Japan Preindustrial Growth

Economic History Association
Economic Development in Preindustrial Japan, 1859-1894

Author(s): Mataji Miyamoto, Yōtarō Sakudō and Yasukichi Yasuba
Source: The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Dec., 1965), pp. 541-564
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Economic History Association
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Economic Development in Preindustrial
Japan, 18 59-1894:
IN this paper we shall try to do three things: first, to describe

the economic conditions which prevailed before the arrival of
Commodore Perry; second, to survey the economic policy of the
Shogunate and the Meiji Government in responding to the impact
of the opening up of the country; and third, to make a few general
comments on some selected aspects of Japan's economic develop-
ment between 1859, when three Japanese ports were opened to
foreign trade, and 1894, when the Sino-Japanese War broke out.
The latter date is chosen because it fairly clearly marks off the
beginning of the rapid development of the modern sector of the
Japanese economy.
The pre-Perry Japan can be characterized, in principle, as a de-

caying feudal society depending mainly on agriculture. The popula-
tion was stagnant at around 30,000,000 persons, of whom about
80 per cent or more were peasants. From 6 to 7 per cent were bush,
or warriors, and the rest were mostly chonin, or city artisans and
traders.
At the top of the feudal hierarchy was the Shogunate, whose
domains amounted to as much as one third of the total land subject
to dues. The rest of the taxable land was divided among more than
two hundred feudal lords who pledged allegiance to the Shogunate.
Of the major harvest of the land, 30 per cent or more was collected,
normally in kind, by these feudal lords, who lived mainly on this
source of income. Common bush, who pledged allegiance directly
to the Shogunate or to one of the feudal lords, were in return either
* We are grateful to Thomas Rimer and Mary B. Fernholz for corrections of

