to rely on the disputable
presumption of marriage even in the face of such countervailing evidence as (1) the
continued use by Felisa and Luis (her son with Ramon Osorio) of the surname
Delgado and (2) Luis Delgado's and Caridad Concepcion's Partida de
Casamiento[49] identifying Luis as "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the natural child
of Felisa Delgado).[50] 

All things considered, we rule that these factors sufficiently overcame the
rebuttable presumption of marriage. Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never
married. Hence, all the children born to Felisa Delgado out of her relations with
Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo, namely, Luis and his half-blood siblings Nazario,
Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all surnamed Delgado,
[51]
 were her natural children.[52] 

Pertinent to this matter is the following observation: 

Suppose, however, that A begets X with B, and Y with another woman, C; then X
and Y would be natural brothers and sisters, but of half-blood relationship. Can they
succeed each other reciprocally?

The law prohibits reciprocal succession between illegitimate children and legitimate
children of the same parent, even though there is unquestionably a tie of blood
between them. It seems that to allow an illegitimate child to succeed ab
intestato (from) another illegitimate child begotten with a parent different from that
of the former, would be allowing the illegitimate child greater rights than a
legitimate child. Notwithstanding this, however, we submit that succession should
be allowed, even when the illegitimate brothers and sisters are only of the half-
blood. The reason impelling the prohibition on reciprocal successions between
legitimate and illegitimate families does not apply to the case under consideration.
That prohibition has for its basis the difference in category between illegitimate and
legitimate relatives. There is no such difference when all the children are
illegitimate children of the same parent, even if begotten with different persons.
They all stand on the same footing before the law, just like legitimate children of
half-blood relation. We submit, therefore, that the rules regarding succession of
legitimate brothers and sisters should be applicable to them. Full blood illegitimate
brothers and sisters should receive double the portion of half-blood brothers and
sisters; and if all are either of the full blood or of the half-blood, they shall share
equally.[53]
Here, the above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her by full-blood,
except Luis Delgado, her half-brother. Nonetheless, since they were all illegitimate,
they may inherit from each other. Accordingly, all of them are entitled to inherit
from Josefa Delgado.

We note, however, that the petitioners before us are already the nephews, nieces,
grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of the new
Civil Code, the right of representation in the collateral line takes place only in favor
of the children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces). Consequently, it
cannot be exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces. [54] Therefore, the only
collateral relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to partake of her intestate
estate are her brothers and sisters, or their children who were still alive at the time
of her death on September 8, 1972. They have a vested right to participate in the
inheritance.[55] The records not being clear on this matter, it is now for the trial
court to determine who were the surviving brothers and sisters (or their children) of
Josefa Delgado at the time of her death. Together with Guillermo Rustia, [56] they are
entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado in accordance with Article 1001 of the new
Civil Code:[57]
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers
and sisters or their children to the other one-half.
Since Josefa Delgado had heirs other than Guillermo Rustia, Guillermo could not
have validly adjudicated Josefa's estate all to himself. Rule 74, Section 1 of the
Rules of Court is clear. Adjudication by an heir of the decedent's entire estate to
himself by means of an affidavit is allowed only if he is the sole heir to the estate:
SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. – If the decedent
left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented
by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties
may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among
themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the
register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of
partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the estate
by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. x x x
(emphasis supplied)
THE LAWFUL HEIRS OF GUILLERMO RUSTIA

Intervenor (now co-respondent) Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child [58] of

Guillermo Rustia. As such, she may be entitled to successional rights only upon
proof of an admission or recognition of paternity. [59] She, however, claimed the
status of an acknowledged illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia only after the
death of the latter on February 28, 1974 at which time it was already the new Civil
Code that was in effect.

Under the old Civil Code (which was in force till August 29, 1950), illegitimate
children absolutely had no hereditary rights. This draconian edict was, however,
later relaxed in the new Civil Code which granted certain successional rights to
illegitimate children but only on condition that they were first recognized or
acknowledged by the parent.

Under the new law, recognition may be compulsory or voluntary. [60] Recognition is

compulsory in any of the following cases: 
(1) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense
coincides more or less with that of the conception;

(2) when the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged
father (or mother)[61] by the direct acts of the latter or of his family;

(3) when the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with
the supposed father;

(4) when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his
father. [62]
On the other hand, voluntary recognition may be made in the record of birth, a will,
a statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing. [63] 

Intervenor Guillerma sought recognition on two grounds: first, compulsory

recognition through the open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child and second, voluntary recognition through authentic writing. 

There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an illegitimate child
from her birth until the death of her putative father Guillermo Rustia. However, this
did not constitute acknowledgment but a mere ground by which she could have
compelled acknowledgment through the courts.[64] Furthermore, any (judicial)
action for compulsory acknowledgment has a dual limitation: the lifetime of the
child and the lifetime of the putative parent.[65] On the death of either, the action
for compulsory recognition can no longer be filed. [66] In this case, intervenor
Guillerma's right to claim compulsory acknowledgment prescribed upon the death of
Guillermo Rustia on February 28, 1974.

The claim of voluntary recognition (Guillerma's second ground) must likewise fail.
An authentic writing, for purposes of voluntary recognition, is understood as a
genuine or indubitable writing of the parent (in this case, Guillermo Rustia). This
includes a public instrument or a private writing admitted by the father to be his.
[67] 
Did intervenor's report card from the University of Santo Tomas and Josefa
Delgado's obituary prepared by Guillermo Rustia qualify as authentic writings under
the new Civil Code? Unfortunately not. The report card of intervenor Guillerma did
not bear the signature of Guillermo Rustia. The fact that his name appears there as
intervenor's parent/guardian holds no weight since he had no participation in its
preparation. Similarly, while witnesses testified that it was Guillermo Rustia himself
who drafted the notice of death of Josefa Delgado which was published in the
SUNDAY TIMES on September 10, 1972, that published obituary was not the
authentic writing contemplated by the law. What could have been admitted as an
authentic writing was the original manuscript of the notice, in the handwriting of
Guillermo Rustia himself and signed by him, not the newspaper clipping of the
obituary. The failure to present the original signed manuscript was fatal to
intervenor's claim. 

The same misfortune befalls the ampun-ampunan, Guillermina Rustia Rustia, who

was never adopted in accordance with law. Although a petition for her adoption was
filed by Guillermo Rustia, it never came to fruition and was dismissed upon the
latter's death. We affirm the ruling of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
holding her a legal stranger to the deceased spouses and therefore not entitled to
inherit from them ab intestato. We quote:
Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem, which [created] between two
persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and
filiation. Only an adoption made through the court, or in pursuance with the
procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this jurisdiction.
It is not of natural law at all, but is wholly and entirely artificial. To establish the
relation, the statutory requirements must be strictly carried out, otherwise, the
adoption is an absolute nullity. The fact of adoption is never presumed, but must be
affirmatively [proven] by the person claiming its existence.[68]
Premises considered, we rule that two of the claimants to the estate of Guillermo
Rustia, namely, intervenor Guillerma Rustia and the ampun-ampunan Guillermina
Rustia Rustia, are not lawful heirs of the decedent. Under Article 1002 of the new
Civil Code, if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or
surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased. Therefore, the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia are the remaining
claimants, consisting of his sisters,[69] nieces and nephews.[70]

ENTITLEMENT TO LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION

An administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer the intestate

estate of the decedent. Rule 78, Section 6 of the Rules of Court prescribes an order
of preference in the appointment of an administrator:
Sec. 6 When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If no executor is
named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust,
or fail to give a bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in
the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or
next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the
person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow
or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply
for administration or to request that the administration be granted to some other
person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent
and willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to
such other person as the court may select.
In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in
the estate of the one to be appointed.[71] The order of preference does not rule out
the appointment of co-administrators, specially in cases where
justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the
management of the estates,[72] a situation which obtains here. 

It is in this light that we see fit to appoint joint administrators, in the persons of
Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and a nominee of the nephews and nieces of
Guillermo Rustia. They are the next of kin of the deceased spouses Josefa Delgado
and Guillermo Rustia, respectively.

WHEREFORE, the petition (which seeks to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of
the RTC Manila, Branch 55) is hereby DENIED. The assailed October 24, 2002
decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the following modifications: 

1. Guillermo Rustia's June 15, 1973 affidavit of self-adjudication is

hereby ANNULLED.

2. the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit half of the

intestate estate of Josefa Delgado. The remaining half shall pertain to
(a) the full and half-siblings of Josefa Delgado who survived her and
(b) the children of any of Josefa Delgado's full- or half-siblings who
may have predeceased her, also surviving at the time of her death.
Josefa Delgado's grandnephews and grandnieces are excluded from
her estate. In this connection, the trial court is hereby ordered to
determine the identities of the relatives of Josefa Delgado who are
entitled to share in her estate.
 3. Guillermo Rustia's estate (including its one-half share of Josefa
Delgado's estate) shall be inherited by Marciana Rustia vda. deDamian
and Hortencia Rustia Cruz (whose respective shares shall be per
capita) and the children of the late Roman Rustia, Sr. (who survived
Guillermo Rustia and whose respective shares shall be per stirpes).
Considering that Marciana Rustia vda.  de Damian and Hortencia Rustia
Cruz are now deceased, their respective shares shall pertain to their
estates.

4. Letters of administration over the still unsettled intestate estates of

Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado shall issue to Carlota
Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and to a nominee from among the heirs of
Guillermo Rustia, as joint administrators, upon their qualification and
filing of the requisite bond in such amount as may be determined by
the trial court.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

[1] 
Oppositors in SP Case No. 97668 with the RTC Manila, Branch 55. 

[2] 
Intervenor in SP Case No. 97668 with the RTC Manila, Branch 55.

[3]
 In the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioners, the oppositors were
identified as "oppositors-respondents," while intervenor was identified as
"intervenor-respondent." For clarity, we shall refer to them collectively as
"respondents" in this decision. The Court of Appeals was also impleaded as public
respondent but this was not necessary since this is a petition for review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court.

[4] 
Judge Hermogenes Liwag, Rollo, pp. 92-106.

[5] 
Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., and concurred in by Associate
Justices Oswaldo D. Agcaoili and Sergio L. Pestaño of the former 15th Division,
Rollo, pp. 75-90. 

[6]
 The original action was a petition for letters of administration of the intestate
estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado, Rollo, p. 92. 

[7]
 Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz, both deceased and
now substituted by their respective heirs. 

[8]
 The children of Guillermo Rustia's deceased brother Roman Rustia, Sr.
[9]
 Intervenor Guillerma Rustia.

[10]
 Oppositor Guillermina Rustia Rustia.
[11]
 In some pleadings, this was spelled as "Feliza."

[12] 
In some pleadings, this was spelled as "Osario" and in others, "Oscorro."

[13]
 Art. 992, new CIVIL CODE. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall
such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child. 

[14]
 Rollo, p. 1262.

[15]
 Id., pp. 1200-1201. 

[16]
 In relation, the Civil Code of Spain (the old Civil Code) provided that when the
acknowledgment was made separately by either parent, the name of the other
parent shall not be revealed. Nor shall any circumstance be mentioned by which
such person might be recognized (Article 132). This showed the intent of the said
Code to protect the identity of the non-acknowledging parent. 

[17] 
One of the children of Felisa Delgado with Lucio Campo.

[18]
 CA decision, Rollo, pp. 77-78.

[19]
 Under the old Civil Code, which was in effect at the time of Guillerma Rustia's
birth in 1920, she was an illegitimate child, not a natural child, since she was born
of parents who at the time of conception were disqualified to marry each other.

[20]
 Rollo, p. 920.

[21]
 Law in effect at the time of the death of Guillermo Rustia.

[22]
 Filed before the then Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila.

[23]
 Rollo, p. 1149.

[24]
 Most of the respondents herein.

[25]
 Filed on behalf of the surviving brothers, sisters, nephews, nieces,
grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado.

[26]
 Now represented by their heirs as respondents. 

[27]
 Id.
[28]
 Rollo, pp. 105-106.

[29]
 Dated September 25, 1990.

[30]
 This petition was initially filed with the Supreme Court but was referred to the
Court of Appeals, the latter having concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court
over the petition.

[31] 
Penned by Associate Justice Artemon Luna, and concurred in by Associate
Justices Serafin Camilon and Celso Magsino of the Seventh Division, dated March
20, 1991, Rollo, pp. 627-644.

[32]
 Resolution dated November 27, 1991, Rollo, pp. 656-671.

[33]
 De la Rosa v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 678 (1997).

[34]
 Decision penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., and concurred in by
Associate Justices Oswaldo D. Agcaoili and Sergio L. Pestaño of the 15 th Division,
dated January 31, 2002, Rollo, pp. 46-63.

[35]
 Both the petitioner and the oppositors filed a motion for reconsideration of the
January 31, 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals.

[36]
 Dated October 24, 2002.

[37]
 II Florenz D. Regalado, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM 672 (9 th rev. ed. 2001).

[38] 
Elisa vda. de Anson.

[39]
 Rollo, p. 1266.

[40] 
Balogbog v. Court of Appeals, 336 Phil. 252 (1997).

[41] 
Certificate of Identity No. 9592 dated December 1, 1944 issued to Mrs.
Guillermo J. Rustia by Carlos P. Romulo, then Resident Commissioner to the United
States of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.

[42]
 Philippine Passport No. 4767 issued to Josefa D. Rustia on June 25, 1947.

[43]
 Veterans Application for Pension or Compensation for Disability Resulting from
Service in the Active Military or Naval Forces of the United States- Claim No. C-4,
004, 503 (VA Form 526) filed with the Veterans Administration of the United States
of America by Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia wherein Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia himself stated
under oath to his marriage to Josefa Delgado in Manila on June 3, 1919.

[44] 
Rule 132, Section 23, Rules of Court.

[45] 
Josefa Delgado stood as sponsor in the baptism of Luisa Delgado on September
14, 1919, Rollo, p. 1266. In 1975, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao filed a
petition for letters of administration for the intestate estate of Josefa
Delgado; supra, note 25.

[46] 
Acebedo v. Arquero, 447 Phil. 76 (2003).

[47]
 Vda. de Jacob v. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil. 693 (1999), citing Perido v. Perido,
No. L-28248, 12 March 1975, 63 SCRA 97.

[48] 
Ricardo Francisco, EVIDENCE 400 (3rd ed. 1996).

[49]
 Rollo, p. 1262.

[50]
 Id., pp. 1200-1201. 

[51]
 Old CIVIL CODE, art. 134. An acknowledged natural child is entitled:

1. To bear the surname of the person acknowledging it.

2. To receive support from such person, in accordance with article 143.
3. To receive the hereditary portion, if available, determined by this Code.

[52]
 The records do not indicate the dates of birth of Felisa Delgado's children. The
dates when Felisa Delgado cohabited with Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo were
likewise not stated. From the limited facts of the case on this issue, it is safe to
assume that they were all born during the effectivity of the old Civil Code. Under
the said Code, children born out of wedlock of parents who, at the time of
conception, could have married, were natural children. 

[53]
 III Arturo M. Tolentino, COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL
CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES 493-494 (1979 ed.) citing 7 Manresa 139.

[54]
 Desiderio P. Jurado, COMMENTS AND JURISPRUDENCE ON SUCCESSION 391
(8th ed. 1991). 

[55]
 In case the surviving collateral relatives are already deceased at the time of
execution of this judgment, their shares in the inheritance of Josefa Delgado shall
accrue to their respective estates. 

[56] 
Then surviving spouse, now represented by his intestate estate.

[57]
 Law in effect at the time of the death of Josefa Delgado. 

[58]
 Under the old Civil Code, which was in effect at the time of Guillerma Rustia's
birth in 1920, she is an illegitimate child, not a natural child, since she was born of
parents who, at the time of conception, were disqualified to marry each other.

[59]
 Paterno v. Paterno, No. L- 23060, 30 June 1967, 20 SCRA 585. 
[60]
 I Arturo M. Tolentino, COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL
CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES 577 (1985 ed.).

[61]
 Art. 284 of the new Civil Code provided that the mother is obliged to recognize
her natural child in any of the cases referred to in Art. 283.

[62]
 New CIVIL CODE, Art. 283.

[63] 
New CIVIL CODE, Art. 278.

[64] 
Supra, note 60, at 283.

[65] 
This was provided in Article 285 of the new Civil Code and carried over to Article
175 of the Family Code. While there are exceptions to this rule, Guillerma's case
does not fall within the exceptions.

[66]
 Subject to exceptions provided in paragraphs (1) and (2) of Article 285 of the
new Civil Code.

[67]
 I Tolentino, supra note 60, at 585-586.

[68]
 RTC decision, Rollo, p. 104.

[69]
 Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz, represented by their
heirs in this 
petition. 

[70]
 Children of his predeceased brother Roman Rustia, Sr.

[71] 
II Regalado, supra note 37, at 39. 

[72]
 Gabriel et al. v. Court of Appeals,  G.R. No. 101512, 7 August 1992, 212 SCRA
413.

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336 Phil. 252

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 83598, March 07, 1997 ]
LEONCIA BALOGBOG AND GAUDIOSO BALOGBOG,
PETITIONERS, VS.HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
RAMONITO BALOGBOG AND GENEROSO BALOGBOG,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.: 

This is a petition for review of the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals, affirming the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu City (Branch IX), declaring private
respondents heirs of the deceased Basilio and Genoveva Balogbog entitled to inherit
from them.

The facts are as follows. Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are the children
of Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva Arnibal who died intestate in 1951 and 1961,
respectively. They had an older brother, Gavino, but he died in 1935, predeceasing
their parents.

In 1968, private respondents Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog brought an action

for partition and accounting against petitioners, claiming that they were the
legitimate children of Gavino by Catalina Ubas and that, as such, they were entitled
to the one-third share of Gavino in the estate of their grandparents.

In their answer, petitioners denied knowing private respondents. They alleged that
their brother Gavino died single and without issue in their parents’ residence at
Tag-amakan, Asturias, Cebu. In the beginning they claimed that the properties of
the estate had been sold to them by their mother when she was still alive, but they
later withdrew this allegation.

Private respondents presented Priscilo Y. Trazo,[2] then 81 years old, mayor of the

municipality of Asturias from 1928 to 1934, who testified that he knew Gavino and
Catalina to be husband and wife and Ramonito to be their first child. On
crossexamination, Trazo explained that he knew Gavino and Catalina because they
performed at his campaign rallies, Catalina as “balitaw” dancer and Gavino
Balogbog as her guitarist. Trazo said he attended the wedding of Gavino and
Catalina sometime in 1929, in which Rev. Father Emiliano Jomao-as officiated and
Egmidio Manuel, then a municipal councilor, acted as one of the witnesses.

The second witness presented was Matias Pogoy, [3] a family friend of private
respondents, who testified that private respondents are the children of Gavino and
Catalina. According to him, the wedding of Gavino and Catalina was solemnized in
the Catholic Church of Asturias, Cebu and that he knew this because he attended
their wedding and was in fact asked by Gavino to accompany Catalina and carry her
wedding dress from her residence in Camanaol to the poblacion of Asturias before
the wedding day. He testified that Gavino died in 1935 in his residence at Obogon,
Balamban, Cebu, in the presence of his wife. (This contradicts petitioners’ claim
made in their answer that Gavino died in the ancestral house at Tag-amakan,
Asturias.) Pogoy said he was a carpenter and he was the one who had made the
coffin of Gavino. He also made the coffin of the couple’s son, Petronilo, who died
when he was six.

Catalina Ubas testified concerning her marriage to Gavino. [4] She testified that after
the wedding, she was handed a “receipt,” presumably the marriage certificate, by
Fr. Jomao-as, but it was burned during the war. She said that she and Gavino lived
together in Obogon and begot three children, namely, Ramonito, Petronilo, and
Generoso. Petronilo died after an illness at the age of six. On crossexamination, she
stated that after the death of Gavino, she lived in common law relation with a man
for a year and then they separated.

Private respondents produced a certificate from the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar (Exh. P) that the Register of Marriages did not have a record of the
marriage of Gavino and Catalina, another certificate from the Office of the
Treasurer (Exh. L) that there was no record of the birth of Ramonito in that office
and, for this reason, the record must be presumed to have been lost or destroyed
during the war, and a certificate by the Parish Priest of Asturias that there was
likewise no record of birth of Ramonito in the church, the records of which were
either lost or destroyed during the war. (Exh. M)

On the other hand, as defendant below, petitioner Leoncia Balogbog testified [5]that
Gavino died single at the family residence in Asturias. She denied that her brother
had any legitimate children and stated that she did not know private respondents
before this case was filed. She obtained a certificate (Exh. 10) from the Local Civil
Registrar of Asturias to the effect that that office did not have a record of the
names of Gavino and Catalina. The certificate was prepared by Assistant Municipal
Treasurer Juan Maranga, who testified that there was no record of the marriage of
Gavino and Catalina in the Book of Marriages between 1925 to 1935. [6]

Witness Jose Narvasa testified[7]that Gavino died single in 1935 and that Catalina
lived with a certain Eleuterio Keriado after the war, although he did not know
whether they were legally married. He added, however, that Catalina had children
by a man she had married before the war, although he did not know the names of
the children. On crossexamination, Narvasa stated that Leoncia Balogbog, who
requested him to testify, was also his bondsman in a criminal case filed by a certain
Mr. Cuyos.

Ramonito Balogbog was presented[8] to rebut Leoncia Balogbog’s testimony.

On June 15, 1973, the Court of First Instance of Cebu City rendered judgment for
private respondents (plaintiffs below), ordering petitioners to render an accounting
from 1960 until the finality of its judgment, to partition the estate and deliver to
private respondents one-third of the estate of Basilio and Genoveva, and to pay
attorney’s fees and costs.

Petitioners filed a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration, contending that the
trial court erred in not giving weight to the certification of the Office of the
Municipal Treasurer of Asturias (Exh. 10) to the effect that no marriage of Gavino
and Catalina was recorded in the Book of Marriages for the years 1925-1935. Their
motion was denied by the trial court, as was their second motion for new trial
and/or reconsideration based on the church records of the parish of Asturias which
did not contain the record of the alleged marriage in that church.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that private respondents failed to
overcome the legal presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife are in fact married, that a child is presumed to be legitimate, and
that things happen according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary
habits of life.[9] Hence, this petition.

We find no reversible error committed by the Court of Appeals.

First. Petitioners contend that the marriage of Gavino and Catalina should have
been proven in accordance with Arts. 53 and 54 of the Civil Code of 1889 because
this was the law in force at the time the alleged marriage was celebrated. Art. 53
provides that marriages celebrated under the Civil Code of 1889 should be proven
only by a certified copy of the memorandum in the Civil Registry, unless the books
thereof have not been kept or have been lost, or unless they are questioned in the
courts, in which case any other proof, such as that of the continuous possession by
parents of the status of husband and wife, may be considered, provided that the
registration of the birth of their children as their legitimate children is also
submitted in evidence.

This Court noted long ago, however, that Arts. 42 to 107 of the Civil Code of 1889
of Spain did not take effect, having been suspended by the Governor General of the
Philippines shortly after the extension of that code to this country. [10]Consequently,
Arts. 53 and 54 never came into force. Since this case was brought in the lower
court in 1968, the existence of the marriage must be determined in accordance
with the present Civil Code, which repealed the provisions of the former Civil Code,
except as they related to vested rights, [11] and the rules on evidence. Under the
Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting themselves
as husband and wife are legally married.[12] This presumption may be rebutted only
by cogent proof to the contrary.[13] In this case, petitioners’ claim that the
certification presented by private respondents (to the effect that the record of the
marriage had been lost or destroyed during the war) was belied by the production
of the Book of Marriages by the assistant municipal treasurer of Asturias.
Petitioners argue that this book does not contain any entry pertaining to the alleged
marriage of private respondents’ parents.

This contention has no merit. In Pugeda v. Trias,[14] the defendants, who questioned

the marriage of the plaintiffs, produced a photostatic copy of the record of
marriages of the Municipality of Rosario, Cavite for the month of January, 1916, to
show that there was no record of the alleged marriage. Nonetheless, evidence
consisting of the testimonies of witnesses was held competent to prove the
marriage. Indeed, although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of
marriage,[15] the failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place. Other
evidence may be presented to prove marriage.16] [Here, private respondents
proved, through testimonial evidence, that Gavino and Catalina were married in
1929; that they had three children, one of whom died in infancy; that their
marriage subsisted until 1935 when Gavino died; and that their children, private
respondents herein, were recognized by Gavino’s family and by the public as the
legitimate children of Gavino.

Neither is there merit in the argument that the existence of the marriage cannot be
presumed because there was no evidence showing in particular that Gavino and
Catalina, in the presence of two witnesses, declared that they were taking each
other as husband and wife.[17] An exchange of vows can be presumed to have been
made from the testimonies of the witnesses who state that a wedding took place,
since the very purpose for having a wedding is to exchange vows of marital
commitment. It would indeed be unusual to have a wedding without an exchange of
vows and quite unnatural for people not to notice its absence.

The law favors the validity of marriage, because the State is interested in the
preservation of the family and the sanctity of the family is a matter of constitutional
concern. As stated in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee:[18]

  The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage.
Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an
institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.
Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony.
Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of
any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The
reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what
they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant
violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil
Procedure is “that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.” (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage. (U.S. vs. Villafuerte and
Rabano [1905], 4 Phil., 476; Son Cui vs. Guepangco, supra; U.S. vs. Memoracion and
Uri [1916], 34 Phil., 633; Teter vs. Teter [1884], 101 Ind., 129.)

Second. Petitioners contend that private respondents’ reliance solely on testimonial

evidence to support their claim that private respondents had been in the continuous
possession of the status of legitimate children is contrary to Art. 265 of the Civil
Code which provides that such status shall be proven by the record of birth in the
Civil Register, by an authentic document or by final judgment. But in accordance
with Arts. 266 and 267, in the absence of titles indicated in Art. 265, the filiation of
children may be proven by continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child
and by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court or special laws. Thus the
Civil Code provides:

ART. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article, the filiation
shall be proved by the continuous possession of status of a legitimate child

ART. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment
or possession of status, legitimate filiation may be proved by any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

Petitioners contend that there is no justification for presenting testimonies as to the

possession by private respondents of the status of legitimate children because the
Book of Marriages for the years 1928-1929 is available.

What is in issue, however, is not the marriage of Gavino and Catalina but the
filiation of private respondents as their children. The marriage of Gavino and
Catalina has already been shown in the preceding discussion. The treasurer of
Asturias, Cebu certified that the records of birth of that municipality for the year
1930 could not be found, presumably because they were lost or destroyed during
the war (Exh. L). But Matias Pogoy testified that Gavino and Catalina begot three
children, one of whom, Petronilo, died at the age of six. Catalina testified that
private respondents Ramonito and Generoso are her children by Gavino Balogbog.
That private respondents are the children of Gavino and Catalina Balogbog cannot
therefore be doubted.

Moreover, the evidence in the record shows that petitioner Gaudioso Balogbog
admitted to the police of Balamban, Cebu that Ramonito is his nephew. As the
Court of Appeals found:

Ironically, it is appellant Gaudioso himself who supplies the clincher that tips the
balance in favor of the appellees. In an investigation before the Police Investigating
Committee of Balamban, Cebu, held on March 8, 1968, conducted for the purpose
of inquiring into a complaint filed by Ramonito against a patrolman of the Balamban
police force, Gaudioso testified that the complainant in that administrative case is
his nephew. Excerpts from the transcript of the proceedings conducted on that date
(Exhs. “N”, “N-1”, “N-2”, “N-3” and “N-4”) read:

“Atty. Kiamco - May it please this investigative body.

“Q.-       Do you know the complainant in this Administrative Case No. 1?

“A.-       Yes I know.

“Q.-       Why do you know him?

“A.-        I know because he is my nephew.

“Q.-       Are you in good terms with your nephew, the complainant?
“A.-       Yes.

“Q.-       Do you mean to say that you are close to him?

“A.-       Yes. We are close.

“Q.- Why do you say you are close?

“A.- We are close because aside from the fact that he is my nephew we were also
leaving (sic) in the same house in Butuan City, and I even barrow (sic) from him
money in the amount of P300.00, when I return to Balamban, Cebu.

x x x                                        x x x     x x x

“Q.-             Why is Ramonito Balogbog your nephew?

“A.- Because he is the son of my elder brother.”

This admission of relationship is admissible against Gaudioso although made in

another case. It is considered as a reliable declaration against interest (Rule 130,
Section 22). Significantly, Gaudioso did not try to offer any explanation to blunt the
effects of that declaration. He did not even testify during the trial. Such silence can
only mean that Ramonito is indeed the nephew of Gaudioso, the former being the
son of Gavino.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, (Chairman), Romero, Puno, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur

[1]
Per Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo, J., concurred in by Justices Ricardo J. Francisco
and Jose C. Campos, Jr.

[2]
 TSN, December 3, 1969, pp. 2-6.

[3]
 TSN, July 9, 1970, pp. 3-28.

[4]
 TSN, July 25, 1980, pp. 3-28.

[5]
 TSN, Aug. 12, 1972, pp. 5-18.

[6]
 TSN, Aug. 28, 1972, p. 13.

[7]
 TSN, Sept. 16, 1972, pp. 4-20.

[8]
 TSN, July 7, 1983, pp. 3-5.

[9]
 1964 Rules of Court, Rule 131, §5 (z), (bb), and (cc).

[10]
 Benedicto v. De la Rama, 3 Phil. 34 (1903).

[11]
 Civil Code, Art. 2270.

[12]
 1964 Rules of Court, Rule 131, §5(bb).

[13]
 Alavado v. City Government of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230, 235 (1985); Perido v.
Perido, 63 SCRA 97, 102-103 (1975).

[14]
 4 SCRA 849 (1962). See Madridejo v. De Leon, 55 Phil. 1 (1930); Jones v.
Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 179 (1937); People v. Borromeo, 133 SCRA 106 (1984).

[15]
 Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete, 66 SCRA 425 (1975).

[16]
 Tolentino v. Paras, 122 SCRA 525 (1983); United States v. Memoracion, 34 Phil.
633 (1916); People v. Borromeo, 133 SCRA 106 (1984).

[17]
 Civil Code, Art. 55.

[18]
 43 Phil. 43, 56 (1922). Accord, Perido v. Perido, 63 SCRA 97 (1975).
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786 Phil. 59

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 191936, June 01, 2016 ]
VIRGINIA D. CALIMAG, PETITIONER, VS. HEIRS OF
SILVESTRA N. MACAPAZ, REPRESENTED BY ANASTACIO P.
MACAPAZ, JR., RESPONDENTS. 

DECISION

REYES, J.: 

This is a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the Decision[2] of the Court of

Appeals (CA) promulgated on October 20, 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 90907 which
affirmed with modification the Decision[3] dated September 28, 2007 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 147, in Civil Case No. 06-173, an action for
annulment of deed of sale and cancellation of title with damages. The CA
Resolution[4] dated April 5, 2010 denied the motion for reconsideration thereof.

The Facts

Virginia D. Calimag (petitioner) co-owned the property, the subject matter of this
case, with Silvestra N. Macapaz (Silvestra).

On the other hand, Anastacio P. Macapaz, Jr. (Anastacio, Jr.) and Alicia Macapaz-
Ritua (Alicia) (respondents) are the children of Silvestra's brother, Anastacio
Macapaz, Sr. (Anastacio, Sr.) and Fidela O. Poblete Vda. de Macapaz (Fidela).

The subject property, with a total area of 299 square meters, is located at No. 1273
Bo. Visaya Street, Barangay Guadalupe Nuevo, Makati City, and was duly registered
in the names of the petitioner (married to Demetrio Calimag) and Silvestra under
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 183088. [5] In said certificate of title, appearing
as Entry No. 02671 is an annotation of an Adverse Claim of Fidela asserting rights
and interests over a portion of the said property measuring 49.5 sq m. [6]

On November 11, 2002, Silvestra died without issue. On July 7, 2005, TCT No.
183088 was cancelled and a new certificate of title, TCT No. 221466, [7] was issued
in the name of the petitioner by virtue of a Deed of Sale [8] dated January 18, 2005
whereby Silvestra allegedly sold her 99-sq-m portion to the petitioner for
P300,000.00. Included among the documents submitted for the purpose of
cancelling TCT No. 183088 was an Affidavit[9] dated July 12, 2005 purportedly
executed by both the petitioner and Silvestra. It was stated therein that the
affidavit of adverse claim filed by Fidela was not signed by the Deputy Register of
Deeds of Makati City, making the same legally ineffective. On September 16, 2005,
Fidela passed away.[10]

On December 15, 2005, Anastacio, Jr. filed a criminal complaint for two counts of
falsification of public documents under Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal
Code against the petitioner.[11] However, said criminal charges were eventually
dismissed.

On March 2, 2006, the respondents, asserting that they are the heirs of Silvestra,
instituted the action for Annulment of Deed of Sale and Cancellation of TCT No.
221466 with Damages against the petitioner and the Register of Deeds of Makati
City.[12]

In her Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,[13] the petitioner averred that the

respondents have no legal capacity to institute said civil action on the ground that
they are illegitimate children of Anastacio, Sr. As such, they have no right over
Silvestra's estate pursuant to Article 992 of the Civil Code which prohibits
illegitimate children from inheriting intestate from the legitimate children and
relatives of their father and mother.

After trial, the RTC found for the respondents and rendered its Decision on
September 28, 2007.[14] The fallo of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered as follows:

1. Declaring the Deed of Sale purportedly executed by [Silvestra] in favor

of [the petitioner] on January 18, 2005 over a parcel of land covered
by TCT No. 183088 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City, as Null and
Void;

2. Ordering the Registrar of Deeds of Makati City to cancel TCT No.

221466 issued in the name of [the petitioner], the same having been
issued on the basis of a fraudulent/falsified Deed of Sale, and
thereafter to reinstate TCT No. 183088 issued in the name of [the
petitioner] and [Silvestra] with all the liens and encumbrances
annotated thereon, including the adverse claim of [Fidela]; [and]

3. Ordering [the petitioner] to pay the [respondents] the sum of

P100,000.00 as moral damages and another P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages, P50,000.00 as and by way of attorney's fees,
plus costs of suit.

[The petitioner's] counter-claim is dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.[15]
The RTC found that the Deed of Sale dated January 18, 2005 presented for the
cancellation of TCT No. 183088 was a forgery considering that Silvestra, who
purportedly executed said deed of sale died on November 11, 2002, about three
years before the execution of the said Deed of Sale.[16] Respecting the respondents'
legal capacity to sue, the RTC favorably ruled in this wise:
Demetrio Calimag, Jr. sought, but failed, to impugn the personality of the
[respondents] to initiate this action as the alleged heirs of [Silvestra]. The
marriage between [Anastacio Sr.] and [Fidela] is evidenced by the
Certificate of (canonical) Marriage (Exh. "M"). The name 'Fidela Obera
Poblete' is indicated in [the respondents'] respective birth certificates as
the mother's maiden name but Fidela signed the same as the informant as
"Fidela P. Macapaz". In both birth certificates, "Anastacio Nator Macapaz"
is indicated as the name of the father.[17] (Emphasis ours)
Ruling of the CA

Aggrieved, the petitioner elevated her case to the CA resting on the argument that
the respondents are without legal personality to institute the civil action for
cancellation of deed of sale and title on the basis of their claimed status as
legitimate children of Anastacio, Sr., the brother and sole heir of the deceased,
Silvestra.[18]

On October 20, 2009, the CA rendered its Decision affirming the RTC decision with
modification as to the amount of damages. The fallo of the assailed decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby DISMISSED, for
lack of merit. The Decision dated September 28, 2007 of the [RTC] of Makati City,
Branch 147 in Civil Case No. 06-173 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in
that the award of moral and exemplary damages is hereby reduced from
P100,000.00 to P50,000.00, respectively.

With costs against the [petitioner]. 

SO ORDERED.[19]
The CA sustained the RTC ruling that the cancellation of TCT No. 183088 and the
issuance of TCT No. 221466 in the name of the petitioner were obtained through
forgery. As to the question of whether the respondents are legal heirs of Silvestra
and thus have the legal capacity to institute the action, the CA ruled in this wise:
Reviewing the evidence on record, we concur with the trial court in sustaining the
appellees' legitimate filiation to Silvestra's brother [Anastacio, Sr.] The trial court
found unsuccessful the attempt of Atty. Demetrio Calimag, Jr. to assail the validity
of marriage between [Anastacio, Sr.] and [Fidela] with a certification from the NSO
that their office has no record of the certificate of marriage of [Anastacio, Sr.] and
[Fidela], and further claiming the absence of a marriage license.

The best proof of marriage between man and wife is a marriage contract. A
certificate of marriage issued by the Most Holy Trinity Parish, Alang[-]alang, Leyte
(Exh. "M") as well as a copy of the marriage contract were duly submitted in
evidence by the [respondents].

xxxx
The Marriage Contract (Exh. "U") in this case clearly reflects a marriage license
number and in the absence of a certification from the local civil registrar that no
such marriage license was issued, the marriage between [Anastacio, Sr.] and
[Fidela] may not be invalidated on that ground.

x x x.

xxxx

Every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling
together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any
counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. This
jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is based on the prima facie presumption
that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage. The Courts look upon this presumption with
great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of
great weight.

Here, the fact of marriage between [Anastacio, Sr.] and [Fidela] was established by
competent and substantial proof. [The respondents] who were conceived and born
during the subsistence of said marriage are therefore presumed to be legitimate
children of [Anastacio, Sr.], in the absence of any contradicting evidence.
[20]
 (Citations omitted)
The petitioner sought reconsideration,[21] but her motion was denied in the
Resolution[22] dated April 5, 2010.

Hence, this petition.

Notably, even before the CA, the petitioner never assailed the factual finding that
forgery was indeed committed to effect the cancellation of TCT No. 183088 and the
consequent transfer of title of the property in her name. Verily, in this petition, the
petitioner continues to assail the legal capacity of the respondents to institute the
present action. Invoking the provisions of Article 992 of the Civil Code, [23] the
petitioner insists that the respondents have no legal right over the estate left by
Silvestra for being illegitimate children of Anastacio, Sr.

While the petitioner does not question that Anastacio, Sr. is the legal heir of
Silvestra, she, however, claims that the respondents failed to establish their
legitimate filiation to Anastacio, Sr. considering that the marriage between
Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela was not sufficiently proven. According to the petitioner,
the marriage contract[24] presented by the respondents is not admissible under the
Best Evidence Rule for being a mere fax copy or photocopy of an alleged marriage
contract, and which is not even authenticated by the concerned Local Civil
Registrar. In addition, there is no mark or stamp showing that said document was
ever received by said office. Further, while the respondents also presented a
Certificate of (Canonical) Marriage,[25] the petitioner asserts that the same is not the
marriage license required under Articles 3 and 4 of the Family Code; [26] that said
Certificate of (Canonical) Marriage only proves that a marriage ceremony actually
transpired between Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela.[27]

Moreover, the petitioner contends that the certificates of live birth of the
respondents do not conclusively prove that they are legitimate children of
Anastacio, Sr.

In their Comment,[28] the respondents reiterate the finding and ruling of the CA that
the petitioner's argument has no leg to stand on considering that one's legitimacy
can only be questioned in a direct action seasonably filed by a party who is related
to the former either by consanguinity or affinity.[29]

Thereupon, the resolution of this case rests upon this fundamental issue: whether
or not the respondents are legal heirs of Silvestra.

Ruling of the Court

The petition is bereft of merit.

While it is true that a person's legitimacy can only be questioned in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party, as held in Spouses Fidel v. Hon. CA, et al.,
[30]
this Court however deems it necessary to pass upon the respondents'
relationship to Silvestra so as to determine their legal rights to the subject
property. Besides, the question of whether the respondents have the legal capacity
to sue as alleged heirs of Silvestra was among the issues agreed upon by the
parties in the pre-trial.

