SECOND DIVISION

FLORENTINO PINEDA, G.R. No. 143188

Petitioner,

Present:

- versus - QUISUMBING, J.,

Chairperson,
CARPIO,

HEIRS OF ELISEO GUEVARA, CARPIO MORALES,

represented by ERNESTO E. TINGA, and

GUEVARA and ISAGANI S. VELASCO, JR.

GUEVARA, namely: ELISEO

GUEVARA, JR., ZENAIDA G. Promulgated:

SAPALICIO, DANTE G.

GUEVARA, DANILO C. GUEVARA,

and ISAGANI S. GUEVARA, February 14, 2007

Respondents.

x -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

TINGA, J.:

On appeal by way of certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure are the Decision[1] and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54074. The Decision reversed the order of dismissal
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 273, Marikina, and directed the court a quo to conduct trial on
the merits, while the Resolution denied petitioner Pinedas motion for reconsideration.

As borne out by the records, the following are the factual antecedents.

On 7 September 1995, respondents Eliseo Guevara, Jr., Zenaida G. Sapalicio, Dante G. Guevara and
Isagani S. Guevara, collectively referred hereinafter as the Guevara heirs, filed an action for the
nullification of the certificates of title of a parcel of land measuring approximately 2,304 hectares
situated in Marikina.

Named defendants were the estate of the late Pedro Gonzales, Virginia Perez, Crisanta Perez, Jose Perez,
Roy Guadalupe, Lino Bucad and Florentino Pineda. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-171-MK,
was raffled to Branch 273 of the RTC of Marikina.

The Guevara heirs alleged in the complaint that they were the co-owners of a property originally covered
by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 386 issued on 7 December 1910 in favor of the spouses Emiliano
Guevara and Matilde Crimen. The couples son, and the Guevara heirs predecessor-in-interest, Eliseo
Guevara, allegedly purchased the property on 1 January 1932 and had exercised ownership over the
property since then by selling and donating portions thereof to third persons. The Guevara heirs averred
that the sale of the property to Eliseo Guevara was annotated at the back of OCT No. 386.

According to the Guevara heirs, the defendants illegally claimed ownership and possession over a certain
portion of the property, particularly that area covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 223361
issued to the estate of Pedro C. Gonzales. TCT No. 223361 was derived from OCT No. 629, which the
Guevara heirs described as fake, having been issued only on 26 January 1912 or subsequent to the
issuance of OCT No. 386. Hence, the Guevara heirs prayed that OCT No. 629 and its derivative titles, to
wit, TCT Nos. 223361, 244447, 244448, 244449 be cancelled, that the Guevara heirs be declared owners
of the property and that a new certificate of title be issued in their names.
Defendant Pineda filed an answer with counterclaim, raising the defenses of lack of cause of action,
prescription, laches and estoppel. He averred that he was a buyer in good faith and had been in actual
possession of the land since 1970 initially as a lessor and subsequently as an owner. He registered the
property in his name and was issued TCT No. 257272.

Defendants Virginia, Crisanta, and Jose, all surnamed Perez, filed an answer with compulsory
counterclaim and averred that their father, Marcos Perez, purchased the property from the late Pedro
Gonzales and had it declared in Perezs name for taxation purposes. According to them, they had been in
actual possession of a lot measuring 375 square meters before 1958 and had been regularly paying the
property taxes thereon.

The rest of the defendants, including the estate of Pedro Gonzales, also filed an answer with
counterclaim, raising the same defenses of laches and prescription and res judicata. They claimed that
OCT No. 629 was issued to the Municipality of Marikina in 1912 and that the late Pedro Gonzales and his
family started occupying the property as early as 1950 as lessees thereon. The late Pedro Gonzales
allegedly bought the property from the Municipality of Marikina in a public bidding on 25 April 1966 and
had allowed defendants to occupy the property. They asserted that the Guevara heirs never actually
occupied the property.

On 4 December 1995, the RTC set the case for hearing as if a motion to dismiss had been filed. During
the hearing, the parties presented oral arguments and were directed to file their memoranda.

After submission of memoranda, the RTC issued an Order dated 7 May 1996, dismissing the action on
the ground of laches. The Guevara heirs appealed the order of dismissal, claiming the denial of their
right to due process.

On 23 August 1999, the Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed Decision, which set aside the RTCs
order of dismissal and directed the reinstatement of Civil Case No. 95-171-MK. The appellate court ruled
that a complaint cannot be dismissed under Rule

16, Section 1[2] of the Rules of Court based on laches since laches is not one of the grounds enumerated
under said provision. Although the RTC order of dismissal did not rule on the other affirmative defenses
raised by petitioners in the answer, such as lack of cause of action, prescription and res judicata, the
Court of Appeals discussed them and ruled that none of these affirmative defenses raised were present
to warrant the dismissal of the action.

