Coseteng vs. Mitra, Jr.

FACTS

The congressional elections of May 11, 1987 resulted in the election to the
House of Representatives of the candidates of diverse political parties.
Petitioner Anna Dominique M.L. Coseteng was the only candidate elected under
the banner of KAIBA.

On August 26, 1987, the House of Representatives, upon nomination by

the Majority Floor Leader, Cong. Francisco Sumulong, elected from the
Coalesced Majority, eleven (11) out of twelve (12) congressmen to represent the
House in the Commission on Appointments.

On September 22, 1987, upon nomination of the Minority Floor Leader, the
House elected Honorable Roque Ablan, Jr., KBL, as the twelfth member of the
Commission on Appointments, representing the Coalesced Minority in the
House.

On October 8, 1988, petitioner Coseteng wrote a letter to Speaker Ramon

Mitra requesting that as representative of KAIBA, she be appointed as a member
of the Commission on Appointments and House Electoral Tribunal. Her request
was endorsed by nine (9) congressmen.

On February 1, 1989, Congresswoman Coseteng and her party, the

KAIBA, filed this Petition for Extraordinary Legal Writs (which may be
considered as a petition for quo warranto and injunction) praying this Court to
declare as null and void the election of respondent, as members of the
Commission on Appointments, to enjoin them from acting as such and to
enjoin also the other respondents from recognizing them as members of the
Commission on Appointments on the theory that their election to that
Commission violated the constitutional mandate of proportional representation.

Petitioner Coseteng further alleged that she is qualified to sit in the

Commission on Appointments as a representative of the Minority because she
has the support of nine (9) other congressmen and congresswomen of the
Minority.

ISSUE

whether or not the members of the House in the Commission on Appointments

were chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political
parties therein as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
HELD

Petition dismissed, he revision of the House representation in the Commission

on Appointments is based on proportional representation of the political parties
therein as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

The composition of the House membership in the Commission on

Appointments was based on proportional representation of the political parties
in the House. There are 160 members of the LDP in the House. They represent
79% of the House membership (which may be rounded out to 80%). Eighty
percent (80%) of 12 members in the Commission on Appointments would equal
9.6 members, which may be rounded out to ten (10) members from the LDP.
The remaining two seats were apportioned to the LP (respondent Lorna Verano-
Yap) as the next largest party in the Coalesced Majority and the KBL
(respondent Roque Ablan) as the principal opposition party in the House. There
is no doubt that this apportionment of the House membership in the
Commission on Appointments was done “on the basis of proportional
representation of the political parties therein.

The other political parties or groups in the House, such as petitioner’s KAIBA
(which is presumably a member also of the Coalesced Majority), are bound by
the majority’s choices. Even if KAIBA were to be considered as an opposition
party, its lone member (petitioner Coseteng) represents only .4% or less than 1%
of the House membership, hence, she is not entitled to one of the 12 House seats
in the Commission on Appointments. To be able to claim proportional
membership in the Commission on Appointments, a political party should
represent at least 8.4% of the House membership, i.e., it should have been able
to elect at least 17 congressmen or congresswomen.

The indorsements of the nine (9) congressmen and congresswomen in favor of

the petitioner’s election to the Commission are inconsequential because they are
not members of her party and they signed identical indorsements in favor of her
rival, respondent Congresswoman Verano-Yap.
Guingona, Jr. vs. Gonzales

FACTS

As a result of the national elections held last May 11, 1992, the Senate is
composed of the following members or Senators representing the respective
political affiliations:
LDP — 15 senators
NPC — 5 senators
LAKAS-NUCD — 3 senators1
LP-PDP-LABAN — 1 senator

Applying the mathematical formula agreed to by the parties as follows:

No. of senators of a political party x 12 seats
__________________________
Total No. of senators elected
the resulting composition of the senate based on the rule of proportional
representation of each political party with elected representatives in the Senate,
is as follows:
Political Party/ Membership Proportional
Political Coalition Representatives
LDP 15 7.5 members
NPC 5 2.5 members
LAKAS-NUCD 3 1.5 members
LP-PDP-LABAN 1 .5 members

At the organization meeting of the Senate held on August 27, 1992, Senator
Romulo in his capacity as Majority Floor Leader nominated, for and in behalf of
the LDP, eight (8) senators for membership in the Commission on
Appointments, The nomination of the eighth senator2 was objected to by
Petitioner, Senator Guingona, as Minority Floor Leader, and Senator John
Osmeña, in representation of the NPC.

