Conflict of Laws Batch I interrogated   her   about   the
Jakarta   incident.   They   then
1.  Saudi   Arabian   Airlines   vs.
CA
(Flight   attendant;   attempted
rape)
Doctrine:   The   Philippines   is
the   situs   of   the   tort
complained   of   and   the   place
"having   the   most   interest   in
the   problem",   we   find,   by   way
of   recapitulation,   that   the
Philippine   law   on   tort
liability should have paramount
application   to   and   control   in
the   resolution   of   the   legal
issues   arising   out   of   this
case.
FACTS:
Morada  was   a   flight   attendant
of SAUDIA (the airline). During
a lay­over in Jakarta, she went
to   a   disco   dance   with   fellow
crew   members   Thamer   Al­Gazzawi
and   Allah   Al­Gazzawi,   both
Saudi nationals.  Because it was
almost   morning   when   they
returned   to   their   hotels,   they
agreed   to   have   breakfast
together at the room of Thamer.
When   they   were   in   the   room,
Allah   left   on   some   pretext.
Shortly   after   he   did,   Thamer
attempted   to   rape   plaintiff.
Fortunately,   a   roomboy   and
several   security   personnel
heard   her   cries   for   help   and
rescued   her.   Later,   the
Indonesian   police   came   and
arrested   Thamer   and   Allah   Al­
Gazzawi,   the   latter   as   an
accomplice.
When   plaintiff   returned   to
Jeddah   a   few   days   later,
several   SAUDIA   officials
requested   her   to   go   back   to
Jakarta   to   help   arrange   the
release of Thamer and Allah. In
Jakarta,   SAUDIA   Legal   Officer
Sirah   Akkad   and   base   manager
Baharini   negotiated   with   the
police   for   the   immediate
release   of   the   detained   crew
members   but   did   not   succeed
because   plaintiff   refused   to
cooperate.   She   was   afraid   that
she   might   be   tricked   into
something   she   did   not   want
because   of   her   inability   to
understand   the   local   dialect.
She   also   declined   to   sign   a
blank   paper   and   a   document
written   in   the   local   dialect.
Eventually,   SAUDIA   allowed
plaintiff   to   return   to   Jeddah
but barred her from the Jakarta
flights.
Plaintiff learned that, through
the   intercession   of   the   Saudi
Arabian   government,   the
Indonesian   authorities   agreed
to   deport   Thamer   and   Allah
after   two   weeks   of   detention.
Eventually, they were again put
in service by defendant SAUDIA.
In   September   1990,   defendant
SAUDIA transferred plaintiff to
Manila.
On   January   14,   1992,   just   when
plaintiff   thought   that   the
Jakarta   incident   was   already
behind   her,   her   superiors
requested   her   to   see   Mr.   Ali
Meniewy, Chief Legal Officer of
SAUDIA,   in   Jeddah,   Saudi
Arabia.   When   she   saw   him,   he
brought   her   to   the   police
station   where   the   police   took
her passport and questioned her
about   the   Jakarta   incident.
Miniewy   simply   stood   by   as   the
police   put   pressure   on   her   to
make   a   statement   dropping   the
case   against   Thamer   and   Allah.
Not   until   she   agreed   to   do   so
did   the   police   return   her
passport   and   allowed   her   to
catch   the   afternoon   flight   out
of Jeddah.
One year and a half later or on
lune 16, 1993, in Riyadh, Saudi
Arabia,   a   few   minutes   before
the   departure   of   her   flight   to
Manila,   plaintiff   was   not
allowed   to   board   the   plane   and
instead ordered to take a later
flight   to   Jeddah   to   see   Mr.
Miniewy,   the   Chief   Legal
Officer   of   SAUDIA.   When   she
did,   a   certain   Khalid   of   the
SAUDIA   office   brought   her   to   a
Saudi court where she was asked
to   sign   a   document   written   in
Arabic. They told her that this
was necessary to close the case
against Thamer and Allah. As it
turned   out,   plaintiff   signed   a
notice   to   her   to   appear   before
the   court   on   June   27,   1993.
Plaintiff   then   returned   to
Manila.
Shortly   afterwards,   defendant
SAUDIA   summoned   plaintiff   to
report to Jeddah once again and
see   Miniewy   on   June   27,   1993
for   further   investigation.
Plaintiff   did   so   after
receiving   assurance   from
SAUDIA's   Manila   manager,   Aslam
Saleemi, that the investigation
was routinary and that it posed
no danger to her.
In   Jeddah,   a   SAUDIA   legal
officer   brought   plaintiff   to
the   same   Saudi   court   on   June
27, 1993. Nothing happened then
but   on   June   28,   1993,   a   Saudi
judge   interrogated   plaintiff
through   an   interpreter   about
the Jakarta incident. After one
hour of interrogation, they let
her   go.   At   the   airport,
however,   just   as   her   plane   was
about   to   take   off,   a   SAUDIA
officer   told   her   that   the
airline   had   forbidden   her   to
take   flight.   At   the   Inflight
Service   Office   where   she   was
told   to   go,   the   secretary   of
Mr. Yahya Saddick took away her
passport and told her to remain
in   Jeddah,   at   the   crew
quarters, until further orders.
On July 3, 1993 a SAUDIA legal
officer   again   escorted
plaintiff   to   the   same   court
where   the   judge,   to   her
astonishment   and   shock,
rendered a decision, translated
to   her   in   English,   sentencing
her to five months imprisonment
and   to   286   lashes.   Only   then
did   she   realize   that   the   Saudi
court   had   tried   her,   together
with Thamer and Allah, for what
happened   in   Jakarta.   The   court
found   plaintiff   guilty   of   (1)
adultery; (2) going to a disco,
dancing   and   listening   to   the
music   in   violation   of   Islamic
laws;   and   (3)   socializing   with
the male crew, in contravention
of Islamic tradition. 
Facing   conviction,   private
respondent   sought   the   help   of
her   employer,   petitioner
SAUDIA.   Unfortunately,   she   was
denied any assistance. She then
asked the Philippine Embassy in
Jeddah   to   help   her   while   her
case   is   on   appeal.   Meanwhile,
to   pay   for   her   upkeep,   she
worked   on   the   domestic   flight
of   SAUDIA,   while   Thamer   and
Allah continued to serve in the
international
flights.  consisted in the fact that private respondent
Because   she   was   wrongfully
convicted, the Prince of Makkah
dismissed   the   case   against   her
and   allowed   her   to   leave   Saudi
Arabia.   Shortly   before   her
return   to   Manila,   she   was
terminated   from   the   service   by
SAUDIA,   without   her   being
informed of the cause.
On   November   23,   1993,   Morada
filed   a   Complaint   for   damages
against   SAUDIA,   and   Khaled   Al­
Balawi   ("Al­Balawi"),   its
country manager.  quo. After a careful study of the private
ISSUES:
a. Whether   RTC   has
juridisdiction.
b. Whether   Philippine   Law
governs.
HELD:
a. Yes, RTC has jurisdiction
b. Yes,   Philippine   Law
governs
Where the factual antecedents satisfactorily
establish the existence of a foreign element, we
agree with petitioner that the problem herein
could present a "conflicts" case.
A factual situation that cuts across
territorial lines and is affected by the diverse
laws of two or more states is said to contain
a "foreign element". The presence of a
foreign element is inevitable since social and
economic affairs of individuals and
associations are rarely confined to the
geographic limits of their birth or conception.
The forms in which this foreign element may
appear are many. The foreign element may
simply consist in the fact that one of the parties
to a contract is an alien or has a foreign
domicile, or that a contract between nationals
of one State involves properties situated in
another State. In other cases, the foreign
element may assume a complex form.
In the instant case, the foreign element
Morada is a resident Philippine national,
and that petitioner SAUDIA is a resident
foreign corporation. Also, by virtue of the
employment of Morada with the petitioner
Saudia as a flight stewardess, events did
transpire during her many occasions of travel
across national borders, particularly from
Manila, Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia,
and vice versa, that caused a "conflicts"
situation to arise.
We thus find private respondent's assertion that
the case is purely domestic, imprecise. A
conflicts problem presents itself here, and the
question of jurisdiction confronts the court a
respondent's Amended Complaint, and the
Comment thereon, we note that she aptly
predicated her cause of action on Articles 19
and 21 of the New Civil Code. Although
Article 19 merely declares a principle of law,
Article 21 gives flesh to its provisions. Thus,
we agree with private respondent's assertion
that violations of Articles 19 and 21 are
actionable, with judicially enforceable
remedies in the municipal forum.
Pragmatic considerations, including the
convenience of the parties, also weigh heavily
in favor of the RTC Quezon City assuming
jurisdiction. Paramount is the private interest of
the litigant. Enforceability of a judgment if one
is obtained is quite obvious. Relative
advantages and obstacles to a fair trial are
equally important. Plaintiff may not, by choice
of an inconvenient forum, "vex", "harass", or
"oppress" the defendant, e.g. by inflicting upon
him needless expense or disturbance. But
unless the balance is strongly in favor of the
defendant, the plaintiffs choice of forum should
rarely be disturbed.
The trial court also possesses jurisdiction
over the persons of the parties herein. By
filing her Complaint and Amended Complaint
with the trial court, private respondent has
voluntary submitted herself to the jurisdiction
of the court.
The records show that petitioner SAUDIA has
filed several motions praying for the dismissal
of Morada's Amended Complaint. SAUDIA
also filed an Answer In Ex Abundante
Cautelam dated February 20, 1995. What is
very patent and explicit from the motions filed,
is that SAUDIA prayed for other reliefs under
the premises. Undeniably, petitioner SAUDIA
has effectively submitted to the trial court's
jurisdiction by praying for the dismissal of the
Amended Complaint on grounds other than
lack of jurisdiction.
Clearly, petitioner had submitted to the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City. Thus, we find that the trial court
has jurisdiction over the case and that its
exercise thereof, justified.
As to the choice of applicable law, we note that
choice-of-law problems seek to answer two
important questions: (1) What legal system
should control a given situation where some of
the significant facts occurred in two or more
states; and (2) to what extent should the chosen
legal system regulate the situation.
Several theories have been propounded in order
to identify the legal system that should
ultimately control. Although ideally, all choice-
of-law theories should intrinsically advance
both notions of justice and predictability, they
do not always do so. The forum is then faced
with the problem of deciding which of these
two important values should be stressed.
Before a choice can be made, it is necessary
for us to determine under what category a
certain set of facts or rules fall. This process
is known as "characterization", or the
"doctrine of qualification". It is the "process
of deciding whether or not the facts relate to
the kind of question specified in a conflicts
rule." The purpose of "characterization" is
to enable the forum to select the proper law.
Our starting point of analysis here is not a legal
relation, but a factual situation, event, or
operative fact. An essential element of conflict
rules is the indication of a "test" or "connecting
factor" or "point of contact". Choice-of-law
rules invariably consist of a factual
relationship (such as property right,
contract claim) and a connecting factor or
point of contact, such as the situs of the res,
the place of celebration, the place of
performance, or the place of wrongdoing.
Note that one or more circumstances may be
present to serve as the possible test for the
determination of the applicable law. These "test
factors" or "points of contact" or "connecting
factors" could be any of the following:
(1) The nationality of a person, his
domicile, his residence, his place of
sojourn, or his origin;
(2) the seat of a legal or juridical person,
such as a corporation;
(3) the situs of a thing, that is, the place
where a thing is, or is deemed to be
situated. In particular, the lex situs is
decisive when real rights are involved;
(4) the place where an act has been done,
the locus actus, such as the place where a
contract has been made, a marriage
celebrated, a will signed or a tort
committed. The lex loci actus is
particularly important in contracts and
torts;
(5) the place where an act is intended to
come into effect, e.g., the place of
performance of contractual duties, or the
place where a power of attorney is to be
exercised;
(6) the intention of the contracting parties
as to the law that should govern their
agreement, the lex loci intentionis;
(7) the place where judicial or
administrative proceedings are instituted or
done. The lex fori — the law of the forum
— is particularly important because, as we
have seen earlier, matters of "procedure"
not going to the substance of the claim
involved are governed by it; and because
the lex fori applies whenever the content of
 the otherwise applicable foreign law is
excluded from application in a given case
for the reason that it falls under one of the
exceptions to the applications of foreign
law; and
(8) the flag of a ship, which in many cases
is decisive of practically all legal
relationships of the ship and of its master or
owner as such. It also covers contractual
relationships particularly contracts of
affreightment.
After a careful study of the pleadings on
record, including allegations in the Amended
Complaint deemed admitted for purposes of the
motion to dismiss, we are convinced that there
is reasonable basis for private respondent's
assertion that although she was already
working in Manila, petitioner brought her to
Jeddah on the pretense that she would merely
testify in an investigation of the charges she
made against the two SAUDIA crew members
for the attack on her person while they were in
Jakarta. As it turned out, she was the one made
to face trial for very serious charges, including
adultery and violation of Islamic laws and
tradition.
Considering that the complaint in the court
a quo is one involving torts, the "connecting
factor" or "point of contact" could be the
place or places where the tortious conduct or
lex loci actus occurred. And applying the
torts principle in a conflicts case, we find
that the Philippines could be said as a situs
of the tort (the place where the alleged tortious
conduct took place). This is because it is in the
Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived
private respondent, a Filipina residing and
working here. According to her, she had
honestly believed that petitioner would, in the
exercise of its rights and in the performance of
its duties, "act with justice, give her due and
observe honesty and good faith." Instead,
petitioner failed to protect her, she claimed.
That certain acts or parts of the injury allegedly
occurred in another country is of no moment.
For in our view what is important here is the
place where the over-all harm or the totality of
the alleged injury to the person, reputation,
social standing and human rights of
complainant, had lodged, according to the
plaintiff below (herein private respondent). All
told, it is not without basis to identify the
Philippines as the situs of the alleged tort.
Moreover, with the widespread criticism of the
traditional rule of lex loci delicti commissi,
modern theories and rules on tort liability have
been advanced to offer fresh judicial
approaches to arrive at just results. In keeping
abreast with the modern theories on tort
liability, we find here an occasion to apply the
"State of the most significant relationship"
rule, which in our view should be appropriate
to apply now, given the factual context of this
case.
In applying said principle to determine the
State which has the most significant
relationship, the following contacts are to be
taken into account and evaluated according to
their relative importance with respect to the
particular issue: (a) the place where the
injury occurred; (b) the place where the
conduct causing the injury occurred; (c) the
domicile, residence, nationality, place of
incorporation and place of business of the
parties, and (d) the place where the
relationship, if any, between the parties is
centered.
Prescinding from this premise that the
Philippines is the situs of the tort complained
of and the place "having the most interest in
the problem", we find, by way of
recapitulation, that the Philippine law on tort
liability should have paramount application to
and control in the resolution of the legal issues
arising out of this case. Further, we hold that
the respondent Regional Trial Court has
jurisdiction over the parties and the subject
matter of the complaint; the appropriate venue
is in Quezon City, which could properly apply
Philippine law.
2. In the Matter of the Estate of Edward E.
Christensen vs Adolfo C. Aznar
(American citizen; institution of heir)
Doctrine: There are two laws in the California that
matter — Kaufman Case, which is its internal law, and
Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is its
conflict of laws rule. The internal law should apply to
Californians domiciled in California; and the conflict of
laws rule which should apply to Californians domiciled
outside of California. The applicable law in this case is
the conflict of laws rule since the decedent is domiciled
in the Philippines, hence, Philippine Law will apply.
FACTS:
Edward Christensen was born in New York but he
migrated to California where he resided for a period of 9
years. In 1913, he came to the Philippines where he
became a domiciliary until his death. However, during
the entire period of his residence in this country he had
always considered himself a citizen of California.
In his will, he instituted an acknowledged natural
daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen (legitimate), as his
only heir, but left a legacy sum of money in favor of
Helen Christensen Garcia (illegitimate). Adolfo Aznar
was the executor of the estate.
Counsel for Helen Garcia claims that under Article 16,
paragraph 2 of the Civil Code, California law should
be applied. Under California law, the matter is referred
back to the law of the domicile ultimately making
Philippine law applicable. Therefore, the share of Helen
must be increased in view of the successional rights of
illegitimate children under Philippine law.
On the other hand, counsel for Maria Christensen
contends that inasmuch as it is clear that under Article 16
of our Civil Code, the national law of the deceased must
apply, our courts must immediately apply the internal
law of California on the matter. Under California law,
there are no compulsory heirs and consequently a
testator could dispose of any property possessed by him
in absolute dominion and that finally, illegitimate
children not being entitled to anything and his will
remain undisturbed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine law should
prevail in administering the estate of Christensen.
RULING: Yes.
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary
dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, which is as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property
is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions,
both with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic
validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated
by the national law of the person whose succession is
under consideration, whatever may be the nature of
the property and regardless of the country where said
property may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires
the determination of the meaning of the term "national
law"is used therein.
The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil
Code above quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or
apply to any general American law since there is no
single American law governing the validity of
testamentary provisions in the United States, each state
of the Union having its own private law applicable to its
citizens only and in force only within the state. So it can
refer to no other than the private law of the State of
California.
The decision of the court below, sustains the contention
of the executor-appellee that under the California
Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by
will in the form and manner he desires, citing the case of
Estate of McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952.
But appellant invokes the provisions of Article 946 of
the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where
personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow
the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of
his domicile.
It is argued on executor's behalf that as the deceased
Christensen was a citizen of the State of California, the
internal law thereof, which is that given in the
abovecited case, should govern the determination of the
validity of the testamentary provisions of Christensen's
will, such law being in force in the State of California of
which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other
hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in
accordance therewith and following the doctrine of
the renvoi, the question of the validity of the
testamentary provision in question should be referred
back to the law of the decedent's domicile, which is the
Philippines.
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the
rules of the conflict of laws are to be understood as
incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law of the
foreign state or country, but its rules of the conflict of
laws as well. According to this theory 'the law of a
country' means the whole of its law
The court in deciding to grant more successional rights
to Helen said in effect that there are two rules in
California on the matter: the internal law which should
apply to Californians domiciled in California; and the
conflict rule which should apply to Californians
domiciled outside of California.
The California conflict rule says: “If there is no law to
the contrary in the place where personal property is
situated, is deemed to follow the person of its owner and
is governed by the law of his domicile.”
Christensen being domiciled outside California, the law
of his domicile, the Philippines, ought to be followed.
Where it is referred back to California, it will form a
circular pattern referring to both country back and forth.
Decision appealed from is reversed and the case returned
to the lower court with instructions that the partition be
made as the Philippine law on succession provides.
Notes: Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the
institute of International Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900, in
the form of the following theses:
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as
regards the application of foreign laws.
(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary
exists, the court shall respect:
(1) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims
the right to bind its nationals abroad as regards
their personal statute, and desires that said
personal statute shall be determined by law of
the domicile, or even by the law of the place
where the act in question occurred
(2) The decision of two or more foreign systems of
law, provided it be certain that one of them is
necessarily competent, which agree in
attributing the determination of a question to
the same system of law
3. Allison G. Gibbs vs Government of the Philippines
Islands
(American citizens; conjugal property in the Philippines)
FACTS:
Allison Gibbs has been continuously, since the year
1902, a citizen of California and domiciled therein. He
and Eva Johnson Gibbs were married in Ohio, in 1906.
During said marriage, the spouses acquired land in the
Philippine Islands as conjugal property.
Eva Johnson Gibbs died intestate in California in 1929.
At the time of her death she and her husband were
citizens of the State of California and domiciled therein.
Allison Gibbs was appointed administrator of the estate
of his said deceased wife. In said intestate proceedings,
Allison filed an ex parte petition in which he alleged
"that the parcels of land described belong to the conjugal
partnership, and that in accordance with the law of
California, the community property of spouses who are
citizens of California, upon the death of the wife
previous to that of the husband, belongs absolutely to the
surviving husband without administration.
The court granted the petition and entered a decree
adjudicating Allison D. Gibbs to be the sole and absolute
owner of said lands, applying section 1401 of the Civil
Code of California. Gibbs presented this decree to the
register of deeds of Manila and demanded that the latter
issue to him a "transfer certificate of title".
The register of deeds of the City of Manila, declined to
accept as binding said decree of court, and refused to
register the transfer of title of the said conjugal property
to Allison D. Gibbs, on the ground that the
corresponding inheritance tax had not been paid.
Allison filed in the said court a petition for an order
requiring the said register of deeds "to issue the
corresponding titles" to the petitioner without requiring
previous payment of any inheritance tax. The court
reaffirmed order of September 22, 1930.
Under review, the SC remanded the case to the court of
origin for new trial upon additional evidence in regard to
the pertinent law of California in force at the time of the
death of Mrs. Gibbs, also authorizing the introduction of
evidence with reference to the dates of the acquisition of
the property involved in this suit and with reference to
the California law in force at the time of such
acquisition.
The appellee contends that the law of California should
determine the nature and extent of the title, citing
Article 9 of the Civil Code. But that, even if the nature
and extent of her title under said certificates be governed
by the law of the Philippine Islands, the laws of
California govern the succession to such title, citing the
second paragraph of Article 10 of the Civil Code:
“Legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the
order of succession as well as to the amount of the
successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of
the person whose succession is in question, whatever
may be the nature of the property or the country in
which it may be situated."
It is argued that the conjugal right of the California wife
in community real estate in the Philippine Islands is a
personal right and must be settled by the law governing
her personal status, that is, the law of California.
ISSUE: Whether or not Eva Johnson Gibbs, at the time
of her death, is the owner of a descendible interest in the
Philippine Islands
RULING: Yes.
It is the law of the state in which the land is situated we
must look for the rules which govern its descent,
alienation, and transfer, and for the effect and
construction of wills and other conveyances. This
fundamental principle is stated in the first paragraph of
Article 10 of our Civil Code: "Personal property is
subject to the laws of the nation of the owner thereof;
real property to the laws of the country in which it is
situated”.
The second paragraph of Article 10 of the Civil Code
states that:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in
respect to the order of succession as well as to the
amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic
validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is in
question, whatever may be the nature of the property
or the country in which it may be situated.
It seems clear that the second paragraph of article 10
applies only when a legal or testamentary succession has
taken place in the Philippines and in accordance with the
law of the Philippine Islands; and the foreign law is
consulted only in regard to the order of succession or the
extent of the successional rights; in other words, the
second paragraph of article 10 can be invoked only when
the deceased was vested with a descendible interest in
property within the jurisdiction of the Philippine Islands.
The nature and extent of the title which vested in
Mrs. Gibbs at the time of the acquisition of the
community lands here in question must be
determined in accordance with the lex rei sitae.
In accord with the rule that real property is subject to the
lex rei sitae, the respective rights of husband and wife in
such property, in the absence of an antenuptial contract,
are determined by the law of the place where the
property is situated, irrespective of the domicile of the
parties or of the place where the marriage was
celebrated.
Under the provisions of the Civil Code and the
jurisprudence prevailing here, the wife, upon the
acquisition of any conjugal property, becomes
immediately vested with an interest and title equal to that
of her husband, subject to the power of management and
disposition which the law vests in the husband.
Attention has not been called to any law of California
that incapacitates a married woman from acquiring or
holding land in a foreign jurisdiction in accordance with
the lex rei sitae. Article 9 of the Civil Code treats of
purely personal relations and status and capacity for
juristic acts, the rules relating to property, both personal
and real, being governed by Article 10 of the Civil Code.
The trial court found that under the law of California,
upon the death of the wife, the entire community
property without administration belongs to the surviving
husband; that he is the absolute owner of all the
community property from the moment of the death of his
wife, not by virtue of succession or by virtue of her
death, but by virtue of the fact that when the death of the
wife precedes that of the husband he acquires the
community property, not as an heir or as the beneficiary
of his deceased wife, but because she never had more
than an inchoate interest or expectancy which is
extinguished upon her death. It never belonged to the
estate of the deceased wife.
Thus, the descendible interest of Eva in the lands was
transmitted to her heirs by virtue of inheritance and this
transmission plainly falls within the inheritance and this
transmission plainly falls within the language of section
1536 of Article XI of Chapter 40 of the
Administrative Code which levies a tax on
inheritances.
5. Cadalin vs. POEA, et al
(Overseas   employees   sought   the
payment   of   the   unexpired
portion   of   the   employment
contracts   and   secondarily,   the
payment   of   the   interest   of   the
earnings.)
Doctrine:  The   courts   of   the
forum   will   not   enforce   any
foreign   claim   obnoxious   to   the
forum's public policy.
FACTS
This   is   a   consolidation   of   3
cases   filed   under   Rule   65   of
the Revised Rules of Court.