Only Pineda sought reconsideration. In its 3 May 2000 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied Pinedas
motion. Hence, the instant petition, attributing the following errors to the Court of Appeals:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE APPEAL OF RESPONDENTS WHICH
RAISED ONLY PURELY QUESTIONS OF LAW; AND, THEREFORE, IT ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN
HEARING AND DECIDING THE SAID APPEALED CASE.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF LACHES AS
ANALOGOUS TO PRESCRIPTION.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL COURTS DISMISSAL OF THE RESPONDENTS
COMPLAINT IS ERRONEOUS FOR THE REASON THAT THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF LACHES IS NOT
AMONG THE GROUNDS FOR A MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER THE RULES, WHICH MAY BE ALLEGED AS
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE TO BE PROVED DURING THE TRIAL.

AS A COROLLARY TO THE THIRD ASSIGNED ERROR ABOVE, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
TREATING THE ASSAILED ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF RESPONDENTS COMPLAINT BY THE TRIAL COURT AS A
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, TO AVOID PROTRACTED LITIGATION.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT WHILE PRESCRIPTION IN DEROGATION OF THE
TITLE TO REGISTERED OWNERS WILL NOT LIE, LACHES WILL.[3]

Counsel for the estate of Pedro Gonzales filed a Comment/Manifestation,[4] stating that her clients have
adopted and joined Pinedas petition praying for the reinstatement of the trial courts order of dismissal.
At bottom, the petition raises two main issues, to wit: (1) whether or not the appeal of the heirs of
Guevara was improperly elevated to the Court of Appeals since, according to them, it raised a pure
question of law; and (2) whether or not the trial court correctly dismissed the action on the ground of
laches without conducting trial on the merits.

Petitioner Pineda had ample opportunity to raise before the Court of Appeals the objection on the
improper mode of appeal taken by the heirs of Guevara. This, he failed to do. The issue of improper
appeal was raised only in Pinedas motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals Decision. Hence,
this Court cannot now, for the first time on appeal, pass upon this issue. For an issue cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal.[5] In any case, the appeal by the heirs of Guevara also raised the issue regarding
the existence of laches on the part of petitioners as defendants, which is factual in nature as discussed
below.

Now, did the trial court correctly order the dismissal of the complaint based on laches without
conducting trial on the merits? The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that under Rule 16, Section 1[6]
of the Rules of Court, laches is not enumerated under said provision, hence, it must be proved during
trial. On the other hand, petitioner Pineda asserts that laches is analogous to prescription and,
therefore, can be a ground of dismissing a complaint as though a motion to dismiss is filed.

Well-settled is the rule that the elements of laches must be proved positively. Laches is evidentiary in
nature which could not be established by mere allegations in the pleadings and can not be resolved in a
motion to dismiss. At this stage therefore, the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of laches is
premature.[7] Those issues must be resolved at the trial of the case on the merits wherein both parties
will be given ample opportunity to prove their respective claims and defenses.[8]
The elements of laches are: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims,
giving rise to the situation of which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the
complainants rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the defendants conduct as
having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the
defendant that the complainant would assert the right in which he bases his suit; and (4) injury or
prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held
barred.[9]

Whether or not the elements of laches are present is a question involving a factual determination by the
trial court. There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to
be determined according to its particular circumstances.[10] Laches is not concerned with the mere
lapse of time, rather, the party must have been afforded an opportunity to pursue his claim in order that
the delay may sufficiently constitute laches.[11] Without prejudging the instant case, an apparent delay
in the enforcement of ones claim does not automatically constitute laches. The party charged with
negligence or omission in invoking his right must be afforded the opportunity to raise his defenses,
which can be accommodated only in a contentious proceeding.

In reversing the RTCs order of dismissal, the Court of Appeals held that laches could not be a ground to
dismiss the complaint as it is not enumerated under Rule 16, Section 1.[12] This is not entirely correct.
Under paragraph (h) thereof, where a claim or demand set forth in the plaintiffs pleading has been paid,
waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished, the same may be raised in a motion to dismiss. The
language of the rule, particularly on the relation of the words abandoned and otherwise extinguished to
the phrase claim or demand deemed set forth in the plaintiffs pleading is broad enough to include within
its ambit the defense of bar by laches. However, when a party moves for the dismissal of the complaint
based on laches, the trial court must set a hearing on the motion where the parties shall submit not only
their arguments on the questions of law but also their evidence on the questions of fact involved.[13]
Thus, being factual in nature, the elements of laches must be proved or disproved through the
presentation of evidence by the parties. As discussed above, an apparent delay in the filing of a
complaint as shown in a pleading does not automatically warrant the dismissal of the complaint on the
ground of laches.
In the case at bar, while the trial court correctly set the case for hearing as though a motion to dismiss
had been filed, the records do not reveal that it extended to the parties the opportunity to present
evidence. For instance, counsel for the heirs of Guevara filed and served written interrogatories[14] on
one of the defendants but the trial court held in abeyance the resolution of the motion to order the
defendant to submit answers to the written interrogatories.[15] The trial court likewise denied the Ex
Parte Motion To Set Trial filed by the heirs of Guevara.[16] These were the instances which would have
enabled the trial court to receive evidence on which to anchor its factual findings. Although the trial
court heard oral arguments and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda, the
presentation of evidence on the defenses which are grounds for a motion to dismiss was not held at all.
Otherwise, the oral arguments and memoranda submitted by the parties would have enabled this Court
to review the trial courts factual finding of laches instead of remanding the case for trial on the merits. A
perusal of the records precludes this Court from making a categorical declaration on whether the heirs of
Guevara were guilty of laches.

