THE ROLE OF RECIPROCITY IN

INTERNATIONAL LAW

SUBMITTED BY: SUBMITTED TO:

AMAN RAI MS. ANUKRITI MISHRA

B.A. LL.B. (HONS.) (FACULTY OF LAW)
SEMESTER IV, SECTION B
ROLL NO. – 18

PROJECT REPORT

PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

SUBMITTED ON:

15.02.2017

HIDAYATULLAH NATIONAL LAW

UNIVERSITY, NEW RAIPUR
 The Role Reciprocity in International Law

Acknowledgements

I, Aman Rai, would like to humbly present this project to Ms. Anukriti Mishra. I would first
of all like to express my most sincere gratitude to Ms. Anukriti Mishra for his encouragement
and guidance regarding several aspects of this project. I am thankful for being given the
opportunity of doing a project on ‘The role of Reciprocity in International Law’.

I am thankful to the library staff as well as the IT lab staff for all the conveniences they have
provided me with, which have played a major role in the completion of this paper.

I would like to thank God for keeping me in good health and senses to complete this project.

Last but definitely not the least; I am thankful to my seniors for all their support, tips and
valuable advice whenever needed. I present this project with a humble heart.

Aman Rai

SEMESTER IV

SEC. B (Roll No. 18)

2
 The Role Reciprocity in International Law

INTRODUCTION

At the world level, the political scenario is somewhat anarchic, i.e. there is no common or
‘World Government’. Thomas Hobbes described the state of nature or anarchy to be
characterised by “Bellum omnium contra omnes”, a Latin phrase meaning "the war of all
against all".1 But, so far, this was war has not ensued, which essentially means that even
sovereign governments that recognize no common authority engage in limited cooperation.
The anarchic structure of world politics does mean, that the achievement of cooperation can
depend neither on deference to hierarchical authority nor on centralized enforcement.2 On the
contrary, if cooperation is to emerge, whatever produces it must be consistent with the
principles of sovereignty and self-help.3

To put is simply, in international relations, the principle of reciprocity states that favours,
benefits, or penalties that are granted by one state to the citizens or legal entities of another,
should be returned in kind. For example, reciprocity has been used in the reduction of tariffs,
the grant of copyrights to foreign authors, the mutual recognition and enforcement of
judgments, and the relaxation of travel restrictions and visa requirements, and it also governs
agreements on extradition.

As Keohane describes it, there are two aspects of reciprocity that constitute, at least in
qualified form, essential dimensions of the concept: contingency and equivalence4 and based
on these there are responses from one party, viz. cooperation and defiance.

Dealing with the simplest situation, including only two parties, depending on these two
possible reactions there are four possible outcomes. When both the parties cooperate, it is
called reciprocity (in the positive sense), when one party cooperates and the other defects, it
is altruism on the part of cooperating party while the other party acted selfishly, and finally

1
Hobbes Thomas, Of Man, Being the First Part of Leviathan, Vol. XXXIV, Part 5, The Harvard Classics, New
York: P.F. Collier & Son, 1909–14.
2
Keohane Robert 0., Reciprocity in international relation, International Organization, Vol. 40, No. 1 ( Winter,
1986), MIT Press, at 1.
3
Keohane Robert 0., After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton
University Press, 1984.
4
Keohane, supra note 2, at 5.

3
 The Role Reciprocity in International Law

when both parties defect, the situation might be called spite (reciprocity in its negative
sense).5

These seemingly simple situations become exceedingly complicated when all the subjective
elements come in, e.g. what constitutes an equivalent or equal treatment is not always easy to
determine. Moreover, there are factors like compulsive reciprocity, self-interest and moral
obligations which add to the complexities and the possibilities of outcomes.

This principle of reciprocity has been moulded, divided and defined in many different as per
the convenience of the person defining it and depending on what furthers there ideology. But
in this project only two types of reciprocity will be considered: specific and diffused
reciprocity.