At first blush, the documents presented as proof of marriage between Anastacio,

Sr. and Fidela, viz: (1) fax or photo copy of the marriage contract, and (2) the
canonical certificate of marriage, cannot be used as legal basis to establish the fact
of marriage without running afoul with the Rules on Evidence of the Revised Rules
of Court. Rule 130, Section 3 of the Rules on Evidence provides that: "When the
subject of the inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself, x x x." Nevertheless, a
reproduction of the original document can still be admitted as secondary evidence
subject to certain requirements specified by law. In Dantis v. Maghinang, Jr.,[31] it
was held that:
A secondary evidence is admissible only upon compliance with Rule 130, Section 5,
which states that: when the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the
cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a
copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the
testimony of witnesses in the order stated. Accordingly, the offeror of the
secondary evidence is burdened to satisfactorily prove the predicates thereof,
namely: (1) the execution or existence of the original; (2) the loss and destruction
of the original or its non-production in court; and (3) the unavailability of the
original is not due to bad faith on the part of the proponent/offeror. Proof of the
due execution of the document and its subsequent loss would constitute the basis
for the introduction of secondary evidence, x x x.[32] (Citation omitted)
On the other hand, a canonical certificate of marriage is not a public document. As
early as in the case of United States v. Evangelista,[33] it has been settled that
church registries of births, marriages, and deaths made subsequent to the
promulgation of General Orders No. 68 and the passage of Act No. 190 are no
longer public writings, nor are they kept by duly authorized public officials. [34]They
are private writings and their authenticity must therefore be proved as are all other
private writings in accordance with the rules of evidence.[35] Accordingly, since there
is no showing that the authenticity and due execution of the canonical certificate of
marriage of Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela was duly proven, it cannot be admitted in
evidence.

Notwithstanding, it is well settled that other proofs can be offered to establish the
fact of a solemnized marriage.[36] Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage
may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence,
even a person's birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the
marriage between his parents.[37]

Thus, in order to prove their legitimate filiation, the respondents presented their
respective Certificates of Live Birth issued by the National Statistics Office [38]where
Fidela signed as the Informant in item no. 17 of both documents.

A perusal of said documents shows that the respondents were apparently born to
the same parents — their father's name is Anastacio Nator Macapaz, while their
mother's maiden name is Fidela Overa Poblete. In item no. 24 thereof where it
asks: "24. DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE OF PARENTS (For legitimate birth)" it
was stated therein that respondents' parents were married on "May 25, 1955 in
Alang-alang, Leyte."[39]

The petitioner asserts that said documents do not conclusively prove the
respondents' legitimate filiation, albeit, without offering any evidence to the
contrary. The certificates of live birth contain no entry stating whether the
respondents are of legitimate or illegitimate filiation, making said documents
unreliable and unworthy of weight and value in the determination of the issue at
hand.

Moreover, the petitioner states that in the respondents' certificates of live birth,
only the signature of Fidela appears, and that they were not signed by Anastacio,
Sr. She argues that the birth certificate must be signed by the father in order to be
competent evidence to establish filiation, whether legitimate or illegitimate,
invoking Roces v. Local Civil Registrar of Manila[40] where it was held that a birth
certificate not signed by the alleged father is not competent evidence of paternity.
[41]

The petitioner's contentions are untenable.

"A certificate of live birth is a public document that consists of entries (regarding
the facts of birth) in public records (Civil Registry) made in the performance of a
duty by a public officer (Civil Registrar)."[42] Thus, being public documents, the
respondents' certificates of live birth are presumed valid, and are prima
facieevidence of the truth of the facts stated in them.[43]

"Prima facie evidence is defined as evidence good and sufficient on its face. Such
evidence as, in the judgment of the law, is sufficient to establish a given fact, or the
group or chain of facts constituting the party's claim or defense and which if not
rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient."[44]

The petitioner's assertion that the birth certificate must be signed by the father in
order to be a competent evidence of legitimate filiation does not find support in law
and jurisprudence. In fact, the petitioner's reliance on Roces[45] is misplaced
considering that what was sought to be proved is the fact of paternity of an
illegitimate child, and not legitimate filiation.

Verily, under Section 5 of Act No. 3753,[46] the declaration of either parent of the

new-born legitimate child shall be sufficient for the registration of his birth in the
civil register, and only in the registration of birth of an illegitimate child does the
law require that the birth certificate be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of
the infant, or only by the mother if the father refuses to acknowledge the child.

The pertinent portion of Section 5 of Act No. 3753 reads:

Sec. 5. Registration and Certification of Birth. - The declaration of the physician or
midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of cither
parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a
birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt from the
documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than
thirty days after the birth, by the physician, or midwife in attendance at the birth or
by either parent of the newly born child.

In such declaration, the persons above mentioned shall certify to the following
facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names,
citizenship, and religion of parents or, in case the father is not known, of the
mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; (f)
and such other data as may be required in the regulations to be issued.

xxxx

In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and

sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant or only the mother if the father
refuses. In the latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or reveal in the
document the name of the father who refuses to acknowledge the child, or to give
therein any information by which such father could be identified. x x x (Emphasis
Ours)
Forsooth, the Court finds that the respondents' certificates of live birth were duly
executed consistent with the provision of the law respecting the registration of birth
of legitimate children. The fact that only the signatures of Fidela appear on said
documents is of no moment because Fidela only signed as
the declarant or informant of the respondents' fact of birth as legitimate children.
Nonetheless, the respondents' certificates of live birth also intimate that Anastacio,
Sr. and Fidela had openly cohabited as husband and wife for a number of years, as
a result of which they had two children—the second child, Anastacio, Jr. being born
more than three years after their first child, Alicia. Verily, such fact is admissible
proof to establish the validity of marriage. Court Resolution dated February 13,
2013 in GR. No. 183262 entitled Social Security System (SSS) v. Lourdes S.
Enobiso[47] had the occasion to state:
Sarmiento v. CA is instructive anent the question of what other proofs can be
offered to establish the fact of a solemnized marriage, viz:
In Trinidad vs. Court of Appeals, et al., this Court ruled that as proof of
marriage may be presented: a) testimony of a witness to the matrimony; b) the
couple's public and open cohabitation as husband and wife after the
alleged wedlock; c) the birth and baptismal certificate of children born during
such union; and d) the mention of such nuptial in subsequent documents. [48]
(Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
Moreover, in a catena of cases,[49] it has been held that, "[p]ersons dwelling
together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is
that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they
thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of
decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is
'that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage.' Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio  — Always
presume marriage."[50]

Furthermore, as the established period of cohabitation of Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela

transpired way before the effectivity of the Family Code, the strong presumption
accorded by then Article 220 of the Civil Code in favor of the validity of marriage
cannot be disregarded. Thus:
Art. 220. In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus,
every intendment of law or facts leans toward the validity of marriage, the
indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of
property during marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the
validity of defense for any member of the family in case of unlawful aggression.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision
dated October 20, 2009 and Resolution dated April 5, 2010 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 90907 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, and  Perez, JJ., concur.

Jardeleza, J., on official leave.

June 23, 2016

 N O T I C E OF J U D G M E N T

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that on June 1, 2016 a Decision, copy attached hereto, was
rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which
was received by this Office on June 23, 2016 at 2:05 p.m.

Very truly yours,

(SGD)
WILFREDO V. LAPITAN
Division Clerk of Court

[1]
 Rollo, pp. 7-24.

[2]
 Penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. (now retired Supreme Court
Associate Justice), with Associate Justices Magdangal M. De Leon and Ricardo R.
Rosario concurring; id. at 26-39.

[3]
 Id. at 62-67.

[4]
 Id. at 41-42.

[5]
 Records, p. 10.

[6]
 Id. at 11.

[7]
 Id. at 12-13.

[8]
 Id. at 14.

[9]
 Id. at 15.

[10]
 Rollo, pp. 27-28. Records, pp. 151-152.

[12]
 Id. at 1-8.

[13]
 Rollo, pp. 59-61.

[14]
 Id. at 62-67.

[15]
 Id. at 66-67.

[16]
 Id. at 65.
[17]
 Id. at 66.

[18]
 Id. at 31-32.

[19]
 Id. at 39.

[20]
 Id. at 34-36.

[21]
 Id. at 105-112.

[22]
 Id. at 41-42.

[23]
 ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or
relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.

[24]
 Rollo, p. 115.

[25]
 Id. at 119.

[26]
 ART. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this
Title; and

(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting
parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take
each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of
legal age.

ART. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the
marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2).

A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as
provided in Article 45.

An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage
but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally
and administratively liable.

[27]
 Rollo, pp. 15-17.

[28]
 Id. at 134-144.

[29]
 Id. at 141.
[30]
 581 Phil. 160 (2008).

[31]
 G.R. No. 191696, April 10, 2013, 695 SCRA 599.

[32]
 Id. at 611.

[33]
 29 Phil. 215 (1915).

[34]
 Id. at 221.

[35]
 Cercado-Siga v. Cercado, Jr., G.R. No. 185374, March 11, 2015, 752 SCRA 514,
525-526.

[36]
 Sarmiento v. CA, 364 Phil. 613, 620 (1999).

[37]
 Macua Vila, de Avenido v. Avenido, G.R. No. 173540, January 22, 2014, 714
SCRA 447, 455, citing Añonuevo, et al., v. Intestate Estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni,
651 Phil. 137, 147 (2010).

[38]
 Rollo, pp. 120-121.

[39]
 Id.

[40]
 102 Phil. 1050 (1958).

[41]
 Rollo, p. 17.

[42]
 Remiendo v. People, 618 Phil. 273 (2009); Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N.
Properties, Inc., 578 Phil. 441, 454 (2008), citing REVISED RULES ON EVIDENCE,
Rule 132, Section 23; People v. Delantar, 543 Phil. 107, 127 (2007).

[43]
 Court Resolution dated July 13, 2011 in G.R. No. 190745 entitled "Lourdes T.
Buhay v. Letecia A. Buhay Dela-Peña." 

[44]
 Tomas P. Tan, Jr. v. Jose G. Hosana, G.R. No. 190846, February 3, 2016.

[45]
 Supra note 40.

[46]
 LAW ON REGISTRY OF CIVIL STATUS. Approved on November 26, 1930.

[47]
 <elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/elibsearch> visited April 14, 2016.

[48]
 Id.

[49]
 Social Security System (SSS) v. Lourdes S. Enobiso, G.R. No. 183262, February
13, 2013, supra note 47; Sevilla v. Cardenas, 529 Phil. 419, 435 (2006);Vda. de
Jacob v. CA, 371 Phil. 693, 708-709 (1999), citing Perido v. Perido, 159 Phil. 710,
716-717 (1975).

[50]
 Id.

Source: Supreme Court E-Library | Date created: July 09, 2018 

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562 Phil. 953

FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. NO. 174689, October 19, 2007 ]
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, PETITIONER, VS.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

CORONA, J.: 

When God created man, He made him in the

  likeness of God; He created them male and female.
(Genesis 5:1-2)
 
Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by
Bathala and she heard voices coming from
inside the bamboo. “Oh North Wind! North
Wind! Please let us out!,” the voices said. She
pecked the reed once, then twice. All of a
  sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out
came two human beings; one was a male and
the other was a female. Amihan named the man
“Malakas” (Strong) and the woman
“Maganda” (Beautiful). (The Legend of
Malakas and Maganda)

When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law
recognize the changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling
with regard to a person’s sex? May a person successfully petition for a change of
name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the result of a sex
reassignment surgery?

On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition
for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 8. The petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207,
impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.

Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the
spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His
name was registered as “Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio” in his certificate of live
birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as “male.”

He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, “anatomically male but
feels, thinks and acts as a female” and that he had always identified himself with
girls since childhood.[1] Feeling trapped in a man’s body, he consulted several
doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological examination, hormone
treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a
“woman” culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment
surgery[2] in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino
Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued
a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the
procedure.

From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married.
He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from “Rommel
Jacinto” to “Mely,” and his sex from “male” to “female.”

An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the People’s Journal
Tonight, a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive
weeks.[3] Copies of the order were sent to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
and the civil registrar of Manila.

On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No

opposition to the petition was made.

During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr.
and his American fiancé, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.

On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision [4] in favor of petitioner. Its
relevant portions read:

Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any
infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making
his birth records compatible with his present sex.

The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.

The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.

Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in
consonance with the principles of justice and equity. With his sexual [re-
assignment], petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted like a woman, now
possesses the physique of a female. Petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in a
man’s body is not his own doing and should not be in any way taken against him.

Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to
anybody or the community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the
petition would bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and
her [fiancé] and the realization of their dreams.

Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the
present petition despite due notice and publication thereof. Even the State, through
the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose any [o]pposition.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering the
Civil Registrar of Manila to change the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of
[p]etitioner, specifically for petitioner’s first name from “Rommel Jacinto”
to MELY and petitioner’s gender from “Male” to FEMALE.[5]

On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed
a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. [6] It alleged that there is no law
allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.

On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals [7] rendered a decision[8] in favor of the
Republic. It ruled that the trial court’s decision lacked legal basis. There is no law
allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of
sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court of Appeals granted the
Republic’s petition, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the
dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it
was denied.[9] Hence, this petition.

Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth
certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108
of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.[10]

The petition lacks merit.

A PERSON’S FIRST NAME

CANNOT BE CHANGED ON THE
GROUND OF SEX REASSIGNMENT

Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of
name and sex. As found by the trial court:

Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any
infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of
making his birth records compatible with his present sex. (emphasis
supplied)
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he
became entitled to the civil registry changes sought. We disagree.

The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for
purposes of identification.[11] A change of name is a privilege, not a right.[12]Petitions
for change of name are controlled by statutes.[13] In this connection, Article 376 of
the Civil Code provides:

ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.

This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In
particular, Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:

SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First

Name or Nickname. – No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected
without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of
first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or
municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this
Act and its implementing rules and regulations.

RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.[14] It vests the power and authority
to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar
or consul general concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications
for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned
administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of
first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation
or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless
an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied.
[15]
 It likewise lays down the corresponding venue,[16] form[17] and procedure. In
sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily
administrative in nature, not judicial.

RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be
allowed:

SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The petition for
change of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:

(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and
he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex
reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he
thought he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a change of name
does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status. [18] RA 9048 does not sanction a
change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding
confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may only create
grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest.

Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or
reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. [19] In addition,
he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name.
[20]
 In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer
as a result of using his true and official name.

In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of
petitioner’s first name was not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the
petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it
could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the proper remedy was
administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong
venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where
his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his
true and official name does not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court
of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioner’s petition in so far as the change of his
first name was concerned.

NO LAW ALLOWS THE

CHANGE OF ENTRY IN THE
BIRTH CERTIFICATE AS TO
SEX ON THE GROUND OF SEX
REASSIGNMENT

The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue
and the court must look to the statutes.[21] In this connection, Article 412 of the
Civil Code provides:

ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a
judicial order.

Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048
in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of
such matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the
need for a judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. [22] Rule 108 now applies only to
substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register. [23]

Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a “clerical or typographical error” is:

SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the following terms shall
mean:

xxx             xxx             xxx

(3) “Clerical or typographical error” refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work
in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and
innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the
eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other
existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change
of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a
mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the
applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil
Code:[24]

ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons
shall be recorded in the civil register.

ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of
marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7)
legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10)
naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14)
judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16)
changes of name.

The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code
include even those that occur after birth.[25] However, no reasonable interpretation
of the provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the correction on the
ground of sex reassignment.

To correct simply means “to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from”
while to change means “to replace something with something else of the same kind
or with something that serves as a substitute.”[26] The birth certificate of petitioner
contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first
name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.

Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of
certain acts(such as legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and
naturalization), events (such as births, marriages, naturalization and deaths)
and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of marriage,
declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of
citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of
name). These acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that
touch upon the legal capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effects are
expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among those
acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even
mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.

“Status” refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum
total of capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and
his family membership.[27]

The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more
or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such
as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not. The
comprehensive term status… include such matters as the beginning and end of legal
personality, capacity to have rights in general, family relations, and its various
aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and
sometimes even succession.[28] (emphasis supplied)

A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of

a person’s legal capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil
Code provides:

ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be
governed by special laws.

But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and
its effects. This is fatal to petitioner’s cause.

Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:

SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. – The declaration of the physician or

midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either
parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the
civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax and
shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by
the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent of the
newborn child.

In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts:
(a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship
and religion of parents or, in case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d)
civil status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; and (f) such other data
as may be required in the regulations to be issued.

xxx             xxx             xxx (emphasis supplied)
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as
they existed at the time of birth.[29] Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth,
visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the
genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex
reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her
birth, if not attended by error,[30] is immutable.[31]

When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and
ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words “sex,”
“male” and “female” as used in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil
registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be understood in their common
and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary. In this
connection, sex is defined as “the sum of peculiarities of structure and function that
distinguish a male from a female”[32] or “the distinction between male and
female.”[33] Female is “the sex that produces ova or bears young”[34] and male is
“the sex that has organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova.” [35] Thus, the
words “male” and “female” in everyday understanding do not include persons who
have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, “words that are employed in a
statute which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed to have been
used in that sense unless the context compels to the contrary.” [36] Since the
statutory language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early 1900s and
remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term “sex” as used then is
something alterable through surgery or something that allows a post-operative
male-to-female transsexual to be included in the category “female.”

For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and
appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the
change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal
basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth
certificate.

NEITHER MAY ENTRIES IN THE BIRTH

CERTIFICATE AS TO FIRST NAME OR
SEX BE CHANGED ON THE GROUND OF
EQUITY

The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the
principles of justice and equity. It believed that allowing the petition would cause no
harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.

The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and
public policy consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition
was but petitioner’s first step towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé.
However, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract
of permanent union between a man and a woman.[37] One of its essential requisites
is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female.
[38]
 To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and
greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a
man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female
post-operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply particularly
to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women,
[39]
 certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code[40] and the presumption of
survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, [41]among
others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be
substantially affected if petitioner’s petition were to be granted.

It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that “[n]o judge or court shall
decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the
law.” However, it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The
duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it.

In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to

determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex
reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in
this case where the claims asserted are statute-based.

To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and
for correction or change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed,
what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be presented and what procedures
shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has
undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform
with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn
governing the conferment of that privilege.

It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person
may be recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has
no authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot
enact a law where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of
its co-equal branch of government, Congress. Petitioner pleads that “[t]he
unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and [the]
realization of their dreams.” No argument about that. The Court recognizes that
there are people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the
commonly recognized parameters of social convention and that, at least for them,
life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of
public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., (Chairperson), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

[1] 
Petitioner went for his elementary and high school, as well as his Bachelor of
Science in Statistics and Master of Arts, in the University of the Philippines. He took
up Population Studies Program, Master of Arts in Sociology and Doctor of
Philosophy in Sociology at the University of Hawaii, in Manoa, Hawaii, U.S.A. Rollo,
p. 48.

[2]
 This consisted of “penectomy [surgical removal of penis] bilateral oschiectomy
[or orchiectomy which is the surgical excision of the testes] penile skin inversion
vaginoplasty [plastic surgery of the vagina] clitoral hood reconstruction and
augmentation mammoplasty [surgical enhancement of the size and shape of the
breasts].” Id.

[3] 
On January 23, 2003, January 30, 2003 and February 6, 2003.

[4]
 Penned by Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr. Rollo, pp. 51-53.

[5] 
Id., pp. 52-53 (citations omitted).

[6] 
Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 78824.

[7]
 Special Sixth Division.

[8]
 Penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok with Associate Justices
Marina L. Buzon and Aurora Santiago-Lagman concurring. Rollo, pp. 25-33.

[9] 
Resolution dated September 14, 2006, id., pp. 45-46.

[10]
 An Act Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul General to
Correct a Clerical or Typographical Error in an Entry and/or Change of First Name or
Nickname in the Civil Register Without Need of a Judicial Order, Amending for the
Purpose Articles 376 and 412 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

[11]
 Wang v. Cebu City Civil Registrar, G.R. No. 159966, 30 March 2005, 454 SCRA
155.
[12]
 Id.

[13]
 K v. Health Division, Department of Human Resources, 277 Or. 371, 560 P.2d
1070 (1977).

[14] 
Under Section 2 (6) of RA 9048, “first name” refers to a name or nickname given
to a person which may consist of one or more names in addition to the middle
names and last names. Thus, the term “first name” will be used here to refer both
to first name and nickname.

[15]
 The last paragraph of Section 7 of RA 9048 provides:

SECTION 7. Duties and Powers of the Civil Registrar General. – xxx xxx xxx

Where the petition is denied by the city or municipal civil registrar or the consul
general, the petitioner may either appeal the decision to the civil registrar general
or file the appropriate petition with the proper court.

[16]
 SECTION 3. Who May File the Petition and Where. – Any person having direct
and personal interest in the correction of a clerical or typographical error in an
entry and/or change of first name or nickname in the civil register may file, in
person, a verified petition with the local civil registry office of the city or
municipality where the record being sought to be corrected or changed is kept.

In case the petitioner has already migrated to another place in the country and it
would not be practical for such party, in terms of transportation expenses, time and
effort to appear in person before the local civil registrar keeping the documents to
be corrected or changed, the petition may be filed, in person, with the local civil
registrar of the place where the interested party is presently residing or domiciled.
The two (2) local civil registrars concerned will then communicate to facilitate the
processing of the petition.

Citizens of the Philippines who are presently residing or domiciled in foreign

countries may file their petition, in person, with the nearest Philippine Consulates.

The petitions filed with the city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general
shall be processed in accordance with this Act and its implementing rules and
regulations.

All petitions for the clerical or typographical errors and/or change of first names or
nicknames may be availed of only once.

[17] 
SECTION 5. Form and Contents of the Petition. – The petition shall be in the
form of an affidavit, subscribed and sworn to before any person authorized by the
law to administer oaths. The affidavit shall set forth facts necessary to establish the
merits of the petition and shall show affirmatively that the petitioner is competent
to testify to the matters stated. The petitioner shall state the particular erroneous
entry or entries, which are sought to be corrected and/or the change sought to be
made.

The petition shall be supported with the following documents:

(1) A certified true machine copy of the certificate or of the page of the registry book containing the
entry or entries sought to be corrected or changed;
(2) At least two (2) public or private documents showing the correct entry or entries upon which the
correction or change shall be based; and
(3) Other documents which the petitioner or the city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general
may consider relevant and necessary for the approval of the petition.

In case of change of first name or nickname, the petition shall likewise be

supported with the documents mentioned in the immediately preceding paragraph.
In addition, the petition shall be published at least once a week for two (2)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation. Furthermore, the
petitioner shall submit a certification from the appropriate law enforcement
agencies that he has no pending case or no criminal record.

[18] 
Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97906, 21 May 1992, 209 SCRA 189.

[19]
 Supra note 11.

[20] 
Id.

[21] 
In re Ladrach, 32 Ohio Misc.2d 6, 513 N.E.2d 828 (1987).

[22]
 Lee v. Court of Appeals, 419 Phil. 392 (2001).

[23]
 Id.

[24] 
Co v. Civil Register of Manila, G.R. No. 138496, 23 February 2004, 423 SCRA
420.

[25] 
Id.

[26]
 Id.

[27] 
Beduya v. Republic of the Philippines, 120 Phil. 114 (1964).

[28]
 Salonga, Jovito, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1995 Edition, Rex Bookstore, p.
238.

[29]
 This, of course, should be taken in conjunction with Articles 407 and 412 of the
Civil Code which authorizes the recording of acts, events and judicial decrees or the
correction or change of errors including those that occur after birth. Nonetheless, in
such cases, the entries in the certificates of birth are not be corrected or changed.
The decision of the court granting the petition shall be annotated in the certificates
of birth and shall form part of the civil register in the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar. (Co v. Civil Register of Manila, supra note 24)

[30]
 The error pertains to one where the birth attendant writes “male” or “female”
but the genitals of the child are that of the opposite sex.

[31] 
Moreover, petitioner’s female anatomy is all man-made. The body that he
inhabits is a male body in all aspects other than what the physicians have supplied.

[32]
 Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th edition (2004), p.1406.

[33]
 Words and Phrases, volume 39, Permanent Edition, p. 106.

[34] 
In re Application for Marriage License for Nash, 2003-Ohio-7221 (No. 2002-T-
0149, slip op., Not Reported in N.E.2d, 2003 WL 23097095 (Ohio App. 11 Dist.,
December 31, 2003), citing Webster’s II New College Dictionary (1999).

[35] 
Id.

[36] 
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), 31 S.Ct. 502, 55 L.Ed.
619.

[37]
 Article 1, Family Code.

[38] 
Article 2(1), Id.

[39]
 These are Articles 130 to 138 of the Labor Code which include nightwork
prohibition, facilities for women, prohibition on discrimination and stipulation
against marriage, among others.

[40] 
These include Article 333 on adultery, Articles 337 to 339 on qualified seduction,
simple seduction and acts of lasciviousness with the consent of the offended party
and Articles 342 and 343 on forcible and consented abduction, among others.

[41]
 Section 3(jj)(4).
 Source: Supreme Court E-Library | Date created: August 12, 2013 
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586 Phil. 637

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 166676, September 12, 2008 ]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. JENNIFER
B. CAGANDAHAN, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.: 

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising purely
questions of law and seeking a reversal of the Decision [1] dated January 12, 2005 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, which granted the
Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate filed by Jennifer B. Cagandahan
and ordered the following changes of entries in Cagandahan's birth certificate: (1)
the name "Jennifer Cagandahan" changed to "Jeff Cagandahan" and (2) gender
from "female" to "male."

The facts are as follows.

On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for

Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate [2] before the RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan,
Laguna.

In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was
registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she
developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital
Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess
both male and female characteristics. She further alleged that she was diagnosed to
have clitoral hyperthropy in her early years and at age six, underwent an
ultrasound where it was discovered that she has small ovaries. At age thirteen,
tests revealed that her ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped growing
and she has no breast or menstrual development. She then alleged that for all
interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male
person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her
gender be changed from female to male and her first name be changed from
Jennifer to Jeff.

The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation for three (3)
consecutive weeks and was posted in conspicuous places by the sheriff of the court.
The Solicitor General entered his appearance and authorized the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor to appear in his behalf.

To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr. Michael
Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine
General Hospital. Dr. Sionzon issued a medical certificate stating that respondent's
condition is known as CAH. He explained that genetically respondent is female but
because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop
normally and she has two sex organs - female and male. He testified that this
condition is very rare, that respondent's uterus is not fully developed because of
lack of female hormones, and that she has no monthly period. He further testified
that respondent's condition is permanent and recommended the change of gender
because respondent has made up her mind, adjusted to her chosen role as male,
and the gender change would be advantageous to her.

The RTC granted respondent's petition in a Decision dated January 12, 2005 which
reads:

The Court is convinced that petitioner has satisfactorily shown that he is entitled to
the reliefs prayed [for]. Petitioner has adequately presented to the Court very clear
and convincing proofs for the granting of his petition. It was medically proven that
petitioner's body produces male hormones, and first his body as well as his action
and feelings are that of a male. He has chosen to be male. He is a normal person
and wants to be acknowledged and identified as a male.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Civil Register of Pakil, Laguna is hereby

ordered to make the following corrections in the birth [c]ertificate of Jennifer
Cagandahan upon payment of the prescribed fees:

a) By changing the name from Jennifer Cagandahan to JEFF CAGANDAHAN; and

b) By changing the gender from female to MALE.

It is likewise ordered that petitioner's school records, voter's registry, baptismal

certificate, and other pertinent records are hereby amended to conform with the
foregoing corrected data.

SO ORDERED.[3]

Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a reversal of
the abovementioned ruling.

The issues raised by petitioner are:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION CONSIDERING THAT:

 I.

THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULES 103 AND 108 OF THE RULES OF COURT HAVE NOT
BEEN COMPLIED WITH; AND,

II.

CORRECTION OF ENTRY UNDER RULE 108 DOES NOT ALLOW CHANGE OF "SEX" OR
"GENDER" IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE, WHILE RESPONDENT'S MEDICAL
CONDITION, i.e., CONGENITAL ADRENAL HYPERPLASIA DOES NOT MAKE HER A
"MALE."[4]

Simply stated, the issue is whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction of
entries in the birth certificate of respondent to change her sex or gender, from
female to male, on the ground of her medical condition known as CAH, and her
name from "Jennifer" to "Jeff," under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.

The OSG contends that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance
with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because while the local civil registrar
is an indispensable party in a petition for cancellation or correction of entries under
Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, respondent's petition before the court a
quo did not implead the local civil registrar.[5] The OSG further contends
respondent's petition is fatally defective since it failed to state that respondent is
a bona fide resident of the province where the petition was filed for at least three
(3) years prior to the date of such filing as mandated under Section 2(b), Rule 103
of the Rules of Court.[6] The OSG argues that Rule 108 does not allow change of sex
or gender in the birth certificate and respondent's claimed medical condition known
as CAH does not make her a male.[7]

On the other hand, respondent counters that although the Local Civil Registrar of
Pakil, Laguna was not formally named a party in the Petition for Correction of Birth
Certificate, nonetheless the Local Civil Registrar was furnished a copy of the
Petition, the Order to publish on December 16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders or
processes in the course of the proceedings, [8] respondent is actually a male person
and hence his birth certificate has to be corrected to reflect his true sex/gender,
[9]
change of sex or gender is allowed under Rule 108, [10] and respondent
substantially complied with the requirements of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of
Court.[11]

Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court provide:

Rule 103
CHANGE OF NAME

SECTION 1. Venue. - A person desiring to change his name shall present the
petition to the Regional Trial Court of the province in which he resides, [or, in the
City of Manila, to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court].

SEC. 2. Contents of petition. - A petition for change of name shall be signed and
verified by the person desiring his name changed, or some other person on his
behalf, and shall set forth:

(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide  resident of the province where the
petition is filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing;

(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is sought;

(c) The name asked for.

SEC. 3. Order for hearing. - If the petition filed is sufficient in form and substance,
the court, by an order reciting the purpose of the petition, shall fix a date and place
for the hearing thereof, and shall direct that a copy of the order be published before
the hearing at least once a week for three (3) successive weeks in some newspaper
of general circulation published in the province, as the court shall deem best. The
date set for the hearing shall not be within thirty (30) days prior to an election nor
within four (4) months after the last publication of the notice.

SEC. 4. Hearing. - Any interested person may appear at the hearing and oppose the
petition. The Solicitor General or the proper provincial or city fiscal shall appear on
behalf of the Government of the Republic.

SEC. 5. Judgment. - Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed in the
order that such order has been published as directed and that the allegations of the
petition are true, the court shall, if proper and reasonable cause appears for
changing the name of the petitioner, adjudge that such name be changed in
accordance with the prayer of the petition.

SEC. 6. Service of judgment. - Judgments or orders rendered in connection with

this rule shall be furnished the civil registrar of the municipality or city where the
court issuing the same is situated, who shall forthwith enter the same in the civil
register.

Rule 108
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES 
IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY

SECTION 1. Who may file petition. - Any person interested in any act, event, order
or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry
relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located.

SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. - Upon good and valid grounds,
the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births;
(b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of
marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g)
legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j)
naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m)
judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o)
changes of name.

SEC. 3. Parties. - When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is

sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which
would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.

SEC. 4. Notice and publication. - Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by
an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable
notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also
cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province.

SEC. 5. Opposition.  - The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any
interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of
such notice, file his opposition thereto.

SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. - The court in which the proceedings is brought

may make orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary
injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such
proceedings.

SEC. 7. Order. - After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an
order granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified
copy of the judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall
annotate the same in his record.

The OSG argues that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because respondent's petition did not
implead the local civil registrar. Section 3, Rule 108 provides that the civil registrar
and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby
shall be made parties to the proceedings. Likewise, the local civil registrar is
required to be made a party in a proceeding for the correction of name in the civil
registry. He is an indispensable party without whom no final determination of the
case can be had.[12] Unless all possible indispensable parties were duly notified of
the proceedings, the same shall be considered as falling much too short of the
requirements of the rules.[13] The corresponding petition should also implead as
respondents the civil registrar and all other persons who may have or may claim to
have any interest that would be affected thereby.[14] Respondent, however, invokes
Section 6,[15] Rule 1 of the Rules of Court which states that courts shall construe the
Rules liberally to promote their objectives of securing to the parties a just, speedy
and inexpensive disposition of the matters brought before it. We agree that there is
substantial compliance with Rule 108 when respondent furnished a copy of the
petition to the local civil registrar.

The determination of a person's sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue
and the court must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil
Code provides:

ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a

judicial order.

Together with Article 376[16] of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by
Republic Act No. 9048[17] in so far as clerical or typographical  errors are involved.
The correction or change of such matters can now be made through administrative
proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048
removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such
errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries
in the civil register.[18]

Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of
sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which
the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. [19]

The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil
Code:

ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons
shall be recorded in the civil register.

ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of
marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7)
legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10)
naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14)
judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16)
changes of name.

The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code
include even those that occur after birth.[20]
Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or
"inappropriate" appearance of male characteristics. A person, like respondent, with
this condition produces too much androgen, a male hormone. A newborn who has
XX chromosomes coupled with CAH usually has a (1) swollen clitoris with the
urethral opening at the base, an ambiguous genitalia often appearing more male
than female; (2) normal internal structures of the female reproductive tract such as
the ovaries, uterus and fallopian tubes; as the child grows older, some features
start to appear male, such as deepening of the voice, facial hair, and failure to
menstruate at puberty. About 1 in 10,000 to 18,000 children are born with CAH.

CAH is one of many conditions[21] that involve intersex anatomy. During the

twentieth century, medicine adopted the term "intersexuality" to apply to human
beings who cannot be classified as either male or female.[22] The term is now of
widespread use. According to Wikipedia, intersexuality "is the state of a living thing
of a gonochoristic species whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex
characteristics are determined to be neither exclusively male nor female. An
organism with intersex may have biological characteristics of both male and female
sexes."

Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different cultures. In most

societies, intersex individuals have been expected to conform to either a male or
female gender role.[23] Since the rise of modern medical science in Western
societies, some intersex people with ambiguous external genitalia have had their
genitalia surgically modified to resemble either male or female genitals. [24] More
commonly, an intersex individual is considered as suffering from a "disorder" which
is almost always recommended to be treated, whether by surgery and/or by taking
lifetime medication in order to mold the individual as neatly as possible into the
category of either male or female.

In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the
various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright
denial. "It has been suggested that there is some middle ground between the
sexes, a `no-man's land' for those individuals who are neither truly `male' nor truly
`female'."[25] The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a
person be classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled
by mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid
classification.

In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female, then there is no

basis for a change in the birth certificate entry for gender. But if we determine,
based on medical testimony and scientific development showing the respondent to
be other than female, then a change in the

subject's birth certificate entry is in order.

Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither consistently and
categorically female nor consistently and categorically male) composition.
Respondent has female (XX) chromosomes. However, respondent's body system
naturally produces high levels of male hormones (androgen). As a result,
respondent has ambiguous genitalia and the phenotypic features of a male.

Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally
intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the
individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason
thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and considering
that his body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen) there is
preponderant biological support for considering him as being male. Sexual
development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth
inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is
fixed.

Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural
steps to arrest or interfere with what he was born with. And accordingly, he has
already ordered his life to that of a male. Respondent could have undergone
treatment and taken steps, like taking lifelong medication, [26] to force his body into
the categorical mold of a female but he did not. He chose not to do so. Nature has
instead taken its due course in respondent's development to reveal more fully his
male characteristics.

In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent
concerning a matter so innately private as one's sexuality and lifestyle preferences,
much less on whether or not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male
tendency due to CAH. The Court will not consider respondent as having erred in not
choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither
will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in
order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows this gender
of the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex
anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health.
Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take
along the path of his sexual development and maturation. In the absence of
evidence that respondent is an "incompetent"[27] and in the absence of evidence to
show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of society who
are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and
justified the respondent's position and his personal judgment of being a male.

In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2)
how an individual deals with what nature has handed out. In other words, we
respect respondent's congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life
is already difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but respect how respondent
deals with his unordinary state and thus help make his life easier, considering the
unique circumstances in this case.

As for respondent's change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a
change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in
the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow. [28] The trial
court's grant of respondent's change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change
of a feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the consequence that
respondent's change of name merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit
in respondent's change of name. Such a change will conform with the change of the
entry in his birth certificate from female to male.

WHEREFORE, the Republic's petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 12,
2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, is AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio-Morales, Tinga, Velasco, Jr., and Brion, JJ., concur.

[1]
 Rollo, pp. 29-32. Penned by Judge Florenio P. Bueser.

[2]
 Id. at 33-37.

[3]
 Id. at 31-32.

[4]
 Id. at 97.

[5]
 Id. at 99.

[6]
 Id. at 103.

[7]
 Id. at 104.

[8]
 Id. at 136.

[9]
 Id. at 127.

[10]
 Id. at 134.
[11]
 Id. at 136.

[12]
 Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103695, March 15, 1996, 255 SCRA 99,
106.

[13]
 Ceruila v. Delantar, G.R. No. 140305, December 9, 2005, 477 SCRA 134, 147.

[14]
 Republic v. Benemerito, G.R. No. 146963, March 15, 2004, 425 SCRA 488, 492.

[15]
 SEC. 6. Construction.- These Rules shall be liberally construed in order to
promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of
every action and proceeding.

[16]
 Art. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.

[17]
 AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR MUNICIPAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OR THE
CONSUL GENERAL TO CORRECT A CLERICAL OR TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN AN
ENTRY AND/OR CHANGE OF FIRST NAME OR NICKNAME IN THE CIVIL REGISTRAR
WITHOUT NEED OF A JUDICIAL ORDER, AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE ARTICLES
376 AND 412 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES. APPROVED, MARCH 22,
2001.

[18]
 Silverio v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 174689, October 19, 2007, 537
SCRA 373, 388.

[19]
 Id. at 389.

[20]
 Id. at 389.

[21]
 (1) 5-alpha reductase deficiency; (2) androgen insensitivity syndrome; (3)
aphallia; (4) clitoromegaly; (5) congenital adrenal hyperplasia; (6) gonadal
dysgenesis (partial & complete); (7) hypospadias; (8) Kallmann syndrome; (9)
Klinefelter syndrome; (10) micropenis; (11) mosaicism involving sex chromosomes;
(12) MRKH (mullerian agenesis; vaginal agenesis; congenital absence of vagina);
(13) ovo-testes (formerly called "true hermaphroditism"); (14) partial androgen
insensitivity syndrome; (15) progestin induced virilization; (16) Swyer syndrome;
(17) Turner syndrome. [Intersexuality <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intersexual>
(visited August 15, 2008).]

[22]
 Intersexuality<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intersexual> (visited August 15,
2008).

[23]
 Intersexuality<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intersexual> visited August 15,
2008), citing Gagnon and Simon 1973.
[24]
 Intersexuality <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intersexual> (visited August 15,
2008).

[25]
 M.T. v. J.T. 140 N.J. Super 77 355 A. 2d 204.

[26]
 The goal of treatment is to return hormone levels to normal. This is done by
taking a form of cortisol (dexamethasone), fludrocortisone, or hydrocortisone)
every day. Additional doses of medicine are needed during times of stress, such as
severe illness or surgery.

xxxx

Parents of children with congenital adrenal hyperplasia should be aware of the side
effects of steroid therapy. They should report signs of infection and stress to their
health care provider because increases in medication may be required. In
additional, steroid medications cannot be stopped suddenly, or adrenal
insufficiencywill result.

xxxx

The outcome is usually associated with good health, but short stature may result
even with treatment. Males have normal fertility. Females may have a smaller
opening of the vagina and lower fertility. Medication to treat this disorder must be
continued for life. (Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia )

[27]
 The word "incompetent" includes persons suffering the penalty of civil
interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are
unable to read and write, those who are of unsound mind, even though they have
lucid intervals, and persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age,
disease, weak mind, and other similar causes, cannot, without outside aid, take
care of themselves and manage their property, becoming thereby an easy prey for
deceit and exploitation. (See Sec. 2 of Rule 92 of the Rules of Court)

[28]
 Yu v. Republic of the  Philippines, 123 Phil. 1106, 1110 (1966).
 Source: Supreme Court E-Library | Date created: January 07, 2014 
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719 Phil. 622

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 198780, October 16, 2013 ]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. LIBERTY
D. ALBIOS, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.: 

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court

assailing the September 29, 2011 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA). in CA-
G.R. CV No. 95414, which affirmed the April 25, 2008 Decision [2] of the Regional
Trial Court, Imus, Cavite (RTC), declaring the marriage of Daniel Lee Fringer
(Fringer) and respondent Liberty Albios (Albios) as void from the beginning.

The Facts

On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before
Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 59, Mandaluyong City
(MeTC), as evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588. [3]

On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of
nullity[4] of her marriage with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their
marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never
really had any intention of entering into a married state or complying with any of
their essential marital obligations. She described their marriage as one made in jest
and, therefore, null and void ab initio.

Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September 13,
2007, Albios filed a motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief.
The RTC ordered the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an investigation and
determine the existence of a collusion. On October 2, 2007, the Assistant
Prosecutor complied and reported that she could not make a determination for
failure of both parties to appear at the scheduled investigation.

At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did
not attend the hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule. After the pre-
trial, hearing on the merits ensued.
Ruling of the RTC

In its April 25, 2008 Decision,[5] the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the

marriage of Liberty Albios and Daniel Lee Fringer as void from the very beginning.
As a necessary consequence of this pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using the
surname of respondent as she never acquired any right over it and so as to avoid a
misimpression that she remains the wife of respondent.

xxxx

SO ORDERED.[6]

The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience only.
Giving credence to the testimony of Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer to
enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in
consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the
ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that Fringer returned to the United
States and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay
him the $2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for citizenship. The
RTC, thus, ruled that when marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the
establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be
recognized from its inception.

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor

General (OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order,
[7]
dated February 5, 2009, denying the motion for want of merit. It explained that
the marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely give their
consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used
it only as a means to acquire American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.

Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.

Ruling of the CA

In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling
which found that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. The CA stated that
the parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting
married and that their case was similar to a marriage in jest. It further explained
that the parties never intended to enter into the marriage contract and never
intended to live as husband and wife or build a family. It concluded that their
purpose was primarily for personal gain, that is, for Albios to obtain foreign
citizenship, and for Fringer, the consideration of $2,000.00.

Hence, this petition.

Assignment of Error

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW WHEN IT HELD

THAT A MARRIAGE CONTRACTED FOR THE PURPOSE OF OBTAINING
FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP WAS DONE IN JEST, HENCE, LACKING IN THE
ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF CONSENT.[8]

The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American
citizenship and for Fringer to be paid $2,000.00, both parties freely gave their
consent to the marriage, as they knowingly and willingly entered into that marriage
and knew the benefits and consequences of being bound by it. According to the
OSG, consent should be distinguished from motive, the latter being inconsequential
to the validity of marriage.

The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of a
marriage in jest. The parties here intentionally consented to enter into a real and
valid marriage, for if it were otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire American
citizenship would be rendered futile.

On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment [9] to the petition, reiterating her
stand that her marriage was similar to a marriage by way of jest and, therefore,
void from the beginning.

On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply[10] reiterating its arguments in its
petition for review on certiorari.

Ruling of the Court

The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a marriage,
contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration of
$2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?

The Court resolves in the negative.

Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the phenomenon of
marriage fraud for the purposes of immigration.

Marriage Fraud in Immigration

The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the
development of marriage fraud for the sole purpose of availing of particular
benefits. In the United States, marriages where a couple marries only to achieve a
particular purpose or acquire specific benefits, have been referred to as “limited
purpose” marriages.[11] A common limited purpose marriage is one entered into
solely for the legitimization of a child.[12] Another, which is the subject of the
present case, is for immigration purposes. Immigration law is usually concerned
with the intention of the couple at the time of their marriage, [13] and it attempts to
filter out those who use marriage solely to achieve immigration status. [14]

In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,

[15]
established the principal test for determining the presence of marriage fraud in
immigration cases. It ruled that a “marriage is a sham if the bride and groom did
not intend to establish a life together at the time they were married.” This standard
was modified with the passage of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of
1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead demonstrate that the
marriage was not “entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws of
the United States.” The focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to
establish a life together, to determining the intention of evading immigration laws.
[16]
 It must be noted, however, that this standard is used purely for immigration
purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the legal validity or existence
of a marriage.

The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or

fraudulent for the limited purpose of immigration is also legally void and inexistent.
The early cases on limited purpose marriages in the United States made no
definitive ruling. In 1946, the notable case of United States v. Rubenstein[17] was
promulgated, wherein in order to allow an alien to stay in the country, the parties
had agreed to marry but not to live together and to obtain a divorce within six
months. The Court, through Judge Learned Hand, ruled that a marriage to convert
temporary into permanent permission to stay in the country was not a marriage,
there being no consent, to wit:

x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual consent is
necessary to every contract; and no matter what forms or ceremonies the parties
may go through indicating the contrary, they do not contract if they do not in fact
assent, which may always be proved. x x x Marriage is no exception to this rule: a
marriage in jest is not a marriage at all. x x x It is quite true that a marriage
without subsequent consummation will be valid; but if the spouses agree to a
marriage only for the sake of representing it as such to the outside world and with
the understanding that they will put an end to it as soon as it has served its
purpose to deceive, they have never really agreed to be married at all. They must
assent to enter into the relation as it is ordinarily understood, and it is not
ordinarily understood as merely a pretence, or cover, to deceive others.[18]

(Italics supplied)
On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines,
[19]
which declared as valid a marriage entered into solely for the husband to gain
entry to the United States, stating that a valid marriage could not be avoided
“merely because the marriage was entered into for a limited purpose.” [20] The 1980
immigration case of Matter of McKee,[21] further recognized that a fraudulent or
sham marriage was intrinsically different from a nonsubsisting one.

Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore, been
recognized as problematic. The problem being that in order to obtain an
immigration benefit, a legal marriage is first necessary. [22] At present, United States
courts have generally denied annulments involving “limited purpose” marriages
where a couple married only to achieve a particular purpose, and have upheld such
marriages as valid.[23]

The Court now turns to the case at hand.

Respondent’s marriage not void

In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage
was entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and
family life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception. In its
resolution denying the OSG’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC went on to
explain that the marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely give
their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and
used it only as a means for the respondent to acquire American citizenship.

Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential requisite of consent was
lacking. It held that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and
consequence of getting married. As in the Rubenstein case, the CA found the
marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest considering that the parties only
entered into the marriage for the acquisition of American citizenship in exchange of
$2,000.00. They never intended to enter into a marriage contract and never
intended to live as husband and wife or build a family.

The CA’s assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties’ supposed lack
of consent. Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of
marriage. Article 4 of the same Code provides that the absence of any essential
requisite shall render a marriage void ab initio.

Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2)
made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A “freely given” consent requires
that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage.
Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by
any of the vices of consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as
fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence.[24] Consent must also be conscious
or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the
nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act. [25]Their
understanding should not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.
[26]

Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact,
there was real consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any
vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood
the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as
nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is best
evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through
marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted
the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so
as to fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was
a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between
them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their
goal.

In ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized
such as akin to a marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended
marriage, legal in form but entered into as a joke, with no real intention of entering
into the actual marriage status, and with a clear understanding that the parties
would not be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct indicating a
purpose to enter into such a relation.[27] It is a pretended marriage not intended to
be real and with no intention to create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the
absence of any genuine consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for
vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of consent.
There is no genuine consent because the parties have absolutely no intention of
being bound in any way or for any purpose.

The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest. Albios and
Fringer had an undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond
necessary to allow the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine
consent to be married would allow them to further their objective, considering that
only a valid marriage can properly support an application for citizenship. There was,
thus, an apparent intention to enter into the actual marriage status and to create a
legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly
present.

The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the
couple to establish a conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties in a
marriage might have no real intention to establish a life together is, however,
insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in accordance with law. The
same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage
are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be
declared void or voidable under the grounds provided by law. There is no law that
declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the
Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship.
Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal requisites precribed by law are
present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be
declared valid.[28]

Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not
and cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to
regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would
raise serious constitutional questions.[29] The right to marital privacy allows married
couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they see fit, to live together
or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not, and so on.
[30]
 Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as
convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply
with all the legal requisites,[31] are equally valid. Love, though the ideal
consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other
considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.

Although the Court views with disdain the respondent’s attempt to utilize marriage
for dishonest purposes, It cannot declare the marriage void. Hence, though the
respondent’s marriage may be considered a sham or fraudulent for the purposes of
immigration, it is not void ab initio and continues to be valid and subsisting.

Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under
Article 45 (3) of the Family Code. Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of
the same Code may constitute fraud, namely, (1) non-disclosure of a previous
conviction involving moral turpitude; (2) concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by
another man; (3) concealment of a sexually transmitted disease; and (4)
concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other
misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a ground tor an action to annul
a marriage. Entering into a: marriage tor the sole purpose of evading immigration
laws does not qualify under any oft he listed circumstances. Furthermore, under
Article 47 (3), the ground of fraud may only be brought by the injured or innocent
party. In the present case, there is no injured party because Albios and Fringer
both conspired to enter into the sham marriage.

Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing
her marriage with Fringer to be declared void would only further trivialize this
inviolable institution. The Cout1 cannot declare such a marriage void in the event
the parties fail to quality for immigration benefits, after they have availed of its
benefits, or simply have no further use for it. These unscrupulous individuals cannot
be allowed to use the courts as instruments in their fraudulent schemes. Albios
already misused a judicial institution to enter into a marriage of convenience; she
should not be allowed to again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient
situation.

No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an inviolable social

institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. [32]It
must, therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting
parties. This Cout1 cannot leave the impression that marriage may easily be
entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified when
no longer needed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-
06 is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro,* Brion,** and Peralta, JJ., concur.

*
 Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F.
Leonen, per Special Order No. 1570 dated October 14, 2013.

**
 Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad, per
Special Order No. 1554 dated September 19, 2013.

[1]
 Rollo, pp. 26-32; penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and
concurred in by Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and Associate Justice Florito
S. Macalino of the Fifth Division, Manila.

[2]
 Id. at 38-39.

[3]
 Id. at 37.

[4]
 Id. at 33-35.

[5]
 Id. at 38-39.

[6]
 Id. at 39.

[7]
 Id. at 48-49.

[8]
 Id. at 13.

[9]
 Id. at 61-71.

[10]
 Id. at 89-95.
[11]
 Abrams, Kerry, Marriage Fraud. 100 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (2012);
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract_id=2000956. Lutwak v. United
States, 344 U.S. 604, 612-613 (U.S. 1953).

[12]
 Abrams, Kerry. Marriage Fraud. 100 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (2012);
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract_id=2000956; citing Schibi v.
Schibi, 69 A.2d 831 (Conn. 1949) (denying annulment where parties married only
to give a name to a prospective child); Bishop v. Bishop, 308 N.Y.S.2d 998 (Sup.
Ct. 1970); Erickson v. Erickson, 48 N.Y.S.2d 588 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (holding similarly
to Schibi); Delfino v.Delfino, 35 N.Y.S.2d 693 (Sup. Ct. 1942) (denying annulment
where purpose of marriage was to protect the girl’s name and there was an
understanding that the parties would not live together as man and wife); Bove v.
Pinciotti, 46 Pa. D. & C. 159 (1942); Campbell v. Moore, 189 S.E.2d 497
(S.C.1939) (refusing an annulment where parties entered marriage for the purpose
of legitimizing a child); Chander v. Chander, No. 2937-98-4, 1999 WL 1129721
(Va. Ct. App. June 22, 1999) (denying annulment where wife married husband to
get his pension with no intention to consummate marriage because husband knew
that was the purpose of the marriage).

[13]
 Abrams, Kerry. Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage; 91 Minn. L.
Rev. 1625 (2007); http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/01/Abrams_Final.pdf; citing Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA), § 237(a)(1)(G), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(G) (2000).

[14]
 Abrams, Kerry. Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage; 91 Minn. L.
Rev. 1625 (2007); http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/01/Abrams_Final.pdf; citing 132 CONG. REC. 27,012, 27,015
(1986) (statement of Rep McCollum) (promoting the Immigration Marriage Fraud
Amendments of 1986).

[15]
 511 F.2d 1200, 1201 (9th Cir. 1975).

[16]
 Abrams, Kerry. Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage; 91 Minn. L.
Rev. 1625 (2007); http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/01/Abrams_Final.pdf.

[17]
 151 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1945).

[18]
 United States v. Rubenstein, 151 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1945).

[19]
 Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 323 F. Supp. 865 (S.D. Tex. 1969), aff’d, 440
F.2d 1163 (5th Cir. 1971).

[20]
 Abrams, Kerry. Marriage Fraud. 100 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (2012);
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract_id=2000956; citing Mpiliris v.
Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 323 F. Supp. 865 (S.D. Tex. 1969), aff’d, 440 F.2d 1163 (5th
Cir. 1971).

[21]
 Matter of McKee, 17 I. & N. Dec. 332, 333 (B.I.A. 1980).

[22]
 Lynn D. Wardle and Laurence C. Nolan, Family Law in the USA, (The
Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2011) p. 86.

[23]
 Abrams, Kerry. Marriage Fraud. 100 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (2012);
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract_id=2000956.

[24]
 Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, (Quezon
City, Philippines: Joer Printing Services, 2005), p. 4.

[25]
 Melencio S. Sta. Maria, Jr., Persons and Family Relations Law, (Quezon City,
Philippines: Rex Printing Company, Inc., 2010), Fifth Edition, p. 121.

[26]
 Arturo M. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the
Philippines, (Manila, Philippines: Central Book Supply, Inc., 2004), Volume I, p.
231.

[27]
 Arturo M. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the
Philippines, (Manila, Philippines: Central Book Supply, Inc., 2004), Volume I, p.
231; citing McClurg v. Terry, 21 N.J. 225.

[28]
 Article 4, Family Code.

[29]
 Bark v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 511 F.2d 1200, 1201 (9th Cir.
1975).

[30]
 Abrams, Kerry. Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage; 91 Minn. L.
Rev. 1625 (2007); http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/01/Abrams_Final.pdf; citing McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d
336, 337 (Neb. 1953). Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965).

[31]
 Article 4, Family Code.

[32]
 Const. (1987), Article XV, Section 2.
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328 Phil. 435

SECOND DIVISION
[ A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088, July 19, 1996 ]
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE
HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY, RESPONDENT. 

DECISION

ROMERO, J.: 

The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao
del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted evidence in relation to two specific
acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando
Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in
office and ignorance of the law.

First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between
Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is
merely separated from his first wife.

Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano

Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on
October 27, 1994. Respondent judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding
was solemnized at the respondent judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa,
which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica
and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa,
Surigao del Norte.

In his letter-comment to the Office of the Court Administrator, respondent judge

avers that the office and name of the Municipal Mayor of Dapa have been used by
someone else, who, as the mayor's "lackey," is overly concerned with his actuations
both as judge and as a private person. The same person had earlier filed
Administrative Matter No. 94-980-MTC, which was dismissed for lack of merit on
September 15, 1994, and Administrative Matter No. OCA-IPI-95-16, "Antonio
Adapon v. Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy," which is still pending.

In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from his
act of having solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man
separated from his wife, and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely relied on the
Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact
that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven
years.[1] With respect to the second charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the
marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph
1 of the Family Code which states that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any
incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction"; and that Article
8 thereof applies to the case in question.

The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the pleadings
submitted were considered sufficient for a resolution of the case. [2]

Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of complainant
have not been sufficiently proven, they will not be dwelt upon. The acts complained
of and respondent judge's answer thereto will suffice and can be objectively
assessed by themselves to prove the latter's malfeasance.

The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn
Borga states that Tagadan's civil status is "separated." Despite this declaration, the
wedding ceremony was solemnized by respondent judge. He presented in evidence
a joint affidavit by Maurecio A. Labado, Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer, subscribed and
sworn to before Judge Demosthenes C. Duquilla, Municipal Trial Judge of Basey,
Samar.[3] The affidavit was not issued by the latter judge, as claimed by respondent
judge, but merely acknowledged before him. In their affidavit, the affiants stated
that they knew Gaspar Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D. Peñaranda in
September 1983; that after thirteen years of cohabitation and having borne five
children, Ida Peñaranda left the conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon and that
she has not returned nor been heard of for almost seven years, thereby giving rise
to the presumption that she is already dead.

In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit is

sufficient proof of Ida Peñaranda's presumptive death, and ample reason for him to
proceed with the marriage ceremony. We do not agree.

Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:

"A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous

marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead.
In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances
set forth in the provisions of Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two
years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as
provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse."
(Emphasis added.)

There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the

law is clear and simple. Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that
the absent spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage, a
mandatory requirement which has been precisely incorporated into the Family Code
to discourage subsequent marriages where it is not proven that the previous
marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead,
in accordance with pertinent provisions of law.

In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the
declaration of his first wife's presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he
remains married to Ida Peñaranda. Whether wittingly, or unwittingly, it was
manifest error on the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit
submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a
bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, "The
following marriage shall be void from the beginning: (4) Those bigamous x x x
marriages not falling under Article 41."

The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside the
court's jurisdiction, covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus:

"Art. 7.  Marriage may be solemnized by:

(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;

x x x x x x xxx (Emphasis supplied.)

Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in
open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general,
consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of
marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places in
accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties request the
solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be
solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement
to that effect."

Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justifications for his
having solemnized the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario
outside of his court's jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision states, a marriage
can be held outside of the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following
instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in remote places in accordance with Article
29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect.
There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or
in a remote place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the
respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario. [4]

More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority
of the solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage
is the "authority of the solemnizing officer." Under Article 7, marriage may be
solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent member of the judiciary within the
court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the
venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the
solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith
will not invalidate the marriage.

A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the
faithful, is authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese or place allowed
by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction
over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long
as the requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed
to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not
beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there
is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it
may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to
administrative liability.[5]

Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta.

Monica and Burgos, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in
the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions
therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent judge
again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic principles of civil law.

Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law.
The legal principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention are elementary
and uncomplicated, prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure to apply
them is due to a lack of comprehension of the law.

The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least,
proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They
should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law. It is
imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved
in instant case.[6] It is not too much to expect them to know and apply the law
intelligently.[7] Otherwise, the system of justice rests on a shaky foundation indeed,
compounded by the errors committed by those not learned in the law. While
magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not
penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of
law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons.

The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous
and void, there being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida
Peñaranda.

The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the

Court, a six-month suspension and a stern warning that a repetition of the same or
similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Considering that one of the marriages
in question resulted in a bigamous union and therefore void, and the other lacked
the necessary authority of respondent judge, the Court adopts said
recommendation. Respondent is advised to be more circumspect in applying the law
and to cultivate a deeper understanding of the law.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is

hereby SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months and given a STERN
WARNINGthat a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado (Chairman), Puno, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

[1]
 Rollo, pp. 7-8.

[2]
 Uy v. Dizon-Capulong, A.M. No. RTJ-91-766, April 7, 1993; Montemayor v.
Collado, A.M. No. 2519-MTJ, September 10, 1981; Ubongon v. Mayo, A.M. No.
1255-CTJ, August 6, 1980, 99 SCRA 30.

[3]
 Rollo, p. 12.

[4]
 Rollo, pp. 10-11.

[5]
 Article 4, Family Code.

[6]
 Lim v. Domogas, A.M. No. RTJ-92-899, October 15, 1993, 227 SCRA 258, 263
citing Ubongan v. Mayo, 99 SCRA 30 and Ajeno v. Inserto, 71 SCRA 166.

[7]
 Galan Realty Co. v. Arranz, A.M. No. MTJ-93-978, October 27, 1994, 237 SCRA
771.
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 EN BANC
[ A.M. No. MTJ-15-1860 (Formerly OCA I.P.I.
No. 09-2224-MTJ), April 03, 2018 ]
ROSILANDA M. KEUPPERS, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE
VIRGILIO G. MURCIA, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES,
BRANCH 2, ISLAND GARDEN CITY OF SAMAL, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.: 

A municipal trial judge who solemnizes a marriage outside of his territorial

jurisdiction violates Article 7 of the Family Code, and is guilty of grave misconduct
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. He should be properly
sanctioned.

The Case

This administrative matter commenced from the 1st Indorsement dated November

4, 2009,[1] whereby the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao endorsed to
the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for appropriate action the complete
records of the case initiated by affidavit-complaint by complainant Rosilanda
Maningo Keuppers against respondent Judge Virgilio G. Murcia, the Presiding Judge
of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, in the Island Garden City of Samal,
Davao del Norte. She thereby charged respondent Judge with estafa; violation of
Republic Act No. 6713; and grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service.[2]

The complainant averred in her affidavit-complaint executed on June 6, 2008 [3]that

on May 12, 2008, she and her husband, Peter Keuppers, went to the Local Civil
Registrar's Office (LCRO) of Davao City to apply for a marriage license because they
wanted to get married before Peter's departure on May 22, 2008 so that he could
bring the marriage certificate with him back to Germany; that Julie Gasatan, an
employee of the LCRO, explained the process for securing the license, and apprised
them that it would be virtually impossible to solemnize their marriage before May
22, 2008 because of the requirement for the mandatory 10-day posting of the
application for the marriage license; that Gasatan then handed a note with the
advice for the couple to proceed to the office of DLS Travel and Tours Corporation
(DLS Travel and Tours) in Sandawa, Matina, Davao City to look for a person who
might be able to help the couple; that in the office of the DLS Travel and Tours,
Lorna Siega, the owner, told the couple that the marriage processing fees charged
by her office would be higher than the P600.00 fee collected in the City Hall in
Davao City; that Siega assured that the couple would immediately get the original
as well as the National Statistics Office (NSO) copies of the marriage certificate;
that Siega then required the couple to fill up forms but instructed the couple to
leave the spaces provided for the address and other information blank; that the
couple paid P15,750.00 to Siega purportedly to cover the fees of the solemnizing
Judge, the certification fee, the security fee, the City Hall fee, the service fee and
the passport fee; and that Siega later on confirmed to the couple the date, time
and place of the solemnization of the marriage.

According to the complainant, respondent Judge solemnized the marriage on May

19, 2008 in the premises of the DLS Travel and Tours in Davao City; that the staff
of the DLS Travel and Tours later on handed to the couple the copy of the marriage
certificate for their signatures; that on the following day, May 20, 2008, the couple
returned to the DLS Travel and Tours to pick up the documents as promised by
Siega; that the couple was surprised to find erroneous entries in the marriage
certificate as well as on the application for marriage license, specifically: (a) the
certificate stating "Office of the MTCC Judge, Island Garden City of Samal" as the
place of the solmenization of the marriage although the marriage had been
solemnized in the office of the DLS Travel and Tours in Davao City; (b) the
statement in the application for marriage license that she and her husband had
applied for the marriage license in Sta. Cruz, Davao City on May 8, 2008 although
they had accomplished their application on May 12, 2008 in the office of the DLS
Travel and Tours; and (c) the statement in their application for marriage license on
having appeared before Mario Tizon, the Civil Registrar of Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur,
which was untrue.

In his comment dated February 2, 2010,[4] the respondent professed no knowledge

of how the complainant had processed and secured the documents pertinent to her
marriage; denied personally knowing her and the persons she had supposedly
approached to help her fast-track the marriage; insisted that he had met her only
at the time of the solemnization of the marriage, and that the solemnization of the
marriage had been assigned to him; asserted that the documents necessary for a
valid marriage were already duly prepared; and claimed that he was entitled to the
presumption of regularity in the performance of his duties considering that the
documents submitted by her had been issued by the appropriate government
agencies. He contended that he should not be blamed for the erroneous entries in
her certificate of marriage because the same had been merely copied from her
marriage license and from the other documents submitted therewith, and also
because he had not been the person who had prepared the certificate; and that he
had only performed the ministerial duty of solemnizing the marriage based on the
proper documents submitted to him, with the real parties involved having
personally signed the certificate of marriage before him.

The respondent also denied receiving any amount for solemnizing the marriage of
the complainant and her husband; and pointed out that he had not been aware as
the solemnizing officer if any of the documents submitted by her was spurious. He
recalled that she had freely and voluntarily signed the certificate of marriage; and
that it was the same document that had been filed in the Local Civil Registrar's
Office of Davao City. He declared that the marriage certificate itself stated the place
of the solemnization of the marriage; and that he did not alter, modify or amend
the entries therein.

Report & Recommendation

of the Investigating Justice

Upon the recommendation of the OCA,[5] the Court referred the complaint to the
Court of Appeals in Cagayan de Oro City for investigation, report and
recommendation. The complaint, originally assigned to Associate Justice Pamela
Ann Abella Maxino for such purposes, was re-assigned to Associate Justice Maria
Elisa Sempio Diy in view of the transfer of Associate Justice Maxino to the Cebu
Station of the Court of Appeals.

On August 10, 2012, Investigating Justice Sempio Diy submitted her report and
recommendation as the Investigating Justice, [6] whereby she concluded and
recommended as follows:

The undersigned Investigating Officer, in the course of the investigation, has been
hurled with overwhelming evidence that the marriage between complainant and
Peter Keuppers was held only  in the premises of DLS Travel and Tours Corporation,
Sandawa Road, Matina, Davao City, and was solemnized by respondent. Several
witnesses for complainant affirmed the same. More importantly, this Office has
conducted an ocular inspection of the premises of DLS Travel and Tours. During
said inspection, it was confirmed that the premises shown in Exhibits "G", "G-1",
"G-2", "G-3", "G-4", and "G-5" where respondent is seen solemnizing a wedding, is
the same place subject of the ocular inspection. Hence, the DLS Travel and Tours
building is, in fact, the actual venue of complainant's wedding.

It is also of equal importance to note that respondent admitted that he indeed

solemnized the subject marriage outside of his jurisdiction. In fact, in his testimony,
respondent stated:

A: Rosilanda Maningo was really begging that the marriage be performed since that
was the very day of the marriage as the German fiance will be leaving soon.
Because of pity, I accommodated the parties. I risked your honor because I didn't
want that the marriage be postponed as it was for the best interest of the couple
because according to Rosilanda Maningo that was the only day, the German fiance
was leaving for Germany. So, I decided to solemnize the marriage in the
office of DLS Travel and Tours.

(Emphasis supplied)

The fact that respondent solemnized a marriage outside of his jurisdiction is further
bolstered by his own admission that he solemnized the marriage of complainant
and Peter Keuppers at DLS Travels and Tours and not in his territorial jurisdiction in
the Island Garden City of Samal.

Indeed, respondent knows the possible consequence of the aforementioned act

when he said:

A: I was thinking your honor that there was a sanction but because of my honest
intention to help the parties because they were already begging that the
solemnization be performed [sic].  I was honest with my intention and my
conscience was clear.

However, this Office is also duty bound to specify that respondent had no hand in
the preparation and processing of the documents pertaining to the subject wedding.
The witness for complainant, Lorna Siega, stated:

Q: Madam, you mentioned a while ago that your establishment was the one who
processed the documents for Rosilanda Maningo Kuppers and Peter Keuppers to get
married, you confirm that?

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: Who prepared the certificate of marriage?

A: Orlan.

Q: How about the marriage contract?

A: My employee.

-xxx-     -xxx-      -xxx-

Q: Who supplied the entries in the marriage contract?

A: Based on the marriage license.

-xxx-     -xxx-      -xxx-

Q: So, in relation to this case the once [sic] involving Peter Keuppers, I have here
the copy of the marriage contract, have you seen this document, if any?

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: You would confirm that the place of marriage typed there is the office of the
MTCC Judge, Branch 2, Island Garden City of Samal?

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: And your office supplied the information in the upper portion in the certificate of
marriage which is Davao del Norte, Island Garden City of Samal?

A: Yes, ma'am.

Be that as it may, this Office is of the opinion that notwithstanding that respondent
had no hand in the preparation and processing of the subject marriage, he indeed
solemnized a marriage outside of his territorial jurisdiction, subject to sanctions
that the Office of the Court Administrator may impose.

The above-quoted Article 8 of the Family Code clearly states that a marriage can be
held outside the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: 1.]
at the point of death; 2.] in remote places in accordance with Article 29; or 3.]
upon the request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect.

Inasmuch as respondent's jurisdiction covers only the Island Garden City of Samal,
he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in Davao City.

In this case, there is no pretense that either complainant or her fiance Peter
Keuppers was at the point of death or in a remote place. Neither was there a sworn
written request made by the contracting parties to respondent that the marriage be
solemnized outside his chambers or a place other than his sala.  What in fact
appears on record that respondent took pity on the couple and risked sanctions to
attend to the urgency of solemnizing the marriage of complainant and Peter
Keuppers.

In Beso vs. Daguman,  the Supreme Court held:

A person presiding over a court of law must not only apply the law but must also
live and abide by it and render justice at all times without resorting to shortcuts
clearly uncalled for. A judge is not only bound by oath to apply the law; he must
also be conscientious and thorough in doing so. Certainly, judges, by the very
delicate nature of their office[,] should be more circumspect in the performance of
their duties.
The undersigned Investigating Officer believes that taking pity on the Keuppers
couple is not enough reason for respondent to risk possible sanctions that may be
imposed upon him for not observing the applicable laws under the circumstances. It
is his sworn duty to conscientiously uphold the law at all times despite the
inconvenience that it may cause to others.

Significantly, Canon 6, Section 7 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary mandates:

-xxx- Judges shall not engage in conduct incompatible with the diligent discharge of
judicial duties.

It is likewise worth mentioning that respondent cannot be charged with ignorance

of the law considering that he knew the consequences of his actions and he also
cannot be seen as a judge that demonstrates a lack of understanding of the basic
principles of civil law. Lastly, it also does not appear from the records that he has
been previously charged with any offense or that there is/are any pending
administrative case/s against him.

RECOMMENDATION:

The undersigned Investigating Justice finds that indeed respondent is guilty of

solemnizing a marriage outside of his territorial jurisdiction under circumstances not
falling under any of the exceptions as provided for in Article 8 of the Family Code.
Considering, however, the factual milieu of the instant case and the peculiar
circumstances attendant thereto, it is respectfully recommended that respondent be
meted a fine of P5,000.00 with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same
or a similar offense in the future will be dealt with severely.

Issue

Was respondent Judge liable for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service?

Ruling of the Court

We hold and find respondent Judge guilty of grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service for solemnizing the marriage of the
complainant and her husband outside his territorial jurisdiction, and in the office
premises of the DLS Tour and Travel in Davao City.

Such place of solemnization was a blatant violation of Article 7 of the Family

Code, which pertinently provides:

Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:

(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;

xxxx

Furthermore, in solemnizing the marriage of the complainant and her husband in

the office premises of the DLS Tour and Travel in Davao City despite the foregoing
provision of the Family Code,  respondent Judge flagrantly violated the spirit of the
law. Article 8 of the Family Code  disallows solemnizing the marriage in a venue
other than the judge's courtroom or chambers, viz.:

Article. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge
or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office the consul-
general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in
cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places in
accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both of the parties request the
solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a
house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect. (57a)

Respondent Judge's explanation of having done so only out of pity for the
complainant after she had supposedly claimed that her German fiancé was soon
returning to Germany and wanted to bring with him the certified copy of the
marriage certificate did not diminish his liability, but instead highlighted his
dismissive and cavalier attitude towards express statutory requirements instituted
to secure the solemnization of marriages from abuse. By agreeing to solemnize the
marriage outside of his territorial jurisdiction and at a place that had nothing to do
with the performance of his duties as a Municipal Trial Judge, he demeaned and
cheapened the inviolable social institution of marriage. Article 8 of the Family
Code contains the limiting phrase and not elsewhere,  which emphasizes that the
place of the solemnization of the marriage by a judge like him should only be in his
office or courtroom. Indeed, the limiting phrase highlighted the nature and status of
the marriage of the complainant and her husband as "a special contract of
permanent union between a man and a woman," and as "the foundation of the
family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation."[7] The only exceptions
to the limitation are when the marriage was to be contracted on the point of death
of one or both of the complainant and her husband, or in a remote place in
accordance with Article 29 of the Family Code,[8] or where both of the complainant
and her husband had requested him as the solemnizing officer in writing to
solemnize the marriage at a house or place designated by them in their sworn
statement to that effect.

Respondent Judge's offense was not his first act of gross misconduct concerning the
discharge of the office of solemnizing marriages. He had been charged on February
28, 2008 in A.M. No. RTJ-10-2223 entitled Palma v. Judge George E. Omelio,
Regional Trial Court, Br. 14, Davao City (then of Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Br.
4, Davao City), Judge Virgilio G. Murcia, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Br. 2, et
al. with having affixed his signature as the solemnizing officer on the marriage
contract without having actually solemnized the marriage. The charge was in
violation of Administrative Order No. 125-2007 dated August 8, 2007 (Guidelines
on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary). The Court
declared him guilty of gross misconduct, and fined him in the amount of
P40,000.00.[9] The present offense was committed on May 19, 2008.

Misconduct consists in the transgression of some established and definite rule of

action, or, more particularly, in an unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the
public officer. It implies wrongful intention, and must not be a mere error of
judgment. Respondent Judge was guilty of grave, not simple, misconduct because
he had at the very least the wilful intent to violate the Family Code  on the venue of
a marriage solemnized by a judge, and to flagrantly disregard the relevant rules for
such solemnization set forth in the law. The office of solemnizing marriages should
not be treated as a casual or trivial matter, or as a business activity. For sure, his
act, although not criminal, constituted grave misconduct considering that crimes
involving moral turpitude are treated as separate grounds for dismissal under
the Administrative Code.[10] It is relevant to observe, moreover, that his acts of
grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
seriously undermined the faith and confidence of the people in the Judiciary.

The Investigating Justice recommended the imposition on respondent Judge of the

measly fine of P5,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or a
similar offense in the future would be dealt with severely. The recommendation did
not take into account that the present charge was the second offense respondent
Judge committed in relation to his office of solemnizing marriages. Given that the
charge was committed with a wilful intent to violate the letter and the spirit of
Article 7 and Article 8 of the Family Code, and to flagrantly disregard the relevant
rules for the solemnization of marriages set by the Family Code, the proper penalty
was dismissal from the service.

Yet, dismissal from the service can no longer be imposed in view of the intervening
retirement from the service of respondent Judge. Instead, the Court forfeits all his
retirement benefits except his accrued leaves.
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and HOLDS respondent JUDGE VIRGILIO G.
MURCIA, the former Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch
2, in the Island Garden City of Samal, Davao del Norte GUILTY of GRAVE
MISCONDUCT and CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE BEST INTEREST OF THE
SERVICE; and, ACCORDINGLY, DECLARES as forfeited all his retirement
benefits, except his accrued leaves, with prejudice to his appointment in the
government service.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Acting C.J.),** Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Del Castillo,

Leonen, Jardeleza, Caguioa, Martires, Tijam, and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.
Sereno, C.J., on leave.
Perlas-Bernabe, and Reyes, Jr., JJ., on official leave.

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that on April 3, 2017 a Decision/Resolution, copy

attached herewith, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-
entitled administrative matter, the original of which was received by this
Office on May 11, 2018 at 2:20 p.m.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETA

Clerk of Court

**
 Acting Chief Justice per Special Order No. 2539 dated February 28, 2018.

[1]
 Rollo, p. 1

[2]
 Id. at 2-5.

[3]
 Id. at 7-9.

[4]
 Id. at 18-19.
[5]
 Id. at 22-24.

[6]
 Id. at 38-58.

[7]
 Article 1, Family Code.

[8]
 Article 29. In the cases provided for in the two preceding articles, the
solemnizing officer shall state in an affidavit executed before the local civil registrar
or any other person legally authorized to administer oaths that the marriage was
performed in articulo mortis  or that the residence of either party, specifying the
barrio or barangay, is so located that there is no means of transportation to enable
such party to appear personally before the local civil registrar and that the officer
took the necessary steps to ascertain the ages and relationship of the contracting
parties and the absence of legal impediment to the marriage. (72a)

[9]
 See A.M. No. RTJ-10-2223, August 30, 2017.

[10]
 Office of the Court Administrator v. Lopez, A.M. No. P-10-2788, January 18,
2011, 639 SCRA 633, 639.

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558 Phil. 192

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. NO. 167746, August 28, 2007 ]
RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA, PETITIONER, VS. ROSITA A.
ALCANTARA AND HON. COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: 

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Restituto

Alcantara assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004
in CA-G.R. CV No. 66724 denying petitioner's appeal and affirming the decision [2] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 143, in Civil Case No. 97-1325
dated 14 February 2000, dismissing his petition for annulment of marriage.

The antecedent facts are:

A petition for annulment of marriage [3] was filed by petitioner against respondent

Rosita A. Alcantara alleging that on 8 December 1982 he and respondent, without
securing the required marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose
of looking for a person who could arrange a marriage for them. They met a person
who, for a fee, arranged their wedding before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a
Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC BR Chapel.[4] They got married on the same day,
8 December 1982. Petitioner and respondent went through another marriage
ceremony at the San Jose de Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983.
The marriage was likewise celebrated without the parties securing a marriage
license. The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on
the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and
they never went to Carmona to apply for a license with the local civil registrar of
the said place. On 14 October 1985, respondent gave birth to their child Rose Ann
Alcantara. In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed
that after due hearing, judgment be issued declaring their marriage void and
ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding marriage contract [5] and its
entry on file.[6]

Answering petitioner's petition for annulment of marriage, respondent asserts the

validity of their marriage and maintains that there was a marriage license issued as
evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite.
Contrary to petitioner's representation, respondent gave birth to their first child
named Rose Ann Alcantara on 14 October 1985 and to another daughter named
Rachel Ann Alcantara on 27 October 1992.[7] Petitioner has a mistress with whom
he has three children.[8] Petitioner only filed the annulment of their marriage to
evade prosecution for concubinage.[9] Respondent, in fact, has filed a case for
concubinage against petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong
City, Branch 60.[10] Respondent prays that the petition for annulment of marriage be
denied for lack of merit.

On 14 February 2000, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143, rendered its Decision
disposing as follows:
The foregoing considered, judgment is rendered as follows:

1. The Petition is dismissed for lack of merit;

2. Petitioner is ordered to pay respondent the sum of twenty thousand

pesos (P20,000.00) per month as support for their two (2) children on
the first five (5) days of each month; and

3. To pay the costs.[11]

As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the
petitioner's appeal. His Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied in a
resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 6 April 2005. [12]

The Court of Appeals held that the marriage license of the parties is presumed to be
regularly issued and petitioner had not presented any evidence to overcome the
presumption. Moreover, the parties' marriage contract being a public document is a
prima facie proof of the questioned marriage under Section 44, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court.[13] 

In his Petition before this Court, petitioner raises the following issues for resolution:

a. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it ruled

that the Petition for Annulment has no legal and factual basis despite the
evidence on record that there was no marriage license at the precise moment
of the solemnization of the marriage.

b. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it gave

weight to the Marriage License No. 7054133 despite the fact that the same
was not identified and offered as evidence during the trial, and was not the
Marriage license number appearing on the face of the marriage contract.

c. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it failed to

apply the ruling laid down by this Honorable Court in the case of Sy vs. Court
of Appeals. (G.R. No. 127263, 12 April 2000 [330 SCRA 550]).

d. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it failed to

relax the observance of procedural rules to protect and promote the
substantial rights of the party litigants.[14]
We deny the petition.

Petitioner submits that at the precise time that his marriage with the respondent
was celebrated, there was no marriage license because he and respondent just
went to the Manila City Hall and dealt with a "fixer" who arranged everything for
them.[15] The wedding took place at the stairs in Manila City Hall and not in CDCC
BR Chapel where Rev. Aquilino Navarro who solemnized the marriage belongs. [16]He
and respondent did not go to Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a marriage license.
Assuming a marriage license from Carmona, Cavite, was issued to them, neither he
nor the respondent was a resident of the place. The certification of the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, cannot be given weight because the certification
states that "Marriage License number 7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto
Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario"[17] but their marriage contract bears the number
7054033 for their marriage license number.

The marriage involved herein having been solemnized on 8 December 1982, or

prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law to determine its
validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration.

A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code,
the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3)
[18]
 in relation to Article 58 of the same Code.[19]
Article 53 of the Civil Code[20] which was the law applicable at the time of the
marriage of the parties states:

Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied
with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the State's demonstration of
its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which
the general public is interested. [21]

Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity
of his marriage. The cases where the court considered the absence of a marriage
license as a ground for considering the marriage void are clear-cut.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, [22] the Local Civil Registrar issued
a certification of due search and inability to find a record or entry to the effect that
Marriage License No. 3196182 was issued to the parties. The Court held that the
certification of "due search and inability to find" a record or entry as to the
purported marriage license, issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, enjoys probative
value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data
relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Based on said certification, the Court
held that there is absence of a marriage license that would render the marriage
void ab initio.

In Cariño v. Cariño,[23] the Court considered the marriage of therein petitioner

Susan Nicdao and the deceased Santiago S. Carino as void ab initio. The records
reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage
license number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro
Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license. The court held that the
certification issued by the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non- issuance
of the marriage license. Their marriage having been solemnized without the
necessary marriage license and not being one of the marriages exempt from the
marriage license requirement, the marriage of the petitioner and the deceased is
undoubtedly void ab initio.

