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1. INTRODUCTION

There are certain general principles of interpretation which have been applied by

Courts from time to time. These also include:

1. Identical expressions to have same meaning.

2. Construction noscitur a sociis.

2. IDENTICAL EXPRESSIONS TO HAVE SAME MEANING

There is a presumption that if the same words are used in the same statute in the same

context, they bear the same meaning. But if there is a change of language, such

change indicates the change in the intention of Legislature. According to LORD

SHAW, “In the absence of any context indicating a contrary intention, it may be

presumed that the Legislature intended to attach the same meaning to the same words

when used in a subsequent statute in a similar connection.’’1

It is reasonable to assume that when the legislature has used a particular expression in

a statute many times, the expression must bear the same meaning everywhere. To call

the same thing by the same name is a very safe proposition.

1D.N. Mathur, ‘Interpretation of Statutes’, Central Law Publications, Allahabad, 2015, page no.
93-94.
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But the courts should be very careful while applying this principle because the same

expression expressed in a different context than the earlier one may have been

intended by the legislature to have a different meaning. To find out, therefore,

whether the same word should have the same meaning or not is a very difficult task

for the court. The courts while interpreting the same expression differently generally

give the reason that their context is different. Another reason for doing so may be that

the word exists in a consolidating statute where it has been derived from two distinct

enactments.2

The commonest illustrations where the principle identical expressions to have same

meaning has not been followed are found in the interpretations of the expressions

may and shall where frequently either of these words has been interpreted sometimes

as mandatory and sometimes non-obligatory depending upon the context in which it

has been used.3

In D.D. Rego v. Rajiv Gandhi University of Health Sciences,4 the Karnataka High

Court held that it is settled law that in matters relating to educational institutions if

two interpretations are possible, the courts would be reluctant to accept that which

would upset and reverse the decision of the educational authorities and would accept

the interpretation made by such institutions. Thus, when examination regulations for

2Prof. T. Bhattacharya, ‘The Interpretation of Statutes’, Central Law Agency, Allahabad, 2014, page
no. 73.
3 Id., at page no. 74.
4 AIR 1999 Karn 203.
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the purpose of declaration of results were notified by the University and the

candidates knew about the procedure to be adopted by the University fully well, they

cannot turn around to say that the University regulations are contrary to regulations

framed by the Medical Council of India.

In Shamrao Vishnu Parulekar v. District Magistrate, Thana,5 interpretations of the

word ‘statement’ under Section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and of the

words ‘the grounds on which the order has been made’ under Sections 3 (3) and 7 (1)

of the Preventive Detention Act,1950 were involved. The Supreme Court held that the

word ‘statement’ has been used in Sections 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 32, 39, 145 and 157 of

the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and in all these sections it has been used in the same

sense, that is to say, ‘something that is stated’. Therefore, where a prosecution

witness who while recording his conversation with other witnesses had prepared

notes, these notes could be used for corroboration under Section 157 as these were

‘something that is stated’. But, on the contrary, the Supreme Court also held that the

words ‘the grounds on which the order has been made’ under Sections 3 (3) and 7 (1)

of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 did not have the same meaning because the

authority could withhold facts on ground of public interest under Section 7 (2) while

stating the grounds of detention to the detenu under Section7 (1), but those facts

could be stated to the State Government while reporting to it the grounds of detention

under section 3 (3).

5 AIR 1957 SC 23.

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In Maharaj Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh,6 the word ‘vest’ was being interpreted.

The State Government was authorised under Section 117 (1) of the Uttar Pradesh

Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1951 to declare hats, bazars and melas

which ‘vested’ in the State shall ‘vest’ in the Gaon Sabhas. The Supreme Court held

that whereas vesting in the state was absolute vesting in the Gaon Sabhas was only

for the limited purpose of possession and management.

Similarly, the Supreme Court observed in M. Ismail v. Union of India,7 that even

when the word ‘vest’ has been used in a section only once, in the context of one

property it could mean only vesting of management while in the context of another

property it could mean vesting of ownership.

