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Gentilucci, J. L. (2007). Managing communication during a school crisis: A case

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Managing Communication
During a School Crisis:
A Case Study

JAMES L. GENTILUCCI

ABSTRACT: Crisis communication training of school principals is problem-

atic because it overemphasizes media relations and underemphasizes the
critical importance of immediate and personal communication with stu-
dents, staff, and parents—those most affected by school crises. A case
study involving the death of a student in a small rural school explains why
insider-first communication should be principals’ first priority during an
emergency. It describes how the approach was successfully used and
how it increased public confidence in the crisis management abilities of a
principal and his staff. Analysis of the case provides several important les-
sons for principals who face similar circumstances: Be proactive and take
charge of communication; communicate first and personally with those
most affected by a crisis; speak through the media with one voice; seek
the advice and expertise of others; adapt communication plans as neces-
sary; manage public perception from the inside out; and learn from mis-
takes.

R obert Burns, the 18th-century Scottish poet, said that

the best laid plans of mice and men often go awry, and
nowhere is this truism more evident than in attempts by
school principals to manage communication during emer-
gencies. This is surprising because there is a plethora of in-
formation about best practices for crisis communication,
readily available to schools and districts (see Heath, 2006;
National Education Association, n.d.; Seeger, 2006; Twine-
ham, 1996). Given this body of knowledge, one wonders why
crisis communication efforts frequently go awry and fail to
produce desired outcomes.

318 Journal of School Public Relations Volume 28—Fall 2007

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Managing Communication During a School Crisis 319

According to Twineham (1996), weak or ambiguous emer-

gency preparedness policies, coupled with a lack of re-
sources for proper training, leave many principals ill-pre-
pared for the task, and in districts where adequate planning
and preparation do occur, media relations are often the
focus of such training. In some districts, principals are
taught to use broadcast media as the first conduit for dis-
seminating information to internal constituents (i.e., stu-
dents, staff, and parents) as well as the public at large
(Seeger, 2006). This is problematic for several reasons.
First, timely, appropriate, and thorough communication
with students, staff, and parents—not the media—is the ini-
tial and most important duty of principals (Kowalski, 2005).
These insiders are most seriously affected by school crises
and have unique needs (Dyregrov, Bie Wikander, & Vigerust,
1999). Second, broadcast media is not the most effective
channel for communicating crisis-related information to in-
ternal constituents, even though it can quickly blanket a
community with information (Benoit, 1995). In many in-
stances, communication via school networks is more useful
because it allows messages to be tailored for audiences.
Third, direct communication with internal constituents is
more effective than media broadcasts for dispelling rumors
(Padgett, 2006; Vann, 1992). Principals who attempt to
quash rumors via the media discover that the approach
often fails to remedy and, in fact, frequently exacerbates the
problem because reporters and school administrators have
conflicting communication agendas. The former seek wide
and immediate distribution of all available information to
ensure that they scoop a story (Kowalski, 2005), whereas the
latter strive to protect confidentiality, clarify facts, and limit
distribution of information that could reflect negatively on
themselves or their schools (Seeger, 2006).
Finally, crises, especially those involving children, have
potential to create panic, and it is incumbent upon princi-
pals and their staffs to allay fear whenever possible. Relying
on broadcast media to accomplish this is a mistake because
reporters often embellish and sensationalize news to attract
audiences. This heightens fear, and it works against efforts
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320 JAMES L. GENTILUCCI

to promote calm. Instead, principals and their staffs should

use internal communication strategies, such as face-to-face
meetings and phone trees, to disseminate constructive,
calming, and encouraging messages (National Education As-
sociation, n.d.).
In sum, principals struggle with crisis communication be-
cause disaster-preparedness training places too much em-
phasis on media relations and not enough on internal com-
munication tactics. Although media relations are essential
for image management and communication with external
publics (Coombs, 1999), they are not the most effective
means of disseminating factual information, preventing ru-
mors, and promoting calm during a campus emergency.
The following case study describes how the insider com-
munication approach helped one school cope successfully
with the death of a student, and it explains why the ap-
proach challenges the conventional wisdom that shapes
many crisis management training programs.