In Sy v. Court of Appeals,[24] the marriage license was issued on 17 September

1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place on 15 November 1973. The
Court held that the ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed
contracted without a marriage license.

In all these cases, there was clearly an absence of a marriage license which
rendered the marriage void.

Clearly, from these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void on the
ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such
marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least,
supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage
license was issued to the parties. In this case, the marriage contract between the
petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number. A certification to this
effect was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. [25] The
certification moreover is precise in that it specifically identified the parties to whom
the marriage license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario,
further validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein.

The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L. Diaz of Carmona, Cavite,

reads:
This is to certify that as per the registry Records of Marriage filed in this office,
Marriage License No. 7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and
Miss Rosita Almario on December 8, 1982.

This Certification is being issued upon the request of Mrs. Rosita A. Alcantara for
whatever legal purpose or intents it may serve.[26]
This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed and the issuance of the marriage license was done in the regular conduct
of official business.[27] The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted
by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. However, the
presumption prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes
conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of the
presumption and, in case of doubt as to an officer's act being lawful or unlawful,
construction should be in favor of its lawfulness. [28] Significantly, apart from these,
petitioner, by counsel, admitted that a marriage license was, indeed, issued in
Carmona, Cavite.[29]

Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage

license, claims that neither he nor respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite.
Even then, we still hold that there is no sufficient basis to annul petitioner and
respondent's marriage. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not
the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license
despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10- day period
for publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of
the marriage.[30] An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not
affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly,
criminally and administratively liable. [31]

Again, petitioner harps on the discrepancy between the marriage license number in
the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar, which states that the marriage
license issued to the parties is No. 7054133, while the marriage contract states that
the marriage license number of the parties is number 7054033. Once more, this
argument fails to sway us. It is not impossible to assume that the same is a mere a
typographical error, as a closer scrutiny of the marriage contract reveals the
overlapping of the numbers 0 and 1, such that the marriage license may read either
as 7054133 or 7054033. It therefore does not detract from our conclusion
regarding the existence and issuance of said marriage license to the parties.

Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean hands,
[32]
petitioner cannot pretend that he was not responsible or a party to the marriage
celebration which he now insists took place without the requisite marriage license.
Petitioner admitted that the civil marriage took place because he "initiated
it."[33]Petitioner is an educated person. He is a mechanical engineer by profession.
He knowingly and voluntarily went to the Manila City Hall and likewise, knowingly
and voluntarily, went through a marriage ceremony. He cannot benefit from his
action and be allowed to extricate himself from the marriage bond at his mere say-
so when the situation is no longer palatable to his taste or suited to his lifestyle. We
cannot countenance such effrontery. His attempt to make a mockery of the
institution of marriage betrays his bad faith.[34]

Petitioner and respondent went through a marriage ceremony twice in a span of

less than one year utilizing the same marriage license. There is no claim that he
went through the second wedding ceremony in church under duress or with a gun
to his head. Everything was executed without nary a whimper on the part of the
petitioner.

In fact, for the second wedding of petitioner and respondent, they presented to the
San Jose de Manuguit Church the marriage contract executed during the previous
wedding ceremony before the Manila City Hall. This is confirmed in petitioner's
testimony as follows"
WITNESS

As I remember your honor, they asked us to get the necessary document prior to
the wedding.

COURT

What particular document did the church asked you to produce? I am referring to
the San Jose de Manuguit church.

WITNESS

I don't remember your honor.

COURT

Were you asked by the church to present a Marriage License?

WITNESS

I think they asked us for documents and I said we have already a Marriage Contract
and I don't know if it is good enough for the marriage and they accepted it your
honor.

COURT

In other words, you represented to the San Jose de Manuguit church that you have
with you already a Marriage Contract?

WITNESS

Yes your honor.

COURT

That is why the San Jose de Manuguit church copied the same marriage License in
the Marriage Contract issued which Marriage License is Number 7054033.

WITNESS

Yes your honor.[35]

The logical conclusion is that petitioner was amenable and a willing participant to all
that took place at that time. Obviously, the church ceremony was confirmatory of
their civil marriage, thereby cleansing whatever irregularity or defect attended the
civil wedding.[36] 
Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner -- that they appeared before a "fixer" who
arranged everything for them and who facilitated the ceremony before a certain
Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC Br Chapel -- will not
strengthen his posture. The authority of the officer or clergyman shown to have
performed a marriage ceremony will be presumed in the absence of any showing to
the contrary.[37] Moreover, the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate
whether or not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the local
civil registrar. All the solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has been
issued by the competent official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of the
license that said official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting
parties had fulfilled the requirements of law.[38]

Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the

validity of the marriage.[39] Every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the
validity of the marriage bonds. The Courts look upon this presumption with great
favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great
weight.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED for lack of

merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 affirming the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 143 of Makati City, dated 14 February
2000, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Ynares-Santiago, (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Nachura, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

[1]
 Penned by Associate Justice Vicente S. E. Veloso with Associate Justices Roberto
A. Barrios and Amelita G. Tolentino, concurring; rollo, p. 25-32.

[2]
 Penned by Judge Salvador S. Abad Santos; CA rollo, pp. 257-258.

[3]
 Docketed as Civil Case No. 97-1325.

[4]
 Crusade of the Divine Church of Christ.

[5]
 Annex A, Records, p. 5; Annexes B to C, Records, pp. 6-7.

[6]
 Rollo, pp. 33-36.

[7]
 Id. at 185.

[8]
 TSN, 14 October 1999, p. 34.

[9]
 Rollo, p. 39.
[10]
 Id. at 46.

[11]
 Id. at 68-69.

[12]
 Id. at 21.

[13]
 Sec. 44. Entries in official records. - Entries in official records made in the
performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated.

[14]
 Rollo, p. 206.

[15]
 Id. at 209.

[16]
 Records p. 1.

[17]
 Id. at 15-a.

[18]
 (3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional
character.

[19]
 Art. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of
this Title, but not those under article 75, no marriage shall be solemnized without a
license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either
contracting party habitually resides.

[20]
 Now Article 3 of the Family Code.

Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this
Title; and

(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting
parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take
each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of
legal age.
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the
marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35.

A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as
provided in Article 45.

[21]
 Niñal v. Bayadog, 384 Phil. 661, 667-668 (2000).

[22]
 G.R. No.103047, 2 September 1994, 236 SCRA 257, 262.
[23]
 G.R. No.132529, 2 February 2001, 351 SCRA 127, 133.

[24]
 386 Phil. 760, 769 (2000).

[25]
 Article 70 of the Civil Code, now Article 25 Family Code, provides:

The local civil registrar concerned shall enter all applications for marriage licenses
filed with him in a register book strictly in the order in which the same shall be
received. He shall enter in said register the names of the applicants, the dates on
which the marriage license was issued, and such other data as may be necessary.

[26]
 Records, p. 15-a.

[27]
 Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. - x x x

xxxx

(m) That official duty has been regularly performed. (Rule 131, Rules of Court.)

[28]
 Magsucang v. Balgos, 446 Phil. 217, 224-225 (2003).

[29]
 TSN. 23 November 1999, p. 4.

[30]
 Sta. Maria Jr., Persons and Family Relations Law, p. 125.

[31]
 Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code, p. 8; Moreno v. Bernabe, 316 Phil.
161, 168 (1995).

[32]
 Abacus Securities Corporation v. Ampil,  G.R. No. 160016, 27 February 2006,
483 SCRA 315, 337.

[33]
 TSN, 1 October 1998, p. 96.
[34]
 Atienza v. Judge Brilliantes, Jr., 312 Phil. 939, 944 (1995).

[35]
 TSN, 1 October 1998, pp. 33-35.

[36]
 Ty v. Court of Appeals, 399 Phil. 647, 662 2003).

[37]
 Goshen v. New Orleans, 18 US 950.

[38]
 People v. Janssen, 54 Phil. 176, 180 (1929).

[39]
 Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco, G.R. No. 158896, 27 October 2004, 441 SCRA
422, 436; Sevilla v. Cardenas, G.R. No. 167684, 31 July 2006, 497 SCRA 428, 443.
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G.R. No. 103047

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 103047, September 02, 1994 ]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF
APPEALS AND ANGELINA M. CASTRO, RESPONDENTS. 

DECISION

PUNO, J.: 

The case at bench originated from a petition filed by private respondent Angelina M.
Castro in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City seeking a judicial declaration of
nullity of her marriage to Edwin F. Cardenas. [1] As ground therefor, Castro claims
that no marriage license was ever issued to them prior to the solemnization of their
marriage.

Despite notice, defendant Edwin F. Cardenas failed to file his answer. Consequently,
he was declared in default. Trial proceeded in his absence.

The controlling facts are undisputed:

On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a
civil ceremony performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay City.
The marriage was celebrated without the knowledge of Castro's parents. Defendant
Cardenas personally attended to the processing of the documents required for the
celebration of the marriage, including the procurement of the marriage license. In
fact, the marriage contract itself states that marriage license no. 3196182 was
issued in the name of the contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro
Manila.

The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the
marriage was unknown to Castro's parents. Thus, it was only in March 1971, when
Castro discovered she was pregnant, that the couple decided to live together.
However, their cohabitation lasted only for four (4) months. Thereafter, the couple
parted ways. On October 19, 1971, Castro gave birth. The baby was adopted by
Castro's brother, with the consent of Cardenas.
The baby is now in the United States. Desiring to follow her daughter, Castro
wanted to put in order her marital status before leaving for the States. She thus
consulted a lawyer, Atty. Frumencio E. Pulgar, regarding the possible annulment of
her marriage. Through her lawyer's efforts, they discovered that there was no
marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to the celebration of their marriage.

As proof, Angelina Castro offered in evidence a certification from the Civil Register
of Pasig, Metro Manila. It reads:

"February 20, 1987

"TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that the names EDWIN F. CARDENAS and ANGELINA M. CASTRO
who were allegedly married in the Pasay City Court on June 21, 1970 under
an alleged (s)upportive marriage license no. 3196182 allegedly issued in the
municipality on June  20, 1970 cannot be located as said
license no. 3196182 does not appear from our records.

Issued upon request of Mr. Ed Atanacio.

(Sgd) CENONA D. QUINTOS

Senior Civil Registry

Officer"

Castro testified that she did not go to the civil registrar of Pasig on or before June
24, 1970 in order to apply for a license. Neither did she sign any application
therefor. She affixed her signature only on the marriage contract on June 24, 1970
in Pasay City.

The trial court denied the petition.[2] It held that the above certification was
inadequate to establish the alleged non-issuance of a marriage license prior to the
celebration of the marriage between the parties. It ruled that the "inability of
the certifying official to locate the marriage license is not conclusive to show that
there was no marriage license issued."

Unsatisfied with the decision, Castro appealed to respondent appellate court. She
insisted that the certification from the local civil registrar sufficiently established the
absence of a marriage license.

As stated earlier, respondent appellate court reversed the Decision of the trial
court.[3] It declared the marriage between the contracting parties null and void and
directed the Civil Registrar of Pasig to cancel the subject marriage contract.

Hence this petition for review on certiorari.

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines urges that respondent appellate court erred
when it ruled that the certification issued by the civil registrar that marriage license
no. 3196182 was not in their record adequately proved that no such
license was ever issued. Petitioner also faults the respondent court for relying on
the self-serving and uncorroborated testimony of private respondent Castro that
she had no part in the procurement of the subject marriage license. Petitioner thus
insists that the certification and the uncorroborated testimony of private respondent
are insufficient to overthrow the legal presumption regarding the validity of a
marriage.

Petitioner also points that in declaring the marriage between the parties as null and
void, respondent appellate court disregarded the presumption that the solemnizing
officer, Judge Pablo M. Malvar, regularly performed his duties when he attested in
the marriage contract that marriage license no. 3196182 was duly presented to him
before the solemnization of the subject marriage.

The issues, being interrelated, shall be discussed jointly.

The core issue presented by the case at bench is whether or not the documentary
and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent are sufficient to establish
that no marriage license was issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the
celebration of the marriage of private respondent to Edwin F. Cardenas.

We affirm the impugned Decision.

At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law
governing marital relations was the New Civil Code. The law[4] provides that no
marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage license first issued by a local civil
registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a
license would render the marriage void ab initio.[5]

Petitioner posits that the certification of the local civil registrar of due search and
inability to find a record or entry to the effect that marriage license no. 3196182
was issued to the parties is not adequate to prove its non-issuance.

We hold otherwise. The presentation of such certification in court is sanctioned by

Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, viz:

"Sec. 29. Proof of lack of  record. -- A written statement signed by an officer having
custody of an official record or by his deputy, that after diligent search, no record or
entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied
by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his
office contain no such record or entry."

The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite
diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular
entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public
documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of
maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all applications for
marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage
license was issued and such other relevant data. [6]

The certification of “due search and inability to find” issued by the civil
registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged
under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a
marriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and
pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of "due
search and inability to find” sufficiently proved that his office did not issue
marriage license no. 3196182 to the contracting parties.

The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her testimony in support of her
petition is, in itself, not a ground to deny her petition. The failure to offer any other
witness to corroborate her testimony is mainly due to the peculiar circumstances of
the case. It will be remembered that the subject marriage was a civil ceremony
performed by a judge of a city court. The subject marriage is one of those
commonly known as a "secret marriage" -- a legally non-existent phrase but
ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the knowledge of the
relatives and/or friends of either or both of the contracting parties. The records
show that the marriage between Castro and Cardenas was initially unknown to the
parents of the former.

Surely, the fact that only private respondent Castro testified during the trial cannot
be held against her. Her husband, Edwin F. Cardenas, was duly served with notice
of the proceedings and a copy of the petition. Despite receipt thereof, he chose to
ignore the same. For failure to answer, he was properly declared in default. Private
respondent cannot be faulted for her husband's lack of interest to participate in the
proceedings. There was absolutely no evidence on record to show that there was
collusion between private respondent and her husband Cardenas.

It is noteworthy to mention that the finding of the appellate court that the marriage
between the contracting parties is null and void for lack of a marriage license does
not discount the fact that indeed, a spurious marriage license, purporting to be
issued by the civil registrar of Pasig, may have been presented by Cardenas to the
solemnizing officer.

In fine, we hold that, under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and
testimonial evidence presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently established
the absence of the subject marriage license.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED there being no showing of any

reversible error committed by respondent appellate court.

SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Padilla, Regalado,  and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

[1]
 Filed on February 19, 1987 and docketed as Civil Case No. Q-50117.

 Decision dated June 30, 1987, issued by Presiding Judge Antonio P. Solano,

[2]

Quezon City RTC, Branch LXXXVI; Rollo, pp. 46-48.

 Sixteenth Division, penned by Mr. Justice Justo P. Torres, with Mr. Justices

[3]

Ricardo J. Francisco and Consuelo Ynares?Santiago, concurring; Decision dated

November 27, 1991, Rollo, pp. 38-42.

[4]
 Articles 53 (4) and 58, New  Civil Code.

[5]
 Article 80 (3), New Civil Code.

[6]
 Article 70, New Civil Code.

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403 Phil. 861

FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 132529, February 02, 2001 ]
SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO, PETITIONER, VS. SUSAN YEE
CARIÑO, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: 

The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity of the two
marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, whose "death
benefits" is now the subject of the controversy between the two Susans whom he
married.

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the
decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263, which affirmed in
totothe decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, in Civil
Case No. Q-93-18632.

During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, he contracted two
marriages, the first was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño
(hereafter referred to as Susan Nicdao), with whom he had two offsprings, namely,
Sahlee and Sandee Cariño; and the second was on November 10, 1992, with
respondent Susan Yee Cariño (hereafter referred to as Susan Yee), with whom he
had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting way back in 1982.

In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño became ill and bedridden due to diabetes
complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away on November 23, 1992,
under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both
petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance
pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies. Petitioner Susan
Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 from "MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation,
NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig,"[3] while respondent Susan Yee received a total of
P21,000.00 from "GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS)."[4]

On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection
of sum of money against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia, that petitioner
be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the one hundred forty-six thousand
pesos (P146,000.00) collectively denominated as "death benefits" which she
(petitioner) received from "MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-
ibig." Despite service of summons, petitioner failed to file her answer, prompting
the trial court to declare her in default.

Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place
during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity
of, the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. She, however, claimed that
she had no knowledge of the previous marriage and that she became aware of it
only at the funeral of the deceased, where she met petitioner who introduced
herself as the wife of the deceased. To bolster her action for collection of sum of
money, respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is
void ab initio because the same was solemnized without the required marriage
license. In support thereof, respondent presented: 1) the marriage certificate of the
deceased and the petitioner which bears no marriage license number; [5] and 2) a
certification dated March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro
Manila, which reads -

This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage license of the spouses
SANTIAGO CARINO (sic) and SUSAN NICDAO, who are married in this municipality
on June 20, 1969. Hence, we cannot issue as requested a true copy or transcription
of Marriage License number from the records of this archives.

This certification is issued upon the request of Mrs. Susan Yee Cariño for whatever
legal purpose it may serve.[6]

On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, Susan Yee, holding
as follows:

WHEREFORE, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of
P73,000.00, half of the amount which was paid to her in the form of death benefits
arising from the death of SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, plus attorney's fees in the
amount of P5,000.00, and costs of suit.

IT IS SO ORDERED.[7]

On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed in toto the

decision of the trial court. Hence, the instant petition, contending that:

I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT THAT VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS. GSIS IS
APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.

II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING EQUITY IN
THE INSTANT CASE INSTEAD OF THE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL MANDATE OF THE
FAMILY CODE.

III.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE CASE
OF VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS GSIS TO HAVE BEEN MODIFIED, AMENDED AND EVEN
ABANDONED BY THE ENACTMENT OF THE FAMILY CODE.[8]

Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage
may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second
marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free
from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
[9]
However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited
to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of
estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court
may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto,
and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so
long as it is essential to the determination of the case.[10] In such instances,
evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of
grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be
limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous
marriage void.[11]

It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon
the validity of the two marriages in this case, as the same is essential to the
determination of who is rightfully entitled to the subject "death benefits" of the
deceased.

Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner
Susan Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is
a requisite of marriage,[12] and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions,
[13]
 renders the marriage void ab initio.[14]

In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the
deceased does not fall within the marriages exempt from the license requirement. A
marriage license, therefore, was indispensable to the validity of their marriage. This
notwithstanding, the records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the
deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage
license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals,[15] the Court held that such a certification is
adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any circumstance
of suspicion, as in the present case, the certification issued by the local civil
registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep
a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.

Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the
deceased has been sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner
to prove that their marriage is valid and that they secured the required marriage
license. Although she was declared in default before the trial court, petitioner could
have squarely met the issue and explained the absence of a marriage license in her
pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this Court. But petitioner conveniently
avoided the issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that will put her
case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their marriage cannot stand.

It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao
and the deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license,
and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement,
is undoubtedly void ab initio.

It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the marriage
of petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the "death benefits" under
scrutiny would now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate, under
Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a
prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a
party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also
be void.

Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of
the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of
the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was
solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of
petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent
Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.

One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the
property of the spouses according to the applicable property regime. [16]Considering
that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would not
be absolute community or conjugal partnership of property, but rather, be
governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on "Property
Regime of Unions Without Marriage."

Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of
bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubine,
relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons, multiple
alliances of the same married man,[17] -
"... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions ..."

In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual
joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by
each party belong to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of
care of the home, children and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are
excluded in this regime.[18]

Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is a
bigamous marriage, having been solemnized during the subsistence of a previous
marriage then presumed to be valid (between petitioner and the deceased), the
application of Article 148 is therefore in order.

The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.],
NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly renumerations,
incentives and benefits from governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a
police officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee presents proof to the contrary, it could
not be said that she contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition of
these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not owned in common by respondent and
the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and respondent has no right
whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate succession, the said "death benefits" of
the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent, not being the legal wife
of the deceased is not one of them.

As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147
of the Family Code governs. This article applies to unions of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose
marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like the absence of a marriage
license. Article 147 of the Family Code reads -

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or
under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal
shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived
together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article,
a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property
shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.

xxxxxxxxx
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the
party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common
children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or
their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the
innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation.

In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries earned by
either party during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares
and will be divided equally between them, even if only one party earned the wages
and the other did not contribute thereto.[19] Conformably, even if the disputed
"death benefits" were earned by the deceased alone as a government employee,
Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to
share one-half thereof. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case,
both parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-half
of the subject "death benefits" under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share
in the property regime, and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by,
intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.

In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on the case
of Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance System, [20] where the Court
awarded one-half of the retirement benefits of the deceased to the first wife and
the other half, to the second wife, holding that:

"... [S]ince the defendant's first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void
the conjugal partnership established by that marriage has not ceased. Nor has the
first wife lost or relinquished her status as putative heir of her husband under the
new Civil Code, entitled to share in his estate upon his death should she survive
him. Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in a still subsisting marriage or as
such putative heir she has an interest in the husband's share in the property here
in dispute...." And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed
that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was
celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial
declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed by the
second marriage was dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity, "[t]he only
just and equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the right of the
second wife to her share of one-half in the property acquired by her and her
husband, and consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of
the first marriage."[21]

It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited decision is premised on the rule
which requires a prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity of marriage. This is
the reason why in the said case, the Court determined the rights of the parties in
accordance with their existing property regime.
In Domingo v. Court of Appeals,[22] however, the Court, construing Article 40 of the
Family Code, clarified that a prior and separate declaration of nullity of a marriage
is an all important condition precedent only for purposes of remarriage. That is, if a
party who is previously married wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she
has to obtain first a judicial decree declaring the first marriage void, before he or
she could contract said second marriage, otherwise the second marriage would be
void. The same rule applies even if the first marriage is patently void because the
parties are not free to determine for themselves the validity or invalidity or their
marriage. However, for purposes other than to remarry, like for filing a case for
collection of sum of money anchored on a marriage claimed to be valid, no prior
and separate judicial declaration of nullity is necessary. All that a party has to do is
to present evidence, testimonial or documentary, that would prove that the
marriage from which his or her rights flow is in fact valid. Thereupon, the court, if
material to the determination of the issues before it, will rule on the status of the
marriage involved and proceed to determine the rights of the parties in accordance
with the applicable laws and jurisprudence. Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog,[23] the Court
explained:

[T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly
instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the
case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such
need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the
purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connoted
that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals

in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City ordering petitioner to pay respondent the sum of P73,000.00 plus
attorney's fees in the amount of P5,000.00, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
complaint in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632, is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement
as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.

Puno J., on official leave.

[1]
 Rollo, pp. 43-47.

[2]
 Rollo, pp. 49-55.

[3]
 Exhibit "F", Records, p. 38.
[4]
 Ibid.

[5]
 Exhibit "D-1", Records, p. 36

[6]
 Exhibit "E", Records, p. 37.

[7]
 Rollo, p. 55.

[8]
 Rollo, p. 18.

[9]
 Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 572, 579 [1993].

[10]
 Niñal, et al., v. Bayadog, G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000.

[11]
 Domingo v. Court of Appeals, supra.

[12]
 ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are
complied with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

[13]
 ART. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of
this Title, but not those under Article 75, no marriage shall be solemnized without a
license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either
contracting party habitually resides.

[14]
 ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxxxxxxxx
(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional
character;

xxxxxxxxx

[15]
 236 SCRA 257, 261-262; citing the Rules of Court, Rule 132, Section 29.

[16]
 Art. 50. The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43
and in Article 44 shall also apply in proper cases to marriages which are declared
void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45.
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition, and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the
common children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such
matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.

xxxxxxxxx

Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding
Article shall produce the following effects:

xxxxxxxxx

(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case
may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said
marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property
or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children
or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or, in
default of children, the innocent spouse;

xxxxxxxxx

Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said
marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by reason of marriage and
testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of the other are revoked by
operation of law.
[17]
 Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, p. 233-234
(1995).

[18]
 Id., p. 234.

[19]
 Id.,  p. 230.

[20]
 37 SCRA 316 [1971].

[21]
 Id., p. 326.

[22]
 Supra.

[23]
 Supra.
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386 Phil. 760

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 127263, April 12, 2000 ]
FILIPINA Y. SY, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN
FERNANDO, PAMPANGA, BRANCH XLI, AND FERNANDO SY,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.: 

For review is the decision[1] dated May 21, 1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 44144, which affirmed the decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of San
Fernando, Pampanga, denying the petition[3] for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage of the spouses Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy.

Petitioner Filipina Y. Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted marriage on

November 15, 1973 at the Church of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. [4] Both
were then 22 years old. Their union was blessed with two children, Frederick and
Farrah Sheryll who were born on July 8, 1975 and February 14, 1978,respectively.
[5]

The spouses first established their residence in Singalong, Manila, then in Apalit,
Pampanga, and later at San Matias, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. They operated a
lumber and hardware business in Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. [6]

On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, the
spouses lived separately, and their two children were in the custody of their
mother. However, their son Frederick transferred to his father's residence at
Masangkay, Tondo, Manila on May 15,1988, and from then on, lived with his father.
[7]

On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation, docketed as Civil
Case No. 7900 before the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga. Later,
upon motion of petitioner, the action was later amended to a petition for separation
of property on the grounds that her husband abandoned her without just cause;
that they have been living separately for more than one year; and that they
voluntarily entered into a Memorandum of Agreement dated September 29, 1983,
containing the rules that would govern the dissolution of their conjugal partnership.
[8]
 Judgment was rendered dissolving their conjugal partnership of gains and
approving a regime of separation of properties based on the Memorandum of
Agreement executed by the spouses.[9] The trial court also granted custody of the
children to Filipina.[10]

In May 1988, Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted parricide against her
husband, docketed as Criminal Case No. 88-68006, before the Regional Trial Court
of Manila. Filipina testified that in the afternoon of May 15, 1988, she went to the
dental clinic at Masangkay, Tondo, Manila, owned by her husband but operated by
his mistress, to fetch her son and bring him to San Fernando, Pampanga. While she
was talking to her son, the boy ignored her and continued playing with the family
computer. Filipina got mad, took the computer away from her son, and started
spanking him. At that instance, Fernando pulled Filipina away from their son, and
punched her in the different parts of her body. Filipina also claimed that her
husband started choking her when she fell on the floor, and released her only when
he thought she was dead. Filipina suffered from hematoma and contusions on
different parts of her body as a result of the blows inflicted by her husband,
evidenced by a Medical Certificate issued by a certain Dr. James Ferraren. She said
it was not the first time Fernando maltreated her.[11]

The Regional Trial Court of Manila, however, in its decision [12] dated April 26, 1990,
convicted Fernando only of the lesser crime of slight physical injuries, and
sentenced him to 20 days imprisonment. 

Petitioner later filed a new action for legal separation against private respondent,
docketed as Civil Case No. 8273,on the following grounds: (1) repeated physical
violence; (2) sexual infidelity; (3) attempt by respondent against her life; and (4)
abandonment of her by her husband without justifiable cause for more than one
year. The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, in its decision [13] dated
December 4,1991, granted the petition on the grounds of repeated physical
violence and sexual infidelity, and issued a decree of legal separation. It awarded
custody of their daughter Farrah Sheryll to petitioner, and their son Frederick to
respondent.

On August 4, 1992, Filipina filed a petition[14] for the declaration of absolute nullity

of her marriage to Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity. She points
out that the final judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court in her favor, in her
petitions for separation of property and legal separation, and Fernando's infliction of
physical violence on her which led to the conviction of her husband for slight
physical injuries are symptoms of psychological incapacity. She also cites as
manifestations of her husband's psychological incapacity the following: (1) habitual
alcoholism; (2) refusal to live with her without fault on her part, choosing to live
with his mistress instead; and (3) refusal to have sex with her, performing the
marital act only to satisfy himself. Moreover, Filipina alleges that such psychological
incapacity of her husband existed from the time of the celebration of their marriage
and became manifest thereafter.[15]

The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, in its decision [16] dated
December 9, 1993, denied the petition of Filipina Sy for the declaration of absolute
nullity of her marriage to Fernando. It stated that the alleged acts of the
respondent, as cited by petitioner, do not constitute psychological incapacity which
may warrant the declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the trial
court. In the decision[17] of the Court of Appeals dated May 21, 1996, it ruled that
the testimony of petitioner concerning respondent's purported psychological
incapacity falls short of the quantum of evidence required to nullify a marriage
celebrated with all the formal and essential requisites of law. Moreover, the Court of
Appeals held that petitioner failed to show that the alleged psychological incapacity
of respondent had existed at the time of the celebration of their marriage in 1973.
It reiterated the finding of the trial court that the couple's marital problems
surfaced only in 1983, or almost ten years from the date of the celebration of their
marriage. And prior to their separation in 1983, they were living together
harmoniously. Thus, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the lower court
which it found to be in accordance with law and the evidence on record. [18]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,[19] which the Court of Appeals denied in

its resolution dated November 21, 1996.[20]

Hence, this appeal by certiorari[21] wherein petitioner now raises the following

issues:

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY

OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ON THE DATE OF THE CELEBRATION OF THE
PARTIES' MARRIAGE ON NOVEMBER 15, 1973, NOT DISPUTED BY RESPONDENT
FERNANDO, THERE WAS NO MARRIAGE LICENSE THERETO;

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED

MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS BY STATING THAT THE GROUNDS RELIED UPON BY
APPELLANT [herein petitioner] DO NOT CONSTITUTE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
AS WOULD JUSTIFY NULLIFICATION OF HER MARRIAGE TO APPELLEE [herein
respondent];

3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED

MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS BY STATING THAT APPELLANT FAILED TO SHOW
THAT THE ALLEGED UNDESIRABLE ACTUATIONS OF APPELLEE HAD EXISTED OR
WERE PRESENT AT THE TIME THEIR MARRIAGE WAS CELEBRATED IN 1973;
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN AFFIRMING THE ERRONEOUS RULING OF THE LOWER
COURT THAT THERE IS A REDEEMING ATTITUDE SHOWN TO THE COURT BY
RESPONDENT FERNANDO WITH RESPECT TO HIS CHILDREN AND ALSO BELIEVES
THAT RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS NOT A REMOTE POSSIBILITY
WHICH IS ERRONEOUS; AND

5.WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE OF SANTOS V.COURT OF APPEALS (240 SCRA 20)
IS APPLICABLE HERETO.[22]

In sum, two issues are to be resolved:

1. Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void
from the beginning for lack of a marriage license at the time of the ceremony; and

2. Whether or not private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at the time of

said marriage celebration to warrant a declaration of its absolute nullity.

Petitioner, for the first time, raises the issue of the marriage being void for lack of a
valid marriage license at the time of its celebration. It appears that, according to
her, the date of the actual celebration of their marriage and the date of issuance of
their marriage certificate and marriage license are different and incongruous.

Although we have repeatedly ruled that litigants cannot raise an issue for the first
time on appeal, as this would contravene the basic rules of fair play and justice,
[23]
in a number of instances, we have relaxed observance of procedural rules, noting
that technicalities are not ends in themselves but exist to protect and promote
substantive rights of litigants. We said that certain rules ought not to be applied
with severity and rigidity if by so doing, the very reason for their existence would
be defeated.[24] Hence, when substantial justice plainly requires, exempting a
particular case from the operation of technicalities should not be subject to cavil.
[25]
 In our view, the case at bar requires that we address the issue of the validity of
the marriage between Fillipina and Fernando which petitioner claims is void from
the beginning for lack of a marriage license, in order to arrive at a just resolution of
a deeply seated and violent conflict between the parties. Note, however, that here
the pertinent facts are not disputed; and what is required now is a declaration of
their effects according to existing law.

Petitioner states that though she did not categorically state in her petition for
annulment of marriage before the trial court that the incongruity in the dates of the
marriage license and the celebration of the marriage itself would lead to the
conclusion that her marriage to Fernando was void from the beginning, she points
out that these critical dates were contained in the documents she submitted before
the court. The date of issue of the marriage license and marriage certificate,
September 17, 1974, is contained in their marriage contract which was attached as
Annex "A" in her petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the
trial court, and thereafter marked as Exhibit "A" in the course of the trial. [26] The
date of celebration of their marriage at Our Lady of Lourdes, Sta. Teresita Parish,
on November 15, 1973, is admitted both by petitioner and private respondent, as
stated in paragraph three of petitioner's petition for the declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage before the trial court, and private respondent's answer admitting
it.[27] This fact was also affirmed by petitioner, in open court, on January 22, 1993,
during her direct examination,[28] as follows:

ATTY. RAZON: In the last hearing, you said that you were married on November 15,1973?
FILIPINA SY: Yes, Sir.

November 15, 1973, also appears as the date of marriage of the parents in both
their son's and daughter's birth certificates, which are also attached as Annexes "
B" and "C" in the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the
trial court, and thereafter marked as Exhibits "B" and "C" in the course of the trial.
[29]
 These pieces of evidence on record plainly and indubitably show that on the day
of the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license. A marriage license is a
formal requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab initio. In addition, the
marriage contract shows that the marriage license, numbered 6237519, was issued
in Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither petitioner nor private respondent ever resided in
Carmona.[30]

Carefully reviewing the documents and the pleadings on record, we find that indeed
petitioner did not expressly state in her petition before the trial court that there was
incongruity between the date of the actual celebration of their marriage and the
date of the issuance of their marriage license. From the documents she presented,
the marriage license was issued on September 17,1974, almost one year after the
ceremony took place on November 15, 1973. The ineluctable conclusion is that the
marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage license. Nowhere do we find
private respondent denying these dates on record. Article 80 of the Civil Code [31] is
clearly applicable in this case. There being no claim of an exceptional character, the
purported marriage between petitioner and private respondent could not be
classified among those enumerated in Articles 72-79[32] of the Civil Code. We thus
conclude that under Article 80 of the Civil Code, the marriage between petitioner
and private respondent is void from the beginning.

We note that their marriage certificate and marriage license are only photocopies.
So are the birth certificates of their son Frederick and daughter Farrah Sheryll.
Nevertheless, these documents were marked as Exhibits during the course of the
trial below, which shows that these have been examined and admitted by the trial
court, with no objections having been made as to their authenticity and due
execution. Likewise, no objection was interposed to petitioner's testimony in open
court when she affirmed that the date of the actual celebration of their marriage
was on November 15, 1973. We are of the view, therefore, that having been
admitted in evidence, with the adverse party failing to timely object thereto, these
documents are deemed sufficient proof of the facts contained therein. [33]

The remaining issue on the psychological incapacity of private respondent need no

longer detain us. It is mooted by our conclusion that the marriage of petitioner to
respondent is void ab initio for lack of a marriage license at the time their marriage
was solemnized.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
San Fernando, Pampanga, dated December 9,1993 as well as the Decision
promulgated on May 21, 1996 by the Court of Appeals and its Resolution dated
November 21, 1996, in CA-G.R. No. 44144 are set aside. The marriage celebrated
on November 15, 1973 between petitioner Filipina Yap and private respondent
Fernando Sy is hereby declared void ab initio for lack of marriage license at the
time of celebration. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

[1]
 CA Records, at 51-59.
[2]
 Records, at 136-143.
[3]
 Id. at 1-5.
[4]
 Exh. A; Id. at 6.
[5]
 Exhs. B & C; Id. at 7-8.
[6]
 Id. at 136.
[7]
 Ibid.
[8]
 Id. at 10-11.
[9]
 Exh. E, Id. at 10-18.
[10]
 Id. at 18.
[11]
 Id. at 23-24.
[12]
 Exh. G; Id. at 23-26.
[13]
 Exh. H; Id. at 27-46.
[14]
 Id. at 1-5.
[15]
 Id. at 3.
[16]
 Id. at 136-143.
[17]
 Supra, note 1.
[18]
 Id. at 59.
[19]
 Id. at 60-64.
[20]
 Id. at 76.
[21]
 Rollo, pp. 10-55.
[22]
 Id. at 31.
[23]
 Sumbad v. Court of appeals, G.R. No. 106060, June 21, 1999, p. 23; Modina vs.
CA, G.R. No. 109355, October 29, 1999, p. 13; citing Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila v. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 145 (1997).
[24]
 Government Service Insurance System vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 187, 198
(1997); Mauna vs. Civil Service Commission, 232 SCRA 388, 398 (1994).
[25]
 GSIS vs. CA, at 198, citing Aguilar vs. Court of Appeals, 250 SCRA 371 (1995).
[26]
 Exhibit A, Records, p. 6; Rollo, p. 72.
[27]
 Records, at 1 and 53.
[28]
 TSN, 22 January 1993, p. 4.
[29]
 Records pp. 7 & 8; Exh. A, Rollo, p. 72.
[30]
 Rollo, at 20.
[31]
 Art. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxx

(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional

character;

xxx

[32]
 ART. 72. When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to the conjugal
union or commits acts which tend to bring danger, dishonor or injury to the other or
to the family, the aggrieved party may apply to the court for relief.

ART. 73. Either spouse may exercise any legitimate profession, occupation,
business or activity without the consent of the other. The latter may object only on
valid, serious, and moral grounds.

In case of disagreement, the court shall decide whether or not:

(1) The objection is proper, and

(2) Benefit has accrued to the family prior to the objection or thereafter. If the
benefit accrued prior to the objection, the resulting obligation shall be enforced
against the separate property of the spouse who has not obtained consent.

The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the rights of creditors who acted in
good faith.

ART. 74. The property relations between husband and wife shall be governed in the
following order:
(1) By marriage settlements executed before the marriage;

(2) By the provisions of this Code; and

(3) By the local customs.

ART. 75. The future spouses may, in the marriage settlements, agree upon the
regime of absolute community, conjugal partnership of gains, complete separation
of property, or any other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or when
the regime agreed upon is void, the system of absolute community of property as
established in this code shall govern.

ART. 76. In order that any modification in the marriage settlements may be valid, it
must be made before the celebration of the marriage, subject to the provisions of
Articles 66, 67, 128, 135 and 136.

ART. 77. The marriage settlements and any modification thereof shall be in writing,
signed by the parties and executed before the celebration of the marriage. They
shall not prejudice third persons unless they are registered in the local civil registry
where the marriage contract is recorded as well as in the proper registries of
property.

ART. 78. A minor who according to law may contract marriage may also enter into
marriage settlements, but they shall be valid only if the persons designated in
Article 14 to give consent to the marriage are made parties to the agreement,
subject to the provisions of Title IX of this Code.

ART. 79. For the validity of any marriage settlements executed by a person upon
whom a sentence of civil interdiction has been pronounced or who is subject to any
other disability, it shall be indispensable for the guardian appointed by a competent
court to be made a party thereto.
[33]
 See also Son vs. Son, 251 SCRA 556 (1995); Tison vs. CA, 276 SCRA 582
(1997); Quebral vs. CA, 252 SCRA 353 (1996).

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529 Phil. 419

FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. NO. 167684, July 31, 2006 ]
JAIME O. SEVILLA, PETITIONER, VS. CARMELITA N.
CARDENAS, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: 

This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74416 dated 20 December 2004 which set aside
the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, in Civil Case No. 94-
1285 dated 25 January 2002.

In a Complaint[3] dated 28 March 1994 filed by Jaime O. Sevilla before the RTC, he

claimed that on 19 May 1969, through machinations, duress and intimidation
employed upon him by Carmelita N. Cardenas and the latter's father, retired
Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed forces of the Philippines, he and Carmelita
went to the City Hall of Manila and they were introduced to a certain Reverend
Cirilo D. Gonzales, a supposed Minister of the Gospel. On the said date, the father
of Carmelita caused him and Carmelita to sign a marriage contract before the said
Minister of the Gospel. According to Jaime, he never applied for a marriage license
for his supposed marriage to Carmelita and never did they obtain any marriage
license from any Civil Registry, consequently, no marriage license was presented to
the solemnizing officer.

For her part, Carmelita refuted these allegations of Jaime, and claims that she and
Jaime were married civilly on 19 May 1969,[4] and in a church ceremony thereafter
on 31 May 1969[5] at the Most Holy Redeemer Parish in Quezon City. Both
marriages were registered with the local civil registry of Manila and the National
Statistics Office. He is estopped from invoking the lack of marriage license after
having been married to her for 25 years.