English. All the names of contemporary (post-Restoration) Japanese appear with
surnames last. The names of historical characters, for whom the inversion of the
name order looks awkward, are written in the Japanese way, that is, with surnames
first. In such cases, surnames are printed in small capitals to avoid confusion.
1 In many of the fiefs the official rates were around 50 per cent. Due to the exist-
ence of various allowances and exemptions, the actual rates were often lower. In
the Shogunate's domains, where the tax rates are believed to have been lower than
in most other fiefs, the actual rates ranged by and large between 30 and 40 per cent.
Winter crops were exempt from taxation and are not included in the calculation of
these rates.
541
542 Miyamoto, Sakudo, and Yasuba
allotted land from which they could collect dues or given income
in the form of rice.
In most fiefs, bushi lived in towns located near the castles which
became, during the two-hundred-fifty peaceful years of the Toku-
gawa period, feudal courts serving as the administrative and cere-
monial centers of the fiefs. Some bushi played useful parts in the
administration, but in the peaceful days of simple agricultural
economy their number was obviously too large; they constituted
the major nonproductive class of the society.
The Shogunate tried every means to maintain the feudal order.
The practice of confiscating and reallocating the fiefs of misbehav-
ing lords was no longer common in the eighteenth or nineteenth
centuries. But the system of forcing the lords to live at Edo (Tokyo)
one year and at home the following year, thereby exhausting the
resources of possible rebels and leaving their families as hostages,
was still maintained. To deplete such resources further, the Shogu-
nate often promoted public works at the lords' expense. Contact
with foreigners was allowed only at the port of Nagasaki and only
with the Dutch and the Chinese. Commerce and transportation
between fiefs were kept to a minimum by prohibiting construction
of large vessels and of bridges across major rivers and by estab-
lishing inspection posts at strategic points on major roads and at
important ports.
Nowhere were feudal restrictions as many or as far reaching as
in agriculture, which was the mainstay of the whole feudal order.
Peasants were not allowed to move, to change professions, to sell
arable land, to partition holdings into parcels smaller than a certain
minimum, or to change their crops at will. Restrictions touched
even the daily life of peasants, who were ordered not to eat much
rice and never to use silk, never to purchase tea and sake, never to
live in a luxurious home.
Despite feudal restrictions, a number of improvements took place
in agricultural techniques in certain regions, such as the use of pur-
chased fertilizer, the introduction of animal husbandry, the devel-
opment of foot-pedaled wheels for irrigation, and the spread of a
number of commercial crops, like mulberry (silk), indigo, cotton,
and tobacco. There is little doubt that these improvements consti-
tuted the seeds of later progress. However, most of these were
geographically restricted and, taken as a whole, Japanese agriculture
Growth in Preindustrial Japan 543
at the end of the Tokugawa era was still at a low level of de-
velopment.
Purchased fertilizer-mainly oil cake and dried sardines-was
used by well-to-do peasants primarily for growing commercial crops
in more developed areas such as Kinai. Its use was very much
limited, particularly on paddyfields, where animal and human excre-
tions and grass were mainly used.
In the late Tokugawa period there were, perhaps, nearly as many
cows, oxen, and horses as in the Meiji period, but they were used
primarily as draft animals and not for ploughing. Animal husbandry
was limited to the well-to-do farmers in the western parts of Japan.
Nothing indicates more clearly the small extent of ploughing by
animals than the comparative figures of the production of ploughs
and hoes. These figures, reported in the 1874 Fuken Bussanhy6,
were only 11,000 for ploughs and 33,000 for plough-edges as against
651,000 for hoes.2 Since it can be assumed that underreporting of
production was less important for ploughs, the figures may be taken
to suggest the backwardness of Japanese agriculture in this respect.
One implication of the limited use of animals in cultivation is that
only the surface soil was shallowly tilled.3 Another implication is
that the practice of kanden-drainage of the surface water on
paddyfields in winter-was not practicable, since it was difficult to
break hardened soil in spring without the help of animal power.
This meant, in terms of productivity, two things: first, the soil could
not be enriched in winter through exposure to air and, second, the
paddyfields could not be used for winter crops.
Finally, it may be noted that crop rotation was virtually unknown.
Max Fesca, who was one of the foreign professors invited by the
Meiji Government to teach at the Komaba Agricultural College,
wrote in 1887: "In Japan the same crop was generally planted re-
peatedly on the same field for a long time. This is particularly true
of rice production. . Since Japanese climate is conducive to
rapid decomposition of soil, the damage caused by such biased
2 The figures are those compiled by Toshio Furushima. See Chihashi Kenky-
Ky6gikai, ed., Nihon Sangyoshi Taikei, S5ron (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai,
1961), pp. 123-24.
3 Shallow cultivation should not be ascribed solely to the lack of animal hus-
bandry. Even where animals were used for cultivation the inadequate ploughs used
at the end of the Tokugawa period allowed only relatively shallow tilling.
method of cultivation is not so great as in foreign countri
it can not be denied that the method is harmful."4
Such was the state of agricultural techniques in the pre-Meiji
Japan. Any generalization is dangerous for this period because of
the marked geographical differences in technical procedures. It
seems safe, however, to state that the average technical level was
much lower than that of contemporary England or Germany, or
than that of Japan at the end of the Meiji period. In fact, there is
little to suggest that the productivity of land was appreciably higher
in pre-Meiji Japan than in other countries in the Far East. Stag-
nating population, restricted not by birth control but by infanticide
and famine; the failure of many feudal lords, including the Shogu-
nate, to increase even the absolute volume of dues (in terms of
rice); and the increasing incidence of the peasants' mass protests
and rebellions all point to the probability that progress was limited.
We can only touch upon other aspects of Japanese agriculture.
The private-property right on land was not yet clearly recognized.
Every patch of arable land was feudally held by the lords, who col-
lected dues from cultivators. Cultivators "owned"-or rather had a
right to the use of-the land, which was typically scattered in a
number of small fields throughout the village. Selling of land was
illegal, but owner-cultivators could borrow with their land as
security. Thus, particularly toward the end of the Tokugawa period,
many pieces of land changed hands through foreclosures. Non-
owners either worked as servile labor or as contractual wage earners
for the owner-farmers, or became tenants. Some 30 per cent of the
cultivated land is estimated to have been under tenancy, or de facto
tenancy, at the end of the Tokugawa period.5
The cultivation of land was only a part of the peasants' productive
activity. They made, and certainly repaired, many of their tools and
containers and produced most of their processed foods and clothes.
Even building and construction activities were largely done by
peasants, often in a communal way.
By the end of the Tokugawa period, some of these activities
became independent. In the weaving of silk and cotton fabrics,
4"Nihon Chisan Ron," in Shis6 Hattori and Shir6 Konishi, eds., Meiji NOgy5
Ronshii (Osaka: S6gensha, 1955), pp. 427-28.
5 See Toshio Furushima, "Jinushiseido Tenkai no Chiiki-teki Tokushitsu," Keizai
Hybron, old ser., Vol. VI, No. 5 (May 1951). He considers that the ratio of 31
per cent for 1876 is applicable to the late Tokugawa period.
commercialization had progressed to such an extent that household
industries were organized into extensive putting-out systems by
wholesale traders who distributed the products widely throughout
Japan. The commercialization and organization of household pro-
duction by traders were also seen in the manufacture of cotton
yarn, paper, paper lanterns, and umbrellas. In certain more capital-
intensive industries-such as brewing, the processing of whales, and
the production of iron, earthenware, and sugar-as well as in
weaving, incipient manufactories, both private and public, were
seen at the end of the Tokugawa period. The accumulation of tech-
nical, managerial, and commercial knowledge and skill among these
handicraft producers and traders no doubt was quite important in
later economic development.
The artisans, traders, and moneylenders living in jdkamachi
(towns which grew up near castles), and later in commercial towns
which sprang up in strategic transportation centers, constituted
another class, the lowest in the hierarchy of the feudal order but
becoming increasingly rich and influential as commerce and finance
developed. Particularly important were wholesale traders and
moneylenders, who were the major progressive forces in the feudal
society. They thrived on trade and finance; they pushed forward
the monetization and commercialization of the agrarian economy;
they organized rural handicraft industries under various forms of
domestic systems; they initiated some of the incipient manufactories;
they promoted the production of commercial crops; they opened
up new paddyfields; and they even supported fishing and whaling
enterprises.
Yet, their progressivism was limited largely within the framework
of the feudal order. For one thing, they were too closely associated
with the feudal regime. They handled the sales of rice which feudal
lords collected from peasants as dues; they sold the fiefs' specialty
products as monopolistic agents; they were allowed to organize
guildlike societies called kabunakama on payment of fees; they were
often partners with feudal lords in their monopolistic sales and
production schemes; they served as treasurers for the lords; and,
finally and most significantly, they extended enormous amounts of
credit to the Shogunate, to other feudal lords, and to common bush.
In addition, continued prosperity gave rise to conservative philos-
ophy among the traders and moneylenders. "The tendency to cling
to the old ways of the family and to abstain from novel things was
an important element in traders' ethos. They honored their family
profession, and simply repeated the same humdrum practices ac-
cording to customs and traditions." It could hardly be expected
that they would try to undermine the feudal order or to initiate
drastic industrial changes.
All the same, some of the institutions and practices developed
by these traders and moneylenders have significance for later
economic development. For instance, double-entry bookkeeping
was developed and used to a considerable extent, and in the excep-
tional case of the famous Nakai family the technique is said to be
comparable with the most advanced in the contemporary West.
Another example is the practice of cash sales at discounted fixed
prices initiated as early as 1683 by MITSUI Hachiroemon Takatoshi.
Mitsui's innovation is believed to have greatly facilitated transac-
tions in retail trading.7
In business organization, incipient partnerships appeared toward
the end of the Tokugawa period. However, as Yasuz6 Horie pointed
out,8 the commercial family was probably a more important organ-
izational form, the immediate followers of which can be found in
the Meiji economy. A commercial family in the Tokugawa Japan
was not a simple organization of those who were related and living
together but, in fact, a form of perpetual business organization in
which prosperity was eagerly sought after through such means as
the promotion of the most gifted-even to the position of family
head-and the disinheritance of mediocre heirs.
Even though the monetary system was far from well organized,
credit institutions and instruments were exceptionally highly devel-
oped. Commerce on credit and various forms of lending were pros-
pering, and all sorts of conceivable credit instruments ranging from
warehouse receipts, bills of exchange, promissory notes, and checks,
to government and private paper money were widely used and
circulated in commercial towns. Even futures transactions in rice
were initiated as early as 1730 in Osaka.9
6 Mataji Miyamoto, Nihon Keizaishiy6 (Kyoto: Sanwa Shob6, 1952), p. 133.