On   various   dates   from   1975   to
1983,   petitioners   were
recruited   by   respondent   Asia
International   Builders
Corporation   (AIBC),   a   domestic
corporation, for its accredited
foreign   principal,   Browns   &
Root International, Inc (BRII),
with   headquarters   in   Houston,
Texas   and   is   engaged   in
construction.   They   were   all
deployed   at   various   projects
undertaken   by   Brown   &   Root   in
several countries in the Middle
East,   such   as   Saudi   Arabia,
Libya, United Arab Emirates and
Bahrain,   as   well   as   in
Southeast   Asia,   in   Indonesia
and Malaysia.
Having   been   officially
processed   as   overseas   contract
workers   by   the   Philippine
Government,   all   the   individual
complainants   signed   standard
overseas   employment   contracts
with   AIBC   before   their
departure from the Philippines.
The   employment   contract   was,
however,   terminated
prematurely.
Hence,   petitioners   primarily
sought   the   payment   of   the
unexpired   portion   of   the
employment   contracts   and
secondarily, the payment of the
interest of the earnings of the
Travel   and   Reserved   Fund.
Interest   on   all   the   unpaid
benefits, etc.  the   time   the   cause   of   action
The   claimants   are   of   the   view
that   the   applicable   provision
is   Article   1144   of   the   Civil
Code   of   the   Philippines,   which
provides:  prescriptive   period   was   one
The following actions must be
brought within ten years from
the   time   the   right   of   action
accrues:  that   Article   291   of   the   Labor
(1) Upon a written contract;  Code of the Philippines was the
(2)   Upon   an   obligation
created by law; 
(3) Upon a judgment.
AIBC   and   BRII,   insisting   that
the   actions   on   the   claims   have
prescribed   under   the   Amiri
Decree   No.   23   of   1976,   argue
that   there   is   in   force   in   the
Philippines   a   "borrowing   law,"
which is Section 48 of the Code
of   Civil   Procedure   and   that
where   such   kind   of   law   exists,
it   takes   precedence   over   the
common­law conflicts rule.
To   the   POEA   Administrator,   the
prescriptive   period   was   ten
years, applying  Article 1144 of
the   Civil   Code   of   the
Philippines.   It   was   of   the
opinion   what   the   respondents
violated   are   not   the   rights   of
the   workers   as   provided   by   the
Labor   Code,   but   the   provisions
of   the   Amiri   Decree   No.   23
issued   in   Bahrain,   which  ipso
facto  amended   the   worker's
contracts of employment.
NLRC believed otherwise, fixing
the   prescriptive   period   at
three   years   as   provided   in
Article   291   of   the   Labor   Code
of   the   Philippines:   “All   money
claims   arising   from   employer­
employee   relations   ...shall   be
filed   within   three   years   from
accrued;   otherwise   they   shall
be forever barred”
The Solicitor General expressed
his   personal   view   that   the
year as prescribed by the Amiri
Decree   No.   23   of   1976   but   he
deferred   to   the   ruling   of   NLRC
operative law.
ISSUE
Whether   it   is   the   Bahrain   law
on prescription of action based
on   the   Amiri   Decree   No.   23   of
1976   or   a   Philippine   law   on
prescription   that   shall   be   the
governing law.
Whether the prescriptive period
governing   the   filing   of   the
claims   is   three   years,   as
provided   by   the   Labor   Code   or
ten   years,   as   provided   by   the
Civil Code of the Philippines.
RULING
As   a   general   rule,   a   foreign
procedural   law   will   not   be
applied   in   the   forum.
Procedural   matters,   such   as
service   of   process,   joinder   of
actions,   period   and   requisites
for   appeal,   and   so   forth,   are
governed   by   the   laws   of   the
forum. This is true even if the
action   is   based   upon   a   foreign
substantive law.  1976.
A   law   on   prescription   of
actions   is  sui   generis  in
Conflict   of   Laws   in   the   sense
that it may be viewed either as
procedural   or   substantive,
depending   on   the
characterization   given   such   a
law.  would   contravene   the   public
However,   the   characterization
of   a   statute   into   a   procedural
or   substantive   law   becomes
irrelevant   when   the   country   of
the   forum   has   a   "borrowing
statute."   Said   statute   has   the
practical   effect   of   treating
the   foreign   statute   of
limitation as one of substance.
A   "borrowing   statute"   directs
the state of the forum to apply
the   foreign   statute   of
limitations   to   the   pending
claims   based   on   a   foreign   law.
While   there   are   several   kinds
of   "borrowing   statutes,"   one
from   provides   that   an   action
barred by the laws of the place
where   it   accrued,   will   not   be
enforced   in   the   forum   even
though   the   local   statute   has
not   run   against   it.  Section   48
of   the   Code   of   Civil   Procedure
is   of   this   kind.   Said   Section
provides:   "If   by   the   laws   of
the state or country where the
cause   of   action   arose,   the
action   is   barred,   it   is   also
barred   in   the   Philippines
Islands." 
In   the   light   of   the   1987
Constitution,   however,   Section
48   cannot   be   enforced  ex
proprio   vigore  insofar   as   it
ordains the application in this
jurisdiction   of   Section   156   of
the   Amiri   Decree   No.   23   of
 
The   courts   of   the   forum   will
not   enforce   any   foreign   claim
obnoxious to the forum's public
policy. To enforce the one­year
prescriptive   period   of   the
Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as
regards   the   claims   in   question
policy   on   the   protection   to
labor.   In   the   Declaration   of
Principles   and   State   Policies,
the   1987   Constitution
emphasized that: 
"The state shall promote social
justice   in   all   phases   of
national   development"   (Sec.
10). 
"The   state   affirms   labor   as   a
primary   social   economic   force.
It   shall   protect   the   rights   of
workers   and   promote   their
welfare" (Sec. 18). 
In   Article   XIII   on   Social
Justice   and   Human   Rights,   the
1987 Constitution provides: 
"Sec. 3. The State shall afford
full protection to labor, local
and   overseas,   organized   and
unorganized,   and   promote   full
employment   and   equality   of
employment   opportunities   for
all."
Furthermore,   the   contention   of
the   POEA   Administrator,   that
the   three­year   prescriptive
period under Article 291 of the
Labor   Code   of   the   Philippines
applies   only   to   money   claims
specifically   recoverable   under
said   Code,   does   not   find
support   in   the   plain   language
of   the   provision.   Neither   is
the contention of the claimants
in   G.R.   Nos.   104911­14   that
said   Article   refers   only   to
claims   "arising   from   the
employer's   violation   of   the
employee's   right,"   as   provided
by   the   Labor   Code   supported   by
the   facial   reading   of   the
provision.
Therefore,   the   applicable   law
on   prescription   is   the   Labor
Code   of   the   Philippines   which
provides   for   the   three­year
prescriptive   period   for   filing
of claims.
6. Van Dorn vs Romillo  dismiss   on   the   ground   that   the
Doctrine:  While   a   divorce
decree is not recognized in the
Philippines   as   a   matter   of
public   policy,   such   policy
covers   only   Filipino   citizens.
Insofar as the alien husband is
concerned,   divorce   is   binding
upon him.
FACTS:
A Filipino citizen (petitioner)
and   an   American   citizen
(respondent)   married   in
Hongkong,   and   established
residence   in   the   Philippines.
They   had   two   children.   After
some   time,   they   separated   and
divorced   in   Nevada,   U.S.   The
Fil   citizen   subsequently
remarried   another   American
citizen in Nevada.
Thereafter,   private   respondent
filed   a   suit   against
petitioner,   stating   that   the
latter’s   business   in   Manila   is
their   conjugal   property,   and
asked   that   the   latter   be
ordered to render an accounting
of   such   business   and   that   the
former   be   declared   with   the
right   to   manage   the   conjugal
property.
Petitioner   filed   a   motion   to
dismiss   on   the   ground   that   the
cause   of   action   is   barred   by
previous   judgment   in   the
divorce   proceedings   before   the
Nevada   Court   wherein   private
respondent   had   acknowledged
that   they   had   no   community
property.   He   alleged   that   the
divorce decree obtained by them
in   the   US   was   void   for   being
against public policy.
The   RTC   denied   the   motion   to
property involved is located in
the   Philippines   so   that   the
Divorce   Decree   has   no   bearing
in   the   case.   As   such,   the
denial   is   the   subject   of   this
certiorari proceeding.
ISSUE:  What   is   the   effect   of
foreign   divorce   on   the   parties
and   their   alleged   conjugal
property in the Philippines?
RULING:
The   pivotal   fact   in   this   case
is   the   Nevada divorce of   the
parties.
While   a   divorce   decree   is   not
recognized   in   the   Philippines
as   a   matter   of   public   policy,
such   policy   covers   only
Filipino   citizens.   Insofar   as
the alien husband is concerned,
he   is   governed   by   his   national
law. Being an American citizen,
he   is   governed   by   the   laws   in
the US which recognize divorce.
Since   his   national   law
recognizes divorce, the divorce
decree is binding upon him.
Thus,   pursuant   to   his   national
law,   private   respondent   is   no
longer   the   husband   of
petitioner.   He   would   have   no
standing   to   sue   in   the   case
below   as   petitioner's   husband
entitled   to   exercise   control
over   conjugal   assets.   As   he   is
bound   by   the   Decision   of   his
own   country's   Court,   which
validly   exercised   jurisdiction
over him, and whose decision he
does   not   repudiate,   he   is
estopped   by   his   own
representation   before   said
Court   from   asserting   his   right
over   the   alleged   conjugal
property.
7. Pilapil vs. Ibay­Somera
FACTS:
Petitioner   Imelda   Manalaysay
Pilapil,   a   Filipino   citizen,
and   private   respondent   Erich
Ekkehard   Geiling,   a   German
national,   were   married   in
Germany.   Couple   lived   together
and   had   a   child   Isabella
Pilapil   Geiling,   was   born   on
April   20,   1980.   After   about
three   and   a   half   years   of
marriage,   private   respondent
initiating a divorce proceeding
against   petitioner   in   Germany
before   the   Schoneberg   Local
Court   in   January,   1983.   He
claimed   that   there   was   failure
of their marriage and that they
had   been   living   apart   since
April,   1982.   More   than   five
months   after   the   issuance   of
the   divorce   decree,   private
respondent filed two complaints
for   adultery   before   the   City
Fiscal of Manila alleging that,
while   still   married   to   said
respondent,   petitioner   "had   an
affair   with   a   certain   William
Chia as early as 1982 and with
yet   another   man   named   Jesus
Chua sometime in 1983"
ISSUE:
WON   court   has   jurisdiction   to
try   and   decide   charge   od
adultery   which   is   a   private
offense   since   complainant   is   a
foreigner   and   WON   he   qualifies
as offended spouse.
HELD:
We   are   convinced   that   in   cases
of   such   nature,   the   status   of
the   complainant   vis­a­vis   the
accused   must   be   determined   as
of   the   time   the   complaint   was
filed.   Thus,   the   person   who
initiates   the   adultery   case
must be an offended spouse, and
by   this   is   meant   that   he   is
still   married   to   the   accused
spouse,   at   the   time   of   the
filing of the complaint. 
In the present case, the fact that private
respondent obtained a valid divorce in his
country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is
admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may
be recognized in the Philippines insofar as
private respondent is concerned 23 in view of
the nationality principle in our civil law on the
matter of status of persons.
Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs.
Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorce was
granted by a United States court between Alice
Van Dornja Filipina, and her American
husband, the latter filed a civil case in a trial
court here alleging that her business concern
was conjugal property and praying that she be
ordered to render an accounting and that the
plaintiff be granted the right to manage the
business. Rejecting his pretensions, this Court
perspicuously demonstrated the error of such
stance, thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of
that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the
United States. The decree is binding on private
respondent as an American citizen. For
instance, private respondent cannot sue
petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the
Union. ...
It is true that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public
policy and morality. However, aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they
are valid according to their national law. ...
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private
respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in
the case below as petitioner's husband entitled
to exercise control over conjugal assets. ... 25
Under   the   same   considerations
and   rationale,   private
respondent, being no longer the
husband   of   petitioner,   had   no
legal   standing   to   commence   the
adultery   case   under   the
imposture   that   he   was   the
offended   spouse   at   the   time   he
filed suit.  of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
8. Llorente vs. CA
(Wife   having   relationship   with
husband’s brother)
FACTS:
Lorenzo and Paula Llorente were
married   in   Camarines   Sur.
Lorenzo   departed   for   US   and
Paula   stayed   in   Phils.   Lorenzo
was admitted US Citizenship and
certificate   of   naturalization.
When he went back to Phils, his
wife   was   pregnant   and   having  a
relationship   with   his   brother.
Lorenzo returned to US and filed
divorce   and   married   Alicia
Llorente. He executed a will and
bequeathed   property   to   Alicia
and   their   3   children.   Paula
filed   for   letters   of
administration   and   was   opposed
by   Alicia.   RTC   granted   paula’s
petition. CA affirmed RTC.
ISSUE:   Who   are   entitled   to
inherit   from   Lorenzo   Llorente?
What is the applicable law?
HELD:
Case remanded to trial court to
rule   intrinsic   validity.  The
fact   that   the   late   Lorenzo   N.
Llorente   became   an   American
citizen   long   before   and   at   the
time   of:   (1)   his   divorce   from
Paula;   (2)   marriage   to   Alicia;
(3)   execution   of   his   will;   and
(4) death, is duly established,
admitted and undisputed.
Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these
incidents are necessarily governed by foreign
law. The Civil Code clearly provides:
“Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and
duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens
“Art. 16. Real property as well as personal
property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.
“However, intestate and testamentary
succession, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional
rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by
the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever
may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property
may be found.” (emphasis ours)
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in
our jurisdiction and our courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like
any other fact, they must be alleged and
proved.
While the substance of the foreign law was
pleaded, the Court of Appeals did not admit the
foreign law. The Court of Appeals and the trial
court called to the fore the renvoi doctrine,
where the case was “referred back” to the law
of the decedent’s domicile, in this case,
Philippine law.
We note that while the trial court stated that the
law of New York was not sufficiently proven,
in the same breath it made the categorical,
albeit equally unproven statement that
“American law follows the ‘domiciliary theory’
hence, Philippine law applies when
determining the validity of Lorenzo’s will.
First, there is no such thing as one American
law. The "national law" indicated in Article 16
of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to
general American law. There is no such law
governing the validity of testamentary
provisions in the United States. Each State of
the union has its own law applicable to its
citizens and in force only within the State. It
can therefore refer to no other than the law of
the State of which the decedent was a resident.
Second, there is no showing that the
application of the renvoi doctrine is called for
or required by New York State law.
The trial court held that the will was
intrinsically invalid since it contained
dispositions in favor of Alice, who in the trial
court’s opinion was a mere paramour. The
trial court threw the will out, leaving Alice, and
her two children, Raul and Luz, with nothing.
The Court of Appeals also disregarded the
will. It declared Alice entitled to one half (1/2)
of whatever property she and Lorenzo acquired
during their cohabitation, applying Article 144
of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The hasty
application of Philippine law and the complete
disregard of the will, already probated as duly
executed in accordance with the formalities of
Philippine law, is fatal, especially in light of
the factual and legal circumstances here
obtaining.
We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo
H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid
and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter
of comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as
to the succession to the estate of the decedent)
are matters best left to the determination of the
trial court.
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who
shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best
proved by foreign law which must be pleaded
and proved. Whether the will was executed in
accordance with the formalities required is
answered by referring to Philippine law. In
fact, the will was duly probated. Case
remanded.
9. Republic vs. Obrecido
(Filipino   wife   acquired
American   citizenship,   divorced
her   filipino   husband   outside
Philippines,   Wife   can   remarry
after   complying   the   necessary
legal steps)

FACTS:
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III
married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the
United Church of Christ in the Philippines in
Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was
blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer
Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V.
Orbecido.
In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United
States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A
few years later, Cipriano discovered that his
wife had been naturalized as an American
citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his
son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree
and then married a certain Innocent Stanley.
She, Stanley and her child by him currently
live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San
Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a
petition for authority to remarry invoking
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.
No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the
petition, the court granted the same. The
Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought
reconsideration but it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question
of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN
REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE
FAMILY CODE
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article
26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the
instant case because it only applies to a valid
mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The
proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file
a petition for annulment or for legal
separation. Furthermore, the OSG argues there
is no law that governs respondent’s situation.
The OSG posits that this is a matter of
legislation and not of judicial determination.
ISSUE:
1. Given a valid marriage between two
Filipino citizens, where one party is later
The instant case was one where at
the   time   the   marriage   was
solemnized, the parties were two
Filipino citizens, but later on,
the   wife   was   naturalized   as   an
American citizen and subsequently
obtained   a   divorce   granting   her
capacity to remarry, and indeed,
she remarried an American citizen
while   residing   in   the   US.   The
Filipino   spouse   should   likewise
be   allowed  to   remarry  as   if  the
other   party   were   a   foreigner   at
the time of the solemnization of
the marriage.
The court ruled that taking into consideration the
legislative intent and applying the rule of reason,
Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases
involving parties who, at the time of the celebration
of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on,
one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen
and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse
should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other
party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage.
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains
a valid divorce decree capacitating him or
her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse
likewise remarry under Philippine law?
2. WON Cipriano’s petition for authority to
remarry will prosper.
RULING:
1. Yes. 
Article 26 provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized
outside the Philippines in accordance
with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37
and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner is validly
 celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine
law. (Emphasis supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not
appear to govern the situation presented by the
case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases
where at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner. The instant case is one where at the
time the marriage was solemnized, the parties
were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the
wife was naturalized as an American citizen
and subsequently obtained a divorce granting
her capacity to remarry, and indeed she
remarried an American citizen while residing in
the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public
Hearings9 on the Family Code, the Catholic
Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines
(CBCP) registered the following objections to
Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
1. The rule is discriminatory. It
discriminates against those whose spouses
are Filipinos who divorce them abroad.
These spouses who are divorced will not
be able to re-marry, while the spouses of
foreigners who validly divorce them
abroad can.
2. This is the beginning of the recognition
of the validity of divorce even for Filipino
citizens. For those whose foreign spouses
validly divorce them abroad will also be
considered to be validly divorced here and
can re-marry. We propose that this be
deleted and made into law only after more
widespread consultation. (Emphasis
supplied.)
[Legislative Intent]
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code
deliberations showed that the intent of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge
Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil
Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative
intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold
that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be
interpreted to include cases involving parties
who, at the time of the celebration of the
marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on,
one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign
citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The
Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to
remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at
the time of the solemnization of the marriage.
To rule otherwise would be to sanction
absurdity and injustice. Where the
interpretation of a statute according to its exact
and literal import would lead to mischievous
results or contravene the clear purpose of the
legislature, it should be construed according to
its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as
necessary the letter of the law. A statute may
therefore be extended to cases not within the
literal meaning of its terms, so long as they
come within its spirit or intent.12
If we are to give meaning to the legislative
intent to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the
instant case must be deemed as coming within
the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin
elements for the application of paragraph 2 of
article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of
the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a
valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was
naturalized as an American citizen, there was
still a valid marriage that has been celebrated
between her and Cipriano. As fate would have
it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently
obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to
remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are
both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the
"divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed
to remarry.
We are also unable to sustain the OSG’s theory
that the proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is
to file either a petition for annulment or a
petition for legal separation. Annulment would
be a long and tedious process, and in this
particular case, not even feasible, considering
that the marriage of the parties appears to have
all the badges of validity. On the other hand,
legal separation would not be a sufficient
remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie;
hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse
would still remain married to the naturalized
alien spouse.
2. No. the records are bereft
of competent evidence duly
submitted   by   respondent
concerning   the  divorce
decree  and   the
naturalization   of
respondent’s   wife.   It   is
settled   rule   that   one   who
alleges   a   fact   has   the
burden   of   proving   it   and
mere   allegation   is   not
evidence.
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent
herein must prove his allegation that his wife
was naturalized as an American citizen.
Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can
be recognized by our own courts, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it.14 Such foreign law must also be
proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice
of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws
must be alleged and proved.15 Furthermore,
respondent must also show that the divorce
decree allows his former wife to remarry as
specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise,
there would be no evidence sufficient to
declare that he is capacitated to enter into
another marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding
that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No.
227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino
citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse
who had acquired foreign citizenship and
remarried, also to remarry. However,
considering that in the present petition there is
no sufficient evidence submitted and on record,
we are unable to declare, based on respondent’s
bare allegations that his wife, who was
naturalized as an American citizen, had
obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an
American, that respondent is now capacitated
to remarry. Such declaration could only be
made properly upon respondent’s submission
of the aforecited evidence in his favor.
10. PHILSEC   INVESTMENT
CORPORATION,  vs. THE   HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS
Facts: 
Antecedent   facts   :   libug   kaau
but   BASICALLY   loan   agreement
wala   ka   bayad   so   ni   file   ug
case sa U.S. thereafter ni file
sa RTC of Makati. 
On January 15, 1983, private respondent
Ventura O. Ducat obtained separate loans
from petitioners Ayala International Finance
Limited (hereafter called AYALA) and Philsec
Investment Corporation (hereafter called
PHILSEC) in the sum of US$2,500,000.00,
secured by shares of stock owned by Ducat
with a market value of P14,088,995.00. In
order to facilitate the payment of the loans,
private respondent 1488, Inc., through its
president, private respondent Drago Daic,
assumed Ducats obligation under an
Agreement, dated January 27, 1983, whereby
1488, Inc. executed a Warranty Deed with
Vendors Lien by which it sold to petitioner
Athona Holdings, N.V. (hereafter called
ATHONA) a parcel of land in Harris County,
Texas, U.S.A., for US$2,807,209.02, while
PHILSEC and AYALA extended a loan to Motion to Dismiss, contending that the action
ATHONA in the amount of US$2,500,000.00 being in personam, extraterritorial service of
as initial payment of the purchase price. The summons by publication was ineffectual and
balance of US$307,209.02 was to be paid by did not vest the court with jurisdiction over
means of a promissory note executed by 1488, Inc., which is a non-resident foreign
ATHONA in favor of 1488, Inc. Subsequently, corporation, and Daic, who is a non-resident
upon their receipt of the US$2,500,000.00 from alien.
1488, Inc., PHILSEC and AYALA released
Ducat from his indebtedness and delivered to RTC   dismissed   the   case   and   CA
1488, Inc. all the shares of stock in their affirmed
possession belonging to Ducat.
As   ATHONA  FAILED   TO   PAY   THE ISSUES: 
INTEREST   ON   THE   BALANCE   OF
US$307,209.02, the   entire In their present appeal, petitioners contend
amount   covered   by   the   note that:
became due and demandable. 1. THE DOCTRINE OF PENDENCY
Accordingly,   on   October   17, OF ANOTHER ACTION
1985,   private   respondent   1488, BETWEEN THE SAME PARTIES
Inc.  sued  petitioners   PHILSEC, FOR THE SAME CAUSE (LITIS
AYALA, and ATHONA in the United PENDENTIA) RELIED UPON
States  Civil   Case   No.   H­86­440 BY THE COURT OF APPEALS
( 1st case filed ) IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
Petitioners   filed   a COURTS DISMISSAL OF THE
complaint For Sum of Money with CIVIL ACTION IS NOT
Damages and Writ of Preliminary APPLICABLE.
Attachment   against   private 2. THE PRINCIPLE OF FORUM
respondents   in   the  Regional NON CONVENIENS ALSO
RELIED UPON BY THE COURT
Trial Court of Makati, where it
OF APPEALS IN AFFIRMING
was   docketed   as   Civil   Case   No.
THE DISMISSAL BY THE
16563. ( 2nd case filed) 
TRIAL COURT OF THE CIVIL
ACTION IS LIKEWISE NOT
Private   respondent   Ducat APPLICABLE.
moved to dismiss Civil Case No. 3. AS A COROLLARY TO THE
16563 on the grounds of  FIRST TWO GROUNDS, THE
(1)   litis   pendentia,   vis­a­ COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
vis   Civil   Action   No.   H­86­440 NOT HOLDING THAT
filed by 1488, Inc. and Daic in PHILIPPINE PUBLIC POLICY
the U.S., REQUIRED THE ASSUMPTION,
(2) FORUM   NON NOT THE RELINQUISHMENT,
CONVENIENS, and   (   ENTIRE   CASE BY THE TRIAL COURT OF ITS
DWELLS ON THIS )  RIGHTFUL JURISDICTION IN
(3)   failure   of   petitioners THE CIVIL ACTION FOR
PHILSEC   and   BPI­IFL   to   state   a THERE IS EVERY REASON TO
cause of action PROTECT AND VINDICATE
ON THE OTHER HAND, private PETITIONERS RIGHTS FOR
respondents 1488, Inc. and its president Drago TORTIOUS OR WRONGFUL
filed a joint Special Appearance and Qualified ACTS OR CONDUCT PRIVATE
 RESPONDENTS (WHO ARE
MOSTLY NON-RESIDENT
ALIENS) INFLICTED UPON
THEM HERE IN THE
PHILIPPINES.
