Neg Round 5

1NC
 1
A. Interpretation: The affirmative must reject the resolution.

Military aid is bilateral between two states.

Sean Ross 16, [Bachelor of Science in Economics and International Political Economy at Regis University.] 8-26-2016, "What Are
the Different Types of Foreign Aid?," Investopedia, https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/082616/what-are-different-
types-foreign-aid.asp RE

Military aid can be considered a type of bilateral aid, with one twist. It normally requires one
nation to either purchase arms or sign defense contracts directly with the United States. In some
cases, the federal government purchases the arms and uses the military to transport them to the recipient country. The country that
receives the most military aid from the United States, and the most aid in general, is Israel. The American government effectively
bankrolls the Israeli military to the tune of $3 billion per year.

Provide is defined by Merriam Webster as

Merriam Webster, “provide” RE
to supply or make available (something wanted or needed) provided new uniforms for the band also : AFFORD curtains
provide privacy b : to make something available to provide the children with free balloons

“Resolved” is legislative
Jeff Parcher 1, former debate coach at Georgetown, Feb 2001
http://www.ndtceda.com/archive s/200102/0790.html

Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide
or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constiutent parts See Syns at *analyze* (emphasis in orginal) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at
*Solve* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Firmness
of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or
decision. (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of
action determined or decided on. A formal statement of a decision, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a
question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconceivable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for
ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context
- they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be
ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which
will be resolved by determining the policy desirablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't
just send the topic committee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the
preliminary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) Further
context: the word resolved is
used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of
resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this
statement be adopted or not. (5) The very terms 'affirmative' and 'negative' support my view. One affirms a resolution. Affirmative and negative are the
equivalents of 'yes' or 'no' - which, of course, are answers to a question.

B. Violation: they affirm the resolution.

C. Standards:
1. Unpredictability—their adherence to a bounded, interpretation of the
chaos at the heart of debate is life-denying cowardice.
Grimm’77 (Ruediger Hermann, art historian and Goethe scholar, Nietzsche's Theory of
Knowledge, ed. M. Montinari, W. Miiller-Lauter & H. Wenzel, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, pg. 30-
33

Western logic and metaphysics have been traditionally founded upon a handful of principles which were regarded as
being self-evidently true, and therefore neither requiring nor admitting of any further proof40• One of these principles we have already dealt with at some length, the notion that
truth must be unchanging. Rather than further belabor the whole question of truth, we shall now turn to Nietzsche's analysis of why it is that truth should be regarded as necessarily unchanging in the first place.

reality (the will to power) is such that all that exists is an ever-changing chaos of power-quanta, continually
Nietzsche's view of

struggling with one another for hegemony. Nothing remains the same from one instant to the
next. Consequently there are no stable objects, no "identical cases," no facts, and no order. Whatever
order we see in the world, we ourselves have projected into it. By itself, the world has no order : there is no
intrinsically stable "world order," no "nature." Yet metaphysics, logic, and language indeed, our whole
conceptual scheme is grounded in the assumption that there is such a stable order. Why? . • . die Annahme des seienden ist nothig, um
denken und schliessen zu konnen : die Logik handhabt our Formeln fiir Gleichbleibendes deshalb ware diese Annahme noch ohne Beweiskraft fiir die Reali tat : ,,das Seiende" gehort zu unserer Optik48• This can
perhaps be best clarified by anticipating our discussion of Nietzsche's perspectivism. Even if reality is a chaos of power-quanta, about which any statement is already an interpretation and "falsification," we

We
nevertheless must assume some sort of order and continuity in order to function at all. But the assumption of order and continuity even if it is a necessary assumption is certainly not any sort of proof.

ourselves, as will to power, gain control over our environment by "interpreting" it, by simplifying and adapting it to
our requirements. Life itself is an ongoing process of interpretation, a process of imposing a superficial

order upon a chaotic reality. In Wahrheit ist Interpretation ein Mittel selbst, um Herr iiber etwas zu werden. (Der organische Prozess setzt fortwahrendes /nterpretieren voraus42•
Thus we create for ourselves a world in which we can live and function and further enhance and increase our will to power. Even our perceptual apparatus is not

geared to gleaning "truth" from the objects of our experience. Rather, it arranges, structures, and interprets these objects so that we can gain control over them and utilize them for
our own ends. The "truth" about things is something we ourselves have projected onto them purely for

the purpose of furthering our own power. Thus Nietzsche can say Wahrheit ist die Art von Irrthum, ohne welche eine bestimmte Art von lebendigen Wesen nicht
leben konnte. Der Werth fiir das Leben entscheidet zuletzt43. Thus the "truth" about reality is simply a variety of error, a convenient fiction which is nevertheless necessary for our maintenance. In the

last analysis it is not a question of "truth" at all, but rather, a matter of which "fiction," which
interpretation of reality best enables me to survive and increase my power. In an absolute sense, the traditional standard
of unchanging truth is no more true or false than Nietzsche's own. But on the basis of Nietzsche's criterion for truth we can make a vital distinction. All statements about the

truth or falsity of our experiential world are functions of the will to power, and in this sense, all equally true (or false). The
difference lies in the degree to which any particular interpretation increases or decreases our power. The notion that truth is unchanging is the

interpretation of a comparatively weak will to power, which demands that the world be
simple, reliable, predictable, i. e. "true." Constant change, ambiguity, contradiction, paradox, etc. are
much more difficult to cope with, and require a comparatively high degree of will to power to be
organized (i. e. interpreted) into a manageable environment. The ambiguous and contradictory the unknown is frightening and threatening. Therefore we have
constructed for ourselves a model of reality which is eminently "knowable," and consequently
subject to our control. Pain and suffering have traditionally been held to stem from "ignorance" about the way the world "really" is : the more predictable and reliable the world is, the
less our chances are of suffering through error, of being unpleasantly surprised. However, " darin driickt sich eine gedriickte Seele aus, voller MIBtrauen und schlimmer Erfahrung . . . 44." The

demand that reality and truth be stable, reliable, predictable, and conveniently at our disposal is a symptom of weakness.
The glossing over of the chaotic, contradictory, changing aspect of reality is the sign of a will to
power which must reduce the conflict and competition in the world to a minimum. Yet resistance and competition are the very
factors which enable any particular power-constellation to express itself and grow in power. As we saw earlier, the will to power can only express itself by

meeting resistance, and any interpretation of reality which attempts to minimize these factors is
profoundly anti-life (since life is will to power). Furthermore, a person embodying a strong and vigorous will to power
will "interpret" the "threatening" aspect of the world the chaos, ambiguity, contradiction, danger, etc. as
stimuli, which continually offer [them] a high degree of resistance which [they] must meet and
overcome if [they are] to survive and grow. Rather than negate change and make the world
predictable, a "strong" person would, according to Nietzsche, welcome the threat and challenge of a
constantly changing world. Referring to those who require a world as changeless as possible in order to survive, Nietzsche says . . . (eine umgekehrte Art Mensch wiirde diesen
Wechsel zum Reiz rechnen) Eine mit Kraft iiberladene und spielende Art W esen wiirde gerade die Aff ekte, die Unvernunft und den Wechsel in eudamonistischem Sinne gutheissen, sammt ihren Consequenzen,

