THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 153798 September 2, 2005

BELEN SAGAD ANGELES, Petitioners,

vs.
ALELI "CORAZON" ANGELES MAGLAYA, Respondent.

DECISION

GARCIA, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
petitioner Belen Sagad Angeles seeks to set aside the Decision dated May
29, 20021 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 66037, reversing an
earlier Order of the Regional Trial Court at Caloocan City which dismissed
the petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Francisco Angeles,
thereat commenced by the herein respondent Aleli "Corazon" Angeles-
Maglaya.

The legal dispute between the parties started when, on March 25, 1998, in
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Caloocan City, respondent filed a
petition2 for letters of administration and her appointment as administratrix of
the intestate estate of Francisco M. Angeles (Francisco, hereinafter). In the
petition, docketed as Special Proceedings No. C-2140 and raffled to Branch
120 of the court, respondent alleged, among other things, the following:

1. That Francisco, a resident of 71 B. Serrano St., Grace Park, Caloocan,

died intestate on January 21, 1998 in the City of Manila, leaving behind four
(4) parcels of land and a building, among other valuable properties;

2. That there is a need to appoint an administrator of Francisco’s estate;

3. That she (respondent) is the sole legitimate child of the deceased and
Genoveva Mercado, and, together with petitioner, Belen S. Angeles,
decedent’s wife by his second marriage, are the surviving heirs of the
decedent; and

4. That she has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
required of an administrator.
Petitioner opposed the basic petition and prayed that she, instead of
respondent, be made the administratrix of Francisco’s estate.3 In support of
her opposition and plea, petitioner alleged having married Francisco on
August 7, 1948 before Judge Lucio M. Tianco of the Municipal Court of Rizal,
a union which was ratified two (2) months later in religious rites at the Our
Lady of Grace Parish in Caloocan City, and that Francisco represented in
their marriage contract that he was single at that time. Petitioner also averred
that respondent could not be the daughter of Francisco for, although she was
recorded as Francisco’s legitimate daughter, the corresponding birth
certificate was not signed by him. Pressing on, petitioner further alleged that
respondent, despite her claim of being the legitimate child of Francisco and
Genoveva Mercado, has not presented the marriage contract between her
supposed parents or produced any acceptable document to prove such
union. And evidently to debunk respondent’s claim of being the only child of
Francisco, petitioner likewise averred that she and Francisco had, during
their marriage, legally adopted Concesa A. Yamat, et al. Petitioner thus
urged that she, being the surviving spouse of Francisco, be declared as
possessed of the superior right to the administration of his estate.

In her reply to opposition, respondent alleged, inter alia, that per certification
of the appropriate offices, the January to December 1938 records of
marriages of the Civil Registrar of Bacolor, Pampanga where the alleged
1938 Francisco-Genoveva wedding took place, were destroyed. In the same
reply, respondent dismissed as of little consequence the adoption adverted
to owing to her having interposed with the Court of Appeals a petition to
nullify the decree of adoption entered by the RTC at Caloocan.4

Issues having been joined, trial ensued. Respondent, as petitioner a quo,

commenced the presentation of her evidence by taking the witness stand.
She testified having been born on November 20, 1939 as the legitimate child
of Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Mercado, who died in January
1988.5 She also testified having been in open and continuous possession of
the status of a legitimate child. Four (4) other witnesses testified on her
behalf, namely: Tomas Angeles,6 Francisco Yaya,7 Jose O. Carreon8 and
Paulita Angeles de la Cruz.9 Respondent also offered in evidence her birth
certificate which contained an entry stating that she was born at the Mary
Johnston Hospital, Tondo, Manila, to Francisco Angeles and Genoveva
Mercado and whereon the handwritten word "Yes" appears on the space
below the question "Legitimate? (Legitimo?)"; pictures taken during
respondent’s wedding as bride to Atty. Guillermo T. Maglaya; and a copy of
her marriage contract. Likewise offered were her scholastic and government
service records.

After respondent rested her case following her formal offer of exhibits,
petitioner filed a "Motion to Dismiss" under Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the Rules
of Court. In it, she prayed for the dismissal of the petition for letters of
administration on the ground that the petition failed "to state or prove a cause
of action", it being her stated position that "[P]etitioner [Corzaon], by her
evidence, failed to establish her filiation vis-à-vis the decedent, i.e., that she
is in fact a legitimate child of Francisco M. Angeles."10

To the motion to dismiss, respondent interposed an opposition, followed by

petitioner’s reply, to which respondent countered with a rejoinder.

Eventually, in an Order dated July 12, 1999,11 the trial court, on its finding
that respondent failed to prove her filiation as legitimate child of Francisco,
dismissed the petition, thus:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby ordered DISMISSED for

failure of the [respondent] to state a cause of action in accordance with
Section 1(g) of Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil of Procedure. (Word in
bracket added]

Respondent then moved for reconsideration, which motion was denied by

the trial court in its Order of December 17, 1999.12 Therefrom, respondent
went on appeal to the Court of Appeals where her recourse was docketed
as CA-G.R. CV No. 66037.

As stated at the threshold hereof, the Court of Appeals, in its assailed

Decision dated May 29, 2002,13 reversed and set aside the trial court’s order
of dismissal and directed it to appoint respondent as administratrix of the
estate of Francisco, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the appealed order of dismissal is REVERSED. The Trial

Court is hereby ordered to appoint petitioner-appellant Aleli "Corazon"
Angeles as administratrix of the intestate estate of Francisco Angeles.

SO ORDERED.

The appellate court predicated its ruling on the interplay of the following main
premises:
1. Petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss filed with the trial court, albeit premised on
the alleged failure of the underlying petition for letter of administration to state
or prove a cause of action, actually partakes of a demurrer to evidence under
Section 1 of Rule 33;14

2. Petitioner’s motion being a demurer, it follows that she thereby waived her
right to present opposing evidence to rebut respondent’s testimonial and
documentary evidence; and

3. Respondent has sufficiently established her legitimate filiation with the

deceased Francisco.

Hence, petitioner’s instant petition for review on certiorari, on the submission

that the Court of Appeals erred: (1) in reversing the trial court’s order of
dismissal;15 (2) in treating her motion to dismiss as a demurrer to evidence;
(3) in holding that respondent is a legitimate daughter of Francisco; and (4)
in decreeing respondent’s appointment as administratrix of Francisco’s
intestate estate.

We resolve to grant the petition.

The principal issue tendered in this case boils down to the question of
whether or not respondent is the legitimate child of decedent Francisco M.
Angeles and Genoveva Mercado. The Court of Appeals resolved the issue
in the affirmative and, on the basis of such determination, ordered the trial
court to appoint respondent as administratrix of Francisco’s estate.

We are unable to lend concurrence to the appellate court’s conclusion on the

legitimate status of respondent, or, to be precise, on her legitimate filiation to
the decedent. A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid
and lawful marriage. Remove the element of lawful union and there is strictly
no legitimate filiation between parents and child. Article 164 of the Family
Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter: "Children conceived or born
during the marriage of the parents are legitimate."

In finding for respondent, the Court of Appeals, citing and extensibly quoting
from Tison vs. Court of Appeals,16stated that since petitioner "opted not to
present any contrary evidence", the presumption on respondent’s legitimacy
stands "unrebutted."17

Following is an excerpt from Tison:

It seems that both the court a quo and respondent appellate court have
regrettably overlooked the universally recognized presumption on legitimacy.
There is no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on
sounder morality and more convincing than the presumption that children
born in wedlock are legitimate. And well-settled is the rule that the issue
of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally.

The rationale for this rule has been explained in this wise:

‘The presumption of legitimacy in the Family Code . . .

actually fixes a status for the child born in wedlock, and that civil status
cannot be attacked collaterally. xxx

xxx xxx xxx

‘Upon the expiration of the periods provided in Article 170 [of the Family
Code], the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child can no longer be bought.
The status conferred by the presumption, therefore, becomes fixed, and can
no longer be questioned. The obvious intention of the law is to prevent the
status of a child born in wedlock from being in a state of uncertainty. It also
aims to force early action to settle any doubt as to the paternity of such child
so that the evidence material to the matter . . . may still be easily available.’

xxxxxxxxx

‘Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife . .
. .’(Words in bracket added; Emphasis ours)

Contextually, the correct lesson of Tison, which the appellate court evidently
misapplied, is that: (a) a child is presumed legitimate only if conceived or
born in wedlock; and (b) the presumptive legitimacy of such child cannot be
attacked collaterally.

A party in whose favor the legal presumption exists may rely on and invoke
such legal presumption to establish a fact in issue. He need not introduce
evidence to prove that fact.18 For, a presumption is prima facie proof of the
fact presumed. However, it cannot be over-emphasized, that while a fact
thus prima facie established by legal presumption shall, unless overthrown,
stand as proved,19 the presumption of legitimacy under Article 164 of the
Family Code20 may be availed only upon convincing proof of the factual basis
therefor, i.e., that the child’s parents were legally married and that his/her
conception or birth occurred during the subsistence of that marriage. Else,
the presumption of law that a child is legitimate does not arise.