First issue: 
Arguments  Second issue
Respondent  contend   that   for
a   foreign   judgment   to   be
pleaded   as   res   judicata,   a
judgment   admitting   the   foreign
decision is not necessary.
Petitioners argue that the foreign
judgment cannot be given the effect of res
judicata without giving them an opportunity to
impeach it on grounds stated in Rule 39, 50 of
the Rules of Court, to wit: want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact.
SUPREME COURT AGREES WITH
Petitioners contention is meritorious. While
this Court has given the effect of res judicata to
foreign judgments in several cases, it was after
the parties opposed to the judgment had been
given ample opportunity to repel them on
grounds allowed under the law
“ SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments.
- The effect of a judgment of a tribunal
of a foreign country, having jurisdiction
to pronounce the judgment is as
follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a
specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon
the title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a
person, the judgment is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the
parties and their successors in interest
by a subsequent title; but the judgment
may be repelled by evidence of a want
of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake
of law or fact.”
In   the   case   at   bar,   it   cannot
be   said   that   petitioners   were
given   the   opportunity   to
challenge   the   judgment   of   the
U.S.   court   as   basis   for
declaring   it res   judicata or
conclusive   of   the   rights   of
private   respondents. The
proceedings   in   the   trial   court
were summary.
 
Nor   is   the   trial   courts
refusal   to   take   cognizance   of
the   case   justifiable   under   the
principle   of forum   non
conveniens. First,   a   motion   to
dismiss   is  limited   to   the
grounds under Rule 16, 1, which
does   not   include forum   non
conveniens.  The   propriety   of
dismissing a case based on this
principle   requires   a   factual
determination,   hence,   it   is
more   properly
considered a matter   of
defense. Second,   while   it   is
within   the   discretion   of   the
trial   court   to   abstain   from
assuming   jurisdiction   on   this
ground,   it   should   do   so   only
after   vital   facts   are
established,   to   determine
whether   special   circumstances
require the courts desistance. 
In this case, the trial court abstained from
taking jurisdiction solely on the basis of the
pleadings filed by private respondents in
connection with the motion to dismiss. It failed
to consider that one of the plaintiffs
(PHILSEC) is a domestic corporation and one
of the defendants (Ventura Ducat) is a Filipino,
and that it was the extinguishment of the latters
debt which was the object of the transaction
under litigation. The trial court arbitrarily
dismissed the case even after finding that
Ducat was not a party in the U.S. case.
Third issue
Third. It was error we think for the Court of
Appeals and the trial court to hold that
jurisdiction over 1488, Inc. and Daic could not
be obtained because this is an action
in personam and summons were served by
extraterritorial service. Rule 14, 17 on
extraterritorial service provides that service of
summons on a non-resident defendant may be
effected out of the Philippines by leave of
Court where, among others, the property of the
defendant has been attached within the
Philippines
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court
of Appeals is REVERSED and Civil Case No.
16563 is REMANDED to the Regional Trial
Court of Makati for consolidation with Civil
Case No. 92-1070 and for further proceedings
in accordance with this decision. The
temporary restraining order issued on June 29,
1994 is hereby LIFTED.
11. RAYTHEON INTERNATIONAL v.
ROUZIE, JR.
(Mt. Pinatubo eruption, NLRC case, forum non
conveniens)
Doctrine: Doctrine of forum non conveniens -
a court, in Conflict of Law cases, may refuse
impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not
the most "convenient" or available forum and
the parties are not precluded from seeking
remedies elsewhere; But Forum non
conveniens cannot be a ground for a motion
to dismiss unless the circumstances that would
show that the Philippine court is an
inconvenient forum is established as a fact.;
Phases in deciding COL cases: 1) jurisdiction
2) choice of law 3) recognition and
enforcement of judgments. The court can
decide if: 1) it is one to which the parties may
conveniently resort; 2) it is in a position to
make an intelligent decision as to law and
facts; 3) it has or is likely to have the power to
enforce its decision.
Facts: Brand Marine Services, Inc. (BMSI), a
corporation duly organized and existing under
the laws of the State of Connecticut, United
States of America, and respondent Stockton W.
Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen, entered into a
contract whereby BMSI hired respondent as its
representative to negotiate the sale of services
in several government projects in the
Philippines for an agreed remuneration of 10%
of the gross receipts.
In 1992, Respondent secured a service contract
with the Republic of the Philippines on behalf
of BMSI for the dredging of rivers affected by
the Mt. Pinatubo eruption and mudflows.
In 1994, Respondent filed before the
Arbitration Branch of (NLRC) a suit against
BMSI and Rust International, Inc. (RUST),
Rodney C. Gilbert and Walter G. Browning for
alleged nonpayment of commissions, illegal
termination and breach of employment
contract.
Labor Arbiter Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr. rendered
judgment ordering BMSI and RUST to pay
respondent's money claims.
Upon appeal by BMSI, the NLRC reversed the
decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed
respondent's complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. Respondent elevated the case to
the SC but was dismissed.
Respondent, then a resident of La Union,
instituted an action for damages before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bauang, La
Union against Raytheon International, Inc. as
well as BMSI and RUST, the two corporations
impleaded in the earlier labor case, alleging
that BMSI verbally employed respondent to
negotiate the sale of services in government
projects and that Respondent was not paid the
commissions due him from the Pinatubo
dredging project which he secured on behalf of
BMSI.
In its Answer, petitioner alleged that contrary
to respondent's claim, it was a foreign
corporation duly licensed to do business in the
Philippines and denied entering into any
arrangement with respondent or paying the
latter any sum of money.

Petitioner also referred to the NLRC decision
which disclosed that per the written agreement
between respondent and BMSI and RUST,
denominated as "Special Sales Representative
Agreement," the rights and obligations of the
parties shall be governed by the laws of the
State of Connecticut (valid choice of law
clause). It also mentions the presence of
foreign elements in the dispute —the parties
and witnesses involved are American
corporations and citizens and the evidence to
be presented is located outside the Philippines
— that renders our local courts inconvenient
forums. Petitioner theorizes that the foreign
elements of the dispute necessitate the
immediate application of the doctrine of forum
non conveniens.
RTC denied petitioner's motion. The trial court
held that the factual allegations in the
complaint, assuming the same to be admitted,
were sufficient for the trial court to render a
valid judgment thereon. It also ruled that the
principle of forum non conveniens was
inapplicable because the trial court could
enforce judgment on petitioner, it being a
foreign corporation licensed to do business in
the Philippines.
Court of Appeals rendered the assailed
Decision, denying the petition for certiorari for
lack of merit. The appellate court deferred to
the discretion of the trial court when the latter
decided not to desist from assuming
jurisdiction on the ground of the inapplicability
of the principle of forum non conveniens.
Issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN REFUSING TO
DISMISS THE COMPLAINT ON THE
GROUND OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS.
Petitioner mainly asserts that the written
contract between respondent and BMSI
included a valid choice of law clause, that is,
that the contract shall be governed by the laws
of the State of Connecticut. It also mentions the
presence of foreign elements in the dispute
namely, the parties and witnesses involved are
American corporations and citizens and the
evidence to be presented is located outside the
Philippines that renders our local courts
inconvenient forums.
Petitioner theorizes that the foreign elements of
the dispute necessitate the immediate
application of the doctrine of forum non
conveniens.
Ruling:
NO. Petitioner's averments of the foreign
elements in the instant case are not sufficient to
oust the trial court of its jurisdiction over the
case and the parties involved. There are three
consecutive phases involved in judicial
resolution of conflicts-of-laws problems,
namely:
(1) jurisdiction
(2) choice of law, and
(3) recognition and enforcement of
judgments.
Where the Court held that the local judicial
machinery was adequate to resolve
controversies with a foreign element, the
following requisites had to be proved:
(1) that the Philippine Court is one to
which the parties may conveniently resort;
(2) that the Philippine Court is in a
position to make an intelligent decision as to
the law and the facts; and
(3) that the Philippine Court has or is
likely to have the power to enforce its decision.
On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-
of-laws problem where the case is filed in a
Philippine court and where the court has
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties
and the res, it may or can proceed to try the
case even if the rules of conflict-of-laws or the
convenience of the parties point to a foreign
forum. This is an exercise of sovereign
prerogative of the country where the case is
filed.
Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter
of an action is conferred by the Constitution
and the law and by the material allegations in
the complaint, irrespective of whether or not
the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of
the claims or reliefs sought therein. The case is
an action for damages arising from an alleged
breach of contract. Undoubtedly, the nature of
the action and the amount of damages prayed
are within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the trial
court acquired jurisdiction over herein plaintiff
upon the filing of the complaint. On the other
hand, jurisdiction over the person of defendant
was acquired by its voluntary appearance in
court.
That the subject contract included a
stipulation that the same shall be governed by
the laws of the State of Connecticut does not
suggest that the Philippine courts, or any other
foreign tribunal for that matter, are precluded
from hearing the civil action. Jurisdiction and
choice of law are two distinct concepts:
Jurisdiction Choice of law
considers whether it is asks the further question
fair to cause a defendant whether the application of
to travel to this state a substantive law which
will determine the merits
of the case is fair to both
parties
The choice of law
stipulation will become
relevant only when the
substantive issues of the
instant case develop, that
is, after hearing on the
merits proceeds before
the trial court
Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a
case based on the principle of forum non
conveniens requires a factual determination;
hence, it is more properly considered as a
matter of defense. While it is within the
discretion of the trial court to abstain from
assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should
do so only after vital facts are established, to
determine whether special circumstances
require the court's desistance.
12. MANILA HOTEL CORP. & MANILA
HOTEL   INTL.   v.   NLRC   ARBITER
DIOSANA and SANTOS 
Doctrine:  Under   the   rule   of
forum   non   conveniens,   a
Philippine   court   or   agency   may
assume   jurisdiction   over   the
case   if   it   chooses   to   do   so
provided:   (1)   that   the
Philippine   court   is   one   to
which   the   parties   may
conveniently   resort   to;   (2)
that the Philippine court is in
a   position   to   make   an
intelligent   decision   as   to   the
law and the facts; and (3) that
the Philippine court has or is
likely to have power to enforce
its decision. 
Facts:
Respondent   Marcelo   Santos   was
an   overseas   worker   employed   as
a printer at the Mazoon Printer
Press   in   Oman.   During   his
employment,   respondent   accepted
an   employment   with   the   same
position   as   printer   but   with
higher   salary   and   benefits   at
Palace Hotel in Beijing, China.
Santos resigned from the Mazoon
Printing   Press,   signed   the
employment   contract,   and
started   to   work   at   the   Palace
Hotel.   However,   he   was
terminated   due   to   business
reverses   caused   by   political
upheaval in China, and was paid
all   benefits   due   him.   Santos
filed   a   complaint   for   illegal
dismissal   with   the   NLRC
demanding   full   compensation
pursuant   to   the   employment
agreement.   Manila   Hotel
International   Company   (MHICL)
trained the personnel and staff
of   Palace   Hotel.   Manila   Hotel
Corporation   (MHC)   is   an
incorporator   of   MHICL,   owning
50% of its capital stock.
Issue:  government.
Whether   or   not   NLRC   has
jurisdiction   over   the   case
under   the   rule   of  forum   non
conveniens.
Ruling:
No,   the   NLRC   do   not   have
jurisdiction   over   the   case
under   the   rule   of  forum   non
conveniens.
The   main   aspects   of   the   case
transpired   in   two   foreign
jurisdictions,   and   the   case
involves   purely   foreign
elements.   The   only   link   that
the   Philippines   has   with   the
case   is   that   respondent   Santos
is   a   Filipino   citizen.   The
Palace   Hotel   and   MHICL   are
foreign   corporations.   Not   all
cases   involving   Filipino
citizens   can   be   tried   here.
This   is   not   to   say   that
Philippine   courts   and   agencies
have   no   power   to   solve
controversies   involving   foreign
employers.   If   Santos   were   an
"overseas   contract   worker,"   a
Philippine   forum,   specifically
the   POEA,   not   the   NLRC,   would
protect him. However, he is not
an   "overseas   contract   worker,"
a   fact   which   he   admits   with
conviction.   He   was   hired
directly by the Palace Hotel, a
foreign   employer,   through
correspondence   sent   to   the
Sultanate   of   Oman   where   he   was
then   employed.   He   was   hired
without the intervention of the
POEA   or   any   authorized
recruitment   agency   of   the
 
Under   the   rule   of  forum   non
conveniens,   a   Philippine   court
or   agency   may   assume
jurisdiction   over   the   case   if
it   chooses   to   do   so   provided:
(1)   that   the   Philippine   court
is one to which the parties may
conveniently   resort   to;   (2)
that the Philippine court is in
a   position   to   make   an
intelligent   decision   as   to   the
law and the facts; and (3) that
the   Philippine   court   has   or   is
likely to have power to enforce
its   decision.   The   conditions
are   unavailing   at   the   case   at
bar.
Not   Convenient.  —The   NLRC   is
not   a   convenient   forum   given
that   all   the   incidents   of   the
case   —   from   the   time   of
recruitment,   to   employment   to
dismissal   occurred   outside   the
Philippines.   The   inconvenience
is   compounded   by   the   fact   that
the   proper   defendants,   the
Palace   Hotel   and   MHICL   are   not
nationals   of   the   Philippines.
Neither   are   they   "doing
business   in   the   Philippines."
Likewise,   the   main   witnesses,
Mr.   Shmidt   and   Mr.   Henk   are
non­residents   of   the
Philippines.  AMERICAN REALTY CORP & CA
No   power   to   determine
applicable   law.  —   Neither   can
an intelligent decision be made
as   to   the   law   governing   the
employment contract as such was
perfected in foreign soil. This
calls   to   fore   the   application
of   the   principle   of   lex   loci
contractus   (the   law   of   the
place   where   the   contract   was
made).   The   employment   contract
was   not   perfected   in   the
Philippines.   Respondent   Santos
signified   his   acceptance   by
writing   a   letter   while   he   was
in   the   Republic   of   Oman.   This
letter   was   sent   to   the   Palace
Hotel   in   the   People's   Republic
of China.  respondent) defaulted in the payment of the
No   power   to   determine   the
facts.  —   Neither   can   the   NLRC
determine the facts surrounding
the   alleged   illegal   dismissal
as   all   acts   complained   of   took
place   in   Beijing,   People's
Republic of China. The NLRC was
not   in   a   position   to   determine
whether   the   Tiannamen   Square
incident   truly   adversely
affected   operations   of   the
Palace   Hotel   as   to   justify
respondent   Santos'
retrenchment. 
Principle of effectiveness, no power to execute
decision. — Even assuming that a proper
decision could be reached by the NLRC, such
would not have any binding effect against the
employer, the Palace Hotel. The Palace Hotel is
a corporation incorporated under the laws of
China and was not even served with summons.
Jurisdiction over its person was not acquired.
13. BANK OF AMERICA, NT and SA vs.
(Collection suits sa HK and England + REM
foreclosure sa Philippines para more chances
of winning pero pildi nuon)
Doctrine: When the foreign law, judgment or
contract is contrary to a sound and established
public policy of the forum, the said foreign law,
judgment or order shall not be applied.
FACTS: Petitioner Bank of America granted
loans to 3 corporate borrowers (foreign
affiliates of private respondent). Due to default
in payment of the loans, Bank of America and
the 3 corporate borrowers entered into
restructuring agreements. As additional
security for the restructured loans, private
respondent American Realty Corporation
(domestic corporation), as third party
mortgagor, executed 2 REMs. The 3 corporate
borrowers (foreign affiliates of private
restructured loans. Bank of America filed civil
actions before the foreign courts for the
collection of the principal loan. 2 cases were
filed before the High Court of Justice in
England and 2 cases were filed before the
Supreme Court of Hong Kong High Court. In
these civil suits, the private respondent was not
impleaded as party-defendant.
Despite the pendency of civil suits before the
foreign courts for the collection of the principal
loan, petitioner Bank of America filed before
the Office of the Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan,
Philippines an application for extrajudicial
foreclosure of REM. Eventually, the mortgaged
properties were sold at public auction in an
extrajudicial foreclosure sale to a third party.
Respondent filed before RTC – Pasig an action
for damages against the petitioner. Respondent
alleged that petitioner waived its remedy to
foreclose the REMs by filing an action for
collection of the principal loan before foreign
courts.
In its answer, petitioner alleged that: 1)
respondent was not a party defendant in the
civil cases filed in HK and England; 2) There is
no civil suit for sum of money filed in the
Philippines; and 3) Under the English Law,
which is the governing law or choice of law
under the principal agreements, the mortgagee
does not lose its security interest by filing civil
actions for sums of money.
The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the
respondent and declared that the filing in
foreign courts by the defendant of collection
suits against the principal debtors operated as
waiver of the security of the mortgages.
Consequently, the respondent’s rights as
owners were violated by the foreclosure sale.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s
decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner’s act of
filing a collection suit against the principal
debtors for the recovery of the loan before
foreign courts constituted a waiver of the
remedy of foreclosure.
HELD: YES, the act of filing a collection suit
against the principal debtors for the recovery of
the loan before foreign courts CONSTITUTED
A WAIVER of the remedy of foreclosure.
Philippine laws prohibit the creditor to avail
two remedies: collection of loan and
foreclosure of mortgage. It may opt to exercise
only one of two remedies so as not to violate
the rule against splitting a cause of action. On
the basis of Philippine laws, the filing for
collection abroad amounts to waiver of
petitioner to institute foreclosure proceedings.
On the question of the choice of law, Philippine
law shall apply notwithstanding the evidence
presented by petitioner to prove the English
law on the matter. A foreign law must be
properly pleaded and proved as a fact. Thus, if
the foreign law involved is not properly
pleaded and proved, our courts will presume
that the foreign law is the same as our local or
domestic or internal law. This is the doctrine of
processual presumption.
Assuming   arguendo   that   the
English   Law   on   the   matter   were
properly   pleaded   and   proved,
said   foreign   law   would   still
not   find   applicability.   Thus,
when   the   foreign   law,   judgment
or   contract   is   contrary   to   a
sound   and   established   public
policy   of   the   forum,   the   said
foreign   law,   judgment   or   order
shall   not   be   applied.   The
public   policy   sought   to   be
protected   in   the   instant   case
is   the   principle   imbedded   in
our   jurisdiction   proscribing
the   splitting   up   of   a   single
cause   of   action.   Moreover,
foreign   law   should   not   be
applied   when   its   application
would work undeniable injustice
to the citizens or residents of
the forum. Clearly, English Law
is   not   applicable   and   the
doctrine   of   processual
presumption cannot be applied.
14. YAO KEE, ET AL. v. AIDA SY-
GONZALES, ET AL.
(“The China marriage, or not???)
FACTS:   Sy   Kiat,   a   male   Chinese
national,   died   on   January   17,
1977   in   Caloocan   City.
Thereafter   Respondents
initially   filed   a   claim   that
they   are   children   of   deceased
Sy   Kiat   with   Asuncion   Gillego
and   they   do   not   recognize   Sy
Kiat’s   Marriage   to   Petitioner
Yao   Kee   nor   her   children’s
filiation   to   him.   They   also
nominate fellow respondent Aida
Sy­Gonzales   to   be
administratrix   of   Sy   Kiat’s
estate.
Petitioners   Yao   Kee   and   her
children   opposed,   alleging   Yao
Kee is the lawful wife who was
married   by   deceased   in   1931   in
China   and   they   are   legitimate
children   and   wish   to   become
administratrix.
Probate   Court   held   in   favor   of
the   oppositors   (petitioners
herein)   declaring   Sy   Kiat   and
Yao   Kee   were   legally   married
and children of Yao Kee and Sy
Kiat   as   legitimate   children.
While   petitioners   were
identified   as   acknowledged
illegitimate   children.   Court
also   appointed   Sze   Sook   Wah,
eldest   child   of   Yao   Kee   and
among   the   respondents,   as
Administratrix.
On   Appeal,   the   CA   modified   the
decision   of   the   probate   court
declaring that petitioners were
only   acknowledged   natural
children as the marriage of Yao
Kee   and   Sy   Kiat   could   not   be
proved to be valid to the laws
of China.
Petitioners   come   before   the
Supreme   Court   arguing   that   the
marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee
in   accordance   with   Chinese   law
and   custom   was   conclusively
proven.   To   buttress   this
argument   they   rely   on   the
following   testimonial   and
documentary evidence.
1)   Yao   Kee   testified   that
she was married to Sy Kiat
on   January   19,   1931   in
Fookien, China; that there
was   no   marriage
certificate;   that   the
practice   during   the   time
of   her   marriage   was   a
written   document   is
exchanged just between the
parents   of   the   bride   and
the   parents   of   the   groom,
or   any   elder   for   that
matter; that in China, the
custom  is   that   there   is   a
go­between,   a   sort   of
marriage   broker   who   is
known   to   bother   parties
who   would   talk   to   the
parents   of   the   bride­to­
be; that if the parents of
the   bride­to­be   agree   to
have the groom­to­be their
son­in­law,   then   they
agree   on   a   date   as   an
engagement   day;   that
during   her   wedding;   that
during   her   wedding,   Sy
Chick,   the   eldest   brother
of   Sy   Kiat,   signed   the
document   with   her   mother;
that as to the whereabouts
of   that   document,   she   and
Sy Mat were married for 46
years   already   and   the
document was left in China
and   she   doubt   if   that
document   can   still   be
found   now;   that   it   was
left   in   the   possession   of
Sy   Kiat's   family;   that
right   now,   she   does   not
know   the   whereabouts   of
that   document   because   of
the   lapse   of   many   years
and   because   they   left   it
in   a   certain   place   and   it
was   already   eaten   by   the
termites;   that   after   her
wedding with Sy Kiat, they
lived   immediately   together
as   husband   and   wife,   and
from   then   on,   they   lived
 together.
2) Testimony of Gan Ching,
the younger brother of Yao
Kee who stated that he was
among   the   people   who
attended   the   wedding   of
his   sister   with   Sy   Kiat
and   no   marriage
certificate   was   issued   by
the   Chinese   government   as
a   document   signed   by
parents   or   elders   is
sufficient.
3)   Asuncion   Gillego’s
statement that Sy Kiat was
married   to   Yao   Kee
according   to   Chines
customs
4)   Sy   Kiat’s   Alien
Certificate   Registration
issued   in   Caloocan   City
contained   the   following
entries:   “Civil   Status:
Married;”   and,   “If
married,   name   of   spouse:
Yao   Kee;”   “Place   of
Marriage: China”
5)   Certification   by   the
Embassy   of   the   People’s
Republic   of   China   to   the
effect   that   “according   to
the   information   available
at the Embassy Sy Kiat and
Yao   Kee   were   married   on
January 19, 1931.”
ISSUE
1) Did   Petitioners   Yao   Kee
and her children prove the
legality   of   the   marriage
conducted in China?
HELD
The evidence presented may very
well prove the fact of marriage
between   Yao   Kee   and   Sy   Kiat.
However,   the   same   do   not
suffice   to   establish   the
validity   of   said   marriage   in
accordance   with   Chinese   law   or
custom.
The law requires that "a custom
must   be   proved   as   a   fact,
according   to   the   rules   of
evidence"   [Article   12,   Civil
Code.]   On   this   score   the   Court
had   occasion   to   state   that   "a
local   custom   as   a   source   of
right cannot be considered by a
court   of   justice   unless   such
custom   is   properly   established
by   competent   evidence   like   any
other fact." The same evidence,
if not one of a higher degree,
should be required of a foreign
custom. 
The law on foreign marriages is
provided   by   Article   71   of   the
Civil Code which states that:
Art.   71.   All   marriages
performed   outside   the
Philippines   in   accordance
with   the   laws   in   force   in
the   country   where   they
were   performed   and   valid
there   as   such,   shall   also
be   valid   in   this   country,
except   bigamous,
Polygamous,   or   incestuous
marriages,   as   determined
by Philippine law. 
Construing   this   provision   of
law the Court has held that to
establish   a   valid   foreign
marriage   two   things   must   be
proven,   namely:   (1)   the
existence of the foreign law as
a question of fact; and (2) the
alleged   foreign   marriage   by
convincing evidence. In proving
a   foreign   law   the   procedure   is
provided in the Rules of Court.