A particular word occurring in one section of the Act, having a particular object

cannot carry the same meaning when used in a different section of the same act,

which is enacted for a different object. In other words, one word occurring in

different sections of the act can have different meanings, if the object of the two

sections is different and when both operate in different fields. Hence the object with

which the legislature has used a particular word is an important parameter according

to which meaning should be inferred.8

6 AIR 1976 SC 2608.

7 AIR 1995 SC 605.
8 B.M. Gandhi, ‘Interpretation of Statutes’, Eastern Book Company, Lucknow, 2014, page no. 75.
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The words which are used in declaring the meaning of other words may also need

interpretation and the legislature may use a word in the same statute in several

different senses. In that view of the matter, it would not be correct to contend that the

expression as defined in the interpretation clause would necessarily carry the same

meaning throughout the statute.9

3. CONSTRUCTION NOSCITUR A SOCIIS

Noscere means to know and sociis means association. Therefore, noscitur a sociis

means to know from the association. When two or more words which are susceptible

of analogous meaning are put together, they are to be understood in their cognate

sense. They take their colour from each other, the meaning of the more general being

restricted to a sense analogous to that of the less general. A word may be known by

the company it keeps. Associated words explain and limit each other. The principle

helps in finding the true legislative intent and, therefore, cannot prevail where it is

clear that wider words have been deliberately used.10

The maxim means that if the meaning of a particular word is vague or ambiguous, the

word or phrase must be construed on the basis of the words or phrases preceding or

following it. It is a rule of construction which assists resolution of ambiguity. This

rule of construction has much relevance in understanding the import of words in a

9 Id., at page no. 76.

10 Prof. T. Bhattacharya, supra note 2 at page no. 76.
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statutory provision. In ascertaining the meaning of the word or a clause or sentence in

the statute in its interpretation, everything that is logically relevant should be

admissible. It is no doubt true that the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, meaning thereby,

that is a legitimate rule of construction to construe words in an Act of Parliament,

with reference to word found in immediate connection with them.11

In Alamgir v. State of Bihar,12 the construction of Section 498, Indian penal Code

was involved. This section says: ‘Whoever takes or entices away any woman who is

and whom he knows or has reason to believe to be the wife of any other man, with

intent that she may have illicit intercourse with any such person, or conceals or

detains with that intent any such woman, shall be punished.’

The facts in this case were that a married woman, voluntarily leaving her husband,

started living openly with the appellant against whom a prosecution under Section

498, Indian Penal Code was launched. The appellant contended that the charge must

fail because he had neither taken or enticed away the woman nor had he concealed or

detained her. The main question to be decided by the court was that since there was

no taking, enticement or concealment of the woman by the appellant as she was

voluntarily and openly living with him, did the action of the appellant fall under the

expression detains used in Section 498.

11 B.M. Gandhi, supra note 8 at page no. 82.

12 AIR 1959 SC 436.
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The Supreme Court held that though the word detains generally means detention

against will, this meaning cannot be attributed to the word here because the

expression should be construed in the light of other words in its company. This means

that the word detains should be interpreted with reference to the expression takes,

entices and conceals used in Section 498. The word detains, therefore, should mean

detention without the consent of the husband. Section 498 protects the rights of a

husband who has been deprived of the company of his wife and in the light of this

object also the expression detains must mean keeping a woman without the

permission of her husband. The woman’s consent under this provision is, therefore,

meaningless.

In Devendra M. Surti v. State of Gujarat,13 interpretation of the word ‘profession’

was in question. Section 2 (4) of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948

says that commercial establishment means an establishment which carries on any

business, trade or profession. The Supreme Court interpreted the word ‘profession’ in

the light of the other associated words ‘business’ and ‘trade’ and held that a private

dispensary of a medical doctor could not be within the word ‘profession’.

In the English case of Director of Public Prosecutions v. Jordan,14 interpretation of

the words ‘other objects of general concern’ under Section 4 (1) of the Obscene

Publications Act, 1959 was in question. This provision is an exception to the offence

13 AIR 1969 SC 63.

14 (1976) 3 All ER 775 (HL).
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under Section 2 of the Act and provides that an accused would not be liable if the

“publication of the article in question is justified as being for the public good on the

ground that it is in the interest of science, literature, art or learning or of other objects

of general concern.” The House of Lords applied the principle of noscitur a sociis

and held that the words ‘other objects of general concern’ are to be construed in the

light of other words in their company, that is to say, science, literature, art or learning.

Thus interpreted they could not mean that articles seized had some psychotherapeutic

value for persons of heterosexual behaviour etc.

In K. Janardhan Pillai v. Union of India,15 the Supreme Court held that raw

cashewnut is a foodstuff falling under Section 2 (a) (v) of the Essential Commodities

Act, 1955 and hence cannot be declared an essential article under Section 2 (a) of the

Kerala Essential Articles Control (Temporary Powers) Act, 1962.