RESEARCH OBJECTIVE

 To study different theories associated with the principle of reciprocity

 To study the concept of reciprocity as a general concept
 To study the two different types reciprocities
 To study the institutional innovations associated with the concept of reciprocity

LITERATURE REVIEW
 Keohane Robert 0., Reciprocity in international relation, International
Organization, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Winter, 1986), MIT Press.
This article presents a groundbreaking analysis of the concept reciprocity in the
international law. It explains the principle in practical terms and suggests the way
forward.
 N. Shaw, Malcolm, International Law, Cambridge University Press.
This books deals with concept of reciprocity in its various practical aspects and
applications in the different fields of International law.

5
Badcock Christopher, Reciprocity And The Law, Vol. 22:295, 1997, Vermont Law Review, at 295.

4
 The Role Reciprocity in International Law

RESEARCH METHOD AND SOURCE OF DATA

This project report is based on Descriptive Research Methodology. Secondary and Electronic
resources have been largely used to gather information and data about the topic. Books and
other reference have been primarily helpful in giving this project a firm structure. Websites,
dictionaries and articles have also been referred.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS
 What is the meaning of reciprocity?
 What is the importance of the principle of reciprocity in international law?
 What are the different types of reciprocities in International Law?

HYPOTHESIS
The principle of reciprocity plays an important in interaction of sovereign entities and the
development of the world community.

SCOPE AND LIMITATION

This project deals with the general principle of reciprocity in Public International Law and does not
deal with and particular applicable aspect of this principle. Moreover, for the purpose of this project
Robert 0. Keohane’s definition and interpretation of reciprocity is taken as standard.

5
 The Role Reciprocity in International Law

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................................... 2

LITERATURE REVIEW ....................................................................................................................................... 4

RESEARCH METHOD AND SOURCE OF DATA.................................................................................................... 5
RESEARCH QUESTIONS ..................................................................................................................................... 5
HYPOTHESIS ...................................................................................................................................................... 5
SCOPE AND LIMITATION ................................................................................................................................... 5

TOOLS FOR THE STUDY OF RECIPROCITY ......................................................................................... 7

PRISONERS' DILEMMA ...................................................................................................................................... 7

THE GAME THEORY .......................................................................................................................................... 8

RECIPROCITY AS A GENERAL CONCEPT ........................................................................................... 10

CONTINGENCY ................................................................................................................................................. 10
EQUIVALENCE ................................................................................................................................................. 10

SPECIFIC RECIPROCITY ......................................................................................................................... 12

DIFFICULTIES OF RECIPROCITY IN BILATERAL SITUATIONS ........................................................................ 13

DIFFICULTIES OF RECIPROCITY IN MULTILATERAL SITUATIONS ................................................................ 13

DIFFUSE RECIPROCITY .......................................................................................................................... 15

RECIPROCITY AND INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION ......................................................................... 17

CONCLUSION............................................................................................................................................. 19

BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................................................ 20

ARTICLES ......................................................................................................................................................... 20
BOOKS .............................................................................................................................................................. 21
WEBSITES ........................................................................................................................................................ 21

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 The Role Reciprocity in International Law

TOOLS FOR THE STUDY OF RECIPROCITY

Reciprocity as a concept can be studied through the lens of different theories and situations
which help in explaining the origins, needs and the requirements of this concept. These tools
can be defined as different frameworks under which the interaction of two individuals can be
studied and they help us understand the different factors leading to cooperation and defection.

The conclusions drawn from these results can be directly applied to the interactions between
countries and can be useful for the study of international law and the relations between
sovereign states.