Gefahr, Contrast, Zu-Grunde-gehn usw-45. A large part of the intellectual energy of the West has been spent in trying to discover "facts," "laws
of nature," etc., all of which are conceived to be "truths" and which, therefore, do not change. For Nietzsche, this
conceptualization of our experience is tantamount to a "mummification" : when an experience
is conceptualized, it is wrenched from the everchanging stream of becoming which is the world.
By turning our experiences into facts, concepts, truths, statistics, etc. we "kill" them, rob them of their immediacy
and vitality and embalm them, thus transforming them into the convenient bits of knowledge
which furnish our comfortable, predictable, smug existences46• Der Mensch sucht ,,die Wahrheit" : eine Welt, die nicht sich widerspricht,
nicht tiiuscht, nicht wechselt, eine wahre Welt, eine Welt, in der man nicht leidet : Widerspruch, Tauschung, Wechsel Ursachen des Leidens l47 For Nietzsche, this whole tendency to

negate change which is so intimately connected with the presupposition that "truth" always means "unchanging, eternal truth," is a symptom of decadence, a

symptom of the weakening and disruption of the will to power. This outlook says, in effect, "This far
shall you go, and this much shall you learn, but no more than this . . . . " In the absence of any fixed and ultimate standard for truth,
of course, this outlook is no more true or false than Nietzsche's own. Yet it is not a question here of rightness or wrongness, but a

question of power. More specifically, it is a matter of vital power. "Der Werth fur das Leben entscheidet zuletzt48." Nietzsche's conclusion is that this static world
interpretation has a negative, depressing effect on a person's vital energies (will to power). It constricts
growth, it sets limits and hampers the self-assertion of the will to power. The strong individual,
whom Nietzsche so much admires, flourishes only in an environment of change, ambiguity, contradiction, and

danger. The chaotic and threatening aspect of the world is a stimulus for such individuals, demanding that
they constantly grow and increase their power, or perish49• It demands that they constantly exceed their previous limits, realize

their creative potential and surpass it, become more than they were. In the absence of any
stability in the world, the strong individual who can flourish in such an environment is radically
free from any constraint, radically free to create. It need scarcely be said that this world-interpretation is immeasurably
more conducive to the growth and enhancement of the will to power than the static worldview. And
the increase of will to power is Nietzsche's only criterion : Alles Geschehen, alle Bewegung, alles Werden als ein Feststellen von Gradund Kraftverhaltnissen, als ein Kampf . . .0 0

2. Lawfare—their legalistic approach colludes with invocations of

legality to sanitize violence, erase political objections, and render
invisible the militarization of the globe.
Jones 15. Craig A. Jones, Liu scholar at the Liu Center for Global issues, PhD in geography
from the University of British Columbia, “Lawfare and the juridification of late modern war,”
Progress in Human Geography, 2015, pg. 15
The task remains that in order to look forward and to explore putatively ‘new’ and ‘different’
formations of lawfare, we first must look (back) to legal historical geographies of war. This is
not simply to argue that history matters. It is to insist that the entire lawfare debate rests on an assumption
that, suddenly, law has become important to war without ever interrogating the when or where
of that claim. I intend this not as a dismissal of what is a fascinating literature, but more as a provocation for those interested in lawfare to
explore its genealogies and geogra- phies. This is an opportunity for CLG, CLS and TWAIL and proponents
of military lawfare to examine their (possible) shared intellectual heritage and to articulate
where their theoretical and political differences may lie. It is also an opportunity for a broader conversation
between political, historical and legal geography and to attend to the multiple and overlapping spaces and process of war and law. Work in this
direction is already underway. Extending Blomley’s (1989) concept of the ‘law-space nexus’, Jones and Smith (forthcom- ing) have proposed that
we should think about the interconnections between war and law as forming a set of entangled
relationships captured by what they call a ‘war/law/space nexus’. This nexus, Jones and Smith argue,
recognizes that ‘war and law have an intimate connection’ but it also emphasizes that this
relationship is ‘historically and spatially variable’. In positing the relationship between war and law as dynamic,
the war/law/space nexus opens up precisely the kind of thinking that has been missing
from the lawfare literature. Conceptualized thus, lawfare becomes a spatial and historical
question, rather than a universal and foregone conclusion. The value of lawfare, therefore,
may be realized not so much by thinking about it as a neologism of recent vintage but rather
as a broader phenomenon and set of relationships in a changeable war/law/space
nexus. The lawfare literature heralds – and is a man- ifestation of – a series of vitally important transformations in later modern war. To be
sure, war may have always entailed rhetorics of justification and regimes of authorization, yet as Jones and Smith (forthcoming) have argued,
today war and law have become inseparable and now, more than ever, ‘war requires a
legal armature to secure its legitimacy and organise its conduct’. The emergence of, and growing interest in, law- fare
would seem to suggest that something recently has changed; that there has been an intensified or somehow more duplicitous recourse to the law and
to legal argumentation vis-a`-vis questions of war. The question of why and how this transformation –
or intensification – has taken place is a complex one beyond the scope of this review, but there is
little doubt that it is tied intimately to the hypermediatization of war and the growing ‘reflexivity’ of advanced
militaries who have become, to borrow from Foucault, obsessed with the conduct of their own conduct. Here, for
example, is David Kennedy (2006: 122) connecting the juridification of war with processes of mediatization and perception:
‘Communicating the war is fighting the war, and law – legal categorization – is a communication tool. Defining the
as to
battlefield is not only a matter of deployed force, or privileging killing; it is also a rhetorical claim.’ These changes require a careful articulation
what is and what is not novel about the 21st-century (re)weaponization of law. Here,
historians Strachan and Sheipers (2011) offer a cautionary note about the putative ‘changing character of war’ heralded by several commen-
tators espousing what has become known as the ‘new wars’ thesis (see Kaldor, 2007). Over the last decade or so the thesis has provoked useful
discussions as to how war has changed since the end of the Cold War, but its critics have retorted that change and newness have been overstated
(e.g. Gregory, 2011). Strachan and Sheipers (2011: 18), however, go even further: ‘ the
perception of newness is often not
so much a matter of empirical change but of our conceptual perspective on war’. With this note of
caution in mind, and by way of closing, I return to Comaroff and Comaroff one last time. In Law and Disorder in the Post- colony they argue that
everyday life is becoming increasingly juridified. They claim that politics itself has ‘migrated
to the courts’, shrouding itself in a ‘culture of legality’ where: [c]onflicts once joined in parliaments, by means of street
protests, mass demonstrations, and media campaigns, through labor strikes, boycotts, blockades, and other instruments of assertion,
tend more and more – if not only, or in just the same way everywhere – to find their way to the
judiciary. (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2006: 26) What is specific about the logic of juridification in comparison to other logics? What specific
rhetorical figures and forms do jurists, legal scholars, and (military) lawyers utilize to make something appear as a legal (not ethical, not
political) problem, which then needs to be solved by experts?2 Law has an audience; it speaks to an addressee,
and the field of perception in later modern war has been expanded to include a
multiplicity of publics, both at home and abroad (see Smith, 2008). Thus it is not so much that war is ‘migrating to
the court’ but that the courts and the law are migrating elsewhere, into the very spaces and ontologies of war,
(re)signifying and (re)presenting it as they do. Alongside the ‘judicialization of politics’
could it be possible that we are witnessing a corresponding juridification of war that is at least partially new
and/or different to that which came before? If we are – and that conditional must again be underscored – the task
ahead is to chart and examine the legal historical geographies that underwrite and continue to animate the juridification
of war. And all the while it will be important to ask: What does the reduction of war to law enable? What are the consequences of thinking
about war in distinctly legal terms and what might have been lost? What other reg- isters, whether political-economic, social or ethical, have
been marginalized as law has sent the gavel down on war? What does law do to war, and war to law? These
are questions and
problems: invitations for some preliminary critiques on a fascinating and emerging field.