7 Takao Tsuchiya, Nihon Keiei Rinenshi (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1964), pp. 175-
76, 182-84.
8 Yasuz6 Horie, "Nihon no Keizai Kindaika to 'le,' " Keizai Kenkyfi, XVI, No. 2
(Apr. 1965), 97-103.
9 Y6tar6 Sakud6, Nihon Kahei-Kinyiishi no Kenkyi (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1961),
pp. 345, 347.
II
Feudalism was already in the decaying stage when the Western
"barbarians" arrived and sought ports and trade. Continuing peace
and the appearance of new commodities had gradually raised the
living standard of feudal lords and other bushi despite their rather
inflexible incomes. With their efforts to increase the dues and other
income only partially successful, they had increasingly resorted
to credits. Obviously this led to the cumulative impoverishment of
lords and other bushi and to the increasing wealth of traders and
moneylenders.
To cope with their financial difficulties, the Shogunate and other
lords sometimes resorted to long-term moratoria and the cancella-
tion of debts. They also tried to cut back on expenditures, degraded
coins, issued paper money, increased (or at any rate tried to main-
tain) annual dues, asked traders and moneylenders for contributions,
and reduced the stipends of rank-and-file bush. The latter, still
more impoverished, worked part time as artisans and petty traders,
sold their titles, married the daughters of chonin, or adopted
chonin's sons, and sank still deeper into debt.
The arrival of Commodore Perry's armada in Uraga in 1853 and
the ensuing contact with foreigners greatly accelerated the process
of the disintegration of the feudal regime. The Japanese were divided
into those who would punish and banish the "barbarians" and those
who would open the country's door to outsiders. The division caused
a series of internal strifes and civil wars. Ultranationalists attacked
foreigners and foreign vessels in a few isolated incidents, causing
severe reprisals and the payment of huge amounts of indemnities.
Partly preparing for future clashes with foreigners and partly keep-
ing themselves ready for civil wars, opposing lords incurred heavy
outlays for military buildup. Finally, the outbreak of civil war
between the Shogunate and Choshfi Han put additional burden on
the lords' finances.
Precise trade statistics are unavailable, but the estimates compiled
by Takashi Ishii suggest a few broad generalizations. Both exports
and imports increased rapidly during the first few years of trade,
with exports (which were larger than imports at first) exceeding
$10 million by 1863 and imports passing that sum two years later.'0
10 Takashi Ishii, Bakumatsu Bbekishi no Kenkyi (Tokyo: Nihonhy6ronsha, 1944),

pp. 52-53.
Silk accounted for 50 to 80 per cent of exports, followed by tea and
silkworm eggs. Cotton, seafoods, vegetable oil, and wax were other
and rather minor components of exports. Cotton and woolen fabrics
led the list of imports, each comprising 20 to 50 per cent of total
imports. Sugar, firearms, and vessels nearly exhaust the remaining
imports.
The initial excess of exports over imports was naturally followed
by the rise of the general price level. Poor harvests and the expan-
sion of outlays by the lords for military buildup were other causes
of the rise in prices. The price of rice in Osaka increased tenfold
between 1858 and 1867. A similar rise was observed in other towns.
Those urban dwellers who depended upon more or less fixed money
income suffered greatly as a result.
Of course, not all prices rose at the same rate. Export prices
increased much more rapidly than import prices. The producers
of exports, the consumers of imports, and the distributors of inter-
nationally-traded goods enjoyed considerable gains but only at the
expense of some of the vested interests and with the general break-
down of the traditional order. Thus, the producers of cotton and
silk textiles incurred heavy losses-mainly because of the import
of competing products in the case of the former and because of the
export of raw material in the case of the latter. The producers of
sugar and the consumers of vegetable oil and wax also suffered.
Urban traders in cotton and silk fabrics and in raw silk lost ground,
while the new class of exporters and importers gained.
Alarmed by the disruption of the old order, the Shogunate and
some other lords tried desperately to arrest the expansion of trade
and the changes in traditional modes of production and distribu-
tion. Unable to rely on import duties because of the Treaties, they
adopted various measures to restrict exports. Thus, the export of
rice, wheat, and armaments was prohibited; five other important
commodities were to be shipped to Edo wholesalers before being
exported; restrictions were placed on the export of silk; and the
planting of commercial crops in paddyfields was prohibited. How-
ever, the pressure from foreigners was strong enough to cause the
Shogunate and other lords eventually to give up most of these
measures, a move which could not but precipitate the day of its fall.
The economic policy of the Meiji Government, which placed
exceptionally heavy emphasis on the rapid buildup of economic
and military power of the nation, is so well known that we shall not
try to go much beyond enumerating the more important measures