In the case at bench, the Court of Appeals, in its decision under review, did
not categorically state from what facts established during the trial was the
presumption of respondent’s supposed legitimacy arose. But even if perhaps
it wanted to, it could not have possibly done so. For, save for respondent’s
gratuitous assertion and an entry in her certificate of birth, there is absolutely
no proof of the decedent’s marriage to respondent’s mother, Genoveva
Mercado. To stress, no marriage certificate or marriage contract – doubtless
the best evidence of Francisco’s and Genoveva’s marriage, if one had been
solemnized21 – was offered in evidence. No priest, judge, mayor, or other
solemnizing authority was called to the witness box to declare that he
solemnized the marriage between the two. None of the four (4) witnesses
respondent presented could say anything about, let alone affirm, that
supposed marriage. At best, their testimonies proved that respondent was
Francisco’s daughter. For example, Tomas Angeles and Paulita Angeles de
la Cruz testified that they know respondent to be their cousin because his
(Tomas’) father and her (Paulita’s) mother, who are both Francisco’s
siblings, told them so.22 And one Jose Carreon would testify seeing
respondent in 1948 in Francisco’s house in Caloocan, the same Francisco
who used to court Genoveva before the war.23 In all, no evidence whatsoever
was presented of the execution of the Francisco Angeles-Genoveva
Mercado marriage contract; when and where their marriage was solemnized;
the identity of the solemnizing officer; the persons present, and like
significant details.

While perhaps not determinative of the issue of the existence of marriage

between Francisco and Genoveva, we can even go to the extent of saying
that respondent has not even presented a witness to testify that her putative
parents really held themselves out to the public as man-and-wife. Clearly,
therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in crediting respondent with the legal
presumption of legitimacy which, as above explained, should flow from a
lawful marriage between Francisco and Genevova. To reiterate, absent such
a marriage, as here, there is no presumption of legitimacy and, therefore,
there was really nothing for petitioner to rebut.

Parenthetically, for all her unyielding stance that her mother and Francisco
Angeles were married in 1938, respondent never, thru the years, even
question what would necessarily be a bigamous Francisco-Belen Sagad
marriage. Ironical as it may seem, respondent herself undermined her very
own case. As it were, she made certain judicial admission negating her own
assertion – as well as the appellate court’s conclusion - that Francisco was
legally married to Genoveva. As may be recalled, respondent had declared
that her mother Genoveva died in 1988, implying, quite clearly, that when
Francisco contracted marriage with petitioner Belen S. Angeles in 1948,
Genoveva and Francisco were already "spouses". Now, then, if, as
respondent maintained despite utter lack of evidence, that Genoveva
Mercado and Francisco were married in 1938, it follows that the marriage of
Francisco to petitioner Belen Angeles in 1948, or prior to Genoveva’s death,
would necessarily have to be bigamous, hence void,24 in which case
petitioner could not be, as respondent alleged in her petition for letters of
administration, a "surviving spouse" of the decedent. We quote the pertinent
allegation:

4. The surviving heirs of decedent are the petitioner [Corazon] herself who
is 58 years old, and BELEN S. Angeles, the surviving spouse of
deceased Francisco M. Angeles by his second marriage, who is about 77
years old . . . .YEARS OLD . . . " (Emphasis and word in bracket added)

We can concede, because Article 172 of the Family Code appears to say so,
that the legitimate filiation of a child can be established by any of the modes
therein defined even without direct evidence of the marriage of his/her
supposed parents. Said article 172 reads:

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the

following:

1. The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgments; or

2. An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private

handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be

proved by:

1. The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

2. Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Here, respondent presented, in support of her claim of legitimacy, a copy of
her Birth Certificate dated November 23, 1939 issued by the Civil Registrar
of the City of Manila (Exh. "E"). In it, her birth was recorded as the legitimate
child of Francisco Angeles and Genoveva Mercado. And the word "married"
is written in the certificate to indicate the union of Francisco and Genoveva.

Petitioner, however, contends, citing jurisprudence, that "[I]t was error for the
Court of Appeals to have ruled . . . that [respondent’s] Birth
Certificate indubitably establishes that she is the legitimate daughter of
Francisco and Genoveva who are legally married".

The contention commends itself for concurrence. The reason is as simple as

it is elementary: the Birth Certificate presented was not signed by Francisco
against whom legitimate filiation is asserted. Not even by Genoveva. It was
signed by the attending physician, one Rebecca De Guzman, who certified
to having attended the birth of a child. Such certificate, albeit considered a
public record of a private document is, under Section 23, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court, evidence only of the fact which gave rise to its execution: the
fact of birth of a child.25 Jurisprudence teaches that a birth certificate, to be
considered as validating proof of paternity and as an instrument of
recognition, must be signed by the father and mother jointly, or by the mother
alone if the father refuses.26 Dr. Arturo Tolentino, commenting on the
probative value of the entries in a certificate of birth, wrote:

xxx if the alleged father did not intervene in the making of the birth certificate,
the putting of his name by the mother or doctor or registrar is void; the
signature of the alleged father is necessary.27

The conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals that the Birth Certificate of
respondent, unsigned as it were by Francisco and Genoveva, establishes –
and "indubitably" at that - not only respondent’s filiation to Francisco but even
her being a legitimate daughter of Francisco and Genoveva, taxes credulity
to the limit. In a very real sense, the appellate court regarded such certificate
as defining proof of filiation, and not just filiation but of legitimate filiation, by
inferring from it that Francisco and Genoveva are legally married. In the apt
words of petitioner, the appellate court, out of a Birth Certificate signed by a
physician who merely certified having attended "the birth of a child who was
born alive at 3:50 P.M. ", created " a marriage that of ‘ Francisco and
Genoveva’, and filiation (that said child) is the daughter of ‘Francisco’"’28
It cannot be over-emphasized that the legitimate filiation of a child is a matter
fixed by law itself.29 It cannot, as the decision under review seems to suggest,
be made dependent on the declaration of the attending physician or midwife,
or that of the mother of the newborn child. For then, an unwed mother, with
or without the participation of a doctor or midwife, could veritably invest
legitimate status to her offspring through the simple expedient of writing the
putative father’s name in the appropriate space in the birth certificate. A long
time past, this Court cautioned against according a similar unsigned birth
certificate prima facie evidentiary value of filiation:

Give this certificate evidential relevancy, and we thereby pave the way for
any scheming unmarried mother to extort money for her child (and herself)
from any eligible bachelor or affluent pater familias. How? She simply causes
the midwife to state in the birth certificate that the newborn babe is her
legitimate offspring with that individual and the certificate will be accepted for
registration . . . . And any lawyer with sufficient imagination will realize the
exciting possibilities from such mischief of such prima facie evidence – when
and if the "father" dies in ignorance of the fraudulent design xxx30

Just like her Birth Certificate, respondent can hardly derive comfort from her
marriage contract to Atty. Maglaya and from her student and government
records which indicated or purported to show that Francisco Angeles is her
father. The same holds true for her wedding pictures which showed
Francisco giving respondent’s hands in marriage. These papers or
documents, unsigned as they are by Francisco or the execution of which he
had no part, are not sufficient evidence of filiation or recognition.31 And
needless to stress, they cannot support a finding of the legitimate union of
Francisco and Genoveva.

The argument may be advanced that the aforesaid wedding pictures, the
school and service records and the testimony of respondent’s witnesses lend
support to her claim of enjoying open and continuous possession of the
status of a child of Francisco. The Court can even concede that respondent
may have been the natural child of Francisco with Genoveva. Unfortunately,
however, that angle is not an, or at issue in the case before us. For,
respondent peremptorily predicated her petition for letters of administration
on her being a legitimate child of Francisco who was legally married to her
mother, Genoveva, propositions which we have earlier refuted herein.
If on the foregoing score alone, this Court could very well end this disposition
were it not for another compelling consideration which petitioner has raised
and which we presently take judicially notice of.

As may be recalled, respondent, during the pendency of the proceedings at

the trial court, filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for the annulment of
the decision of the RTC Caloocan granting the petition of spouses Francisco
Angeles and petitioner Belen S. Angeles for the adoption of Concesa A.
Yamat and two others. In that petition, docketed with the appellate court
as CA-G.R. SP No. 47832 and captioned "Aleli ‘Corazon’ Angeles Maglaya
vs. Hon Jaime T. Hamoy, Consesa A. Yamat, Teodora A. Santos, Franco
Angeles and Belen S. Angeles", respondent alleged that as legitimate
daughter of Francisco, she should have been notified of the adoption
proceedings.

Following a legal skirmish, the Court of Appeals referred the aforementioned

annulment case to RTC, Caloocan for reception of evidence. Eventually, in
a Decision32 dated December 17, 2003, the Court of Appeals dismissed CA-
G.R. SP No. 47832 on the ground, inter alia, that herein respondent is not,
contrary to her claim, a "legitimate daughter" of Francisco, nor "a child of a
lawful wedlock between Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Y. Mercado".
Wrote the appellate court in that case:

Petitioner [Aleli "Corazon Maglaya] belabors with repetitious persistence the

argument that she is a legitimate child or the only daughter of Francisco M.
Angeles and Genoveva Y. Mercado . . . .

In the case at bench, other than the self-serving declaration of the petitioner,
there is nothing in the record to support petitioner’s claim that she is indeed
a legitimate child of the late Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Y.
Mercado. xxx In other words, Francisco M. Angeles was never married
before or at anytime prior to his marriage to Belen Sagad, contrary to the
claim of petitioner that Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Y. Mercado
were married in 1938

While petitioner may have submitted certifications to the effect that the
records of marriages during the war years . . . were totally destroyed, no
secondary evidence was presented by petitioner to prove the existence of
the marriage between Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Y. Mercado,
even as no witness was presented to confirm the celebration of such
marriage . . . .