TRAGEDY AT SAN PABLO SCHOOL

By all accounts, Gabriela Fuentes was a happy, well-ad-

justed 6-year-old girl enrolled in the first grade at San Pablo
School.1 She was one of four children, whose immigrant par-
ents worked in local vineyards. Like most other immigrant
families in the community, the Fuenteses were poor and
spoke little English, but they enjoyed the kinship and sup-
port of a large and tightly knit Latino community in San
Pablo. Many of Gabriela’s aunts, uncles, and cousins had
also come to the United States in search of better lives and
had settled in the same small rural town.
San Pablo School, where Gabriela, her siblings, and
cousins were enrolled, served as the hub of the community.
Originally established to meet the educational needs of chil-
dren of local ranchers, San Pablo School experienced a siz-
able influx of Spanish-speaking students during the past
decade and now served approximately 450 students in
kindergarten through Grade 8, one third of whom were chil-
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Managing Communication During a School Crisis 321

dren of migrant farmworkers. Because of its relatively small

size, San Pablo enjoyed a reputation as a family school
where the principal, staff, parents, and students socialized
at school and community functions. This sense of family was
even stronger among the growing Latino community, where
the children often said, “Todos el mundo—nuestro primos”
(“The whole world—our cousins”).
One Sunday afternoon in midwinter, Gabriela, her older
brothers, and several of their friends were playing in the
Fuenteses’ yard on a makeshift swingset that Gabriela’s fa-
ther had constructed from discarded irrigation pipe.
Gabriela shrieked with delight as her brothers pushed her
higher and higher on the swing. The other friends soon
joined in the fun, and they began to rock the swing set back
and forth in motion with Gabriela’s swinging body. Sud-
denly, things went terribly wrong.
The swingset was not anchored to the ground, and the mo-
tion of Gabriela’s body, coupled with the rocking by her
brothers’ friends, tipped over the entire apparatus. Gabriela
was thrown violently to the ground, and the falling swingset
struck her on the head and neck. The children were
stunned, and Gabriela, although still conscious, did not
move or make a sound. The boys quickly summoned help
from nearby adults, and the paramedics were called. They
arrived to find the critically injured girl surrounded by her
terrified playmates. Despite their best efforts, Gabriela
Fuentes died at the scene.
News of the tragedy spread quickly among the Fuenteses’
neighbors and friends, and Gabriela’s teacher called David
Thompson, superintendent and principal of San Pablo
School, to tell him that Gabriela had been killed in an acci-
dent. After hanging up the phone, a shocked and saddened
Thompson remembered that Gabriela had given him a hug
as she left school the previous Friday afternoon. He recalled
her sweet disposition and smile as he contemplated how to
communicate information about the tragedy to the commu-
nity of San Pablo School.
As he pondered his next steps, Thompson knew that he
faced two immediate challenges. Even though the accident
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322 JAMES L. GENTILUCCI

had not occurred on school property, he was keenly aware of

the centrality of San Pablo School in the affairs of the com-
munity. He knew that the school would become an informa-
tion hub when classes resumed on Monday morning, and he
wanted to ensure that his staff communicated appropriate
factual information to parents and students while respecting
the privacy of the Fuentes family. He was aware that rumors
spread quickly in small communities such as San Pablo, and
he did not want incorrect information about the accident to
cause additional heartache for Gabriela’s family and the
boys who were involved in the incident.
Thompson also wanted to inform the community that
Gabriela’s death had not occurred on the school playground.
He was aware of how school parents emotionally react to
tragic news, and he did not want them to assume that the
school’s play equipment was responsible for the death of a
child. Such an assumption could quickly become a rumor
and seriously harm the reputation of the school. Instead of
working reactively to repair damage after gossip spread,
Thompson decided to be proactive and communicate quickly
with parents and students before the school’s rumor mill
began to churn.
San Pablo School had a well-designed crisis management
plan, and Thompson’s first decision was to activate the staff
phone tree. He created a simple message stating that a first-
grade student had been killed in an accident at her home,
and he asked staff to attend an emergency meeting at 7:45
a.m. the following morning. He provided as much detail as
was appropriate and instructed staff to call him directly if
they had questions. Next, he contacted the local branch of
hospice and asked them to send a representative to the
morning meeting. He also consulted with superintendents of
two adjoining school districts and asked them to loan coun-
seling resources to his school. Both gave Thompson their full
support, and school counselors were put on standby to as-
sist as needed.
When school staff assembled the next morning, Thompson
saw that they were upset and visibly shaken. He began by
calmly clarifying facts about Gabriela’s death, and his can-
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Managing Communication During a School Crisis 323