and making a few generalizations on them.
Anti-feudal institutional changes implemented by the Meiji Gov-
ernment should perhaps get greater recognition than has been
given. Feudal class distinction was abolished and the stipends of
the bushi were largely confiscated. Restrictions or prohibitions on
peasants to move, to change profession, to sell or partition land, to
plant crops of their liking, to sell their harvests freely-all these
were successively abrogated in the matter of a few years. Private-
property right to land was recognized and a land tax, payable in
money, replaced the old feudal dues. Guilds were disbanded. In-
ternal trade and transportation were freed from traditional restric-
tions. Foreign trade was also further liberalized with the abolition
of the ban on the export of certain important commodities and the
opening of additional ports.
A large variety of coins and paper money which had been in use
was standardized at first into new government paper money and
coins. The first modern corporations were formed under the auspices
of the government. The institutional framework was set for the
establishment of various financial institutions, including American-
style national banks, and finally the Bank of Japan was founded,
eventually to replace the national bank notes by its own convertible
currency.
Growth-promoting economic activities of the government in the
early Meiji period have attracted a great deal of attention from
foreign observers. By the fifteenth year of Meiji (1882), the govern-
ment had already been operating a Western-style railroad (174
miles), postal service (5,527 post offices and 99,000,000 deliveries
per year), and telegraph service (2,979,000 telegrams). Govern-
ment factories in a large variety of industries (including silk reeling,
silk and cotton spinning, woolen fabrics, various types of mining,
iron and other metals, firearms and ammunitions, vessels, tools and
machinery, boilers, cement, bricks, and glass) were run largely with
a view to importing the latest Western techniques and giving train-
ing to Japanese engineers and workers. Even in agriculture experi-
ments were conducted in Western methods, implements, seeds, and
breeds.
A few general comments are in order. First, the radical nature
of the near confiscation of feudal rights and its implication in the
context of economic development should be emphasized. The tra-
ditional stipends were reduced successively and drastically. By the
fourth year of Meiji (1871) the total amount of rice allotted to lords
and other bushi was down to 4,920,000 koku, or less than 40 per cent
of what they used to receive in the Tokugawa period, leaving the
rest in the hands of the government. The stipends were then con-
verted into bonds (190 million yen) and cash (20 million yen).
The converted annual income as the proportion of the total amount
of this fund was as much as 12 per cent, in terms of the wholesale
price of rice in Tokyo in 1876," when the bulk of the conversion
was made. Since interest rates on these bonds were only 5 to 7 per
cent, it may be concluded that another partial confiscation took
place on this occasion. Finally, inflation-under which the price of
rice doubled between 1876 and 1881-delivered an additional blow
to the former bush, many of whom had to sell their bonds in distress
before the Matsukata deflation temporarily lowered the price of
rice to the original level by 1887. Thus, most of the former bush,
some 400,000 strong (excluding families), had to seek employment
in unaccustomed professions. It is no wonder that some of these
bush, with considerable education and what little liquid funds they
had, turned out to be the most venturesome entrepreneurs in Meiji
Japan.'2 Of course, those who succeeded in business comprised only
a small portion of this class; yet even losers ceased to be idle con-
sumers and joined the ranks of productive members of society.
The net revenue that supported government activities came from
the former income of bush, not of cultivators. The land-tax reform,
while serving a useful purpose by giving incentive to owner-culti-
vators, did not, on an average, increase the burden on the peasants.
On the contrary, it is believed that the average tax rate on harvests
became somewhat lower. Later the tax burden decreased further
as a result of the reduction of the tax rate from 3 per cent to 2.5
per cent of the land value in 1877 and, more significantly, as a
result of inflation.
The Meiji Government experimented with the latest Western
techniques in practically all industries including agriculture. There
is little doubt that a number of these experiments bore fruit in the
11 Kaheiseido Ch6sakat's figure of 5.13 yen per koku was used.

12 Most illuminating in this connection is T. C. Smith's finding that landlords'
younger sons, who were unable to become landlords under the system of primogeni-
ture, are much more than proportionately represented in the business leaders of
present-day Japan. Smith, "Landlords' Sons in the Business Elite," Economic Devel-
opment and Cultural Change, IX, No. 1 (Oct. 1960), Part II, 101.
long run. It should be pointed out, however, that many of these
experiments were discontinued later, and most of the nonmilitary
public enterprises were sold to private entrepreneurs who had to
operate without the protection of import duties. Whether Japan
was economically fortunate in having to live without the right to
set its own import duties is a difficult and intriguing question to
answer; but a case can be made to the effect that this condition
made it difficult for the government to support for a long time
industries which were neither genuinely "infants' nor creative of
external economies.
Another point to be noted is the fact that, despite their conspicu-
ousness and probable effectiveness, the economic activities of the
government were quantitatively not very important in the early
Meiji period. According to statistics compiled by Koichi Emi, total
government expenditures, excluding transfer payments, as a pro-
portion of estimated GNP were only 8.4 per cent in 1878-1882 as
against 15.0 per cent in 1898-1902 and 17.6 per cent in 1908-1912
(see Table 1). Since the denominator (Ohkawa's preliminary esti-
mate of GNP) is likely to be too small for the early years, the actual
importance of government expenditures in these years will probably
have to be further discounted.
III
Due to shortage of space, we present in what follows a few gen-