Petitioner presented pictures. x x x However, it is already settled law that

photographs are not sufficient evidence of filiation or acknowledgment.

To be sure, very little comfort is provided by petitioner’s birth certificate and

even her marriage contract.. . . Reason: These documents were not signed
by Francisco . . . . Equally inconsequential are petitioner’s school records . .
. . all these lacked the signatures of both Francisco and Genoveva . . . .

xxx xxx xxx

Having failed to prove that she is the legitimate daughter or acknowledged

natural child of the late Francisco M. Angeles, petitioner cannot be a real
party in interest in the adoption proceedings, as her consent thereto is not
essential or required. (Emphasis in the original; words in bracket added)

Significantly, the aforesaid December 17, 2003 Decision of the appellate

court in CA-G.R. SP No.47832 was effectively affirmed by this Court via its
Resolution dated August 9, 2004 in G.R. No. 163124, denying Aleli
"Corazon" Maglaya’s petition for Review on Certiorari,33 and Resolution
dated October 20, 2004,34 denying with "FINALITY" her motion for
reconsideration. Another Resolution dated January 24, 2005 resolved to
"NOTE WITHOUT ACTION" Maglaya’s second motion for reconsideration.

In the light of the ruling of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47832, as
affirmed with finality by this Court in G.R. No. 163124, there can be no
serious objection to applying in this case the rule on conclusiveness of
judgment,35 one of two (2) concepts embraced in the res judicata principle.
Following the rule on conclusiveness of judgment, herein respondent is
precluded from claiming that she is the legitimate daughter of Francisco and
Genoveva Mercado. In fine, the issue of herein respondent’s legitimate
filiation to Francisco and the latter’s marriage to Genoveva, having been
judicially determined in a final judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction,
has thereby become res judicata and may not again be resurrected or
litigated between herein petitioner and respondent or their privies in a
subsequent action, regardless of the form of the latter.36

Lest it be overlooked, the same ruling of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP

No. 47832, as sustained by this Court in G.R. No. 163124, virtually confirms
the ratio of the trial court’s order of dismissal in Special Proceedings (SP)
No. C-2140, i.e, that respondent failed to establish that she is in fact a
legitimate child of Francisco. Accordingly, the question of whether or not
the Motion to Dismiss37 interposed by herein petitioner, as respondent in SP
No. C-2140, is in the nature of a demurer to evidence has become moot and
academic. It need not detain us any minute further.

Finally, it should be noted that on the matter of appointment of administrator

of the estate of the deceased, the surviving spouse is preferred over the next
of kin of the decedent.38 When the law speaks of "next of kin", the reference
is to those who are entitled, under the statute of distribution, to the
decedent’s property;39 one whose relationship is such that he is entitled to
share in the estate as distributed,40 or, in short, an heir. In resolving,
therefore, the issue of whether an applicant for letters of administration is a
next of kin or an heir of the decedent, the probate court perforce has to
determine and pass upon the issue of filiation. A separate action will only
result in a multiplicity of suits. Upon this consideration, the trial court acted
within bounds when it looked into and pass upon the claimed relationship of
respondent to the late Francisco Angeles.

WHEREFORE, the herein assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is

hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the order of the trial court
dismissing Special Proceedings No. C-2140 REINSTATED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 168728 August 2, 2007

SAMUEL BARREDO y GOLANI, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. VICENTE VINARAO, Director, Bureau of
Corrections, Respondent.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner

Samuel Barredo y Golani prays for his release from the maximum security
compound of the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City on the ground that he
has already served the sentence imposed on him in Criminal Case Nos. Q-
92-38559 and Q-92-38560.

Criminal Case No. Q-92-385591 was for carnapping2 while Criminal Case
No. Q-92-38560 was for illegal possession of firearms.3 Both cases were
filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 103.4

The cases were tried jointly. After trial, the court rendered a joint decision
finding petitioner guilty of both charges. Relevant parts of the dispositive
portion read:

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered in Q-92-38559 finding

Samuel Barredo,5 xxx GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt xxx of the crime of
Carnapping aggravated and qualified by the frustrated killing of Ciriaco
Rosales and [he is] hereby sentenced to undergo an imprisonment term of
THIRTY (30) YEARS;

xxx xxx xxx

In Q-92-38560, Samuel Barredo is hereby found GUILTY as principal

beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of P.D. 1866 and he is
hereby sentenced to an imprisonment term of EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS and
ONE (1) DAY of Reclusion Temporal.

xxx xxx xxx

SO ORDERED.6

No appeal was made, hence, the decision became final and executory.

Petitioner was committed to the custody of the Quezon City Jail (as detention
prisoner) on March 15, 1993.7 After conviction, he was transferred to and
confined at the maximum security compound of the New Bilibid Prison in
Muntinlupa City on July 23, 19948 where he is now still detained.

According to petitioner, as of August 2, 2004, he already served a total of 18

years. He claims that, on October 9, 2001, the Board of Pardons and Parole
passed a resolution recommending the commutation of his sentence to a
period of from 15 to 20 years. He further points out that, based on the Bureau
of Corrections’ revised computation table for determining the time to be
credited prisoners for good conduct while serving sentence, he should only
serve 14 years, 9 months and 18 days. Thus, this petition.

Is petitioner entitled to the writ of habeas corpus? No.

Writ of Habeas Corpus Will Not Issue If Detention Is By Virtue Of Valid

Judgment

The writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of illegal confinement,

detention or deprivation of liberty.9 It was devised as a speedy and effective
remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint.10 More specifically, it is a
remedy to obtain immediate relief for those who may have been illegally
confined or imprisoned without sufficient cause and thus deliver them from
unlawful custody.11 It is therefore a writ of inquiry intended to test the
circumstances under which a person is detained.12

The writ may not be availed of when the person in custody is under a judicial
process or by virtue of a valid judgment.13 However, the writ may be allowed
as a post-conviction remedy when the proceedings leading to the conviction
were attended by any of the following exceptional circumstances:
(1) there was a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint
of a person;

(2) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence or

(3) the imposed penalty was excessive, thus voiding the sentence as to such
excess.14

The rule is that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in custody

of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a
judgment or order of a court of record the writ of habeas corpus will not be
allowed.15Thus, Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. – If it appears that

the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an
officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a
judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had
jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the
order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the
writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any
informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything
in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with
or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering
imprisonment under lawful judgment. (emphasis supplied)

Petitioner was detained pursuant to a final judgment of the Quezon City RTC
convicting him for the crimes of carnapping and illegal possession of
firearms. He is therefore not entitled to the writ of habeas corpus.

Sentence is Void Insofar As It Failed to Impose an Indeterminate

Sentence

As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, however, the trial court
erred in imposing a straight penalty of imprisonment for 30 years in the
carnapping case. The sentence imposed by the trial court deprived petitioner
of the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.16 Hence, it was void
insofar as it failed to impose an indeterminate sentence.

Since the crime was committed by means of violence against or intimidation

of persons, the imposable penalty under the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972
was imprisonment for not less than 17 years and 4 months and not more
than 30 years.17 Furthermore, pursuant to the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the court should have imposed an indeterminate sentence with a maximum
term not exceeding the maximum fixed by the special penal law and a
minimum term not less than the minimum term prescribed by the same
law.18 Therefore, the proper imposable penalty is imprisonment not for 30
years but for an indeterminate sentence of 17 years and 4 months as
minimum to 30 years as maximum.19

Reduction of Penalty Under Amendatory Law Should be Applied

Retroactively

Petitioner is likewise entitled to a reduction of the penalty imposed upon him

in the illegal possession of firearms case in view of the passage of RA 8294.
The law reduced the penalty for simple illegal possession of firearms
to prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than
₱15,000. Being favorable to petitioner, RA 8294 should be applied
retroactively to benefit him.20 Further applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the proper imposable penalty is imprisonment for 4 years, 2 months
and 1 day as minimum to 6 years as maximum.21

Petitioner Has Not Yet Served The Penalties Imposed on Him

Petitioner has to serve the penalties imposed on him successively in the

order of their severity.22 Hence, he has to first serve the more severe
penalty, i.e., that imposed in the carnapping case: imprisonment for 17 years
and 4 months as minimum to 30 years as maximum. Only after he has served
this will he commence serving the less severe penalty imposed in the illegal
possession of firearms case: imprisonment for 4 years, 2 months and 1 day
as minimum to 6 years as maximum.23

Per the certification issued by the Bureau of Corrections,24 as of April 3,

2007, petitioner has served a total of 18 years, 4 months and 26 days,
inclusive of his good conduct time allowance and preventive imprisonment.
Thus, while he has already served the minimum penalty in the carnapping
case, he has not yet served the minimum penalty in the illegal possession of
firearms case. Consequently, petitioner is not entitled to the issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus. Neither is he eligible for parole because only prisoners
who have served the minimum penalty imposed on them may be released
on parole on such terms and conditions as may be prescribed by the Board
of Pardons and Parole.25
Petitioner’s claim that the Board of Pardons and Parole passed a resolution
recommending the commutation of his sentence does not justify the
issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. Commutation of sentence is a
prerogative of the Chief Executive.26 Hence, even if petitioner’s claim were
true, the recommendation of the Bureau of Pardons and Parole was just that,
a mere recommendation. Until and unless approved by the President, there
is no commutation to speak of.

Accordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 127920. August 9, 2005

EMILIO B. PACIOLES, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR AND

HEIR OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF MIGUELITA CHING-
PACIOLES, Petitioners,
vs.
MIGUELA CHUATOCO-CHING, Respondent.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Oftentimes death brings peace only to the person who dies but not to the
people he leaves behind. For in death, a person’s estate remains, providing
a fertile ground for discords that break the familial bonds. Before us is
another case that illustrates such reality. Here, a husband and a mother of
the deceased are locked in an acrimonious dispute over the estate of their
loved one.

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Emilio B. Pacioles, Jr., herein
petitioner, against Miguela Chuatoco-Ching, herein respondent, assailing the
Court of Appeals Decision1 dated September 25, 1996 and Resolution2dated
January 27, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP No. 41571.3 The Appellate Court affirmed
the Order dated January 17, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
99, Quezon City denying petitioner’s motion for partition and distribution of
the estate of his wife, Miguelita Ching-Pacioles; and his motion for
reconsideration.

The facts are undisputed.

On March 13, 1992, Miguelita died intestate, leaving real properties with an
estimated value of ₱10.5 million, stock investments worth ₱518,783.00, bank
deposits amounting to ₱6.54 million, and interests in certain businesses. She
was survived by her husband, petitioner herein, and their two minor children.
Consequently, on August 20, 1992, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified
petition4 for the settlement of Miguelita’s estate. He prayed that (a) letters of
administration be issued in his name, and (b) that the net residue of the
estate be divided among the compulsory heirs.

Miguelita’s mother, Miguela Chuatoco-Ching, herein respondent, filed an

opposition, specifically to petitioner’s prayer for the issuance of letters of
administration on the grounds that (a) petitioner is incompetent and unfit to
exercise the duties of an administrator; and (b) the bulk of Miguelita’s estate
is composed of "paraphernalproperties." Respondent prayed that the
letters of administration be issued to her instead.5 Afterwards, she also filed
a motion for her appointment as special administratrix.6

Petitioner moved to strike out respondent’s opposition, alleging that the latter
has no direct and material interest in the estate, she not being a compulsory
heir, and that he, being the surviving spouse, has the preferential right to be
appointed as administrator under the law.7

Respondent countered that she has direct and material interest in the estate
because she gave half of her inherited properties to Miguelita on condition
that both of them "would undertake whatever business endeavor they
decided to, in the capacity of business partners."8

In her omnibus motion9 dated April 23, 1993, respondent nominated her
son Emmanuel Ching to act as special administrator.

On April 20, 1994, the intestate court issued an order appointing petitioner
and Emmanuel as joint regular administrators of the estate.10 Both were
issued letters of administration after taking their oath and posting the
requisite bond.

Consequently, Notice to Creditors was published in the issues of the Manila

Standard on September 12, 19, and 26, 1994. However, no claims were filed
against the estate within the period set by the Revised Rules of Court.

Thereafter, petitioner submitted to the intestate court an inventory of

Miguelita’s estate.11 Emmanuel did not submit an inventory.

On May 17, 1995, the intestate court declared petitioner and his two minor
children as the only compulsory heirs of Miguelita.12
On July 21, 1995, petitioner filed with the intestate court an omnibus
motion13 praying, among others, that an Order be issued directing
the: 1) payment of estate taxes; 2) partition and distribution of the estate
among the declared heirs; and 3) payment of attorney’s fees.

Respondent opposed petitioner’s motion on the ground that the partition and
distribution of the estate is "premature and precipitate," considering that
there is yet no determination "whether the properties specified in the
inventory are conjugal, paraphernal or owned in a joint
venture."14 Respondent claimed that she owns the bulk of Miguelita’s
estate as an "heir and co-owner." Thus, she prayed that a hearing be
scheduled.

On January 17, 1996, the intestate court allowed the payment of the estate
taxes and attorney’s fees but denied petitioner’s prayer for partition and
distribution of the estate, holding that it is indeed "premature." The intestate
court ratiocinated as follows:

"On the partition and distribution of the deceased’s properties, among the
declared heirs, the Court finds the prayer of petitioner in this regard to be
premature. Thus, a hearing on oppositor’s claim as indicated in her
opposition to the instant petition is necessary to determine ‘whether the
properties listed in the amended complaint filed by petitioner are
entirely conjugal or the paraphernal properties of the deceased, or a
co-ownership between the oppositor and the petitioner in their
partnership venture.’"

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in the

Resolution dated May 7, 1996.

Forthwith, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition

for certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the intestate court’s Order dated
January 17, 1996 and Resolution dated May 7, 1996 which denied
petitioner’s prayer for partition and distribution of the estate for being
premature, indicating that it (intestate court) will first resolve respondent’s
claim of ownership.

The Appellate Court dismissed the petition for certiorari, holding that in
issuing the challenged Order and Resolution, the intestate court did not
commit grave abuse of discretion.
The Appellate Court ruled:

"Regarding the second issue raised, respondent judge did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in entertaining private respondent’s unsupported claim of
ownership against the estate. In fact, there is no indication that the probate
court has already made a finding of title or ownership. It is inevitable that in
probate proceedings, questions of collation or of advancement are involved
for these are matters which can be passed upon in the course of the
proceedings. The probate court in exercising its prerogative to schedule a
hearing, to inquire into the propriety of private respondent’s claim, is being
extremely cautious in determining the composition of the estate. This act is
not tainted with an iota of grave abuse of discretion."

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration but it was likewise denied. Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari anchored on the following assignments of
error:

"I

RESPONDENT COURT’S DECISION WHICH AFFIRMS THE INTESTATE

COURT’S ORDER IS A GRAVE ERROR FOR BEING CONTRARY TO THE
SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE AND POLICY OF THE LAW THAT ESTATE
PROCEEDINGS MUST BE SETTLED EXPEDITIOUSLY.

II

RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN SUSTAINING

THE INTESTATE COURT’S ORDER TO CONDUCT HEARING ON THE
ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP CLAIM AGAINST THE ESTATE, AS SAID
FUNCTION IS OUTSIDE AND BEYOND THE JURISDICTION OF THE
INTESTATE COURT.

III

RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE

INTESTATE COURT’S ORDER AND RESOLUTION NOTWITHSTANDING
THAT RESPONDENT CHING’S OWNERSHIP CLAIMS ARE
CONFLICTING, FRIVOLOUS AND BASELESS."
The fundamental issue for our resolution is: May a trial court, acting as an
intestate court, hear and pass upon questions of ownership involving
properties claimed to be part of the decedent’s estate?

The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court either as an intestate
or a probate court relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of
the estate and probate of will of deceased persons but does not extend to
the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the
proceedings.15 The patent rationale for this rule is that such court exercises
special and limited jurisdiction.16

A well-recognized deviation to the rule is the principle that an intestate or a

probate court may hear and pass upon questions of ownership when its
purpose is to determine whether or not a property should be included in the
inventory. In such situations the adjudication is merely incidental and
provisional. Thus, in Pastor, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals,17 we held:

"x x x As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the

probate court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of
determining whether a certain property should or should not be
included in the inventory of estate properties, the probate court may
pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not
conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to
resolve title."

The Court of Appeals relied heavily on the above principle in sustaining the
jurisdiction of the intestate court to conduct a hearing on respondent’s
claim. Such reliance is misplaced. Under the said principle, the key
consideration is that the purpose of the intestate or probate court in hearing
and passing upon questions of ownership is merely to determine whether
or not a property should be included in the inventory. The facts of this
case show that such was not the purpose of the intestate court.

First, the inventory was not disputed. In fact, in her Manifestation and
Opposition18 dated September 18, 1995, respondent expressly adopted the
inventory prepared by petitioner, thus:

"6. She adopts the inventory submitted by the petitioner in his

Amended Compliance dated October 6, 1994, and filed only on November
4, 1994 not October 5, 1995 as erroneously asserted in Par. 12 of the
Omnibus Motion. Oppositor, however, takes exception to the low valuation
placed on the real estate properties and reserves her right to submit a more
accurate and realistic pricing on each."

Respondent could have opposed petitioner’s inventory and sought the

exclusion of the specific properties which she believed or considered
to be hers. But instead of doing so, she expressly adopted the inventory,
taking exception only to the low valuation placed on the real estate
properties.

And second, Emmanuel, respondent’s son and representative in the

settlement of Miguelita’s estate, did not submit his own inventory. His
mandate, as co-administrator, is "to submit within three (3) months after his
appointment a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate
of the deceased which have come into his possession or knowledge."19 He
could have submitted an inventory, excluding therefrom those
properties which respondent considered to be hers. The fact that he
did not endeavor to submit one shows that he acquiesced with
petitioner’s inventory.

Obviously, respondent’s purpose here was not to obtain from the intestate
court a ruling of what properties should or should not be included in the
inventory. She wanted something else, i.e., to secure from the intestate
court a final determination of her claim of ownership over properties
comprising the bulk of Miguelita’s estate. The intestate court went along
with respondent on this point as evident in its Resolution20 dated May 7, 1996,
thus:

"On petitioner’s motion for partition and distribution of the estate of the late
Miguelita Ching Pacioles, it is believed that since oppositor had interposed a
claim against the subject estate, the distribution thereof in favor of the heirs
could not possibly be implemented as there is still a need for appropriate
proceedings to determine the propriety of oppositor’s claim. It must be
mentioned that if it is true that oppositor owns the bulk of the properties,
which she allegedly placed/registered in the name of the deceased for
convenience, Oppositor, therefore, has a material and direct interest in the
estate and hence, should be given her day in Court."