3. Truth testing—their transparent model capitulates a will to truth that

terminates in implosive violence
Artrip and Debrix 14. Ryan E. Artrip, Doctoral Student, ASPECT, Virginia Polytechnic
Institute, and Francois Debrix, professor of political science at Virginia Polytechnical
Institute, “The Digital Fog of War: Baudrillard and the Violence of Representation,” Volume
11, Number 2 (May, 2014)
The story that needs to be told is thus not about the undoubtedly deplorable “truth” or fact of explosive and warlike violence, but about a
violence of another sort. In the radical digital transparency of the global scene, we (members of
the demos) often have full or direct exposure to explosivity, as we saw above with the
image of terror. But what still needs to be thought and problematized is implosivityor what
may be called implosive violence. Implosive violence is a violence for which we do not, and
perhaps will never, have much of a language (Rancière, 2007: 123). Although, not having a language for it or,
rather, as we saw above, seeking to find a language to talk about it and, perhaps, to make sense
of it is still sought after. This is, perhaps, what digital pictures of war/terror violence seek
to capture or want to force through. Implosive violence, often digitally rendered these days, is in
close contact with media technologies and representational devices and techniques
because it seeks representation and meaning. This is why implosive violence insists on
calling in wars (against terror, for example) and on mobilizing war machines (against
terrorist others, against vague enemy figures), but wars and war machines that no
longer have—to the extent that they ever had—a clearly identifiable object and subject,
or a clear mission/purpose. As such, this implosive violence and its wars (the new
Western/global way of war, perhaps) must remain uncertain, unclear, foggy,
inwardly driven, representational, and indeed virulent. They must remain uncertain
and confused even as they are digitally operative and desperately capture
events/images to give the impression that meanings/significations can and will be
found. Yet, as we saw above, it is not meanings exactly that must be found, but information and
the endless guarantee of its immediate circulation. As information occupies the empty
place of meaning, certainty, or truth, images must be instantaneously turned into
appearances that search for meanings that will never be discovered because, instead,
a proliferation of information-worthy facts and beliefs will take over (perhaps this is
what US fake pundit and comedian Stephen Colbert famously referred to as
“truthiness”). Or, as Baudrillard puts it, “free from its former enemies, humanity now has to
create enemies from within, which in fact produces a wide variety of inhuman
metastases” (Baudrillard, 2003). Thus, this implosive violence is destined to be a global violence
since it "is the product of a system that tracks down any form of negativity and singularity,
including of course death as the ultimate form of singularity. […] It is a violence that, in a
sense, puts an end to violence itself and strives to establish a world where anything related
to the natural must disappear […] Better than a global violence, we should call it a
global virulence. This form of violence is indeed viral. It moves by contagion, produces
by chain reaction, and little by little it destroys our immune systems and our
capacities to resist" (2003; our italics).
 2
The 1AC is complicit in hyperreality – a white fiction of domination over the
social that concretizes itself over black life. The map has preceded the territory
and all that remains are mere vestiges of the Real saturated with ontological
damnation cohered via black death. Their withdrawal is merely a simulacral
play within a broader organism of fiction.
Gillespie’17 |John Gillespie, a leader of Occupy Towson and Co-Founder of the Organized Network of
Student Resistance, “On the Prospect of Weaponized Death,” Propter Nos 2:1 (Fall 2017), Page 6-8|KZaidi

Black life is lived in a white hyper-reality. By this I mean, black life is lived inside a constituted white
fiction which concretizes itself as fact. Black life is a life lived in non-existence; blackness
“exists” as a symbol of death that is, but is not. Blackness “exists” only insofar as White Being
structures it onto a map of anti-black violence.4 Achille Mbembe corroborates this in his Critique of Black Reason,
stating: Racism consists, most of all, in substituting what is with something else, with another
reality. It has the power to distort the real and to fix affect, but it is also a form of psychic
derangement, the mechanism through which the repressed suddenly surfaces. When the racist sees the Black person, he
does not see that the Black person is not there, does not exist, and is just a sign of a pathological fixation on the absence of a relationship. We

must therefore consider race as being both beside and beyond being.5 The reality that replaces
that which is is a white hyper-reality. This white hyper- realism fixes blackness as “a sign of a
pathological fixation.” White hyper-realism is the paradigm whereby consciousness is unable to
distinguish between the fictions created by White Being and the Real. It is this fact that permits
black death to be subsumed in simulations by each and every (analytic) encounter with
Whiteness and the World. Questions like, “Can the Black suffer?” and “Is it capable for the Black
to be wronged?” arise due to the inability to access a grammar of suffering to communicate a
harm that has never ended, a harm that can never end without ending the World itself. It is for
this reason that viral videos of black death, more than opening the possibility for liberal notions
of justice, seem to suture the relationship between the mythical and the real that perpetuates
itself through the reification of black trauma. Black death, more than deconstructing the ontics of the Human,
seems to extend its hyper-reality. Black death makes it harder to distinguish white fictions
from any sense of real harm being done to human flesh. The Black is meant to experience its
death over and over and over again; and the World itself recycles all its fictions-as-the-Real. Put
differently, the White World subjects the Black to perpetual, gratuitous violence, and then uses
that violence as evidence to further suggest that the Black is not Human. For how can a
Human endure such a thing? The experience of gratuitous violence secures the semiotics of
the white hyper-reality. White Disneyland stays intact. Blackness exists at the nexus of fact and
fiction, possibility and (non)value, inclusion and exclusion. Blackness is trapped even in saying
it’s trapped because the “trapped-ness” of the Black extends to locations where the diction and
syntax of White “words don’t go.”6 The Black does not have the grammar to speak against
where and how it is trapped since Blackness can only articulate itself through the semiotics of
Whiteness. That White Being continues to center black death as the matrix of possibility for its
hyper-realist structure indexes the promise of death insofar that White Being is promised
futurity. The Black was rendered fungible through the conjunction of the political and the
libidinal economy of the anti-Black world. Blackness gave birth to the commodity and the
economy of signification that structures the cartography of the Human’s coordinates. This could be
said to be a still birth, insofar as the nature of Black life in a white hyper-reality is conducted on a plane
that guarantees natal alienation, social, and ontological death. The Black body lives to die; the
specter of death shadows it everywhere. What matters crucially here, in our invocation of the hyper-real, is the
importance of the Symbolic. The Symbolic is what “structures the libidinal economy of civil society.”7
The Symbolic here is understood as “the representational process” that structures “the
curriculum and order of knowledge” and/or “the descriptive statement of the human” in our
contemporary World.8 And in this World, white symbolism is everywhere. In fact, in an anti-Black
paradigm, white symbolism is everything. White symbolism over-determines itself as the
Symbolic itself, and denounces anything that challenges its genre-specific mode of knowing,
seeing and understanding the World. In other words, white symbolism holds a monopoly on the
Symbolic in ways that operate “lawlikely so within the terms of their/our order- specific modes of adaptive cognition-for, truth-
for.”9 There is no outside to whiteness, to white semiotics, to white constructs of value and
reality, to white structuring of libidinal value. And for this reason, like Wilderson, “[I] am more interested
in the symbolic value of Whiteness (and the absence of Blackness's value)...”10 in a world of white hyper-
reality. If Blackness is lived in the hyper-real, then there is a hyper-intensification—an
overrepresentation—of semiology that dictates the coercive violence of the Black’s
(non)existence. The semiotics of White Being is the factitious fiction that simulates the entire
World. White Being and black death are part of a globally blood-soaked symbolic exchange
that has extended itself over the terrain of the World to such an extent that there can be no
distinguishing between the Real and the Non-Real. White Being is that Being for whom
ontological capacity exists, whereas the Black is the antithesis to Being, that fleshly matter
whose essence is incapacity.11 If “language is the house of being,”12 as Heidegger puts it, then Blackness is
trapped at the very center of White Being. Dionne Brand puts it concisely when she writes, “We are people without
a translator. The language we use already contains our demise and any response contains that
demise as each response emboldens and strengthens the language it hopes to undermine.”13
This abject positionality was codified through a violence so epochal that Modernity itself can be
said to have been inaugurated through it. However, at the same time, “the center is, paradoxically,
within the structure and outside it.”14 That black death and anti-blackness exist in this liminal
positionality posits the impossible possibility of a rupture in the moment. For that which is inside the
structure, only through being outside the structure, enables the possibility of both sedimentation
and disorientation. Jacques Derrida writes, “The function of this center was not only to orient; balance,
and organize the structure— one cannot in fact conceive of an unorganized structure—but
above all to make sure that the organizing principle of the structure would limit what we might
call the freeplay of the structure.”15 If black death centers the structure, then it is somewhere in
the perfection and expansion of this antagonism (the inside-outside antagonism) that the cartography of
gratuitous anti-Black violence is laid out. What might happen when what orients the structure
becomes insurgent, attacking the structure through that which centers its very Being? What might
happen if black death became weaponized in order to further limit the freeplay of the structure—the expansion of White Being?
Racial profiling is the sine qua non of militarism writ large. The aff cannot
account for the foundational violence of anti-blackness that seeks to contain
the threat of the Black weapon of mass destruction generating anti-black
protocols of threat containment. We impact turn the way in which your Bryant
evidence maps supply lines cuz the form by which that take
Sexton’06 |Jared, thought harder about this stuff than you, Race Nation and Empire in a
Blackned World, Radical History Review Issue 95 (Spring 2006), p. 250-255|KZaidi

