3/1/2019

Hazard Identification

Chapter Outline

 Introduction
 Process hazards checklist
 Hazards survey
 HAZOP studies

1
 3/1/2019

Instructional Learning Objectives

After completing this
chapter, students should
be able to do the
following:
 Identify hazards using
process hazards
checklist
 Identify hazards using
Dow indexes
 Identify hazards using
HAZOP

What is Hazard? What is Risk?

 A hazard is any source of potential damage, harm

or adverse health effects on something or someone
under certain conditions at work.

 A hazard is anything with the potential for

producing/resulting in an accident and harm

What is Risk?
 Risk = Probability of accident x Consequences
in lost life / money

2
 3/1/2019

What are examples of a hazard?

 Hazards include practices or conditions that

release uncontrolled energy like:
• an object that could fall from a height (potential
or gravitational energy),
• a run-away chemical reaction (chemical
energy),
• the release of compressed gas or steam
(pressure; high temperature),
• entanglement of hair or clothing in rotating
equipment (kinetic energy), or
• contact with electrodes of a battery or capacitor
(electrical energy).

Introduction

 What are the hazards? (Hazard identification)

 What can go wrong and how?
 What are the chances? (Risk Assessment)
 What are the consequences?
 Risk assessment: determination of events that can
produce an accident, the probability of those events, and
the consequences.
 The consequences include human injury or loss of life,
loss of production, damage to the environment, etc.
 Hazard identification + risk assessment  Hazard
evaluation / Hazard Analysis

3
 3/1/2019

Hazard Identification

Why? To identify hazards so that they can be

eliminated or controlled.
How? Using a number of available methods.

 Many methods are available for hazard identification

and risk assessment and no single approach is best
suited for any application.

Hazard ID / Risk Assessment Procedure

System description
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION METHODS:
- Process hazard checklist Hazard identification
- Hazard survey: DOW index
- HAZOP hazard & operability study
Scenario
- Safety review identification

RISK ASSESSMENT:
Accident Accident
- What can go wrong & how ? probability consequences
- What are the chances ?
- Consequences ?
Risk determination
EXTREMES:
- Low probability risk &
hazard N
- Minimal consequences Modify design
acceptable
?
Y
Accept system

4
 3/1/2019

Hazard Identification

 Some of the popular hazards identification

method;
• Process Hazards Checklist
• Hazards survey
• HAZOP studies
 Other hazard identification techniques are
safety review, what if analysis, human error
analysis, failure mode, effects and criticality
analysis (FMECA), etc.

Process Hazards Checklist (PHC)

 PHC is a list of problems and areas to be checked
 Can be used during the design of a process or before
process operation – reminder on potential problem areas.
 A typical process design safety checklist is given in Figure
10-2.
 The design of the check-list depends on intent.
 A checklist intended for use during the initial design of the
process will be different from a checklist used for a process
change.
 Checklists should be applied only during the preliminary
stages of hazard identification and should not be used as a
replacement for a more complete hazard identification
procedure.
 Checklists are most effective in identifying hazards arising
from process design, plant layout, storage of chemicals,
electrical systems, etc.

5
 3/1/2019

11

Hazard Survey

 Can be a simple inventory of hazardous materials or

a complicated rigorous procedure
 Use rating system and rank the hazards based on the
relative ranking. May contain a mechanism for
estimating the dollar loss in the event of accident.
 Example of established hazard survey is:
• Dow Fire and Explosion Index (F&EI)

6
 3/1/2019

Hazard Survey
Dow F&EI Procedure
Dow F&EI Procedure
 Divide the process into separate process units (pump, heat exchanger,
reactor, etc)
 Determine material factor (MF) from Table 10-1. (More rigorous data
available from Dow’s Chemical Exposure Index Guide, 4th Ed. (AIChE,
1994).
 Assess the general process hazards by using penalties factor
 General process hazards factor (F1) and special process hazards (F2) are
multiplied to give unit hazard factor (F3).
 The Dow F&EI is computed using F3 x MF.
 Identify the degree hazards using Table 10-2.
 The consequences of an accident is determined using maximum probable
property damage (MPPD) and the maximum probable days outage
(MPDO)
 The completed analysis is given by the Risk Analysis Summary from
Figure 10-4.