With   respect   to   an   unwritten
foreign   law,   Rule   130   section
45 states that:
SEC.   45.   Unwritten   law.—
The   oral   testimony   of
witnesses,   skilled
therein,   is   admissible   as
evidence   of   the   unwritten
law   of   a   foreign   country,
as   are   also   printed   and
published books of reports
of decisions of the courts
of the foreign country, if
proved   to   be   commonly
admitted in such courts.
Proof of a written foreign law,
on   the   other   hand,   is   provided
for   under   Rule   132   section   25,
thus:
SEC.   25.   Proof   of   public
or   official   record.—An
official   record   or   an
entry   therein,   when
admissible   for   any
purpose,   may   be   evidenced
by an official publication
thereof   or   by   a   copy
attested   by   the   officer
having   the   legal   custody
of   the   record,   or   by   his
deputy,   and   accompanied,
if   the   record   is   not   kept
in the Philippines, with a
certificate   that   such
officer   has   the   custody.
If the office in which the
record   is   kept   is   in   a
foreign   country,   the
certificate may be made by
a   secretary   of   embassy   or
legation,   consul   general,
consul,   vice   consul,   or
consular   agent   or   by   any
officer   in   the   foreign
service of the Philippines
stationed   in   the   foreign
country   in   which   the
record   is   kept   and
authenticated   by   the   seal
of his office.
The   Court   has   interpreted
section 25 to include competent
evidence   like   the   testimony   of
a   witness   to   prove   the
existence   of   a   written   foreign
law.  In   the   case   at   bar
petitioners did not present any
competent   evidence   relative   to
the law and custom of China on
marriage.   The   testimonies   of
Yao   and   Gan   Ching   cannot   be
considered   as   proof   of   China's
law   or   custom   on   marriage   not
only   because   they   are   self­
serving   evidence,   but   more
importantly,   there   is   no
showing that they are competent
to   testify   on   the   subject
matter.   For   failure   to   prove
the   foreign   law   or   custom,   and
consequently,   the   validity   of
the marriage in accordance with
said   law   or   custom,   the
marriage between Yao Kee and Sy
Kiat   cannot   be   recognized   in
this jurisdiction.
In the absence of proof of the
Chinese   law   on   marriage,   it
should   be   presumed   that   it   is
the same as ours. Since Yao Kee
admitted   in   her   testimony   that
there   was   no   solemnizing
officer as is known here in the
Philippines   [See   Article   56,
Civil   Code]   when   her   alleged
marriage   to   Sy   Kiat   was
celebrated,   it   therefore
follows that her marriage to Sy
Kiat,   even   if   true,   cannot   be
recognized in this jurisdiction
Petitioners   are   considered
acknowledged   natural   children
considering   that   there   was
failure   to   prove   the   legality
of the marriage in China.
Private   respondents   on   the
other   hand   are   also   the
deceased's   acknowledged   natural
children with Asuncion Gillego.
They   have   in   their   favor   their
father's   acknowledgment,
evidenced   by   a   compromise
agreement   entered   into   by   and
between   their   parents.   Wherein
Sy   Kiat   not   only   acknowledged
them   as   his   children   by
Asuncion   Gillego   but   likewise
made   provisions   for   their
support and future inheritance.
15. RECTO v. ESPERANZA P. DE HARDEN and
FRED M. HARDEN
(Validity   of   contract   of
services   for   the   purpose   of
securing   an   increase   in   the
amount of support received from
husband   to   effect   a   claim   of
attorney’s fees)
FACTS:
Mrs. Esperanza Harden and Atty.
Claro   M.   recto   entered   into   a
Contract   of   Professional
Services   for   the   latter   to
appear   as   the   former’s   counsel
in   the   action   which   she   would
file   against   her   husband,   Fred
M.   Harden,   for   the   purpose   of
securing   an   increase   in   the
amount   of   support   she   receives
from   the   conjugal   partnership,
as   well   as   for   protecting   and
preserving   her   rights   in   the
properties of the said conjugal
partnership,   in   contemplation
of the divorce suit intended to
be   filed   against   her   husband,
in California.
The   conditions   of   the   contract
state   that   in   lieu   of   retainer
fee,   it   is   agreed   that   Mrs.
Harden   will   pay   Atty.   Recto
monthly, during the pendency of
the   litigation   and   until   its
termination,   25%   of   the   total
increase   in   allowance   or
pension which may be awarded by
the   court   over   and   above   the
amount   received   monthly   from
Mr.   Harden   at   the   time   of   the
agreement   out   of   the   funds   of
the   conjugal   partnership.
Provided,   that   should   the   case
be   terminated   or   an   amicable
settlement   thereof   be   arrived
at   by   the   parties   before   the
expiration   of   two   years   from
the   date   of   the   filing   of   the
complaint, Recto shall still be
paid the said 25% up to the end
of   said   period.   These   monthly
payments   shall   be   in   addition
to   whatever   amount   may   be
adjudged   by   the   court   against
the   Mr.   Harden   or   against   the
conjugal   partnership   by   way   of
litis expenses (attorney's fees
chargeable   as   expenses   of
litigation).
In   addition,   as   full   and
complete   satisfaction   of   the
fees of Atty Recto, it has been
agreed   that   the   latter   be   paid
20%   of   the   value   of   the   share
and   participation   which   may   be
received   in   the   funds   and
properties   of   the   conjugal
partnership   as   a   result   of   the
liquidation.
As   agreed,   Atty.   Recto   then
filed   the   case   for   support   in
the   CFI   of   Manila   which
authorized   the   issuance   a   writ
of   preliminary   injunction
restraining the defendants from
disposing   of   the   assets   of   the
conjugal   partnership   in   fraud
of Mrs. Harden.
Subsequently,   the   Philippines
was invaded by the Japanese and
placed   under   military
occupation.   Then   came   the
liberation,   in   the   course   of
which   the   records   of   this   case
were   destroyed.   Said   records
were   reconstituted,   the
proceedings   were   resumed   and,
in due course, the CFI declared
the   writ   of   preliminary
injunction permanent.
The   defendants   appealed.
However,   while   the   appeal   was
pending   Mrs.   Harden   decided   to
discontinue   all   proceedings   of
the   case   and   to,   "vacate   all
orders   and   judgments   rendered
therein,   and   abandon   and
nullify   all   her   claims   to   the
conjugal   partnership   existing
between her and Mr. Harden", in
accordance   with   several
instruments   executed   without
the   knowledge,   advise   and
consent   of   Atty.   Recto,   as
counsel   for   Mrs.   Harden,
wherein   Mr.   and   Mrs.   Harden
agreed   to   settle.   Now,   Atty.
Recto   is   demanding   for   the
amounts   promised   him   as   his
attorney’s   fees.   He   is   now
claiming   from   the   property
under   receivership   that
belonged   to   Mrs.   Harden’s
husband, Fred.
Counsel   for   the   defendants­
appellants   moved   for   the
dismissal   of   the   case.   The
Court   issued   a   resolution
remanding the case to the court
of   origin   to   determine   the
amount   of   fees   claimed   by
Attorney   Claro   M.   Recto.   It   is
understood   that,   after   said
fees   had   been   finally
determined   and   paid,   this   case
will be completely dismissed as
prayed   for   by   the   defendants­
appellants,   without   prejudice
to considering the claim of the
receiver   for   compensation,
which   receivership   if   ordered
maintained.
The   lower   court   designated   a
commissioner   to   receive
evidence   on   the   amount   of   the
fees   collectible   by   appellee.
Said   commissioner   submitted   a
report   with   the   following
conclusion and recommendation:
"Taking   into   consideration   the
value   of   the   properties
involved   in   this   litigation,
the   length   of   time   in   which
claimant   had   handled   the   same
for   Esperanza   Harden,   the
volume   and   quality   of   the   work
performed,   the   complicated
legal   questions   involved,   the
responsibility   assumed   by   the
claimant   as   counsel,   his
reputation   in   the   bar,   the
difficulties encountered by him
while   handling   the   same   in
which he had to work hard every
inch of the way because of the
stiff   oppositions   filed   by
adverse   counsel,   the   diligence
he   employed   not   only   in   the
preservation   of   the   records   in
his   possession   during   the   days
of   enemy   occupation   but   also
in   the   protection   of   the
interests   of   Esperanza   Harden,
his successful handling of said
case   and   those   cases   growing
out   of   it   which   reached   the
Supreme   Court,   and   the   extra
services   he   rendered   in   her
behalf   in   the   tax   and   other
court   cases,   the   undersigned
Commissioner   concludes   that
claimant   is   entitled   to   the
full amount of 20% of Esperanza
Harden's   share   of   the   conjugal
properties,   as   provided   in
paragraph   3   of   the   Contract   of
Professional   Services.”   He
further   recommends   that   Atty.
Claro   M.   Recto   be   paid   the
equivalent   amount   of   20%   of
Esperanza   P.   de   Harden's   share
of   the   conjugal   properties   or
the sum of P369, 410.04 as his
contingent   fee   for   services
rendered in her behalf."
The   lower   court   rendered   a
decision   adopting   substantially
the   commisioner’s   report   but
increasing   the   contingent   fee
from   P369,   410.04,   the   sum
recommended   in   the   report,   to
P384,110.97.   Mr.   and   Mrs.
Harden appealed this decision.
ISSUE:
Is   the   contract   of   services
entered   into   between   Mrs.
Harden   and   the   appellee,   Atty.
Recto, valid?
Mr.   and   Mrs.   Harden   assails
that   said   Contract   of
Professional   Services   is   void,
mainly, upon the grounds:
(1)   that   Mrs.   Harden   cannot
bind   the   conjugal   partnership
without her husband's consent;
(2)   that   Article   1491   of   the
Civil   Code   of   the   Philippines
in   effect   prohibits   contingent
fees;
(3)   that   the   contract   in
question has for its purpose to
secure   a   decree   of   divorce,
allegedly   in   violation   of
Articles 1305, 1352 and 1409 of
the   Civil   Code   of   the
Philippines; and
(4)   that   the   terms   of   said
contract are harsh, inequitable
and oppressive.
RULING:
1.  The   first   objection   has   no
foundation   in   fact,   for   the
contract   in   dispute   does   not
seek   to   bind   the   conjugal
partnership.   By   virtue   of   said
contract,   Mrs.   Harden   merely
bound herself or   assumed
the personal obligation   to   pay,
by way of contingent fees, 20 %
of   her   share   in   said
partnership.   The   contract
neither   gives,   nor   purports   to
give, to the appellee any right
whatsoever,   personal   or   real,
in   and   to   her   aforesaid   share.
The   amount   thereof   is   simply
a basis for   the computation of
said fees.
2.  The   second   objection   is,
likewise,   untenable.   Moreover,
it   has   already   been   held   that
contingent   fees   are   not
prohibited   in   the   Philippines
and are impliedly sanctioned by
our   Cannons   (No.   13)   of
Professional   Ethics.   Such   is,
likewise,   the   rule   in   the
United States where, “the great
weight   of   authority   recognizes
the   validity   of   contracts   for
contingent   fees,   provided   such
contracts   are   not   in
contravention of public policy,
and   it   is   only   when   the
attorney has taken an unfair or
unreasonable   advantage   of   his
client   that   such   a   claim   is
condemned."  hands,   and   appellants   have   not
There   is   absolutely   nothing   in
the   records   to   show   that
appellee   herein   had,   in   any
manner,   taken   an   unfair   or
unreasonable   advantage   of   his
client Mrs. Harden.
3.  The   third   objection   is   not
borne   out,   either   by   the
language   of   the   contract
between   them,   or   by   the   intent
of   the   parties   thereto.  Its
purpose   was   not   to   secure   a
divorce,   or   to   facilitate   or
promote   the   procurement   of   a
divorce.   It   merely   sought   to
protect   the   interest   of   Mrs.
Harden   in   the   conjugal
partnership,   during   the
pendency   of   a   divorce   suit   she
intended   to   file   in   the   United
States.  What   is   more,   inasmuch
as   Mr.   and   Mrs.   Harden   are
admittedly   citizens   of   the
United States, their status and
the   dissolution   thereof   are
governed   pursuant   to   Article   9
of   the   Civil   Code   of   Spain
(which   was   in   force   in   the
Philippines   at   the   time   of   the
execution   of   the   contract   in
question) and Article 15 of the
Civil   Code   of   the   Philippines
by   the   laws   of   the   United
States, which sanction divorce.
The   contract   of   services,
between   Mrs.   Harden   and   herein
appellee,   is   not   contrary   to
law,   morals,   good   customs,
public order or public policy.
4.  The   last   objection   is   based
upon principles of equity, but,
pursuant thereto,  one who seeks
equity   must   come   with   clean
done   so,   for   the   circumstances
surrounding   the   case   show,   to
our   satisfaction,   that   their
aforementioned   agreements,
ostensibly   for   the   settlement
of   the   differences   between
husband and wife, were made for
the purpose of circumventing or
defeating   the   rights   of   herein
appellee.
[Having   secured   a   judgment   in
her   favor,   acknowledging   her
rights   to   the   assets   of   the
conjugal   partnership,   which
turned   out   to   be   worth   almost
P4,000,000 in addition to litis
expensae in   the   sum   of
P175,000,   it   is   inconceivable
that   Mrs.   Harden   would   have
waived   such   rights,   as   well   as
the   benefits   of   all   orders   and
judgments   in   her   favor,   in
consideration of the paltry sum
of $5,000 allegedly paid to her
by   Mr.   Harden   and   the
additional sum of $20,000 to be
paid by him in installments, at
the   rate   of   $500   a   month.   –
(This was based on the supposed
settlement   agreement   between
Mr. and Mrs. Harden)]
In   fact,   no   explanation   has
been   given   for   this   most
unusual   avowed   settlement
between   Mr.   and   Mrs.   Harden.
One   cannot   even   consider   the
possibility   of   reconciliation
between   the   spouses,   the   same
being   inconsistent   with   the
monetary consideration for said
alleged   settlement.   What   is
more, the records show that the
relations   between   said   spouses
which were bad indeed, not only
at the time Mrs. Harden engaged
the services of the appellee in
1941, but, even before, for Mr.
and   Mrs.   Harden   were   separated
since   1938   had   worsened
considerably   thereafter,   as
evidence   by   an   action   for
divorce   filed   by   Mr.   Harden   in
New   Jersey,   in   July   1948,   upon
the   ground   of   repeated   acts   of
infidelity   allegedly   committed
by   Mrs.   Harden   in   1940   and
1941.
Then   too,   the   conjugal
partnership   had   varied   and
extensive   business   interests
and   its   assets   were   worth
almost   P4,000,000.   The
pleadings,   motions,
oppositions,   rejoinders,   and
memoranda   filed,   and   the
evidence   introduced,   in   the
aforementioned   cases   in   which
appellee was pitted against one
of   the   most   experienced   and
able   members   of   the   Philippine
Bar   were   numerous,   extensive
and exhaustive.  Appellants, further contend:
Considering   the   character   of
the   services   rendered   by   the
appellee,   the   nature   and
importance   of   the   issues   in
said litigations, the amount of
labor,   time   (1941   to   1952)   and
trouble   involved   therein,   the
skill   displayed   in   connection
with   said   cases,   the   value   of
the   property   affected   by   the
controversy,   the   professional
character   and   standing   of   the
appellee, the risks assumed and
the results obtained, we are of
the   opinion,   and   so   hold,   that
the   contract   of   services   in
question   is   neither   harsh   nor
oppressive or inequitable.
Further:
“The   appellants   maintain   in
their   2nd  assignment   of   error
that   the   legal   services   have
already   been   paid   by   his
immediate   execution   pending
appeal   in   the   civil   case
wherein he collected the sum of
P175,000.00   for   all   such   legal
services.”
Said   decision,   however,   states
clearly   that   the   sum   of
P175,000   represents litis
expensae,   and   the   contract
between   the   appellee   and   Mrs.
Harden explicitly declares that
said litis   expensae shall
be "in   addition   to" appellee's
share of 25% of the increase in
the   allowance   of   Mrs.   Harden
and   his   attorney's   fees   of   20%
of   her   share   in   the   conjugal
partnership.   The   second
assignment   of   error   is,
therefore, devoid of merit.
“The   contract   of   services   in
question   provides   that
appellee's   contingent   fees
shall   be   20%   of   the   share   of
Mrs.   Harden   in   the   conjugal
partnership.   Pursuant   to   law,
the   share   of   Mrs.   Harden   shall
be   determined   upon   the
liquidation   of   said
partnership,   which   has   not
taken   place,   as   yet.   What   is
more,   it   cannot   be   effected
until   the   dissolution   of   the
marriage   relation   between   Mr.
and   Mrs.   Harden.   Inasmuch   as
this   relation   subsists,   it
follows   that   the   amount   of
attorney's fees due to appellee
herein   should   not   have   been
determined   in   the   decision
appealed from.”
This line of argument overlooks
the   fact   that   said   contract   of
services was made, principally,
in   contemplation   of   a   suit   for
divorce that, according to Mrs.
Harden,   she   intended   to   file
before   a   competent   court   in
California,   "and   of   the
liquidation   of   the   conjugal
partnership   between"   her   and
Mr.   Harden.   Had   she   filed   said
action   for   divorce   and   secured
a   decree   of   divorce,   said
conjugal partnership would have
been   dissolved   and   then
liquidated,   and   the   share   of
Mrs.   Harden   therein   would   have
been   fixed.   However,   this
cannot   take   place,   either   now,
or   in   the   foreseeable   future,
owing to the agreements between
Mr. and Mrs. Harden, which were
made for the evident purpose of
defeating   appellee's   claim   for
attorney's fees.
In other words, the occurrence,
within the time contemplated by
the parties bearing in mind the
nature   of,   and   the
circumstances   under   which   they
entered   into,   said   contract   of
services   of   the   event   upon
which   the   amount   of   said   fees
depended,   was   rendered
impossible   by   Mrs.   Harden.
Hence,  whether   such   event   be
regarded as a condition or as a
period, she may not insist upon
its   occurrence,   prior   to   the
enforcement   of   the   rights   of
the   herein   appellee,   for   "the
condition   shall   be   deemed
fulfilled   when   the   obligor
voluntarily   prevents   its
fulfillment"   (Art.   1186,   Civil
Code)   and   "the   debtor   shall
lose every right to make use of
the   period"   when   he   "violates
any   undertaking,   in
consideration   of   which   the
creditor agreed to the period."
(Art. 1198, Civil Code.)
[It should be noted, also, that
the   compensation   agreed   upon
for   appellee's   services,
consists   of three (3)   parts,
namely: (a) 25% of the increase
in   the,allowance   of   Mrs.
Harden; (b) litis expensae; and
(c)   20%   of   her   share   in   the
conjugal partnership. The first
part   was   dealt   with   in   the
first   paragraph   of   their
contract   of   services.   The
second and third parts were the
object   of   the   second   and   third
paragraphs,   respectively,
The first paragraph   limited   the
rights   of   appellee   thereunder
to two (2) years, in the event
of   termination   of   the   case   or
amicable   settlement   thereof
within   two   (2)   years   from   the
filing   of   the   complaint.   No
such   limitation   appears   in   the
second   and   third   paragraphs   of
said   contract.   Hence,   the   same
were intended by the parties to
be   fully   operative   under   any
and all conditions.]
Conclusion:
It   appears   that   the   assets   of
the   conjugal   partnership
between Mr. and Mrs. Harden are
reasonably   valued   at
3,841,109.70;   1/2   thereof,
representing   the   share   of   Mrs.
Harden,   is   therefore,   worth
P1,920,554.85:   20%   of   this   is
P384,110.97,   which   is   the
contingent   fee   due   to   the
appellee,   apart   from   the litis
expensae already   paid   to   him.
Inasmuch   as   the   appellee   has
collected,   also,   the   sum   of
P80,000.00,   on   account   of   said
contingent   fees,   there   results
in   his   favor   a   balance   of
P304,110.97.
Subject   to   this   qualification,
the   decision   appealed   from   is
hereby   affirmed,   therefore,
with   costs   against   the
appellants. So ordered.
16. PIONEER   CONCRETE   PHILS,   ET
AL. v. TODARO  (PIL),   an   Australian   company
(of   forum   non   conveniens,   left
his job only to be betrayed)
Doctrine: The doctrine of forum
non   conveniens   should   not   be
used   as   a   ground   for   a   motion
to dismiss because Sec. 1, Rule
16   of   the   Rules   of   Court   does
not include said doctrine as a
ground. While it is within the
discretion   of   the   trial   court
to   abstain   from   assuming
jurisdiction on this ground, it
should   do   so   only   after   vital
facts   are   established,   to
determine   whether   special
circumstances   require   the
court's   desistance;   and   that
the   propriety   of   dismissing   a
case based on this principle of
forum non conveniens requires a
factual determination, hence it
is   more   properly   considered   a
matter of defense.
FACTS: In 1998, respondent Todaro filed with the RTC
of Makati City, a complaint for Sum of Money and
Damages with Preliminary Attachment against five
petitioners:
1. Pioneer International Limited (PIL) is a
corporation duly organized and existing under
the laws of Australia and is principally engaged
in the ready-mix concrete and concrete
aggregates business.
2. Pioneer Philippines Holdings, Inc. (PPHI) is
the company established by PIL to own and
hold the stocks of its operating company in the
Philippines.
3. Pioneer Concrete Philippines, Inc. (PCPI) is
the company established by PIL to undertake its
business of ready-mix concrete, concrete
aggregates and quarrying operations in the
Philippines.
4. McDonald, the Chief Executive of the
Hongkong office of PIL
5. Klepzig, the President and Managing Director
of PPHI and PCPI.
Pioneer International Limited
engaged   in   the   ready­mix
concrete   business,   established
herein   petitioner   PCPI   to
undertake   its   business   in   the
Philippines.   Todaro   has   been
the managing director Betonval,
a   company   engaged   in   pre­mixed
concrete and concrete aggregate
production.   He   resigned   in
1996.   PIL   contacted   respondent
Todaro   and   asked   if   the   latter
is   available   to   join   them   in
their   intention   to   establish
plant operations in the country
to   which   the   latter   agreed.
Subsequently,   PIL   and   Todaro
came   to   an   agreement   wherein
the   former   consented   to   engage
the   services   of   the   latter   as
consultant   for   2­3   months,
after   which   he   would   be
employed as manager of concrete
operations should PIL decide to
invest   in   the   Philippines.   PIL
started   its   operation   however
it   refused   to   comply   with   its
undertaking to employ Todaro on
a   permanent   basis.   Respondent
thus   filed   a   complaint   for   sum
of   money   and   damages   against
petitioner.  conveniens   should   not   be
PPHI,   PCPI   and   Klepzig
separately moved to dismiss the
complaint   on   the   basis,   among
others,   of   the   doctrine   of
forum   non   conveniens.
Petitioners   contend   that   since
the   majority   of   the   defendants
in   the   present   case   are   not
residents   of   the   Philippines,
they   are   not   subject   to
compulsory   processes   of   the
Philippine   court   handling   the
case   for   purposes   of   requiring
their   attendance   during   trial.
Even   assuming   that   they   can   be
summoned,   their   appearance
would entail excessive costs.
Respondent,   on   the   other
hand,   avers   that   the   question
of   whether   a   suit   should   be
entertained or dismissed on the
basis of the principle of forum
non   conveniens  depends   largely
upon   the   facts   of   the
particular   case   and   is
addressed   to   the   sound
discretion   of   the   trial   judge,
who is in the best position to
determine   whether   special
circumstances   require   that   the
court   desist   from   assuming
jurisdiction over the suit. 
Both RTC and CA ruled against
the motion to dismiss.  relationship   between   PIL
ISSUE:   Whether   or   not   the   case
should   be   dismissed   based   on
the ground of doctrine of forum
non conveniens?
RULING:
(1) The doctrine of forum non
used   as   a   ground   for   a
motion   to   dismiss   because
Sec.   1,   Rule   16   of   the
Rules   of   Court   does   not
include said doctrine as a
ground.
While it is within the discretion of the trial court to
abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it
should do so only after vital facts are established, to
determine whether special circumstances require the
court's desistance; and that the propriety of dismissing a
case based on this principle of forum non conveniens
requires a factual determination, hence it is more
properly considered a matter of defense. In the present
case, the factual circumstances cited by petitioners
which would allegedly justify the application of the
doctrine of forum non conveniens are matters of
defense, the merits of which should properly be
threshed out during trial.
The doctrine of forum non conveniens, literally
meaning 'the forum is inconvenient', emerged in private
international law to deter the practice of global forum
shopping, that is to prevent non-resident litigants from
choosing the forum or place wherein to bring their suit
for malicious reasons, such as to secure procedural
advantages, to annoy and harass the defendant, to avoid
overcrowded dockets, or to select a more friendly venue.