In the United States, homegrown white supremacists, and the lion’s share of their more moderate neighbors, have
long considered black people to be weapons of mass destruction. Racial profiling, the hallmark of
Homeland Security’s dreadful encroachments, cut its fearsome teeth several years prior to the passage of the

USA PATRIOT Act. Prior, as well, to the American Civil Liberties Union’s (ACLU) “Driving while Black” campaign in the late 1990s; prior to the
launch of President Ronald Reagan’s infamous war on drugs in the early 1980s, and even to President Richard Nixon’s earlier consolidation of the first
truly nationwide police apparatus in the late 1960s. In fact, thegenealogy of this nefarious police practice is properly
charted beyond the twentieth century, reaching back, with stunningly little modification, to the ethos of the
colonial slave patrols of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries. Given this line of
descent, it is not unreasonable to say that racial profiling is the sine qua non of modern policing. In the

consternated deliberations of national security, official and unofficial, from the founding of the republic to the trumpeting of
the new world order, the social control and crisis management of the black population has always

figured centrally, even or perhaps especially when matters of emancipation or racial equality
have by no means enjoyed the focus of debate. Across the sweep of U.S. history, policing the color line has
required no credible threat of invasion, no evidence of insurrectionary design, no proven
stockpile of illicit chemical agents or radioactive material, no particular breach of domestic or
international law, no sensational moral or ethical transgression (though all of these items, real or imagined, have
factored in the relevant discourses, public and private). It has only required the presence —
within the polity, economy, culture, and society — of a so-called problem people, dwelling as
the absence of human presence. We can note further that the institution of transatlantic racial slavery — whose
political and economic relations constitute, present tense, the social fabric of Western modernity in general, of the

Americas in particular, and of the United States most acutely — cannot be explained (away) by the acquisition of fixed

capital, the minimization of variable capital, or the maximization of profits, much less by the
dictates of gunboat diplomacy, the expansion of strategic overseas military installations, or the
idiosyncrasies of the White House. It may seem so at times, but only insofar as contemporary
observers, or our historical counterparts, fundamentally misrecognize the nature of racial slavery: as a brutal
regime of labor exploitation; as the atrocious adjunct to land conquest and the extermination,
containment, and/or forced assimilation of indigenous peoples; or as an endeavor functional
to, rather than in excess of and at times at odds with, the advent and maturation of
Eurocentric capitalism. Of course, all of these procedures have been important to the history of racial slavery (and vice versa), but none
is essential to its origins, its development 252 and, above all, its pernicious afterlife.1 Rather,
enslavement — the inaugural enterprise for the age of Europe, the precondition for the American century and its coveted sequel — is
enabled by and dependent on the most basic of operations: symbolic and material
immobilization, the absolute divestment of sovereignty at the site of the black body: its
freedom of movement, its conditions of labor, its physical and emotional sustenance, its social
and sexual reproduction, its political and cultural representation. Beyond its economic utility, this
rendering of the black as the object of dispossession par excellence — object of accumulation,
prototypical commodity, captive flesh — structures indelibly the historical proliferation of
modern conceptions of sovereignty that now dominate political and legal discourse globally
and provide the crucial frames of intelligibility for both imperialism and anti-imperialism, empire
and its discontents. With blacks barred by definition from the very notion of the sovereign (whatever their nominal legal status, wherever their
tentative place of residence), those
not marked by the material and symbolic stigma of slavery have the
exclusive and positive capacity to debate about sovereignty: to trivialize its importance and
rationalize its violation or to struggle in its defense, to name and lament its loss, and wage
war for its recovery. Blacks, then, suffer a peculiar relation to the U.S. empire in the historic instance: neither its subjects (certainly not its
authors or beneficiaries) nor its objects (at least not in the most direct sense). This peculiarity was underscored dramatically during the notorious U.S.
war in Southeast Asia (1965 – 75) wherein black soldiers, overwhelmingly conscripted, were not only disproportionately offered up as cannon fodder
(after long being segregated and retained in noncombat functions, depicted as cowardly and inept, denied access to the social capital of military
heroism, etc. — all components of the typical critique of the racism internal to the armed forces) but were also differentiated by the enemies of the
U.S. military invasion and occupation. Racially targeted propaganda appealed to the cruel ironies of black
military service (ironies already well known and articulated by mid-century) and offered ideological support to the
struggle for freedom, justice, and equality that was, at the time, intensifying and mutating
stateside as it raised the galvanizing cry of Black Power. More important, I think, were the notable combat
tactics of Vietcong and North Vietnamese Army soldiers, which frequently targeted white
soldiers for ambush and sniper attacks while leaving unharmed (if at all possible) contingents of
black soldiers on hand, a veritable racial partition of attack. In this circumscribed domain, the campaign of
Vietnamese guerrilla fighters sought to exploit — in parts strategically, in parts earnestly — the
living legacy of antiblackness among U.S. fighting forces not only by suggesting a political
affinity between blacks and Asians as victims of white supremacy (whether European colonialism or U.S.
imperialism) but also by enacting a displacement of the racially distributed vulnerability to violence

that otherwise slated blacks for gratuitous assault without recourse. Muhammad Ali’s famous 1966 statement,
“I ain’t got no quarrel with them Viet-Cong. No Viet- Cong ever called me nigger,” takes on added weight in this light. Black troops, for their