14

7
 3/1/2019

15

Example - Dow F&EI Procedure

Your plant is considering the installation of a new railcar tank
unloading facility. The facility will unload nominal 25,000-gal tank
cars containing either pure butadiene or cyclohexane. The
unloading system will be equipped with an emergency shutdown
system with remotely operated block valves. The unloading
operation will be done by computer control. The railcars are inerted
with nitrogen to a pressure of 40 psig, and the railcar relief
system has a set pressure of 75 psig. The unloading operating
instructions are written and have been reviewed by the corporate
technical staff. Determine the Dow F&EI for this operation.

16

8
 3/1/2019

17

Solution - Dow F&EI Procedure

 The resulting calculation shows an F&EI value of 106

 This unloading station is an intermediate hazard.

18

9
 3/1/2019

Hazard & Operability Study

A scenario…
You and your family are on a road trip by using a car in
the middle of the night. You were replying a text
message while driving at 100 km/h and it was raining
heavily. The car hits a deep hole and one of your tire
blows. You hit the brake, but due to slippery road and
your car tire thread was thin, the car skidded and was
thrown off the road.

What is the cause of the accident?

What is the consequence of the event?

What can we do to prevent all those things to happen in

the first place?

Can we make it more systematic?

Parameter Guideword Possible Consequences Action Safeguard
Causes

Car speed Too fast Rushing Skidded when - Slow down -ABS brake system
Too slow emergency brake - Speed up -Safety belt
- Air bag
Tire No thread Tire too old, Car skidded - Check frequently
Less thread often speeding - Have spare tire
and emergency
break
Window Low Rain Cannot see the
visibility Very low road

Car light Dim -Stop car

No light -Go to nearest
garage
-Use emergency
signal

Road With holes Breaks the car tire - Put a signboard

Rocky -Street lights

Travel time Night No street light -Travel during daylight

Foggy 20

10
 3/1/2019

What is HAZOP?
• Systematic technique to IDENTIFY potential HAZard and
OPerating problems
• A formal systematic rigorous examination to the process and
engineering facets of a production facility
• A qualitative technique based on “guide-words” to help provoke
thoughts about the way deviations from the intended operating
conditions can lead to hazardous situations or operability
problems
• HAZOP is basically for safety
• Hazards are the main concern
• Operability problems degrade plant performance (product
quality, production rate, profit)
• Considerable engineering insight is required - engineers working
independently could develop different results

Objective & Purpose of HAZOP

• To identifying cause and the consequences of
perceived mal-operations of equipment and associated
operator interfaces in the context of the complete system.

• Emphasize upon the operating integrity of a system – lead

to most potential and detectable deviations which could
possibly arise in the course of normal operating routine

• It is important to remember at all times that HAZOP is an

identifying technique and not intended as a means of
solving problems nor is the method intended to be used
solely as an undisciplined means of searching for
hazardous scenarios.

11
 3/1/2019

HAZOP Study Application

HAZOP study are applied during :

• Normal operation

• Foreseeable changes in operation, e.g. upgrading,

reduced output, plant start-up and shut-down

• Suitability of plant materials, equipment and

instrumentation

• Provision for failure of plant services, e. g . steam,

electricity, cooling water

• Provision for maintenance.

Documents Needed for HAZOP Study

 For Preliminary HAZOP
• Process Flow Sheet ( PFS or PFD )
• Description of the Process

 For Detailed HAZOP

• Piping and Instrumentation Diagram ( P & ID )
• Process Calculations
• Process Data Sheets
• Instrument Data Sheets
• Interlock Schedules
• Layout Requirements
• Hazardous Area Classification
• Description of the Process

12
 3/1/2019

Before Detailed HAZOP

 The development of the detailed P&I Diagram is the last
stage of the process design.