eralizations on selected aspects of economic development in pre-
industrial Japan rather than a survey of the whole field.
First, what can we say about the effect of nearly free trade upon
capital formation and economic development? In Section II we
emphasized the effect of trade in undermining the feudal order.
Some Japanese economists and historians have gone further and
claimed that the Japanese were economically exploited by foreigners
through trade. It is quite true that at the outset-ignorant, poorly-
financed and numerous-the Japanese traders fell an easy prey to
the numerically few, well-informed, well-financed foreigners. It is
also true that irregular practices-or at least practices that appeared
unfair in Japanese eyes-on the part of foreigners were not rare.
However, gains from trade, which accrued mostly to foreigners at
first, gradually shifted with the increase in knowledge on the part
of Japanese traders, the intensification of competition among for-
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eigners, and the strengthening of the regulation of trade practices.
It may also be noted that these gains, instead of remaining in the
hands of Japanese traders dealing with foreigners, trickled down to
internal distributors and finally to the producers of exports and to
the consumers of imports. This is illustrated most dramatically by the
statistics of the prices of raw silk at different stages of distribution,
compiled by Mitsuo Fujii and presented in Table 2 (see the upward
trend of the proportions in cols. 1, 5, and 6).
A more general idea of the gains from trade can be obtained from
the Paasche price indexes of exports and imports with a pre-trade
year (1857) as the base. Since a relatively few commodities ac-
counted for most of both exports and imports in the early years,
it is not too difficult to construct meaningful indexes. The indexes
of wholesale prices in 1860 are 104 for imported commodities and
234 for exported commodities. The comparable figures for 1865 are
138 and 384, respectively.'3 Gains from trade are clearly shown
by these statistics.
Where did these gains go? Were they used to import capital
goods to promote economic growth? The answer to the latter ques-
tion is a fairly definite "No," particularly for early years. If we ex-
clude military items, the import of producers' durables other than
vessels in this period accounted for a very small portion of total
imports, which were again rather a small proportion of domestic
production. This is true even of the period (1871-1879) when the
government set up a number of factories importing the latest
Western machinery and equipment (see Table 3). It was only
after 1887 that the proportion was larger than a negligible amount.
Because of the lack of production statistics,"4 it is not possible to
13 Commodities included are raw silk, silkworm eggs, tea, and silk cloth for
export prices; and cotton yam, cotton cloth, woolen cloth (on which the 1860
figure was used for 1857 import price), sugar, and iron for import prices. Data
were taken from the following sources; for raw silk, silkworm eggs, and woolen
cloth, Ishii, pp. 22, 273-74; for tea and sugar, Kinyfi Kenkyfikai, Wagakuni Shohin
Soba Tokeihy3 (Tokyo: Kinyii Kenkyilkai, 1937), pp. 33-34, 82; for silk cloth, cotton
yam, and iron, Mataji Miyamoto, ed., Kinsei Osaka no Bukka to Rishi (Osaka:
Sobunsha, 1963), pp. 226-27, 237-38, 291-92; and for cotton cloth, Mitsui Bunko,
Kinsei K6ki ni okeru Shuy6 Bukka no Dbtai (Tokyo: Nihon Gakujutsu Shink6kai,
1952), pp. 37-45.
14 Rosovsky's figures for the period before 1919 are hardly usable since they
are based on the very misleading Nagoya K6sh6 index of production of ma-
chinery and equipment. The index represents the domestic consumption of a few
basic metals, mainly iron and steel. Since the input of metals as the proportion of
total input in the production of producers' durables was negligible in the 1870's and
overwhelming in the 1920's, Rosovsky's estimates of the production of, and the
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talk with any authority about the proportion of imports in t
supply of producers' durables, but it would be safe to state that
it was not very great in the early Meiji period.
The bulk of the imports consisted of consumers' goods, a consider-
able proportion of which in turn consisted of what were then con-
sidered luxuries. The proportion of cotton and woolen fabrics in
total imports was overwhelmingly large in the late Tokugawa period.
It became somewhat smaller in the early Meiji period but was still
as large as 30 to 40 per cent. When cotton yarn is added, the propor-
tion was consistently above 50 per cent in the first fifteen years of
the Meiji period. Sugar accounted for another 10 per cent. Then
there was a large variety of Western-type goods which found eager
consumers among Japanese of all classes.
"International demonstration effect," though perhaps not so
strong as today, was clearly observable. The report of the Tokyo
Chamber of Commerce in 1879 stated that "this practice [of using
imported goods] was not confined to government but gradually
pervaded the general public. Now, from houses, clothes, foods and
drinks, to all sorts of household goods, imported Western commod-
ities were preferred and eagerly sought after."'"5 At one time,
anxious to be accepted by foreigners, the government took the lead
and encouraged the adoption of Western clothes, hairdo, makeup,
and manners. Even the countryside did not remain untouched.
Paul Meyet, a German who worked for the Meiji Government as
teacher and advisor for nearly twenty years, wrote in 1893:
I think that the farmers' way of life has been changed almost completely.
... Lanterns were replaced by lamps and spills by matches. There are many
who carry cheap watches which were made in the United States. When going
out to towns, many persons wear red blankets instead of straw mantles. In
years when the peasants' income was larger, Western-style umbrellas threat-
ened to take the place of traditional paper umbrellas, and flannels and shirtings
found customers in the countryside.16
Even though the government's flirtation with Western ways was

short-lived, it must be pointed out that it had to rely on other
investment in, producers' durables represent a gross understatement of the actual

figures in early years. Henry Rosovsky, Capital Formation in Japan (New York: Free
Press [Macmillan], 1961), pp. 318-21.
15 Quoted in Kazuma Hattori, "Meiji lO-nen-zengo no Nihon Sangy6," Nihon
Sangyoshi Taikei, Soron (cited in n.2), p. 348.
16 Paul Meyet, "Nihon Nbmin no Hihei oyobi sono Kyfijisaku," Meiji N
Ronshi (cited in n.4), pp. 220-21.
measures than import duties to fend off the tide of the oncoming
"international demonstration effect -a circumstance which was
fortunate for the efficiency of the economy.
Whether the gains from trade were used to a considerable extent
for purchasing domestically made capital goods is quite another,
and more difficult, question to answer. However, the fact that many
of these Western-style goods were soon being produced domestic-
ally in large quantities plus the non-capital-intensive characteristics
of techniques used in this period (to be discussed later) suggests
that we should at least reexamine the notion that the Japanese were
always heavy savers.
Foreign trade was important for economic development in this
period, as in ensuing periods, but its importance in this period was
probably not so much in the promotion of capital formation as in
the stimulation of technological innovation, either directly through
the importation of adaptable technical knowledge or indirectly
through the expansion of export markets and competition by im-
ports.
By and large, the industries that expanded most rapidly in this
period were not those which used the latest Western techniques
imported by the government. At first, the most dynamic industries
were silk reeling and tea making, which held comparative advan-
tages when foreign trade first started. Initial comparative ad-
vantage, however, was probably less important than the tech-
nological progress (and the particular nature of that progress)
which took place later. With the single important exception of
cotton spinning, Western techniques were not transplanted intact
in this period. Sometimes, a rather simple innovation of indigenous
origin took place in response to the expansion of demand. Such was
the case with the spread of the silk-reeling tools with gears in the
late Tokugawa and the early Meiji periods. At other times-and
more often-innovation consisted of the adaptation of foreign tech
niques to domestic conditions. The government established a model
silk-reeling factory using imported machinery in 1872, but it was
the domestically'made, less-capital-using wooden machinery that
was widely adopted in the middle part of the Meiji period. In weav-
ing, it was domestically made looms with flying shuttles, foot pedals,
gears, and belts-and not the imported power looms-that were
used widely throughout much of the Meiji period. Again, when
power looms made their impact felt at the beginning of the twen-
tieth century, it was rather the cheaper domestically made wooden
or wood-and-metal machines, and not the imported iron machines,
that were speedily adopted. Even cotton spinning had experienced
a transitional period in the 1880's, when a domestically invented
simple spinning tool called garaboki was widely used, often com-
bined with such imported technical ideas as the transmission of
power by belts and the use of waterpower.
By the 1890's the textile industry, which had made so many in-
novations of this kind, had acquired an overwhelmingly important
position in Japan's industry. In the textile industry itself, non-fac-
tory production was dominant;'7 but even in factory production for
which we have nationwide statistics the importance of textiles far
outdistanced that of any competitor. Its share of factory operatives'8
in industry in 1891 was 65.6 per cent and its share of the paid-in
capital of industrial companies in 1893 was 55.6 per cent.'9 During
the period of the Sino-Japanese War, when factory production in
general attained a tremendous growth, the share of the textile
industry decreased somewhat. Yet, in terms of contribution to the
growth of factory production as a whole, its importance far out-
weighed that of any other branch of manufacturing. Of an increase
of 330,000 factory operatives between 1891 and 1897-a 300 per
cent increase-155,000 (or 47 per cent) were absorbed by the tex-
tile industry.
It is not possible to get a reliable estimate of the growth rate of
industrial production in general before 1894. The best we can do
is to compare the figures of production in 1874, for which statistics
of production compiled separately by Mataji Umemura and Kazuo
Yamaguchi from Fuken Bussanhy6 are available, with those in 1909,
for which K6/6 Tokeihy6 as well as Noshomu statistics of the pro-
duction of selected commodities are available. Since usable figures
are lacking for many industries in 1909 and for some in 1874, we
chose only those industries for which usable production statistics
exist for both years or those for which it is believed there is no figure
17 As late as 1897, only 36,000 of 1,041,000 weavers worked in factories. The