Under this doctrine, a court, in conflicts of law cases,
may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not
the most "convenient" or available forum and the parties
are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere.
The issue is a matter which is not ripe for
determination in the present case; rather, this issue must
be taken up during trial, considering that its
resolution would necessarily entail an examination of
the veracity of the allegations not only of herein
respondent as plaintiff but also of petitioners as
defendants.
(2) Whether   or   not   there   is
employer­employee
and respondent.
In the present case, no employer-employee
relationship exists between petitioners and respondent.
In fact, in his complaint, private respondent is not
seeking any relief under the Labor Code, but seeks
payment of damages on account of petitioners' alleged
breach of their obligation under their agreement to
employ him. It is settled that an action for breach of
contractual obligation is intrinsically a civil dispute. In
the alternative, respondent seeks redress on the basis of
the provisions of Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.
Hence, it is clear that the present action is within the
realm of civil law, and jurisdiction over it belongs to the
regular courts.
Petition   is   DENIED   and   the
assailed Decision of the CA are
AFFIRMED
17. NAVIDA, ET AL. V. JUDGE DIZON, JR.,
SHELL OIL CO., ET AL.
Doctrine: The plaintiffs, material witness and alleged
cause of action also took place in the Philippines. The
Philippine court was the convenient forum.
FACTS:
Beginning 1993, a number of personal injury suits were
filed in different Texas state courts by citizens of twelve
foreign countries, including the Philippines. The
thousands of plaintiffs sought damages for injuries they
allegedly sustained from their exposure to
dibromochloropropane (DBCP), a chemical used to kill
worms, while working on farms in 23 foreign countries.
The cases were eventually transferred to, and
consolidated in, the Federal District Court for the
Southern District of Texas, Houston Division.
The defendants in the consolidated cases prayed for the
dismissal of all the actions under the doctrine of forum
non conveniens.
In a Memorandum and Order dated July 11, 1995, the
Federal District Court conditionally granted the
defendants' motion to dismiss. In the event that the
highest court of any foreign country finally affirms the
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of an action
commenced by a plaintiff in these actions in his home
country or the country in which he was injured, that
plaintiff may return to this court and, upon proper
motion, the court will resume jurisdiction over the action
as if the case had never been dismissed for forum non
conveniens.
In accordance with the above Memorandum and Order, a
total of 336 plaintiffs from General Santos City filed a
Joint Complaint in the RTC of General Santos City.
NAVIDA, et al., prayed for the payment of damages in
view of the illnesses and injuries to the reproductive
systems which they allegedly suffered because of their
exposure to DBCP.
They claimed, among others, that they were exposed to
this chemical during the early 1970's up to the early
1980's when they used the same in the banana
plantations where they worked at; and/or when they
resided within the agricultural area where such chemical
was used. NAVIDA, et al., claimed that their illnesses
and injuries were due to the fault or negligence of each
of the defendant companies in that they produced, sold
and/or otherwise put into the stream of commerce
DBCP-containing products. According to NAVIDA, et
al., they were allowed to be exposed to the said
products, which the defendant companies knew, or ought
to have known, were highly injurious to the former's
health and well-being.
The RTC of General Santos City issued an Order
dismissing the complaint. It ruled that the substance of
the cause of action as stated in the complaint against the
defendant foreign companies cites activity on their part
which took place abroad and had occurred outside and
beyond the territorial domain of the Philippines.
Second, the RTC of General Santos City declared that
the tort alleged in their complaint is a tort category that
is not recognized in Philippine laws. Averments describe
and identify the category of specific tort known as
product liability tort.
.
The lower court also opined that the decision of the U.S.
District Court dismissing the case is not yet final and
executory since both the plaintiffs and defendants
appealed. Consequently, since the authority of the agent
of the defendants in the Philippines is conditioned on the
final adjudication of the case pending with the U.S.
courts, the acquisition of jurisdiction by the court over
the persons of the defendants is also conditional.
NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., argue that the
allegedly tortious acts and/or omissions of defendant
companies occurred within Philippine territory.
Specifically, the use of and exposure to DBCP that was
manufactured, distributed or otherwise put into the
stream of commerce by defendant companies happened
in the Philippines. Said fact allegedly constitutes
reasonable basis for our courts to assume jurisdiction
over the case.
DOLE similarly maintains that the acts attributed to
defendant companies constitute a quasi-delict, which
falls under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. DOLE posits
that the Philippines is the situs of the tortious acts
allegedly committed by defendant companies as
NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., point to their
alleged exposure to DBCP which occurred in the
Philippines, as the cause of the sterility and other
reproductive system problems that they allegedly
suffered.
ISSUE: Whether the Philippine court was the
convenient forum to decide the dispute?
RULING: Yes. The allegations in the complaints
constitute the cause of action of plaintiff claimants — a
quasi-delict, which under the Civil Code is defined as an
act, or omission which causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides: “Whoever by
act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter”
What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the
nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the
allegations in the complaint. The averments therein and
the character of the relief sought are the ones to be
consulted.
In   this   case,  the   injuries   and
illnesses   they   allegedly
suffered   resulted   from   their
exposure   to   DBCP   while   they
were   employed   in   the   banana
plantations   located   in   the
Philippines  or   while   they   were
residing   within   the
agricultural areas also located
in the Philippines. The factual
allegations   in   the   Amended
Joint­Complaints   all   point   to
their   cause   of   action,   which
undeniably  occurred   in   the
Philippines.  The RTC of General
Santos   City   and   the   RTC   of
Davao   City   obviously   have
reasonable   basis   to   assume
jurisdiction over the cases.
It is, therefore, error on the part of the courts a quo when
they dismissed the cases on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction on the mistaken assumption that the cause of
action took place abroad and had occurred outside and
beyond the territorial boundaries of the Philippines,.
Certainly, the cases below are not criminal cases where
territoriality, or the situs of the act complained of, would
be determinative of jurisdiction and venue for trial of
cases. In personal civil actions, such as claims for
payment of damages, the Rules of Court allow the action
to be commenced and tried in the appropriate court,
where any of the plaintiffs or defendants resides, or in
the case of a non-resident defendant, where he may be
found, at the election of the plaintiff.
In a very real sense, most of the evidence required to
prove the claims are available only in the Philippines.
1. Plaintiff claimants are all residents of the
Philippines, either in General Santos City or in
Davao City.
2. The specific areas where they were allegedly
exposed to the chemical DBCP are within the
territorial jurisdiction of the courts a quo
wherein NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al.,
initially filed their claims for damages.
3. The testimonial and documentary evidence
from important witnesses, such as doctors, co-
workers, family members and other members of
the community, would be easier to gather in the
Philippines.
4. Considering the great number of plaintiff
claimants involved in this case, it is not far-
fetched to assume that voluminous records are
involved in the presentation of evidence to
support the claim of plaintiff claimants.
Thus, these additional factors, coupled with the fact that
the alleged cause of action against the defendant
companies for damages occurred in the Philippines,
demonstrate that, apart from the RTC of General Santos
City and the RTC of Davao City having jurisdiction over
the subject matter in the instant civil cases, they are,
indeed, the convenient fora for trying these cases.
This is in consonance with the lex loci delicti commisi
theory in determining the situs of a tort, which states that
the law of the place where the alleged wrong was
committed will govern the action.
Court GRANTS the petitions for review on certiorari
and REMAND the records of this case to the respective
Regional Trial Courts of origin for further and
appropriate proceedings in line with the ruling that said
courts have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
amended complaints.
The   Court   likewise  GRANTS  the
motion   filed   by   Del   Monte   to
withdraw   its   petition   in   G.R.
No.   127856.   In   view   of   the
previous grant of the motion to
withdraw   the   petition   in   G.R.
No.   125598,   both   G.R.   Nos.
127856   and   125598   are
considered  CLOSED   AND
TERMINATED.
18. KAZUHIRO HASEGAWA & NIPPON
ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS CO., V. MINORU
KITAMURA
Doctrine: Where the only issue in the case is that of
jurisdiction, choice-of-law rules are not only
inapplicable but also not yet called for; Before
determining which law should apply, first there should
exist a conflict of laws situation requiring the
application of the conflict of laws rules.
FACTS:
Nippon Engineering Consultants, a Japanese consultancy
firm providing technical and management support in the
infrastructure projects of foreign governments, entered
into an Independent Contractor Agreement (ICA)
with respondent Minoru Kitamura, a Japanese national
permanently residing in the Philippines.
The agreement provides that respondent was to extend
professional services to Nippon for a year starting
April 1, 1999. Nippon then assigned respondent to work
as the project manager of the Southern Tagalog Access
Road (STAR) Project in the Philippines, following the
company's consultancy contract with the Philippine
Government.
When the STAR Project was near completion, the
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)
engaged the consultancy services of Nippon, this time
for the detailed engineering and construction supervision
of the Bongabon-Baler Road Improvement (BBRI)
Project. MINORU KITAMURA was named as the
project manager in the contract’s aappendix.
Kazuhiro Hasegawa, Nippon's general manager for its
International Division, informed respondent that the
company had no more intention of automatically
renewing his ICA. His services would be engaged by
the company only up to the substantial completion of
the STAR Project on March 31, 2000, just in time for
the ICA's expiry.
Threatened with impending unemployment, respondent,
through his lawyer, requested a negotiation conference
and demanded that he be assigned to the BBRI project.
Nippon insisted that respondent's contract was for a
fixed term that had already expired and refused to
negotiate for the renewal of the ICA.
As he was not able to generate a positive response from
the petitioners, respondent consequently initiated a case
for specific performance and damages with the RTC
of Lipa City.
Nippon moved to dismiss arguing that the ICA had
been perfected in Japan and executed by and between
Japanese nationals. They asserted that the claim for
improper pre-termination of respondent's ICA could
only be heard and ventilated in the proper courts of
Japan following the principles of lex loci celebrationis
and lex contractus.
In the meantime, the DPWH approved Nippon's request
for the replacement of Kitamura by a certain Y. Kotake
as project manager of the BBRI Project.
The   RTC   denied   the   motion   to
dismiss   on   the   premise   that
matters   connected   with   the
performance   of   contracts   are
regulated by the law prevailing
at the place of performance.
The CA ruled, among others, that the principle of lex
loci celebrationis was not applicable to the case, because
nowhere in the pleadings was the validity of the written
agreement put in issue. The CA thus declared that the
trial court was correct in applying instead the principle
of lex loci solutionis.
Asserting that the RTC of Lipa City is an inconvenient
forum, petitioners question its jurisdiction to hear and
resolve the civil case for specific performance and
damages filed by the respondent. The ICA subject of the
litigation was entered into and perfected in Tokyo, Japan,
by Japanese nationals, and written wholly in the
Japanese language. Thus, petitioners posit that local
courts have no substantial relationship to the parties
following the state of the most significant relationship
rule in Private International Law.
ISSUE: Whether the subject matter jurisdiction of
Philippine courts in civil cases for specific performance
and damages involving contracts executed outside the
country by foreign nationals may be assailed on the
principles of lex loci celebrationis, lex contractus, the
"state of the most significant relationship rule," or forum
non conveniens?
RULING: The power to exercise jurisdiction does not
automatically give a state constitutional authority to
apply forum law. While jurisdiction and the choice of
the lex fori will often coincide, the "minimum
contacts" for one do not always provide the necessary
"significant contacts" for the other. The question of
whether the law of a state can be applied to a transaction
is different from the question of whether the courts of
that state have jurisdiction to enter a judgment.
There are three consecutive phases involved in judicial
resolution of conflicts-of-laws problems, namely:
 (1) jurisdiction
(2) choice of law, and
(3) recognition and enforcement of judgments.
In this case, only the first phase is at issue —
jurisdiction. Jurisdiction, however, has various aspects.
For a court to validly exercise its power to adjudicate a
controversy, it must have jurisdiction over the plaintiff or
the petitioner, over the defendant or the respondent, over
the subject matter, over the issues of the case and, in
cases involving property, over the res or the thing which
is the subject of the litigation. In assailing the trial court's
jurisdiction herein, petitioners are actually referring to
subject matter jurisdiction.
In the instant case, petitioners, in their motion to
dismiss, do not claim that the trial court is not
properly vested by law with jurisdiction to hear the
subject controversy for, case for specific performance
and damages is one not capable of pecuniary estimation
and is properly cognizable by the RTC of Lipa City.
What they rather raise as grounds to question subject
matter jurisdiction are the principles of lex loci
celebrationis and lex contractus, and the "state of the
most significant relationship rule."
The Court finds the invocation of these grounds
unsound. DCASIT Lex loci celebrationis relates to the
"law of the place of the ceremony" or the law of the
place where a contract is made.
The doctrine of lex contractus or lex loci contractus
means the " law of the place where a contract is
executed or to be performed." It controls the nature,
construction, and validity of the contract and it may
pertain to the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties
or the law intended by them either expressly or
implicitly.
Under the "state of the most significant relationship
rule," to ascertain what state law to apply to a dispute,
the court should determine which state has the most
substantial connection to the occurrence and the
parties. In a case involving a contract, the court should
consider where the contract was made, was negotiated,
was to be performed, and the domicile, place of
business, or place of incorporation of the parties. This
rule takes into account several contacts and evaluates
them according to their relative importance with respect
to the particular issue to be resolved.
Since these three principles in conflict of laws make
reference to the law applicable to a dispute, they are
rules proper for the second phase, the choice of law.
They determine which state's law is to be applied in
resolving the substantive issues of a conflicts problem.
Necessarily, as the only issue in this case is that of
jurisdiction, choice-of-law rules are not only
inapplicable but also not yet called for.
Further, petitioners' premature invocation of choice-of-
law rules is exposed by the fact that they have not yet
pointed out any conflict between the laws of Japan and
ours. Before determining which law should apply,
first there should exist a conflict of laws situation
requiring the application of the conflict of laws rules.
Also, when the law of a foreign country is invoked to
provide the proper rules for the solution of a case, the
existence of such law must be pleaded and proved.
It should be noted that when a conflicts case, one
involving a foreign element, is brought before a court or
administrative agency, there are three alternatives open
to the latter in disposing of it:
(1) dismiss the case, either because of lack of
jurisdiction or refusal to assume jurisdiction
over the case;
(2) assume jurisdiction over the case and apply
the internal law of the forum; or
(3) assume jurisdiction over the case and take
into account or apply the law of some other
State or States. The court's power to hear cases
and controversies is derived from the
Constitution and the laws. While it may choose
to recognize laws of foreign nations, the court is
not limited by foreign sovereign law short of
treaties or other formal agreements, even in
matters regarding rights provided by foreign
sovereigns.
Neither can the other ground raised, forum non
conveniens, be used to deprive the trial court of its
jurisdiction herein. FIRST, it is not a proper basis for a
motion to dismiss because Section 1, Rule 16 of the
Rules of Court does not include it as a ground.
SECOND, whether a suit should be entertained or
dismissed on the basis of the said doctrine depends
largely upon the facts of the particular case and is
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. In
this case, the RTC decided to assume jurisdiction.
THIRD, the propriety of dismissing a case based on this
principle requires factual determination. Hence, this
conflicts principle is more properly considered a
matter of defense .
The   RTC   is   vested   by   law   with
the power to entertain and hear
the   civil   case.   Petition   for
review on certiorari is DENIED
19.  Manufacturers Hanover Trust
Co.   and/or   Chemical   Bank   v.
Rafael Guerrero
(Walden Affidavit/New York Law)
Doctrine:  Foreign   law   and
jurisprudence   are   not   a   matter
of   judicial   notice.   They   must
be duly alleged and proven.
Facts:  On   May   17,   1994,
respondent   Rafael   Guerrero
filed   a   complaint   for   damages
against   petitioner
Manufacturers   Hanover   Trust   Co
and/or   Chemical   Bank   with   the
RTC   of   Manila.   Guerrero   sought
payment   of   damages   allegedly
for   (1)   illegally   withheld
taxes charged against interests
on   his   checking   account   with
the   Bank;   (2)   a   returned   check
worth   $18,000   due   to   signature
verification   problems;   and   (3)
unauthorized   conversion   of   his
account.
On   September   1,   1995,   the   Bank
filed   its   answer   alleging   that
by   stipulation   Guerrero’s
account is governed by New York
law   and   this   law   does   not
permit any of Guerrero’s claims
except   actual   damages.
Subsequently,   the   Bank   filed   a
Motion   for   Partial   Summary
Judgment   seeking   the   dismissal
of   Guerrero’s   claims   for
consequential,   nominal,
temperate,   moral   and   exemplary
damages   as   well   as   attorney’s
fees on the same ground alleged
in   its   answer.   The   Bank
contended that the trial should
be   limited   to   the   issue   of
actual   damages.   Guerrero
opposed the motion.
The affidavit of Alyssa Walden,
a   NY   attorney,   supported   the
Bank’s   Motion   for   Partial
Summary Judgment. Her affidavit
stated   that   Guerrero’s   NY   bank
account   stipulated   that   the
governing   law   is   NY   law   and
that   this   law   bars   all   of
Guerrero’s claims except actual
damages.   The   Philippine
Consular   Office   in   NY
authenticated the affidavit.
RTC   denied   the   Bank’s   Motion
for   Partial   Summary   Judgment
and   its   motion   for
reconsideration   on   March   6,
1996,   and   July   17,   1996,
respectively.   The   Bank   filed   a
petition   for   certiorari   and
prohibition   with   the   CA
assailing   the   RTC   orders.   In
its   decision   dated   August   24,
1998,   the   CA   dismissed   the
petition. On December 14, 1998,
the CA denied the Bank’s motion
for reconsideration.
The CA sustained the RTC orders
denying   the   motion.   The   CA
ruled that the Walden affidavit
does not serve as proof of the
New   York   law   and   jurisprudence
relied   on   by   the   Bank   to
support   its   motion.   The   CA
considered the New York law and
jurisprudence   as   public
documents   defined   in   Section
19,   Rule   132   of   the   Rules   on
Evidence.   The   CA   opined   that
Section   24,   Rule   132   should   be
followed   in   proving   foreign
law.
The   CA   likewise   rejected   the
Bank’s argument that Rule 34 of
the old Rules of Court (Rule 35
in the new ROC) allows the Bank
to   move   with   the   supporting
Walden   affidavit   for   partial
summary   judgment   in   its   favor.
The   CA   clarified   that   the
Walden   affidavit   is   not   the
supporting   affidavit   referred
to in Rule 34 that would prove
the   lack   of   genuine   issue
between   the   parties.   The   CA
concluded   that   even   if   the
Walden   affidavit   is   used   for
purposes   of   summary   judgment,
the Bank must still comply with
the   procedure   by   the   Rules   to
prove foreign law.  the   Bank   contains   specific
Issue:  Whether   or   not   the
Walden   Affidavit   may   serve   as
substantial   proof   of   New   York
Law and jurisprudence ­ NO
Ruling:  The   petition   is   devoid
of merit.
A   court   may   grant   a   summary
judgment   to   settle
expeditiously   a   case   if,   on
motion   of   either   party,   there
appears   from   the   pleadings,
depositions,   admissions,   and
affidavits   that   no   important
issues   of   fact   are   involved,
except   the   amount   of   damages.
In such event, the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.
In   a   motion   for   summary
judgment,   the   crucial   question
is:   are   the   issues   raised   in
the pleadings  genuine, sham, or
fictitious,   as   shown   by
affidavits,   depositions   or
admissions   accompanying   the
motion?
A   genuine   issue   means   an   issue
of   fact   which   calls   for   the
presentation   of   evidence   as
distinguished   from   an   issue
which   is   fictitious   or
contrived   so   as   not   to
constitute   a   genuine   issue   for
trial.
A   perusal   of   the   pleadings
would   show   that   there   are
genuine   issues   of   fact   that
necessitate   formal   trial.
Guerrero’s complaint before the
RTC   contains   a   statement   of
ultimate   facts   on   which   he
relies   for   his   claim   for
damages,   while   the   Answer   of
denials   and   affirmative
defenses.
True,   the   court   can   determine
whether   there   are   genuine
issues   in   a   case   based   merely
on   the   affidavits   or   counter­
affidavits   submitted   by   the
parties   to   the   court.   However,
as   correctly   ruled   by   the   CA,
the   Bank’s   motion   for   partial
summary   judgment   as   supported
by   the   Walden   affidavit   does
not demonstrate that Guerrero’s
claims are sham, fictitious, or
contrived.   On   the   contrary,
such   affidavit   shows   that   the
facts   and   material   allegations
as   pleaded   by   the   parties   are
disputed   and   there   are
substantial   triable   issues
necessitating formal trial.
There   can   be   no   summary
judgment   where   questions   of
fact   are   in   issue   or   where
material   allegations   of   the
pleadings   are   in   dispute.   The
resolution of whether a foreign
law allows only the recovery of
actual damages is a question of
fact as far as the trial court
is concerned since foreign laws
do   not   prove   themselves   in   our
courts.   They   are   not   a   matter
of   judicial   notice.   Like   any
other   fact,   they   must   be
alleged   and   proven.   Certainly,
the   conflicting   allegations   as
to   whether   New   York   law   or
Philippine   law   applies   to
Guerrero’s   claims   present   a
clear   dispute   on   material
allegations   which   can   only   be
resolved   by   a   trial   on   the
merits.  California as proved by the respondents’
Under   Section   24   of   Rule   132,
the   record   of   public   documents
of   a   sovereign   authority   or
tribunal   may   be   proved   by   (1)
an official publication thereof
or   (2)   a   copy   attested   by   the
officer   having   the   legal
custody   thereof.   Such   official
publication   or   copy   must   be
accompanied,   if   the   record   is
not   kept   in   the   Philippines,
with   a   certificate   that   the
attesting officer has the legal
custody   thereof.   The
certificate   may   be   issued   by
any   of   the   authorized
Philippine   embassy   or   consular
officials   stationed   in   the
foreign   country   in   which   the
record   is   kept,   and
authenticated   by   the   seal   of
his   office.   The   attestation
must   state,   in   substance,   that
the   copy   is   a   correct   copy   of
the   original,   or   a   specific
part   thereof,   as   the   case   may
be,   and   must   be   under   the
official   seal   of   the   attesting
officer.
Certain exceptions to this rule were recognized
in Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal
and in Collector of Internal Revenue v. Fisher.
The Supreme Court held in Willaemette Iron v.
Muzzal, that Section 25, Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules of Court does not exclude the
presentation of other competent evidence to
prove the existence of foreign law. In this case,
the SC considered the testimony under oath of
an attorney-at-law of San Francisco, California,
who quoted verbatim a section of the
California Civil Code, and who stated that the
same was in force at the time the obligations
were contracted. Accordingly, the Supreme
Court also held in the case of Collector of
Internal Revenue v. Fisher that the Tax Court
was correct in considering the pertinent law of
witness. In this case, the counsel for respondent
testified that he was an active member of the
California Bar, and that he is familiar with the
revenue and taxation laws of the State of
California.
The Bank, however, cannot rely on Willamette
Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal or Collector
of Internal Revenue v. Fisher to support its
cause. These cases involved attorneys
testifying in open court during the trial in the
Philippines and quoting the particular foreign
laws sought to be established. On the other
hand, the Walden affidavit was taken
abroad ex parte and the affiant never
testified in open court. The Walden affidavit
cannot be considered as proof of New York law
on damages not only because it is self-serving
but also because it does not state the specific
New York law on damages.
The Walden affidavit states conclusions from
the affiant’s personal interpretation and opinion
of the facts of the case vis a vis the alleged
laws and jurisprudence without citing any law
in particular. The citations in the Walden
affidavit of various U.S. court decisions do not
constitute proof of the official records or
decisions of the U.S. courts. While the Bank
attached copies of some of the U.S. court
decisions cited in the Walden affidavit, these
copies do not comply with Section 24 of Rule
132 on proof of official records or decisions of
foreign courts. Thus, the Bank has only
alleged, but has not proved, what New York
law and jurisprudence are on the matters at
issue.
Next, the Bank makes much of Guerrero’s
failure to submit an opposing affidavit to the
Walden affidavit. However, the pertinent
provision of Section 3, Rule 35 of the old Rules
of Court did not make the submission of an
opposing affidavit mandatory, it only states that
the adverse party MAY serve opposing
affidavits. It is only permissive, not mandatory.
Guerrero cannot be said to have admitted the
averments in the Bank’s motion for partial
summary judgment and the Walden affidavit
just because he failed to file an opposing
affidavit. Guerrero opposed the motion for
partial summary judgment, although he did not
present an opposing affidavit. Guerrero may
not have presented an opposing affidavit, as
there was no need for one, because the Walden
affidavit did not establish what the Bank
intended to prove. The Bank still had the
burden of proving New York law and
jurisprudence even if Guerrero did not present
an opposing affidavit. As the party moving for
summary judgment, the Bank has the burden of
clearly demonstrating the absence of any
genuine issue of fact and that any doubt as to
the existence of such issue is resolved against
the movant.
