Skippers United Pacific, Inc. vs. Doza, G.R. No.

175558, February 8, 2012

Facts:
Petitioner deployed De Gracia, Lata and Aprosta to work on board the vessel MV Wisdom Star.
On December 3 1998, Skippers alleges that De Garcia smelling strongly of alcohol, went to the cabin of Gabriel Oleszek, MV Wisdom Stars’
Master. Skippers claims that he was rude and shouted noisily to the master. De Gracia left the master’s cabin after a few minutes and was heard
shouting very loudly somewhere down the corridors. The incident was evidenced by the Captain’s Report sent on said date.

Furthermore, Skippers also claim that on January 22, 1999, Aprosta, De Gracia, Lata and Daza arrived in the master’s cabin and demanded
immediate repatriation because they were not satisfied with the ship. De Gracia, et al. threatened that they may become crazy any moment and
demanded for all outstanding payments due to them. The incident is evidenced by a telex of Cosmoship MV Wisdom to skippers but had
conflicting dates.

De Gracia claims that Skippers failed to remit their respective allotments, compelling them to vent their grievances with the Romanian Seafarers
Union. On January 28, 1999, the Filipino seafarers were unceremoniously discharged and immediately repatriated. Upon arrival in the
Philippines, they filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the LA.
The LA dismissed the seafarers’ complaint as the seafarers’ demand for immediate repatriation due to the dissatisfaction with the ship is
considered a voluntary pre-termination of employment. Such act was deemed akin to resignation recognized under Article 285 of the LC.

The LA gave credence to the telex of the master’s report that the seafarers indeed demanded immediate repatriation.

The NLRC agreed with the LA’s decision.

The CA however reversed the LA’s and the NLRC’s decision. The Court deemed the telex message as a self-serving document that does not satisfy
the requirement of substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify the
conclusion that petitioners indeed voluntarily demanded their immediate repatriation.
Aggrieved, Skippers appeals the case with the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the seafarer’s demand for immediate repatriation can be considered an act of voluntary resignation.
Held:
For a worker's dismissal to be considered valid, it must comply with both procedural and substantive due process. The legality of the manner of
dismissal constitutes procedural due process, while the legality of the act of dismissal constitutes substantive due process.
Procedural due process in dismissal cases consists of the twin requirements of notice and hearing.

The employer must furnish the employee with two written notices before the termination of employment can be effected:

(1) the first notice apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and

(2) the second notice informs the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him. Before the issuance of the second notice, the requirement
of a hearing must be complied with by giving the worker an opportunity to be heard. It is not necessary that an actual hearing be conducted.

Substantive due process, on the other hand, requires that dismissal by the employer be made under a just or authorized cause under Articles 282
to 284 of the Labor Code.
In this case, there was no written notice furnished to De Gracia, et al., regarding the cause of their dismissal. Cosmoship furnished a written
notice (telex) to Skippers, the local manning agency, claiming that De Gracia, et al., were repatriated because the latter voluntarily pre-
terminated their contracts.

This telex was given credibility and weight by the Labor Arbiter and NLRC in deciding that there was pre-termination of the employment contract
"akin to resignation" and no illegal dismissal. However, as correctly ruled by the CA, the telex message is "a biased and self-serving document
that does not satisfy the requirement of substantial evidence."

If, indeed, De Gracia, et al., voluntarily pre-terminated their contracts, then De Gracia, et al., should have submitted their written resignations.

Article 285 of the Labor Code recognizes termination by the employee of the employment contract by "serving written notice on the employer at
least one (1) month in advance." Given that provision, the law contemplates the requirement of a written notice of resignation.