part, contributed actively to this antagonistic milieu with, among other things, hundreds of
fraggings of white junior officers, the repeated refusal of high-risk assignments, and, on
several occasions, open rebellion and riot against the system of overseas military policing and
prisons in which they were, predictably, overrepresented as captives. In the contemporary theater of
operations in occupied Iraq, this historical discrepancy — which has hardly been mitigated, even if it is newly mediated — promised

to reassert itself briefly with the fragging incident involving U.S. Army Sergeant Asan Akbar, a
native-born black.2 But the racial politics of U.S. militarism, so prominent at the height of black
political movement and social upheaval in the 1960s and 1970s, have been consistently and
unsurprisingly convoluted by the combined effects of corporate media machinations and the
marked disarray of black politics domestically.3 The global antiwar movement, while eloquent on the
menace of the former, has missed the latter point almost entirely. In its drive for popular (if not populist) appeal, a

drive fueled by the euphoria of mass demonstrations on the eve of the U.S. invasion, political
opposition to the war on terror across the global North has borrowed freely from the rhetorical
repertoire of black freedom struggle in and beyond the United States, but it has displayed a
striking disinterest in either the political energies or the lived experience of actually existing
black communities.
We demand an un-relenting negativity that refuses transparency in favor of
changing the coordinates of politics to pose a demand in excess of ANY call for
hospitality in a world invigorated by anti-blackness. Vote neg to sabotage the
1AC – they have extended us unconditional hospitality. With their guard down,
we have taken their 1ac hostage, stripped it of its name, and embraced a
symbolic terrorism that annuls the 1AC thru a zero-transformation into
blackness which breaks their hail towards communication. This HAHA solves
Bleiker better cuz ur my hostage so this is the MOST plural option. The Bryant
evidence isnt responsive
Gillespie’17 |John Gillespie, a leader of Occupy Towson and Co-Founder of the Organized Network of
Student Resistance, “On the Prospect of Weaponized Death,” Propter Nos 2:1 (Fall 2017), Page 9-
11|KZaidi

If we are engaging in a war in which the symbolic value, the semiotics of this World itself,
positions “the Black as death personified, the White as personification of diversity, of life
itself,”18 then resistance needs an “unspoken dynamic.” It needs a space where “words don’t
go”—a form of guerrilla linguistics, a submarined syntax, an undercommon communication.
Perhaps, here, where the conversation is blackened, and the theory is phobogenic, and the journal is
Propter Nos, we can allow ourselves to excavate insurgent dictions still lost in the lingua franca of
White Being, but full of the specter of black terror, black disorientation. If the Black is death
personified, then what might happen if we weaponized our death? What might happen if we
recognized the inevitability of that death? What if we began to think that the non-uniqueness
of that death was an opening towards the “end of Humanity?” In The Spirit of Terrorism, Jean Baudrillard
writes, “When global power monopolizes the situation to this extent, when there is such a
formidable condensation of all functions in the technocratic machinery, and when no
alternative form of thinking is allowed, what other way is there but a terroristic situational
transfer?”19 Terrorism consists of the militaristic tactics used by those who are facing
globalized White Being with asymmetrical technologies of terror, violence, intimidation and
war. A terrorist is any armed vigilante willing to rupture the system of semiotics through an
equally cofounding semiotic. A semiotic that returns one to the “desert of the [Black] Real”—
where a “project of total disorder” is unleashed upon the semiotic system.20 Black terrorism is
a violence that re-appropriates the death embedded in the Black’s ontological incapacity in
order to enable the possibility of a radical capacity—gratuitous freedom. White Being itself is a
decentralized onto- epistemic deployment of violence, and if violent insurgency is necessary,
then the decentralized approach of the black terrorist is necessary to counter the terror of
White Being. This being said, black terrorism is perhaps better understood as counter-terror
terrorism. We do not have the power to end the World with life. We only have the power to end the World
through death. As Baudrillard writes, “The radical difference is that the terrorist, while they have at
their disposal weapons that are the system’s own, possess a further lethal weapon: their own
deaths.”21 The United States has an international military force, a storehouse of nuclear arms,
and the capacity, within their police state alone, to “terrorize” not just one block in Baltimore,
but the whole entire world. Black terrorism is what happens when we heed the Afro-Pessimist
call that “A living death is as much a death as it is a living,”22 it is what happens when we take
seriously the unsayable in Afro-Pessimism. Black Terrorism is (non)ontological fugitivity that
disavows any need to focus on social life—black terrorism steals black death itself from White
Being. It is for this reason that Baudrillard speaks to his own White Being and the specter of terror when he says: When Western
culture sees all of its values extinguished one by one, it turns inward on itself in the very worst
way. Our death is an extinction, an annihilation. Herein lies our poverty. When a singularity
throws its own death into the ring, it escapes this slow extermination, its dies its own natural
death. This is an immense game of double or quits. In committing suicide, the singularity suicides the other
at the same time— we might say that the terrorist acts literally ‘suicided’ the West. A death for
a death, then, but transfigured by the symbolic stakes. ‘We have already devastated our world,
what more do you want?’ says Muray. But precisely, we have devastated this world, it still has to be
destroyed. Destroyed symbolically. This is not at all the same undertaking. And though we did the first part, only
others are going to be able to do the second.23 We are the others. Tasked with the (un)fortunate task of
ending White hyper-realism, the White World, and White Being. Well aware that if White Fascism
continues the project of black annihilation, the only choice we will have is to fight. Not because
we want to, but because we have to. But, ultimately, we must remember the words of Huey Newton: “[T]he first
lesson a revolutionary must learn is that he is a doomed man.”24 In the age of Trump, the perfection of slavery
reaches its horizon.25 The disavowal of the lives of refugees is White Being attempting to
reconcile the “Nation- State” simulation with the free track and flow of bodies it’s been
attempting to murder; the deportation of undocumented immigrants in conjunction with the
materialization of borders is White Being attempting to secure its linguistic and economic
integrity; the rise of the private prison and the militarization of the police force is White Being
attempting to innovate the system of enslavement and necropolitics for the 21st Century; the
plundering of indigenous land and bodies is White Being attempting to finish off the project of
genocide; the disregard for the Earth is White Being ensuring the Anthropocene will also be
the Apocalypse. Trump is a reinvigoration, a call to arms, for White Being, and White Being
can only be “destroyed symbolically.” Black terrorism transfigures the symbolic stakes
because it steals away that condition of White Being’s possibility in a kind of fugitivity that is a
zero-transformation into Blackness. This being said, we all know that the only thing that follows the
absolute loss of hope is this Black Spring, this Neo-Fanonian violence, this blackened terroristic
situational transfer. In Baudrillard’s words, in the Age of Trump, let us remember the gift of
immorality, “Terrorism is immoral. The World Trade Center event, that symbolic challenge, is immoral, and it is
a response to a globalization which is itself immoral. So, let us be immoral...”26

Their conception of death as a biological end to life denies way in which death
is co-constitutive of life. The result is the securitization against death from
which social control is made possible and life is reduced to a capitalist
prolongation.
Robinson 12. Andrew Robinson, political theorist and activist based in the UK, “An A to Z of
Theory | Jean Baudrillard: The Rise of Capitalism & the Exclusion of Death” Ceasefire Magazine,
March 30, 2012, https://ceasefiremagazine.co.uk/in-theory-baudrillard-2/