There being substantial triable issues between
the parties, the courts a quo correctly denied
the Bank’s motion for partial summary
judgment.
20. Catalan v. Catalan-Lee
(Letters of Administration)
Doctrine: Aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are duly proven and are valid
according to their national law.
Facts: Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized
American citizen. After allegedly obtaining a
divorce in the USA from his first wife, Felicitas
Amor, he contracted a second marriage with
petitioner herein.
When Orlando died intestate in the Philippines
on November 18, 2004, petitioner herein filed
with the RTC of Dagupan City a petition for
the issuance of letters of administration for her
appointment as administratrix of the intestate
estate of Orlando. While such case was
pending, respondent Louella Catalan-Lee, one
of the children of Orlando from the first
marriage, filed a similar petition with the RTC.
These 2 cases were subsequently consolidated.
Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the
petition filed by respondent on the ground of
litis pendentia, considering that the same estate
was already pending. Respondent alleged that
petitioner was not an interested person
qualified to file for the issuance of letters of
administration of the estate of Orlando.
Respondent also alleged that a criminal case
for bigamy was filed against petitioner before
Branch 54 of the RTC of Alaminos,
Pangasinan. Apparently, it was Felicitas Amor
that filed the complaint of bigamy, alleging that
petitioner contracted a second marriage to
Orlando despite having been married to one
Eusebio Bristol on December 12, 1959.
However, the RTC acquitted the petitioner of
bigamy, and ruled that since the deceased was a
divorced American citizen, and since that
divorce is not recognized under Philippine
jurisdiction, the marriage between him and
petitioner was not valid. Furthermore, the RTC
took note of the action for declaration of nullity
then pending action with the trial court of
Dagupan City filed by Felicitas Amor against
the deceased and petitioner. It considered the
pending action to be a prejudicial question in
determining the guilt of petitioner for the crime
of bigamy. Finally, the RTC found that
petitioner had never been married to Eusebio
Bristol in the first place.
The RTC subsequently dismissed the petition
for the issuance of letters of administration
filed by petitioner and granted that of private
respondent. Contrary to the findings in the
criminal case, the RTC held that the marriage
between petitioner and Eusebio Bristol was
valid and subsisting when she married Orlando.
Without expounding, it reasoned further that
her acquittal in the previous bigamy case was
fatal to her cause. Thus, the trial court held that
petitioner was not an interested party who may
file such petition.
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The
CA held that petitioner undertook the wrong
remedy. She should have instead filed a
petition for review rather than a petition for
certiorari, but the CA continued to decide the
case on its merits. The CA held that as to the
issue of litis pendentia, it is not applicable to
this case because a petition for letters of
administration is a special proceeding, wherein
respondent was not a party to the case filed by
petitioner, and petitioner was not a party to the
case filed by respondent. Furthermore, CA held
that the fact that the petitioner had been
charged with bigamy and was acquitted has not
been disputed by the petitioner. The deduction
of the trial court that the acquittal of the
petitioner in said case negates the validity of
her subsequent marriage with Orlando had not
been disproved by her.
Issue: Whether or not the divorce obtained by
Orlando may be recognized under Philippine
jurisdiction - YES
Ruling: It is true that owing to the nationality
principle embodied in Article 15 of the NCC,
only Philippine nationals are covered by the
policy against absolute divorces, the same
being considered contrary to our concept of
public policy and morality. However, aliens
may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they
are valid according to their national law. In
this case, the divorce in Nevada released
private respondent from the marriage from
the standards of American law, under which
divorce dissolves the marriage.
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., we held that
owing to the nationality principle embodied in
Article 15 of the NCC, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces, the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that
aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided
they are valid according to their national law.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in
Quita v. CA, that once proven that
respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen
when he obtained the divorce from
petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would
become applicable and petitioner could
“very well lose her right to inherit from
him.”
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, we recognized the
divorce obtained by the respondent in his
country, Germany. There we stated that
divorce and its legal effects may be
recognized in the Philippines insofar as
respondent is concerned in view of the
nationality principle in our civil law on the
status of persons. We held that the divorce
obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his
first wife Paula was valid and recognized in
this jurisdiction as a matter of comity.
Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first
be proven as we have enunciated in Garcia v.
Recio, to wit:
Before a foreign judgment is given
presumptive evidentiary value, the document
must first be presented and admitted in
evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven
by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best
evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself.
The decree purports to be a written act or
record of an act of an official body or tribunal
of a foreign country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on
the other hand, a writing or document may be
proven as a public or official record of a
foreign country by either (1) an official
publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by
the officer having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine Foreign Service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and
(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
As  to  the  burden  of  proving
such   divorce,   the   burden   of
proof lies with the “party who
alleges the existence of a fact
or   thing   necessary   in   the
prosecution   or   defense   of   an
action.”   In   civil   cases,
plaintiffs   have   the   burden   of
proving   the   material
allegations   in   their   answer
when   they   introduce   new
matters.   It   is   well­settled   in
our   jurisdiction   that   our
courts   cannot   take   judicial
notice   of   foreign   laws.   Like
any   other   facts,   they   must   be
alleged and proved.
It appears that the trial court
no   longer   required   petitioner
to   prove   the   validity   of
Orlando’s   divorce   under   the
laws   of   the   United   States   and
the marriage between petitioner
and   the   deceased.   Thus,   there
is   a   need   to   remand   the
proceedings   to   the   trial   court
for   further   reception   of
evidence   to   establish   the   fact
of divorce.
Should   petitioner   prove   the
validity of the divorce and the
subsequent   marriage,   she   has
the   preferential   right   to   be
issued   the   letters   of
administration over the estate.
Otherwise,   letters   of
administration may be issued to
respondent, who is undisputedly
the daughter or next of kin of
the   deceased,   in   accordance
with   Section   6   of   Rule   78   of
the Revised Rules of Court.
Thus,   it   is   imperative   for   the
trial   court   to   first   determine
the   validity   of   the   divorce   to
ascertain the rightful party to
be   issued   the   letters   of
administration   over   the   estate
of Orlando B. Catalan.
21. EDGAR SAN LUIS v FELICIDAD SAN
LUIS
(3 ang asawa ni Gov)
Doctrine: Presentation solely of the divorce
decree is insufficient and that proof of its
authenticity and due execution must be
presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule
132, a writing or document may be proven as a
public or official record of a foreign country by
either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy
thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document.
FACTS: The instant case involves the
settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San
Luis, who was the former governor of the
Province of Laguna. Felicisimo contracted
three marriages. His first marriage was with
Virginia Sulit out of which were born six
children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda,
Emilita and Manuel. Virginia predeceased
Felicisimo.
Five years later, Felicisimo married Merry Lee
Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias.
However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an
American citizen, filed a Complaint for
Divorce before the Family Court of Hawaii,
U.S.A., which issued a Decree Granting
Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody
on December 14, 1973.
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married
respondent Felicidad San Luis at Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A. He had no children with
respondent but lived with her for 18 years from
the time of their marriage up to his death.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution
of their conjugal partnership assets and the
settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December
17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of
administration before the RTC of Makati
City.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San
Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his
first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the
grounds of improper venue and failure to state
a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the
petition for letters of administration should
have been filed in the Province of Laguna
because this was Felicisimo’s place of
residence prior to his death. He further claimed
that respondent has no legal personality to file
the petition because she was only a mistress of
Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his
death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
Respondent submitted documentary evidence
showing that while Felicisimo exercised the
powers of his public office in Laguna, he
regularly went home to their house in New
Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which
they bought sometime in 1982. Further, she
presented the decree of absolute divorce to
prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry
Lee was already dissolved. Thus, she claimed
that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry
her by virtue of par 2, Article 26 of the Family
Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court
dismissed the petition for letters of
administration. It held that there was an
improper venue and respondent was without
legal capacity because her marriage with
Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio.
CA REVERSED!
ISSUES: (1) whether venue was properly laid,
and (2) whether respondent has legal capacity
to file the subject petition for letters of
administration.
RULING: Venue is properly laid and
respondent has legal capacity.
1) In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of
Appeals, we laid down the doctrinal rule for
determining the residence for purposes of
fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:
“The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini
"actual residence" as distinguished from "legal
residence or domicile." This term "resides,"
like the terms "residing" and "residence," is
elastic and should be interpreted in the light of
the object or purpose of the statute or rule in
which it is employed. In other words, "resides"
should be viewed or understood in its popular
sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place
of abode. It signifies physical presence in a
place and actual stay thereat."
In election cases, "residence" and "domicile"
are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the
fixed permanent residence to which when
absent, one has the intention of
returning. However, for purposes of fixing
venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence"
of a person is his personal, actual or physical
habitation, or actual residence or place of
abode, which may not necessarily be his legal
residence or domicile provided he resides
therein with continuity and consistency.
In the instant case, while petitioners
established that Felicisimo was domiciled in
Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he
also maintained a residence in Alabang,
Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his
death. Respondent submitted in evidence the
Deed of Absolute showing that the deceased
purchased the aforesaid property. She also
presented billing statements from the
Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General
Hospital indicating the address of Felicisimo at
"100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang,
Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof
of membership of the deceased in the Ayala
Alabang Village Association and Ayala
Country Club, Inc., letter-envelopes sent by the
deceased’s children to him at his Alabang
address, and the deceased’s calling
cards stating that his home/city address is at
"100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village,
Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial
address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz,
Laguna."
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo
was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement
of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition
for letters of administration was validly filed in
the Regional Trial Court of Makati which has
territorial jurisdiction over Alabang,
Muntinlupa.
2) Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad’s
legal personality to file the petition for letters
of administration, we must first resolve the
issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by
his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry
under the Civil Code, considering that
Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo was
solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the
Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In
resolving this issue, we need not retroactively
apply the provisions of the Family Code,
particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that
there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing
us to rule in the affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. involved a
marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino
wife, which marriage was subsequently
dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by
the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not
valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse
alleged that his interest in the properties from
their conjugal partnership should be protected.
The Court, however, recognized the validity of
the divorce and held that the alien spouse had
no interest in the properties acquired by the
Filipino wife after the divorce.
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino
wife, the Court ruled that she should no longer
be considered married to the alien spouse.
Further, she should not be required to perform
her marital duties and obligations.
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case,
the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry
Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to
remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the
legal personality to file the present petition as
Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the
records show that there is insufficient
evidence to prove the validity of the divorce
obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage
of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of
the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid
down the specific guidelines for pleading and
proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It
held that presentation solely of the divorce
decree is insufficient and that proof of its
authenticity and due execution must be
presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule
132, a writing or document may be proven as a
public or official record of a foreign country by
either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy
thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not
kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and
(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
With regard to respondent’s marriage to
Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California,
U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the
Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of
the Family Law Act of California which
purportedly show that their marriage was done
in accordance with the said law. As stated
in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be
alleged and proved.
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the
trial court for further reception of evidence on
the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and
the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not
capacitated to marry respondent in 1974,
nevertheless, we find that the latter has the
legal personality to file the subject petition for
letters of administration, as she may be
considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as
regards the properties that were acquired
through their joint efforts during their
cohabitation.
In view of the foregoing, we find that
respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject
petition for letters of administration may arise
from her status as the surviving wife of
Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article
144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the
Family Code. DENIED.
22. MINORU FUJIKI v MARIA PAZ
GALELA MARINAY
(Japanese Bigamy)
Doctrine: For Philippine courts to recognize a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen
of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs
to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under
the Rules of Court. Petitioner may prove the
Japanese Family Court judgment through (1)
an official publication or (2) a certification or
copy attested by the officer who has custody of
the judgment. If the office which has custody is
in a foreign country such as Japan, the
certification may be made by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine
foreign service in Japan and authenticated by
the seal of office.
FACTS: Petitioner Minoru Fujiki is a Japanese
national who married respondent Maria Paz
Galela Marinay in the Philippines on 2004. The
marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s
parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to
Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost
contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese,
Shinichi Maekara. Without the first marriage
being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were
married on 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines.
Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However,
Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from
Maekara. She left Maekara and started to
contact Fujiki.3
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were
able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010,
Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from
a family court in Japan which declared the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara void
on the ground of bigamy. On 14 January 2011,
Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled:
"Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or
Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)."
Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family
Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the
bigamous marriage between Marinay and
Maekara be declared void under the Family
Code of the Philippines; and (3) for the RTC to
direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City
to annotate the Japanese Family Court
judgment on the Certificate of Marriage
between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse
such annotation to the Office of the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General in
the NSO.
RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing
the petition and withdrawing the case from its
active civil docket. The trial court based its
dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC. Apparently, the RTC took the view that
only "the husband or the wife," in this case
either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition
to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered.
He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
contemplated ordinary civil actions for
declaration of nullity and annulment of
marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does
not apply.
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition.
He prayed that the RTC’s "pronouncement that
the petitioner failed to comply with A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC be set aside" and that the case be
reinstated in the trial court for further
proceedings. The Solicitor General argued that
Fujiki, as the spouse of the first marriage, is an
injured party who can sue to declare the
bigamous marriage between Marinay and
Maekara void. The Solicitor General
cited Juliano-Llave v. Republic which held that
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not
apply in cases of bigamy.
The Issues
(1) Whether the A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is
applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior
marriage can file a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent
marriage between his or her spouse and a
foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can
recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding
for cancellation or correction of entries in the
Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.
RULING: 1) not applicable 2) YES 3)YES
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not
apply in a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of a
foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v.
Republic, this Court held that the rule in A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife
can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage "does not apply if the reason behind
the petition is bigamy."
I. For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign
country, the petitioner only needs to prove the
foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of
Court. To be more specific, a copy of the
foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence
and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections
24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b)
of the Rules of Court. Petitioner may prove the
Japanese Family Court judgment through (1)
an official publication or (2) a certification or
copy attested by the officer who has custody of
the judgment. If the office which has custody is
in a foreign country such as Japan, the
certification may be made by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine
foreign service in Japan and authenticated by
the seal of office.
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a
petition for recognition of foreign judgment
would mean that the trial court and the parties
should follow its provisions, including the form
and contents of the petition, the service of
summons, the investigation of the public
prosecutor, the setting of pre-trial, the trial and
the judgment of the trial court. This is absurd
because it will litigate the case anew. It will
defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign
judgments, which is "to limit repetitive
litigation on claims and issues." The
interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to
relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v.
Rañada, this Court explained that "if every
judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on
the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back
on his/her original cause of action, rendering
immaterial the previously concluded
litigation."
Philippine courts exercise limited review on
foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to
delve into the merits of a foreign judgment.
II. Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court
states: Who may file petition. — Any
person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons
which has been recorded in the civil register
xxx
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to
recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the
judgment concerns his civil status as married to
Marinay. For the same reason he has the
personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to
cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay
and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of
the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a
personal and material interest in maintaining
the integrity of the marriage he contracted and
the property relations arising from it. There is
also no doubt that he is interested in the
cancellation of an entry of a bigamous
marriage in the civil registry, which
compromises the public record of his marriage.
The interest derives from the substantive right
of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve,
in limited instances) his most intimate human
relation, but also to protect his property
interests that arise by operation of law the
moment he contracts marriage. These property
interests in marriage include the right to be
supported "in keeping with the financial
capacity of the family" and preserving the
property regime of the marriage.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not
preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to
question the validity of a subsequent marriage
on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary,
when Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife"—it refers to the husband or the wife of
the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4)
of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are
void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a
bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor
the wife under the law.
III. To be sure, a petition for correction or
cancellation of an entry in the civil registry
cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a
marriage. However, this does not apply in a
petition for correction or cancellation of a civil
registry entry based on the recognition of a
foreign judgment annulling a marriage where
one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign
country. There is neither circumvention of the
substantive and procedural safeguards of
marriage under Philippine law, nor of the
jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No.
8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is
not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an
action for Philippine courts to recognize the
effectivity of a foreign judgment, which
presupposes a case which was already tried
and decided under foreign law. The
procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not
apply in a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment annulling a bigamous marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of the
foreign country.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, Philippine courts are empowered
to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse
is still tied to the marriage while the foreign
spouse is free to marry. Moreover,
notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code,
Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to
extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines to the extent that the foreign
judgment does not contravene domestic public
policy. A critical difference between the case of
a foreign divorce decree and a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is
that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of
marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine
public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of
the Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option
to undergo full trial by filing a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only
remedy available to him or her. Philippine
courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage,
without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for
bigamy.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only
determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is
inconsistent with an overriding public policy in
the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging
party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to
repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
If there is neither inconsistency with public
policy nor adequate proof to repel the
judgment, Philippine courts should, by default,
recognize the foreign judgment as part of the
comity of nations. The recognition of the
foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage is a subsequent event that establishes
a new status, right and fact that needs to be
reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there
will be an inconsistency between the
recognition of the effectivity of the foreign
judgment and the public records in the
Philippines. GRANTED.
23. LWV Construction vs Dupo 
(Severance   pay   equals   service
award)
Doctrine: Article 291 of the LC
(3­yr   prescriptive   period)
covers   all   money   claims   from
employer­employee   relationship
and   is   broader   in   scope   than
claims   arising   from   a   specific
law. It is not limited to money
claims   recoverable   under   the
Labor Code, but applies also to
claims   of   overseas   contract
workers.
FACTS: Petitioner,   a   domestic
corporation   which   recruits
Filipino   workers,   hired
respondent   as   Civil   Structural
Superintendent   to  work   in Saudi
Arabia for   its   principal,
Mohammad   Al­Mojil
Group/Establishment
(MMG). Respondent   thereafter
signed   his   first   overseas
employment   contract,   renewable
after   one   year. It   was   renewed
five times.
On   April   1999,   after   his   sixth
and   last   contract,   respondent
left Saudi Arabia and went on a
vacation   to   the   Philippines.
On May   1999,   respondent
informed   MMG,   through   the
petitioner,   that   he   needs   to
extend his vacation because his
son   was   hospitalized. He   also
sought   a   promotion   with   salary
adjustment.
In   reply,   MMG   informed
respondent   that   his   promotion
is   subject   to   management’s
review;   that   his   services   are
still   needed;   and   that   his
decision   regarding   his
employment   must   be   made   within
seven days, otherwise, MMG will
be   compelled   to   cancel   his
slot.
On July   1999,   respondent
resigned.  In   his   letter   to
MMG,   he   stated   that   he   should
be   entitled,   as   the   Saudi   Law
stated,   for  a  long   service
award  for   the   7   years   of
service he has rendered.
When   he   followed   up   his   claim
for long   service   award,
petitioner   informed   him   that
MMG   did   not   respond.
Thereafter,   respondent   filed   a
complaint   for   payment
of service   award against
petitioner before the NLRC.
In   support   of   his   claim,
respondent   averred that:   Under
the   Law   of   Saudi   Arabia,   an
employee   who   rendered   at   least
5 years in a company within the
jurisdiction   of Saudi   Arabia,
is   entitled   to   the   so­
called long service award which
is known to others as longevity
pay of   at   least   one   half   month
pay   for   every   year   of   service.
In   excess   of   5   years   an
employee   is   entitled   to   one
month   pay   for   every   year   of
service.
For   its   part,   petitioner
offered  payment  and
prescription  as
defenses. Petitioner   maintained
that   MMG   pays   its   workers
their Service   Award   or
Severance   Pay every   conclusion
of   their   Labor   Contracts.   And
that   based   on   the   payroll,
respondent   was   already   paid
his service   award   or   severance
pay for   his   latest   (sixth)
employment contract.
Petitioner   added   that   under
Article   13   of   the   Saudi   Labor
Law,   the   action   to   enforce
payment   of   the service
award must   be   filed   within   1
year   from   the   termination   of   a
labor   contract.   Petitioner
concluded   that   the   1­year
prescriptive   period   had   lapsed
because   respondent   filed   his
complaint   on December   11,   2000
or   one   year   and   seven   months
after his sixth contract ended.
The   LA,   NLRC   and   upon   appeal,
the   CA   all   ruled   in   favor   of
respondent   hence   the   case   at
bar.
ISSUE:  WON   there   was   already
payment   of   the   service   award/
WON   prescription   already   set
in.
    1.  YES.
RULING:     There   was
already   payment   of   the   service
 
award.
   We   find   that
respondents service   award under
Article   87   of   the   Saudi   Labor
Law   has   already   been   paid. Our
computation   will   show   that
the severance   pay received   by
respondent   was   his service
award.
Respondent’s   position   paper
mentioned   how   his   long   service
award   or   longevity   pay   is
computed:   half­month’s   pay   per
year of service and one­month’s
pay   per   year   after   5   years   of
service. Article   87   has   the
same   formula   to   compute   the
service award.
The   payroll   submitted   by
petitioner showed that respondent
received severance pay of SR2,786
for   his   sixth   employment
contract. The   computation   shows
that respondents severance pay of
SR2,786   was   his service
award under   Article   87.
Respondent’s   service   award   for
the   sixth   contract   is
equivalent only to half­month’s
pay   plus   the   proportionate
amount   for   the   additional   nine
days   of   service   he   rendered
after one year.  that it may be viewed either as
2. NO. Prescription has not yet
set   in.  We   cannot   agree   with
petitioner   that   respondent’s
action   has   prescribed   under
Article   13   of   the   Saudi   Labor
Law. What applies is Article 291
of our Labor Code which reads:
ART.   291. Money
claims. All   money   claims
arising   from   employer­
employee   relations
accruing   during   the
effectivity   of   this   Code
shall   be   filed   within   3
years   from   the   time   the
cause   of   action   accrued;
otherwise   they   shall   be
forever barred.
In Cadalin   v.   POEAs
Administrator,   we   held   that
Article   291   covers   all   money
claims   from   employer­employee
relationship   and   is   broader   in
scope   than   claims   arising   from
a   specific   law. It   is   not
limited   to   money   claims
recoverable   under   the   Labor
Code,   but   applies   also   to
claims   of   overseas   contract
workers.
As   a   general   rule,   a   foreign
procedural   law   will   not   be
applied   in   the
forum. Procedural   matters,   such
as   service   of   process,   joinder
of   actions,   period   and
requisites   for   appeal,   and   so
forth, are governed by the laws
of the forum. This is true even
if   the   action   is   based   upon   a
foreign substantive law
A   law   on   prescription   of
actions   is sui   generis in
Conflict   of   Laws   in   the   sense
procedural   or   substantive,
depending   on   the
characterization   given   such   a
law.
However,   the   characterization
of   a   statute   into   a   procedural
or   substantive   law   becomes
irrelevant   when   the   country   of
the   forum   has   a  borrowing
statute. Said   statute   has   the
practical   effect   of   treating
the   foreign   statute   of
limitation as one of substance.
Section 48 of our Code of Civil
Procedure is of this kind. Said
Section   provides:  If   by   the
laws   of   the   country   where   the
cause   of   action   arose,   the
action   is   barred,   it   is   also
barred   in   the   Philippine
Islands.
HOWEVER,   in   the   light   of   the
1987   Constitution,   Section   48
[of   the   Code   of   Civil
Procedure]   cannot   be
enforced ex   proprio
vigore insofar   as   it   ordains
the   application   in   this
jurisdiction   of the   one­year
prescriptive period,  as regards
the claims in question, because
it   would   contravene   the   public
policy   on   the   protection   to
labor.
Thus,   in   our   considered   view,
respondent’s   complaint   was
filed   well   within   the   3­year
prescriptive   period   under
Article   291   of   our   Labor
Code. This   point,   however,   has
already   been   mooted   by   our
finding   that   respondents
service award had been paid.
24. ATCI vs Echin
Principle:  Doctrine   of
Processual   Presumption;  The
party   invoking   the   application
of a foreign law has the burden
of   proving   the   law,   under   the
doctrine   of   processual
presumption; they must not only
be alleged and proven complying
with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule
132.
Facts:
Echin   was   hired   by   ATCI
Overseas Corp. (ATCI) in behalf
of   the   Public   Health   Ministry
of   Kuwait   (Ministry)   for   the
position   of   medical
technologist.   Under   Kuwaiti
law,   all   wly­hired   employees
undergo   a   probationary   period
of one (1) year and are covered
by Kuwait’s Civil Service Board
Employment   Contract   No.   2.
Echin   was   terminated,   she   not
having   passed   the   probationary
period.   She   returned   to   the
Philippines shouldering her air
fare. She filed before the NLRC
a   complaint   for   illegal
dismissal against the NLRC. The
NLRC   held   that   Echin   was
illegally   dismissed.   It   argued
on   its   appeal   before   the   CA
that   the   Ministry   is   a   foreign
government agency and is immune
from suit and such immunity was
extended   to   ATCI.   This   was
dismissed   by   the   CA   affirming
the   NLRC   decision.   Hence   this
petition. 