In the absence of a written resignation, it is safe to presume that the employer terminated the seafarers. In addition, the telex message relied
upon by the Labor Arbiter and NLRC bore conflicting dates of 22 January 1998 and 22 January 1999, giving doubt to the veracity and authenticity
of the document.
In 22 January 1998, De Gracia, et al., were not even employed yet by the foreign principal.
PERT VS VINUYA

Labor Law; Illegal Recruitment; Words and Phrases; Article 38 of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. 8042, defined “illegal recruitment” to
include the following act: To substitute or alter to the prejudice of the worker, employment contracts approved and verified by the Department of
Labor and Employment from the time of actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the period of the expiration of the same without
the approval of the Department of Labor and Employment.—Clearly, the agency and Modern Metal committed a prohibited practice and engaged
in illegal recruitment under the law. Article 34 of the Labor Code provides:

Art. 34. Prohibited Practices. It shall be unlawful for any individual, entity, licensee, or holder of authority: x x x x (i) To substitute or alter
employment contracts approved and verified by the Department of Labor from the time of actual signing thereof by the parties up to and
including the periods of expiration of the same without the approval of the Secretary of Labor[.] Further, Article 38 of the Labor Code, as
amended by R.A. 8042, defined “illegal recruitment” to include the following act: (i) To substitute or alter to the prejudice of the worker,
employment contracts approved and verified by the Department of Labor and Employment from the time of actual signing thereof by the parties
up to and including the period of the expiration of the same without the approval of the Department of Labor and Employment[.]

Same; Termination of Employment; Constructive Dismissal; A constructive dismissal or discharge is a quitting because continued employment is
rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as, an offer involving a demotion in rank and a diminution in pay .—With their original contracts
substituted and their oppressive working

and living conditions unmitigated or unresolved, the respondents’ decision to resign is not surprising. They were compelled by the dismal state of
their employment to give up their jobs; effectively, they were constructively dismissed. A constructive dismissal or discharge is “a quitting
because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as, an offer involving a demotion in rank and a diminution in
pay.”

Statutory Construction; Retroactivity of Laws; Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided .—Laws shall have no
retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. By its very nature, the amendment introduced by R.A. 10022— restoring a provision of R.A.
8042 declared unconstitutional —cannot be given retroactive effect, not only because there is no express declaration of retroactivity in the law,
but because retroactive application will result in an impairment of a right that had accrued to the respondents by virtue of the Serrano ruling —
entitlement to their salaries for the unexpired portion of their employment contracts.

NELSON B. GAN v. GALDERMA PHILIPPINES, INC., ET. AL., G.R. No. 177167, January 17, 2013

Labor Law; Remedial Law; Rule 45; Instances in which factual issues may be resolved by the Supreme Court. Settled is the rule that factual
findings of labor officials, who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their jurisdiction, are generally accorded not only with
respect but even finality by the courts when supported by substantial evidence, i.e., such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. Likewise, factual findings arrived at by a trier of facts, who is uniquely positioned to observe the
demeanor of the witnesses appearing before him and is most competent in judging the credibility of the contending parties, are accorded great
weight and certitude.

Admittedly, the above rule is not ironclad. There are instances in which factual issues may be resolved by this Court, to wit: (1) the conclusion is a
finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there
is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) the Court of
Appeals goes beyond the issues of the case, and its findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellees; (7) the findings of
fact of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court (in this case, the Labor Arbiter and NLRC); (8) said findings of fact are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition, as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs, are
not disputed by the respondent; and (10) the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by
the evidence on record.

INDUSTRIAL AND TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT, INC. and/or ANTONIO JARINA vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and LEOPOLDO ME
DRANO G.R. No. 113592, January 15, 1998

FACTS:

Leopoldo Medrano was employed as a mechanic by INTECO. During his indefinite leave of absence, he was able to secure a temporary job in anot
her firm. When he reported for work, he was asked to resign due to his employment in another firm. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Medrano
and ordered reinstatement, payment of proportionate 13th month pay and without backwages. The decision became final and executory upon f
ailure of petitioner to file an appeal within the reglementary period. Consequently, a writ of execution was granted. The proportionate 13th mon
th pay was fully settled. The aspect of reinstatement, however, remained unsatisfied in view of the alleged refusal of petitioner to comply with th
e said order. The respondent filed a motion to cite petitioner for indirect contempt and for payment of backwages. Labor Arbiter Garduque issue
d an order finding petitioner guilty of indirect contempt with a fine of P100.00, and likewise directed the reinstatement of respondent but now w
ith backwages. On appeal, said order was affirmed in toto by the NLRC .