PRISONERS' DILEMMA
In the traditional version of the game, the police have arrested two suspects and are
interrogating them in separate rooms. Each can either confess, thereby implicating the other,
or keep silent. No matter what the other suspect does, each can improve his own position by
confessing. If the other confesses, then one had better do the same to avoid the especially
harsh sentence that awaits a recalcitrant holdout. If the other keeps silent, then one can obtain
the favorable treatment accorded a state’s witness by confessing. Thus, confession is the
dominant strategy for each. But when both confess, the outcome is worse for both than when
both keep silent.6

Christopher Badcock explains this situation simply by giving an example of two people going
out for lunck together. Each of the two would face a choice: either to pay or not to pay. Let's
call paying the bill cooperating, and not paying it defecting. 7 Dealing with the simplest
situation, including only two parties, depending on these two possible reactions there are four
possible outcomes. When both the parties cooperate, we can call it cooperation, when one
party cooperates and the other defects, it is altruism on the part of cooperating party while the
other party acted selfishly, and finally when both parties defect, the situation might be called
spite.8

6
Avinash Dixit and Barry Nalebuff, Prisoners’ Dilemma, Library of Economics and Liberty (14 Feb, 2016;
10:30 AM), http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/PrisonersDilemma.html.
7
Badcock, supra note 5, at 296.
8
Id., at 295.

7
 The Role Reciprocity in International Law

If we now think about the relative value of these outcomes to the two partners, we can see
that a free lunch is always best because you get a benefit without a cost. This is better than a
lunch with a shared cost, because, although you still get your lunch, you must pay for it. This,
in turn, is better than no lunch at all. Although it imposes no cost, it also carries no benefit
whatsoever. Finally, the worst outcome is having to pay for someone else's lunch; a cost
without a benefit to you. We can see that selfishness (a free lunch) is better than reciprocity
(both eating, both paying), but that, in turn, is worth more than spite (neither pays, neither
eats). The worst outcome is having to perform an act of altruism (you pay, the other eats at
your expense).

If two parties only interact once, it will always pay for each to incriminate the other, or
defect. In this way, they defend themselves from the worst outcome-cooperating when the
other defects-but stand to win if the other cooperates. However, things can be very different if
Prisoner's Dilemma-style interactions between the same two players are repeated over a
period of time, or in the technical term, iterated.

THE GAME THEORY

In game theory, an outcome results from the joint interaction of strategies chosen by
independent players. That is, parties can choose their strategies, but their activities alone
cannot necessarily determine the outcome9, as the outcome is determined by the behaviour of
both the players.

The origin of this theory can be traced to Robert Axelrod's book, The Evolution of
Cooperation.10 At first sight, nothing could be more surprising because the book's ostensible
purpose was to report and comment on nothing more significant than the results of two
computer tournaments.11 Axelrod invited participants to submit computer programs to play
iterated Prisoner's Dilemma and the computer programs entered had to make a similar choice
with only the knowledge of the previous choices of its opponent. Programs were played
against each other in a round robin tournament (meaning that each entry was played against
every other entry), and scores were totalled.

9
Schelling Thomas C., The Strategy Of Conflict, 1980, Harvard University Press, at 122.
10
Axelrod Robert, The Evolution of Cooperation, Basic Books New York, 1984, at 136-39.
11
Badcock, supra note 5, at 297.

8
 The Role Reciprocity in International Law

There are many possible situations in the game theory, but for the purpose of this project,
only idealistic or “Pure Common Interest Situation” has been considered. In game theory,
this group of situations are represented as positive sum games with a single dominant strategy
that leads to efficient outcomes. This optimal outcome is achievable by the parties in a stable
Nash equilibrium.12 Thomas Schelling has identified this category as a "pure common interest
game." As the optimal outcome is a Nash equilibrium-where the party's incentives are
perfectly aligned-any implicit or explicit agreement between the parties becomes self-
enforcing, because no party has an interest to unilaterally deviate.

Both parties following individually rational strategies, which maximize payoffs, would
choose to follow strategy of complete cooperation for a payoff of 6 units each (maximum
possible individual payoff in Axelrod’s game). The cooperation outcome, with a payoff of 6
units for each player, remains the dominant strategy even with the imposition of a reciprocity
constraint.13 There is no incentive for either party to deviate from this outcome.