ATCI   argues   that   should   not   be
held   liable   because   Echin’   s
employment   contract
specifically   stipulates   that
her   employment   shall   be
governed   by   the   Civil   Service
Law   and   Regulations   of   Kuwait.
They   thus   conclude   that   it   was
patent   error   for   the   labor
tribunals   and   the   appellate
court   to   apply   the   Labor   Code
provisions   governing
probationary   employment   in
deciding   the   present   case.
Further, POEA Rules relative to
master   employment   contracts
accord respect to the "customs,
practices, company policies and
labor   laws   and   legislation   of
the   host   country.   And   that
assuming   arguendo   that
Philippine   labor   laws   are
applicable,   given   that   the
foreign   principal   is   a
government   agency   which   is
immune from suit, as in fact it
did   not   sign   any   document
agreeing to be held jointly and
solidarily   liable,   ATCI   cannot
likewise   be   held   liable,   more
so   since   the   Ministry’s
liability   had   not   been
judicially   determined   as
jurisdiction   was   not   acquired
over it.
Issues:
Whether or not the CA is erred
in   affirming   the   ruling   of
NLRC.
Held: No.
Indeed,   a   contract   freely
entered   into   is   considered   the
law between the parties who can
establish   stipulations,
clauses,   terms   and   conditions
as   they   may   deem   convenient,
including   the   laws   which   they
wish to govern their respective
obligations,   as   long   as   they
are   not   contrary   to   law,
morals,   good   customs,   public
order   or   public   policy.   It   is
hornbook   principle,   however,
that   the   party   invoking   the
application   of   a   foreign   law
has   the   burden   of   proving   the
law,   under   the   doctrine   of
processual   presumption   which,
in   this   case,   ATCI   failed   to
discharge.   In   international
law,   the   party   who   wants   to
have a foreign law applied to a
dispute   or   case   has   the   burden
of proving the foreign law. The
foreign   law   is   treated   as   a
question of fact to be properly
pleaded and proved as the judge
or   labor   arbiter   cannot   take
judicial   notice   of   a   foreign
law.   He   is   presumed   to   know
only domestic or forum law. The
Philippines   does   not   take
judicial   notice   of   foreign
laws, hence, they must not only
be   alleged;   they   must   be
proven. To prove a foreign law,
the   party   invoking   it   must
present   a   copy   thereof   and
comply   with   Sections   24   and   25
of Rule 132. 
To   prove   the   Kuwaiti   law,   ATCI
submitted   the   following:   MOA
between Echin and the Ministry,
as   represented   by   ATCI,   which
provides   that   the   employee   is
subject   to   a   probationary
period of one (1) year and that
the   host   country’s   Civil
Service   Laws   and   Regulations
apply;   a   translated   copy
(Arabic   to   English)   of   the
termination   letter   to   Echin
stating   that   she   did   not   pass
the   probation   terms,   without
specifying   the   grounds
therefor, and a translated copy
of   the   certificate   of
termination   certified   by   the
Department   of   Foreign   Affairs­
Office   of   Consular   Affairs
Islamic   Certification   and
Translation   Unit;   and   Echin’s
letter   wherein   she   noted   that
in   her   first   eight   (8)   months
of   employment,   she   was   given   a
rating of "Excellent" albeit it
changed   due   to   changes   in   her
shift of work schedule.
These   documents,   whether   taken
singly   or   as   a   whole,   do   not
sufficiently   prove   that   Echin
was   validly   terminated   as   a
probationary   employee   under
Kuwaiti   civil   service   laws.
Instead of submitting a copy of
the   pertinent   Kuwaiti   labor
laws   duly   authenticated   and
translated by Embassy officials
thereat,   as   required   under   the
Rules, what ATCI submitted were
mere   certifications   attesting
only   to   the   correctness   of   the
translations of the MOA and the
termination   letter   which   does
not   prove   at   all   that   Kuwaiti
civil   service   laws   differ   from
Philippine   laws   and   that   under
such   Kuwaiti   laws,   Echin   was
validly terminated
25. BANK   OF   AMERICA   NT   &   SA,
BANK   OF   AMERICA   INTERNATIONAL,
LTD.  latter,   as   trustees,   did   not
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS
Doctrine: Under the doctrine  of
forum   non­conveniens,   a   court,
in conflicts of law cases, may
refuse   impositions   on   its
jurisdiction   where   it   is   not
the   most   "convenient"   or
available forum and the parties
are   not   precluded   from   seeking
remedies elsewhere.
Facts:
The   Litonjuas   were   engaged   in
the shipping business and owned
two   vessels   through   their
wholly­owned   corporations.
Revenues   from   which   and   other
funds   were   deposited   with   the
branches of petitioner banks in
the   United   Kingdom   and
Hongkong.   With   their   business
doing   well,   the   banks   induced
the   Litonjuas   to   increase   the
number of their ships, offering
them   easy   loans,   to   which   the
latter   did.   The   operation,
possession   and   the   funds
therefrom were placed under the
complete   and   exclusive   control
and disposition of the banks. A
39­hectare   land   located   in   the
Philippines   was   included   also
as   security   for   the   loan.
However,   the   revenues   derived
from   the   operation   of   all   the
vessels   declined   drastically,
and   the   loans   acquired   matured
and   remained   unpaid.   The
vessels   were   then   sold   at
public   auction.   Later   on,   the
Lintojuas   filed   a   complaint
before the RTC of Pasig against
the   banks   claiming   that   the
full   render   an   accunt   of   all
the   income   derived   from   the
operation   of   the   vessels   as
well as of the proceeds of the
foreclosure sale.
The   banks   filed   a   Motion   to
Dismiss on grounds of forum non
conveniens,   lack   of   cause   of
action and  litis pendentia. RTC
denied   the   motion,   and   a
Petition   for   Review   on
Certiorari   of   the   denial   was
brought   to   CA,   which   was   also
denied.   The   banks   argued   that
the   foreign   corporation,   which
is the registered owner, is the
proper   party   and   the   the
Litonjuas.   Since   the   branches
of   the   banks   involved   are
located   outside   of   the
Philippines   and   all   of   the
transactions   transpired   abroad,
the   local   court   is   not   the
proper   forum,   thus   applying
forum   non   conveniens.   Lastly,
since   the   banks   have   already
filed   cases   against   the
Litonjuas   in   the   Courts   of
England   and   Hongkong,   the
latter   are   barred   by  litis
pendentia.
Issue:
WON   the   case   should   be
dismissed   on   the   ground   of
forum non conveniens. (NO)
WON the Litonjuas are guilty of
forum   shopping   due   to   the
pendency of cases abroad. (NO)
Ruling:
The   complaint   contains   the
three   elements   of   a   cause   of
action.   It   alleges   that:   (1)
private   respondents,   have   the
right   to   demand   for   an
accounting from  banks by virtue
of   the   fiduciary   relationship
created   between   them;   (2)  the
banks  have   the   obligation,   as
trustees,   to   render   such   an
accounting;   and   (3)  the   banks
failed   to   do   the   same.  The
corporations   are   wholly   owned
by   the  Litonjuas  and   prior   to
the   incorporation   of   such
entities,   they   were   clients   of
petitioners   which   induced   them
to   acquire   loans   from   said
petitioners   to   invest   on   the
additional   ships.  Thus,   they
have a cause of action.
The   doctrine   of forum   non­
conveniens, literally   meaning
'the   forum   is   inconvenient',
emerged   in   private
international   law   to   deter   the
practice   of   global   forum
shopping, that   is   to   prevent
non­resident   litigants   from
choosing   the   forum   or   place
wherein to bring their suit for
malicious   reasons,   such   as   to
secure   procedural   advantages,
to   annoy   and   harass   the
defendant, to avoid overcrowded
dockets,   or   to   select   a   more
friendly   venue.   Under   this
doctrine, a court, in conflicts
of law cases, may refuse, based
on   its   sound   discretion,
impositions on its jurisdiction
where   it   is   not   the   most
"convenient" or available forum
and   the   parties   are   not
precluded from seeking remedies
elsewhere.  Philippine Court may
assume   jurisdiction   over   the
case   if   it   chooses   to   do   so;
provided,   that   the   following
requisites   are   met:   (1)   that
the   Philippine   Court   is   one   to
which   the   parties   may
conveniently   resort   to;   (2)
that the Philippine Court is in
a   position   to   make   an
intelligent   decision   as   to   the
law   and   the   facts;   and,   (3)
that   the   Philippine   Court   has
or   is   likely   to   have   power   to
enforce   its
decision. Evidently,   all   these
requisites   are   present   in   the
instant   case.  Moreover,   the
doctrine   of forum   non
conveniens should   not   be   used
as   a   ground   for   a   motion   to
dismiss because Sec. 1, Rule 16
of the Rules of Court does not
include   said   doctrine   as   a
ground.  The   propriety   of
dismissing a case based on this
principle   of forum   non
conveniens requires   a   factual
determination, hence it is more
properly considered a matter of
defense.
Forum shopping exists where the
elements   of litis   pendentia are
present   and   where   a   final
judgment   in   one   case   will
amount   to res   judicata in   the
other. Parenthetically,
for litis   pendentia to   be   a
ground   for   the   dismissal   of   an
action   there   must   be:   (a)
identity   of   the   parties   or   at
least   such   as   to   represent   the
same   interest   in   both   actions;
(b) identity of rights asserted
and   relief   prayed   for,   the
relief   being   founded   on   the
same acts; and (c) the identity
in the two cases should be such
that   the   judgment   which   may   be
rendered   in   one   would,
regardless   of   which   party   is
successful,   amount   to res
judicata in   the   other.  The
banks  mentioned   that   civil
cases   were   filed   in   Hongkong
and   England   without   however
showing   the   identity   of   rights
asserted and the reliefs sought
for as well as the presence of
the   elements   of res
judicata should   one   of   the
cases be adjudged.  They failed,
wittingly   or   inadvertently,   to
include   a   single   foreign
judgment   in   their   pleadings
submitted   to   the  Court   as
annexes to their petition.  knowledge   in   ACAD   system;   (3)
26. EDI­STAFFBUILDERS vs NLRC
(Computer   Specialist,   PH   or
Saudi)
FACTS:  Petitioner   EDI,   upon
request   of   Omar   Ahmed   Ali   Bin
Bechr (OAB), a company in Saudi
Arabia,   sent   to   the   latter   CVs
from   which   OAB   can   choose   a
computer   specialist.   Eleazar
Gran was selected.
Gran   signed   an   employment
contract   that   granted   him   a
monthly   salary   of   USD   850.00
for   a   period   of   two   years.   He
was   then   deployed   to   Riyadh.
But   5   months   into   his   service,
Gran   received   a   termination
letter   with   the   grounds
mentioned therefor: 
1.   Non­compliance   to   contract
requirements by the recruitment
agency primarily on your salary
and contract duration.
2.   Non­compliance   to   pre­
qualification   requirements   by
the recruitment agency
3.   Insubordination   or
disobedience   to   Top   Management
Order and/or instructions (non­
submittal   of   daily   activity
reports   despite   several
instructions).
Gran   filed   a   complaint   for
underpayment   of   wages/salaries
and illegal dismissal.
LA:  Gran   (1)   did   not   submit   a
single   activity   report   of   his
daily   activity   as   dictated   by
company   policy;   (2)   not
qualified   for   the   job   as
computer   specialist   due   to   his
insufficient   knowledge   in
programming   and   lack   of
refused   to   follow   management's
instruction   for   him   to   gain
more   knowledge   of   the   job   to
prove   his   worth   as   computer
specialist.   Complaint
dismissed.
NLRC:  reversed   the   decision   of
LA.
CA:  EDI   failed   to   prove   that
private   respondent   was
terminated   for   a   valid   cause
and   in   accordance   with   due
process; x x x no evidence was
presented   to   show   how   and   why
Gran   was   considered   to   be
incompetent.   The   court   held
that since the law requires the
recruitment agencies to subject
OFWs   to   trade   tests   before
deployment, Gran must have been
competent   and   qualified;
otherwise,   he   would   not   have
been hired and deployed abroad.
ISSUE:  W/N   Gran's   dismissal   is
justifiable   by   reason   of
incompetence,   insubordination,
and   disobedience  (NO,   SC   then
applied PH labor laws)
HELD:  In   cases   involving   OFWs,
the   rights   and   obligations
among   and   between   the   OFW,   the
local   recruiter/agent,   and   the
foreign   employer/principal   are
governed   by   the   employment
contract.   A   contract   freely
entered   into   is   considered   law
between the parties; and hence,
should be respected. x x x
In   the   present   case,   the
employment   contract   signed   by
Gran   specifically   states   that
Saudi   Labor   Laws   will   govern
matters not provided for in the
contract   (e.g.   specific   causes
for   termination,   termination
procedures,   etc.).   Being   the
law   intended   by   the   parties
(lex loci intentiones)  to apply
to   the   contract,   Saudi   Labor
Laws   should   govern   all   matters
relating   to   the   termination   of
the employment of Gran.
In international law, the party
who wants to have a foreign law
applied   to   a   dispute   or   case
has   the   burden   of   proving   the
foreign law. The foreign law is
treated   as   a   question   of   fact
to   be   properly   pleaded   and
proved   as   the   judge   or   labor
arbiter   cannot   take   judicial
notice of a foreign law. He is
presumed   to   know   only   domestic
or forum law.
Unfortunately   for   petitioner,
it   did   not   prove   the   pertinent
Saudi laws on the matter; thus,
the   International   Law   doctrine
of  presumed­identity   approach
or processual presumption  comes
into   play.   Where   a   foreign   law
is   not   pleaded   or,   even   if
pleaded,   is   not   proved,   the
presumption is that foreign law
is   the   same   as   ours.   Thus,   we
apply   Philippine   labor   laws   in
determining   the   issues
presented before us.
27. ASIAVEST VS. CA 
PRINCIPLES: 
1. Processual   presumption   ­
In   view   of   the   absence   of
proof of the [foreign] law
on   this   particular   issue,
the   presumption   of
identity   or   similarity   or
the   so­called   processual
presumption   shall   come
into play. It will thus be
presumed   that   the
[foreign]   law   on   the
matter   is   similar   to   the
Philippine law. 
 2. A foreign judgment against
a   person   rendered   by   a
court   having   jurisdiction
to   pronounce   the   judgment
is presumptive evidence of
a   right   as   between   the
parties.
BRIEF SUMMARY:  Asiavest Limited
sued   Antonio   Heras   in   a   Hong
Kong   Court   owing   to   his
personal guarantee. The foreign
Court   awarded   damages   to
Asiavest.   Asiavest   then   prayed
the RTC of Quezon City to order
Heras   to   comply   with   the
foreign judgment. In pre­trial,
the   parties   stipulated   that:
there   was   an   existing   foreign
judgment,   that   Asiavest   has   no
business   in   Philippines,   and
that   Heras   resides   in   Quezon
City.   Heras   presented   as
witness   Mr.   Russel   Lousich,   an
expert   witness,   and   testified
via   direct   examination   that
Heras   did   not   receive   summons
from   the   Hong   Kong   Court.
However,   in   the   cross
examination,   Lousich   admitted
that summons was sent to Heras’
son­in­law, Mr. Dionisio Lopez.
Since   neither   Lousich   nor
Asiavest   stated   the   procedural
rules   of   Hong   Kong   regarding
the   service   of   summons   in   in
personam cases, our rules shall
apply   owing   to   the  doctrine   of
processual   presumption  [see
definition   above].   Under
Philippine   laws,   in   an   action
in   personam   wherein   the
defendant is a non­resident who
does   not   voluntarily   submit
himself to the authority of the
court,  personal   service   of
summons   within   the   state  is
essential to the acquisition of
jurisdiction   over   her   person.
Since   it   was   stipulated   by   the
parties that Heras “resides” in
Quezon   City     and   the   summons
was   merely   given   only   to   the
son­in­law, the Hong Kong court
had no jurisdiction over Heras.
Hence, the Supreme Court denied
the petition of Asiavest. 
FACTS:  In   issue   is   the
enforceability   in   the
Philippines   of   a   foreign
judgment.   Asiavest   Limited
filed   a   complaint   on   December
3,   1987   against   Antonio   Heras,
praying   that   the   latter   be
ordered   to   pay   the   following
amounts   awarded   by   the   Hong
Kong   Court   dated   December   28,
1984:   $1.8Million   dollars   with
legal   interest   and   $80K
attorney’s   fees.   This   amount
was due to a personal guarantee
of Heras for the obligations of
Compania   Hernmanos   de
Navegacion S.A. 
The defendant filed a motion to
dismiss.   However,   before   the
court could resolve the same, a
fire   razed   the   Quezon   City
Hall,   the   court   and   all   its
records.   After   filing   for   a
Motion   for   Reconstitution   of
Case   Records,   the   court   denied
the   Motion   to   Dismiss   and
allowed   the   defendant   to   file
an Answer.
In   the   pre­trial   conference,
the   parties   stipulated   the
following   facts:   (1)   the
existence   of   the   foreign
judgment   (but   not   its
authenticity/validity),   (2)
that   plaintiff   is   not   doing
business   in   the   Philippines,
and   (3)   that   the   defendant
resides in Quezon City.
Asiavest   presented   evidence   to
show   rendition,   existence,   and
authentication of such judgment
by   the   proper   officials
concerned.  pronounce   the   judgment   is
The   defendant   presented   two
witnesses,   namely:   Fortunata
dela   Vega   and   Russel   Warren
Lousich.   Fortunata,   the
secretary   of   Heras,   testified
that   she   did   not   receive   the
foreign   court’s   summons.
Lousich,   an   expert   witness   and
former counsel of Antonio Heras
in   commercial   cases   in   Hong
Kong,   testified   that   Heras   did
not   receive   a   copy   of   the
foreign   court’s   decision   and
summons.   However,   under   court
examination,   he   admitted   that
(1)   receipt   of   the   court’s
decision   is   not   a   legal
requirement   under   Hong   Kong
laws,   and   that   (2)   the   son­in­
law   of   Heras,   Mr.   Dionisio
Lopez,   received   the   Hong   Kong
summons from Sycip Law firm.  Hong Kong in respect of service
RTC   ruled   in   favour   of
plaintiff. CA reversed RTC.
ISSUE:  WON   the   foreign   court
acquired jurisdiction? The main
argument   raised   against   the
Hong   Kong   judgment   is   that   the
Hong Kong Supreme Court did not
acquire   jurisdiction   over   the
person   of   HERAS.   This   involves
the   issue   of   whether   summons
was properly and validly served
on HERAS.  on the matter is similar to the
RULING:  NO. Under paragraph (b)
of   Section   50,   Rule   39   of   the
Rules   of   Court,  which   was   the
governing   law   at   the   time  this
case   was   decided   by   the   trial
court   and   respondent   Court   of
Appeals,   a   foreign   judgment
against   a   person   rendered   by   a
court   having   jurisdiction   to
presumptive evidence of a right
as   between   the   parties   and
their successors in interest by
the   subsequent   title.   However,
the judgment may be repelled by
evidence   of  WANT   OF
JURISDICTION, want of notice to
the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact.
Also,   Section   3(n)   of   Rule   131
of   the   New   Rules   of   Evidence
provides that in the absence of
proof to the contrary, a court,
or   judge   acting   as   such,
whether   in   the   Philippines   or
elsewhere,   is   presumed   to   have
acted in the lawful exercise of
jurisdiction.
There   is   nothing   in   the
testimony   of   Mr.   Lousich   that
touched   on   the   specific   law   of
of summons either in actions in
rem   or   in   personam,   and   where
the   defendant   is   either   a
resident or nonresident of Hong
Kong. In view of the absence of
proof   of   the   Hong   Kong   law   on
this   particular   issue,   the
presumption   of   identity   or
similarity   or  the   so­called
processual   presumption   shall
come into play. It will thus be
presumed that the Hong Kong law
Philippine law. 
In   an   action   in   personam,
jurisdiction over the person of
the   defendant   is   necessary   for
the   court   to   validly   try   and
decide   the   case.   Jurisdiction
over   the   person   of   a   resident
defendant   who   does   not
voluntarily appear in court can
be acquired by personal service
of   summons   as   provided   under
Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules
of   Court.   If   he   cannot   be
personally   served   with   summons
within   a   reasonable   time,
substituted service may be made
in accordance with Section 8 of
said Rule. If he is temporarily
out of the country, any of the
following   modes   of   service   may
be resorted to: (1) substituted
service set forth in Section 8;
21 (2) personal service outside
the   country,   with   leave   of
court;   (3)   service   by
publication, also with leave of
court;   22   or   (4)   any   other
manner   the   court   may   deem
sufficient. 23
However,   in   an   action   in
personam   wherein   the   defendant
is   a   non­resident   who   does   not
voluntarily   submit   himself   to
the   authority   of   the   court
(such   as   this   case),   personal
service   of   summons   within   the
state   is   essential   to   the
acquisition   of   jurisdiction
over her person.  CC (absolute prohibition against divorce)
On   the   other   hand,   in   a
proceeding   in   rem   or   quasi   in
rem,   jurisdiction   over   the
person   of   the   defendant   is   not
a   prerequisite   to   confer
jurisdiction   on   the   court
provided   that   the   court
acquires   jurisdiction   over   the
res.   Nonetheless   summons   must
be   served   upon   the   defendant
not   for   the   purpose   of   vesting
the court with jurisdiction but
merely   for   satisfying   the   due
process requirements.
In the case at bar, the action
filed   in   Hong   Kong   against
HERAS was in personam, since it
was   based   on   his   personal
guarantee   of   the   obligation   of
the   principal   debtor.
Significantly, in the pre­trial
conference, the parties came up
with   stipulations   of   facts,
among   which   was   that   "the
residence of defendant, Antonio
Heras,   is   New   Manila,   Quezon
City." 39 We therefore conclude
that   the   stipulated   fact   that
HERAS   "is   a   resident   of   New
Manila,   Quezon   City,
Philippines"   refers   to   his
residence   at   the   time
jurisdiction   over   his   person
was   being   sought   by   the   Hong
Kong   court.   With   that
stipulation   of   fact,   ASIAVEST
cannot now claim that HERAS was
a resident of Hong Kong at the
time.   Hence,   petition   is
denied. 
28. GERBERT CORPUZ vs DAISYLYN STO TOMAS
PRINCIPLES:
1) 2nd par of Art. 26 FC is an EXCEPTION to Art. 17
2) 2nd par. of Art. 26 provide ONLY the FILIPINO
SPOUSE a substantive right to have his or her
marriage to the alien spouse considered as
dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry.
3) To reconcile, the foreign divorce decree is a
presumptive evidence which allows the alien
spouse to have it recognized.
FACTS:
 Gerbert Corpuz, a former Filipino citizen,
acquired Canadian Citizenship through
naturalization on Nov. 2000. On Jan. 2005, he
married Daisylyn Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig
City. Due to work, he immediately left for Canada
after the wedding. He returned sometime in April
2005 to surprise his wife, but he discovered that
she was having an affair. He then returned to
Canada and filed a petition for divorce, which was
granted by the Superior Court of Justice.
2 years after, Gerbert found another Filipina to
love. To marry her, he went to the Pasig City Civil
Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce
decree he obtained. Nevertheless, despite
registration of said decree, an NSO official
informed him that his marriage with Daisylyn still
subsists unless the decree is judicially recognized
by a Philippine Court. Accordingly, Gerbert filed a
petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce
and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved with
the RTC. Daisylyn did not oppose, and instead
requested that she be considered as a party-in-
interest with a similar prayer to Gerbert’s.
RTC denied the petition saying that Gerbert
was not the proper party since he is a naturalized
Canadian citizen. According to Art. 26 of the Family
Code, only the Filipino spouse can avail of the
remedy. The RTC stated that this conclusion is
consistent with the legislative intent behind of said
article as determined in the case of Rep. v
Orbecido III, which is to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the
alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no
longer married to the Filipino Spouse. Hence, the
petition.
ISSUE:
WON the 2nd par. of Art. 26 FC extends to
aliens the right to petition a court of this
jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce
decree. - NO
RULING:
 LEGISLATIVE INTENT BEHIND THE 2ND PAR.
OF ART 26 FC
There are only 2 types of defective marriages
recognized under the FC, void and voidable
marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial
declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the
marriage exists before or at the time of the
marriage. On the other hand, Divorce
contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union
for cause arising after marriage. Absolute divorce
is not recognized by the FC.