 The development will follow a normal standard

procedure and include the following considerations :
• Basic process control system - this is a closed loop control to
maintain process within an acceptable operating region.
• Alarm system - this is to bring unusual situation to attention of
a person monitoring the process in the plant
• Safety interlock system - this is to stop operation or part of the
process during emergencies.
• Relief system - this is to divert material safely during
emergencies.

HAZOP Study Procedure

• Procedure in HAZOP study consist of examining the

process and instrumentation (P&I) line diagram ,
process line by process line .
• A list of guide words is used to generate deviations
from normal operation corresponding to all conceivable
possibilities.
• Guide words covering every parameter relevant to the
system under review :i.e. flow rate and quality,
pressure, temperature, viscosity, components etc.

13
 3/1/2019

HAZOP Study Procedure

HAZOP keeps all team
members focused on the
same topic and enables
them to work as a team
1+1=3

NODE: Concentrate on one location in the process

PARAMETER: Consider each process variable individually

(P, T, L, composition, operator action, etc.)

GUIDE WORD: Pose a series of standard questions about deviations

from normal conditions. We assume that we know a safe “normal”
operation.

HAZOP Study Procedure

NODE: Pipe after pump and splitter

PARAMETER*: Flow rate

GUIDE WORD*: Less (less than normal value)

• DEVIATION: less flow than normal A group
• CAUSE: of deviation, can be more than one members focus
on the same
• CONSEQUENCE: of the deviation/cause issue
simultaneously
• ACTION: initial idea for correction/
prevention/mitigation

14
 3/1/2019

HAZOP Study Procedure

1. Detailed flow sheet—break into a number of process units
2. Choose a study node (e.g., vessel, line, operating instruction)
3. Design intent of study node – e.g. V-1 to store benzene liquid
4. Pick a process parameter – e.g. flow, level (Table 10-4 & 10-5)
5. Apply guide word to process parameter to suggest possible
deviations – e.g. NO, MORE, LESS, etc. (Refer Table 10-3)
6. (if deviation applicable) Possible causes? (Note protective
systems)
7. Evaluate consequences of deviation (if any)
8. Recommend action (what? by whom? by when?)
9. Record all information
10. Repeat steps 5 – 9 until all applicable guide words have been
applied to chosen process parameter
11. Repeat steps 4 – 10 until all applicable process parameters have
been considered for given study node
12. Repeat steps 2 – 11 until all study nodes have been considered.
Proceed to next section on flow sheet

HAZOP Study Flow Chart

30

15
 3/1/2019

Guidelines for Division into Sections

 Choices of lines – P&ID must be divided logically. Not too many
sections. Factors to be considered :
• Each section should contain active components, which gives rise to
deviations. E.g. piping which contains control valves can give rise to
flow deviations, heat exchangers can cause T deviations.
• Materials in section – contain significant amount of hazardous
materials.
• Section based on process and states of materials. Only 1 process
operation per 1 section.
 General guidelines :
• Define each major process component as a section. Usually anything
assigned equipment number should be considered a major process
component.
• Define one line section between each major process component.
• Define additional line sections for each branches off the main process
flow.
• Define a process section at each connection to existing equipment.