It is apparent from the foregoing Resolution that the purpose of the hearing
set by the intestate court was actually to "determine the propriety of
oppositor’s (respondent’s) claim." According to the intestate court, "if it is
true that the oppositor (respondent) owns the bulk of (Miguelita’s)
properties," then it means that she has a "material and direct interest in
the estate" and, hence, "she should be given her day in court." The
intended "day in court" or hearing is geared towards resolving the propriety
of respondent’s contention that she is the true owner of the bulk of Miguelita’s
estate.

Surely, we cannot be deluded by respondent’s ingenious attempt to secure

a proceeding for the purpose of resolving her blanket claim against
Miguelita’s estate. Although, she made it appear that her only intent was to
determine the accuracy of petitioner’s inventory, however, a close review of
the facts and the pleadings reveals her real intention.

Clearly, the RTC, acting as an intestate court, had overstepped its

jurisdiction. Its proper course should have been to maintain a hands-off
stance on the matter. It is well-settled in this jurisdiction, sanctioned and
reiterated in a long line of decisions, that when a question arises as to
ownership of property alleged to be a part of the estate of the deceased
person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of
any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the
deceased and his estate, such question cannot be determined in the course
of an intestate or probate proceedings. The intestate or probate court has
no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, which must be
submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a
regional trial court.21 Jurisprudence teaches us that:

"[A] probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or

intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to
be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside
parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to
determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or
list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no
dispute, well and good, but if there is, then the parties, the
administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary
action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because
the probate court cannot do so."22

Hence, respondent’s recourse is to file a separate action with a court of

general jurisdiction. The intestate court is not the appropriate forum for the
resolution of her adverse claim of ownership over properties ostensibly
belonging to Miguelita's estate.

Now, even assuming that the intestate court merely intended to make a
provisional or prima facie determination of the issue of ownership, still
respondent’s claim cannot prosper. It bears stressing that the bulk of
Miguelita’s estate, as stated in petitioner’s inventory, comprises real estates
covered by the Torrens System which are registered either in the name of
Miguelita alone or with petitioner. As such, they are considered the
owners of the properties until their title is nullified or modified in an
appropriate ordinary action. We find this Court’s pronouncement
in Bolisay vs. Alcid23 relevant, thus:

"It does not matter that respondent-administratrix has evidence purporting to

support her claim of ownership, for, on the other hand, petitioners have a
Torrens title in their favor, which under the law is endowed with
incontestability until after it has been set aside in the manner indicated in the
law itself, which, of course, does not include, bringing up the matter as a
mere incident in special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of
deceased persons. x x x

x x x In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a

property covered by Torrens Title is involved, the presumptive
conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in the absence
of strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should
be considered as the owner of the property in controversy until his title
is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action, particularly,
when as in the case at bar, possession of the property itself is in the
persons named in the title. x x x"

Corrolarily, P.D. 1529, otherwise known as, "The Property Registration

Decree," proscribes collateral attack against Torrens Title, hence:

"Section 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack.

A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot

be altered, modified or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law."
Significantly, a perusal of the records reveals that respondent failed to
present convincing evidence to bolster her bare assertion of ownership. We
quote her testimony, thus:

"Q: I now direct your attention to paragraph (5) appearing on page 1 of this
sworn statement of yours which I quote:" In accordance with the Chinese
tradition and culture in the distribution of properties to the legal heirs, we
decided to give only a token to our daughter Miguelita and leave the rest to
our only son Emmanuel, with the undertaking that being the son he will take
full responsibility of the rest of the family despite his marriage. Madame
witness, do you recall having stated that in your sworn statement?

A: Yes sir, but it was not carried out.

Q What was actually given to your daughter Miguelita is only a token, is that
right?

A: Not a token, sir, but one half of the share of the estate was given to Lita
and the other half was given to Emmanuel.

Q: What went to Emmanuel was also ½, is that right?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What makes up the one half share of Lita, if you recall?

A: What was given to her were all checks, sir, but I cannot remember
any more the amount.

xxxxxx

Q: Summing up your testimony, Madame, you cannot itemize the one

half share of the estate of Miguelita, is that right?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Was there any document covering this partition of the estate among
you, Emmanuel and Miguelita with respect to the estate of your late
husband?

A: If I only knew that this will happen…

Q: Samakatuwid po ay walang dokumento?

A: Wala po."24

She further testified as follows:

"Q: Among the properties listed like the various parcels of land,
stocks, investments, bank accounts and deposits both here and
abroad, interests and participation in IFS Pharmaceuticals and
Medical Supplies, Inc. and various motor vehicles, per your pleasure,
Madam Witness, how should these properties be partitioned or what
should be done with these properties? According to you earlier, you
are agreeable for the partition of the said properties with Emil on a 50-
50 basis, is that right?

A: Kung ano po ang sa akin, iyon ang dapat na bumalik sa akin, sir.

Q Halimbawa ay ano po iyon? Real estate properties, parcels of land

located in Pag-Asa, in Silangan, in San Lazaro, in Sta. Cruz, in San
Francisco del Monte and shares of stock. Alinsunod sa inyo, paano
po ang dapat na partihan o hatian ninyo ni Emil?

A: Kung ano ang sa akin…

xxxxxx

Q Ang tanong ko po sa inyo ay ganito, ito po ba ang inyong

iminungkahi kay Emil? Ito po ba ang inyong paghahatian or hindi?

A: Iyo akin talaga na hindi nila pinaghirapan, sir."25

Unfortunately, respondent could not even specify which of the properties

listed in petitioner’s inventory belong to her. Neither could she present any
document to prove her claim of ownership. The consistently changing basis
of her claim did nothing to improve her posture. Initially, she insisted that the
bulk of Miguelita’s estate is composed of paraphernal properties.26 Sensing
that such assertion could not strengthen her claim of ownership, she opted
to change her submission and declare that she and Miguelita were "business
partners" and that she gave to the latter most of her properties to be used in
a joint business venture.27 Respondent must have realized early on that if the
properties listed in petitioner’s inventory are paraphernal, then Miguelita had
the absolute title and ownership over them and upon her death, such
properties would be vested to her compulsory heirs, petitioner herein and
their two minor children.28

At any rate, we must stress that our pronouncements herein cannot diminish
or deprive respondent of whatever rights or properties she believes or
considers to be rightfully hers. We reiterate that the question of ownership of
properties alleged to be part of the estate must be submitted to the Regional
Trial Court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction.29

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and

Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41571 are hereby
REVERSED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 142015 April 29, 2003

RURAL BANK OF STA. IGNACIA, INC., petitioner,

vs.
PELAGIA DIMATULAC, GLORIA DIMATULAC, NORA M. VDA. DE
GRACIA AND ANTONIO NUQUI, respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the

decision1 of the Court of Appeals, dated November 26, 1999, in CA-GR SP
No. 52157, which dismissed the petitioner's petition for review to set aside
the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City, Branch 64, in
Civil Case No. 8670. The RTC affirmed the decision3 of the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of Tarlac City, Branch 2, dismissing herein petitioner's
complaint for unlawful detainer and damages against respondents.

Before the MTC, petitioner had filed what appeared to be a simple ejectment
case, but as found out by the Court of Appeals, the parcel of land subject of
the dispute has a long and convoluted history, to wit:

Back in August 17, 1965, Prudencia Reyes purchased from the now defunct
Rural Progress Administration (RPA), an 800-square meter parcel of land
identified as Lot 11, Block 8 of the Subdivision Plan, Psd-24941 located in
Barrio Suizo and Barrio San Rafael, Tarlac, Tarlac. As a result of the
purchase, TCT No. 65765 was issued in her favor. However, the deed of
sale in favor of Reyes was later cancelled by the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) by reason of her non-occupancy of said property, and made
the land available for distribution to the landless residents of San Rafael.

In 1971, respondents took possession of the property and were allocated

portions of 200 square meters each. They paid the purchase price and
awaited their Emancipation Patent titles.

Despite her knowledge that the land had reverted to the government, Reyes
sold the property to the spouses Maximo Valentin and Retina Razon in a
Deed of Sale dated April 4, 1973. The spouses thereafter obtained TCT No.
106153 thereon. On finding, however, that respondents were in possession
of the property, Valentin and Razon filed a complaint for recovery and
damages against respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. 6152, with the
Regional Trial Court of Tarlac, Tarlac. The Republic of the Philippines
intervened in said case and along with respondents, contending that the title
of the spouses was null and void, because the sale by Reyes was in violation
of the terms and conditions of sale of the lot by the RPA to Reyes.

The trial court decided in favor of the spouses Maximo Valentin and Retina
Razon. But on appeal, the appellate court in CA-G.R. CV No. 14909, entitled
"Spouses Maximo E. Valentin and Retina Razon v. Sps. Ricardo Garcia and
Mona Macabili, et al.," reversed the judgment, cancelled the title of the
spouses, and decreed the reversion of the property to the government for
disposition to qualified beneficiaries. The decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 14909 dated August 31, 1990, attained finality on
September 22, 1990, as per entry of judgment dated February 22, 1991.

Meanwhile, on February 15, 1987, or during the pendency of CA-G.R. CV

No. 14909, Razon, through her attorney-in-fact, mortgaged the property to
petitioner rural bank to secure a loan of P37,500.00. The property was
subsequently extra-judicially foreclosed when Razon failed to pay the loan
and on October 20, 1987, petitioner purchased the property. TCT No.
330969 dated May 11, 1989 was accordingly issued to herein petitioner.