The passage to capitalism:Symbolic exchange – or rather, its suppression – plays a central role in the
emergence of capitalism. Baudrillard sees a change happening over time. Regimes based on symbolic exchange
(differences are exchangeable and related) are replaced by regimes based on equivalence (everything is, or means, the same). Ceremony
gives way to spectacle, immanence to transcendence. Baudrillard’s view of capitalism is derived from Marx’s analysis of value. Baudrillard accepts Marx’s view that capitalism is
based on a general equivalent. Money is the general equivalent because it can be exchanged for any commodity. In turn, it expresses the value of abstract labour-time. Abstract

labour-time is itself an effect of the regimenting of processes of life, so that different kinds of labour can be compared. Capitalism is derived from the autonomisation
or separation of economics from the rest of life. It turns economics into the ‘reality-principle’. It is a kind of sorcery, connected in some way to the

disavowed symbolic level. It subtly shifts the social world from an exchange of death with the
Other to an eternal return of the Same. Capitalism functions by reducing everything to a regime based on value and the production of value.
To be accepted by capital, something must contribute value. This creates an immense regime of social exchange. However, this
social exchange has little in common with symbolic exchange. It ultimately depends on the mark of value itself being unexchangeable. Capital must be

endlessly accumulated. States must not collapse. Capitalism thus introduces the irreversible into social life, by means of accumulation. According
to Baudrillard, capitalism rests on an obsession with the abolition of death. Capitalism tries to
abolish death through accumulation. It tries to ward off ambivalence (associated with death)
through value (associated with life. But this is bound to fail. General equivalence – the basis of capitalism –
is itself the ever-presence of death. The more the system runs from death, the more it places
everyone in solitude, facing their own death. Life itself is fundamentally ambivalent. The
attempt to abolish death through fixed value is itself deathly. Accumulation also spreads to other fields. The idea
of progress, and linear time, comes from the accumulation of time, and of stockpiles of the past. The idea of truth comes from the
accumulation of scientific knowledge. Biology rests on the separation of living and non-living.
According to Baudrillard, such accumulations are now in crisis. For instance, the accumulation of
the past is undermined, because historical objects now have to be concealed to be preserved –
otherwise they will be destroyed by excessive consumption. Value is produced from the residue or remainder of an incomplete
symbolic exchange. The repressed, market value, and sign-value all come from this remainder. To destroy the remainder would be to destroy value. Capitalist exchange is always
based on negotiation, even when it is violent. The symbolic order does not know this kind of equivalential exchange or calculation. And capitalist extraction is always one-way. It

It is also this regime which

amounts to a non-reversible aggression in which one act (of dominating or killing) cannot be returned by the other.

produces scarcity – Baudrillard here endorses Sahlins’ argument. Capitalism produces the Freudian “death drive”,
which is actually an effect of the capitalist culture of death. For Baudrillard, the limit to both Marx and Freud is
that they fail to theorise the separation of the domains they study – the economy and the unconscious. It is the
separation which grounds their functioning, which therefore only occurs under the regime of the code. Baudrillard also criticises theories of desire, including those of Deleuze,
Foucault, Freud and Lacan. He believes desire comes into existence based on repression. It is an effect of the denial of the symbolic. Liberated energies always leave a new
remainder; they do not escape the basis of the unconscious in the remainder. Baudrillard argues that indigenous groups do not claim to live naturally or by their desires – they
simply claim to live in societies. This social life is an effect of the symbolic. Baudrillard therefore criticises the view that human liberation can come about through the liberation
of desire. He thinks that such a liberation will keep certain elements of the repression of desire active. Baudrillard argues that the processes which operate collectively in
indigenous groups are repressed into the unconscious in metropolitan societies. This leads to the autonomy of the psyche as a separate sphere. It is only after this repression has
occurred that a politics of desire becomes conceivable. He professes broad agreement with the Deleuzian project of unbinding energies from fixed categories and encouraging
flows and intensities. However, he is concerned that capitalism can recuperate such releases of energy, disconnecting them so they can eventually reconnect to it. Unbinding
and drifting are not fatal to capitalism, because capitalism itself unbinds things, and re-binds things which are unbound. What is fatal to it is, rather, reversibility. Capitalism
continues to be haunted by the forces it has repressed. Separation does not destroy the remainder. Quite the opposite. The remainder continues to exist, and gains power from
its repression. This turns the double or shadow into something unquiet, vampiric, and threatening. It becomes an image of the forgotten dead. Anything which reminds us of the
repressed aspects excluded from the subject is experienced as uncanny and threatening. It becomes the ‘obscene’, which is present in excess over the ‘scene’ of what is
imagined. This is different from theories of lack, such as the Lacanian Real. Baudrillard’s remainder is an excess rather than a lack. It is the carrier of the force of symbolic
exchange. Modern culture dreams of radical difference. The reason for this is that it exterminated radical difference by simulating it. The energy of production, the unconscious,

and signification all in fact come from the repressed remainder. Our culture is dead from having broken the pact with monstrosity, with radical difference. The West
continues to perpetrate genocide on indigenous groups. But for Baudrillard, it did the same
thing to itself first – destroying its own indigenous logics of symbolic exchange. Indigenous
groups have also increasingly lost the symbolic dimension, as modern forms of life have been
imported or imposed. This according to Baudrillard produces chronic confusion and instability. Gift-
exchange is radically subversive of the system. This is not because it is rebellious. Baudrillard thinks the system can survive defections or exodus. It is
because it counterposes a different ‘principle of sociality’ to that of the dominant system. According to Baudrillard, the
mediations of capitalism exist so that nobody has the opportunity to offer a symbolic challenge or an irreversible gift. They exist to keep the symbolic at bay. The

affective charge of death remains present among the oppressed, but not with the ‘properly symbolic rhythm’ of immediate
retaliation. The Church and State also exist based on the elimination of symbolic exchange. Baudrillard is highly critical of Christianity for what he takes to be a cult of suffering,
solitude and death. He sees the Church as central to the destruction of earlier forms of community based on symbolic exchange. Baudrillard seems to think that earlier forms of
the state and capitalism retained some degree of symbolic exchange, but in an alienated, partially repressed form. For instance, the imaginary of the ‘social contract’ was based
on the idea of a sacrifice – this time of liberty for the common good. In psychoanalysis, symbolic exchange is displaced onto the relationship to the master-signifier. I haven’t
seen Baudrillard say it directly, but the impression he gives is that this is a distorted, authoritarian imitation of the original symbolic exchange. Nonetheless, it retains some of its
intensity and energy. Art, theatre and language have worked to maintain a minimum of ceremonial power. It is the reason older orders did not suffer the particular malaise of
the present. It is easy to read certain passages in Baudrillard as if he is bemoaning the loss of these kinds of strong significations. This is initially how I read Baudrillard’s work. But
on closer inspection, this seems to be a misreading. Baudrillard is nostalgic for repression only to the extent that the repressed continued to carry symbolic force as a referential.
He is nostalgic for the return of symbolic exchange, as an aspect of diffuse, autonomous, dis-alienated social groups. Death: Death plays a central role in Baudrillard’s theory, and

is closely related to symbolic exchange. According to Baudrillard, what we have lost above all in the transition to alienated
society is the ability to engage in exchanges with death. Death should not be seen here in purely
literal terms. Baudrillard specifies early on that he does not mean an event affecting a body, but
rather, a form which destroys the determinacy of the subject and of value – which returns
things to a state of indeterminacy. Baudrillard certainly discusses actual deaths, risk-taking, suicide and so on. But he also sees death figuratively, in
relation to the decomposition of existing relations, the “death” of the self-image or ego, the interchangeability of processes of life across different categories. For