HAZOP Study Procedure

GUIDE WORDS *

DEVIATION ( FROM DESIGN AND/OR

OPERATING INTENT )
POSSIBLE CAUSES

CONSEQUENCES

ACTION(S) REQUIRED OR
RECOMMENDEED

16
 3/1/2019

33

Guide Words

NONE No forward flow when there should be

MORE More of any parameter than there should be,
e.g more flow, more pressure, more
temperature, etc.
LESS As above, but "less of" in each instance
PART System composition difference from what it
should be
MORE THAN More "components" present than there should
be for example, extra phase, impurities
OTHER What needs to happen other than normal
operation, e.g. start up,shutdown,
maintenance

17
 3/1/2019

Guide Words

NONE e.g., NO FLOW caused by blockage; pump

failure; valve closed or jammed : leak: valve open;
suction vessel empty; delivery side over -
pressurized : vapor lock ; control failure
REVERSE e.g., REVERSE FLOW caused by pump failure :
NRV failure or wrongly inserted ; wrong routing;
delivery over pressured; back- siphoning ; pump
reversed
MORE OF e.g., MORE FLOW caused by reduced delivery
head ; surging ; suction pressurised ; controller
failure ; valve stuck open leak ; incorrect
instrument reading.

Guide Words

MORE OF MORE TEMPERATURE, pressure caused by external

fires; blockage ; shot spots; loss of control ; foaming;
gas release; reaction; explosion; valve closed; loss of
level in heater; sun.
LESS OF e.g., LESS FLOW caused by pump failure; leak; scale
in delivery; partial blockage ; sediments ; poor suction
head; process turndown.
LESS e.g., low temperature, pressure caused by Heat loss;
vaporisation ; ambient conditions; rain ; imbalance of
input and output ; sealing ; blocked vent .
PART OF Change in composition high or low concentration of
mixture; additional reactions in reactor or other
location ; feed change.

18
 3/1/2019

Guide Words

MORE THAN Impurities or extra phase Ingress of

contaminants such as air, water, lube oils;
corrosion products; presence of other process
materials due to internal leakage ; failure of
isolation ; start-up features.
OTHER Activities other than normal operation start-up
and shutdown of plant ; testing and inspection ;
sampling ; maintenance; activating catalyst;
removing blockage or scale ; corrosion;
process emergency ; safety procedures
activated ; failure of power, fuel, steam , air,
water or inert gas; emissions and lack of
compatibility with other emission and effluents.

Strength of HAZOP
• A systematic, reasonably comprehensive and flexible.
• Suitable for team use - possible to incorporate the
general experience available.
• Gives good identification of cause and excellent
identification of critical deviations.
• Use of keywords is effective and the whole group is
able to participate.
• Excellent well-proven method for studying large plant
in a specific /structured manner.
• Identifies virtually all significant deviations on the plant.

19
 3/1/2019

Weakness of HAZOP

• Very time consuming and laborious with a tendency for

boredom for analysts.

• A hardware-oriented and process-oriented, although the

technique should be amenable to human error
application.

• Generate many failure events with insignificance

consequences and generate many failure events which
have the same consequences.

• Does not identify all causes of deviations and therefore

omits many scenarios.

Weakness of HAZOP
• Little consideration on the probabilities of events or
consequences. The group generally let their collective
experiences decide whether deviations are meaningful.
• Poor where multiple-combination events can have severe
effects.
• Assume defects or deterioration of materials of
construction will not arise.
• When identifying consequences, HAZOP tends to
encourage listing these as resulting in action by
emergency control measures without considering that
such action might fail. It tends to ignore the contribution
which can be made by operator interventions

20
 3/1/2019

Preliminary HAZOP Example

Refer to reactor system shown.
Cooling
Coils The reaction is exothermic. A cooling
Monomer
Feed system is provided to remove the
excess energy of reaction. In the event
Cooling Water to of cooling function is lost, the
Sewer
temperature of reactor would increase.
This would lead to an increase in
Cooling reaction rate leading to additional
Water In energy release.

The result could be a runaway reaction

with pressures exceeding the bursting
pressure of the reactor. The
temperature within the reactor is
TC measured and is used to control the
Thermocouple cooling water flow rate by a valve.