On March 4, 1997, petitioner filed a complaint for unlawful detainer and

damages with the MTC of Tarlac, Tarlac, docketed as Civil Case No. 6367.
Petitioner alleged that respondents were occupying the property by mere
tolerance as they had no contract of lease with it, nor right or claim annotated
on its title. It also averred that it had advised respondents of its purchase of
the property and had demanded that respondents vacate the same, but its
notice went unheeded.

Respondents in their Answer claimed that they had been occupants of the
land since 1971 and had been awarded as beneficiaries by the government
after the titles of Reyes and Razon were nullified. They also maintained that
the lots had been reverted to the government by virtue of the final and
executory judgment in CA-G.R. CV No. 14909.4

On April 6, 1998, the municipal court decided Civil Case No. 6367 in this
wise:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant case is hereby dismissed

for want of jurisdiction. The counter-claim is likewise dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction to grant. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.5

In dismissing the complaint, the MTC found that the possession of

respondents was not by mere tolerance but as lawful beneficiaries. It also
declared that it had no jurisdiction over the case as it involved the issue of
ownership. The court noted that the respondents were lawful beneficiaries of
a government land grant while petitioner was not a purchaser in good faith
and hence, could not avail of the protective mantle of the indefeasibility of
Torrens Title. It concluded that its competence to decide the case was limited
only to addressing the question of ownership in order to determine the issue
of de facto possession.6

Petitioner then elevated the matter to the RTC of Tarlac City, Branch 64 in
Civil Case No. 8670. The RTC ruled on the appeal as follows:

ACCORDINGLY, above premises all considered, this Court hereby affirms

the lower court's Judgment, dated April 6, 1998, dismissing the case. With
costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.7

In affirming the judgment of the municipal court, the RTC ruled that petitioner
could not eject respondents from said property as: (1) there was no legal
relationship, e.g. such as a lease agreement or otherwise, between them
that has expired or terminated; (2) respondents' possession was not through
the tolerance of petitioner; (3) respondents were in possession of the lot as
lawful/rightful possessors, vis-a-vis their status as occupants-beneficiaries
of the DAR, previously RPA. Therefore, respondents had a better right to
possession as against petitioner rural bank.8

Petitioner then moved for reconsideration, but this was likewise denied by
the RTC in its Order dated March 15, 1999.9

Petitioner then filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 52517. The appellate court, however,
dismissed the petition and ruled that the possession of respondents was not
by mere tolerance but by lawful mandate of the law and by virtue of its final
judgment in CA-G.R. CV No. 14909, thus:

WHEREFORE, the petition at bench is hereby DISMISSED. Without costs.

SO ORDERED.10

Hence, the instant recourse to this Court premised on the following issues:

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT

CONSIDERING THAT PETITIONERS' OWNERSHIP OVER THE
PROPERTY IN LITIGATION WAS ACQUIRED THRU AN EXTRAJUDICIAL
FORECLOSURE SALE;

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING

THE DECISION IN C.A.-G.R. CV NO. 14909 IN THE CASE AT BENCH;

3. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT

TREATING THE POSITION PAPER OF THE RESPONDENTS AS A MERE
SCRAP OF PAPER FOR HAVING BEEN FILED FIFTEEN (15) DAYS LATE;

4. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT

CONSIDERING THAT EXHIBITS MARKED ONLY DURING THE PRE-
TRIAL SHOULD NOT BE TREATED AS EVIDENCES.11

Worth noting, the issues raised by petitioner involve questions on procedure

premised on a very rigid and strict application of the Rules of Court. Petitioner
faults the appellate court for sustaining the liberal interpretation of the rules
by the trial court. However, this case springs from a complaint for unlawful
detainer. In forcible entry and detainer cases, which are summary in nature
to minimize disturbance of social order, procedural technicalities should be
carefully avoided and should not be allowed to override substantial
justice.12 The interest of substantial justice is best served if both parties in a
case like this are heard and their respective claims considered through their
respective pleadings and position papers. A liberal interpretation of the
technical rules, which does not subvert the nature of the Rule on Summary
Procedure nor defeat its objective of expediting the adjudication of suits,13 is
not disfavored by this Court.

Coming to the issues as formulated by petitioner, we find that the only issue
left for our resolution is: Did the Court of Appeals commit a reversible error
when it dismissed the petition of the bank? In our view, it did not err when it
sustained the judgment of the regional trial court which earlier also sustained
that of the municipal trial court.
Petitioner contends that as the absolute and registered owner of the subject
land as a mortgagee-purchaser in a foreclosure sale it is entitled to
possession of the land as an attribute of ownership. Petitioner further argues
that it cannot be faulted for relying on the validity of Valentin and Razon's
title as it had checked and verified the status of said title on file with the
Register of Deeds and found that it was free from any lien and
encumbrance.14 Further, petitioner submits that the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 14909 cannot defeat its right to eject respondents
as it is not bound by the said judgment because petitioner was not impleaded
as a party therein. Moreover, according to petitioner when the decision in
CA-G.R. No. 14909 nullifying Razon's title became final, said title was
already cancelled and another title already issued in favor of petitioner. For
this reason, petitioner insists the CA decision could not comprehend within
its ambit petitioner's title to the land.

Respondents contend that petitioner could not properly raise in issue the
question of ownership in an action for unlawful detainer under the Rule on
Summary Procedure. Petitioner should seek the proper remedy through an
ordinary civil proceeding. Moreover, they argue that petitioner was totally
negligent in its duty to determine the propriety of accepting the property for
a mortgage by the Valentin and Razon spouses. Thus, it is estopped from
claiming good faith. Further, respondents add that since the title of Razon
was declared null and void, petitioner as the successor-in-interest acquired
no rights of ownership over the land it purchased through public auction.

In ejectment cases the question is limited to which party among the litigants
is entitled to the physical or material possession of the premises, that is to
say, who should have possession de facto.15 Settled is the rule, however,
that in an ejectment case, the assertion by a defendant of ownership over
the disputed property does not serve to divest an inferior court of its
jurisdiction.16 When the defendant raises the defense of ownership and the
question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of
ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved for the purpose only of
determining the issue of possession.17 Said judgment shall be conclusive
with respect to the possession only, and shall in no wise bind the title of the
realty, or affect the ownership thereof. It shall not bar an action between the
same parties respecting title to the real property.18 Only with this
understanding of that well-entrenched principle can we accept the ruling of
the municipal court in Civil Case No. 6367 that "the case is dismissed for
want of jurisdiction."19
Petitioner's contention that the final and executory judgment of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 14909 does not bind the bank, in our view, is
devoid of merit. Rule 39, Section 47 (b)20 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, speaks of conclusiveness of judgment as "between the parties
and their successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of
the action." In the present case, petitioner herein derived its title from the
Valentin and Razon spouses, after an extrajudicial foreclosure sale. Under
the law which permits a successor in interest to redeem the property sold on
execution, the term "successor-in-interest" includes one to whom the debtor
has transferred his statutory right of redemption; one to whom the debtor has
conveyed his interest in the property for the purpose of redemption; or one
who succeeds to the interest of the debtor by operation of law.21 Petitioner
acquired its title while CA-G.R. CV No. 14909 was pending before the Court
of Appeals. To acquire title, the successor-in-interest must do
so subsequent to the commencement of the action, and not before such
commencement.22 Having derived little from the Spouses Valentin and
Razon, whose title was nullified by the final and executory decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 14909, the petitioner cannot escape the
effect of the appellate court's judgment in said case. The rural bank as
purchaser at an auction sale does not have a better right to said property
than their predecessors-in-interest, namely the Valentin and Razon couple.

The rule that persons dealing with registered lands can rely solely on the
certificate of title does not apply to banks.23 The degree of diligence required
of banks is more than that of a good father of a family; in keeping with their
responsibility to exercise the necessary care and prudence in dealing even
with a registered or titled property. The business of a bank is affected with
public interest, holding in trust the money of the depositors, which the bank
should guard against loss due to negligence or bad faith. For this reason, the
bank is not allowed to rely merely on the protective mantle of the land
registration law, which is normally accorded only to purchasers or
mortgagees for value and in good faith.24

In the present case, while petitioner sent a representative to verify the

original TCT on file with the Registrar of Deeds, no ocular inspection of the
premises took place. Judicial notice may be taken of the common practice of
banks, before approving a loan, to send a representative to the premises of
the land offered as collateral and duly investigate who are the true owners
thereof. Failure to do so is negligence on the part of a bank.25 Had petitioner
taken extra steps, time and effort in dealing with the property it purchased by
conducting proper ocular inspection of the premises, it could have
discovered early the presence of settlers therein who are land reform
beneficiaries.

