Partisan conditions

Notes Jelen Ross for Boss: the Perot Phenomenon and Beyond

- In 1996 citizens’ trust in government registered a modest improvement, suggesting that the
electoral landscape when Perot made his second run was less favorable to his attempt than in 1992
[65].

- Citizens failed to distinguish between the major parties in their ability to solve the nation’s
problems in the early 1990s; they were also not particularly enthusiastic about them [69].

- In sum, in the 1990s a considerable segment of the public did not find either major political party
particularly relevant for dealing with the nation’s most pressing problems and, relatedly, did not
express a great deal of enthusiasm for them.

- By 1996, citizen trust in government had improved modestly and citizens express more confidence
in the major parties’ ability to address important problems [69].

- In 1990, 1991, and 1992 Perot supporters exhibited neutrality toward the major political parties
[81]. … Perot supporters do not express strong support for political parties in general; their mean
score on the feeling thermometer for political parties is 49.44 [81]. … The overall impression formed
of the partisan inclinations of the Perot supporters … is one of partisan independence [82].

- After 1992, Perot supporters became more favorable of political parties [82]. 1. The Republican
Party was more successful than their Democratic counterparts in enlisting the Perot supporters into
their ranks. 2. The level of affection of 1992 Perot voters for Perot himself diminished considerably
by 1996; the movement was unable to hold onto those who had supported it at its origin [83].

- Instead of: dissatisfied voter > votes third party, there is more evidence, in the case of Perot, for:
neutral voter > persuaded by third party candidate that the political system is inefficient [84]. Lacking
the moorings provided by strong attachments to the major political parties and lengthy experience
with the political system, these citizens were a group especially vulnerable to Perot’s message [84].

Notes Koch et al. The Perot Candidacy and Attitudes toward Government and Politics

- Perot’s candidacy elevated voter turnout in 1992 by raising the interest of his supporters [143].

Notes Southwell The Politics of Alienation: Nonvoting and Support for Third-Party Candidates
Among 18-30-year-olds

- Alienation: Alienated individuals may not regard a vote for an unlikely winner as “wasted,” but as
a statement of dissatisfaction. We suggest that alienated individuals were more likely to vote for
third-party candidates such as Ross Perot. Alienation can result in elevated turnout [100].

- Perot was described himself as an “outsider” who could “get things done” at a time when stories of
congressional gridlock dominated the media … Perot represented an alternative to “business as usual,”
and as such, had a special appeal to those disgruntled with the political system [100].

- Results: Perot attracted alienated youth in 1992, but lost their support in 1996 [105].

Notes Southwell & Everest The Electoral Consequences of Alienation: Nonvoting and Protest Voting
in the 1992 Presidential Race

- Alienation: It is argued that the context of the 1992 election was such that many alienated
individuals were provided with alternative outlets for expressing their frustration at the system. Such
individuals could protest the current state of political affairs by voting for a third party cndd. [44]. It is
suggested that the context of the 1992 election, specifically, the nature of the Perot candidacy,
transformed certain alienated individuals from likely nonvoter into voter [44].

- The protest voter may behave in an opposite manner to the strategic voter. He or she may
gravitate toward a third party candidate because that candidate has less chance of victory. The
protest voter has been described as one “who may vote for a third party not so much to unseat the
incumbent as to reduce the majority status of that incumbent and so send a message of
dissatisfaction” [44].

- The authors find that alienated individuals are less likely to vote, but if they do vote, they are more
likely to favor an “outsider” – a third party presidential candidate [48].

Notes Alvarez & Nagler Economics, Issues and the Perot Candidacy: Voter Choice in the 1992
Presidential Election

- Angry-voters: Perot does no better among the angry than among the satisfied [720].

Notes Owen & Dennis Anti-Partyism in the USA and Support for Ross Perot

- Perot demonstrated the viability of the ‘outsider principle’ in American politics. Americans have
often proven themselves susceptible to the appeal, especially in the short run, of the amateur
challenger of the powers that be. Because of Americans’ congenital mistrust of those who would
wield power over them, especially as entrenched incumbents, the amateur is applauded [394].

- Anti-party sentiments: There has been an increase in political independence among the mass
public. Citizens fail to see a distinction between the two party options, and they are less favorably
disposed toward political parties as institutions. Perhaps most notably, a substantial number of
Americans feel that the political process might be better off without any political parties at all [396].

- Anti-party sentiments, and especially the rising number of independent voters, have contributed to
Perot’s success. It is not so much that Perot himself was an especially appealing option to all 19% of
the voters he attracted. Instead, Perot allowed voters to register their dissatisfaction with the
established order, which includes the existing party structure [396].

Notes Abramson et al. Change an Continuity in the 1992 Elections

- Perot voters were less likely to care who won the election. … Perot fared substantially better
among whites who felt little concern about the electoral outcome [121]. … Despite the low turnout
among Americans who did not care much who won, Perot may have mobilized Americans who do
not generally care about elections [122]. [How does this compare to Alvarez & Nagler?].

- There has been a substantial decline in political trust during the last three decades. … Perot tended
to do somewhat better among voters who were politically cynical than among those who trusted the
government [122]. … Perot also fared somewhat better among whites with low feelings of political
effectiveness [122]. Perot fared much better among whites with relatively weak partisan loyalties, a
group that generally has a low turnout. Among white voters who were strong party identifiers, only
8% voted for Perot; among those who were weak party identifiers, 23% voted for Perot [123].

- Voter motivations: It seems likely that at least some Perot voters supported him because they
failed to see as much of a policy difference between Bush and Clinton as major party voters did. And,
of course, Perot encouraged them by trying to persuade them that it made very little difference
whether Bush or Clinton won. Nonetheless, most Perot voters did see clear policy differences
between the major party candidates [192].
- Retrospective evaluations of Perot voters: Perot voters disapproved of Bush’s performance by a
nearly two to one margin [218]. … Perot had a somewhat more negative assessment [of the
government] than either Clinton or Bush voters. Seven out of ten Perot voters believed that the
government was doing a poor job [218]. … Half the Perot voters thought that neither party would do
a better job, about the same percentage as among Bush voters [218].

- In short, Perot voters were clearly negative toward Bush and the Republican party, but only a fourth
of them thought that the Democratic party would do a better job of solving the most important
national problem. Since most Perot voters were attracted to neither party, their vote for an
independent candidate makes sense. One reason for their lack of confidence in the Democrats (or
Republicans) is that Perot voters were much less likely than major party voters to be strong party
identifiers, and they were more likely to be self-professed independents [219].

- Support for Wallace, Anderson, and Perot exhibits two basic similarities with regard to partisanship.
First, all three drew more support from independents than from partisans. … Second, each
independent candidate drew more support from those who identified with the incumbent’s party
than from those who were loyal to the opposition. … In each case, the incumbent president was
unpopular, and it seems that voters from the unpopular incumbent’s party were more willing to
defect, whether to the opposition party’s candidate or to a more “neutral” candidate, than
opposition party loyalists were to support the independent candidate [244].

- Summary: It thus appears that the most important characteristics of Perot voters were their
relative independence of party, their dissatisfaction with the government’s handling of the most
important problem, and their expectation that neither major party would solve that problem [246].