The trial court made the following findings:

In support of his complaint, plaintiff [Jaime] testified that on May 19, 1969, he and
defendant [Carmelita] appeared before a certain Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales, a Minister
of the Gospel, at the city hall in Manila where they executed a Marriage Contract
(Exh. "A") in civil rites. A certain Godofredo Occena who, plaintiff alleged, was an
aide of defendant's father accompanied them, and who, together with another
person, stood as witness to the civil wedding. That although marriage license no.
2770792 allegedly issued in San Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969 was indicated in the
marriage contract, the same was fictitious for he never applied for any marriage
license, (Ibid., p. 11). Upon verifications made by him through his lawyer, Atty.
Jose M. Abola, with the Civil Registry of San Juan, a Certification dated March 11,
1994 (Exh. "E") was issued by Rafael D. Aliscad, Jr., Local Civil Registrar of San
Juan, that "no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued by said office." On
May 31, 1969, he and defendant were again wed, this time in church rites, before
Monsignor Juan Velasco at the Most Holy Redeemer Parish Church in Brixton Hills,
Quezon City, where they executed another marriage contract (Exh. "F") with the
same marriage license no. 2770792 used and indicated. Preparations and expenses
for the church wedding and reception were jointly shared by his and defendant's
parents. After the church wedding, he and defendant resided in his house at Brixton
Hills until their first son, Jose Gabriel, was born in March 1970. As his parents
continued to support him financially, he and defendant lived in Spain for some time,
for his medical studies. Eventually, their marital relationship turned bad because it
became difficult for him to be married he being a medical student at that time.
They started living apart in 1976, but they underwent family counseling before they
eventually separated in 1978. It was during this time when defendant's second son
was born whose paternity plaintiff questioned. Plaintiff obtained a divorce decree
against defendant in the United States in 1981 and later secured a judicial
separation of their conjugal partnership in 1983.

Atty. Jose M. Abola, then counsel for the plaintiff, himself manifested that when his
service was engaged by plaintiff, and after the latter narrated to him the
circumstances of his marriage, he made inquiries with the Office of Civil Registry of
San Juan where the supposed marriage license was obtained and with the Church
of the Most Holy Redeemer Parish where the religious wedding ceremony was
celebrated. His request letters dated March 3, 1994 (Exh. "J"), March 7, 1994 (Exh.
"L"), March 9, 1994 (Exh. "M") and March 11, 1994 (Exh. "K") were all sent to and
received by the Civil Registrar of San Juan, who in reply thereto, issued
Certifications dated March 4, 1994 (Exh. "I"), and March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E") and
September 20, 1994 (Exh. "C"), that "no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever
issued by that office." Upon his inquiry, the Holy Redeemer Parish Church issued
him a certified copy of the marriage contract of plaintiff and defendant (Exh. "F")
and a Certificate of Marriage dated April 11, 1994 (Exh. "G"), wherein it noted that
it was a "purely religious ceremony, having been civilly married on May 19, 1969 at
the City Hall, Manila, under Marriage License No. 2770792 issued at San Juan, Rizal
on May 19, 1969."

Perlita Mercader, Registration Officer III of the Local Registry of San Juan, identified
the Certificates dated March 4, 1994, March 11, 1994 and September 20, 1994
issued by Rafael Aliscad, Jr., the Local Civil Registrar, and testified that their office
failed to locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 may have been
registered (TSN, 8-6-96, p. 5).

Defendant Carmelita Cardenas testified that she and plaintiff had a steady romantic
relationship after they met and were introduced to each other in October 1968. A
model, she was compelled by her family to join the Mutya ng Pilipinas beauty
pageant when plaintiff who was afraid to lose her, asked her to run away with him
to Baguio. Because she loved plaintiff, she turned back on her family and decided to
follow plaintiff in Baguio. When they came back to Manila, she and plaintiff
proceeded to the latter's home in Brixton Hills where plaintiff's mother, Mrs. Sevilla,
told her not to worry. Her parents were hostile when they learned of the elopement,
but Mrs. Sevilla convinced them that she will take care of everything, and promised
to support plaintiff and defendant. As plaintiff was still fearful he may lose her, he
asked her to marry him in civil rites, without the knowledge of her family, more so
her father (TSN, 5-28-98, p. 4) on May 19, 1969, before a minister and where she
was made to sign documents. After the civil wedding, they had lunch and later each
went home separately. On May 31, 1969, they had the church wedding, which the
Sevilla family alone prepared and arranged, since defendant's mother just came
from hospital. Her family did not participate in the wedding preparations. Defendant
further stated that there was no sexual consummation during their honeymoon and
that it was after two months when they finally had sex. She learned from Dr.
Escudero, plaintiff's physician and one of their wedding sponsors that plaintiff was
undergoing psychiatric therapy since age 12 (TSN, 11-2-98, p. 15) for some
traumatic problem compounded by his drug habit. She found out plaintiff has
unusual sexual behavior by his obsession over her knees of which he would take
endless pictures of. Moreover, plaintiff preferred to have sex with her in between
the knees which she called "intrafemural sex," while real sex between them was far
and between like 8 months, hence, abnormal. During their marriage, plaintiff
exhibited weird sexual behavior which defendant attributed to plaintiff's drug
addiction (TSN, 11-5-98, pp. 5-8). A compulsive liar, plaintiff has a bad temper who
breaks things when he had tantrums. Plaintiff took drugs like amphetamines,
benzedrine and the like, "speed" drugs that kept him from sleep and then would
take barbiturates or downers, like "mogadon." Defendant tried very hard to keep
plaintiff away from drugs but failed as it has become a habit to him. They had no
fixed home since they often moved and partly lived in Spain for about four and a
half years, and during all those times, her mother-in-law would send some financial
support on and off, while defendant worked as an English teacher. Plaintiff, who
was supposed to be studying, did nothing. Their marriage became unbearable, as
plaintiff physically and verbally abused her, and this led to a break up in their
marriage. Later, she learned that plaintiff married one Angela Garcia in 1991 in the
United States.

Jose Cardenas, father of defendant, testified that he was not aware of the civil
wedding of his daughter with the plaintiff; that his daughter and grandson came to
stay with him after they returned home from Spain and have lived with him and his
wife ever since. His grandsons practically grew up under his care and guidance, and
he has supported his daughter's expenses for medicines and hospital confinements
(Exhs. "9" and "10").

Victoria Cardenas Navarro, defendant's sister, testified and corroborated that it was
plaintiff's family that attended to all the preparations and arrangements for the
church wedding of her sister with plaintiff, and that she didn't know that the couple
wed in civil rites some time prior to the church wedding. She also stated that she
and her parents were still civil with the plaintiff inspite of the marital differences
between plaintiff and defendant.
As adverse witness for the defendant, plaintiff testified that because of
irreconcilable differences with defendant and in order for them to live their own
lives, they agreed to divorce each other; that when he applied for and obtained a
divorce decree in the United States on June 14, 1983 (Exh. "13"), it was with the
knowledge and consent of defendant who in fact authorized a certain Atty.
Quisumbing to represent her (TSN, 12-7-2000, p. 21). During his adverse
testimony, plaintiff identified a recent certification dated July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE")
issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, that the marriage license no.
2770792, the same marriage license appearing in the marriage contract (Exh. "A"),
is inexistent, thus appears to be fictitious.[6]
In its Decision dated 25 January 2002, declaring the nullity of the marriage of the
parties, the trial court made the following justifications:
Thus, being one of the essential requisites for the validity of the marriage, the lack
or absence of a license renders the marriage void ab initio. It was shown under the
various certifications (Exhs. "I", "E", and "C") earlier issued by the office of the
Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of San Juan, and the more recent one issued
on July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE") that no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued
by that office, hence, the marriage license no. 2770792 appearing on the marriage
contracts executed on May 19, 1969 (Exh. "A") and on May 31, 1969 (Exh. "F") was
fictitious. Such a certification enjoys probative value under the rules on evidence,
particularly Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, x x x.

xxxx

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the civil marriage between Jaime O. Sevilla
and Carmelita N. Cardenas solemnized by Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales at the Manila City
Hall on May 19, 1969 as well as their contract of marriage solemnized under
religious rites by Rev. Juan B. Velasco at the Holy Redeemer Parish on May 31,
1969, NULL and VOID for lack of the requisite marriage license. Let the marriage
contract of the parties under Registry No. 601 (e-69) of the registry book of the
Local Civil Registry of Manila be cancelled.

Let copies of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and property
registries in accordance with Article 52 of the Family Code. Likewise, let a copy
hereof be forwarded the Office of the Solicitor General for its record and
information.[7]
Carmelita filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 20
December 2004, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court and held:
In People v. De Guzman (G.R. No. 106025, February 9, 1994), the Supreme Court
explained that: "The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted
by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The
presumption, however, prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it
becomes conclusive."

In this case, We note that a certain Perlita Mercader of the local civil registry of
San Juan testified that they "failed to locate the book wherein marriage
license no. 2770792 is registered," for the reason that "the employee
handling is already retired." With said testimony We cannot therefore just
presume that the marriage license specified in the parties' marriage contract was
not issued for in the end the failure of the office of the local civil registrar of San
Juan to produce a copy of the marriage license was attributable not to the fact that
no such marriage license was issued but rather, because it "failed to locate the
book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is registered." Simply put, if the
pertinent book were available for scrutiny, there is a strong possibility that it would
have contained an entry on marriage license no. 2720792.

xxxx

Indeed, this Court is not prepared to annul the parties' marriage on the basis of a
mere perception of plaintiff that his union with defendant is defective with respect
to an essential requisite of a marriage contract, a perception that ultimately was
not substantiated with facts on record.[8]
Jaime filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 6 January 2005 which the Court of
Appeals denied in a Resolution dated 6 April 2005.

This denial gave rise to the present Petition filed by Jaime.

He raises the following issues for Resolution.

1. Whether or not a valid marriage license was issued in accordance with

law to the parties herein prior to the celebration of the marriages in
question;

2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly applied and relied on the
presumption of regularity of officials acts, particularly the issuance of a
marriage license, arising solely from the contents of the marriage
contracts in question which show on their face that a marriage license
was purportedly issued by the Local Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro
Manila, and

3. Whether or not respondent could validly invoke/rely upon the

presumption of validity of a marriage arising from the admitted "fact of
marriage."[9]

At the core of this controversy is the determination of whether or not the

certifications from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan stating that no Marriage
License No. 2770792 as appearing in the marriage contract of the parties was
issued, are sufficient to declare their marriage as null and void ab initio.

We agree with the Court of Appeals and rule in the negative.

Pertinent provisions of the Civil Code which was the law in force at the time of the
marriage of the parties are Articles 53,[10] 58[11] and 80.[12]
Based on the foregoing provisions, a marriage license is an essential requisite for
the validity of marriage. The marriage between Carmelita and Jaime is of no
exception.

At first glance, this case can very well be easily dismissed as one involving a
marriage that is null and void on the ground of absence of a marriage license based
on the certifications issued by the Local Civil Registar of San Juan. As ruled by this
Court in the case of Cariño v. Cariño[13]:
[A]s certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has
no record of such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court held
that such a certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage
license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case, the
certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys probative value, he being the
officer charged under the law to keep a record of all date relative to the issuance of
a marriage license.

Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the
deceased has been sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner
to prove that their marriage is valid and that they secured the required marriage
license. Although she was declared in default before the trial court, petitioner could
have squarely met the issue and explained the absence of a marriage license in her
pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this Court. But petitioner conveniently
avoided the issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that will put her
case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their marriage cannot stand.

It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao
and the deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license,
and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement,
is undoubtedly void ab initio.
The foregoing Decision giving probative value to the certifications issued by the
Local Civil Registrar should be read in line with the decision in the earlier case
of Republic v. Court of Appeals,[14] where it was held that:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite
diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his office or that a
particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As
custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the
duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all
applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date
the marriage license was issued and such other relevant data. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar must categorically
state that the document does not exist in his office or the particular entry could not
be found in the register despite diligent search. Such certification shall be sufficient
proof of lack or absence of record as stated in Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court:
SEC. 28.  Proof of lack of record. - a written statement signed by an officer having
the custody of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no
record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office,
accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the
records of his office contain no such record or entry.
We shall now proceed to scrutinize whether the certifications by the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan in connection with Marriage License No. 2770792 complied
with the foregoing requirements and deserved to be accorded probative value.

The first Certification[15] issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro
Manila, was dated 11 March 1994. It reads:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

No Marriage License Number 2770792 were (sic) ever issued by this Office. With
regards (sic) to Marriage License Number 2880792, [16] we exert all effort but we
cannot find the said number.

Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the
above problem.

San Juan, Metro Manila

March 11, 1994

(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.

Local Civil Registrar
The second certification[17] was dated 20 September 1994 and provides:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that no marriage license Number 2770792 were ever issued by this
Office with regards to Marriage License Number 2880792, we exert all effort but we
cannot find the said number.

Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the
above problem.

San Juan, Metro Manila

September 20, 1994

(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.

Local Civil Registrar
The third Certification,[18] issued on 25 July 2000, states:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that according to the records of this office, no Marriage License
Application was filed and no Marriage License No. 2770792 allegedly dated May 19,
1969 was issued by this Office to MR. JAIME O. SEVILLA and MS. CARMELITA
CARDENAS-SEVILLA.

This is to further certify that the said application and license do not exist in our
Local Civil Registry Index and, therefore, appear to be fictitious.

This certification is being issued upon the request of the interested party for
whatever legal intent it may serve.

San Juan, Metro Manila

July 25, 2000

(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.

Local Civil Registrar
Note that the first two certifications bear the statement that "hope and understand
our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the above problem." It could
be easily implied from the said statement that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar
could not exert its best efforts to locate and determine the existence of Marriage
License No. 2770792 due to its "loaded work." Likewise, both certifications failed to
state with absolute certainty whether or not such license was issued.

This implication is confirmed in the testimony of the representative from the Office
of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Ms. Perlita Mercader, who stated that they
cannot locate the logbook due to the fact that the person in charge of the said
logbook had already retired. Further, the testimony of the said person was not
presented in evidence. It does not appear on record that the former custodian of
the logbook was deceased or missing, or that his testimony could not be secured.
This belies the claim that all efforts to locate the logbook or prove the material
contents therein, had been exerted.

As testified to by Perlita Mercader:

Q Under the subpoena duces tecum, you were required to bring to this Court
among other things the register of application of/or (sic) for marriage licenses
received by the Office of the :Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Province of Rizal,
from January 19, 1969 to May 1969. Did you bring with you those records?

A I brought may 19, 1969, sir.

Q Is that the book requested of you under no. 3 of the request for subpoena?

A Meron pang January. I forgot, January . . .

Q Did you bring that with you?

A No, sir.

Q Why not?

A I cannot locate the book. This is the only book.

Q Will you please state if this is the register of marriage of marriage applications
that your office maintains as required by the manual of the office of the Local Civil
Registrar?

COURT

May I see that book and the portion marked by the witness.

xxxx

COURT

Why don't you ask her direct question whether marriage license 2880792 is the
number issued by their office while with respect to license no. 2770792 the office of
the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan is very definite about it it was never issued.
Then ask him how about no. 2880792 if the same was ever issued by their office.
Did you ask this 2887092, but you could not find the record? But for the moment
you cannot locate the books? Which is which now, was this issued or not?

A The employee handling it is already retired, sir.[19]

Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that utmost efforts
were not exerted to locate the logbook where Marriage License No. 2770792 may
have been entered, the presumption of regularity of performance of official function
by the Local Civil Registrar in issuing the certifications, is effectively rebutted.

According to Section 3(m),[20] Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the presumption that
official duty has been regularly performed is among the disputable presumptions.

In one case, it was held:

A disputable presumption has been defined as a species of evidence that may be
accepted and acted on where there is no other evidence to uphold the contention
for which it stands, or one which may be overcome by other evidence. One such
disputable/rebuttable presumption is that an official act or duty has been regularly
performed. x x x.[21]
The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative
evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. [22]

The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty is disputable and can

be overcome by other evidence as in the case at bar where the presumption has
been effectively defeated by the tenor of the first and second certifications.

Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of

Marriage License No. 2770792. It can also mean, as we believed true in the case at
bar, that the logbook just cannot be found. In the absence of showing of diligent
efforts to search for the said logbook, we cannot easily accept that absence of the
same also means non-existence or falsity of entries therein.

Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the
validity of the marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds. [23] The courts look
upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the
contrary, the presumption is of great weight.[24]

The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and
strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as
the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
validity of the marriage.[25]

The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and lived together for
several years producing two offsprings, [26] now adults themselves. It took Jaime
several years before he filed the petition for declaration of nullity. Admittedly, he
married another individual sometime in 1991.[27] We are not ready to reward
petitioner by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom and in
the process allow him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy. [28]

Our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic

social institution. Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere
contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State
can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break-up
of families weakens our social and moral fabric; hence, their preservation is not the
concern of the family members alone.[29]

"The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is x x x marriage.

Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an
institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.
Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing
matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact
married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties
were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the
constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of
Civil Procedure is `that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and
wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage." Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio " Always presume marriage."[30]

This jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is based on the prima

faciepresumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and
wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.[31]

By our failure to come to the succor of Jaime, we are not trifling with his emotion or
deepest sentiments. As we have said in Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco,
[32]
regrettably, there are situations like this one, where neither law nor society can
provide the specific answers to every individual problem.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Decision

of the Court of Appeals dated 20 December 2004 and the Resolution dated 6 April
2005 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, C.J., (Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr.,,

JJ., concur.

[1]
 Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 74416, penned by Associate Justice Vicente S. E.
Veloso with Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios and Amelita G. Tolentino,
concurring; Rollo, pp. 20-31.

[2]
 Rollo, p. 46. Penned by Judge Zeus C. Abrogar.

[3]
 Records, Vol. I, pp. 1-4.

[4]
 Id. at 5.

[5]
 Id. at 232.

[6]
  Rollo, pp. 47-50.

[7]
 Id. at 50-52.

[8]
 Id. at 29-31.

[9]
 Id. at 80-81.

[10]
 ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are
complied with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) a marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

[11]
 ART. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of
this Title, but not those under Article 75, no marriage shall be solemnized without a
license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either
contracting party habitually resides.

[12]
 ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxxx

(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional

charater.

[13]
 G.R. No. 132529, 2 February 2001, 351 SCRA 127, 133-134.
[14]
 G.R. No. 103047, 2 September 1994, 236 SCRA 257, 262.

[15]
 Records, Vol. I, p. 103.

[16]
 Atty. Josa Ma. Abola, counsel for Jaime Sevilla testified before the trial court that
in his letter requesting for the issuance of a certification, addressed to the Local
Civil Registrar of San Juan, he mistakenly read the Marriage License No. as
2880792 instead of 2770792. (Records, Vol. II, pp. 725-726.)

[17]
 Id. at 228.

[18]
 Records, Vol. II, p. 888.

[19]
 Id. at 735-737.

[20]
 Rule 131. BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS
xxxx

SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions. - The following presumptions are satisfactory if

uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence;

xxxx
(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;

[21]
 People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 106025, 9 February 1994, 229 SCRA 795, 798-
799.

[22]
 Mabsucang v. Judge Balgos, 446 Phil. 217, 224 (2003).

[23]
 Article 220 Civil Code, Bobis v. Bobis, 391 Phil. 648, 655 (2000).

[24]
 Ricardo J. Francisco, BASIC EVIDENCE (2nd ed., 1999), p. 77.

[25]
 Republic v. Quintero-Hamano, G.R. No. 149498, 20 May 2004, 428 SCRA 735,
740.

[26]
 Records, Vol. II, p. 413, TSN, 11 April 1996.

[27]
 Id. at p. 414.

[28]
 Ty v. Court of Appeals, 399 Phil. 647, 663 (2000).

[29]
 Tuason v. Court of Appeals, 326 Phil. 169, 180-181 (1996) cited in Ancheta v.
Ancheta, G.R. No. 145370, 4 March 2004, 424 SCRA 725, 740.

[30]
 Vda. de Jacob v. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil. 693, 709 (1999).
[31]
 Id.

[32]
 G.R. No. 158896, 27 October 2004, 441 SCRA 422, 439. 

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702 Phil. 578

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 183896, January 27, 2013 ]
SYED AZHAR ABBAS, PETITIONER, VS. GLORIA GOO ABBAS,
RESPONDENT.

DECISION

VELASCO JR., J.: 

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, questioning the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 11,
2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760, which reversed the Decision [2] in Civil Case No. 03-
0382-CFM dated October 5, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 109,
Pasay City, and theCA Resolution dated July 24, 2008, denying petitioner's Motion
for Reconsideration of the CA Decision.

The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed)
for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo Abbas (Gloria) with the
RTC of Pasay City, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM, and raffled to RTC
Branch 109.  Syed alleged the absence of a marriage license, as provided for in
Article 4, Chapter I, Title 1 of Executive Order No. 269, otherwise known as the
Family Code of the Philippines, as a ground for the annulment of his marriage to
Gloria.

In the Marriage Contract[3] of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage License No.
9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite on January 8, 1993, was presented to the
solemnizing officer. It is this information that is crucial to the resolution of this
case.

At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino
citizen, in Taiwan in 1991, and they were married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei
Mosque in Taiwan.[4]  He arrived in the Philippines in December of 1992. On January
9, 1993, at around 5 o’clock in the afternoon, he was at his mother-in-law’s
residence, located at 2676 F. Muñoz St., Malate, Manila, when his mother-in-law
arrived with two men. He testified that he was told that he was going to undergo
some ceremony, one of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not
told of the nature of said ceremony. During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a
document. He claimed that he did not know that the ceremony was a marriage until
Gloria told him later. He further testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to
apply for a marriage license, and that he had never resided in that area. In July of
2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on
their marriage license, and was asked to show a copy of their marriage contract
wherein the marriage license number could be found. [5] The Municipal Civil
Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a certification on July 11, 2003 to the
effect that the marriage license number appearing in the marriage contract he
submitted, Marriage License No. 9969967, was the number of another marriage
license issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. [6]   Said
certification reads as follows:

11 July 2003

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage License filed in this office,
Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued in favor of MR. ARLINDO GETALADO and
MISS MYRA MABILANGAN on January 19, 1993.

No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR. SYED AZHAR ABBAS
and MISS GLORIA F. GOO on January 8, 1993.

This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for whatever legal
purpose or intents it may serve.[7]

On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy cases against him
in 2001 and 2002, and that he had gone to the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite to get certification on whether or not there was a marriage license
on advice of his counsel.[8]

Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee of the Municipal

Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite. Bagsic appeared under a letter of authority from
the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, and brought documents pertaining
to Marriage License No. 9969967, which was issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra
Mabilangan on January 20, 1993.[9]  Bagsic testified that their office issues serial
numbers for marriage licenses and that the numbers are issued chronologically. [10] 
He testified that the certification dated July 11, 2003, was issued and signed by
Leodivina Encarnacion, Registrar of the Municipality of Carmona, Cavite, certifying
that Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued for Arlindo Getalado and Myra
Mabilangan on January 19, 1993, and that their office had not issued any other
license of the same serial number, namely 9969967, to any other person. [11]

For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented Reverend Mario
Dauz, Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and May Ann Ceriola.

Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister of the Gospel and
a barangay captain, and that he is authorized to solemnize marriages within the
Philippines.[12]  He testified that he solemnized the marriage of Syed Azhar Abbas
and Gloria Goo at the residence of the bride on January 9, 1993. [13]  He stated that
the witnesses were Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez (Atty. Sanchez) and Mary Ann Ceriola.
[14]
  He testified that he had been solemnizing marriages since 1982, and that he is
familiar with the requirements.[15] Rev. Dauz further testified that Atty. Sanchez
gave him the marriage license the day before the actual wedding, and that the
marriage contract was prepared by his secretary. [16]  After the solemnization of the
marriage, it was registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and Rev. Dauz
submitted the marriage contract and copy of the marriage license with that office.
[17]

Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the wedding of Syed
Abbas and Gloria Goo by the mother of the bride, Felicitas Goo. [18]  He testified that
he requested a certain Qualin to secure the marriage license for the couple, and
that this Qualin secured the license and gave the same to him on January 8, 1993.
[19]
  He further testified that he did not know where the marriage license was
obtained.[20]  He attended the wedding ceremony on January 9, 1993, signed the
marriage contract as sponsor, and witnessed the signing of the marriage contract
by the couple, the solemnizing officer and the other witness, Mary Ann Ceriola. [21]

Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and Syed Azhar Abbas is her
son-in-law, and that she was present at the wedding ceremony held on January 9,
1993 at her house.[22] She testified that she sought the help of Atty. Sanchez at the
Manila City Hall in securing the marriage license, and that a week before the
marriage was to take place, a male person went to their house with the application
for marriage license.[23]  Three days later, the same person went back to their
house, showed her the marriage license before returning it to Atty. Sanchez who
then gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer.[24]  She further testified that she
did not read all of the contents of the marriage license, and that she was told that
the marriage license was obtained from Carmona.[25]  She also testified that a
bigamy case had been filed by Gloria against Syed at the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, evidenced by an information for Bigamy dated January 10, 2003, pending
before Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. [26]

As to Mary Ann Ceriola’s testimony, the counsels for both parties stipulated that:
(a) she is one of the sponsors at the wedding of Gloria Goo and Syed Abbas on
January 9, 1993; (b) she was seen in the wedding photos and she could identify all
the persons depicted in said photos; and (c) her testimony corroborates that of
Felicitas Goo and Atty. Sanchez.

The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and presented the
marriage contract bearing their signatures as proof. [27]  She and her mother sought
the help of Atty. Sanchez in securing a marriage license, and asked him to be one
of the sponsors.  A certain Qualin went to their house and said that he will get the
marriage license for them, and after several days returned with an application for
marriage license for them to sign, which she and Syed did. After Qualin returned
with the marriage license, they gave the license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to
Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer. Gloria testified that she and Syed were married
on January 9, 1993 at their residence.[28]

Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on June 15, 1993.
[29]
Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who had married a
certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura during the existence of the previous marriage,
and that the case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 02A-03408, with the RTC of
Manila.[30]

Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on August 9, 1992 in
Taiwan, but that she did not know if said marriage had been celebrated under
Muslim rites, because the one who celebrated their marriage was Chinese, and
those around them at the time were Chinese.[31]

The Ruling of the RTC

In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid marriage
license was issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of
Gloria and Syed, as Marriage License No. 9969967 had been issued to Arlindo
Getalado and Myra Mabilangan, and the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona,
Cavite had certified that no marriage license had been issued for Gloria and Syed.
[32]
  It also took into account the fact that neither party was a resident of Carmona,
Cavite, the place where Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued, in violation of
Article 9 of the Family Code.[33]  As the marriage was not one of those exempt from
the license requirement, and that the lack of a valid marriage license is an absence
of a formal requisite, the marriage of Gloria and Syed on January 9, 1993 was
void ab initio.

The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner, and against

the respondent declaring as follows:

1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between petitioner Syed Azhar

Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas is hereby annulled;

2. Terminating the community of property relations between the

petitioner and the respondent even if no property was acquired during
their cohabitation by reason of the nullity of the marriage of the
parties.

3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Civil Registrar General,
National Statistics Office, are hereby ordered to cancel from their
respective civil registries the marriage contracted by petitioner Syed
Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas on January 9, 1993 in
Manila.

SO ORDERED.[34]

Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 7, 2005, but the RTC
denied the same, prompting her to appeal the questioned decision to the Court of
Appeals.

The Ruling of the CA

In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the following assignment of errors:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE

PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT AS NULL AND VOID DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF A
MARRIAGE LICENSE DESPITE EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING THAT THERE WAS
ONE.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING, AS A REQUISITE OF A VALID

MARRIAGE, THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT A MARRIAGE
CEREMONY TOOK PLACE WITH THE APPEARANCE OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES
BEFORE THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER AND THEIR PERSONAL DECLARATION THAT
THEY TOOK EACH OTHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE IN THE PRESENCE OF NOT LESS
THAN TWO WITNESSES OF LEGAL AGE.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE ISSUE OF ESTOPPEL BY

LACHES ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER, AN ISSUE TIMELY RAISED IN THE
COURT BELOW.[35]

The CA gave credence to Gloria’s arguments, and granted her appeal. It held that
the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that a
diligent search for the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus
held that said certification could not be accorded probative value. [36]  The CA ruled
that there was sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence that Gloria and
Syed had been validly married and that there was compliance with all the requisites
laid down by law.[37]  It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having
signed the marriage contract. The CA also considered that the parties had
comported themselves as husband and wife, and that Syed only instituted his
petition after Gloria had filed a case against him for bigamy. [38]

The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 05

October 2005 and Order dated 27 January 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City, Branch 109, in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is DISMISSED. The marriage
between Shed [sic] Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo Abbas contracted on 09 January
1993 remains valid and subsisting. No costs.
SO ORDERED.[39]

Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 2008 [40] but the same
was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated July 24, 2008. [41]

Hence, this petition.

Grounds in Support of Petition

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN

CITING REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS AS THE SAME IS DIAMETRICALLY
INCONSISTENT AND CONTRARY TO THE COURT’S OWN FINDINGS AND
CONCLUSIONS IN THIS CASE.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING AND

SETTING ASIDE, WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS, THE DECISION OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRANTING THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.[42]

The Ruling of this Court

The petition is meritorious.

As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993, Executive
Order No. 209, or the Family Code of the Philippines, is the applicable law. The
pertinent provisions that would apply to this particular case are Articles 3, 4 and
35(3), which read as follows:

Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this
Title; and

(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting
parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take
each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of
legal age.

Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the
marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as
provided in Article 45.

An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage
but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally
and administratively liable.

Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxxx

(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding
Chapter.

There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of the Family Code, nor
with the formal requisites of the authority of the solemnizing officer and the
conduct of the marriage ceremony. Nor is the marriage one that is exempt from the
requirement of a valid marriage license under Chapter 2, Title I of the Family Code. 
The resolution of this case, thus, hinges on whether or not a valid marriage license
had been issued for the couple. The RTC held that no valid marriage license had
been issued. The CA held that there was a valid marriage license.

We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.

Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof,
and relied on the marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to
prove the existence of said license. To prove that no such license was issued, Syed
turned to the office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had
allegedly issued said license. It was there that he requested certification that no
such license was issued.  In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals[43] such
certification was allowed, as permitted by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,
which reads:

SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – A written statement signed by an officer having
the custody of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no
record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office,
accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the
records of his office contain no such record or entry.

In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil Registrar of Pasig to
prove the non-issuance of a marriage license, the Court held:

The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to certify that despite
diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular
entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public
documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of
maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all applications for
marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage
license was issued and such other relevant data. [44]

The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil registrar enjoyed
probative value, as his duty was to maintain records of data relative to the issuance
of a marriage license.

The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of
Gloria and Syed was allegedly issued, issued a certification to the effect that no
such marriage license for Gloria and Syed was issued, and that the serial number of
the marriage license pertained to another couple, Arlindo Getalado and Myra
Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of Marriage License No. 9969967 was
presented, which was issued in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria
and Syed do not appear in the document.

In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the certification, stating
that it did not comply with Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.

The CA deduced that from the absence of the words “despite diligent search” in the
certification, and since the certification used stated that no marriage license
appears to have been issued, no diligent search had been conducted and thus the
certification could not be given probative value.

To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals.[45] 
It is worth noting that in that particular case, the Court, in sustaining the finding of
the lower court that a marriage license was lacking, relied on the Certification
issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, which merely stated that the alleged marriage
license could not be located as the same did not appear in their records.  Nowhere
in the Certification was it categorically stated that the officer involved conducted a
diligent search, nor is a categorical declaration absolutely necessary for Sec. 28,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court to apply.

Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that
an official duty has been regularly performed, absent contradiction or other
evidence to the contrary. We held, “The presumption of regularity of official acts
may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a
duty.”[46] No such affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar
was lax in performing her duty of checking the records of their office, thus the
presumption must stand. In fact, proof does exist of a diligent search having been
conducted, as Marriage License No. 996967 was indeed located and submitted to
the court.  The fact that the names in said license do not correspond to those of
Gloria and Syed does not overturn the presumption that the registrar conducted a
diligent search of the records of her office.

It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof to
the court. She failed to explain why the marriage license was secured in Carmona,
Cavite, a location where, admittedly, neither party resided. She took no pains to
apply for the license, so she is not the best witness to testify to the validity and
existence of said license. Neither could the other witnesses she presented prove the
existence of the marriage license, as none of them applied for the license in
Carmona, Cavite.  Her mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the
contents of the license, having admitted to not reading all of its contents.  Atty.
Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom Gloria and Felicitas Goo approached for
assistance in securing the license, admitted not knowing where the license came
from. The task of applying for the license was delegated to a certain Qualin, who
could have testified as to how the license was secured and thus impeached the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar as well as the testimony of her
representative. As Gloria failed to present this Qualin, the certification of the
Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys probative value.

It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage contract and
a copy of the marriage license were submitted to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.
Thus, a copy of the marriage license could have simply been secured from that
office and submitted to the court. However, Gloria inexplicably failed to do so,
further weakening her claim that there was a valid marriage license issued for her
and Syed.

In the case of Cariño v. Cariño,[47] following the case of Republic,[48] it was held that
the certification of the Local Civil Registrar that their office had no record of a
marriage license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license. The case
of Cariño further held that the presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had
been overcome, and that it became the burden of the party alleging a valid
marriage to prove that the marriage was valid, and that the required marriage
license had been secured.[49]  Gloria has failed to discharge that burden, and the
only conclusion that can be reached is that no valid marriage license was issued.  It
cannot be said that there was a simple irregularity in the marriage license that
would not affect the validity of the marriage, as no license was presented by the
respondent. No marriage license was proven to have been issued to Gloria and
Syed, based on the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite
and Gloria’s failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license.

To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support its conclusion that
Gloria and Syed were validly married. To quote the CA:

Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial and documentary, that
appellant and appellee have been validly married and there was compliance with all
the requisites laid down by law.  Both parties are legally capacitated to marry. A
certificate of legal capacity was even issued by the Embassy of Pakistan in favor of
appellee. The parties herein gave their consent freely. Appellee admitted that the
signature above his name in the marriage contract was his. Several pictures were
presented showing appellant and appellee, before the solemnizing officer, the
witnesses and other members of appellant’s family, taken during the marriage
ceremony, as well as in the restaurant where the lunch was held after the marriage
ceremony. Most telling of all is Exhibit “5-C” which shows appellee signing the
Marriage Contract.
xxxx

The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and has [sic] one
offspring, Aliea Fatima Goo Abbas, who was born on 15 June 1993. It took appellee
more than ten (10) years before he filed on 01 August 2003 his Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 4 of the Family Code. We take
serious note that said Petition appears to have been instituted by him only after an
Information for Bigamy (Exhibit “1”) dated 10 January 2003 was filed against him
for contracting a second or subsequent marriage with one Ma. Corazon (Maryam) T.
Buenaventura. We are not ready to reward (appellee) by declaring the nullity of his
marriage and give him his freedom and in the process allow him to profit from his
own deceit and perfidy.[50]

All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted
and a marriage contract was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid
marriage license. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, “The absence of
any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio,
except as stated in Article 35(2).” Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides
that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except
those exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title
I of the same Code.[51] Again, this marriage cannot be characterized as among the
exemptions, and thus, having been solemnized without a marriage license, is
void ab initio.

As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well be
that his motives are less than pure, that he seeks to evade a bigamy suit.  Be that
as it may, the same does not make up for the failure of the respondent  to prove
that they had a valid marriage license,  given the weight of evidence presented by
petitioner.  The lack of a valid marriage license  cannot  be attributed  to him, as it
was Gloria  who took steps  to procure the same.  The law must be applied.  As the
marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and
Syed is void ab initio.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED.  The

assailed Decision dated March 11, 2008 and Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.  The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City dated
October 5, 2005 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM annulling the marriage of petitioner
with respondent on January 9, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Peralta, Abad, Mendoza, and  Leonen, JJ., concur.

[1]
  Penned  by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo and concurred in by
Associate Justices Regalado E. Maambong and Myrna Dimaranan Vidal.

[2]
 Penned by Judge Tingaraan U. Guiling.

[3]
 Rollo, p. 13.

[4]
 Id. at 47.

[5]
 Id.

[6]
 Id. at 12.

[7]
 Id. at 10.

[8]
 Id. at 48.

[9]
 Id. at 49, “January 19, 1993” in some parts of the records.

[10]
 Id.

[11]
 Id. at 49-50.

[12]
 Id. at 50.

[13]
 Id.

[14]
 Id.

[15]
 Id.

[16]
 Id. at 51.

[17]
 Id.

[18]
 Id.

[19]
 Id.

[20]
 Id. at 52.

[21]
 Id.

[22]
 Id. at 53.

[23]
 Id. at 54.

[24]
 Id.
[25]
 Id.

[26]
 Id.

[27]
 Id. at 55.

[28]
 Id.

[29]
 Id. at 56.

[30]
 Id. at 57.

[31]
 Id.

[32]
 Id. at 58.

[33]
 Article 9. A Marriage License shall be issued by the Local Civil Registrar of the
city or municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, except in
marriages where no license is required in accordance with Chapter 2 of this Title.

[34]
 Rollo, pp. 58-59.

[35]
 Id. at 122.

[36]
 Id. at 128.

[37]
 Id. at 129.

[38]
 Id. at 130.

[39]
 Id. at 131.

[40]
 Id. at 135-146.

[41]
 Id. at 173-174.

[42]
 Id. at 31.

[43]
 G.R. No. 103047, September 2, 1994, 236 SCRA 257.

[44]
 Id. at 262.

[45]
 Supra note 43.

[46]
 Alcantara v. Alcantara, G.R. No. 167746. August 28, 2007, 531 SCRA 446, 456.

[47]
 403 Phil. 861, 869 (2001).
[48]
 Supra note 43.

[49]
 Supra note 47, at 870.

[50]
 Rollo, pp. 129-130.

[51]
 Art. 27. In case either or both of the contracting parties are at the point of
death, the marriage may be solemnized without necessity of a marriage license and
shall remain valid even if the ailing party subsequently survives.

Art. 28. If the residence of either party is so located that there is no means of
transportation to enable such party to appear personally before the local civil
registrar, the marriage may be solemnized without necessity of a marriage license.

Art. 29. In the cases provided for in the two preceding articles, the solemnizing
officer shall state in an affidavit executed before the local civil registrar or any other
person legally authorized to administer oaths that the marriage was performed
in articulo mortis or that the residence of either party, specifying the barrio or
barangay, is so located that there is no means of transportation to enable such
party to appear personally before the local civil registrar and that the officer took
the necessary steps to ascertain the ages and relationship of the contracting parties
and the absence of legal impediment to the marriage.

Art. 30. The original of the affidavit required in the last preceding article, together
with a legible copy of the marriage contract, shall be sent by the person
solemnizing the marriage to the local civil registrar of the municipality where it was
performed within the period of thirty days after the performance of the marriage.

Art. 31. A marriage in articulo mortis between passengers or crew members may

also be solemnized by a ship captain or by an airplane pilot not only while the ship
is at sea or the plane is in flight, but also during stopovers at ports of call.

Art. 32. A military commander of a unit, who is a commissioned officer, shall

likewise have authority to solemnize marriages in articulo mortis  between persons
within the zone of military operation, whether members of the armed forces or
civilians.

Art. 33.  Marriage  among Muslims or among members of the ethnic  cultural
communities may be performed validly without the necessity of marriage licenses,
provided  they are solemnized in accordance with their customs, rites or practices.

Art. 34.  No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who
have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any
legal impediment to marry each other.  The contracting parties shall state the
foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer
oaths.  The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the
qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the
marriage.

Source: Supreme Court E-Library | Date created: April 08, 2016 

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713 Phil. 502

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 201061, July 03, 2013 ]
SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, PETITIONER, VS. BENJAMIN
BANGAYAN, JR., RESPONDENT.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.: 

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review[1] assailing the 17 August 2011

Decision[2]and the 14 March 2012 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 94226.

The Antecedent Facts

On 15 March 2004, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin) filed a petition for

declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43 (trial court). The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 04109401. Benjamin alleged that on 10 September
1973, he married Azucena Alegre (Azucena) in Caloocan City. They had three
children, namely, Rizalyn, Emmamylin, and Benjamin III.

In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally Go-Bangayan

(Sally) who was a customer in the auto parts and supplies business owned by
Benjamin’s family. In December 1981, Azucena left for the United States of
America. In February 1982, Benjamin and Sally lived together as husband and wife.
Sally’s father was against the relationship. On on 7 March 1982, in order to appease
her father, Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City where they
signed a purported marriage contract.  Sally, knowing Benjamin’s marital status,
assured him that the marriage contract would not be registered.