ISSUE: Whether or not Labor Arbiter may cite the petitioner in contempt.

HELD:
Yes. Section 2, Rule X of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC provides that the Commission or any labor arbiter may cite any person for indire
ct contempt upon grounds and in the manner prescribed under Section 3(b), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 3(b), Rule 71 pr
ovides Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing —. . .a) . . . b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or j
udgment of a court . . .

Contempt is defined as a disobedience to the Court by setting up an opposition to its authority, justice and dignity. It signifies not only a willful di
sregard or disobedience of the court’s orders but such conduct as tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disr
epute or in some manner to impede the due administration of justice. There is no question that disobedience or resistance to a lawful writ, proce
ss, order, judgment or command of a court or injunction granted by a court or judge constitutes indirect contempt punishable under Rule 71 of th
e Rules of Court.

HALAGUEÑA v. PAL

FACTS:

Petitioners were employed as female flight attendants of respondent Philippine Airlines (PAL) on different dates prior to November 22, 1996.
They are members of the Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines (FASAP), a labor organization certified as the sole and
exclusive certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the flight attendants, flight stewards and pursers of respondent.

On July 11, 2001, respondent and FASAP entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement incorporating the terms and conditions of their
agreement for the years 2000 to 2005, hereinafter referred to as PAL-FASAP CBA.

Section 144, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA, provides that:

 A. For the Cabin Attendants hired before 22 November 1996:

xxxx

3. Compulsory Retirement

Subject to the grooming standards provisions of this Agreement, compulsory retirement shall be fifty-five (55) for females and sixty (60) for
males. x x x.

In a letter dated July 22, 2003, petitioners and several female cabin crews manifested that the aforementioned CBA provision on compulsory
retirement is discriminatory, and demanded for an equal treatment with their male counterparts. This demand was reiterated in a letter by
petitioners' counsel addressed to respondent demanding the removal of gender discrimination provisions in the coming re-negotiations of the
PAL-FASAP CBA.

On July 29, 2004, petitioners filed a Special Civil Action for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and
Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 147

ISSUE: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the petitioners' action challenging the legality or constitutionality of the provisions on the
compulsory retirement age contained in the CBA between respondent PAL and FASAP.

HELD:

Jurisdiction of the court is determined on the basis of the material allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief prayed for
irrespective of whether plaintiff is entitled to such relief.

The said issue cannot be resolved solely by applying the Labor Code. Rather, it requires the application of the Constitution, labor statutes, law on
contracts and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and the power to apply and interpret the
constitution and CEDAW is within the jurisdiction of trial courts, a court of general jurisdiction.
In Georg Grotjahn GMBH & Co. v. Isnani, this Court held that not every dispute between an employer and employee involves matters that only
labor arbiters and the NLRC can resolve in the exercise of their adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. The jurisdiction of labor arbiters and the
NLRC under Article 217 of the Labor Code is limited to disputes arising from an employer-employee relationship which can only be resolved by
reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes, or their collective bargaining agreement.

Where the principal relief sought is to be resolved not by reference to the Labor Code or other labor relations statute or a collective bargaining
agreement but by the general civil law, the jurisdiction over the dispute belongs to the regular courts of justice and not to the labor arbiter and
the NLRC. In such situations, resolution of the dispute requires expertise, not in labor management relations or in wage structures and other
terms and conditions of employment, but rather in the application of the general civil law. Clearly, such claims fall outside the area of
competence or expertise ordinarily ascribed to labor arbiters and the NLRC and the rationale for granting jurisdiction over such claims to these
agencies disappears