total number of operatives in silk reeling is unknown; but the fact that there were,
in the same year, 421,864 silk-reeling establishments and households as against
110,306 operatives working for silk factories, clearly suggests the importance of non-
factory production. Only in cotton spinning was factor production predominant.
18 A factory is considered as an establishment employing ten or more operatives.
19 "Industry" consists of manufacturing and public utility. Figures for operatives
were taken from Kogy3 Tbkei 50-nenshi. Shiryohen, II (Tokyo: Tsfish6sangy6-Daijin-
Kambo Ch6sat6keibu, 1962), 434-35, and figures for capital were compiled from
Teikoku T6kei Nenkan for each year.
because there was no production. The index of manufacturing pro-
duction for 1909, with 1874 as 100, is 654 according to the Laspeyres
formula, and 408 according to the Paasche formula.20 The average
annual rates of increase are respectively 5.5 per cent and 4.1 per
cent. While these rates may seem respectable by themselves, they
are considerably smaller than the growth rate between 1909 and
193521 and far smaller than that in post World War II years. If the
20 First, individual quantity indexes were computed for those commodities

(marked with *) for which they could be computed either directly from quantity
figures or indirectly by deflating value series by relevant price series. Then, an
unadjusted quantity index for each major industrial branch was computed with
value added as weight. The latter was computed by multiplying the value of the
product in each year by the value-added ratio in 1935. (Source: Ministry of Inter-
national Trade and Industry, "Sh6wa 10-nen Kijun Seisan-shisfi Weight Sanshutsu
Kiso Shiry6," mimeographed, 1959.) Solomon Fabricant's coverage adjustment was
made so as to arrive at tie adjusted branch index (cf. The Output of Manufacturing
Industries, 1899-1937 [New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1940],
pp. 362-69). Finally, the production index for the whole manufacturing industry
was computed in a similar way combining all the computable branch indexes and
making the coverage adjustment for those branches for which no quantity index
could le computed.
Products included are: (1) textiles: raw silk,* spun silk yarn, cotton yarn, hemp
and flax yam, silk thread, cotton thread, silk cloth,* silk-and-cotton cloth, linen and
hemp cloth, woolen cloth, floss silk; (2) metals: iron and steel,* copper;* (3)
machinery and equipment: total value (nonmilitary); (4) glass and clay products:
pottery, glass,* cement, bricks, Japanese roofing tile, looking-glass; (5) chemicals:
paper (Western), paper (Japanese) * leather, sulphuric acid, vegetable oil,* fish
and animal oil, soap, wax,* fertilizer (fish origin), fertilizer (vegetable origin),
chemical and mixed fertilizer, charcoal,* petroleum products; (6) lumbering and
wood products: lumber, wood products; (7) food and beverages: sake,* beer, soy
sauce,* sugar,* tea,* canned and bottled food, salt,* kanten, dried bonito, tobacco
and cigarettes; (8) miscellaneous: lacquerware, matches, bamboo and vine products,
tatami tops, straw mats, toys.
Sources for specific products are as follows. Output figures for 1874, for bricks,
soy sauce, tea, are taken from Kazuo Yamaguchi, Meiji Zenki Keizai no Bunseki
(Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1963), ch. i; other figures from Mataji
Umemura, "Meiji 7-nen Seiz6gy6 Seisangaku" (unpublished discussion paper for
the Hitotsubashi-Rockefeller project, C-10), pp. 1-5. Output figures for 1909, for sp
silk yarn, hemp and flax yarn, cotton thread, cement, sugar, are from K6j1 TMketh
for iron and steel, copper, are from Nihon Keizai Tokei S6kan (Osaka: Asahi
Shimbunsha, 1930), pp. 1220-21; and for soy sauce, sake, and beer are from Teikok
Tokei Nenkan; other figures from Nbsh6mu TokeihyO, with the exception of those
for machiney (Koj5 TMkeihyb's total output figure adjusted for the production of
excluded small-scale enterprises, plus Henry Rosovsky's value of governmental non-
military repairs (Capital Formation in Japan, p. 205), and for lumber and wood
products (Yasuba's unpublished estimate based on NdshOmu Tokeihy3 and various
local statistics). Individual quantity series, except those for bricks and soy sauce,
are obtained by deflating value series. Deflators are -taken from Nihon Gink6,
Meiji 20-nen-Showa 37-nen Oroshiuri Bukka Shisbi (Tokyo: Nihon Gink6, 1964).
passim, and Nihon Keizai Tokel Sokan, pp. 1108, 1109, 1113.
21 According to Yasuba's estimate, the rate of growth of manufacturing output in
this period, based on the production index with a 1935 value-added weight, is 6.5
per cent. This figure is comparable with the growth rate of 4.1 per cent for the
earlier period.
degree of underreporting of production was greater in the earlier
years, even these rather moderate rates of growth will have to be
further discounted.
Turning to the question of the development of agriculture,22
James Nakamura's very provocative paper on the agricultural pro-
duction of Japan23 will undoubtedly arouse much interest and in-
vite intensive research on the problem. Here we present only ten-
tative answers based mainly on qualitative and supplementary
evidence. His conclusion that both acreage and yield as reported
in the government statistics involved underreporting in the early
Meiji period (due to fear of a possible increase in the land tax) is
in accordance with the opinion of Japanese economic historians.
The difficulty lies in how to estimate the extent of underreporting.
The underreporting of planted acreage is easier to handle. For
through prefecture-by-prefecture investigation of planted acreage
and of the acreage of taxable arable land, one can detect upward
revisions due to remeasurement. Sometimes, as in the case of Yama-
guchi, Fukuoka, and a few other prefectures,24 the extent of revi-
sion is clearly recorded and known. In other cases, more will have
to be done before a definite conclusion is reached. For the time
being, either the extrapolation method used by Nakamura or the
method of the removal of irregularities prefecture by prefecture, as
used by Yfijir5 Hayami and Sabur6 Yamada, offers a tentative esti-
mate. According to the latter estimate,25 total cultivated land acreage
was 5 per cent greater than the official statistics in 1883.
Yield is more difficult to estimate. If government statistics can-
not be trusted, we have to rely largely on the records of peasants.
22 In what follows, the whole Meiji period (1868-1912), rather than the period
before the Sino-Japanese War, will be treated. For, unlike the case of industry,
agriculture did not reach any turning point in the war period.
23 James I. Nakamura, "Agricultural Production in Japan, 1878-1922," Confer-
ence on the State and Economic Enterprise in Modern Japan, Estes Park, Colorado,
June 1963. Since the paper "Growth of Japanese Agriculture, 1875-1920" (in Wil-
liam D. Lockwood, ed., The State and Economic Enterprise in Japan [Princeton,
N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1965] was not published until quite recently, it
was not possible for us to take it into consideration.