dor and openness helped dispel rumors that had already

begun to circulate among school personnel. He also distrib-
uted a set of guidelines about what was to be said and was
not to be said to students when inquiries were made about
Gabriela. Thompson encouraged staff not to initiate conver-
sations about Gabriela but to answer questions calmly and
factually if asked. He instructed Gabriela’s teacher not to
move Gabriela’s desk and personal belongings, telling her
that it was important for Gabriela’s young classmates’ emo-
tional well-being that she not disappear completely from the
classroom.
He then proceeded to explain the importance of communi-
cating a single coherent message about the tragedy to the
public, and he informed staff that he, as superintendent and
principal, would be the official point of contact for all com-
munication with the media. This was a prescient decision
because local media called school staff later that day to ob-
tain their reaction to the death of a San Pablo student.
After Thompson finished speaking, the hospice represen-
tative talked about how to help children cope with the death
of a peer. She also listened as staff members voiced their
feelings about the tragedy. As the meeting adjourned,
Thompson asked the representative to coordinate response
efforts between hospice and the school to ensure that staff
had appropriate support and guidance as they worked with
students and families.
The school day began uneventfully, but it was soon ap-
parent that students, staff, and parents needed the counsel-
ing resources that were on standby. Several children had
been present when Gabriela was injured, and many more
had gathered by the time that she had died. These children
and their parents were traumatized. Counselors worked
throughout the day and the following week to help them
cope with their grief.
Once resources had been deployed in support of staff and
students, Thompson turned his attention to the Fuentes fam-
ily. Gabriela’s older brothers and several cousins were stu-
dents at the school, and he knew that they required special
assistance. He asked Guadalupe Rios, the school’s migrant
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324 JAMES L. GENTILUCCI

education coordinator, if she would be willing to coordinate

support services for the family. Rios agreed and was given 3
days of release time to conduct home visits with the Fuente-
ses. She accompanied them to the mortuary as a translator
to help the Fuentes parents make arrangements for
Gabriela’s funeral. She also started a collection among school
staff to help the family pay the cost of burial, and by week’s
end, she had raised over $4,000 in donations.
The community mourned as Gabriela was laid to rest at
the week’s end. Thompson gave school staff opportunity to
attend the services, if they chose, and he attended to repre-
sent the school. Members of the media who had been in con-
tact with him throughout the week spoke with him again, at
the conclusion of the funeral. Thompson expressed his con-
dolences for the Fuentes family and told reporters about the
many efforts undertaken by the school to support the fam-
ily, students, staff, and local community. As he walked to his
car from the grave site, he reflected on the many communi-
cation-oriented decisions that he was forced to make during
what felt like one of the longest weeks of his life.

LESSONS LEARNED

Given the community’s positive reaction, Thompson and his

staff responded appropriately to the death of Gabriela. His
quick thinking and the staff’s support assuaged the com-
munity’s grief and boosted public confidence in the school’s
ability to cope effectively with a crisis. Several months after
the tragedy, Thompson reflected on how his communication
decisions helped the school weather the tragedy. As he re-
called the events surrounding Gabriela’s death, he described
problems that he encountered and offered important advice
for school principals who find themselves in similar circum-
stances.
Pay attention and be proactive. Failure to grasp the over-
whelming impact of a student death upon a school commu-
nity—regardless of circumstance—and not taking action to
quickly and appropriately communicate information to stu-
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Managing Communication During a School Crisis 325