This amounts to a notion termed in economics literature as the "perfect incentive

alignment."14 This game's payoff structure excludes the possibility of opportunistic behavior.
One could think of this ideal environment as the result of optimal contract enforcement
mechanisms, institutional safeguards, relationships involving trust and reputation, or any
other device which renders adversarial possibilities non-advantageous or inaccessible to the
players."15

12
Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics, 37 (3d ed. 2000).
13
Parisit Francesco & Ghei Nita, The Role of Reciprocity in International Law, 36 Cornell Int'l L.J. 93 (2003),
at 96.
14
Francesco Parisi, The Cost of the Game: A Taxonomy of Social Interactions, 9 EUR. J. L. ECON. 99 (2000),
at 104.
15
Cooter & Ulen, supra note 9 (discussing the interaction of game theory and the law).

9
 The Role Reciprocity in International Law

RECIPROCITY AS A GENERAL CONCEPT

As Keohane describes it, there are two broad aspects of reciprocity that constitute, at least in
qualified form, essential dimensions of the concept: contingency and equivalence16 and based
on these there are responses from one party, viz. cooperation and defiance.

CONTINGENCY
It has been observed that experts have often failed to define reciprocity, but in essence
reciprocity implies conditional action.17 Reciprocity implies "actions that are contingent on
rewarding reactions from others and that cease when these expected reaction are not
forthcoming."18 Reciprocal behaviour returns ill for ill as well as good for good: "people
should meet smiles with smiles and lies with treachery." Unconditionality "would be at
variance with the basic character of the reciprocity norm which imposes obligations only
contingently that is, in response to the benefits conferred by others."19 In game theory,
contingency is also a central component of reciprocity: actors behaving in a reciprocal
fashion respond to cooperation with cooperation and to defection with defection.

EQUIVALENCE
The social exchange literature is careful not to define reciprocity as the strict equivalence of
benefits. Among equals, rough equivalence is the usual expectation: the man who gives a
dinner party does not bargain with his guests about what they will do for him in return, but
"he expects them not simply to ask him for a quick lunch if he has given a formal dinner for
them."20 Reciprocity can also characterize relations among unequals, for instance, between a
patron and his client, when there is little prospect of equivalent exchange. Patron-client
relationships are characterized by ex- changes of mutually valued but non-comparable goods
and services. Nevertheless, at least rough equivalence is essential to our usual understanding
of reciprocity.

16
Keohane, supra note 2, at 5.
17
Gouldner Alvin W., The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement, American Sociological Review 25
(April 1960), at 161.
18
Blau Peter M., Exchange and Power in Social Life, at 6 (1st ed. 1964).
19
Gouldner, supra note 17, at 171.
20
Blau Peter M., On the Nature of Organizations, Wiley Publications (1974), at 208-9.

10
 The Role Reciprocity in International Law

When we observe one-sided and unrequited exploitation, which cannot under any
circumstances be considered an exchange of equivalents, we do not describe the relationship
as reciprocal. As Specific reciprocity requires bilateral balancing between particular actors;
diffuse reciprocity emphasizes an overall balance within a group. The literature on reciprocity
in international relations emphatically associates reciprocity with equivalence of benefits.