To resolve the impasse, Senator Arturo Tolentino proposed a compromise to the

effect that the Senate elect3
“x x x 12 members to the Commission on Appointments, eight coming from LDP,
two coming from NPC, one coming from the Liberal Party, with the understanding
that there are strong reservations against this proportion or these numbers so
that if later on in an action in the Supreme Court, if any party is found to have
an excess in representation, that the party will necessarily reduce its
representation, and if any party is found to have a deficiency in representation,
that party will be entitled to nominate and have elected by this body its additional
representative.”
The proposed compromise above stated was a temporary arrangement and,
inspite of the objections of Senators Guingona and Osmeña, to enable the
Commission on Appointments to be organized by the election of its members, it
was approved. The elected members consisted of eight LDP, one LP-PDP-LABAN,
two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD.

On September 23, 1992, Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., in his behalf and in
behalf of Lakas-National Union of Christian Democrats (LAKAS-NUCD), filed a
petition for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to prohibit the respondent
Senate President Neptali Gonzales, as ex-officio Chairman of the Commission
on Appointments, from recognizing the membership of Senators Alberto
Romulo as the eighth senator elected by the LDP, and Wigberto E. Tañada, as
the lone member representing the LP-PDP-LABAN, in the Commission on
Appointments, on the ground that the proposed compromise of Senator
Tolentino was violative of the rule of proportional representation, and that it is
the right of the minority political parties in the Senate, consistent with the
Constitution,4 to combine their fractional representation in the Commission on
Appointments to complete one seat therein, and to decide who, among the
senators in their ranks, shall be additionally nominated and elected thereto.

the instant petition may be regarded as one of prohibition9 wherein the Senate
is claimed to have acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction when it
designated respondent Senator Romulo as eighth member of the Commission
on Appointments, upon nomination by the LDP, and respondent Senator
Tañada as LP nominee, notwithstanding, that, in both instances, LDP and LP
are each entitled only to “half a member.” In the alternative, the petition may
be regarded as one for mandamus,10in which it is claimed that the LAKAS-
NUCD and NPC were unlawfully excluded from the use and enjoyment of a
right or office to which each is entitled.

ISSUE

Whether or not the election of Senators Alberto Romulo and Wigberto E.

Tañada as members of the Commission on Appointments is in accordance with
the provision of Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

HELD

No, We find the respondents’ claim to membership in the Commission on

Appointments by nomination and election of the LDP majority in the Senate as
not in accordance with Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and
therefore violative of the same because it is not in compliance with the
requirement that twelve senators shall be elected on the basis of proportional
representation of the political parties represented therein. To disturb the
resulting fractional membership of the political parties in the Commission on
Appointments by adding together two halves to make a whole is a breach of the
rule on proportional representation because it will give the LDP an added
member in the Commission by utilizing the fractional membership of the
minority political party, who is deprived of half a representation.
JOSE AVELINO, petitioner, vs. MARIANO J. CUENCO, respondent.

FACTS

The petitioners, Senator Jose Avelino, in a quo warranto proceeding, asked the
court to declare him the rightful Senate President and oust the respondent,
Mariano Cuenco. In a session of the Senate, Tanada’s request to deliver a
speech in order to formulate charges against then Senate President Avelino was
approved. With the leadership of the Senate President followed by his
supporters, they deliberately tried to delay and prevent Tanada from delivering
his speech. The SP with his supporters employed delaying tactics, the tried to
adjourn the session then walked out. Only 12 Senators were left in the hall.
The members of the senate left continued the session and Senator Cuenco was
appointed as the Acting President of the Senate and was recognized the next
day by the President of the Philippines.