24 See Kunio Niwa, Meiji Ishin no Tochi Henkaku (Tokyo: Ochanomizu Shob6,
1962) pp. 398ff, on the case of Yamaguchi. See also Nihon Nogyo Hattatsushi, IX
(Tokyo: Chui6k6ronsha, 1956), 682.
25 "K6chi Menseki no Suikei, 1883-1944" (unpublished discussion paper in the
Hitotsubashi-Rockefeller Project, D-25), p. 26. Since no allowance was made in
this study for the more gradual upward revisions of acreages such as those ac-
companying the remeasurement of consolidated fields, this figure should be taken to
represent the minimum amount of underreporting.
Then large regional differences in productivity in the late Toku-
gawa period, its later convergence, the paucity and the probable
unrepresentativeness of existing records, all present considerable
difficulty in arriving at reliable nationwide estimates. Only the
collection of a large amount of miscellaneous statistics from various
parts of the nation over a long period would allow us to draw in-
ferences on the levels and trends of productivity. This may not be
an impossible task, but only a few preliminary steps have so far
been taken in this direction.
In Section II we have adopted another approach, that is, to in-
vestigate the techniques used and to draw inferences as to the
levels and trends of productivity. There we anticipated, to some
extent, our conclusion on the Meiji period: in short, that changes
in agricultural techniques in that period were considerable.
There are at least two important institutional changes which may
quickly have affected productivity on the land. The lifting of feudal
restrictions on communication and transportation, coupled with
the effort of the government to disseminate technical knowledge,
facilitated the spread of techniques heretofore used only in more
advanced regions. Then land-tax reform, by reducing and fixing the
amount of tax for the present and promising further reductions in
the future, gave incentive to the peasants, particularly in those re-
gions where it was customary for the authority to take away nearly
all that remained over and above subsistence needs. Actually the
tax rate was reduced only once and only moderately, but the deci-
sion not to revalue land and, hence, not to increase the amount
of tax, eliminated any remaining uncertainty.
One of the most important changes in the Meiji period was the
use of animal power in cultivation. Horses and oxen, which had
chiefly been used as draft animals and as a source of manure, ex-
cept in certain regions in western Japan, now began to be used
for cultivation everywhere. By 1904 the acreage of paddyfields cul-
tivated with the help of animal power was as much as 54 per cent
of the total acreage. The proportion continued to increase there-
after and reached 65 per cent by 1926.26
The effect of the use of animal power on agricultural techniques
was far reaching. The soil, with the help of improved ploughs, was
now cultivated deeply, with the effect of helping its decomposition
26 "N6ji Tokei" in Nihon Keizai Tbkei Sokan (cited in n.20), p. 683.
and of increasing the efficiency of fertilizers. Animal husbandry
also made possible the winter drainage of the surface water of
paddyfields and, consequently, improved the soil, reduced vul-
nerability to damage by insects and diseases, and spread the prac-
tice of double-cropping.
The acreage of paddyfields under double-cropping is believed
to have increased considerably during the Meiji period. By 1903
the double-cropped acreage was as much as 36 per cent of the
total acreage of paddyfields.27 The proportion increased gradually
until 1920, when the trend was reversed. Double-cropping was
detrimental to rice growing itself in case another regular crop such
as wheat was planted in winter. This was not the case, however,
when the winter crop was renge (Chinese milk vetch) to be used
as green manure in summer. Denkur6 Kitagawa characterizes the
period between 1887 and 1924 as the one in which renge growing
spread rapidly.28 In the peak years of the early 1920's renge covered
nearly 10 per cent of the total acreage-or one fourth of the double-
cropped acreage-of paddyfields in winter.29
The input of fertilizers increased noticeably during the Meiji
period. According to the estimates of Yfijir6 Hayami,30 the input
of purchased fertilizer increased at the annual rate of 5.3 per cent
between 1883 and 1903. Moreover, the great increase in the input
of herring guano had already taken place by 1883. According to
the statistics used by Kazuo Yamaguchi, the catch of herring in
the Hokkaid6 area, which supplied most of Japan's herring fer-
tilizer, increased from 270,000-520,000 koku in 1871-1875 to one
million koku in 1893. The report of Kaitakushi also stated that the
production of herring guano doubled between 1875 and 1888.31
While the absolute amount of input was not too large even in the
early 1900's (less than one fifth of the amount in the 1920's), its
effect could have been considerable precisely because the absolute
amount was small.
Consolidation of scattered fields was another important develop-
ment which was very brisk in the middle Meiji period. While the
fear of an increase in the land tax as a result of the improvement
27 Ibid.
28 Nihon NgyO Hattatsushi, VII (Tokyo: Chfi6karonsha, 1955), 513.
29 Ibid.
30 Yfljir6 Hayami, "Hiry6 Tokaryb no Suikei," N6gy5 Sog6 Kenkyii, XVII, No. 1
(Jan. 1963), 253.
31 Kazuo Yamaguchi, Nihon Gyogy6shi (Tokyo: Seikatsusha, 1947), pp. 111-12.
was an obstacle to such a move, the firm recognition of the private-
property right by the same land-tax legislation constituted an in-
centive to it.
The adoption of better varieties, the improvement in the shape
of the seed bed, and the elimination of inadequate seeds by the
salt-water method are some of the more important other innova-
tions in rice growing.
What happened in rice growing was only a part of the story of
the agricultural development in the Meiji Japan. Similar tech-
nological innovations took place in the planting of other crops. An-
other significant development in agriculture is the change in the
relative importance of different crops. Here the great increase in
the planting of mulberry and tea in the late Tokugawa and the
early Meiji periods, and the increased growing of vegetables and
fruits at the expense of import-competing crops such as cotton
and indigo in the middle Meiji period and later, may be particularly
noted.
While not even tentative quantitative estimates can be presented
at this stage of research, we shall contend that considerable prog-
ress, based on a series of non-capital-using innovations, took place
during the Meiji period. We shall also contend that, while Oh-
kawa's earlier estimate of the annual growth rate of real net product
in the primary industry of 2.7 per cent32 between 1878-1882 and
1918-1922 will have to be reduced,33 it will not be at all surprising
if the actual annual rate of increase of land productivity proves to
have been much higher in the Meiji period than in the late Toku-
gawa period, and also higher than in the period between World
War I and 1940.
IV
There is little doubt that the government played a big role in