Reciprocity is not defined in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, but the director-
general of GATT defines it as "the equivalence of concessions."21

Despite the impossibility of determining exact equivalence, some degree of rough

equivalence is integral to the meaning of reciprocity. Reciprocity refers to exchanges of
roughly equivalent values in which the actions of each party are contingent on the prior
actions of the others in such a way that good is returned for good, and bad for bad.22 These
exchanges are often, but not necessarily, mutually beneficial; they may be based on self-
interest as well as on shared concepts of rights and obligations; and the value of what is
exchanged may or may not be comparable. The requirement of rough equivalence means that
many relationships in world politics are not reciprocal.23 Claims of reciprocity may be
fraudulent, hiding domination and exploitation. Furthermore, even genuinely reciprocal
relationships are not power-free: strong and weak actors practicing-reciprocity face different
opportunity costs, and the international structure of power helps to establish what values are
regarded as equivalent.24

21
Dunkel Arthur, GATT: Its Evolution and Role in the 1980s, Li and Fung Lecture, Chinese University of Hong
Kong, 23 March 1984, at 6.
22
Keohane, supra note 2, at 8.
23
Moore, Jr. Barrington, Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt, White Plains, New York (1978),
at 509.
24
Keohane, supra note 2, at 8.

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 The Role Reciprocity in International Law

SPECIFIC RECIPROCITY

Robert Axelrod has developed a theory of cooperation which relies heavily on specific
reciprocity. Axelrod focuses on the game of Prisoner's Dilemma. In plays of this game, both
players benefit more from cooperation than from mutual defection, but each player achieves
the most successful outcome by defecting, provided that her partner cooperates.25 In single
plays of this game, players lack any way of enforcing promises; therefore, it is always
rational for an egoistic player to defect. Yet defection by both players yields lower payoffs
than does mutual cooperation.

Paradoxically, "stupid" but nice players who cooperate without calculating succeed more
often at Prisoner's Dilemma than do more rational counterparts. Axelrod is concerned not
with single plays of Prisoner's Dilemma but with an indefinite number of interactions. He
follows the argument of Michael Taylor, who showed that when an indefinite sequence of
such games is played, cooperation may become rational for the players.26 He then
demonstrates that the rationality of cooperation depends not only on the immediate payoff
facing the players but also on what he calls the "the shadow of the future." The more
important outcomes of future plays are, the more sensible it is for players to forgo maximal
current payoffs (by defecting), but instead to cooperate; such a strategy fosters cooperation on
future moves.27

As the strategy of reciprocity, he uses Tit for Tat. A player following Tit for Tat cooperates
on the first move of a sequence, then does on a subsequent move what the other player did on
the previous one. In Axelrod's simulation, given the mix of strategies submitted, Tit for Tat
not only induced cooperation more effectively than alternatives but also reaped the highest
overall payoff. Axelrod's simulation thus adds a new dimension to the already impressive
experimental evidence indicating that reciprocity is an effective strategy in Prisoner's
Dilemma.28

25
Axelrod, supra note 10, at 38.
26
Taylor Michael, Anarchy and Cooperation, Wiley Publications (1976).
27
Keohane, supra note 2, at 8-9.
28
Oskamp Stuart, Effects of Programmed Strategies on Co-operation in the Prisoner's Dilemma and Other
Mixed-Motive Games, Journal of Conflict Resolution 15 (June 1971), at 225-59.

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 The Role Reciprocity in International Law

As an additional virtue, specific reciprocity may create incentives for other- wise passive
interests within countries to oppose discordant unilateral action by their own governments. In
trade, for instance, specific reciprocity creates incentives for export interests within countries
to resist protective tariffs on other products, for fear that retaliation could be directed at
them.29

DIFFICULTIES OF RECIPROCITY IN BILATERAL SITUATIONS

As we have seen, valid reasons exist to believe that under some conditions specific
reciprocity can facilitate cooperation in world politics. Yet reciprocity is clearly not a
sufficient condition for cooperation; indeed, it need not entail cooperation of any kind.
Because reciprocity implies returning ill for ill as well as good for good, its moral status is
ambiguous. Because it can lead to mutually harmful conflict, its political value may also be
questionable. If either of two parties practicing specific reciprocity begins with a malign
move, cooperation can never be achieved as long as both persist in this strategy. Axelrod
points out that what he calls "echo effects" can produce conflict: "the trouble with TIT FOR
TAT is that once a feud gets started, it can continue indefinitely."30

Axelrod's remedy for such problems is a modification of specific reciprocity in which players
"return only nine-tenths of a tit for a tat. This would help dampen the echoing of conflict and
still provide an incentive to the other player not to try any gratuitous defections."31 This
solution acknowledges that reciprocity is no panacea even in bilateral relationships.