To capitulate, we find no reversible error in the decision of the Court of

Appeals sustaining those of the lower courts that the possession of
respondents is not by mere tolerance. Respondents' possession springs
from their right as lawful beneficiaries of a government program, pursuant to
law. Certainly, the decision of the appellate court in CA G.R. CV No. 14909
binds not just the beneficiary but also the bank as claimant of the land. In
contrast, petitioner's claim to possession of the land emanates from a
nullified and non-existing title of its predecessors-in-interest, from which it
cannot rely to eject the respondents from the premises.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of Court of Appeals,

dated November 26, 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 52157 as well as the
Resolution dated February 18, 2000, denying the Motion for Reconsideration
are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 152611. August 5, 2003]

LAND BANK OF
THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. SEVERINO
LISTANA, SR., respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 65276 dated December 11, 2001,[1] which annulled the Orders dated January 29,
2001 and April 2, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 51.[2]
Respondent Severino Listana is the owner of a parcel of land containing an area of
246.0561 hectares, located in Inlagadian, Casiguran, Sorsogon, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-20193. He voluntarily offered to sell the said land to the
government, through the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR),[3] under Section 20 of
R.A. 6657, also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL). The
DAR valued the property at P5,871,689.03, which was however rejected by the
respondent. Hence, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) of
Sorsogon commenced summary administrative proceedings to determine the just
compensation of the land.
On October 14, 1998, the DARAB rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, taking into consideration the foregoing computation, the prior valuation made by
the Land Bank of the Philippines is hereby set aside and a new valuation in the amount of TEN
MILLION NINE HUNDRED FIFTY SIX THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED SIXTY THREE
PESOS AND 25 CENTAVOS (P10,956,963.25) for the acquired area of 240.9066 hectares. The
Land Bank of the Philippines is hereby ordered to pay the same to the landowner in the manner
provided for by law.

SO ORDERED.[4]

Thereafter, a Writ of Execution was issued by the PARAD directing the manager of
Land Bank to pay the respondent the aforesaid amount as just compensation in the
manner provided by law.[5]
On September 2, 1999, respondent filed a Motion for Contempt with the PARAD,
alleging that petitioner Land Bank failed to comply with the Writ of Execution issued on
June 18, 1999. He argued that such failure of the petitioner to comply with the writ of
execution constitutes contempt of the DARAB.
Meanwhile, on September 6, 1999, petitioner Land Bank filed a petition with the
Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Branch 52, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC),
for the determination of just compensation, as provided for in Section 16 (f) of the CARL.[6]
On August 20, 2000, the PARAD issued an Order granting the Motion for Contempt,
as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for contempt is hereby GRANTED, thus ALEX
A. LORAYES, as Manager of respondent LAND BANK, is cited for indirect contempt and
hereby ordered to be imprisoned until he complies with the Decision of the case dated October
14, 1998.

SO ORDERED.[7]

Petitioner Land Bank filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforequoted

Order,[8] which was however denied by the PARAD on September 20, 2000.[9] Thus,
petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal with the PARAD, manifesting its intention to appeal the
decision to the DARAB Central, pursuant to Rule XI, Section 3 of the 1994 DARAB New
Rules of Procedure.[10]
On the other hand, the Special Agrarian Court dismissed the petition for the
determination of just compensation filed by petitioner Land Bank in an Order dated
October 25, 2000. Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of said dismissal was likewise
denied.
In a Resolution dated November 27, 2000, PARAD Capellan denied due course to
petitioners Notice of Appeal and ordered the issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution for
the payment of the adjudged amount of just compensation to respondent.[11] On January
3, 2001, he directed the issuance of an arrest order against Manager Alex A. Lorayes.[12]
Petitioner Land Bank filed a petition for injunction before the Regional Trial Court of
Sorsogon, Sorsogon, with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
to restrain PARAD Capellan from issuing the order of arrest.[13] The case was raffled to
Branch 51 of said court. On January 29, 2001, the trial court issued an Order, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the respondent Provincial Adjudicator of the DARAB or
anyone acting in its stead is enjoined as it is hereby enjoined from enforcing its order of arrest
against Mr. Alex A. Lorayes pending the final termination of the case before RTC Branch 52,
Sorsogon upon the posting of a cash bond by the Land Bank.

SO ORDERED.[14]

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the trial courts order, which was
denied in an Order dated April 2, 2001.[15]
 Thus, respondent filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals,[16] docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 65276. On December 11, 2001, the Court of
Appeals rendered the assailed decision which nullified the Orders of the Regional Trial
Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 51.
Hence, the instant petition for review on the following issues:

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:
A. THE PARAD DID NOT ACQUIRE COMPETENT JURISDICTION OVER THE
CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS INASMUCH AS IT WAS INITIATED BY MERE MOTION
FOR CONTEMPT AND NOT BY VERIFIED PETITION, IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 2,
RULE XI OF THE NEW DARAB RULES OF PROCEDURE AND OF RULE 71 OF THE
REVISED RULES OF COURT.

B. THE PARAD CONTEMPT ORDER CANNOT BE CONSIDERED FINAL AND

EXECUTORY, BECAUSE THE PARAD ITSELF DISALLOWED THE PETITIONERS
APPEAL TO THE DARAB CENTRAL OFFICE, IN DISREGARD OF THE BASIC RULE
THAT THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL DETERMINES THE MERITS OF THE APPEAL.

C. THE PARAD ORDER OF ARREST AGAINST LBP MANAGER ALEX LORAYES WAS
IN GROSS AND PATENT VIOLATION OF HIS PERSONAL, CONSTITUTIONAL AND
CIVIL RIGHTS AGAINST UNJUST ARREST AND IMPRISONMENT, INASMUCH AS,
UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, ONLY JUDGES CAN ISSUE WARRANTS OF
ARREST AGAINST CITIZENS, AND THE PROPER SUBJECT OF THE CONTEMPT
PROCEEDING WAS THE PETITIONER ITSELF AND NOT THE LBP MANAGER, AND
YET THE CONTEMPT ORDER WAS AGAINST THE LBP MANAGER.

D. THE PARAD ORDER OF CONTEMPT WAS PATENTLY NULL AND VOID, AS IT

ATTEMPTED TO ENFORCE COMPLIANCE WITH THE PARAD DECISION THAT WAS
ADMITTEDLY NOT FINAL AND EXECUTORY, AS THE MATTER OF JUST
COMPENSATION BEFORE THE SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURT WAS ON APPEAL WITH
THE COURT OF APPEALS.[17]

As regards the first issue, petitioner submits that the special civil action
for certiorari filed by respondent before the Court of Appeals to nullify the injunction
issued by the trial court was improper, considering that the preliminary injunction issued
by the trial court was a final order which is appealable to the Court of Appeals via a notice
of appeal.[18]
Petitioners submission is untenable. Generally, injunction is a preservative remedy
for the protection of ones substantive right or interest. It is not a cause of action in itself
but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit.Thus, it has been held that an
order granting a writ of preliminary injunction is an interlocutory order. As distinguished
from a final order which disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a
particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by
execution what has been determined by the court, an interlocutory order does not dispose
of a case completely, but leaves something more to be adjudicated upon.[19]
Clearly, the grant of a writ of preliminary injunction is in the nature of an interlocutory
order, hence, unappealable.Therefore, respondents special civil action
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals was the correct remedy under the
circumstances. Certiorari is available where there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[20]
The order granting a writ of preliminary injunction is an interlocutory order; as such, it cannot by
itself be subject of an appeal or a petition for review on certiorari. The proper remedy of a party
aggrieved by such an order is to bring an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment in the main
case, citing therein the grounds for assailing the interlocutory order. However, the party
concerned may file a petition for certiorari where the assailed order is patently erroneous and
appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief.[21]

On the substantive issue of whether the order for the arrest of petitioners manager,
Mr. Alex Lorayes by the PARAD, was valid, Rule XVIII of the 2003 DARAB Rules reads,
in pertinent part:
SECTION 2. Indirect Contempt. The Board or any of its members or its Adjudicator may also
cite and punish any person for indirect contempt on any of the grounds and in the manner
prescribed under Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court.

In this connection, Rule 71, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which
deals with the commencement of indirect contempt proceedings, provides:
Sec. 4. How proceedings commenced. Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu
proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal
charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.

In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with
supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and
upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the
court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending
in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed,
heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the
contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision.

xxxxxxxxx

The requirement of a verified petition is mandatory. Justice Florenz D. Regalado,

Vice-Chairman of the Revision of the Rules of Court Committee that drafted the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure explains this requirement:
1. This new provision clarifies with a regulatory norm the proper procedure for commencing
contempt proceedings. While such proceeding has been classified as a special civil action under
the former Rules, the heterogeneous practice, tolerated by the courts, has been for any party to
file a mere motion without paying any docket or lawful fees therefor and without complying with
the requirements for initiatory pleadings, which is now required in the second paragraph of this
amended section.

xxxxxxxxx

Henceforth, except for indirect contempt proceedings initiated motu proprio by order of or a
formal charge by the offended court, all charges shall be commenced by a verified petition with
full compliance with the requirements therefor and shall be disposed of in accordance with the
second paragraph of this section.[22]
 Therefore, there are only two ways a person can be charged with indirect contempt,
namely, (1) through a verified petition; and (2) by order or formal charge initiated by the
court motu proprio.
In the case at bar, neither of these modes was adopted in charging Mr. Lorayes with
indirect contempt.
More specifically, Rule 71, Section 12 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, referring
to indirect contempt against quasi-judicial entities, provides:
Sec. 12. Contempt against quasi-judicial entities. Unless otherwise provided by law, this Rule
shall apply to contempt committed against persons, entities, bodies or agencies exercising quasi-
judicial functions, or shall have suppletory effect to such rules as they may have adopted
pursuant to authority granted to them by law to punish for contempt. The Regional Trial Court of
the place wherein the contempt has been committed shall have jurisdiction over such charges as
may be filed therefore. (emphasis supplied)