It was further stated by the Supreme Court that associated words take their meaning

from one another and that is the meaning of the rule of noscitur a sociis. When

foodstuffs are associated with edible oil-seeds which have to be processed before the

oil in them can be consumed, it is appropriate to interpret foodstuffs in the wider

sense as including all articles of food which may be consumed by human beings after

processing. Further, having regard to the history of legislation relating to foodstuffs

and the object of the Central Act which regulates the production, supply and

distribution of essential commodities amongst the poverty-stricken Indian People, the

15 AIR 1981 SC 1485.

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expression foodstuffs should be given a wider meaning as including even raw

materials which ultimately result in edible articles.

In Rainbow Steels Limited v. Commissioner of Sales Tax,16 the question was

whether the thermal power plant which had been used previously and was in perfect

running condition at the time of sale and was sold as such, would be deemed an old

machinery within the meaning of entry 15 of the notification dated May 30, 1975,

issued under the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948. The Supreme Court held that since the

word old occurs in entry 15 in association with the words discarded, unserviceable

and obsolete, the principle of noscitur a sociis is applicable and the plant cannot

mean an old machinery because the word old in such a context means similar in

nature to discarded, unserviceable or obsolete machinery.

In Ahmedabad Private Primary Teachers Association v. Administrative Officer,17

interpretation of the word ‘employee’ in Section 2(e) of Payment of Gratuity Act,

1972 was in question. The section says ‘employee’ means any person (other than an

apprentice) employed on wages, in any establishment, factory, mine, oilfield,

plantation, port, railway company or shop to do any skilled, semi-skilled, or

unskilled, manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work…… whether or not such

person is employed in a managerial or administrative capacity. Applying the principle

of noscitur a sociis the Supreme Court held that a teacher employed in a school does

16 AIR 1981 SC 2101.

17 AIR 2004 SC 1426.
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not fall under any of the categories mentioned above. The Court, however,

recommended that since the teachers are in a noble profession the legislature should

extend benefits of gratuity to them by enacting a new legislation for them.

In Sri Shamaraja Udupa v. The Assistant Labour (2012) (Karnataka High Court),

it was observed that it is a legitimate rule of construction to construe words in an Act

of Parliament with reference to words found in immediate connection with them.

In M I Hussain & Anr. v. Director of Education & Anr. (2014) (Delhi High Court),

it was observed that noscitur a sociis- is merely a rule of construction and it cannot

prevail in cases where it is clear that the wider words have been deliberately used in

order to make the scope of the defined word correspondingly wider. It is only where

the intention of the legislature in associating wider words with words of narrower

significance is doubtful or is otherwise not clear that the present rule of construction

can be usefully applied. It can also be applied where the meaning of the words of

wider import is doubtful; but where the object of legislature in using wider words is

clear and free of ambiguity, the rule of construction cannot be pressed into service.

The philosophy behind the rule of noscitur a sociis is that the meaning of the doubtful

words may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of words associated with it.

Thus when words are clearly defined or are unambiguous, this rule will cease to

apply. In a catena of cases, it has been observed thus:

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It must be borne in mind that noscitur a sociis is merely a rule of construction and it

cannot prevail in cases where it is clear that the wider words have been deliberately

used in order to make the scope of the defined word correspondingly wider. It is only

where the intention of the legislature in associating wider words with words of

narrower significance is doubtful, or otherwise not clear that the present rule of

construction can be usefully applied. It can also be applied where the meaning of the

words of wider import is doubtful; but, where the object of the legislature in using

wider words is clear and free of ambiguity, the rule of construction in question cannot

be pressed into service.

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5. CONCLUSION

RULE I— When a word or phrase appears more than once in a statute, it is generally

construed the same way each time it appears unless there is reason to believe that the

legislature intended to use it in a different sense. In other words, when same words

appear in a statute, such words are ascribed the same meaning “unless there is

anything to indicate the contrary”. However, one cannot rely on the principle that the

same word should be given the same meaning wherever it occurs in the Act, for the

context excludes the application of the principle. Before construing same words

appearing in a statute at more than one place, it is necessary to ascertain the object of

the section. Often Courts are required to interpret the same words differently in order

to avoid any form of absurdity or to adhere to the general scheme of the Act.

RULE II— The legal maxim noscitur a sociis is Latin for “it is known by the

company it keeps”. This means that the meaning of a word can be gathered from its

context. Under this rule words of doubtful meaning may be better understood from

the nature of the words and phrases with which they are associated. It is a rule of

construction which assists resolution of ambiguity. However, interpretation as per

principle of noscitur a sociis need not always be made when words showing

particular classes are followed by general words. Before the general words can be so

interpreted, there must be a genus constituted or a category disclosed with reference

to which the general words can and are intended to be restricted.