DIFFICULTIES OF RECIPROCITY IN MULTILATERAL SITUATIONS

One of the most frequent objections to specific reciprocity pertains to a multilateral situation
involving a large number of actors, in which collective, or public, goods are involved. (Public
goods are indivisible and cannot be denied to any member of a group, regardless of whether
that member contributed to their provision.) Such multilateral situations offer substantial
incentives to behave as a "free-rider" not to pay for the good but to gain from its provision by
others.32 In such a situation, public choice theory predicts less cooperation (in producing the
public good) than in an otherwise comparable bilateral or small-group context.33

29
Parisit & Ghei, supra note 13, at 105.
30
Axelrod, supra note 10, at 138.
31
Id., at 139.
32
Badcock, supra note 5, at 295.
33
Fard Shahrad Nasrolahi, Reciprocity in International Law: Its Impact and Function, (1st ed. 2016), at 115.

13
 The Role Reciprocity in International Law

Under these conditions enforcement of reciprocal agreements may prove problematic.

Incentives to punish an agreement by retaliating against defectors are likely to be much lower
than in bilateral games, since the punisher will suffer the opprobrium of other actors, while
gaining only a small portion of the benefits of enforcing the rules.34 Thus if a given actor's
violation of a particular rule does not directly threaten the benefits received by the group,
retaliation is unlikely to be severe. As a consequence, the incentive to co-operate provided by
reciprocity-that defection will lead to punishment by one's partners-may not prove
compelling in a multilateral situation.

34
Wilcox Francis O., Rubin Seymour J., Gotlieb Allan, Jacovides Andrew and Perez-Chiriboga Marcial,
International Law in International Diplomacy, Vol. 77 American Society of International Law
(1983), at 99-105.

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 The Role Reciprocity in International Law

DIFFUSE RECIPROCITY

Governments that rely solely on specific reciprocity in international relations need not accept
any obligations toward one another. They may play Tit for Tat on the basis of self-interest
alone. Thus writers on international relations hardly mention obligation when discussing
reciprocity. Governments certainly cannot be counted on to behave benignly toward one
another on the basis of a vague sense of global public interests. Within societies, on the other
hand, actions that enhance social solidarity cannot be accounted for solely on the basis of
specific reciprocity.

Egoistic rational-choice theory predicts that individuals will not contribute voluntarily to the
production of public goods, yet in societies such as the United States and Great Britain, they
often do.35 Although the notion of diffuse reciprocity rests on an untested assumption about
norms, it is incorporated into this argument because specific reciprocity alone cannot account
for voluntary cooperation.

According to Keohane, in order to expand the range of cooperation in world politics, it may
be necessary to go beyond the practice of specific reciprocity and to engage in diffuse
reciprocity: that is, to contribute one's share, or behave well toward others, not because of
ensuing rewards from specific actors, but in the interests of continuing satisfactory overall
results for the group of which one is a part, as a whole. And since practitioners of diffuse
reciprocity do not receive direct rewards for their cooperative actions, a pattern of diffuse
reciprocity can be maintained only by a widespread sense of obligation.36

For specific reciprocity to become successfully institutionalized, much less to lead to diffuse
reciprocity, exchange must take place sequentially rather than simultaneously. Both game
theory and social exchange theory stress that reliance on simultaneous exchange alone
provides an unsatisfactory basis for long-term relationships. If simultaneous exchange alone
were possible, few agreements could be made, since issues frequently arise sequentially.
Sequential reciprocity promotes long-term cooperation much more effectively than does
simultaneous exchange. Conversely, when simultaneous exchange takes place, it often

35
Sugden Robert, Reciprocity: The Supply of Public Goods through Voluntary Contributions, Economic Journal
94 (December 1984), at 775 and 776.
36
Keohane, supra note 2, at 20.