Recognizing that divorce is a possibility in
marriages between a Filipino and an alien, then
Pres. Aquino enacted EO 227, which amended Art.
26 of the FC, adding the 2nd paragraph.
As applied in Van Dorn v Romillo, and
Pilapil v Ibay-Somera, the SC refused to grant the
assertion of alien spouses of marital rights after a
foreign courts divorce decree between the alien
and Filipino was obtained. The reason being, as
mentioned in Van Dorn v Romillo, it is unjust to
consider the Filipino souse still married to the
alien spouse x x x. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the
ends of justice are to be served.
Essentially therefore, the RTC was correct
in saying that the intent is really to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
to be married to the alien spouse despite the
decree obtained by the latter. Hence, the 2 nd par of
Art. 26 provided the Filipino spouse a substantive
right to have his or her marriage to the alien
spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him
or her to remarry.
 2ND PAR OF ART 26 FAMILY CODE. IS AN
EXCEPTION TO ART. 17 CIVIL CODE
Art. 17 CC provides that the policy against
absolute divorces cannot be subverted by
judgments promulgated in a foreign country. In
effect, the 2nd Par constitutes a direct exception to
this rule and serves as a basis for recognizing the
dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino
and alien spouses.
An action based on said par. also includes
any decree that capacitates the alien spouse to
remarry, not merely the recognition of the foreign
divorce decree.
 THE FOREIGN DIVORCE DECREE IS A
PRESUMPTIVE EVIDENCE OF A RIGHT
THAT CLOTHES THE PARTY WITH LEGAL
INTEREST TO PETITION FOR ITS
RECOGNITION IN THIS JURISDICTION
While not available to an alien, it was not a
sufficient basis for the RTC to deny the petition
because the decree, after its authenticity and
conformity with the alien’s national law has been
duly proven, serves as a presumptive evidence of
a right in favor of Gerbert, under Sec. 48, Rule 39
ROC. The divorce obtained abroad by an alien may
be recognized as long as it is valid according to his
national law.
The starting point in any recognition of a
foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment
that our courts do not take judicial notice of
foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera
explained that, as a rule, no sovereign is bound to
give effect within its dominion to a judgment
rendered by a tribunal of another country. This
means that the foreign judgment and its
authenticity must be proven as facts under our
rules on evidence, together with the aliens
applicable national law to show the effect of the
judgment on the alien himself or herself. The
recognition may be made in an action instituted
specifically for the purpose or in another action
where a party invokes the foreign decree as an
integral aspect of his claim or defense
In this case, Sec. 24, Rule 132 ROC applies
in Gerbert’s petition. This Section requires proof,
either by (1) official publications or (2) copies
attested by the officer having legal custody of the
documents. If the copies of official records are not
kept in the Philippines, these must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by
the seal of his office.
While Gerbert attached a copy of the
divorce decree as well as certificates proving
authenticity, he failed to include a copy of the
Canadian law on divorce. Nevertheless, the SC,
instead of dismissing, remanded the case to the
RTC to serve both interests.
 A JUDICIAL ORDER IS REQUIRED BEFORE
THE CIVIL REGISTRY CAN RECORD THE
DIVORCE DECREE OBTAINED ABROAD
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that
acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the
civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil
register. The law requires the entry in the civil
registry of judicial decrees that produce legal
consequences touching upon a persons legal
capacity and status. This includes a foreign divorce
decree.
But while the law requires the entry of the
divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the
submission of the decree by themselves do not
ipso facto authorize the decrees registration. The
law should be read in relation with the
requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign
judgment before it can be given res judicata effect.
Hence, the registration made is void.
 THE RECOGNITION BY THE RTC OF THE
CANADIAN DIVORCE DECREE DOES NOT,
BY ITSELF, AUTHORIZE THE CANCELLATION
OF THE ENTRY IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that
no entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected, without judicial order. Rule 108
supplements the former by providing in detail the
jurisdictional and procedural requirements that
must be complied with before a judgment,
authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be
annotated in the civil registry. Since the petition of
Gerbert did not conform with Rule 108, it cannot
be said that it was filed under Rule 108 of the ROC.
However, it must be noted that it is NOT
required to file two separate proceedings, one for
the recognition of the foreign divorce decree, and
the other for the cancellation of the entry under
Rule 108. This is because, the recognition of the
foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special
proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court) is precisely to establish the status or
right of a party or a particular fact.
29.  Philippine   Export   and
Foreign   Loan   Guaranty
Corporation   vs.   V.P.   Eusebio
Corporation
Doctrine: Doctrine   of
Processual Presumption
Facts: A   Philippine
Construction   firm   represented
by   respondent   entered   into   a
joint   venture   agreement   with   a
construction firm in Kuwait for
the   construction   of   the
Institute   of   Physical   Therapy­
Medical   Center   Phase   II   in
Iraq. The contract entered into
required respondents to execute
an   advance   payment   bond.
Petitioner(bonding   company),  a
government   financial
institution   empowered   to   issue
guarantees   for   qualified
Filipino   contractors   to   secure
the   performance   of   approved
service   contracts   abroad,
granted   respondent’s
application for a bond.
The   construction   did   not
commence on time and there were
numerous   delays   during   the
construction   period   resulting
in   the   project   not   being
finished   on   time   and   the
performance   bond   had   to   be
extended.   Despite   the
agreements   made   to   extend   the
time   frame   of   the   project,   the
same   was   still   not   completed
within the period of extensions
given and so the Bank of Kuwait
demanded   from   petitioner   the
full payment of the performance
bond   and   after   several   demands
petitioner   paid   the   amount   of
the   performance   bond   to   the
bank   of   Kuwait   with   the
understanding that the bond was
a   solidary   obligation   for   both
petitioner and respondent.
After   its   payment,   petitioner
demanded   reimbursement   from
respondent   and   when   respondent
failed to pay, petitioner filed
a case for collection of sum of
money   against   respondent
arguing   that   what   they   entered
into was a contract of surety. 
Issue: WON   petitioner   is
entitled to reimbursement.
Held: No,   petitioner   is   not
entitled   to   reimbursement
because   the   contract   entered
into   was   in   the   nature   of   a
guaranty   and   respondent   is   not
considered   to   be   in   default
under   the   doctrine   of
processual presumption.
By   guaranty   a   person,   called
the guarantor, binds himself to
the   creditor   to   fulfill   the
obligation   of   the   principal
debtor   in   case   the   latter
should   fail   to   do   so.   If   a
person binds himself solidarily
with   the   principal   debtor,   the
contract is called suretyship.
In   determining   petitioner's
status, it is necessary to read
Letter of Guarantee No. 81­194­
F,   which   provides   in   part   as
follows:
In the event of default by
V.P. EUSEBIO, we shall pay
you 100% of the obligation
 unpaid but   in   no   case
shall   such   amount   exceed
Iraq   Dinars   (ID)
271,808/610   plus   interest
and   other   incidental
expenses….   (Emphasis
supplied) 39
The contract entered into was therefore not a
contract of surety but instead a contract of
guaranty. As a guaranty, it is still characterized
by its subsidiary and conditional quality
because it does not take effect until the
fulfillment of the condition, namely, that the
principal obligor should fail in his obligation at
the time and in the form he bound himself. 40 In
other words, an unconditional guarantee is still
subject to the condition that the principal
debtor should default in his obligation first
before resort to the guarantor could be had. A
conditional guaranty, as opposed to an
unconditional guaranty, is one which depends
upon some extraneous event, beyond the mere
default of the principal, and generally upon
notice of the principal's default and reasonable
diligence in exhausting proper remedies against
the principal.41
It appearing that Letter of Guarantee No. 81-
194-F merely stated that in the event of default
by respondent VPECI the petitioner shall pay,
the obligation assumed by the petitioner was
simply that of an unconditional guaranty, not
conditional guaranty. But as earlier ruled the
fact that petitioner's guaranty is unconditional
does not make it a surety. Besides, surety is
never presumed. A party should not be
considered a surety where the contract itself
stipulates that he is acting only as a guarantor.
It is only when the guarantor binds himself
solidarily with the principal debtor that the
contract becomes one of suretyship.
Having   determined   petitioner's
liability   as   guarantor,   the
next   question   we   have   to
grapple   with   is   whether   the
respondent   contractor
has defaulted in   its
obligations   that   would   justify
resort to the guaranty.
A corollary issue is what law should be applied
in determining whether the respondent
contractor has defaulted in the performance of
its obligations under the service contract. The
question of whether there is a breach of an
agreement, which
includes default or mora,45 pertains to the
essential or intrinsic validity of a contract. 46
No conflicts rule on essential validity of
contracts is expressly provided for in our laws.
The rule followed by most legal systems,
however, is that the intrinsic validity of a
contract must be governed by the lex
contractus or "proper law of the contract." This
is the law voluntarily agreed upon by the
parties (the lex loci voluntatis) or the law
intended by them either expressly or implicitly
(the lex loci intentionis). The law selected may
be implied from such factors as substantial
connection with the transaction, or the
nationality or domicile of the
47
parties. Philippine courts would do well to
adopt the first and most basic rule in most legal
systems, namely, to allow the parties to select
the law applicable to their contract, subject to
the limitation that it is not against the law,
morals, or public policy of the forum and that
the chosen law must bear a substantive
relationship to the transaction.
In this case, the laws of Iraq bear substantial
connection to the transaction, since one of the
parties is the Iraqi Government and the place of
performance is in Iraq. Hence, the issue of
whether respondent VPECI defaulted in its
obligations may be determined by the laws of
Iraq. However, since that foreign law was not
properly pleaded or proved, the presumption of
identity or similarity, otherwise known as
the processual presumption, comes into play.
Where foreign law is not pleaded or, even if
pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that
foreign law is the same as ours.51
Our law, specifically Article 1169, last
paragraph, of the Civil Code, provides: "In
reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in
delay if the other party does not comply or is
not ready to comply in a proper manner with
what is incumbent upon him."
As   found   by   both   the   Court   of
Appeals   and   the   trial   court,
the delay or the non­completion
of   the   Project   was   caused   by
factors   not   imputable   to   the
respondent   contractor.   It   was
rather   due   mainly   to   the
persistent violations by SOB of
the terms and conditions of the
contract.
This brings us to the next question: May the
petitioner as a guarantor secure reimbursement
from the respondents for what it has paid under
Letter of Guarantee No. 81-194-F?
As a rule, a guarantor who pays for a debtor
should be indemnified by the latter67 and would
be legally subrogated to the rights which the
creditor has against the debtor.68 However, a
person who makes payment without the
knowledge or against the will of the debtor has
the right to recover only insofar as the payment
has been beneficial to the debtor.
From   the   findings   of   the   Court
of Appeals and the trial court,
it   is   clear   that   the   payment
made   by   the   petitioner
guarantor   did   not   in   any   way
benefit   the   principal   debtor,
given   the   project   status   and
the conditions obtaining at the
Project site at that time.
30. Del Socorro V. Van Wilsem 
Principles: 
1. Family rights and duties are
governed by the national law of
the person.
2. GR: Foreign laws in order to
be   applicable,   should   be
properly   pleaded   and   proven   in
our courts.
       Exc:   Even   if   properly
pleaded   and   proven,   if   foreign
laws   are   contrary   to   public
policy   of   the   forum,   the   same
should not be applied.
3.   Doctrine   of   Processual
Presumption
Facts:  Petitioner   and
respondent   were   married   in
Holland   on   September   25,   1990.
Petitioner   gave   birth   to   their
son who was a minor upon filing
of the case against respondent.
Eventually,  their marriage bond
ended   on   July   19,   1995   by
virtue   of   a   Divorce   Decree
issued by the appropriate Court
of Holland. Petitioner together
with   her   son   returned   to   Cebu
City.   According   to   the
petitioner,   respondent   made   a
promise   to   provide   support   to
their   son   in   the   amount   of
17,500   pesos   monthly.   However,
respondent   failed   to   keep   his
promise.   Upon   finding   out   that
respondent   got   married   in   Cebu
City,   petitioner   filed   a   case
against   respondent   under   the
provisions   of   RA   9262   for   the
latter’s   unjust   refusal   to
provide   support   in   favor   of
their   son.   Petitioner   contends
that   under   Article   195   of   the
Family   Code,   respondent   is
obliged to support his son. The
trial   court   then   dismissed   the
case   on   the   ground   that   the
information   filed   against   did
not   constitute   an   offense   on
the ground that he is an alien.
Thus the present petition.
Issues: WON an alien is obliged
to   support   his   minor   child
under Philippine Law?
Ruling:  Yes.   Respondent   is
obliged   to   support   his   minor
child   under   Philippine   Law.
Petitioner   however   is   mistaken
in   relying   Article   195   of   the
Family   Code   in   demanding
support   from   respondent   since
Article   15   of   the   Civil   Code
stresses   the   principle   of
Nationality.   The   obligation   to
provide   support   is   a   part   of
Family   rights   and   duties.   As
such,   with   respect   to   the
provisions   of   the   Family   Code,
it   only   applies   to   Filipino
Citizens.   With   respect   to   the
respondent,   the   law   that
applies   to   him   would   be   the
laws   of   his   country   with
respect   to   family   rights   and
duties.   This   does   not   conclude
however   that   respondent   is   not
obliged to support his son.  foreign   law,   judgment   or   order
In international law, the party
who wants to have a foreign law
applied   to   a   dispute   or   case
has   the   burden   of   proving   the
foreign   law.   As   such,
respondent   has   the   burden   in
proving   that   the   laws   of   his
country   do   not   oblige   him   to
support   his   son.   In   this   case,
respondent   only   pleaded   the
laws   of   his   country   (Holland)
but   failed   to   prove   the   same.
Further, the courts do not take
judicial notices of the laws of
a   foreign   country.   The   alien
alleging   the   same   has   the
burden of proving it.  criminal   law   which   applies   to
Since   respondent   failed   to
prove   the   laws   of   his   country
which   do   not   oblige   him   to
provide   support.   The   doctrine
of processual presumption shall
be   applied.   Under   this
doctrine,   if   the   foreign   law
involved   is   not   properly
pleaded   and   proved,   our   courts
will   presume   that   the   foreign
law is the same as our local or
domestic   or   internal   law.  As
such,   it   is   now   presumed   that
the laws of the foreign country
are   the   same   as   that   of   our
laws   and   therefore   respondent
is   obliged   to   provide   support
to his minor son. 
Further,   even   if   respondent
successfully pleaded and proved
foreign   laws   which   do   not
obliged   him   to   provide   support
to his son, such should not be
applied. According to our laws,
when   the   foreign   law,   judgment
or   contract   is   contrary   to   a
sound   and   established   public
policy   of   the   forum,   the   said
shall not be applied. Moreover,
foreign   law   should   not   be
applied   when   its   application
would work undeniable injustice
to the citizens or residents of
the   forum.   To   give   justice   is
the   most   important   function   of
law;   hence,   a   law,   or   judgment
or   contract   that   is   obviously
unjust   negates   the   fundamental
principles of Conflict of Laws.
Additional notes:
­Respondent   can   be   held   liable
under   RA   9262   applying
territoriality   principle   of
all   persons   living   and
sojourning in the Philippines.
­Prescription   does   not   apply
since   in   the   case   at   bar
failure to provide support is a
continuing crime.
31.  Orion   Savings   Bank   VS
Shigekane Suzuki

Facts:
In   the   first   week   of   August
2003,   respondent   Shigekane
Suzuki   (Suzuki),   a   Japanese
national,   met   with   Ms.   Helen
Soneja   (Soneja)   to   inquire
about   a   condominium   unit   and   a
parking   slot   at   Cityland
Pioneer,   Mandaluyong   City,
allegedly   owned   by   Yung   Sam
Kang   (Kang),   a   Korean   national
and   a   Special   Resident
Retiree's   Visa   (SRRV)   holder.
Soneja   informed   Suzuki   that
Unit   536   and   Parking   Lot   42
were   for   sale   for   3M   and   that
their   titles   were   clean.   After
a   negotiation,   the   price   was
lowered   to   2.8M.   Suzuki   then
issued a BPI check for 100k as
downpayment   and   on   Aug   21   2003
issued   another   check   for   2.7M
representing   the   balance.
Suzuki and Kang then executed a
Deed   of   Absolute   Sale   dated
August   26,   20039   covering   Unit
No.   536   and   Parking   Slot   No.
42.   Soon   after,   Suzuki   took
possession   of   the   condominium
unit   and   parking   lot,   and
commenced the renovation of the
interior   of   the   condominium
unit.   Kang   thereafter   made
several   representations   with
Suzuki to deliver the titles to
the properties, which were then
allegedly   in   possession   of
Alexander Perez (Perez, Orion’s
Loans Officer) for safekeeping.
Despite several verbal demands,
Kang   failed   to   deliver   the
documents.   Suzuki   later   on
learned   that   Kang   had   left   the
country,   prompting   Suzuki   to
verify   the   status   of   the
properties with the Mandaluyong
City Registry of Deeds. 
Before   long,   Suzuki   learned
that   CCT   No.   9118   represe   o
nting   the   title   to   the   Parking
Slot   No.   42   contained   no
annotations   although   it
remained   under   the   name   of
Cityland   Pioneer.   To   protect
his   interests,   Suzuki
thenexecuted   an   Affidavit   of
Adverse Claim12 dated September
8,   2003,   withthe   Registry   of
Deeds   of   Mandaluyong   City.
Suzuki   then   demanded   the
delivery   of   the   titles.13
Orion,   (through   Perez),
however,   refused   to   surrender
the titles. 
On   October   14,   2003,   Suzuki
received   a   letter   from   Orion’s
counsel   dated   October   9,   2003,
stating   that   Kang   obtained
another   loan   in   the   amount   of
₱1,800,000.00. When Kang failed
to pay, he executed a Dacion en
Pagodated   February   2,   2003,   in
favorof Orion covering Unit No.
536.   Orion,   however,   did   not
register   the   Dacion   en   Pago,
until   October   15,   2003.   On
January   27,   2004,   Suzuki   filed
a   complaint   for   specific
performance and damages against
Kang and Orion. 
The Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch   213,   Mandaluyong   City
ruled   infavor   of   Suzuki   and
ordered   Orion   to   deliver   the
CCT   Nos.   18186   and   9118   to
Suzuki. On appeal to the CA, CA
partially   granted   Orion’s
appeal   and   sustained   the   RTC
insofar   as   it   upheld   Suzuki’s
right over the properties.
Issue:     WON   the   Dead   of   sale
executed   by   Kang   in   favour   of
Suzuki   is   null   and   void.
Petitoner   alleges   that   under
Korean law, any conveyance of a
conjugal   property   should   be
made   with   the   consent   of   both
spouses.
Held:  only domestic or the law of the
We   deny   the   petition   for   lack
of   merit.   Philippine   Law
governs   the   transfer   of   real
property.  the   South   Korean   law   on   the
It   is   a   universal   principle
thatreal   or   immovable   property
is   exclusively   subject   to   the
laws   of   the   country   or   state
where   it   is   located.21   The
reason   is   found   in   the   very
nature   of   immovable   property   —
its   immobility.   Immovables   are
part   of   the   country   and   so
closely   connected   to   it   that
all rights over them have their
natural   center   of   gravity
there.   Thus,   all   matters
concerning   the   titleand
disposition ofreal property are
determined   by   what   is   known   as
the   lex   loci   rei   sitae,   which
can alone prescribe the mode by
which   a   title   canpass   from   one
person   to   another,   or   by   which
an   interest   therein   can   be
gained   or   lost.23   This   general
principle   includes   all   rules
governing   the   descent,
alienation   and   transfer   of
immovable   property   and   the
validity,   effect   and
construction of wills and other
conveyances. On the other hand,
property   relations   between
spouses   are   governed
principally by the national law
of   the   spouses.26   However,   the
party   invoking   the   application
of a foreign law has the burden
of proving the foreign law. The
foreign   law   is   a   question   of
fact to be properly pleaded and
proved as the judge cannot take
judicial   notice   of   a   foreign
law.27   He   is   presumed   to   know
forum.
In   the   present   case,   Orion,
unfortunately   failed   to   prove
conjugal   ownership   ofproperty.
It   merely   attached   a
"Certification from the Embassy
of   the   Republic   of   Korea"29   to
prove   the   existence   of   Korean
Law.   This   certification,   does
not qualify as sufficient proof
of   the   conjugal   nature   of   the
property   for   there   is   no
showing   that   it   was   properly
authenticated bythe seal of his
office,   as   required   under
Section 24 of Rule 132.
Accordingly,   the   International
Law   doctrine   of   presumed­
identity approach or processual
presumption   comes   into   play,
i.e.,   where   a   foreign   law   is
not pleaded or, evenif pleaded,
is   not   proven,   the   presumption
is that foreign law is the same
as Philippine Law.
Under   Philippine   Law,   the
phrase   "Yung   Sam   Kang   ‘married
to'   Hyun   Sook   Jung"   is   merely
descriptive of the civil status
of   Kang.   In   other   words,   the
import from the certificates of
title is that Kang is the owner
of   the   properties   as   they   are
registered   in   his   name   alone,
and that he is married to Hyun
Sook Jung.
We   are   not   unmindful   that   in
numerous   cases   we   have   held
that   registration   of   the
property   in   the   name   of   only
one   spouse   does   not   negate   the
possibility   of   it   being
conjugal   or   community
property.33   In   those   cases,
however,   there   was   proof   that
the   properties,   though
registered   in   the   name   of   only
one   spouse,   were   indeed   either
conjugal   or   community
properties. Accordingly, we see
no reason to declare as invalid
Kang’s   conveyance   in   favor   of
Suzuki for the supposed lack of
spousal consent.
The petitioner failed to adduce
sufficient   evidence   to   prove
the due execution of the Dacion
en Pago. . In the present case,
the   Deed   of   Sale   dated   August
26,   200335   between   Suzuki   and
Kang   was   admitted   by   Orion   and
was   properly   identified   by
Suzuki’s   witness   Ms.   Mary   Jane
Samin   (Samin).   It   is   not
disputed, too, that the Deed of
Sale   dated   August   26,   2003   was
consummated. On the other hand,
although   Orion   claims   priority
in right under the principle of
prius   tempore,   potior   jure
(i.e.,first   in   time,   stronger
in   right),   it   failedto   prove
the existence and due execution
of   the   Dacion   en   Pagoin   its
favor.
At   the   outset,   Orion   offered
the   Dacion   en   Pagoas   Exhibit
"5"with   submarkings   "5­a"   to
"5­c" to prove the existence of
the   February   6,   2003
transaction in its Formal Offer
dated   July   20,   2008.   Orion
likewise   offered   in   evidence
the   supposed   promissory   note
dated   September   4,   2002   as
Exhibit   "12"to   prove   the
existence   of   the   additional
₱800,000.00   loan.   Despite   the
exclusion   of   its   most   critical
documentary   evidence,   Orion
failed   to   make   a   tender
ofexcluded   evidence,   as
provided under Section 40, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court. For
this   reason   alone,   we   are
prevented   from   seriously
considering Exhibit "5" and its
submarkings and Exhibit "12" in
the present petition.
Moreover,   even   if   we   consider
Exhibit "5" and its submarkings
and Exhibit "12" in the present
petition,   the   copious
inconsistencies   and
contradictions   in   the
testimonial   and   documentary
evidence   of   Orion,   militate
against the conclusion that the
Dacion   en   Pagowas   duly
executed.   First,   there   appears
to   be   no   due   and   demandable
obligation   when   the   Dacion   en
Pago   was   executed,   contrary   to
the allegations of Orion. Also,
the   Dacion   en   Pago   was   first
mentioned   only   two   (2)   months
after Suzuki and Samin demanded
the   delivery   of   the   titles
sometime   in   August   2003,and
after   Suzuki   caused   the
annotation   of   his   affidavit   of
adverse   claim.   Records   show
that it was only on October 9,
2003,   when   Orion,   through   its
counsel,   Cristobal   Balbin
Mapile & Associates first spoke
of   the   Dacion   en   Pago.45   Not
even Perez mentioned any Dacion
en   Pago   on   October   1,   2003,
when   he   personally   received   a
letter   demanding   the   delivery
of the titles. 
These circumstances, aside from
the   glaring   inconsistencies   in
the   documents   and   testimony   of
Orion’s   witness,   indubitably
prove   the   spurious   nature   of
the Dacion en Pago.
With   the   conclusion   that   Orion
failed   to   prove   the
authenticity   of   the   Dacion   en
Pago, we see no reason for the
application   of   the   rules   on
double   sale   under   Article   1544
of   the   New   Civil   Code.   Suzuki,
moreover,   successfully   adduced
sufficient   evidence   to
establish   the   validity   of
conveyance in his favor.