Perform HAZOP Study

Preliminary HAZOP on Reactor - Example

Guide Word Deviation Causes Consequences Action

NO No cooling Temperature
increase in
reactor
REVERSE Reverse Failure of
cooling flow water source
resulting in
backward flow
MORE More Instruct
cooling flow operators on
procedures
AS WELL AS Reactor Check
product in maintenance
coils procedures
and schedules
OTHER THAN Another Water source
material contaminated
besides
cooling
water

21
 3/1/2019

Preliminary HAZOP on Reactor - Answer

Guide Word Deviation Causes Consequences Action

NO No cooling Cooling water Temperature Install high

valve increase in reactor temperature
malfunction alarm (TAH)
REVERSE Reverse Failure of water Less cooling, Install check
cooling flow source resulting possible runaway valve
in backward flow reaction

MORE More cooling Control valve Too much cooling, Instruct

flow failure, operator reactor cool operators on
fails to take procedures
action on alarm
AS WELL AS Reactor More pressure in Off-spec product Check
product in reactor maintenance
coils procedures and
schedules
OTHER THAN Another Water source May be cooling If less cooling,
material contaminated ineffective and TAH will detect.
besides effect on the If detected,
cooling water reaction isolate water
source. Back up
water source?

Case Study – Shell & Tube Heat

Exchanger
 Using relevant guide works, perform HAZOP study on
shell & tube heat exchanger

Process
fluid

Cooling water

22
 3/1/2019

HAZOP on Heat Exchanger – Answer

Guide Word Deviation Causes Consequences Action
Less Less flow Pipe Temperature of High
of cooling blockage process fluid Temperature
water remains Alarm
constant
More More Failure of Temperature of Low
cooling cooling process fluid Temperature
flow water valve decrease Alarm

More of More Failure of Bursting of Install high

pressure on process fluid tube pressure alarm
tube side valve
Contamination Contaminat Leakage of Contamination Proper
ion of tube and of process fluid maintenance
process cooling and operator
fluid line water goes alert
in
Corrosion Corrosion Hardness of Less cooling Proper
of tube cooling and crack of maintenance
water tube

HAZOP on Heat Exchanger – Answer

Guide Word Deviation Causes Consequences Action
NONE No cooling Failure of inlet Process fluid Install
water flow cooling water temperature is not Temperature
valve to open lowered accordingly indicator before
and after the
process fluid line
Install TAH
MORE More cooling Failure of inlet Output of Process Install
water flow cooling water fluid temperature Temperature
valve to close too low indicator before
and after process
fluid line
Install TAL
LESS Less cooling Pipe leakage Process fluid Installation of
water temperature too low flow meter

REVERSE Reverse Failure of Product off set Install check

process fluid process fluid valve (whether it
flow inlet valve is crucial have to
check?)
CONTAMINATION Process fluid Contamination Outlet temperature Proper
contamination in cooling water too low maintenance and
operator alert

23
 3/1/2019

Terminology
Nodes
 The locations (on piping and Instrumentation drawings and
procedures) at which the process parameters are
investigated for deviations is called Nodes.
Intention
 The intention defines how the plant is expected to operate
in the absence of deviations at the study nodes. This can
take a number of forms and can either be descriptive or
diagrammatic; e.g., flowsheets, line diagrams, P&IDs.

Terminology
Deviation
 Deviations are departures from the intention which are discovered
by systematically applying the guide words (e.g., “more pressure”).
Some deviations can be conveniently derived from a combination
of Guide-Words and Process Parameter. For example NO
(Guideword) FLOW (parameters) produces NO FLOW as deviation.
Causes
 These are the reasons why deviations might occur. Once a
deviation has been shown to have a credible cause, it can be
treated as a meaningful deviation. These causes can be hardware
failures, human errors, an unanticipated process state (e.g.,
change of composition), external disruptions (e.g., loss of power),
etc.