15
 The Role Reciprocity in International Law

reflects a breakdown of confidence. Extreme examples of purely simultaneous exchange

indicate hostility and distrust.37

As Francesco Parisit puts it, an induced reciprocity constraint will result in higher levels of
cooperation in a Prisoners' Dilemma. Diffused reciprocity will encourage cooperation in a
situation where the players have divergent preferences.38

37
Sahlins Marshall, Stone Age Economics, (2d. 1972), at 201
38
Parisit & Ghei, supra note 13, at 109.

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 The Role Reciprocity in International Law

RECIPROCITY AND INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION

Specific reciprocity is an appropriate principle of behaviour when norms of obligation are

weak-the usual case in world politics-but when the occurrence of mutually beneficial
cooperation seems possible. Three conditions principally determine whether the exercise of
specific reciprocity leads to co-operation: the extent to which the players have interests in
common, the "shadow of the future," and the number of players in any given game. In
addition, international regimes may make specific reciprocity more effective by providing
information to the players, reducing transaction costs, and limiting strategic options.39

Diffuse reciprocity, on the other hand, is only feasible when some norms of obligation exist:
that is, when international regimes are relatively strong. These norms may express the actors'
conceptions of their self-interest, but their conceptions of self-interest must be broad and their
confidence in the good faith of others fairly great. An important contribution of the social
exchange literature is the suggestion that the successful pursuit of specific reciprocity may
lead to the development of diffuse reciprocity. In other words, repayment of political and
economic debts in a strictly bilateral context may increase confidence, enabling actors to take
a broader view of their common interests. Conversely, the decay of diffuse reciprocity may
lead actors to revert to conditional exchanges on a quid pro quo basis. Thus specific and
diffuse reciprocity are closely interrelated. They can be located on a continuum, although the
relationships between them are as much dialectical as linear.40

Neither diffuse nor specific reciprocity has provided a fully satisfactory principle of
behaviour in international trade. Over the last forty years, governments of the major market-
economy countries have responded accordingly by devising a new, intermediate form of
reciprocity, institutionalized in the GATT. This hybrid invention is built on the principle of
diffuse reciprocity: the adoption of unconditional MFN clauses means that each bilateral
relationship need not be characterized by a balance of equivalent concessions. On the
contrary, GATT relies on indefinite obligations and expectations of achieving a rough
balance at a higher level of welfare for everyone.

39
Keohane Robert 0., After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton
University Press (1984), at 38
40
Parisit & Ghei, supra note 13, at 110.

17
 The Role Reciprocity in International Law

Thus the actual principles of contemporary "reciprocal trade" incorporate a compromise. The
emphasis in tariff negotiations on formula reductions and negotiations among major trading
countries, with these concessions generalized to other members of GATT, avoids the
complex problem of attaining item-by-item reciprocity. Yet specific reciprocity still comes
into play at the end of negotiations, as a way of forestalling the free-rider problem.41

41
Id., at 26.

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 The Role Reciprocity in International Law

CONCLUSION

Specific reciprocity has much to commend it as a principle of action in international relations:

it can permit cooperation to emerge in a situation of anarchy; it tends to deter defection; and
it provides a standard of behaviour- expressed well in Axelrod's Tit for Tat strategy-that
bureaucrats and politicians can easily understand and explain. It may also create conditions
for the growth of diffuse reciprocity.

Yet specific reciprocity is not a sure-fire recipe for promoting cooperation. It protects its
users against exploitation by focusing responses on identifiable actors but thereby restricts the
possible bargains that can be reached, makes multilateral negotiations extremely complex,
and may provoke feuds even in bilateral relationships. Diffuse reciprocity, on the other hand,
may reduce the chances of unnecessary conflict where interests are compatible but exposes
its practitioners to the danger of exploitation.