dents, staff, and parents are serious errors. Thompson’s first

impulse after hearing news of Gabriela’s death was to mini-
mize the school’s role because the accident had not occurred
on district property. After some thought, however, he recon-
sidered. He knew that the death of a child would profoundly
affect the tightly knit community of San Pablo, especially, its
Latino population.
Thompson also knew that nothing travels faster through a
community grapevine than bad news, and he realized that
once the rumor mill began to churn, it would be difficult (if
not impossible) to correct misinformation (see Kowalski, Pe-
tersen, & Fusarelli, 2007). He was deeply concerned about
the impact of Gabriela’s death on the Fuentes family, and he
did not want them to experience additional pain from rumor
and speculation. Faced with these realizations, he knew that
he had to be proactive and lead communication efforts,
rather than passively allow others to control information
flow among school families.
Communicate first and personally with those most affected
by a crisis. One of Thompson’s first leadership decisions was
to modify San Pablo School’s emergency response plan. The
plan called for use of local media to disseminate information
to school families. However, Thompson knew that this ap-
proach was impersonal and subject to journalistic foibles.
The plan also recommended a formal letter be immediately
sent home to school families. Again, he deemed the ap-
proach too impersonal given the nature of the tragedy.
Instead of using either strategy, Thompson decided to first
disseminate information to students and parents using
phone calls and face-to-face meetings. Such personal con-
tact facilitated two-way communication; it gave staff oppor-
tunities to hear concerns, answer questions, and provide
emotional support; and it strengthened the bond of trust be-
tween staff and school families. Once students and parents
were thoroughly informed about the incident, Thompson
turned his attention to the media.
Speak through the media with one voice. Thompson knew
that he had little control over the media itself, but as per
the literature (e.g., Kowalski, 2005), he knew that he could
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326 JAMES L. GENTILUCCI

substantially influence the messages that the media con-

veyed to the community about Gabriela’s death. From the
outset of the crisis, he was determined to disseminate accu-
rate information to the community through the media,
which would happen only if communication was channeled
through an official school spokesperson. District policy re-
quired the principal to assume media liaison responsibili-
ties, and Thompson moved quickly to establish constructive
working relations with local media. When reporters con-
tacted the school, Thompson gave them information that
was timely, correct, and consistent. He issued regular press
releases and invited members of the media to participate in
information meetings. Thompson became an important in-
formation gatekeeper, and he used his role to positively
shape community perception of the school’s crisis response.
Seek the advice and expertise of others. After informing his
staff about Gabriela’s death, Thompson started writing a cri-
sis management to-do list. He paused, however, when he re-
called the adage that “you don’t know what you don’t know”
during emergencies, and he decided to consult with those
who had crisis management expertise before taking further
action. Information gleaned from conversations with fellow
administrators and a local hospice representative proved
tremendously valuable in the hours and days to come.
Thompson secured the services of two counselors from ad-
joining districts, who provided grief counseling for students
and parents. In another phone call, he negotiated with hos-
pice to coordinate its services with the school’s emergency
response efforts so that students, staff, and parents received
access to all available community resources during and after
the crisis.
When asked if this consultative process was common
practice among school leaders, Thompson shook his head
and said that, unfortunately, it was not. He explained that
principals feel a degree of apprehension and inadequacy
about their ability to manage emergencies effectively and are
keenly aware that it only takes one mishandled crisis to tar-
nish a reputation and erode public trust. Consequently,
many try to overcontrol response efforts to protect their per-
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Managing Communication During a School Crisis 327