Japan's economic development. However, it would be a mistake
to place too heavy an emphasis on its economic activity in fields
82 Kazushi Ohkawa and associates, The Growth Rate of the Japanese Economy
since 1878 (Tokyo: Kinokuniya, 1957), p. 32.
33 Saburo Yamada, who has estimated the gross output of agriculture from gov-
ernment statistics, removing apparent internal inconsistencies, gets the growth rates
of gross output of 2.3 per cent based on the deflated value series, and 1.7 per cent
based on the production index with a 1955 price weight ("N6gy6 Sanshutsugaku no
Suikei," Keizai Kenkyii, Vol. XV, No. 1, [Jan. 1964]). To the extent that the under-
reporting of acreage and yield was gradually reduced during these years, these growth
rates overstate the actual rates.
other than social-overhead outlays. More important were the nu-
merous and drastic institutional changes introduced to modernize
the economy. It may also be noted that the direction of changes
was more often than not toward less state intervention, as was
certainly the case with foreign trade, internal commerce, trans-
portation, agriculture, and mining. Even in manufacturing in-
dustries, extensive government intervention was limited in dura-
tion.
The economic development in this period, then, largely depended
on gradualistic innovations in the private sectors of industry and
agriculture, which were brought about in response to newly created
incentives, increased knowledge, demand for exports, and competi-
tion from imports. Innovations were partially borrowed from abroad,
in the sense that principles and mechanisms used in Western
methods of production were applied to improve on the traditional
ways. The speed of progress was anything but miraculous, but the
continuation of such progress over a long period of time resulted
in an expansion of considerable magnitude, which, along with a
few favorable exogenous events, set the stage for a more rapid
growth later.
MATAJI MIYAMOTO and Y6TAR6 SAKUD6, Osaka University

YASUKICHI YASUBA, Osaka and Princeton Universities

Japan Preindustrial Growth

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Economic History Association

Economic Development in Preindustrial Japan, 1859-1894

IN this paper we shall try to do three things: first, to describe

The pre-Perry Japan can be characterized, in principle, as a de-

* We are grateful to Thomas Rimer and Mary B. Fernholz for corrections of

6 Mataji Miyamoto, Nihon Keizaishiy6 (Kyoto: Sanwa Shob6, 1952), p. 133.

10 Takashi Ishii, Bakumatsu Bbekishi no Kenkyi (Tokyo: Nihonhy6ronsha, 1944),

try to go much beyond enumerating the more important measures

11 Kaheiseido Ch6sakat's figure of 5.13 yen per koku was used.

Due to shortage of space, we present in what follows a few gen-

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Even though the government's flirtation with Western ways was

investment in, producers' durables represent a gross understatement of the actual

17 As late as 1897, only 36,000 of 1,041,000 weavers worked in factories. The

20 First, individual quantity indexes were computed for those commodities

26 "N6ji Tokei" in Nihon Keizai Tbkei Sokan (cited in n.20), p. 683.

There is little doubt that the government played a big role in

MATAJI MIYAMOTO and Y6TAR6 SAKUD6, Osaka University

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