ISSUE

Whether or not there was a quorum in the meeting of twelve Senators in which
respondent was elected acting President of the Senate,

HELD

It was held that there is a quorum that 12 being the majority of 23. In fine, all
the four justice agree that the Court being confronted with the practical
situation that of the twenty three senators who may participate in the Senate
deliberations in the days immediately after this decision, twelve senators will
support Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven will side with Senator Avelino, it
would be most injudicious to declare the latter as the rightful President of the
Senate, that office being essentially one that depends exclusively upon the will
of the majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the
President of that body being amenable at any time by that majority. And at any
session hereafter held with thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all
controversy arising from the divergence of opinion here about quorum and for
the benefit of all concerned,the said twelve senators who approved the
resolutions herein involved could ratify all their acts and thereby place them
beyond the shadow of a doubt.
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on Elections

The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more law
to the great masses of our people who have less in life, but also to enable them
to become veritable lawmakers themselves, empowered to participate directly in
the enactment of laws designed to benefit them. It intends to make the
marginalized and the underrepresented not merely passive recipients of the
State’s benevolence, but active participants in the mainstream of representative
democracy. Thus, allowing all individuals and groups, including those which
now dominate district elections, to have the same opportunity to participate in
party-list elections would desecrate this lofty objective and mongrelize the social
justice mechanism into an atrocious veneer for traditional politics.

Petitioners seek the disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that

the party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and
underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or
overrepresented.

FACTS

With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec received several Petitions for
registration filed by sectoral parties, organizations and political parties.
According to the Comelec, “[verifications were made as to the status and capacity
of these parties and organizations and hearings were scheduled day and night
until the last party w[as] heard. With the number of these petitions and the
observance of the legal and procedural requirements, review of these petitions
as well as deliberations takes a longer process in order to arrive at a decision
and as a result the two (2) divisions promulgated a separate Omnibus Resolution
and individual resolution on political parties. These numerous petitions and
processes observed in the disposition of these petition [s] hinder the early release
of the Omnibus Resolutions of the Divisions which were promulgated only on 10
February 2001.”2

Thereafter, before the February 12, 2001 deadline prescribed under Comelec
Resolution No. 3426 dated December 22, 2000, the registered parties and
organizations filed their respective Manifestations, stating their intention to
participate in the party-list elections.

Other sectoral and political parties and organizations whose registrations were
denied also filed Motions for Reconsideration, together with Manifestations of
their intent to participate in the party list elections. Still other registered parties
filed their Manifestations beyond the deadline.

The Comelec gave due course or approved the Manifestations (or accreditations)
of 151 parties and organizations, but denied those of several others in its assailed
March 26, 2001 Omnibus Resolution No. 3785
the ‘party-list system’ is a ‘mechanism of proportional representation’ in the
election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered
with the Commission on Elections.

“However, in the course of our review of the matters at bar, we must recognize
the fact that there is a need to keep the number of sectoral parties, organizations
and coalitions, down to a manageable level, keeping only those who substantially
comply with the rules and regulations and more importantly the sufficiency of
the Manifestations or evidence on the Motions for Reconsiderations or
Oppositions.”3

On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the Comelec a
Petition praying that “the names of [some of herein respondents] be deleted from
the ‘Certified List of Political Parties/Sectoral Parties/Organizations/Coalitions
Participating in the Party List System for the May 14, 2001 Elections’ and that
said certified list be accordingly amended.” It also asked, as an alternative, that
the votes cast for the said respondents not be counted or canvassed, and that
the latter’s nominees not be proclaimed.4 On April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna and
Bayan Muna-Youth also filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and
Nomination against some of herein respondents.5

On April 18, 2001, the Comelec required the respondents in the two
disqualification cases to file Comments within three days from notice. During
the hearing, however, Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion merely directed the
parties to submit their respective memoranda.8
à
Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the Comelec, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party filed a Petition9 before this Court on April 16, 2001. This Petition,
docketed as GR No. 147589, assailed Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In
its Resolution dated April 17, 2001,10 the Court directed respondents to
comment on the Petition within a non-extendible period of five days from
notice.11

On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before this Court a
Petition,12 docketed as GR No. 147613, also challenging Comelec Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated May 9, 2001,13 the Court ordered
the consolidation of the two Petitions before it; directed respondents named in
the second Petition to file their respective Comments on or before noon of May
15, 2001; and called the parties to an Oral Argument on May 17, 2001. It added
that the Comelec may proceed with the counting and canvassing of votes cast
for the party-list elections, but barred the proclamation of any winner therein,
until further orders of the Court.
ISSUE

1. Whether or not political parties may participate in the partylist elections.

2. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to ‘marginalized and
underrepresented’ sectors and organizations.