24
 3/1/2019

Terminology
Consequence
 The primary purpose of the HAZOP is identification of scenarios
that would lead to the release of hazardous or flammable material
into the atmosphere, thus exposing workers to injury. In order to
make this determination it is always necessary to determine, as
exactly as possible, all consequences of any credible causes of a
release that are identified by the group. If the team concludes
from the consequences that a particular cause of a deviation
results in an operability problem only, then the discussion should
end and the team should move on to the next cause, deviation or
node. If the team determines that the cause will result in the
release of hazardous or flammable material, then safeguards
should be identified.

Terminology
Existing Provision / Protection / Safeguard
 Safeguards should be included whenever the team determines that
a combination of cause and consequence presents a credible
process hazard. What constitutes a safeguard can be summarized
based on the following general criteria:
 Those systems, engineered designs and written procedures that are
designed to prevent a catastrophic release of hazardous or
flammable material.
 Those systems that are designed to detect and give early warning
following the initiating cause of a release of hazardous or
flammable material.
 Those systems or written procedures that mitigate the
consequences of a release of hazardous or flammable material.

25
 3/1/2019

Terminology
Action / Recommendation
 Recommendations are made when the safeguards for a
given hazard scenario, as judged by an assessment of the
risk of the scenario, are inadequate to protect against the
hazard. Action Items are those recommendations for
whom an individual or department has been assigned.

Hazard Identification Techniques - Overview

 Checklists - questions to assist in hazard

Increasing effort required

identification
 Brainstorming - whatever anyone can think of
 What If Analysis - possible outcomes of change
 HAZOP - identifies “process plant” type incidents
 FMEA/FMECA - equipment failure causes
 Task Analysis – maintenance activities, procedures
 Fault Tree Analysis - combinations of failures

52

26
 3/1/2019

OverviewofofSome
Overview SomeMethods
Methods
METHOD CHARACTERISTICS ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES
– Simple set of prompts or checklist – Highly valuable as a cross check – Tends to stifle creative thinking
questions to assist in hazard review tool following application of – Used alone introduces the potential
identification other techniques of limiting study to already known
– Can be developed progressively to – Useful as a shop floor tool to review hazards - no new hazard types are
Checklists
capture corporate learning of continued compliance with safety identified
organisation mgmt system – Checklists on their own will rarely
– Particularly useful in early analysis of be able to satisfy regulatory
change within projects requirements
 A defined method with rules  Simple to moderately complicated  Usually used only for collection
 Brainstorming processes or procedures of information and screening
What-If  Focuses on hazards that are  Very simple method to lead
unforeseen
 More documentation
 Very structured approach using  Complicated process or  Time consuming
guideword/parameter combinations procedures  May spend time discussing
HAZOP
 Focuses on all deviations from  Complete/thorough operability issues rather than
normal operations  Less reliance on “experts” safety
 Equipment failures  Complicated systems  Single failure modes only
FMEA  Systematic evaluation of  Expert dependent
component failures
– Graphical technique approach – Quantitative - defines probabilities – Need to have identified the top
– Provides a systematic description of the to each event which can be used to event first
combinations of possible occurrences calculate the probability of the top – More difficult than other
in a system which can result in an event techniques to document
FTA identified undesirable outcome (top – Easy to read and understand hazard – Fault trees can become rather
event) profile complex
– Easily expanded to bow tie diagram – Time consuming approach
by addition of event tree – Quantitative data needed to
perform properly

PHA in the Process Lifecycle Stages

CCPS - Center for

Chemical Process
Safety. (2008).
Guidelines for
hazard evaluation
procedures. New
York, USA:
American Institute
of Chemical
Engineers (AIChE).

27
 3/1/2019

Summary

 Identify hazards using process hazards checklist

• Preset questions to assist in hazard identification

 Identify hazards using Dow indexes

• Use rating system and rank the hazards based on the
relative ranking

 Identify hazards using HAZOP

• identifies “process plant” type incidents
• Utilizing information on process flow & control

55

56

28