Benjamin and Sally’s cohabitation produced two children, Bernice and Bentley.
During the period of their cohabitation, they acquired the following real properties:

(1) property under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 61722 registered in the names of
 Benjamin and Sally as spouses;
(2) properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of Benjamin, married to
Sally;
(3) properties under Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) Nos. 8782 and 8783 registered in the
name of Sally, married to Benjamin; and
(4) properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 registered in the name of Sally as a single
individual.

The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Sally left for Canada,
bringing Bernice and Bentley with her. She then filed criminal actions for bigamy
and falsification of public documents against Benjamin, using their simulated
marriage contract as evidence.  Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for declaration of
a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial
court on the ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the
formal requisites to a valid marriage. Benjamin also asked the trial court for the
partition of the properties he acquired with Sally in accordance with Article 148 of
the Family Code, for his appointment as administrator of the properties during the
pendency of the case, and for the declaration of Bernice and Bentley as illegitimate
children. A total of 44 registered properties became the subject of the partition
before the trial court. Aside from the seven properties enumerated by Benjamin in
his petition, Sally named 37 properties in her answer.

After Benjamin presented his evidence, Sally filed a demurrer to evidence which the
trial court denied. Sally filed a motion for reconsideration which the trial court also
denied. Sally filed a petition for certiorari  before the Court of Appeals and asked for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or injunction which the Court of
Appeals never issued. Sally then refused to present any evidence before the trial
court citing the pendency of her petition before the Court of Appeals. The trial court
gave Sally several opportunities to present her evidence on 28 February 2008, 10
July 2008, 4 September 2008, 11 September 2008, 2 October 2008, 23 October
2008, and 28 November 2008. Despite repeated warnings from the trial court, Sally
still refused to present her evidence, prompting the trial court to consider the case
submitted for decision.

The Decision of the Trial Court

In a Decision[4] dated 26 March 2009, the trial court ruled in favor of Benjamin. The
trial court gave weight to the certification dated 21 July 2004 from the Pasig Local
Civil Registrar, which was confirmed during trial, that only Marriage License Series
Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the month of February 1982 and the
purported Marriage License No. N-07568 was not issued to Benjamin and Sally.
[5]
 The trial court ruled that the marriage was not recorded with the local civil
registrar and the National Statistics Office because it could not be registered due to
Benjamin’s subsisting marriage with Azucena.

The trial court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not
bigamous. The trial court ruled that the second marriage was void not because of
the existence of the first marriage but because of other causes, particularly, the
lack of a marriage license. Hence, bigamy was not committed in this case. The trial
court did not rule on the issue of the legitimacy status of Bernice and Bentley
because they were not parties to the case. The trial court denied Sally’s claim for
spousal support because she was not married to Benjamin. The trial court likewise
denied support for Bernice and Bentley who were both of legal age and did not ask
for support.

On the issue of partition, the trial court ruled that Sally could not claim the 37
properties she named in her answer as part of her conjugal properties with
Benjamin. The trial court ruled that Sally was not legally married to Benjamin.
Further, the 37 properties that Sally was claiming were owned by Benjamin’s
parents who gave the properties to their children, including Benjamin, as advance
inheritance. The 37 titles were in the names of Benjamin and his brothers and the
phrase “married to Sally Go” was merely descriptive of Benjamin’s civil status in the
title. As regards the two lots under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860, the trial court
found that they were bought by Benjamin using his own money and that Sally failed
to prove any actual contribution of money, property or industry in their purchase.
The trial court found that Sally was a registered co-owner of the lots covered by
TCT Nos. 61722, N-193656, and 253681 as well as the two condominium units
under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783. However, the trial court ruled that the lot under
TCT No. 61722 and the two condominium units were purchased from the earnings
of Benjamin alone. The trial court ruled that the properties under TCT Nos. 61722,
61720, and 190860 and CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were part of the conjugal
partnership of Benjamin and Azucena, without prejudice to Benjamin’s right to
dispute his conjugal state with Azucena in a separate proceeding.

The trial court further ruled that Sally acted in bad faith because she knew that
Benjamin was married to Azucena. Applying Article 148 of the Family Code, the trial
court forfeited Sally’s share in the properties covered under TCT Nos. N-193656 and
253681 in favor of Bernice and Bentley while Benjamin’s share reverted to his
conjugal ownership with Azucena.

The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads:

ACCORDINGLY, the marriage of BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR. and SALLY S. GO on

March 7, 1982 at Santolan, Pasig, Metro Manila is hereby declared NULL and VOID
AB INITIO. It is further declared NON-EXISTENT.

Respondent’s claim as co-owner or conjugal owner of the thirty-seven (37)

properties under TCT Nos. 17722, 17723, 17724, 17725, 126397, RT-73480, and
RT-86821; in Manila, TCT Nos. 188949, 188950, 188951, 193035, 194620,
194621, 194622, 194623, 194624, 194625, 194626, 194627, 194628, 194629,
194630, 194631, 194632, 194633, 194634, 194635, 194636, 194637, 194638,
194639, 198651, 206209, 206210, 206211, 206213 and 206215 is DISMISSED for
lack of merit. The registered owners, namely: Benjamin B. Bangayan, Jr., Roberto
E. Bangayan, Ricardo B. Bangayan and Rodrigo B. Bangayan are the owners to the
exclusion of “Sally Go” Consequently, the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City and
Manila are directed to delete the words “married to Sally Go” from these
thirty[-]seven (37) titles.

Properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720 and 190860, CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 are
properties acquired from petitioner’s money without contribution from respondent,
hence, these are properties of the petitioner and his lawful wife. Consequently,
petitioner is appointed the administrator of these five (5) properties. Respondent is
ordered to submit an accounting of her collections of income from these five (5)
properties within thirty (30) days from notice hereof. Except for lot under TCT No.
61722, respondent is further directed within thirty (30) days from notice hereof to
turn over and surrender control and possession of these properties including the
documents of title to the petitioner.

On the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and N-253681, these properties are
under co-ownership of the parties shared by them equally. However, the share of
respondent is declared FORFEITED in favor of Bernice Go Bangayan and Bentley Go
Bangayan. The share of the petitioner shall belong to his conjugal ownership with
Azucena Alegre. The liquidation, partition and distribution of these two (2)
properties shall be further processed pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10
of March 15, 2003.

Other properties shall be adjudicated in a later proceeding pursuant to Section 21

of A.M. No. 02-11-10.

Respondent’s claim of spousal support, children support and counterclaims are

DISMISSED for lack of merit. Further, no declaration of the status of the parties’
children.

No other relief granted.

Furnish copy of this decision to the parties, their counsels, the Trial Prosecutor, the
Solicitor General and the Registry of Deeds in Manila, Quezon City and Caloocan.

SO ORDERED.[6]

Sally filed a Verified and Vigorous Motion for Inhibition with Motion for
Reconsideration. In its Order dated 27 August 2009, [7] the trial court denied the
motion. Sally appealed the trial court’s decision before the Court of Appeals.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

In its 17 August 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals partly granted the appeal. The
Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court did not err in submitting the case for
decision. The Court of Appeals noted that there were six resettings of the case, all
made at the instance of Sally, for the initial reception of evidence, and Sally was
duly warned to present her evidence on the next hearing or the case would be
deemed submitted for decision. However, despite the warning, Sally still failed to
present her evidence. She insisted on presenting Benjamin who was not around and
was not subpoenaed despite the presence of her other witnesses.

The Court of Appeals rejected Sally’s allegation that Benjamin failed to prove his
action for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Court of Appeals ruled that
Benjamin’s action was based on his prior marriage to Azucena and there was no
evidence that the marriage was annulled or dissolved before Benjamin contracted
the second marriage with Sally. The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court
committed no error in declaring Benjamin’s marriage to Sally null and void.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally was
governed by Article 148 of the Family Code. The Court of Appeals ruled that only
the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to
their respective contribution. The Court of Appeals ruled that the 37 properties
being claimed by Sally rightfully belong to Benjamin and his siblings.

As regards the seven properties claimed by both parties, the Court of Appeals ruled
that only the properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name
of Benjamin belong to him exclusively because he was able to establish that they
were acquired by him solely. The Court of Appeals found that the properties under
TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 and under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were exclusive
properties of Sally in the absence of proof of Benjamin’s actual contribution in their
purchase. The Court of Appeals ruled that the property under TCT No. 61722
registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally shall be owned by them in common,
to be shared equally. However, the share of Benjamin shall accrue to the conjugal
partnership under his existing marriage with Azucena while Sally’s share shall
accrue to her in the absence of a clear and convincing proof of bad faith.

Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that Sally failed to present clear and convincing
evidence that would show bias and prejudice on the part of the trial judge that
would justify his inhibition from the case.

The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The
assailed Decision and Order dated March 26, 2009 and August 27, 2009,
respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43, in Civil Case No. 04-
109401 are hereby AFFIRMED with modification declaring TCT Nos. 61720 and
190860 to be exclusively owned by the petitioner-appellee while the properties
under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 as well as [CCT] Nos. 8782 and 8783 shall
be solely owned by the respondent-appellant. On the other hand, TCT No. 61722
shall be owned by them and common and to be shared equally but the share of the
petitioner-appellee shall accrue to the conjugal partnership under his first marriage
while the share of respondent-appellant shall accrue to her. The rest of the decision
stands.

SO ORDERED.[8]

Sally moved for the reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’ decision. In its 14
March 2012 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied her motion.

Hence, the petition before this Court.

The Issues

Sally raised the following issues before this Court:

(1) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the trial
court’s ruling that Sally had waived her right to present evidence;

(2) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the trial
court’s decision declaring the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and
void ab initio and non-existent; and

(3) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming with
modification the trial court’s decision regarding the property relations of Benjamin
and Sally.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition has no merit.

Waiver of Right to Present Evidence

Sally alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s ruling that
she waived her right to present her evidence. Sally alleges that in not allowing her
to present evidence that she and Benjamin were married, the trial court abandoned
its duty to protect marriage as an inviolable institution.
It is well-settled that a grant of a motion for continuance or postponement is not a
matter of right but is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. [9] In this case,
Sally’s presentation of evidence was scheduled on 28 February 2008. Thereafter,
there were six resettings of the case: on 10 July 2008, 4 and 11 September 2008, 2
and 28 October 2008, and 28 November 2008. They were all made at Sally’s
instance. Before the scheduled hearing of 28 November 2008, the trial court
warned Sally that in case she still failed to present her evidence, the case would be
submitted for decision. On the date of the scheduled hearing, despite the presence
of other available witnesses, Sally insisted on presenting Benjamin who was not
even subpoenaed on that day. Sally’s counsel insisted that the trial court could not
dictate on the priority of witnesses to be presented, disregarding the trial court’s
prior warning due to the numerous resettings of the case. Sally could not complain
that she had been deprived of her right to present her evidence because all the
postponements were at her instance and she was warned by the trial court that it
would submit the case for decision should she still fail to present her evidence on
28 November 2008.

We agree with the trial court that by her continued refusal to present her evidence,
she  was deemed to have waived her right to present them. As pointed out by the
Court of Appeals, Sally’s continued failure to present her evidence despite the
opportunities given by the trial court showed her lack of interest to proceed with
the case. Further, it was clear that Sally was delaying the case because she was
waiting for the decision of the Court of Appeals on her petition questioning the trial
court’s denial of her demurrer to evidence, despite the fact that the Court of
Appeals did not issue any temporary restraining order as Sally prayed for. Sally
could not accuse the trial court of failing to protect marriage as an inviolable
institution because the trial court also has the duty to ensure that trial proceeds
despite the deliberate delay and refusal to proceed by one of the parties. [10]

Validity of the Marriage between Benjamin and Sally

Sally alleges that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals recognized her
marriage to Benjamin because a marriage could not be non-existent and, at the
same time, null and void ab initio. Sally further alleges that if she were allowed to
present her evidence, she would have proven her marriage to Benjamin. To prove
her marriage to Benjamin, Sally asked this Court to consider that in acquiring real
properties, Benjamin listed her as his wife by declaring he was “married to” her;
that Benjamin was the informant in their children’s birth certificates where he
stated that he was their father; and that Benjamin introduced her to his family and
friends as his wife. In contrast, Sally claims that there was no real property
registered in the names of Benjamin and Azucena. Sally further alleges that
Benjamin was not the informant in the birth certificates of his children with
Azucena.
First, Benjamin’s marriage to Azucena on 10 September 1973 was duly established
before the trial court, evidenced by a certified true copy of their marriage contract.
At the time Benjamin and Sally entered into a purported marriage on 7 March 1982,
the marriage between Benjamin and Azucena was valid and subsisting.

On the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally, Teresita Oliveros (Oliveros),

Registration Officer II of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig City, testified that there
was no valid marriage license issued to Benjamin and Sally. Oliveros confirmed that
only Marriage Licence Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the month of
February 1982. Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the series issued for
the month. Oliveros further testified that the local civil registrar of Pasig City did not
issue Marriage License No. N-07568 to Benjamin and Sally. The certification from
the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license
and absent any suspicious circumstance, the certification enjoys probative value,
being issued by the  officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data
relative to the issuance of a marriage license.[11] Clearly, if indeed Benjamin and
Sally entered into a marriage contract, the marriage was void from the beginning
for lack of a marriage license.[12]

It was also established before the trial court that the purported marriage between
Benjamin and Sally was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National
Statistics Office. The lack of record was certified by Julieta B. Javier, Registration
Officer IV of the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Pasig;
[13]
Teresita R. Ignacio, Chief of the Archives Division of the Records Management
and Archives Office, National Commission for Culture and the Arts; [14] and Lourdes
J. Hufana, Director III, Civil Registration Department of the National Statistics
Office.[15] The documentary and testimonial evidence proved that there was no
marriage between Benjamin and Sally. As pointed out by the trial court, the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally “was made only in jest” [16] and “a simulated
marriage, at the instance of [Sally], intended to cover her up from expected social
humiliation coming from relatives, friends and the society especially from her
parents seen as Chinese conservatives.” [17] In short, it was a fictitious marriage.

The fact that Benjamin was the informant in the birth certificates of Bernice and
Bentley was not a proof of the marriage between Benjamin and Sally. This Court
notes that Benjamin was the informant in Bernice’s birth certificate which stated
that Benjamin and Sally were married on 8 March 1982 [18] while Sally was the
informant in Bentley’s birth certificate which also stated that Benjamin and Sally
were married on 8 March 1982.[19] Benjamin and Sally were supposedly married on
7 March 1982 which did not match the dates reflected on the birth certificates.

We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null
and void ab initio and, at the same time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the
Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a license, except those covered by
Article 34 where no license is necessary, “shall be void from the beginning.” In this
case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a license.
It was duly established that no marriage license was issued to them and that
Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the marriage license numbers issued
by the local civil registrar of Pasig City for the month of February 1982. The case
clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 35[20] which made their marriage void ab
initio. The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. Applying
the general rules on void or inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil
Code, contracts which are absolutely simulated or fictitious are “inexistent and void
from the beginning.”[21] Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the trial
court’s ruling that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab
initio and non-existent.

Except for the modification in the distribution of properties, the Court of Appeals
affirmed in all aspects the trial court’s decision and ruled that “[t]he rest of the
decision stands.”[22] While the  Court of Appeals did not discuss bigamous
marriages, it can be gleaned from the dispositive portion of the decision declaring
that “[t]he rest of the decision stands” that the Court of Appeals adopted the trial
court’s discussion that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally is not bigamous.
The trial court stated:

On whether or not the parties’ marriage is bigamous under the concept of Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code, the marriage is not bigamous. It is required that the
first or former marriage shall not be null and void.  The marriage of the petitioner
to Azucena shall be assumed as the one that is valid, there being no evidence to
the contrary and there is no trace of invalidity or irregularity on the face of their
marriage contract. However, if the second marriage was void not because of the
existence of the first marriage but for other causes such as lack of license, the
crime of bigamy was not committed. In People v. De Lara [CA, 51 O.G., 4079], it
was held that what was committed was contracting marriage against the provisions
of laws not under Article 349 but Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code. Concluding,
the marriage of the parties is therefore not bigamous because there was no
marriage license. The daring and repeated stand of respondent that she is legally
married to petitioner cannot, in any instance, be sustained. Assuming that her
marriage to petitioner has the marriage license, yet the same would be bigamous,
civilly or criminally as it would be invalidated by a prior existing valid marriage of
petitioner and Azucena.[23]

For bigamy to exist,  the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential
requisites for validity except for the existence of a prior marriage. [24] In this case,
there was really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a
purported marriage contract without a marriage license. The supposed marriage
was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. In
short, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived together
and represented themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.
 Property Relations Between Benjamin and Sally

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and
Sally is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code which states:

Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the
properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to
their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their
contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule
and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-
ownership shall accrue to the absolute community of conjugal partnership existing
in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to
another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last
paragraph of the preceding Article.

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad
faith.

Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage.  Thus, only the
properties acquired by them through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions.  Thus, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
correctly excluded the 37 properties being claimed by Sally which were given by
Benjamin’s father to his children as  advance inheritance. Sally’s Answer to the
petition before the trial court even admitted that “Benjamin’s late father himself
conveyed a number of properties to his children and their respective spouses which
included Sally x x x.”[25]

As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the decision of the Court of
Appeals is more in accord with the evidence on record. Only the property covered
by TCT No. 61722 was registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses.
[26]
 The properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 were in the name of
Benjamin[27] with the descriptive title “married to Sally.” The property covered by
CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were registered in the name of Sally [28] with the
descriptive title “married to Benjamin” while the properties under TCT Nos. N-
193656 and 253681 were registered in the name of Sally as a single individual. We
have ruled that the words “married to” preceding the name of a spouse are merely
descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner.[29] Such words do not prove
co-ownership. Without proof of actual contribution from either or both spouses,
there can be no co-ownership under Article 148 of the Family Code. [30]

Inhibition of the Trial Judge

Sally questions the refusal of Judge Roy G. Gironella (Judge Gironella) to inhibit
himself from hearing the case. She cited the failure of Judge Gironella to
accommodate her in presenting her evidence. She further alleged that Judge
Gironella practically labeled her as an opportunist in his decision, showing his
partiality against her and in favor of Benjamin.

We have ruled that the issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of

conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge. [31] To justify the call for
inhibition, there must be extrinsic evidence to establish bias, bad faith, malice, or
corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error which may be inferred from the
decision or order itself.[32] In this case, we have sufficiently explained that Judge
Gironella did not err in submitting the case for decision because of Sally’s continued
refusal to present her evidence.

We reviewed the decision of the trial court and while Judge Gironella may have
used uncomplimentary words in writing the decision, they are not enough to prove
his prejudice against Sally or show that he acted in bad faith in deciding the case
that would justify the call for his voluntary inhibition.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 17 August 2011 Decision and the 14 March 2012

Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.

SO ORDERED.

Brion, Bersamin,*  Del Castillo, and  Perez, JJ., concur.

*
 Designated additional member per Raffle dated 8 October 2012.

[1]
 Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

[2]
 Rollo, pp. 29-40. Penned by Associate Justice (now Supreme Court Associate
Justice) Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe with Associate Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes (now
also a Supreme Court Associate Justice) and Samuel H. Gaerlan, concurring.

[3]
 Id. at 52. Penned by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan with Associate Justices
Amelita G. Tolentino and Ramon R. Garcia, concurring.

[4]
 Id. at 107-123. Penned by Presiding Judge Roy G. Gironella.

[5]
 Records, Vol. 2, p. 461.

[6]
 Id. at 122-123.
[7]
 Id. at 124-128.

[8]
 Id. at 40.

[9]
 See Bautista v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157219, 28 May 2004, 430 SCRA 353.

[10]
 Id.

[11]
 Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño, 403 Phil. 861 (2001).

[12]
 Article 35 of the Family Code states:

Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the
consent of parents or guardians;
(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages
unless such marriages were contracted with either or both parties believing in good
faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so;
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding
Chapter;
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 41;
(5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of
the other; and
(6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.

[13]
 Records, Vol. 2, p. 458.

[14]
 Id. at 459.

[15]
 Id. at 460.

[16]
 Rollo, p. 112.

[17]
 Id.

[18]
 Records, Vol. 1, p. 65.

[19]
 Id. at 66.

[20]
 Supra note 12.

[21]
 Article 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning:
xxxx

(2) Those which are absolutely simulated or fictitious;

xxxx

[22]
 Rollo, p. 40.

[23]
 Id. at 112-113.

[24]
 See  Nollora, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 191425, 7 September 2011, 657 SCRA 330.

[25]
 Records, Vol. 1, p. 50.

[26]
 Id. at 23.

[27]
 Id. at 24-26.

[28]
 Id. at 27-28.

[29]
 Acre v. Yuttikki, 560 Phil. 495 (2007).

[30]
 Id.

[31]
 Kilosbayan Foundation v. Janolo, Jr., G.R. No. 180543, 27 July 2010, 625 SCRA
684.

[32]
 Ramiscal, Jr. v. Hernandez, G.R. Nos. 173057-74, 27 September 2010, 631
SCRA 312.

Source: Supreme Court E-Library | Date created: June 20, 2016 

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786 Phil. 43

THIRD DIVISION
 [ G.R. No. 187462, June 01, 2016 ]
RAQUEL G. KHO, PETITIONER, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND VERONICA B. KHO, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.: 

Challenged in the present petition for review on certiorari are the Decision[1] and

Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA), Cebu City dated March 30, 2006 and
January 14, 2009, respectively, in CA-GR. CV No. 69218. The assailed CA Decision
reversed and set aside the Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Borongan,
Eastern Samar, Branch 2, in Civil Case No. 464, which ruled in petitioner's favor in
an action he filed for declaration of nullity of his marriage with private respondent,
while the CA Resolution denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

The present petition arose from a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage filed
by herein petitioner with the RTC of Oras, Eastern Samar. Pertinent portions of the
Petition allege as follows:

xxxx

3. Sometime in the afternoon of May 31, 1972, petitioner's parents summoned one
Eusebio Colongon, now deceased, then clerk in the office of the municipal treasurer,
instructing said clerk to arrange and prepare whatever necessary papers were
required for the intended marriage between petitioner and respondent supposedly
to take place at around midnight of June 1, 1972 so as to exclude the public from
witnessing the marriage ceremony;

4. Petitioner and Respondent thereafter exchanged marital vows in a marriage

ceremony which actually took place at around 3:00 o'clock before dawn of June 1,
1972, on account that there was a public dance held in the town plaza which is just
situated adjacent to the church whereas the venue of the wedding, and the dance
only finished at around 2:00 o'clock of same early morning of June 1, 1972;

5. Petitioner has never gone to the office of the Local Civil Registrar to apply for
marriage license and had not seen much less signed any papers or documents in
connection with the procurement of a marriage license;

6. Considering the shortness of period from the time the aforenamed clerk of the
treasurer's office was told to obtain the pertinent papers in the afternoon of May
31, 1972 so required for the purpose of the forthcoming marriage up to the
moment the actual marriage was celebrated before dawn of June 1, 1972, no
marriage license therefore could have been validly issued, thereby rendering the
marriage solemnized on even date null and void for want of the most essential
requisite;

7. For all intents and purposes, thus, Petitioner's and Respondent's marriage
aforestated was solemnized sans the required marriage license, hence, null and
void from the beginning and neither was it performed under circumstances
exempting the requirement of such marriage license;

xxxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable

Court that after due notice and hearing, judgment be rendered:

1. Declaring the contract of marriage between petitioner and respondent held on

June 1, 1972, at Arteche, Eastern Samar, null and void ab initioand of no legal
effect;

x x x x[4]

Among the pieces of evidence presented by petitioner is a Certification [5] issued by

the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar which attested to the fact
that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar has neither record nor copy of a marriage
license issued to petitioner and respondent with respect to their marriage
celebrated on June 1, 1972.

Respondent filed her Answer[6] praying that the petition be outrightly dismissed for
lack of cause of action because there is no evidence to prove petitioner's allegation
that their marriage was celebrated without the requisite marriage license and that,
on the contrary, both petitioner and respondent personally appeared before the
local civil registrar and secured a marriage license which they presented before
their marriage was solemnized.

Upon petitioner's request, the venue of the action was subsequently transferred to
the RTC of Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2, where the parties submitted their
respective pleadings as well as affidavits of witnesses.

On September 25, 2000, the RTC rendered its Decision granting the petition. The
dispositive portion of the said Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby declares the marriage
contracted between Raquel G. Kho and Veronica Borata on June 1, 1972 null and
void ab initio, pursuant to Article 80 of the Civil Code and Articles 4 and 5 of the
Family Code. The foregoing is without prejudice to the application of Articles 50 and
51 of the Family Code.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche,
Eastern Samar for proper registration of this decree of nullity of marriage.

SO ORDERED.[7]

The RTC found that petitioner's evidence sufficiently established the absence of the
requisite marriage license when the marriage between petitioner and respondent
was celebrated. As such, the RTC ruled that based on Articles 53(4), 58 and 80(3)
of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the absence of the said marriage license
rendered the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio.

Respondent then filed an appeal with the CA in Cebu City. On March 30, 2006, the
CA promulgated its assailed Decision, disposing thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated 25 September 2000 of

Branch 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Borongan, Eastern Samar,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage between the petitioner-appellee
Raquel Kho and Veronica Kho is declared valid and subsisting for all intents and
purposes.

SO ORDERED.[8]

The CA held that since a marriage was, in fact, solemnized between the contending
parties, there is a presumption that a marriage license was issued for that purpose
and that petitioner failed to overcome such presumption. The CA also ruled that the
absence of any indication in the marriage certificate that a marriage license was
issued is a mere defect in the formal requisites of the law which does not invalidate
the parties' marriage.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[9] but the CA denied it in its Resolution

dated January 14, 2009.

Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues, to wit:

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ASCRIBING

A SO-CALLED "ETHICAL DIMENSION" TO PETITIONER'S CAUSE, ALLUDING TO AN
ALLEGED LIAISON WITH ANOTHER WOMAN AS A FACTOR IN REVERSING THE
JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT WHICH VOIDED HIS MARRIAGE IN QUESTION
WITH RESPONDENT;

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

APPRECIATING AGAINST PETITIONER THE FACT THAT DESPITE THE LAPSE OF 25
YEARS HE DID NOTHING TO ATTACK, EVEN COLLATERALLY, HIS APPARENTLY VOID
MARRIAGE WITH RESPONDENT;

3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

ALTOGETHER DISREGARDING PETITIONER'S OBVIOUSLY OVERWHELMING
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCES OF LACK OF MARRIAGE LICENSE AND GIVING WEIGHT
INSTEAD TO UNSUPPORTED PRESUMPTIONS IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT, IN ITS
ASSAILED DECISION; and

4 WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SETTING

ASIDE OR REVERSING THE LOWER COURT'S JUDGMENT DECLARING THE
MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT A NULLITY FOR ABSENCE OF
THE REQUISITE MARRIAGE LICENSE.[10]

Petitioner's basic contention in the present petition centers on the alleged failure of
the CA to give due credence to petitioner's evidence which established the absence
or lack of marriage license at the time that petitioner and respondent's marriage
was solemnized. Petitioner argues that the CA erred in deciding the case not on the
basis of law and evidence but rather on the ground of what the appellate court calls
as ethical considerations as well as on the perceived motive of petitioner in seeking
the declaration of nullity of his marriage with respondent.

The Court finds for the petitioner.

At the outset, the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), raises a
procedural question by arguing that the issues presented by petitioner in the
present petition are factual in nature and it is not proper for this Court to delve into
these issues in a petition for review on certiorari.

The Court does not agree.

The issues in the instant petition involve a determination and application of existing
law and prevailing jurisprudence. However, intertwined with these issues is the
question of the existence of the subject marriage license, which is a question of fact
and one which is not appropriate for a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. This rule, nonetheless, is not without exceptions, viz.:

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and
conjectures;

(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;

(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;

(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;

(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of
the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;

(7) When the findings arc contrary to those of the trial court;

(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based;

(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and

(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. [11]

In the present case, the findings of the RTC and the CA, on whether or not there
was indeed a marriage license obtained by petitioner and respondent, are
conflicting. Hence, it is but proper for this Court to review these findings.

The marriage of petitioner and respondent was celebrated on June 1, 1972, prior to
the effectivity of the Family Code.[12] Hence, the Civil Code governs their union.
Accordingly, Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of
marriage as a contract, to wit:

ART 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are
complied with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character. [13]

Article 58 of the Civil Code makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized
without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality
where either contracting party habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional
character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under Article 75. [14] Under the
Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title 111,
comprising Articles 72 to 79. These marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo
mortis or at the point of death during peace or war; (2) marriages in remote
places; (3) consular marriages; (4) ratification of marital cohabitation; (5) religious
ratification of a civil marriage; (6) Mohammedan or pagan marriages; and (7)
mixed marriages. Petitioner's and respondent's marriage does not fall under any of
these exceptions.

Article 80(3) of the Civil Code also makes it clear that a marriage performed
without the corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more than
the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of
the marriage contract.[15] The rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage
license under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the
contracting parties, after the proper government official has inquired into their
capacity to contract marriage.[16] Stated differently, the requirement and issuance
of a marriage license is the State's demonstration of its involvement and
participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is
interested.[17]

In the instant case, respondent claims that she and petitioner were able to secure a
marriage license which they presented to the solemnizing officer before the
marriage was performed.

The OSG, on its part, contends that the presumption is always in favor of the
validity of marriage and that any doubt should be resolved to sustain such validity.
Indeed, this Court is mindful of this principle as well as of the Constitutional policy
which protects and strengthens the family as the basic autonomous social
institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.

On the other hand, petitioner insists that the Certification issued by the Civil
Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar, coupled with the testimony of the former Civil
Registrar, is sufficient evidence to prove the absence of the subject marriage
license.

The Court agrees with petitioner and finds no doubt to be resolved as the evidence
is clearly in his favor.

Apropos is the case of Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño.[18] There, it was held that the
certification of the Local Civil Registrar, that their office had no record of a marriage
license, was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license. [19] It was further
held that the presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had been overcome,
and that it became the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to prove that
the marriage was valid, and that the required marriage license had been secured. [20]

As stated above, petitioner was able to present a Certification issued by the

Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar attesting that the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar "has no record nor copy of any marriage license ever issued in
favor of Raquel G. Kho [petitioner] and Veronica M. Borata [respondent] whose
marriage was celebrated on June 1, 1972."[21] Thus, on the basis of such
Certification, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and respondent
has been overcome and it becomes the burden of respondent to prove that their
marriage is valid as it is she who alleges such validity. As found by the RTC,
respondent was not able to discharge that burden.

It is telling that respondent failed to present their alleged marriage license or a

copy thereof to the court. In addition, the Certificate of Marriage [22] issued by the
officiating priest does not contain any entry regarding the said marriage license.
Respondent could have obtained a copy of their marriage contract from the National
Archives and Records Section, where information regarding the marriage
license, i.e., date of issuance and license number, could be obtained. However, she
also failed to do so. The Court also notes, with approval, the RTC's agreement with
petitioner's observation that the statements of the witnesses for respondent, as well
as respondent herself, all attest to the fact that a marriage ceremony was
conducted but neither one of them testified that a marriage license was issued in
favor of petitioner and respondent. Indeed, despite respondent's categorical claim
that she and petitioner were able to obtain a marriage license, she failed to present
evidence to prove such allegation. It is a settled rule that one who alleges a fact
has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence. [23]

Based on the Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern
Samar, coupled with respondent's failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage
license or of any evidence to show that such license was ever issued, the only
conclusion that can be reached is that no valid marriage license was, in fact, issued.
Contrary to the ruling of the CA, it cannot be said that there was a simple defect,
not a total absence, in the requirements of the law which would not affect the
validity of the marriage. The fact remains that respondent failed to prove that the
subject marriage license was issued and the law is clear that a marriage which is
performed without the corresponding marriage license is null and void.

As to the sufficiency of petitioner's evidence, the OSG further argues that, on the
basis of this Court's ruling in Sevilla v. Cardenas,[24] the certification issued by the
local civil registrar, which attests to the absence in its records of a marriage license,
must categorically state that the document does not exist in the said office despite
diligent search.

However, in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[25] this Court considered

the certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar as a certification of due search
and inability to find the record or entry sought by the parties despite the absence of
a categorical statement that "such document does not exist in their records despite
diligent search." The Court, citing Section 28,[26] Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,
held that the certification of due search and inability to find a record or entry as to
the purported marriage license, issued by the civil registrar, enjoys probative value,
he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to
the issuance of a marriage license. Based on said certification, the Court held that
there is absence of a marriage license that would render the marriage void ab initio.
Moreover, as discussed in the abovestated case of Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño,
[27]
this Court considered the marriage of the petitioner and her deceased husband
as void ab initio as the records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and
the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the local civil
registrar, their office has no record of such marriage license. The court held that
the certification issued by the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-
issuance of the marriage license. Their marriage having been solemnized without
the necessary marriage license and not being one of the marriages exempt from
the marriage license requirement, the marriage of the petitioner and the deceased
is undoubtedly void ab initio. This ruling was reiterated in the more recent case
of Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan, Jr.[28]

Furthermore, in the fairly recent case of Abbas v. Abbas,[29] this Court echoed the
ruling in Republic v. CA[30] that, in sustaining the finding of the lower court that a
marriage license was lacking, this Court relied on the Certification issued by the
local civil registrar, which stated that the alleged marriage license could not be
located as the same did not appear in their records. Contrary to petitioner's
asseveration, nowhere in the Certification was it categorically stated that the officer
involved conducted a diligent search. In this respect, this Court held that Section
28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court does not require a categorical statement to this
effect. Moreover, in the said case, this Court ruled that:

Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that
an official duty has been regularly performed, absent contradiction or other
evidence to the contrary. We held, "The presumption of regularity of official acts
may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a
duty." No such affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar
was lax in performing her duty of checking the records of their office, thus the
presumption must stand. x x x[31]

In all the abovementioned cases, there was clear and unequivocal finding of the
absence of the subject marriage license which rendered the marriage void.

From these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void on the ground of
absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage
license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported
by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was
issued to the parties.[32]

Indeed, all the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was
conducted and a marriage contract was signed does not operate to cure the
absence of a valid marriage license.[33] As cited above, Article 80(3) of the Civil
Code clearly provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the
beginning, except marriages of exceptional character under Articles 72 to 79 of the
same Code. As earlier stated, petitioner's and respondent's marriage cannot be
characterized as among the exceptions.

As to the motive of petitioner in seeking to annul his marriage to respondent, it

may well be that his motives are less than pure - that he seeks a way out of his
marriage to legitimize his alleged illicit affair with another woman. Be that as it
may, the same does not make up for the failure of the respondent to prove that
they had a valid marriage license, given the weight of evidence presented by
petitioner. The law must be applied. As the marriage license, an essential requisite
under the Civil Code, is clearly absent, the marriage of petitioner and respondent is
void ab initio.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals, Cebu City, dated March 30, 2006 and January 14, 2009,
respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 69218, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2, dated
September 25, 2000, in Civil Case No. 464 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Perez, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Brion,* J., on leave.

June 15, 2016

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs / Mesdames:

Please take notice that on June 1, 2016 a Decision, copy attached hereto, was
rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which
was received by this Office on June 15, 2016 at 10:55 a.m.

Very truly yours,

(SGD)WILFREDO V. LAPITAN
Division Clerk of Court

*
 Designated Additional Member in lieu of Associate Francis II. Jardeleza, per Raffle
dated May 23, 2016.
[1]
 Penned by Associate Justice Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., with the concurrence of
Associate Justices Arsenio J. Magapale and Vicente L. Yap, concurring; Annex "A" to
Petition, rollo, pp. 28-40.

[2]
 Penned by Associate Justice Francisco P. Acosta, with Associate Justices Amy C.
Lazaro-Javier and Rodil V. Zalameda, concurring; Annex "B" to Petition, id. at 41-
43.

[3]
 Annex "C" to Petition, id. at 44-59.

[4]
 Rollo, pp. 60-61.

[5]
 See RTC Decision, id. at 56. 

[6]
 Rollo, p. 64. 

[7]
 Id. at 59.

[8]
 Id. at 39.

[9]
 Id. at 72.

[10]
 Id. at 15.

[11]
 Geronimo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105540, July 5, 1993, 224 SCRA 494,
498-499. (Emphasis supplied)

[12]
 The Family Code of the Philippines took effect on August 3, 1988.

[13]
 Emphasis supplied.

[14]
 Art. 75. Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be solemnized by
consuls and vice-consuls of the Republic of the Philippines. The duties of the local
civil registrar and of a judge or justice of the peace or mayor with regard to the
celebration of marriage shall be performed by such consuls and vice-consuls.

[15]
 Republic of the Phils. v. Dayot, 573 Phil. 553, 568-569 (2008).

[16]
 Id. at 569.

[17]
 Alcantara v. Alcantara, 558 Phil. 192, 202 (2007).

[18]
 403 Phil. 861 (2001).
[19]
 Id. at 869.

[20]
 Id. at 870.

[21]
 See RTC Decision, rollo, p. 56.

[22]
 Rollo, p. 133.

[23]
 Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals, 543 Phil. 568, 575 (2007).

[24]
 529 Phil. 419, 429 (2006).

[25]
 G.R. No. 103047, September 2, 1994, 236 SCRA 257, 262.

[26]
 Sec. 28. Proof of lack of record. - A written statement signed by an officer
having the custody of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent search,
no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office,
accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the
records of his office contain no such record or entry.

[27]
 Supra note 18.

[28]
 G.R. No. 201061, July 3, 2013.

[29]
 702 Phil. 578, 590-592 (2013).

[30]
 Supra note 25.

[31]
 Abbas v. Abbas, supra note 29, at 592.

[32]
 Alcantara v. Alcantara, supra note 17, at 203-204. 

[33]
 Abbas v. Abbas, supra note 29, at 594.

Source: Supreme Court E-Library | Date created: July 09, 2018 

This page was dynamically generated by the E-Library Content Management System
Supreme Court E-Library
573 Phil. 553

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 175581, March 28, 2008 ]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,Petitioner,vs. JOSE A.
DAYOT, Respondent. 

[G.R. No. 179474]

FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, Petitioner,vs. JOSE A. DAYOT,

Respondent. 

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: 

Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and G.R. No. 179474 are
Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the Republic of the
Philippines and Felisa Tecson-Dayot (Felisa), respectively, both challenging the
Amended Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006, in CA-G.R.
CV No. 68759, which declared the marriage between Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa
void ab initio.

The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were married at
the Pasay City Hall. The marriage was solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza. [2] In
lieu of a marriage license, Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit, [3] also dated
24 November 1986, attesting that both of them had attained the age of maturity,
and that being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years.

On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint [4] for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Biñan, Laguna, Branch 25. He
contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was
celebrated between the parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating
that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least five years; and that his
consent to the marriage was secured through fraud.

In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his filing of the
same. According to Jose, he was introduced to Felisa in 1986. Immediately
thereafter, he came to live as a boarder in Felisa's house, the latter being his
landlady. Some three weeks later, Felisa requested him to accompany her to the
Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a package sent to her by her brother
from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City Hall, upon a pre-arranged signal from Felisa, a
man bearing three folded pieces of paper approached them. They were told that
Jose needed to sign the papers so that the package could be released to Felisa. He
initially refused to do so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him that his refusal
could get both of them killed by her brother who had learned about their
relationship. Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of paper, and gave them to the man
who immediately left. It was in February 1987 when he discovered that he had
contracted marriage with Felisa. He alleged that he saw a piece of paper lying on
top of the table at the sala of Felisa's house. When he perused the same, he
discovered that it was a copy of his marriage contract with Felisa. When he
confronted Felisa, the latter feigned ignorance.