HELD

Both issue, yes.

The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be remanded to the
Comelec which will determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the
154 parties and organizations enumerated in the assailed Omnibus Resolution
satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941, as specified in this
Decision.

1. Participation of Political Parties

Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified

from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties.
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, provides that members of the House of
Representatives may “be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional,and sectoral parties or organizations.”

Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution,

political parties may be registered under the party-list system.
“Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition
shall be valid, except for those registered under the party-list system as provided
in this Constitution.
“Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the
party-list system, shall not be represented in the voter’s registration boards,
boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies.
However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with
law.”30

During the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Comm. Christian S.

Monsod pointed out that the participants in the party-list system may “be a
regional party, a sectoral party, a national party,

Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of the party-list provision was to
open up the system, in order to give a chance to parties that consistently place
third or fourth in congressional district elections to win a seat in Congress.34 He
explained: The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we
found out that there were certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes
nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were always
third or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the
Assembly. But this way, they would have five or six representatives in the
Assembly even if they would not win individually in legislative districts. So, that
is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the partylist system.”

For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for “a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof, x x x.”

Section 3 expressly states that a “party” is “either a political party or a sectoral

party or a coalition of parties.”

More to the point, the law defines “political party” as “an organized group of
citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general
conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing
their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and
members as candidates for public office.”

Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to the participation of

political parties in the party-list system. We quote the pertinent provision below:

“For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political
parties on the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at
the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to
participate in the party-list system.
Indubitably, therefore, political parties—even the major ones—may participate
in the party-list elections.

2. Marginalized and Underrepresented

That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean,
however, that any political party—or any organization or group for that matter—
may do so. The requisite character of these parties or organizations must be
consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the
Constitution and RA 7941. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, provides as
follows:

1. “(1)The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two

hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities,
and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive
ratio, and those who, as provided by law,shall be elected through a party-
list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.
 2. (2)The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the
total number of representatives including those under the party list. For
three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-
half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled,
as provided by law,by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other
sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious
sector.” (Emphasis supplied.)

The foregoing provision on the party-list system is not self-executory. It is, in

fact, interspersed with phrases like “in accordance with law” or “as may be
provided by law”; it was thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty
objective of the Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was enacted. It laid out the
statutory policy in this wise:

“SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.—The State shall promote proportional

representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives
through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties
or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will
benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full,
free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the
legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.”

The Marginalized and Underrepresented

to Become Lawmakers Themselves

The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of promoting proportional

representation by means of the Filipino-style partylist system, which will
“enable” the election to the House of Representatives of Filipino citizens.

1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations

and parties; and

2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but

3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate

legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.
The key words in this policy are “proportional representation,” “marginalized and
underrepresented,” and “lack [of] well-defined constituencies.”

“Proportional representation” refers to the representation of the “marginalized

and underrepresented” as exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the
law; namely, “labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers,
and professionals.”

The party-list organization or party must factually and truly represent the
marginalized and underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Section
5.36 Concurrently, the persons nominated by the party-list candidate-
organization must be “Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties.”

Finally, “lack of well-defined constituency]” refers to the absence of a traditionally

identifiable electoral group, like voters of a congressional district or territorial
unit of government. Rather, it points again to those with disparate interests
identified with the “marginalized or underrepresented.”