Neither does the affirmative defense of prescription alleged in an answer automatically warrant the
dismissal of the complaint under Rule 16. An allegation of prescription can effectively be used in a
motion to dismiss only when the complaint on its face shows that indeed the action has already
prescribed.[17] Otherwise, the issue of prescription is one involving evidentiary matters requiring a full-
blown trial on the merits and cannot be determined in a mere motion to dismiss.[18] Pinedas theory
that the defense of laches should be treated as an affirmative defense of prescription warranting the
dismissal of the complaint is erroneous.
There is also no basis in procedural law to treat the RTCs order of dismissal as a summary judgment. The
trial court cannot motu proprio decide that summary judgment on an action is in order. Under the
applicable provisions of Rule 35, the defending party or the claimant, as the case may be, must invoke
the rule on summary judgment by filing a motion.[19] The adverse party must be notified of the motion
for summary judgment[20] and furnished with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions before
hearing is conducted.[21] More importantly, a summary judgment is permitted only if there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and a moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.[22]

Based on the parties allegations in the complaint and answer, the issues in the case at bar are far from
settled. For instance, both petitioner and respondents claim their ownership rights over the same
property based on two different original certificates of title. Respondents charge petitioner of illegal
occupation while the latter invokes good faith in the acquisition of the property. Clearly, these are factual
matters which can be best ventilated in a full-blown proceeding before the trial court, especially when
what are involved appear to be sizeable parcels of land covered by two certificates of title.

Except for Pineda, the other defendants did not elevate the Court of Appeals Decision to this Court. With
respect to them, the appellate courts Decision has already become final and conclusive, notwithstanding
their adoption[23] of Pinedas petition.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED and the Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54074 are AFFIRMED. Let the records of the case be remanded
for further proceedings to the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City, which is hereby ORDERED to try and
decide the case with deliberate speed.
SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Associate Justice

Chairperson

ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Associate Justice

Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

[1]Penned by Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero, Chairman, Eleventh Division, and concurred in by JJ.
Portia Alio-Hormachuelos and Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando.

[2]RULES OF COURT, Rule 16, Sec. 1. Grounds. Within the time for but before the filing the answer to the
complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following
grounds:

(a) That the court has no jurisdiction over person of the defending party;

(b) That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim;

(c) That venue is improperly laid;

(d) That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue;

(e) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause;

(f) That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of limitations;

(g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action;

(h) That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiffs pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned, or
otherwise extinguished;

(i) That the claim on which the action is founded is unenforceable under the provisions of the statute
of frauds; and

(j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with.

[3]Rollo, pp. 17-18.

[4]Id. at 46-48.
[5]Lim v. Queensland Tokyo Commodities, Inc., G.R. No. 136031, 4 January 2002, 373 SCRA 31, 41.

[6]Supra note 2.

[7]Felix Gochan and Sons Realty Corporation v. Heirs of Raymundo Baba, G.R. No. 138945, 19 August
2003, 409 SCRA 306, 315.

[8]National Irrigation Administration v. Court of Appeals, 376 Phil. 362, 376 (1999).

[9]Santos v. Santos, 418 Phil. 681, 692 (2001).

[10]Agra v. Philippine National Bank, 368 Phil. 829, 842 (1999).

[11]Juco v. Heirs of Tomas Siy Chung Fu, G.R. No. 150233, 16 February 2005, 451 SCRA 464, 472.
[12]Rollo, p. 39.

[13]RULES OF COURT, Rule 16, Sec. 2.

[14]Records, p. 122.

[15]Id. at 147.

[16]Id. at 161.

[17]National Irrigation Administration v. Court of Appeals, supra note 8 at 376.

[18]Balo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129704, 30 September 2005, 471 SCRA 227, 240.

[19]RULES OF COURT, Rule 35, Sec. 2. Summary judgment for defending party. A party against whom a
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may, at any time, move
with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any
part thereof.

[20]RULES OF COURT, Rule 35, Sec. 3.

[21]RULES OF COURT, Rule 35, Sec. 2.

[22]RULES OF COURT, Rule 35, Sec. 3.

[23]Rollo, p. 46.