German vs.

Barangan, 728 SCRA 514, March 27, 1985

(En Banc), J. Escolin
FACTS: Around 5:00 PM of October 2, 1984, petitioners converged at JP Laurel
Street seemingly to hear the mass at the St. Jude Chapel. Sad chapel adjoins
Malacañang grounds. Wearing yellow T-shirts, petitioners marched with firsts in
the air and shouted anti-anti-government invectives. On their way, thy were barred
from entering the Chapel by Respondent Major Isabelo Lariosa, in obedience to Co-
respondent General Santiago Barangan. In spite of their pleas, the Major further
denied access and warned that any future attempt will be met similarly. Petitioners
now file for writs of mandamus and injunction, invoking their constitutional freedom
to religious worship. The respondents claim that the petitioners’ true purpose is to
conduct an anti-government demonstration, veiled by the freedom to religion.

ISSUE: May this freedom be properly invoked in this case?

RULING: NO. The yellow T-shirts, raised fists, and anti-government speech seem
to substantiate the respondents’ claim. Such acts cast serious doubt in their good
faith in invoking the right to religious freedom While every person has that right,
they must also, under Article 19 of the Civil Code, observe honesty and good faith.

Even if the claim to that right is genuine and valid, the respondents’ act is not
violative of that right. Given that demonstrators have, in the past, forcibly invaded
Malacañang, it can be easily seen why public use of JP Laurel Street and others that
lead to Malacañang is restricted. The purpose is to protect the President and other
government officials.

Freedom of religious worship is recognized in Section 8, Article IV of the 1973

Constitution [Section 5, Article III in the 1987 Constitution]. In explaining this
freedom, the U.S. Supreme Court in Cantwell v. Connecticut notes that the
constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion both prevents
compulsion by law to accept a particular religion and protects the freedom of
exercise of religion. In short, the provision contains the freedoms to believe and to
act. The first is absolute; the second cannot be so.

In Gerona v. Secretary of Education, it is ruled that the realm of belief and creed is
limitless, bounded only by one’s imaginations. But, if its exercise clashes with
established institutions of society and with the law, the former must yield to the
latter.