instance, eroticism or sexuality is related to death, because it leads to fusion and

communication between bodies. Sexual reproduction carries shades of death because one
generation replaces another. Baudrillard’s concept of death is thus quite similar to Bakhtin’s concept of the grotesque. Death refers to
metamorphosis, reversibility, unexpected mutations, social change, subjective transformation,
as well as physical death. According to Baudrillard, indigenous groups see death as social, not natural or
biological. They see it as an effect of an adversarial will, which they must absorb. And they mark it
with feasting and rituals. This is a way of preventing death from becoming an event which does
not signify. Such a non-signifying event is absolute disorder from the standpoint of symbolic exchange. For Baudrillard, the west’s idea of a
biological, material death is actually an idealist illusion, ignoring the sociality of death. Poststructuralists
generally maintain that the problems of the present are rooted in the splitting of life into binary oppositions. For Baudrillard, the division between

life and death is the original, founding opposition on which the others are founded. After this
first split, a whole series of others have been created, confining particular groups – the “mad”,
prisoners, children, the old, sexual minorities, women and so on – to particular segregated
situations. The definition of the ‘normal human’ has been narrowed over time. Today, nearly
everyone belongs to one or another marked or deviant category. The original exclusion was of
the dead – it is defined as abnormal to be dead. “You livies hate us deadies”. This first split and exclusion
forms the basis, or archetype, for all the other splits and exclusions – along lines of gender,
disability, species, class, and so on. This discrimination against the dead brings into being the modern experience of death. Baudrillard suggests that
death as we know it does not exist outside of this separation between living and dead. The modern view of death is constructed on the

model of the machine and the function. A machine either functions or it does not. The human
body is treated as a machine which similarly, either functions or does not. For Baudrillard, this
misunderstands the nature of life and death. The modern view of death is also necessitated by the rise of subjectivity. The subject
needs a beginning and an end, so as to be reducible to the story it tells. This requires an idea of death as an end. It is
counterposed to the immortality of social institutions. In relation to individuals, ideas of religious immortality is simply an ideological cover for the real exclusion of the dead. But

institutions try to remain truly immortal.Modern systems, especially bureaucracies, no longer know how to die –
or how to do anything but keep reproducing themselves. The internalisation of the idea of the
subject or the soul alienates us from our bodies, voices and so on. It creates a split, as Stirner would say, between the category of ‘man’ and the ‘un-man’, the real self
irreducible to such categories. It also individualises people, by destroying their actual connections to others. The
symbolic haunts the code as the threat of its own death. The society of the code works constantly to ward off the danger of irruptions of the symbolic. The mortal body is

we still
actually an effect of the split introduced by the foreclosure of death. The split never actually stops exchanges across the categories. In the case of death,

‘exchange’ with the dead through our own deaths and our anxiety about death. We no longer have living,
mortal relationships with objects either. They are reduced to the instrumental. It is as if we have a transparent veil between us. Symbolic exchange is

based on a game, with game-like rules. When this disappears, laws and the state are invented
to take their place. It is the process of excluding, marking, or barring which allows concentrated
or transcendental power to come into existence. Through splits, people turn the other into their ‘imaginary’. For instance,
westerners invest the “Third World” with racist fantasies and revolutionary aspirations; the “Third
World” invests the west with aspirational fantasies of development. In separation, the other exists only as an imaginary object. Yet the resultant purity is

illusory. For Baudrillard, any such marking or barring of the other brings the other to the core of society. “We all” become dead, or mad, or
prisoners, and so on, through their exclusion. The goal of ‘survival’ is fundamental to the birth
of power. Social control emerges when the union of the living and the dead is shattered, and
the dead become prohibited. The social repression of death grounds the repressive socialisation of life. People are compelled to
survive so as to become useful. For Baudrillard, capitalism’s original relationship to death has historically been concealed by the system of production,
and its ends. It only becomes fully visible now this system is collapsing, and production is reduced to operation. In modern societies, death is made

invisible, denied, and placed outside society. For example, elderly people are excluded from
society. People no longer expect their own death. As a result, it becomes unintelligible. It keeps
returning as ‘nature which will not abide by objective laws’. It can no longer be absorbed
through ritual. Western society is arranged so death is never done by someone else, but always
attributable to ‘nature’. This creates a bureaucratic, judicial regime of death, of which the concentration camp is
the ultimate symbol. The system now commands that we must not die – at least not in any old way. We may only die

if law and medicine allow it. Hence for instance the spread of health and safety regulations. On the other hand, murder and violence
are legalised, provided they can be re-converted into economic value. Baudrillard sees this as
a regressive redistribution of death. It is wrested from the circuit of social exchanges and vested in centralised
agencies. For Baudrillard, there is not a social improvement here. People are effectively being killed, or left to die, by a process which never treats them as having value.
On the other hand, even when capitalism becomes permissive, inclusive and tolerant, it still creates an underlying anxiety about being reduced to the status of an object or a

The slave remains within the master’s dialectic for as long as

marionette. This appears as a constant fear of being manipulated.

‘his’ life or death serves the reproduction of domination. A fatal ontology?: In Fatal Strategies, Baudrillard suggests an ontology
which backs up his analysis of death. The world itself is committed to extremes and to radical antagonism. It is bored of meaning. There is an ‘evil genie’, a principle of Evil which
constantly returns in the form of seduction. Historical processes are really pushed forward by this principle. All energy comes from fission and rupture. These cannot be replaced
by production or mechanical processes. There is no possibility of a collective project or a coherent society, only the operation of such forces. Every order exists only to be

The world is fundamentally unreal. This leads to a necessity of irony, which is to say,
transgressed and dismantled.

the slippage of meaning. Historically, the symbolic was confined to the metaphysical. It did not affect the physical world. But with the rise of
models, with the physical world derived increasingly from the code, the physical world is brought within the symbolic. It
becomes reversible. The rational principle of linear causality collapses. The world is, and always remains, enigmatic.
People will give for seduction or for simulation what they would never give for quality of life.
Advertising, fashion, gambling and so on liberate ‘immoral energies’ which hark back to the magical or archaic gamble on the power of thought against the power of reality.
Neoliberalism is in some ways an ultimate release of such diabolical forces. People will look for an ecstatic excess of anything – even boredom or oppression. In this account, the

What is inescapable is the object and its seduction, its

principle of evil becomes the only fixed point. Desire is not inescapable.

‘principle of evil’. The object at once submits to law and breaks it in practice, mocking it. Its own “game” cannot
be discerned. It is a poor conductor of the symbolic order but a good conductor of signs. The drive towards spectacles, illusions and

scenes is stronger than the desire for survival.

 Case
Turn—Russia fill-in
Ilan Goldenberg 12-5-18 [Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for a New American
Security’s (CNAS) Middle East Security Program and formerly served as the Iran Team Chief in
the Office of the Secretary of Defense.] "Give Saudi Arabia a Take It or Leave It Deal," National
Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/give-saudi-arabia-take-it-or-leave-it-deal-37902RE

Walking away from supporting the Saudi-led war in Yemen and ending U.S. mid-air refueling
might give Washington the moral high ground, but it will do little to stop the killing. The Saudis
view the threat in Yemen as crucial to their interests, so U.S. pressure to end the war altogether
will fall short of causing real change. To the Saudis, the threat of Iran establishing a foothold on
their southern border is much more vital to their interests than procuring U.S. weapons. Rather
than walk away from Yemen, they will buy Russian bombs or use less sophisticated weapons and
tactics that will kill even more civilians. Americans will have washed our hands of a morally
unacceptable situation, but civilian deaths and the threat of famine will actually get worse, and
the world will look on and do nothing.