sonal reputations. Others eschew the guidance of outside

experts because they fear that it will make them appear
weak, indecisive, and not in control. According to Thomp-
son, it is imperative for principals to set aside fear and ego
considerations for the benefit of their schools. Consulting
with others should not be seen as a weakness but as an act
of strength that can reduce stress and improve the quality of
crisis decisions.
Work the communication plan—do not allow the plan to
work you. No two crises are the same; all require differenti-
ated responses. Despite this, when responding to emergen-
cies, principals too often use a one-size-fits-all communica-
tion strategy (e.g., campuswide announcements, formal
letters to staff and parents, and broadcasts via local media).
This is problematic because communication plans should be
used as guidelines rather than strict prescriptions for action
(Heath, 2006). Although working the plan can reduce feel-
ings of uncertainty during chaotic events (National Educa-
tion Association, n.d.), failure to adapt plans to fit unique
crisis demands is a serious mistake.
Thompson knew that announcing the death of a student
required a different approach from the communication
strategies outlined in the school’s response plan (i.e., media
broadcasts and a formal letter from the principal). Conse-
quently, he and his staff modified the plan and used per-
sonal outreach rather than impersonal communication
methods because it better matched the distinctive demands
of the crisis.
Shape public perception of crisis management from the inside
out. Thompson and the San Pablo School staff received acco-
lades for their management of the crisis. Parents, community
leaders, and the local media all lauded them for their timely
and appropriate response to Gabriela’s death. This over-
whelmingly positive community reaction affirmed Thompson’s
decision to use the personal outreach strategy. Parents said
that the quick and compassionate manner in which school
staff shared news of the tragedy helped them cope with their
shock and grief. None could imagine what they might have felt
if they had heard the news first from the media.
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328 JAMES L. GENTILUCCI

The goodwill created by the personal communication

strategy resonated from school families to the entire com-
munity of San Pablo. This was an empowering experience for
Thompson and his staff because they learned that it was
possible to influence public perception from the inside out,
not only by managing messages, but also by using appropri-
ate communication channels to transmit them.
Learn from mistakes. Thompson and his staff did make
some errors during the emotional weeks of the crisis. When
errors did occur, however, staff did not lose faith in their ca-
pacity to manage; they simply made adjustments to the
communication plan and kept up the momentum of their
personal outreach. This ability to self-correct was another
key reason for their success.

CONCLUSION

The case study of San Pablo School demonstrates how rap-

idly schools become information hubs during crises and how
swiftly communication responsibilities are thrust upon prin-
cipals, many of whom are not well prepared for the task.
Principals say that their unpreparedness occurs because
their emergency training is often focused on media relations
and does not provide adequate training to help them com-
municate effectively with internal constituents. It makes
sense, therefore, to argue that crisis management programs
for school leaders be modified to teach communication from
the inside out. Disseminating information quickly and thor-
oughly to staff, students, and parents must be taught as a
first priority. Media relations should remain an important
component of training, but it should be placed in proper
context, not at the top of principals’ to-do lists.
Principals also need training on how to cope effectively
with the unpredictable nature of crises. Emerging issues
make it necessary to change communication tactics and
modify response plans, and current training emphasis on
working the plan as written, rather than improvising as nec-
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Managing Communication During a School Crisis 329

essary, hinders principals’ ability to respond appropriately

when circumstances change.
Finally, principals should be taught that best practices for
crisis communication are general guidelines rather than
rigid prescriptions for action. Communication strategies that
work well in one crisis may prove problematic in another. In
the last analysis, the ability of principals and their staffs to
choose strategies that most appropriately address the
unique challenges of each crisis may be the best practice of
all. JSPR

NOTE
1. All names used in the case study are pseudonyms.

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Padgett, R. (2006). Keeping cool in a crisis. Communicator, 29, 5–6.

Seeger, M. W. (2006). Best practices in crisis communication: An
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James L. Gentilucci is an assistant professor of educational leader-
ship in the Department of Graduate Studies in Education at California
Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo. His research interests
include instructional leadership, school reform, and students’ percep-
tions of schooling and learning. Before his university work, he was a
highly successful K–12 teacher, principal, and assistant superintend-
ent of schools. Address correspondence to Dr. James Gentilucci, Col-
lege of Education, 1 Grand Avenue, California Polytechnic State Uni-
versity, San Luis Obispo, CA 93407. E-mail: jgentilu@calpoly.edu.

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