In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only those Filipinos who
are “marginalized and underrepresented” become members of Congress under
the party-list system, Filipino-style.
The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not
only by giving more law to those who have less in life, but more so by enabling
them to become veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent with this intent, the
policy of the implementing law, we repeat, is likewise clear: “to enable Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations
and parties, x x x, to become members of the House of Representatives.” Where
the language of the law is clear, it must be applied according to its express terms.

The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under the

party-list system are enumerated in Section 5 of RA 7941, which states:
“SEC. 5. Registration.—Any organized group of persons may register as a party,
organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the
COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified
by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list
system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of
such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws,
platform or program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other
relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, that the sector
shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers,
and professionals.”
While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not
exclusive, it demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be
represented under the party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of
statutory construction that words employed in a statute are interpreted in
connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words and
the phrases with which they are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a
term in a statute may be limited, qualified or specialized by those in immediate
association.38

The Party-List System Desecrated

by the OSG Contentions

he Office of the Solicitor General submits that RA No. 7941 “does not limit the
participation in the party-list system to the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors of society.”39 In fact, it contends that any party or group that is not
disqualified under Section 640 of RA 7941 may participate in the elections.
Hence, it admitted during the Oral Argument that even an organization
representing the super rich of Forbes Park or Dasmarinas Village could
participate in the party-list elections.41
The declared policy of RA 7941 contravenes the position of the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG). We stress that the party-list system seeks to enable
certain Filipino citizens—specifically those belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties—to be elected to the House
of Representatives. The assertion of the OSG that the party-list system is not
exclusive to the marginalized and underrepresented disregards the clear
statutory policy. Its claim that even the super-rich and overrepresented can
participate desecrates the spirit of the party-list system.

As earlier noted, the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the
system,44 in order to enhance the chance of sectoral groups and organizations to
gain representation in the House of Representatives through the simplest
scheme possible.45 Logic shows that the system has been opened to those who
have never gotten a foothold within it—those who cannot otherwise win in
regular elections and who therefore need the “simplest scheme possible” to do
so. Conversely, it would be illogical to open the system to those who have long
been within it—those privileged sectors that have long dominated the
congressional district elections.

Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the

remaining seats under the party-list system would not only dilute, but
also prejudice the chance of the marginalized and underrepresented, contrary to
the intention of the law to enhance it. The party-list system is a tool for the
benefit of the underprivileged; the law could not have given the same tool to
others, to the prejudice of the intended beneficiaries.
 This Court, therefore, cannot allow the party-list system to be sullied and
prostituted by those who are neither marginalized nor underrepresented. It
cannot let that flicker of hope be snuffed out. The clear state policy must
permeate every discussion of the qualification of political parties and other
organizations under the party-list system.

Refutation of the
Separate Opinions

the intent of the law is obvious and clear from its plain words. Section 2
thereof unequivocally states that the party-list system of electing congressional
representatives was designed to “enable underrepresented sectors, organizations
and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will
benefit the nation as a whole x x x.” The criteria for participation is well defined.
Thus, there is no need for recourse to constitutional deliberations, not even to
the proceedings of Congress. In any event, the framers’ deliberations merely
express their individual opinions and are, at best, only persuasive in construing
the meaning and purpose of the constitution or statute.
Be it remembered that the constitutionality or validity of Sections 2 and 5 of
RA 7941 is not an issue here. Hence, they remain parts of the law, which must
be applied plainly and simply.
Tio vs. Videogram Regulatory Board

FACTS

In 1985, Presidential Dedree No. 1987 entitled “An Act Creating the Videogram
Regulatory Board” was enacted which gave broad powers to the VRB to regulate
and supervise the videogram industry. The said law sought to minimize the
economic effects of piracy. There was a need to regulate the sale of videograms
as it has adverse effects to the movie industry. The proliferation of videograms
has significantly lessened the revenue being acquired from the movie industry,
and that such loss may be recovered if videograms are to be taxed. Section 10 of
the PD imposes a 30% tax on the gross receipts payable to the LGUs.
In 1986, Valentin Tio assailed the said PD as he averred that it is
unconstitutional on the following grounds:
1. Section 10 thereof, which imposed the 30% tax on gross receipts, is a rider
and is not germane to the subject matter of the law.
2. There is also undue delegation of legislative power to the VRB, an
administrative body, because the law allowed the VRB to deputize, upon its
discretion, other government agencies to assist the VRB in enforcing the said
PD.
ISSUE

Whether or not the Valentin Tio’s arguments are correct.