Given that neither type of reciprocity is entirely satisfactory, it is not surprising that
governments have sought to devise strategies for capitalizing on the benefits of each while
compensating for their defects. Institutional innovations in trade are particularly interesting.
Negotiations conducted on the basis of simultaneous specific reciprocity were embedded in a
larger pattern of sequential trade negotiations. These negotiations were incorporated, in turn,
in a set of norms and rules which emphasized diffuse reciprocity (unconditional MFN
treatment). The effect was to encourage agreement by avoiding the perversities of sequential
specific reciprocity, yet still limiting opportunities for exploitation.

We know that the anarchy of international politics is consistent with a wide range of conflict
and cooperation. Without altering the basic structure of anarchy, governments can make the
world safer, or more dangerous, through the strategies they follow. The feasibility of
alternative strategies can be affected in turn by prevailing institutional arrangements, as
embodied in international regimes. Thinking about reciprocity reminds us of the sig-
nificance of the international regimes that provide the context for strategic interaction in
much of contemporary world politics. To understand the con- ditions under which
international cooperation can occur, we need to think further about strategies and institutions
in world politics, and how they are linked.

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 The Role Reciprocity in International Law

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ARTICLES
 Morrow James D., How Does Reciprocity Work? Evidence from the Laws of War,
Berkeley Law (12 Feb, 2016; 08:50),
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/spring05_Morrow.pdf.
 Robert 0. Keohane, Reciprocity in international relation, International Organization,
Vol. 40, No. 1 ( Winter, 1986), MIT Press.

 Robert 0. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political
Economy, Princeton University Press, 1984.

 Badcock Christopher, Reciprocity And The Law, Vol. 22:295, 1997, Vermont Law
Review.

 Schelling Thomas C., The Strategy Of Conflict, 1980, Harvard University Press.

 Parisit Francesco & Ghei Nita, The Role of Reciprocity in International Law, 36
Cornell Int'l L.J. 93 (2003).

 Francesco Parisi, The Cost of the Game: A Taxonomy of Social Interactions, 9 EUR.
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Sociological Review 25 (April 1960)
 Dunkel Arthur, GATT: Its Evolution and Role in the 1980s, Li and Fung Lecture,
Chinese University of Hong Kong, 23 March 1984.
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Dilemma and Other Mixed-Motive Games, Journal of Conflict Resolution 15 (June
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 Wilcox Francis O., Rubin Seymour J., Gotlieb Allan, Jacovides Andrew and Perez-
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 Sugden Robert, Reciprocity: The Supply of Public Goods through Voluntary

Contributions, Economic Journal 94 (December 1984).

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 The Role Reciprocity in International Law

BOOKS
 Fard Shahrad Nasrolahi, Reciprocity in International Law: Its Impact and Function,
(1st ed. 2016).
 Hobbes Thomas, Of Man, Being the First Part of Leviathan, Vol. XXXIV, Part 5, The
Harvard Classics, New York: P.F. Collier & Son.
 Axelrod Robert, The Evolution of Cooperation, Basic Books New York, 1984.
 Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics, 37 (3d ed. 2000).
 Blau Peter M., Exchange and Power in Social Life, at 6 (1st ed. 1964).
 Blau Peter M., On the Nature of Organizations, Wiley Publications (1974).
 Moore, Jr. Barrington, Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt, White
Plains, New York (1978).
 Taylor Michael, Anarchy and Cooperation, Wiley Publications (1976).
 Sahlins Marshall, Stone Age Economics, (2d. 1972).

WEBSITES
 Avinash Dixit and Barry Nalebuff, Prisoners’ Dilemma, Library of Economics and
Liberty (14 Feb, 2016; 10:30 AM),
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/PrisonersDilemma.html.

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