In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Jose's allegations and defended the
validity of their marriage. She declared that they had maintained their relationship
as man and wife absent the legality of marriage in the early part of 1980, but that
she had deferred contracting marriage with him on account of their age difference.
[5]
 In her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded that while her marriage to Jose was
subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on
31 August 1990. On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose.
Subsequently, she filed an administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of
the Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were both employees of the National
Statistics and Coordinating Board.[6] The Ombudsman found Jose administratively
liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct, and meted out to him the penalty of
suspension from service for one year without emolument. [7]

On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision [8] dismissing the Complaint. It

disposed:
WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the evidence presented by
both parties, this Court finds and so holds that the [C]omplaint does not deserve a
favorable consideration. Accordingly, the above-entitled case is hereby ordered
DISMISSED with costs against [Jose].[9]
The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage
celebrated between Jose and Felisa on 24 November 1986 was valid. It dismissed
Jose's version of the story as implausible, and rationalized that:
Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any attempt to make
him or her sign a blank sheet of paper. [Jose] could have already detected that
something was amiss, unusual, as they were at Pasay City Hall to get a package for
[Felisa] but it [was] he who was made to sign the pieces of paper for the release of
the said package. Another indirect suggestion that could have put him on guard
was the fact that, by his own admission, [Felisa] told him that her brother would kill
them if he will not sign the papers. And yet it took him, more or less, three months
to "discover" that the pieces of paper that he signed was [sic] purportedly the
marriage contract. [Jose] does not seem to be that ignorant, as perceived by this
Court, to be "taken in for a ride" by [Felisa.]

[Jose's] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied by the fact that he
acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his wife when he wrote [Felisa's] name in the duly
notarized statement of assets and liabilities he filled up on May 12, 1988, one year
after he discovered the marriage contract he is now claiming to be sham and false.
[Jose], again, in his company I.D., wrote the name of [Felisa] as the person to be
contacted in case of emergency. This Court does not believe that the only reason
why her name was written in his company I.D. was because he was residing there
then. This is just but a lame excuse because if he really considers her not his
lawfully wedded wife, he would have written instead the name of his sister.

When [Jose's] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath, she testified that
she signed her name voluntarily as a witness to the marriage in the marriage
certificate (T.S.N., page 25, November 29, 1996) and she further testified that the
signature appearing over the name of Jose Dayot was the signature of his [sic]
brother that he voluntarily affixed in the marriage contract (page 26 of T.S.N. taken
on November 29, 1996), and when she was asked by the Honorable Court if indeed
she believed that Felisa Tecson was really chosen by her brother she answered yes.
The testimony of his sister all the more belied his claim that his consent was
procured through fraud.[10]
Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Jose's action had prescribed.
It cited Article 87[11] of the New Civil Code which requires that the action for
annulment of marriage must be commenced by the injured party within four years
after the discovery of the fraud. Thus:
That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent was obtained by
[Felisa] through fraud, trickery and machinations, he could have filed an annulment
or declaration of nullity of marriage at the earliest possible opportunity, the time
when he discovered the alleged sham and false marriage contract. [Jose] did not
take any action to void the marriage at the earliest instance. x x x. [12]
Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of
Appeals. In a Decision dated 11 August 2005, the Court of Appeals found the
appeal to be without merit. The dispositive portion of the appellate court's Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.[13]
The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage between Jose and Felisa
as it was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The appellate court
observed that the circumstances constituting fraud as a ground for annulment of
marriage under Article 86[14] of the Civil Code did not exist in the marriage between
the parties. Further, it ruled that the action for annulment of marriage on the
ground of fraud was filed beyond the prescriptive period provided by law. The Court
of Appeals struck down Jose's appeal in the following manner:
Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was employed on Jose in
giving his consent to the marriage, the action for the annulment thereof had
already prescribed. Article 87 (4) and (5) of the Civil Code provides that the action
for annulment of marriage on the ground that the consent of a party was obtained
by fraud, force or intimidation must be commenced by said party within four (4)
years after the discovery of the fraud and within four (4) years from the time the
force or intimidation ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was allegedly discovered by
Jose in February, 1987 then he had only until February, 1991 within which to file an
action for annulment of marriage. However, it was only on July 7, 1993 that Jose
filed the complaint for annulment of his marriage to Felisa. [15]
Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Jose's assertion that his marriage to
Felisa was void ab initio  for lack of a marriage license. It ruled that the marriage
was solemnized under Article 76[16] of the Civil Code as one of exceptional
character, with the parties executing an affidavit of marriage between man and
woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. The
Court of Appeals concluded that the falsity in the affidavit to the effect that Jose
and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife for the period required by Article
76 did not affect the validity of the marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer
was misled by the statements contained therein. In this manner, the Court of
Appeals gave credence to the good-faith reliance of the solemnizing officer over the
falsity of the affidavit. The appellate court further noted that on the dorsal side of
said affidavit of marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the solemnizing officer, stated
that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting
parties and found no legal impediment to their marriage. Finally, the Court of
Appeals dismissed Jose's argument that neither he nor Felisa was a member of the
sect to which Rev. Tomas V. Atienza belonged. According to the Court of Appeals,
Article 56[17] of the Civil Code did not require that either one of the contracting
parties to the marriage must belong to the solemnizing officer's church or religious
sect. The prescription was established only in Article 7[18] of the Family Code which
does not govern the parties' marriage.

Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for
Reconsideration thereof. His central opposition was that the requisites for the
proper application of the exemption from a marriage license under Article 76 of the
Civil Code were not fully attendant in the case at bar. In particular, Jose cited the
legal condition that the man and the woman must have been living together as
husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage. Essentially, he
maintained that the affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was
false.

The Court of Appeals granted Jose's Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself.
Accordingly, it rendered an Amended Decision, dated 7 November 2006, the fallo of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is RECALLED and SET ASIDE and
another one entered declaring the marriage between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C.
Tecson void ab initio.

Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City.
[19]

In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling of this Court
in Niñal v. Bayadog,[20]  and reasoned that:
In Niñal v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a marriage solemnized
without a marriage license on the basis of their affidavit that they had attained the
age of majority, that being unmarried, they had lived together for at least five (5)
years and that they desired to marry each other, the Supreme Court ruled as
follows:

"x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is

counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal
union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be
the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of
cohabitation characterized by exclusivity - meaning no third party was involved at
any time within the 5 years and continuity - that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that
continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether
the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then
the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common
law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived
faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected
as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a
man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the
approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded
any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same
missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There
should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances
clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is
required in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be united in
matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to
the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.

Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage solemnized without a
marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character, shall be void from the
beginning. Inasmuch as the marriage between Jose and Felisa is not covered by the
exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is, therefore, void ab
initio because of the absence of a marriage license.[21]
Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no avail. The
appellate court rendered a Resolution[22] dated 10 May 2007, denying Felisa's
motion.

Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), filed a Petition for Review before this Court in G.R. No. 175581,
praying that the Court of Appeals' Amended Decision dated 7 November 2006 be
reversed and set aside for lack of merit, and that the marriage between Jose and
Felisa be declared valid and subsisting. Felisa filed a separate Petition for Review,
docketed as G.R. No. 179474, similarly assailing the appellate court's Amended
Decision. On 1 August 2007, this Court resolved to consolidate the two Petitions in
the interest of uniformity of the Court rulings in similar cases brought before it for
resolution.[23]

The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following arguments for the
allowance of its Petition, to wit:
I

RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION OF THE VALIDITY OF

HIS MARRIAGE TO FELISA.

II
RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS AND SHOULD
NOT BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM HIS OWN FRAUDULENT CONDUCT.

III

RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF HIS MARRIAGE

FOR LACK OF MARRIAGE LICEN[S]E.[24]
Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals misapplied Niñal.
[25]
 She differentiates the case at bar from Niñal by reasoning that one of the
parties therein had an existing prior marriage, a circumstance which does not
obtain in her cohabitation with Jose. Finally, Felisa adduces that Jose only sought
the annulment of their marriage after a criminal case for bigamy and an
administrative case had been filed against him in order to avoid liability. Felisa
surmises that the declaration of nullity of their marriage would exonerate Jose from
any liability.

For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and Felisa. To reach
a considered ruling on the issue, we shall jointly tackle the related arguments
vented by petitioners Republic of the Philippines and Felisa.

The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances give rise to the
presumption that a valid marriage exists between Jose and Felisa. For her part,
Felisa echoes the claim that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of
the marriage by citing this Court's ruling in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals.[26] To
buttress its assertion, the Republic points to the affidavit executed by Jose and
Felisa, dated 24 November 1986, attesting that they have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years, which they used in lieu of a marriage
license. It is the Republic's position that the falsity of the statements in the affidavit
does not affect the validity of the marriage, as the essential and formal requisites
were complied with; and the solemnizing officer was not required to investigate as
to whether the said affidavit was legally obtained. The Republic opines that as a
marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was
wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by the fact that the
parties incorporated a fabricated statement in their affidavit that they cohabited as
husband and wife for at least five years. In addition, the Republic posits that the
parties' marriage contract states that their marriage was solemnized under Article
76 of the Civil Code. It also bears the signature of the parties and their witnesses,
and must be considered a primary evidence of marriage. To further fortify its
Petition, the Republic adduces the following documents: (1) Jose's notarized
Statement of Assets and Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988 wherein he wrote Felisa's
name as his wife; (2) Certification dated 25 July 1993 issued by the Barangay
Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District 24 of Pasay City, attesting that Jose and Felisa had
lived together as husband and wife in said barangay; and (3) Jose's company ID
card, dated 2 May 1988, indicating Felisa's name as his wife.

The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue of the effect of
a false affidavit under Article 76 of the Civil Code. A survey of the prevailing rules is
in order.

It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on 24
November 1986, prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil
Code governs their union. Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential
requisites of marriage as a contract:
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied
with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional

character. (Emphasis ours.)
Article 58[27] makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license
first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either
contracting party habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional character
authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under Article 75. [28] Article 80(3)[29] of
the Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage performed without the corresponding
marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate consequence
flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the marriage contract. [30]This
is in stark contrast to the old Marriage Law,[31] whereby the absence of a marriage
license did not make the marriage void. The rationale for the compulsory character
of a marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the
State to the contracting parties, after the proper government official has inquired
into their capacity to contract marriage.[32]

Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2,
Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages
in articulo mortis  or at the point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in
remote places, (2) consular marriages,[33] (3) ratification of marital cohabitation, (4)
religious ratification of a civil marriage, (5) Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and
(6) mixed marriages.[34]

The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under Article 76 of

the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who
have attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other. The
contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who
solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to
ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he
found no legal impediment to the marriage.
The reason for the law,[35] as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the
publicity attending a marriage license may discourage such persons who have lived
in a state of cohabitation from legalizing their status. [36]

It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed
without a marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit declaring that
"they have attained the age of maturity; that being unmarried, they have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years; and that because of this union,
they desire to marry each other."[37] One of the central issues in the Petition at bar
is thus: whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties
have in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders
the marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.

We answer in the affirmative.

Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the
indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of
statutory construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly [38] but
reasonably construed.[39] They extend only so far as their language fairly warrants,
and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the
exception.[40] Where a general rule is established by statute with exceptions, the
court will not curtail the former or add to the latter by implication. [41] For the
exception in Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and the
woman must have attained the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they
have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.

A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other expediency

but to read the law as it is plainly written. The exception of a marriage license
under Article 76 applies only to those who have lived together as husband and wife
for at least five years and desire to marry each other. The Civil Code, in no
ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of five years of
cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since the language of Article
76 is precise. The minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an
indispensability carved in the language of the law. For a marriage celebrated under
Article 76 to be valid, this material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in
the law not as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a mandatory
character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the
contracting parties shall state the requisite facts[42] in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who
solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to
ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he
found no legal impediment to the marriage.

It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five
years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The
Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or
barely five months before the celebration of their marriage.[43] The Court of Appeals
also noted Felisa's testimony that Jose was introduced to her by her neighbor,
Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA Revolution.
[44]
 The appellate court also cited Felisa's own testimony that it was only in June
1986 when Jose commenced to live in her house. [45]

Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the

minimum five-year requisite is factual in nature. A question of fact arises when
there is a need to decide on the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts. [46] Under
Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not subject to this Court's review. [47] It is
already well-settled that:
The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding on
this Court. A recognized exception to this rule is when the Court of Appeals and the
trial court, or in this case the administrative body, make contradictory findings.
However, the exception does not apply in every instance that the Court of Appeals
and the trial court or administrative body disagree. The factual findings of the Court
of Appeals remain conclusive on this Court if such findings are supported by the
record or based on substantial evidence.[48]
Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by Jose
and Felisa to exempt them from the requirement of a marriage license, is beyond
question.

We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in
the parties' affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage, since all the essential
and formal requisites were complied with. The argument deserves scant merit.
Patently, it cannot be denied that the marriage between Jose and Felisa was
celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage license. Neither did Jose and
Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from the
requirement of a marriage license.

Anent petitioners' reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court holds that
the same finds no applicability to the case at bar. Essentially, when we speak of a
presumption of marriage, it is with reference to the prima facie presumption that a
man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage.[49] Restated more explicitly, persons dwelling together
in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption
or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married.[50] The present case does not
involve an apparent marriage to which the presumption still needs to be applied.
There is no question that Jose and Felisa actually entered into a contract of
marriage on 24 November 1986, hence, compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for
Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, which spawned the instant
consolidated Petitions.

In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code[51] that every intendment of law
or fact leans towards the validity of marriage will not salvage the parties' marriage,
and extricate them from the effect of a violation of the law. The marriage of Jose
and Felisa was entered into without the requisite marriage license or compliance
with the stringent requirements of a marriage under exceptional circumstance. The
solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and
would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent
and unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by
making a prior license a prerequisite for a valid marriage.[52] The protection of
marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine
union but the exposure of an invalid one as well.[53] To permit a false affidavit to
take the place of a marriage license is to allow an abject circumvention of the law.
If this Court is to protect the fabric of the institution of marriage, we must be wary
of deceptive schemes that violate the legal measures set forth in our laws.

Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a

marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was
wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated
statement that the parties have cohabited for at least five years as required by law.
The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to an irregularity of the
marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here, there is no marriage license
at all. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the
period of Jose and Felisa's cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage
as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere
irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be
deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. If the essential matter in the
sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and
effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.

In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that based
on equity, Jose should be denied relief because he perpetrated the fabrication, and
cannot thereby profit from his wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It must
be stated that equity finds no room for application where there is a law. [54] There is
a law on the ratification of marital cohabitation, which is set in precise terms under
Article 76 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the authorities are consistent that the
declaration of nullity of the parties' marriage is without prejudice to their criminal
liability.[55]

The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is deemed
estopped from assailing the legality of his marriage for lack of a marriage license. It
is claimed that Jose and Felisa had lived together from 1986 to 1990,
notwithstanding Jose's subsequent marriage to Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990,
and that it took Jose seven years before he sought the declaration of nullity; hence,
estoppel had set in.

This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. [56] Jose and

Felisa's marriage was celebrated sans a marriage license. No other conclusion can
be reached except that it is void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a void
marriage does not prescribe, and may be raised any time.

Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year
common-law cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period
computed back from the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of
legal union had it not been for the absence of a marriage. [57] It covers the years
immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by exclusivity -
meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years - and
continuity that is unbroken.[58]

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of the Court of

Appeals, dated 7 November 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the marriage
of Jose Dayot to Felisa Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, is AFFIRMED, without
prejudice to their criminal liability, if any. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Austria-Martinez, (Acting Chairperson), Tinga *, Velasco, Jr.,**  and Reyes, JJ.,

concur.

*
Per Special Order No. 497, dated 14 March 2008, signed by Chief Justice Reynato
S. Puno designating Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga to replace Associate Justice
Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, who is on official leave under the Court's Wellness
Program and assigning Associate Justice Alicia Austria-Martinez as Acting
Chairperson.

**
 Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. was designated to sit as additional member
replacing Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura per Raffle dated 12 September 2007.

[1]
 Penned by Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon with Associate Justices Mario L.
Guariña III and Santiago Javier Ranada, concurring; rollo (G.R. No. 175581), pp.
65-70; rollo, (G.R. No. 179474), pp. 156-161.

[2]
 Records, p. 170.

[3]
 Id.
[4]
 Id. at 1-8.

[5]
 The marriage contract shows that at the time of the celebration of the parties'
marriage, Jose was 27 years old, while Felisa was 37.

[6]
 The Administrative complaint before the Administrative Adjudication Bureau of
the Office of the Ombudsman was docketed as OMB-ADM-0-93-0466; Records, pp.
252-258.

[7]
 Id. at 257.

[8]
 Id. at 313-323.

[9]
 Id. at 323.
[10]
 Id. at 321-322.

[11]
 ART. 87. - The action for annulment of marriage must be commenced by the
parties and within the periods as follows:

(1) For causes mentioned in Number 1 of Article 85, by the party whose parent or
guardian did not give his or her consent, within four years after attaining the age of
twenty or eighteen years, as the case may be; or by the parent or guardian or
person having legal charge, at any time before such party has arrived at the age of
twenty or eighteen years;

(2) For causes mentioned in Number 2 of Article 85, by the spouse who has been
absent, during his or her lifetime; or by either spouse of the subsequent marriage
during the lifetime of the other;

(3) For causes mentioned in Number 3 of Article 85, by the sane spouse, who had
no knowledge of the other's insanity; or by any relative or guardian of the party of
unsound mind, at any time before the death of either party;

(4) For causes mentioned in Number 4, by the injured party, within four years after
the discovery of the fraud;

(5) For causes mentioned in Number 5, by the injured party, within four years from
the time the force or intimidation ceased;

(6) For causes mentioned in Number 6, by the injured party, within eight years
after the marriage.

[12]
 Records, p. 322.

[13]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 125.

[14]
 ART. 86. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in
number 4 of the preceding article:

(1) Misrepresentation as to the identity of one of the contracting parties;

(2) Nondisclosure of the previous conviction of the other party of a crime involving
moral turpitude, and the penalty imposed was imprisonment for two years or more;

(3) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was
pregnant by a man other than her husband;

No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune or chastity shall

constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage.

[15]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 122.
[16]
 ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who
have attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other. The
contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who
solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to
ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he
found no legal impediment to the marriage.

[17]
 ART. 56. Marriage may be solemnized by:

(1) The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court;

(2) The Presiding Justice and the Justices of the Court of Appeals;

(3) Judges of the Courts of First Instance;

(4) Mayors of cities and municipalities;

(5) Municipal judges and justices of the peace;

(6) Priests, rabbis, ministers of the gospel of any denomination, church, religion or
sect, duly registered, as provided in Article 92; and

(7) Ship captains, airplane chiefs, military commanders, and consuls and vice-
consuls in special cases provided in Articles 74 and 75.

[18]
 ART. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:

(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;

(2) Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or religious sect duly
authorized by his church or religious sect and registered with the civil registrar
general, acting within the limits of the written authority granted him by his church
or religious sect and provided that at least one of the contracting parties belongs to
the solemnizing officer's church or religious sect;

(3) Any ship captain or airplane chief only in the cases mentioned in Article 31; 

(4) Any military commander of a unit to which a chaplain is assigned, in the

absence of the latter, during a military operation, likewise only in the cases
mentioned in Article 32; or

(5) Any consul-general, consul or vice-consul in the case provided in Article 10.

[19]
 CA rollo, p. 279.

[20]
 384 Phil. 661 (2000).
[21]
 CA rollo, pp. 278-279.

[22]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), pp. 173-174.

[23]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 180.

[24]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 175581), pp. 44-45.

[25]
 Erroneously cited as Niño v. Bayadog; rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 18.

[26]
 377 Phil. 919 (1999).

[27]
 ART. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of
this Title, but not those under Article 75, no marriage shall be solemnized without a
license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either
contracting party habitually resides.

[28]
 ART. 75. Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be solemnized by
consuls and vice-consuls of the Republic of the Philippines. The duties of the local
civil registrar and of a judge or justice of the peace or mayor with regard to the
celebration of marriage shall be performed by such consuls and vice-consuls.

[29]
 ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxxx

(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional

character.

[30]
 People v. De Lara,  No. 12583-R, 14 February 1955, 51 O.G. 4079, 4082.

[31]
 The Marriage Law, otherwise known as Act No. 3613, requires the following
essential requisites: (1) legal capacity of the contracting parties; and (2) their
mutual consent.

[32]
 Report of the Code Commission, pp. 79-80; see also Ambrosio Padilla, Civil
Code Annotated,  1956 Edition, Vol. I, p. 195.

[33]
 Must be read with Article 58 of the Civil Code which provides:

ART. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of this

Title, but not those under Article 75, no marriage shall be solemnized without a
license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either
contracting party habitually resides.

[34]
 Edgardo L. Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines  Annotated (1984 Eleventh Ed.),
pp. 302-310.
[35]
 In Niñal v. Bayadog (supra note 20 at 668-669),  this Court articulated the spirit
behind Article 76 of the Civil Code, thus:

"However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a
marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76,
referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken
period of at least five years before the marriage. The rationale why no license is
required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and
embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a
valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant's name for a marriage
license. The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such persons
from legitimizing their status. To preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping
and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from
the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and
exempt them from that requirement."

[36]
 The Report of the Code Commission states that "No marriage license shall be
necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the age of majority and
who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years desire to marry each other. In such case, the publicity attending a marriage
license may discourage such persons from legalizing their status," Report of the
Code Commission, p. 80.

[37]
 Records, p. 49. The affidavit was denominated by the parties as an "Affidavit on
(sic) Marriage Between Man and Woman Who Haved (sic) Lived Together as
Husband and Wife for at Least Five Years."

[38]
 Benedicto v. Court of Appeals,  416 Phil. 722, 744 (2001).

[39]
 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 363 Phil. 130, 137
(1999).
[40]
 Id.

[41]
 Id. citing Samson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-43182, 25 November 1986,
145 SCRA 654, 659.

[42]
 The first part of Article 76 states, "No marriage license shall be necessary when
a man and a woman who have attained the age of majority and who, being
unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to
marry each other x x x."

[43]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 175581), p. 38.

[44]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 158, citing TSN (Civil Case No. B-4143), 15 April
1999.
[45]
 Id. at 159.

[46]
 First Dominion Resources Corporation v. Peñaranda, G.R. No. 166616, 27
January 2006, 480 SCRA 504, 508.

[47]
 Civil Service Commission v. Ledesma,  G.R. No. 154521, 30 September 2005,
471 SCRA 589, 605.

[48]
 Id.

[49]
 Vda. de Jacob v. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil. 693, 708 (1999).

[50]
 Id.

[51]
 ART. 220. In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family.
Thus, every intendment of law or fact leans toward the validity of marriage, the
indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of
property during marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the
validity of defense for any member of the family in case of unlawful aggression.

[52]
 People v. De Lara,  supra note 30 at 4083.

[53]
 Malcampo-Sin v. Sin,  407 Phil. 583, 588 (2001).

[54]
 Salavarria v. Letran>College, 357 Phil. 189, 196 (1998); Aparente, Sr. v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 387 Phil. 96, 108 (2000).

[55]
 Supra note 33 at 306. Alicia V. Sempio-Diy in A Handbook on the Family Code of
the Philippines  (1995 Ed., p. 38) wrote that "If the parties falsify their affidavit in
order to have an instant marriage, although the truth is that they have not been
cohabiting for five years, their marriage will be void for lack of a marriage license,
and they will also be criminally liable." Article 76 of the Civil Code is now Article 34
of the Family Code, which reads:

ART. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who
have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any
legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the
foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer
oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the
qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the
marriage.

[56]
 Niñal v. Bayadog,  supra note 20 at 134.

[57]
 Id. at 130-131.

[58]
 Id.
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384 Phil. 661

FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000 ]
ENGRACE NIÑAL FOR HERSELF AND AS GUARDIAN AD LITEM
OF THE MINORS BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE
NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., PETITIONERS, VS. NORMA
BAYADOG, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: 

May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage after his death?

Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their
marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her
death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11,
1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage
license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11,
1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19,
1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that
the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under
the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect
petitioner's successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could
file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.

Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch
59, dismissed the petition after finding that the Family Code is "rather silent,
obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for
the declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal,
with her specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father
Pepito G. Niñal is already dead;

(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father with
defendant is null and void ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second
marriage after it was dissolved due to their father's death. [1]
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare
null and void their father's marriage to respondent before his death, applying by
analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates the time and the persons
who could initiate an action for annulment of marriage. [2] Hence, this petition for
review with this Court grounded on a pure question of law.

This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state
the basis of petitioner's averment that the allegations in the petition are `true and
correct'." It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal
effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules. [3] However, upon motion of
petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the petition for
review.[4]

The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity
of the Family Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil
Code which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. [5] A valid marriage
license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, [6] the absence of
which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3)[7] in relation to
Article 58.[8] The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the State's
demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the
maintenance of which the general public is interested.[9] This interest proceeds from
the constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and
of affording protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social
institution."[10] Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable
social institution," and is the foundation of family life which shall be protected by
the State.[11] This is why the Family Code considers marriage as "a special contract
of permanent union"[12] and case law considers it "not just an adventure but a
lifetime commitment."[13]

However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a
marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76,
[14]
referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken
period of at least five years before the marriage. The rationale why no license is
required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and
embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a
valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant's name for a marriage
license. The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such persons
from legitimizing their status.[15] To preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping
and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from
the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and
exempt them from that requirement.

There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to respondent Norma

was celebrated without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an
affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried,
have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now
desire to marry each other."[16] The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to
what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to
warrant the counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses
from securing a marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties
are capacitated to marry each other during the entire five-year continuous period or
should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively
with each other as husband and wife during the entire five-year continuous period
regardless of whether there is a legal impediment to their being lawfully married,
which impediment may have either disappeared or intervened sometime during the
cohabitation period?

Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband
and wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should
be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only
missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other
words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from
the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not
been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years
immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of
cohabitation characterized by exclusivity - meaning no third party was involved at
any time within the 5 years and continuity - that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that
continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether
the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then
the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common
law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived
faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected
as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a
man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the
approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded
any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same
missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There
should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances
clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is
required in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be united in
matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to
the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar. [17] The Civil
Code provides:
Article 63: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any
impediment to the marriage to advice the local civil registrar thereof. x x x."

Article 64: "Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the
local civil registrar shall forthwith make an investigation, examining persons under
oath. x x x"
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Article 17 provides in part: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons having
knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil registrar
thereof. x x x."

Article 18  reads in part: "x x x. In case of any impediment known to the local civil
registrar or brought to his attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof and
his findings thereon in the application for a marriage license. x x x."
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited
the concurrence of multiple marriages by the same person during the same period.
Thus, any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse
shall be illegal and void,[18] subject only to the exception in cases of absence or
where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code
complements the civil law in that the contracting of two or more marriages and the
having of extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage
and adultery.[19] The law sanctions monogamy.

In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that
they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to
their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time
of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even
assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both
Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for
five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the
cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that
is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage
contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting
with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had
already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the
marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship
between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third
party as being one as "husband and wife".

Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by
the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because
of the absence of such element.

The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a
petition to declare their father's marriage void after his death?

Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code [20] cannot be

applied even by analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The
second ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which
allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at any time before the death of
either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods and persons
who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The
Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage.
Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid
until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is
considered as having never to have taken place[21] and cannot be the source of
rights. The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or
prescription while the other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be
assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be
attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after
the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the
lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and
their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. [22] That is why
the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where
the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any
proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal
effects except those declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged
spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution,
[23]
 and its effect on the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article
50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family
Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is
generally conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its annulment are
legitimate.

Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father extinguished the
alleged marital bond between him and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and
proceeds from a wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was dissolved
between the two. It should be noted that their marriage was void hence it is
deemed as if it never existed at all and the death of either extinguished nothing.

Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in
order to establish the nullity of a marriage.[24] "A void marriage does not require a
judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage
void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for
the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is
expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by
the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction."[25] "Under ordinary circumstances,
the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon
the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being
good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in
which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil
court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either
or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such
marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is
not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct
proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of
either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio.[26] But Article
40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration
of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a
second marriage[27] and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment
to that effect.[28] For the same reason, the law makes either the action or defense
for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. [29] Corollarily, if
the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for
defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited
to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of
estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court
may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is
without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a
final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other
than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final
judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial
Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., (Chairman), Puno,  and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Pardo, J., on official business abroad.

[1]
 The dispositive portion of the Order dated March 27, 1998 issued by Judge
Ferdinand J. Marcos of Regional Trial Court (RTC) - Branch 59, Toledo City, reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendant's motion to dismiss is hereby
granted and this instant case is hereby ordered dismissed without costs." (p.
6; Rollo, p. 21).

[2]
 Order, p. 4; Rollo, p. 19.

[3]
 Minute Resolution dated July 13, 1998; Rollo, p. 39.

[4]
 Minute Resolution dated October 7, 1998; Rollo, p. 50.

[5]
 Tamano v. Ortiz, 291 SCRA 584 (1998).

[6]
 Now Article 3, Family Code. Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all
the requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties; their consent, freely given;

(2) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(3) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

[7]
 Now Article 4, Family Code. Art. 80. The following marriages shall be void from
the beginning:
x x x       x x x       x x x
(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional
character.

x x x       x x x       x x x
[8]
 Art. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of
this Title, but not those under article 75, no marriage shall be solemnized without a
license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either
contracting party habitually resides.

[9]
 Perido v.  Perido, 63 SCRA 97 (1975).

[10]
 Section 12, Article II, 1987 Constitution; Hernandez v. CA, G. R. No. 126010,
December 8, 1999; See also Tuason v. CA, 256 SCRA 158 (1996).

[11]
 Section 2, Article XV (The Family), 1987 Constitution.

[12]
 Article 1, Family Code provides: "Marriage is a special contract of permanent
union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal or family life. x x x.

[13]
 Santos v. CA, 58 SCAD 17 (1995); 310 Phil. 21, 41 (1995).

[14]
 Now Article 34, Family Code. Art. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary
when a man and a woman who have attained the age of majority and who, being
unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to
marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an
affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official,
priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that
he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting
parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.

[15]
 Report of the Code Commission, p. 80.

[16]
 Rollo, p. 29.

[17]
 Articles 63 and 64, Civil Code; Article 17 and 18, Family Code.

[18]
 Article 83,  Civil  Code provides "Any marriage subsequently contracted by any
person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other
than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:

(1) the first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

(2) the first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years...."

Article 41  of  the  Family Code reads: "A marriage contracted by any person during
the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years..."

[19]
 Arts. 333 and 334, Revised Penal Code.

[20]
 Art. 47. The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by the following
persons and within the periods indicated herein:

(1) For causes mentioned in number 1 of Article 45 by the party whose parent or
guardian did not give his or her consent, within five years after attaining the age of
twenty-one; or by the parent or guardian or person having legal charge of the
minor, at any time before such party has reached the age of twenty-one;

(2) For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 45, by the sane spouse, who had
no knowledge of the other's insanity; or by any relative or guardian or person
having legal charge of the insane, at any time before the death of either party, or
by the insane spouse during a lucid interval or after regaining sanity;

(3) For causes mentioned in number 3 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five
years after the discovery of the fraud;

(4) For causes mentioned in number 4 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five
years from the time the force, intimidation or undue influence disappeared or
ceased;

For causes mentioned in numbers 5 and 6 of Article 45, by the injured party, within
five years after the marriage.

[21]
 Suntay v. Cojuanco-Suntay,  300 SCRA 760 (1998); People v.  RetirementBoard,
272 Ill. App. 59 cited in I Tolentino, Civil Code, 1990 ed. p. 271.

[22]
 In  re  Conza's Estate, 176 Ill. 192; Miller v.  Miller, 175 Cal. 797, 167 Pac. 394
cited in I Tolentino, Civil Code, 1990 ed., p. 271.
[23]
 Article 148-149, Family  Code; Article 144, Civil  Code.

[24]
 Odayat v.  Amante, 77 SCRA 338 (1977); Weigel v. Sempio-Dy, 143 SCRA 499
(1986); People  v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845 (1954); 50 O.G. (10) 4767 cited in
Peoplev.  Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033 (1957); 53 O.G. 3749.

[25]
 35 Am. Jur. 219-220.

[26]
 18 RCL 446-7; 35 Am Jur. 221.

[27]
 Apiag v. Cantero,  335 Phil. 511 (1997); 268 SCRA 47 (1997); Atienza v. Judge
Brillantes, Jr., 60 SCAD 119; 312 Phil. 939 (1995).

[28]
 Domingo v. CA, 226 SCRA 572 (1993).
[29]
 Article 39, Family Code as amended by E.O. 209 and 227 s. 1987 and further
amended by R.A. No. 8533 dated February 23, 1998.

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791 Phil. 481

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 204494, July 27, 2016 ]
JO-ANN DIAZ-SALGADO AND HUSBAND DR. GERARD C.
SALGADO, PETITIONERS, VS. LUIS G. ANSON, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

REYES, J.: 

Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court assailing the Decision[2] dated August 6, 2012 and the Resolution[3]dated
November 26, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 92989. The CA
affirmed the Decision[4] dated July 23, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig City, Branch 155, in Civil Case No. 69611.

The Facts

On September 5, 2003, Luis Anson (Luis) filed a Complaint [5] docketed as Civil Case
No. 69611 against Jo-Ann Diaz-Salgado (Jo-Ann) and Gerard Salgado (Gerard)
(Spouses Salgado) along with Maria Luisa Anson-Maya (Maria Luisa) and Gaston
Maya (Spouses Maya), seeking the annulment of the three Unilateral Deeds of
Sale[6] dated January 23, 2002 and the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate
of the Deceased Severina De Asis dated October 25, 2002. [7]

Luis alleged in his complaint that he is the surviving spouse of the late Severina de
Asis-Anson (Severina). They were married in a civil ceremony on December 28,
1966. Prior to the celebration of their marriage, Severina gave birth to their
daughter, Maria Luisa on December 30, 1965 while Jo-Ann is Severina's daughter
from a previous relationship.[8]

During his marital union with Severina, they acquired several real properties
located in San Juan, Metro Manila, covered by the following Transfer Certificate of
Title/s (TCT/s):
1. TCT No. 20618/T-104 (now TCT No. 11105-R),
2. TCT No. 60069/T-301 (now TCT No. 11106-R),
3. TCT No. 5109/T-26 (now TCT No. 11107),
4. TCT No. 8478-R/T-43 (now TCT No. 11076-R),
5. TCT No. 44637/T-224-II (now TCT No. 11078-R), and
6. TCT No. 8003/T-41 (now TCT No. 11077-R). [9]
According to Luis, because there was no marriage settlement between him and
Severina, the above-listed properties pertain to their conjugal partnership. But
without his knowledge and consent, Severina executed three separate Unilateral
Deeds of Sale on January 23, 2002 transferring the properties covered by TCT Nos.
20618, 60069 and 5109 in favor of Jo-Ann, who secured new certificates of title
over the said properties.[10] When Severina died on September 21, 2002, [11] Maria
Luisa executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased Severina
de Asis on October 25, 2002, adjudicating herself as Severina's sole heir. She
secured new TCTs over the properties covered by TCT Nos. 8478-R, 44637 and
8003.[12]

Luis claimed that because of the preceding acts, he was divested of his lawful share
in the conjugal properties and of his inheritance as a compulsory heir of Severina.
[13]

In Jo-Ann's Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, [14] which the trial court

considered as the Answer of her husband, Gerard, [15] Jo-Ann countered that she
was unaware of any marriage contracted by her mother with Luis. She knew
however that Luis and Severina had a common-law relationship which they both
acknowledged and formally terminated through a Partition Agreement [16] executed
in November 1980. This was implemented through another Partition
Agreement[17]executed in April 1981. Thus, Luis had already received the properties
apportioned to him by virtue of the said agreement while the properties subject of
the Unilateral Deeds of Sale were acquired exclusively by Severina. The TCTs
covering Severina's properties were under Severina's name only and she was
described therein as single without reference to any husband. [18]

Meanwhile, the Spouses Maya corroborated the Spouses Salgado's stance in their
Answer,[19] stating that Maria Luisa is also not aware that Luis and Severina were
married. She is cognizant of the fact that Luis and Severina lived together as
common-law husband and wife - a relationship which was terminated upon
execution of a Partition Agreement. In the Partition Agreement, Luis and Severina
were described as single and they acknowledged that they were living together as
common-law spouses. They also mutually agreed to the partition of the properties
they owned in common. Hence, Luis already received his share in the
properties[20] and is estopped from denying the same.[21] After the termination of
their cohabitation in 1980, Luis went to United States of America (USA), married
one Teresita Anson and had a son with her; while Maria Luisa was left under the
guardianship and custody of Severina.[22] It was after the death of Severina that
Maria Luisa executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the
Deceased Severina de Asis on October 25, 2002. The Spouses Maya were also able
to obtain a Certificate of No Record of Marriage[23] (between Luis and Severina)
from the Office the Civil Registrar General of the National Statistics Office. [24]

Trial ensued thereafter. After Luis gave his testimony and presented documentary
evidence which included a certified true copy of his marriage contract with
Severina,[25] the Spouses Salgado and Spouses Maya filed their respective
Demurrers to Evidence.[26] The Spouses Salgado disputed the validity of Luis and
Severina's marriage on the ground of lack of marriage license as borne out by the
marriage contract. They further claimed that Luis himself disclosed on cross-
examination that he did not procure a marriage license prior to the alleged
marriage.[27] Luis had also admitted the existence, due execution and authenticity of
the Partition Agreement.[28] The logical conclusion therefore is that the properties
disposed in favor of Jo-Ann were owned by Severina as her own, separate and
exclusive properties, which she had all the right to dispose of, without the
conformity of Luis.[29]

On February 16, 2006, the trial court denied both demurrers, explaining that the
sufficiency of evidence presented by Luis is evidentiary in nature and may only be
controverted by evidence to the contrary.[30] The Spouses Salgado and Spouses
Maya filed their separate motions for reconsideration, [31] which the trial court
denied.[32] Consequently, both the Spouses Salgado and Spouses Maya filed their
respective petitions for certiorari with the CA.[33] Meanwhile, the Spouses Salgado
were deemed to have waived their presentation of evidence when they failed to
attend the scheduled hearings before the trial court. [34]

Resolving the petition for certiorari on the demurrer to evidence filed by the

Spouses Salgado, the CA Second Division directed the trial court "to properly
resolve with deliberate dispatch the demurrer to evidence in accordance with
Section 3, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure by stating clearly and
distinctly the reason therefor on the basis of [the Spouses Salgado's] proffered
evidence[,]"[35] whereas the CA Ninth Division dismissed the petition of the Spouses
Maya and ordered the trial court to decide the case with deliberate dispatch. [36]

In an Order[37] dated July 16, 2007, the RTC, in compliance with the order of the CA
to resolve the demurrer to evidence in more specific terms, denied the twin
demurrers to evidence for lack of merit and held that the totality of evidence
presented by Luis has sufficiently established his right to obtain the reliefs prayed
for in his complaint.

Ruling of the RTC

On July 23, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision [38] in favor of Luis, holding that the
marriage between Luis and Severina was valid. It noted that the marriage contract,
being a public document, enjoys the presumption of regularity in its execution and
is conclusive as to the fact of marriage.[39] The trial court also based its ruling
in Geronimo v. CA[40] where the validity of marriage was upheld despite the absence
of the marriage license number on the marriage contract. [41] The trial court thus
declared that the properties covered by the Unilateral Deeds of Sale were
considered conjugal which cannot be disposed of by Severina without the consent
of her husband, Luis.[42]

The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of [Luis]
and against [the Spouses Salgado] ordering as follows:
1. ANNULMENT, VOIDING, SETTING ASIDE and DECLARING OF NO FORCE AND
EFFECT of the three (3) Unilateral Deeds of Sale, all dated January 23, 2002
executed by [Severina] in favor of [Jo-Ann];

2. ANNULMENT, VOIDING, SETTING ASIDE and DECLARING OF NO FORCE AND

EFFECT of the three (3) [TCT] Nos. 11107-R, 11105-R and 11106-R covering the
subject properties, all issued in the name of [Jo-Ann] by the Registry of Deeds for
San Juan, Metro Manila;

3. RESTITUTION of all properties covered by TCT Nos. 11107-R, 11105-R and

11106-R (formerly TCT Nos. 5109, 20618 and 60069, respectively) to the conjugal
community of properties between [Luis] and [Severina].

No pronouncement as to costs. 

SO ORDERED.[43]
On November 17, 2008, the RTC rendered another Decision [44] which ordered the
"ANNULMENT, VOIDING, SETTING ASIDE and DECLARING OF NO FORCE AND
EFFECT the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of the Deceased Severina
De Asis executed by [Maria Luisa] dated October 25, 2002 x x x." [45] The RTC also
ordered the cancellation of new TCTs issued by virtue of the said Deeds. [46]

The Spouses Salgado and the Spouses Maya filed their respective motions for
reconsideration on September 11, 2007[47] and August 28, 2007,[48] respectively,
which the RTC denied in the Omnibus Order[49] dated October 30, 2007 for lack of
merit. This prompted the Spouses Salgado and Spouses Maya to file their separate
notices of appeal before the CAon December 13, 2007 [50] and April 24, 2009,
[51]
respectively.