HELD

No, The Constitutional requirement that “every bill shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof” is sufficiently complied
with if the title be comprehensive enough to include the general purpose which
a statute seeks to achieve. In the case at bar, the questioned provision is allied
and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the
general object of the PD, which is the regulation of the video industry through
the VRB as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor
foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool for regulation it is simply one
of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the PD.
Demetrio vs Alba

FACTS:

 Petitioners as taxpayers and members of the Batasan Pambansa filed a

petition prohibiting respondent, then Minister of the Budget, from
disbursing funds pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1177 or the Budget
Reform Decree of 1977.

 Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of paragraph 1, Section 44 of the

said PD which provides that:

The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund,

appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and
agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the
General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any
department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations
Act or approved after its enactment.

 Petitioner avers that said paragraph is in conflict with Section 16[5], Article
VIII of the 1973 Constitution:

Sec.16[5]. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of

appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the
Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of
constitutional commissions may by law be authorized to augment any
item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from
savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Paragraph 1, Section 44, of PD 1177 is constitutional.

HELD:

NO. The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to another

was explicit and categorical under the 1973 Constitution. However, to
afford the heads of the different branches of the government and those of
the constitutional commissions considerable flexibility in the use of public
funds and resources, the constitution allowed the enactment of a law
authorizing the transfer of funds for the purpose of augmenting an item
from savings in another item in the appropriation of the government
branch or constitutional body concerned. The leeway granted was thus
limited. The purpose and conditions for which funds may be transferred
were specified, i.e. transfer may be allowed for the purpose of augmenting
an item and such transfer may be made only if there are savings from
another item in the appropriation of the government branch or
constitutional body.

However, Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly over extends

the privilege granted under said Section 16[5]. It empowers the President
to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or
agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of
any department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations
Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not
the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the
same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of
augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only
completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby
amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes
beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render
the provision in question null and void.
Lidasan vs. Commission on Elections

Facts: Republic Act 4790, being disputed, reorganized the barrios in different
municipalities of Province of Lanao del Sur. It came to light later that 2 barrios
in the statute are within the boundaries of other municipalities and that other
10 barrios are parts and parcel of another municipality, all in the Province of
Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur. As the statute stood, 12 barrios are
transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a change in
the boundaries of the two provinces.
Apprised of this development, the Office of the President, recommended to
Comelec that the operation of the statute be suspended until “clarified by
correcting legislation.” Comelec, by resolution of September 20, 1967, stood by
its own interpretation, declared that the statute “should be implemented unless
declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.”

This triggered the petition for certiorari and prohibition by Bara Lidasan, a
resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a
qualified voter for the 1967 elections. Petitioner requested that Republic Act
4790 be declared unconstitutional; and that Comelec’s resolutions
implementing the same for electoral purposes, be nullified.

Petitioner relies upon the constitutional requirement that “[n]o bill which may
be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be
expressed in the title of the bill.”

Issue: Whether or not Republic Act 4790 is null and void.

Decision: Republic Act 4790 is null and void. Constitutional provision contains
dual limitations upon legislative power. First. Congress is to refrain from
conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects. Second. The
title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators
and the public and those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof.
Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the statute must be
“expressed in the title” of the bill. Compliance is imperative, given the fact that
the Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its
deliberations the entire text of the bill.
Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of
an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue
all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should
serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators,
the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature,
scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to
lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take
appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the
legislators.

The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and,

which technical accuracy is not essential, and the subject need not be stated in
express terms where it is clearly inferable from the details set forth, a title
which is so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed
of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which
is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or
different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or
indication of the real subject or scope of the act, is bad.

Since the petitioner is a qualified voter from the affected barrio, he has every
right to become a suitor to challenge the constitutionality of the Act as passed
by Congress.