Private sector is an alt cause

David 17 [US-Saudi Arabia seal weapons deal worth nearly $110 billion immediately, $350
billion over 10 years Javier E. David | @TeflonGeek Published 9:31 AM ET Sat, 20 May 2017
Updated 11:03 AM ET Mon, 22 May 2017 https://www.cnbc.com/2017/05/20/us-saudi-arabia-
seal-weapons-deal-worth-nearly-110-billion-as-trump-begins-visit.html]

Simultaneously, Saudi Arabia is in a broad-based push for economic reform, and as part of
that effort signed a flurry of deals with private U.S. companies worth tens of billions of
dollars.

Houthi alt cause

Alasrar 7/25. Fatima Alasrar is the Senior Yemen Analyst at The Arabia Foundation [Fatima
Alasrar. “Yemen Is Bad but It Would Be Worse Without U.S. Involvement.” National Interest. July
25th, 2018. URL = https://nationalinterest.org/blog/middle-east-watch/yemen-bad-it-would-be-
worse-without-us-involvement-26801] NM

For example, congressional narratives depict the Saudi-led coalition as the instigators of the
Yemen conflict. In fact, the war in Yemen did not begin with Saudi Arabia’s March 2015 military
intervention in the country but with the Houthi militias’ violent overthrow of Yemen’s
internationally recognized government, which happened in September 2014. Following their
takeover of Yemen’s capital, Sana’a, the Houthis, backed by Iran, imposed a fundamentalist,
sectarian, brutal, and repressive regime that dashed any hope for political pluralism and
democratic governance in the wake of Yemen’s Arab Spring. The government-in-exile then
requested external military intervention, and the Saudi-led coalition responded. That Saudis
also got involved because they feared that Iranian military and financial support for the Houthis
would create a new and deadly proxy force for Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps within
the Arabian Peninsula.
There is no question that Yemen is confronting a humanitarian crisis that has been exacerbated
by the entry of the Saudi-led coalition into the war. However, much of this crisis has been
manufactured by the Houthis themselves. The Houthi government’s total neglect of sanitation
services, and its failure to maintain and repair sewer and water infrastructure, has contributed
to the deepening of the cholera epidemic. Additionally, the Houthi have confiscated food,
medicine, and critical life-saving medical equipment to give to militia members or to sell on
the black market at wildly inflated prices. Also, they have widely used landmines and the
forced recruitment of child soldiers, many of whom are under fifteen years of age, all of which
further compounds Yemen’s humanitarian crisis. In contrast, areas that the Saudi-led coalition
have restored to Yemeni government control do not suffer the same disastrous conditions that
civilians in Houthi-controlled regions are experiencing.

Non-unique and turn – the war will happen either way, but withdrawing US
support prevents settlement by emboldening the Iran-backed rebels.
Phillips and Posey 18 James Phillips [Senior Research Fellow, The Heritage Foundation] and
Madyson Hutchinson Posey [Research assistant], "Ending US Military Support to Saudi Arabia in
Yemen Would Trigger Dangerous Consequences.” The Heritage Foundation Blog. December 6,
2018. [Premier].

The U.S. currently extends only limited support to Saudi Arabia in Yemen centered on
intelligence and information sharing. There are no U.S. troops involved in combat operations,
except for occasional commando raids and air strikes against Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,
a Sunni terrorist group that continues to target the U.S. homeland, as well as Saudi Arabia,
France, and other countries. The Trump administration already has stopped the aerial refueling
of Saudi warplanes involved in the Yemen conflict and called for a negotiated settlement. But
the United States cannot afford to abandon its allies and hope for the best. Undermining the
Yemeni government and the Saudi-led coalition would make an acceptable political
settlement impossible. The Yemeni government and Saudi Arabia will continue to fight this
war with or without U.S. support. Those who would connect two unrelated issues, condemn
Saudi involvement, and ignore Iran’s hostile role inside Yemen will only do more harm to
innocent Yemeni civilians and empower Iran and its Yemeni proxies.

Walking away makes things worse.

Ilan Goldenberg 12-5-18 [Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for a New American
Security’s (CNAS) Middle East Security Program and formerly served as the Iran Team Chief in
the Office of the Secretary of Defense.] "Give Saudi Arabia a Take It or Leave It Deal," National
Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/give-saudi-arabia-take-it-or-leave-it-deal-37902

Walking away from supporting the Saudi-led war in Yemen and ending U.S. mid-air refueling
might give Washington the moral high ground, but it will do little to stop the killing. The Saudis
view the threat in Yemen as crucial to their interests, so U.S. pressure to end the war altogether
will fall short of causing real change. To the Saudis, the threat of Iran establishing a foothold on
their southern border is much more vital to their interests than procuring U.S. weapons. Rather
than walk away from Yemen, they will buy Russian bombs or use less sophisticated weapons and
tactics that will kill even more civilians. Americans will have washed our hands of a morally
unacceptable situation, but civilian deaths and the threat of famine will actually get worse, and
the world will look on and do nothing.

Withdraw causes Saudi blowback in Yemen

Chollet and Goldenberg 18 (Derek Chollet, served in the Obama administration for six
years in senior positions at the White House, State Department, and Pentagon, most recently as
the U.S. assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs. He is currently the
executive vice president at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Ilan Goldenberg is a
senior fellow and director of the Middle East Security program at the Center for a New American
Security. Previously, he served as chief of staff to the special envoy for Israeli-Palestinian
negotiations, supporting Secretary of State John Kerry’s initiative to conduct peace negotiations
between Israelis and Palestinians.) [The United States Should Give Saudi Arabia a Choice,
Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/11/30/saudi-arabia-should-be-given-a-choice-
stop-the-surprises-or-suffer-the-consequences-mbs-khashoggi/] whs-ee

A divorce will not cause the Saudis to walk away from the war in Yemen or make up with the
Qataris. If anything, the end result will be the Saudis will be less restrained, because they will
no longer feel the need to acquiesce to U.S. requests. They will certainly feel the loss of
sophisticated American weaponry, but the Russians will step in and supply them with less
accurate weapons that will likely just kill more in Yemen (for evidence of that, consider Syria).
The United States will no longer be complicit in problematic Saudi behavior, but that behavior
won’t stop.

Squo checks civ deaths—postdates your evidence

U.S. Department of State 10/16. [U.S. Department of State. “U.S. Security Cooperation
With Saudi Arabia.” Bureau of political-military affairs. October 16, 2018. Accessed 12/21/2018.
URL = https://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/2018/279540.htm] NM

The Saudi-led coalition is supporting the legitimate Yemeni government and defending its
territory from an incursion by Houthi rebels. The United States continues to work with the
Saudi-led Coalition in an effort to reduce and minimize civilian casualties in this conflict. The
Saudi government is taking measures to improve its targeting processes and has also adopted
mechanisms for investigating alleged incidents of civilian casualties and addressing them
operationally, as appropriate.

The Saudis have agreed to receive training from U.S. forces on Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC)
and best practices for preventing civilian casualties. Planned training events for the Royal Saudi
Air Force and other Saudi security forces will specifically include further training on the LOAC
and air-to-ground targeting processes.

Future bilateral and multi-lateral training is designed to improve the Saudi security forces’
understanding of identifying, targeting and engaging correct targets while minimizing
collateral damage and civilian casualties.