Ruling of the CA

The Spouses Maya and Luis thereafter entered into a Compromise

Agreement[52]which was approved by the CA in its Decision[53] dated October 26,
2011. This resulted in the termination of the Spouses Maya's appeal. [54]

On August 6, 2012, the CA rendered a Decision, [55] dismissing the appeal of the

Spouses Salgado. The fallo reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal interposed by [the Spouses Salgado] is DISMISSED.
The Decision dated July 23, 2007 of the [RTC] of Pasig is AFFIRMED IN TOTO.

SO ORDERED.[56]
The CA sustained the ruling of the RTC for the simple reason that the Spouses
Salgado did not present and formally offer any testimonial and documentary
evidence to controvert the evidence presented by Luis. [57] The CA further explained
that "the best evidence to establish the absence of a marriage license is a
certification from the Local Civil Registrar that the parties to the Marriage Contract
did not secure a marriage license or at the very least a certification from the said
office that despite diligent search, no record of application for or a marriage license
was issued on or before December 28, 1966 in favor of Luis and Severina. Again,
Spouses Salgado failed to prove the same by their failure to secure the said
certification and present evidence during the trial." [58]

The Spouses Salgado and Spouses Maya filed a motion for reconsideration [59]which
the CA denied through its Resolution[60] dated November 26, 2012.

The Spouses Salgado elevated the matter before the Court raising the core issue of
whether the CA committed reversible error in affirming the RTC decision which
declared the marriage between Luis and Severina valid and the subject lands as
conjugal properties.

Ruling of the Court

The Spouses Salgado argue that the marriage between Luis and Severina is null
and void for want of marriage license based on the Marriage Contract [61] presented
by Luis which has adequately established its absence.[62]

Luis, in his Comment,[63] opposes the filing of the present petition on the ground
that it raises a question of fact, which cannot be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari. He also countered that the Spouses Salgado did not present any
evidence to support their theory.[64] If the existence of the marriage license is in
issue, it is incumbent upon the Spouses Salgado to show the lack of marriage
license by clear and convincing evidence.[65]

Before proceeding to the substantive issues brought in this petition, the Court shall
first tackle the procedural issue raised by Luis which pertains to the propriety of the
filing of this petition for review on certiorari.

Contrary to Luis' contention, the present petition raises a question of law, mainly,
whether the absence of a marriage license may be proven on the basis of a
marriage contract which states that no marriage license was exhibited to the
solemnizing officer on account of the marriage being of an exceptional character.

In any event, while the jurisdiction of the Court in cases brought before it from the
appellate court is, as a general rule, limited to reviewing errors of law, there are
exceptions[66] recognized by the Court, such as when the CA manifestly overlooked
certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion.[67]

Since the marriage between Luis and Severina was solemnized prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law to determine its validity is the Civil
Code, the law in effect at the time of its celebration[68] on December 28, 1966.

A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 [69] of the Civil
Code, and the absence thereof, save for marriages of exceptional character,
[70]
renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3). It sets forth:
Art. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: x x x x

(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of

exceptional character;

x x x x. (Emphasis ours)
"Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2,
Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages
in articulo mortis or at the point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in
remote places, (3) consular marriages, (4) ratification of marital cohabitation, (5)
religious ratification of a civil marriage, (6) Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and
(7) mixed marriages."[71] To reiterate, in any of the aforementioned marriages of
exceptional character, the requirement of a valid marriage license is dispensed
with.

The marriage is not of an exceptional character

A cursory examination of the marriage contract of Luis and Severina reveals that no
marriage license number was indicated therein. It also appears therein that no
marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer with Article 77 of Republic
Act No. 386 (Civil Code) being cited as the reason therefor. The pertinent portion of
the marriage contract is quoted as follows:
[A]nd I further certify that Marriage License No. x x x issued at x x x on x x x, 19 x
x x in favor of, said parties, was exhibited to me or no marriage license was
exhibited to me, this marriage being of an exceptional character performed under
Art. 77 of Rep. Act 386; x x x.[72]
The reference to Article 77 of the Civil Code in the marriage contract is not
dismissible. Being a public document, the marriage contract is not only a prima
facie proof of marriage, but is also a prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein. This is pursuant to Section 44, Rule 130 of the 1997 Rules of Court, which
reads:
Sec. 44. Entries in official records. - Entries in official records made in the
performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated.
Consequently, the entries made in Luis and Severina's marriage contract me prima
facie proof that at the time of their marriage, no marriage license was exhibited to
the solemnizing officer for the reason that their marriage is of an exceptional
character under Article 77 of the Civil Code.

Article 77 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 77. In case two persons married in accordance with law desire to ratify their
union in conformity with the regulations, rites, or practices of any church, sect, or
religion, it shall no longer be necessary to comply with the requirements of Chapter
1 of this Title and any ratification made shall merely be considered as a purely
religious ceremony.
The foregoing provision pertains to a religious ceremony performed with the
purpose of ratifying a marriage which was solemnized civilly. In the eyes of the law,
the marriage already exists; the subsequent ceremony is undertaken merely to
conform to religious practices. Thus, the parties are exempted from complying with
the required issuance of marriage license insofar as the subsequent religious
ceremony is concerned. For this exemption to be applicable, it is sine qua non that:
(1) the parties to the religious ceremony must already be married to each other
in accordance with law (civil marriage); and (2) the ratifying ceremony is
purely religious in nature.

Applied to the present case however, it is clear that Luis and Severina were not
married to each other prior to the civil ceremony officiated on December 28, 1966 -
the only date of marriage appearing on the records. This was also consistently
affirmed by Luis in open court:
Atty. Francisco:
Q- You testified that you have a Marriage Contract marked as Exhibit A certifying that you
were married to the late [Severina].
A- Yes, sir.
Q- Do you recall when this marriage took place?
A- As far as I can recall it was sometime two (2) days before my daughter get (sic) one (1)
year old. That was 1966 December something like 28, because she was born December
30, the death of Jose Rizal. I can remember 1965. So, before she turned one (1) year old
two (2) days before we got married here in San Juan.
Q- So, when was she born if you can recall?
A- Maria Luisa was born on December 30, 1965.
Q- If it is two (2) days before, it should be 1966?
A- Yes, sir.
Q- If you can recall who solemnized the marriage?
A- It was the late Mayor Ebona of San Juan.[73]
xx
xx
[Atty. Valenton:] x x x You alleged during your direct examination that you were married to
[Severina]?
A: Yes sir.
Q: When do you say you marrfied] her?
A: Two (2) days before our daughter turned one year old, so that is December 28, 1966.
[74]
 (Emphasis ours)
Being that the ceremony held on December 28, 1966 was the only marriage
ceremony between the parties and this was not solemnized pursuant to any
ratifying religious rite, practice or regulation but a civil one officiated by the mayor,
this marriage does not fall under the purview of Article 77 of the Civil Code. It is
evident that the twin requirements of the provision, which are: prior civil marriage
between the parties and a ratifying religious ceremony, were not complied with.
There is no prior ceremony to ratify. Thus, this marriage is not of an exceptional
character and a marriage license is required for Luis and Severina's marriage to be
valid.
Absence of marriage license

The next issue to be resolved is: who has the burden of proving the existence or
non-existence of the marriage license?

Since there was an unequivocal declaration on the marriage contract itself that no
marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer at the time of marriage
owing to Article 77 of the Civil Code, when in truth, the said exception does not
obtain in their case, it is the burden of Luis to prove that they secured the required
marriage license.

However, instead of proving that a marriage license was indeed issued to them at
the time of their marriage, Luis relied mainly on the presumption of validity of
marriage. This presumption does not hold water vis-a-vis a prima facie evidence
(marriage contract), which on its face has established that no marriage license was
presented to the solemnizing officer. If there was a marriage license issued to Luis
and Severina, its absence on the marriage contract was not explained at all. Neither
the original nor a copy of the marriage license was presented. No other witness also
testified to prove its existence, whereas Luis is not the best witness to testify
regarding its issuance. He admitted that he did not apply for one, and is uncertain
about the documents they purportedly submitted in the Municipal Hall. As he
revealed in his testimony:
ATTY. VALENTON:
Q- How did you prepare for the alleged wedding that took place between you and
[Severina]?
ATTY. FRANCISCO: May I know the materiality, Your Honor?
ATTY. VALENTON: We are exploring as to whether there was really a wedding that took
place, Your Honor.
COURT Answer.
:
What preparations were done?
A- There was no preparation because we were just visitors of the Mayor during that
time and the Mayor is a close friend of ours. So, when he knew that we are
traveling, we are going to Thailand with the invitation of a friend to work with
him in Thailand, he told us you better get married first before you travel because
your daughter will be illegitimate.[75]
xxxx
ATTY. VALENTON:
Q- Do you remember having applied for a marriage license?
A- We did not.
Q- So, you are telling us that there is no marriage license?
A- No.
CLARIFICATORY QUESTIONS BY THE COURT TO THE WITNESS
[Q-] There was no marriage license?
A- Well, when you get married you have to get a marriage license.
COURT:
Not necessarily.
A- But, I don't know whether there was an application for the license because it was
at the house of the Mayor.
COURT:
But in this particular case before you went to the house of the Mayor for the
solemnization of your marriage, did you apply for a marriage license?
A- No.[76]
xxxx
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION OF [LUIS]:
Q- Mr. Anson, a while ago during your cross-examination you were asked by counsel
as well as a question was raised by the Honorable Court whether or not you
applied for a marriage license when you got married on December 28, 1966
allegedly with [Severina]. Can you tell the Court what you meant by that?
COURT:
By what?
ATTY. FRANCISCO:
When he was asked, Your Honor, by the Honorable Court.
COURT:
Whether he applied?
ATTY. FRANCISCO:
Whether he applied for a marriage license prior to the solemnization of the marriage,
you answered no.
WITNESS:
I did not apply for such, all what I know is to sign something affidavit or
application before we went to the house of the Mayor to get marry (sic) but that
was about - - I cannot recall if that past (sic) a week or 2 days or 3 days ago.
ATTY. FRANCISCO:
Q- You mentioned, we signed an affidavit or application, when you used we, whom are
you referring to?
A- [Severina].
Q- And, yourself?
A- Yes.
Q- In your recollection, where did you file those affidavits with [Severina] before the
solemnization of the marriage?
A- It was in the Municipal Hall. I do not know whether that was the Registrar, Office
of the [M]ayor or Office of the Chief of Police. I cannot recall. It is inside the
Munisipyo of San Juan.
Q- Who made you sign that Affidavit?
A- The Chief of Police whom we get (sic) to be (sic) witness for our marriage. They let us
signed (sic) an application or affidavit. I cannot recall what it is.[77] (Emphasis ours)
In upholding the supposed validity of the marriage, the RTC and the CA failed to
consider the glaring statements in the marriage contract that no marriage license
was exhibited to the solemnizing officer and that the marriage is of an exceptional
character under Article 77 of the Civil Code, the latter statement being fallacious.
Both the RTC and CA upheld the fact of marriage based on the marriage contract
but simply glossed over the part stating that the marriage is of an exceptional
character. It is inevitable to deduce that this is not a case of mere non-recording of
the marriage license number on the marriage contract, as was in Geronimo.[78]
The factual antecedents in Geronimo are not on all fours with the case under
review, hence, inapplicable. In Geronimo, despite the absence of the marriage
license number on the marriage contract presented by therein petitioner (brother of
the deceased), there was no statement therein that the marriage is of an
exceptional character. Various witnesses also testified that the deceased and her
husband were indeed married. More importantly, the husband of the deceased was
able to produce a copy of the marriage contract on file with the National Archives
and Records Section where the marriage license number appears.

"[T]o be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law

requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on
the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the
local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the
parties."[79]Considering that the absence of the marriage license is apparent on the
marriage contract itself, with a false statement therein that the marriage is of an
exceptional character, and no proof to the contrary was presented, there is no other
plausible conclusion other than that the marriage between Luis and Severina was
celebrated without a valid marriage license and is thus, void ab initio.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Dayot,[80] the Court similarly declared that a

marriage solemnized without a marriage license based on a fabricated claim of
exceptional character, is void. In lieu of a marriage license, therein parties to the
marriage executed a false affidavit of marital cohabitation. In declaring the
marriage void, the Court rejected the notion that all the formal and essential
requisites of marriage were complied with. The Court held that to permit a false
affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to allow an abject circumvention
of the law. It was further explained:
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in
the parties' affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage, since all the essential
and formal requisites were complied with. The argument deserves scant merit.
Patently, it cannot be denied that the marriage between Jose and Felisa was
celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage license. Neither did Jose and
Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from the
requirement of a marriage license.

xxxx

Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a

marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was
wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated
statement that the parties have cohabited for at least five years as required by law.
The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to an irregularity of the
marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here, there is no marriage license
at all. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the
period of Jose and Felisa's cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage
as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere
irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be
deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. If the essential matter in the
sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and
effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all. [81]
The Court cannot turn a blind eye to the statements made in the marriage contract
because these refer to the absence of a formal requisite of marriage. "The parties
should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and
later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify
their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license
unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception." [82] "The
requirement and issuance of marriage license is the State's demonstration of its
involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the
general public is interested. This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate
that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to
the family as a basic 'autonomous social institution." [83]

Partition Agreement is Valid

Relative to the properties they amassed during the period of their cohabitation, Luis
and Severina executed a notarized Partition Agreement[84] in November 1980, which
divided their properties between them without court intervention. Luis sought to
annul such agreement on the ground that "the separation of property is not
effected by the mere execution of the contract or agreement of the parties, but by
the decree of the court approving the same. It, therefore, becomes effective only
upon judicial approval, without which it is void." [85]

The Court does not subscribe to Luis' posture.

In Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City,[86] the Court held that "[i]n a void
marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties
during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or
Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code. Article 147 is a remake of
Article 144 of the Civil Code x x x."[87] It provides:
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each
other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries
shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both
of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on
co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they

lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint
efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For
purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition
by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed
jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care
and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her
share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common,
without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their
cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the
party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common
children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or
their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the
innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation.[88](Emphasis ours)
As there is no showing that Luis and Severina were incapacitated to marry each
other at the time of their cohabitation and considering that their marriage is void
from the beginning for lack of a valid marriage license, Article 144 of the Civil Code,
[89]
 in relation to Article 147 of the Family Code, are the pertinent provisions of law
governing their property relations. Article 147 of the Family Code "applies to union
of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract
marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like absence of
a marriage license."[90] "Under this property regime, property acquired by both
spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules
on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima
faciepresumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did
not participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be considered as having
contributed thereto jointly if said party's 'efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family household.'"[91]

Accordingly, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code shall apply in the
partition of the properties co-owned by Luis and Severina. It is stated under Article
1079 of the Civil Code that "partition, in general, is the separation, division and
assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom it may belong. The
thing itself may be divided, or its value." As to how partition may be validly done,
Article 496 of the Civil Code is precise that "partition may be made by agreement
between the parties or by judicial proceedings x x x." The law does not impose a
judicial approval for the agreement to be valid. Hence, even without the same, the
partition was validly done by Luis and Severina through the execution of the
Partition Agreement.

Moreover, Luis admitted the existence, due execution and authenticity of the
Partition Agreement.[92] It also remains uncontroverted that he already received his
share as stipulated in the Partition Agreement. As such, the Court finds no reason
to have the said agreement declared null and void or annulled, in the absence of
any circumstance which renders such contract invalid or at least, voidable.

All things considered, the Court holds that although a certification of no record of
marriage license or certification of "due search and inability to find" a record or
entry issued by the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of the
license,[93] such certification is not the only proof that could validate the absence of
a marriage license.

In this case, the categorical statement on Luis and Severina's marriage contract
that no marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer, coupled with a
contrived averment therein that the marriage is of an exceptional character under
Article 77 of the Civil Code, are circumstances which cannot be disregarded.
Incidentally, it may be well to note that Luis' failure to assert his marriage to
Severina during the latter's lifetime is suspect. Luis left for the USA in 1981, and
until Severina's death in 2002, he never saw, much less reconciled with her. [94] All
those years, he never presented himself to be the husband of Severina. Not even
their daughter, Maria Luisa, knew of the marriage. During trial, he never presented
any other witness to the marriage. He contends that his marriage to Severina was
valid and subsisting, yet he knowingly contracted a subsequent marriage abroad.
Verily, Luis failed to prove the validity of their marriage based on the evidence he
himself had presented.

"The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law
and would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against
innocent and unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to
prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite for a valid marriage. The protection
of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and
genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well."[95]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 6, 2012 and
the Resolution dated November 26, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
92989 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Complaint filed in Civil Case
No. 69611 is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Perez, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

August 30, 2016

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs / Mesdames:

Please take notice that on July 27, 2016 a Decision, copy attached hereto, was
rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which
was received by this Office on August 30, 2016 at 1:40 p.m.

Very truly yours,

(SGD)
WILFREDO V.
LAPITAN
  Division Clerk of Court

[1]
 Rollo, pp. 11-72.

[2]
 Penned by Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr., with Associate Justices Elihu A.
Ybañez and Florito S. Macalino concurring; CA rollo, pp. 569-597.

[3]
 Id. at 698-699.

[4]
 Rendered by Judge Luis R. Tongco; records, Volume IV, pp. 142-152.

[5]
 Records, Vol. I, pp. 3-14.

[6]
 Id. at 16, 18 and 20.

[7]
 Id. at 22-23.

[8]
 Id. at 4.

[9]
 Id. at 5-8.

[10]
 Id. at 9.

[11]
 Id. at 272.

[12]
 Id. at 10.

[13]
 Id. at 11.

[14]
 Id. at 38-47.

[15]
 See RTC Order dated May 3, 2004; id. at 88.
[16]
 Id. at 112-114.

[17]
 Id. at 49-50.

[18]
 Id. at 40-41.

[19]
 Id. at 100-111.

[20]
 Id. at 102.

[21]
 Id. at 107.

[22]
 Id. at 103.
[23]
 Id. at 201.

[24]
 Id. at 104.

[25]
 Id. at 146-152.

[26]
 Records, Vol. II, pp. 20-38, 55-83.

[27]
 Id. at 23.

[28]
 Id. at 31.

[29]
 Id. at 34.

[30]
 Id. at 356.

[31]
 Id. at 357-369, 371-392.

[32]
 Id. at 433.

[33]
 Records, Vol. III, pp. 1-32, 169-220.

[34]
 See RTC Order dated April 23, 2007; records, Vol. IV, p. 44.

[35]
 See CA Decision dated April 30, 2007; id. at 53.

[36]
 See CA Decision dated May 16, 2007; id. at 64.

[37]
 Issued by Judge Luis R. Tongco; id. at 140-141.

[38]
 Id. at 142-152.

[39]
 Id. at 150.
[40]
 G.R. No. 105540, July 5, 1993, 224 SCRA 494.

[41]
 Records, Vol. IV, p. 150.

[42]
 Id. at 151-152.

[43]
 Id. at 152.

[44]
 Id. at 313-325.

[45]
 Id. at 325.

[46]
 Id.
[47]
 Id. at 167-188.

[48]
 Id. at 154-164.

[49]
 Id. at 216-217.

[50]
 Id. at 228-229.

[51]
 Id. at 360-361.

[52]
 CA rollo, pp. 517-522.

[53]
 Id. at 524-533.

[54]
 See CA Decision dated August 6, 2012; id. at 583.

[55]
 Id. at 569-597.

[56]
 Id. at 596.

[57]
 Id. at 585.

[58]
 Id. at 592-593.

[59]
 Id. at 607-650.

[60]
 Id. at 698-699.

[61]
 Rollo, p. 159.

[62]
 Id. at 36.

[63]
 Id. at 596-603.
[64]
 Id. at 598.

[65]
 Id. at 600.

[66]
 (1) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting;
(6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the
case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the
appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the
findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main
and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact
are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked
certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion. New City Builders, Inc. v. NLRC, 499 Phil. 207,
213 (2005), citing The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. v. CA, G.R. No.
126850, April 28, 2004, 401 SCRA 79, 86.

[67]
 Superlines Transportation Co., Inc. v. Philippine National Construction Company,
548 Phil. 354, 362 (2007). 

[68]
 Niñal v. Bayadog, 384 Phil. 661, 667 (2000).

[69]
 Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied
with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

[70]
 Art. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of
this Title, but not those under Article 75, no marriage shall be solemnized without a
license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either
contracting party habitually resides.

[71]
 Republic of the Philippines v. Dayot, 573 Phil. 553, 569 (2008).

[72]
 Rollo, p. 159.

[73]
 TSN, June 6, 2005, pp. 15-16.
[74]
 TSN, June 7, 2005, p. 30.

[75]
 TSN, June 14, 2005, pp. 15-16.

[76]
 Id. at 17-18.

[77]
 Id. at 46-48.

[78]
 Supra note 40, at 500.

[79]
 Alcantara v. Alcantara, 558 Phil. 192, 203-204 (2007). (Emphasis ours)

[80]
 573 Phil. 553 (2008).
[81]
 Id. at 573-575.

[82]
 Niñal v. Bayadog, supra note 68, at 670.

[83]
 Id. at 667-668.

[84]
 Records, Vol. I, pp. 112-114.

[85]
 See Consolidated Appellee's Brief; id. at 519.

[86]
 328 Phil. 1289 (1996).

[87]
 Id. at 1295. (Italics in the original)

[88]
 Id. at 1295-1296.

[89]
 Art. 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they
are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired
by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

[90]
 Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño, 403 Phil. 861, 872 (2001).

[91]
 Valdez v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City, supra note 86, at 1297. (Emphasis
ours and italics in the original)

[92]
 TSN, June 17, 2005, pp. 30, 36.

[93]
 Abbas v. Abbas, 702 Phil. 578, 593 (2013); Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño, supra
note 90, at 869; Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103047, September 2,
1994, 236 SCRA 257, 262. 

[94]
 Rollo, p. 502.
[95]
 Republic of the Philippines v. Dayot, supra note 80, at 574.

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466 Phil. 1013

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 145226, February 06, 2004 ]
LUCIO MORIGO Y CACHO, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.: 

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the decision [1] dated October
21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, which affirmed the
judgment[2] dated August 5, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol, Branch
4, in Criminal Case No. 8688. The trial court found herein petitioner Lucio Morigo y
Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy and sentenced him to a prison
term of seven (7) months of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. Also assailed in this petition is the
resolution[3] of the appellate court, dated September 25, 2000, denying Morigo’s
motion for reconsideration.
The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as follows:

Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina
Tortor at Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4) years (from
1974-1978).

After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each
other.

In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from
Singapore. The former replied and after an exchange of letters, they became
sweethearts.

In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there.
While in Canada, they maintained constant communication.

In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to
join her in Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on August
30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.

On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving

appellant Lucio behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition
for divorce against appellant which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992
and to take effect on February 17, 1992.

On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago [4] at
the Virgen sa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.

On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity
of marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020.
The complaint seek (sic) among others, the declaration of nullity of accused’s
marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.

On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an Information [5] filed
by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran [City], with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol. [6]
The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil
case for judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question
in the bigamy case. His motion was granted, but subsequently denied upon motion
for reconsideration by the prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case, which
was docketed as Criminal Case No. 8688, herein petitioner pleaded not guilty to the
charge. Trial thereafter ensued.

On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment in Criminal Case
No. 8688, as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds accused Lucio Morigo
y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy and sentences him
to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from Seven (7) Months of Prision
Correccional as minimum to Six (6) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor as
maximum.

SO ORDERED.[7]
In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioner’s claim that his
first marriage to Lucia was null and void ab initio.  Following Domingo v. Court of
Appeals,[8] the trial court ruled that want of a valid marriage ceremony is not a
defense in a charge of bigamy.  The parties to a marriage should not be allowed to
assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a
judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to
marry again.

Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court cited Ramirez v.
Gmur,[9] which held that the court of a country in which neither of the spouses is
domiciled and in which one or both spouses may resort merely for the purpose of
obtaining a divorce, has no jurisdiction to determine the matrimonial status of the
parties.  As such, a divorce granted by said court is not entitled to recognition
anywhere. Debunking Lucio’s defense of good faith in contracting the second
marriage, the trial court stressed that following People v. Bitdu,[10] everyone is
presumed to know the law, and the fact that one does not know that his act
constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt him from the consequences
thereof.

Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-
G.R. CR No. 20700.

Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was pending
before the appellate court, the trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020
declaring the marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab initio since no marriage
ceremony actually took place. No appeal was taken from this decision, which then
became final and executory.

On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.[11]
In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court stressed that
the subsequent declaration of nullity of Lucio’s marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No.
6020 could not acquit Lucio.  The reason is that what is sought to be punished by
Article 349[12] of the Revised Penal Code is the act of contracting a second marriage
before the first marriage had been dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the fact that the
first marriage was void from the beginning is not a valid defense in a bigamy case.

The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by Lucia
from the Canadian court could not be accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant
to Article 15[13] of the Civil Code and given the fact that it is contrary to public policy
in this jurisdiction. Under Article 17[14] of the Civil Code, a declaration of public
policy cannot be rendered ineffectual by a judgment promulgated in a foreign
jurisdiction.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision, contending

that the doctrine in Mendiola v. People,[15] allows mistake upon a difficult question
of law (such as the effect of a foreign divorce decree) to be a basis for good faith.

On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion for lack of merit.
[16]
 However, the denial was by a split vote. The ponente of the appellate court’s
original decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, joined in
the opinion prepared by Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis.  The dissent observed that
as the first marriage was validly declared void ab initio, then there was no first
marriage to speak of. Since the date of the nullity retroacts to the date of the first
marriage and since herein petitioner was, in the eyes of the law, never married, he
cannot be convicted beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.
The present petition raises the following issues for our resolution:

A.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE
THAT IN CRIMES PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE, CRIMINAL INTENT
IS AN INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE. COROLLARILY, WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT
OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE [THE] PETITIONER’S LACK OF
CRIMINAL INTENT WHEN HE CONTRACTED THE SECOND MARRIAGE.

B.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULING
IN PEOPLE VS. BITDU (58 PHIL. 817) IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.

C.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE
THAT EACH AND EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE FAVORING THE INNOCENCE OF THE
ACCUSED MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.[17]
To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner committed
bigamy and if so, whether his defense of good faith is valid.

The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon
the divorce decree of the Ontario court.  He highlights the fact that he contracted
the second marriage openly and publicly, which a person intent upon bigamy would
not be doing. The petitioner further argues that his lack of criminal intent is
material to a conviction or acquittal in the instant case.  The crime of bigamy, just
like other felonies punished under the Revised Penal Code, is mala in se, and
hence, good faith and lack of criminal intent are allowed as a complete defense. He
stresses that there is a difference between the intent to commit the crime and the
intent to perpetrate the act. Hence, it does not necessarily follow that his intention
to contract a second marriage is tantamount to an intent to commit bigamy.

For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that good
faith in the instant case is a convenient but flimsy excuse. The Solicitor General
relies upon our ruling in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,[18] which held that bigamy can be
successfully prosecuted provided all the elements concur, stressing that under
Article 40[19] of the Family Code, a judicial declaration of nullity is a must before a
party may re-marry. Whether or not the petitioner was aware of said Article 40 is of
no account as everyone is presumed to know the law.  The OSG counters that
petitioner’s contention that he was in good faith because he relied on the divorce
decree of the Ontario court is negated by his act of filing Civil Case No. 6020,
seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lucia.

Before we delve into petitioner’s defense of good faith and lack of criminal intent,
we must first determine whether all the elements of bigamy are present in this
case. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,[20] we laid down the elements of bigamy thus:
(1)  the offender has been legally married;

(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her
spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared
presumptively dead;
 (3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and

(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the
existence of the first.
Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during the pendency of
CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, the RTC of Bohol Branch 1, handed down the following
decision in Civil Case No. 6020, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the
annulment of the marriage entered into by petitioner Lucio Morigo and Lucia
Barrete on August 23, 1990 in Pilar, Bohol and further directing the Local Civil
Registrar of Pilar, Bohol to effect the cancellation of the marriage contract.

SO ORDERED.[21]
The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed
between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a
mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a
solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in
accordance with Articles 3[22] and 4[23] of the Family Code. As the dissenting opinion
in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, “This simply means that there was no
marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of
the first marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the
date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the
celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law, never
married.”[24] The records show that no appeal was taken from the decision of the
trial court in Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the decision had long become final and
executory.

The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been
legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married
to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of.  Under the principle of
retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married
“from the beginning.”  The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. 
Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not
married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The
existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the
crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be
sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must,
perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.

The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan.
[25]
 In the latter case, the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was
likewise obtained after the second marriage was already celebrated. We held
therein that:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a
subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent
marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This
principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statutes as “void.” [26]
It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually
solemnized not just once, but twice: first before a judge where a marriage
certificate was duly issued and then again six months later before a priest in
religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared to have transpired,
although later declared void ab initio.

In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly
authorized solemnizing officer.  Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a
marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract
bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of
nullity.  Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an
ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless
he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent
marriage.

The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal
statute in favor of an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the
presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is done.  Under the circumstances
of the present case, we held that petitioner has not committed bigamy.  Further, we
also find that we need not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good
faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED.  The assailed decision, dated

October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the
resolution of the appellate court dated September 25, 2000, denying herein
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.  The
petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho is ACQUITTED from the charge of BIGAMY on the
ground that his guilt has not been proven with moral certainty.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr.,  and Tinga, JJ., concur.

[1]
 Rollo, pp. 38-44. Penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria and concurred
in by Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon and Edgardo P. Cruz.

[2]
 Records, pp. 114-119.

[3]
 Rollo, pp. 46-58. Per Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz, with Associate Justices
Cancio C. Garcia and Marina L. Buzon, concurring and Eugenio S. Labitoria and
Bernardo P. Abesamis, dissenting.

[4]
 Her correct name is Maria Jececha Limbago (Italics for emphasis). See Exh. “B,”
the copy of their marriage contract.  Records, p. 10.

[5]
The accusatory portion of the charge sheet found in Records, p. 1,  reads:
“That, on or about the 4th day of October, 1992, in the City of Tagbilaran,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused being previously united in lawful marriage with Lucia Barrete on August 23,
1990 and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with Maria
Jececha Limbago to the damage and prejudice of Lucia Barrete in the amount to be
proved during trial.

“Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code.”
[6]
 Rollo, pp. 38-40.

[7]
 Records, p. 119.

[8]
 G.R. No. 104818, 17 September 1993, 226 SCRA 572.

[9]
 42 Phil. 855, 863 (1918).

[10]
 58 Phil. 817 (1933).

[11]
 Rollo, p. 43.

[12]
 ART. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any
person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former
marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.

[13]
 Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad.

[14]
 Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public
instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are
executed.

When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of
the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by
Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution.

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have
for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country.

[15]
 G.R. Nos. 89983-84, 6 March 1992, 207 SCRA 85.

[16]
 Rollo, p. 51.
[17]
 Id. at 20-21.

[18]
 G.R. No. 138509, 31 July 2000, 336 SCRA 747, 752-753.

[19]
 Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes
of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void.

[20]
 Supra.

[21]
 CA Rollo, p. 38.

[22]
 Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2)  A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this
Title; and
(3)   A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the
contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that
they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two
witnesses of legal age.
[23]
 Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the
marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2).

A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as
provided in Article 45.

An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage
but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally
and administratively liable.

[24]
 Rollo, p. 54.

[25]
 G.R. No. 137110, 1 August 2000, 337 SCRA 122.

[26]
 Id. at 124.

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316 Phil. 161

FIRST DIVISION
[ A.M. No. MTJ-94-963, July 14, 1995 ]
MARILOU NAMA MORENO, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE JOSE C.
BERNABE, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 72,
PASIG, METRO MANILA, RESPONDENT. 

DECISION

KAPUNAN, J.: 

The responsibility of a Judge is indeed heavy.  As the incarnation of law and justice,
it is his sworn duty to lead by example, to be the example.  But how can he inspire
the people to live by the law if he himself fails to do so?

Marilou Nama Moreno filed this complaint against Judge Jose C. Bernabe of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 72, Pasig, Metro Manila for grave misconduct and
gross ignorance of the law.

Complainant alleges that on October 4, 1993, she and Marcelo Moreno were
married before respondent Judge Bernabe.  She avers that Respondent Judge
assured her that the marriage contract will be released ten (10) days after October
4, 1993.  Complainant then visited the office of the Respondent Judge on October
15, 1993 only to find out that she could not get the marriage contract because the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar failed to issue a Marriage license.  She claims that
Respondent Judge connived with the relatives of Marcelo Moreno to deceive her. [1]

In his comment,[2] Respondent denied that he conspired with the relatives of

Marcelo Moreno to solemnize the marriage for the purpose of deceiving the
complainant.

Respondent contends:

1. That the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig has actually prepared the marriage license
but it was not released due to the subsequent objection of the father of Marcelo
Moreno;

2. That he did not violate the law nor did he have the slightest intention to violate
the law when he, in good faith, solemnized the marriage, as he was moved only by
a desire to help a begging and pleading complainant who wanted some kind of
assurance or security due to her pregnant condition;

3. That in order to pacify complainant, Marcelo Moreno requested him to perform

the marriage ceremony, with the express assurance that "the marriage license was
definitely forthcoming since the necessary documents were complete;" [3]

4. That the contracting parties were not known to him; and

5. That both parties, particularly the complainant, were fully apprised of the effects
of a marriage performed without the required marriage license.

In a Resolution dated August 10, 1994, we referred this matter for investigation,
report and recommendation to Executive Judge Martin Villarama, Jr., of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 156.

In his Memorandum of October 11, 1994, Judge Villarama, Jr. recommended the
dismissal of the complaint against Respondent for failure of complainant to appear
on any of the scheduled hearings and on the basis of a "Sinumpaang
Salaysay"[4]executed on behalf of complainant who has left for Singapore by her
elder sister Sherlita N. Bendanillo expressly withdrawing her complaint against
Respondent.

Judge Villarama, however, also recommended that the Respondent be issued a

stern warning "in view of the fact on record that he indeed solemnized a marriage
without the requisite marriage license...."[5]

On November 7, 1994, we referred the aforementioned Memorandum to the Office

of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation.

In its Memorandum dated January 17, 1995, the Office of the Court Administrator
stated:

Careful study of the records reveal that indeed respondent Judge displayed his
ignorance of the law when he solemnized the marriage without a marriage license. 
As a judge, he is presumed to be aware of the existence of Article 3(2) of the
Family Code of the Philippines (E.O. 209, as amended by E.O. 227), which provides
that one of the formal requisites of a marriage is a valid marriage license.  Absence
of said requisite will make the marriage void from the beginning (Article 35 [3], the
Family Code of the Philippines). Judges are enjoined to show more than just a
cursory acquaintance of the law and other established rules. [6]

It recommended that Respondent be held liable for misconduct for solemnizing a

marriage without a marriage license and that the appropriate administrative
sanctions be imposed against him.[7]

We concur with the findings and recommendation of the Office of the Court
Administrator.
Respondent, by his own admission[8] that he solemnized the marriage between
complainant and Marcelo Moreno without the required marriage license, has
dismally failed to live up to his commitment to be the "embodiment of competence,
integrity and independence"[9] and to his promise to be "faithful to the law."[10]

Respondent cannot hide behind his claim of good faith and Christian motives which,
at most, would serve only to mitigate his liability but not exonerate him
completely.  Good intentions could never justify violation of the law.

Must we always repeat our reminder in Uy v. Dizon Capulong [11] and several other
cases[12] that -

...the judge is the visible representation of law and justice from whom the people
draw their will and awareness to obey the law.  For the judge to return that regard,
the latter must be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for the
others to follow.  The judge should be studiously careful to avoid even the slightest
infraction of the law.  To fulfill this mission, the judge should keep abreast of the
law, the rulings and doctrines of this Court.  If the judge is already aware of them,
the latter should not deliberately refrain from applying them; otherwise such
omission can never be excused.

And have we not frequently stressed that:

... judges should endeavor to maintain at all times the confidence and high respect
accorded to those who wield the gavel of justice.  Circular No. 13, dated July 1,
1987, enjoins judges "to conduct themselves strictly in accordance with the
mandate of existing laws and the Code of Judicial Conduct that they be exemplars
in their communities and the living personification of justice and the Rule of Law....
[13]

A case in point, a definite precedent and a clear basis in determining the liability of
Respondent in the instant case is Cosca, et al. v. Palaypayon, Jr., et al.[14] where
Judge Palaypayon, Jr. was duly fined and sternly warned for, among others,
solemnizing marriages without licenses.  We declared:

... the conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the
dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, should be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility.  His conduct, at all times,
must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum but, above all else, must
be beyond suspicion.  Every employee should be an example of integrity,
uprightness and honesty.  Integrity in a judicial office is more than a virtue, it is a
necessity.  It applies, without qualification as to rank or position, from the judge to
the least of its personnel, they being standard-bearers of the exacting norms of
ethics and morality imposed upon a Court of justice.

On the charge regarding illegal marriages the Family Code pertinently provides that
the formal requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in
the cases provided for therein.  Complementarily, it declares that the absence of
any of the essential or formal requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab
initio  and that, while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the
validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be
civilly, criminally and administratively liable.

The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those affected by the
illegal marriages, and what we are providing for herein pertains to the
administrative liability of respondents, all without prejudice to their criminal
responsibility.  The Revised Penal Code provides that "[p]riests or ministers of any
religious denomination or sect, or civil authorities who shall perform or authorize
any illegal marriage ceremony shall be punished in accordance with the provisions
of the Marriage Law."  This is of course, within the province of the prosecutorial
agencies of the Government.

Finally, on the alleged withdrawal of the complaint against Respondent, we reiterate

our ruling in Imbing v. Tiongson:[15]

The fact that complainant has lost interest in prosecuting the administrative case
against herein respondent judge will not necessarily warrant a dismissal thereof. 
Once charges have been filed, the Supreme Court may not be divested of its
jurisdiction to investigate and ascertain the truth of the matter alleged in the
complaint.  The Court has an interest in the conduct of members of the Judiciary
and in improving the delivery of justice to the people, and its efforts in that
direction may not be derailed by the complainant's desistance from further
prosecuting the case he or she initiated.

To condition administrative actions upon the will of every complainant, who may,
for one reason or another, condone a detestable act, is to strip this Court of its
supervisory power to discipline erring members of the Judiciary.  Definitely,
personal interests are not material or controlling.  What is involved here is a matter
of public interest considering that respondent is no ordinary citizen but an officer of
the court whose personal behavior not only upon the bench and in the performance
of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Respondent is hereby ordered to pay a

fine of P10,000.00 and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar
acts will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, and Quiason, JJ., concur. 

[1]
 Memorandum from the Office of the Court Administrator, signed by Deputy Court
Administrator Juanito A. Bernard as approved by Court Administrator Ernani Cruz
Pano, Rollo,  p. 58.
[2]
 Rollo, pp. 14-16.

[3]
 Id. at 15.

[4]
 Rollo,  p. 49.

[5]
 Id. at 56.

[6]
 Id. at 59.

[7]
 Id. at 60.

[8]
 Pre-hearing Order dated September 6, 1994 issued by Executive Judge Martin S.
Villarama, Jr. which contains the following admissions made by Respondent at the
pre-hearing conference:

xxx 

3. That respondent Judge solemnized marriage of the complainant and one Marcelo
Moreno on Oct. 4, 1993;

4. That at that time, i.e., at the time the marriage was solemnized, the marriage
license has not yet been issued/released by the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig;

xxx. (Rollo, p. 42.)

[9]
 Rule 1.01 Canon 1 Code of Judicial Conduct

[10]
 Rule 3.01 Canon 3 Code of Judicial Conduct.

[11]
 221 SCRA 87 (1993).

[12]
 Garcia v. De la Pena, 229 SCRA 766 (1994); OCA v. Gines, 224 SCRA 261
(1993); Garganera v. Jocson, 213 SCRA 149 (1992).

[13]
 Cuaresma v. Aguilar, 226 SCRA 73 (1993).

[14]
 A.M. No. MTJ-92-721, Sept. 30, 1994.

[15]
 229 SCRA 690 (1994).
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