The foregoing amended provision puts to rest once and for all the questions
regarding the applicability of these rules to quasi-judicial bodies, to wit:
1. This new section was necessitated by the holdings that the former Rule 71 applied only to
superior and inferior courts and did not comprehend contempt committed against administrative
or quasi-judicial officials or bodies, unless said contempt is clearly considered and expressly
defined as contempt of court, as is done in the second paragraph of Sec. 580, Revised
Administrative Code. The provision referred to contemplates the situation where a person,
without lawful excuse, fails to appear, make oath, give testimony or produce documents when
required to do so by the official or body exercising such powers. For such violation, said person
shall be subject to discipline, as in the case of contempt of court, upon application of the official
or body with the Regional Trial Court for the corresponding sanctions.[23] (emphasis in the
original)

Evidently, quasi-judicial agencies that have the power to cite persons for indirect
contempt pursuant to Rule 71 of the Rules of Court can only do so by initiating them in
the proper Regional Trial Court. It is not within their jurisdiction and competence to decide
the indirect contempt cases. These matters are still within the province of the Regional
Trial Courts. In the present case, the indirect contempt charge was filed, not with the
Regional Trial Court, but with the PARAD, and it was the PARAD that cited Mr. Lorayes
with indirect contempt.
Hence, the contempt proceedings initiated through an unverified Motion for
Contempt filed by the respondent with the PARAD were invalid for the following
reasons:[24] First, the Rules of Court clearly require the filing of a verified petition with the
Regional Trial Court, which was not complied with in this case. The charge was not
initiated by the PARAD motu proprio; rather, it was by a motion filed by
respondent. Second, neither the PARAD nor the DARAB have jurisdiction to decide the
contempt charge filed by the respondent. The issuance of a warrant of arrest was beyond
the power of the PARAD and the DARAB. Consequently, all the proceedings that
stemmed from respondents Motion for Contempt, specifically the Orders of the PARAD
dated August 20, 2000 and January 3, 2001 for the arrest of Alex A. Lorayes, are null and
void.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for review is GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65276, dated December 11, 2001,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon,
Sorsogon, Branch 51, dated January 29, 2001, which enjoined the Provincial Adjudicator
of the DARAB or anyone acting in its stead from enforcing its order of arrest against Mr.
Alex A. Lorayes pending the final termination of the case before Regional Trial Court of
Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 52, is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created
them male and female. (Genesis 5:1-2)

Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard
voices coming from inside the bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please
let us out!," the voices said. She pecked the reed once, then twice. All of a
sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out came two human beings;
one was a male and the other was a female. Amihan named the man
"Malakas" (Strong) and the woman "Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend of
Malakas and Maganda)

When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does

the law recognize the changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and
counseling with regard to a person’s sex? May a person successfully petition
for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the
result of a sex reassignment surgery?

On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a

petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The petition, docketed as SP Case
No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.

Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the
spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962.
His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his
certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as "male."

He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male

but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always identified
himself with girls since childhood.1 Feeling trapped in a man’s body, he
consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological
examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to
transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he
underwent sex reassignment surgery2 in Bangkok, Thailand. He was
thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and
reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate
attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.

From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be
married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed
from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female."

An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the People’s
Journal Tonight, a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, for three
consecutive weeks.3 Copies of the order were sent to the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.

On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were

established. No opposition to the petition was made.

During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-
Cruz, Jr. and his American fiancé, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.

On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision4 in favor of petitioner. Its
relevant portions read:

Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any
infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of
making his birth records compatible with his present sex.

The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked
for.

The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.

Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more
in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. With his sexual [re-
assignment], petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted like a
woman, now possesses the physique of a female. Petitioner’s misfortune to
be trapped in a man’s body is not his own doing and should not be in any
way taken against him.

Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused
to anybody or the community in granting the petition. On the contrary,
granting the petition would bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of
the petitioner and her [fiancé] and the realization of their dreams.

Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the
present petition despite due notice and publication thereof. Even the State,
through the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose any [o]pposition.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and

ordering the Civil Registrar of Manila to change the entries appearing in the
Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner, specifically for petitioner’s first name from
"Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and petitioner’s gender from "Male"
to FEMALE. 5

On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the
OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals.6 It alleged that
there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason
of sex alteration.

On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a decision8 in favor of

the Republic. It ruled that the trial court’s decision lacked legal basis. There
is no law allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate of birth
on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court of
Appeals granted the Republic’s petition, set aside the decision of the trial
court and ordered the dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration but it was denied.9 Hence, this petition.

Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth
certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103
and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.10

The petition lacks merit.

A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex

Reassignment
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for
change of name and sex. As found by the trial court:

Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any
infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of
making his birth records compatible with his present sex. (emphasis
supplied)

Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a

female, he became entitled to the civil registry changes sought. We disagree.

The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for
purposes of identification.11 A change of name is a privilege, not a
right.12 Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes.13 In this
connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial
authority.

This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In
particular, Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:

SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change

of First Name or Nickname. – No entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors
and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed
by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in
accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and
regulations.

RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14 It vests the power and
authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal
civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law, therefore,
jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged
with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the
law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103
(Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil
Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for
change of name is first filed and subsequently denied.15 It likewise lays down
the corresponding venue,16 form17 and procedure. In sum, the remedy and
the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative
in nature, not judicial.

RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may
be allowed:

SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The petition

for change of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following
cases:

(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted
with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;

(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously
used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or
nickname in the community; or

(3) The change will avoid confusion.

Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex
reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex
he thought he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a change
of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status.18 RA 9048 does
not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment.
Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his
declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry
and the public interest.

Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper
or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change.19 In
addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and
official name.20 In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice
that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.

In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of
petitioner’s first name was not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the
petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned,
assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the
proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It
was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of
the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More
importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does
not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly
dismissed petitioner’s petition in so far as the change of his first name was
concerned.

No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex

On the Ground of Sex Reassignment

The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal

issue and the court must look to the statutes.21 In this connection, Article 412
of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without
a judicial order.

Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by
RA 9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The
correction or change of such matters can now be made through
administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect,
RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the
correction of such errors.22 Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes
and corrections in entries in the civil register.23

Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:

SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the following terms

shall mean:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the

performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an
entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled
name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or
obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by
reference to other existing record or records: Provided, however, That
no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of
the petitioner. (emphasis supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex
is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for
which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of
the Civil Code:24

ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of
persons shall be recorded in the civil register.

ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of
marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7)
legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10)
naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction;
(14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor;
and (16) changes of name.

The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil
Code include even those that occur after birth.25 However, no reasonable
interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the
correction on the ground of sex reassignment.

To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error
from" while to change means "to replace something with something else of
the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute."26 The birth
certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those
corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is
necessary.

Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of
certain acts (such as legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children
and naturalization), events (such as births, marriages, naturalization and
deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of
marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss
or recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation
and changes of name). These acts, events and judicial decrees produce
legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status and nationality
of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast,
sex reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article
407. Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or
impliedly.

"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the
sum total of capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age,
nationality and his family membership.27

The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and
relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at
his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married
or not. The comprehensive term status… include such matters as the
beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in general,
family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption,
emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even
succession. (emphasis supplied)
28

A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a

part of a person’s legal capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article
413 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall
be governed by special laws.

But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex

reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioner’s cause.

Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:

SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. – The declaration of the

physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the
declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the
registration of a birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt
from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not
later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance
at the birth or by either parent of the newborn child.

In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following
facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names,
citizenship and religion of parents or, in case the father is not known, of the
mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born;
and (f) such other data as may be required in the regulations to be issued.

xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)

Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the
facts as they existed at the time of birth.29Thus, the sex of a person is
determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or
midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no
law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s
sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error,30 is
immutable.31

When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common
and ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The
words "sex," "male" and "female" as used in the Civil Register Law and laws
concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be
understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative
intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as "the sum of
peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male from a
female"32 or "the distinction between male and female."33Female is "the sex
that produces ova or bears young"34 and male is "the sex that has organs to
produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova."35 Thus, the words "male" and
"female" in everyday understanding do not include persons who have
undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are employed in a
statute which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed to have
been used in that sense unless the context compels to the contrary."36 Since
the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early
1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term "sex" as
used then is something alterable through surgery or something that allows a
post-operative male-to-female transsexual to be included in the category
"female."

For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body
and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law
authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason.
Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of
the entries in his birth certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be
Changed on the Ground of Equity

The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the
principles of justice and equity. It believed that allowing the petition would
cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.

The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal
and public policy consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that
the petition was but petitioner’s first step towards his eventual marriage to
his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social
institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a
woman.37 One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the
contracting parties who must be a male and a female.38 To grant the changes
sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws
on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another
man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative
transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to
women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of
women,39 certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code40 and the
presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules
of Court,41 among others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation
to women which could be substantially affected if petitioner’s petition were to
be granted.

It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court
shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or
insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license for courts to engage in
judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not
to make or amend it.

In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do

so, to determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects
of sex reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes
particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are statute-
based.

To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first
name and for correction or change of entries in the civil registry, where they
may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be presented
and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer
on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change
his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact
legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of
that privilege.

It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a

person may be recognized as having successfully changed his sex.
However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on
anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only
apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government,
Congress.

Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of

happiness, contentment and [the] realization of their dreams." No argument
about that. The Court recognizes that there are people whose preferences
and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of
social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal.
However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to
be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.