1 Answer

The term “interpretation” has been derived from the Latin term ‘interpretari’, which means to
explain, expound, understand, or to translate. Interpretation is the process of explaining,
expounding and translating any text or anything in written form. Interpretation of statutes is the
correct understanding of the law. This process is commonly adopted by the courts for
determining the exact intention of the legislature. Because the objective of the court is not only
merely to read the law but is also to apply it in a meaningful manner to suit from case to case. It
is also used for ascertaining the actual connotation of any Act or document with the actual
intention of the legislature

SALMOND has defined it as “the process by which the Courts seek to ascertain the meaning of
the Legislature through the medium of authoritative forms in which it is expressed.” A Statute is
an edict of the Legislature and it must be construed “to the intent of them who make it” and
“duty of the judicature is to act upon the true intention of the Legislature- the mens or sententia
legis.

To ensure that justice is made available to all, the judicial system has been evolved in all nations.
It is extremely important and in fact necessary also that the Courts interpret the law in such a
manner that ensures ‘access to justice’ to the maximum. For this purpose, the concept of ‘Canons
of Interpretation’ has been expounded. The Canons are those rules that have been evolved by the
Judiciary to help Courts determine the meaning and the intent of legislation.

Elaborate rules of interpretation were evolved even at a very early stage of Hindu civilization
and culture. The rules given by ‘Jaimini’, the author of Mimamsat Sutras, originally meant for
srutis were employed for the interpretation of Smritis also. In the process of interpretation,
several aids are used. They may be statutory or non-statutory. Statutory aids may be illustrated
by the General Clauses Act, 1897 and by specific definitions contained in individuals Acts
whereas non-statutory aids are illustrated by common law rules of interpretation (including
certain presumptions relating to interpretation) and also by case-laws relating to the
interpretation of statutes.

INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES IS REQUIRED FOR TWO BASIC REASONS:

1. Legislative Language - Legislative language may be complicated for a layman, and hence may
require interpretation, and

2. Legislative Intent - The intention of the legislature or Legislative intent assimilates two
aspects: a the concept of meaning', ie, what the word means; and b. the concept of purpose and
'object or the 'reason or 'spirit' pervading through the statute.
3. Anticipation of future events leads to the use of indeterminate terms. The impossible task of
anticipating every possible scenario also leads to the use of indeterminate language. Judges
therefore have to interpret statutes because of the gaps in law. Examples of inderterminate
language include words such as “reasonable”. In this case the courts are responsible for
determining what constitutes the word “reasonable”.

If the language is clear and unambiguous, no need of interpretation would arise. In this regard, a
Constitution Bench of five Judges of the Supreme Court in R.S. Nayak v A.R. Antulay, If the
words of the Statute are clear and unambiguous, it is the plainest duty of the Court to give effect
to the natural meaning of the words used in the provision. The question of construction arises
only in the event of an ambiguity or the plain meaning of the words used in the Statute would be
self-defeating.

Again Supreme Court in Grasim Industries Ltd. v Collector of Customs, Bombay has
followed the same principle and observed: “Where the words are clear and there is no obscurity,
and there is no ambiguity and the intention of the legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no
scope for court to take upon itself the task of amending or altering the statutory provisions.” The
purpose of Interpretation of Statutes is to help the Judge to ascertain the intention of the
Legislature – not to control that intention or to confine it within the limits, which the Judge may
deem reasonable or expedient.

Some Important Points to be taken care of in the context of interpreting Statutes:

1. The intention of the legislature.

2. The statute must be read as a whole in its Context.
3. The statute should be construed so as to make it Effective and Workable -if a statutory
provision is ambiguous and capable of various constructions, then that construction must
be adopted which will give meaning and effect to the other provisions of the enactment
rather than that which will give none.
4. If meaning is plain, the effect must be given to it irrespective of consequences.
5. The process of construction combines both literal and purposive approaches. The
purposive construction rule highlights that you shauld shift from literal construction when
it leads to absurdity.

2 Answer

LITERAL RULE OF INTERPRETATION

It is the first rule of interpretation. According to this rule, the words used in this text are to be
given or interpreted in their natural or ordinary meaning. After the interpretation, if the meaning
is completely clear and unambiguous then the effect shall be given to a provision of a statute
regardless of what may be the consequences. The basic rule is that whatever the intention
legislature had while making any provision it has been expressed through words and thus, are to
be interpreted according to the rules of grammar. It is the safest rule of interpretation of statutes
because the intention of the legislature is deduced from the words and the language used.

According to this rule, the only duty of the court is to give effect if the language of the statute is
plain and has no business to look into the consequences which might arise. The only obligation
of the court is to expound the law as it is and if any harsh consequences arise then the remedy for

In Municipal board v State transport authority, Rajasthan, the location of a bus stand was
changed by the Regional Transport Authority. An application could be moved within 30 days of
receipt of order of regional transport authority according to section 64 A of the Motor vehicles
Act, 1939. The application was moved after 30 days on the contention that statute must be read
as “30 days from the knowledge of the order”. The it shall be sought and looked out by the
legislature. Supreme Court held that literal interpretation must be made and hence rejected the
application as invalid. Lord Atkinson stated, ‘In the construction of statutes their words
must be interpreted in their ordinary grammatical sense unless there be something in the
context or in the object of the statute in which they occur or in the circumstances in which they
are used, to show that they were used in a special sense different from their ordinary grammatical
sense.’

A literal construction would not be denied only because the consequences to comply with the
same may lead to a penalty. The courts should not be over zealous in searching for ambiguities
or obscurities in words which are plain. (Tata Consultancy Services V. State of A.P.)

Another important point regarding the rule of literal construction is that exact meaning is
preferred to loose meaning in an Act of Parliament. In the case of Pritipal Singh V. Union of
India, it was held that there is a presumption that the words are used in an Act of Parliament
correctly and exactly and not loosely and inexactly.

In Keshavnanda Bharti v. State of Kerela, it was held that a word gets its ‘colour’ in the
context in which it is used. The word gathers its meaning not only in the context that it has been
used but from the words used in similar conditions.

The literal rule may be understood subject to the following conditions –

i. Statute may itself provide a special meaning for a term, which is usually to be found in the
interpretation section.

ii. Technical words are given ordinary technical meaning if the statute has not specified any
other.

iii. Words will not be inserted by implication.

iv. Words undergo shifts in meaning in course of time.

v. It should always be remembered that words acquire significance from their context.

GOLDEN RULE OF INTERPRETATION

It is known as the golden rule because it solves all the problems of interpretation. The rule says
that to start with we shall go by the literal rule, however, if the interpretation given through the
literal rule leads to some or any kind of ambiguity, injustice, inconvenience, hardship, inequity,
then in all such events the literal meaning shall be discarded and interpretation shall be done in
such a manner that the purpose of the legislation is fulfilled.

The literal rule follows the concept of interpreting the natural meaning of the words used in the
statute. But if interpreting natural meaning leads to any sought of repugnance, absurdity or
hardship, then the court must modify the meaning to the extent of injustice or absurdity caused
and no further to prevent the consequence. This rule suggests that the consequences and effects
of interpretation deserve a lot more important because they are the clues of the true meaning of
the words used by the legislature and its intention. At times, while applying this rule, the
interpretation done may entirely be opposite of the literal rule, but it shall be justified because of
the golden rule. The presumption here is that the legislature does not intend certain objects.
Thus, any such interpretation which leads to unintended objects shall be rejected.

It is a compromise between the plain meaning (or literal) rule and the mischief rule.Like the
plain meaning rule, it gives the words of a statute their plain, ordinary meaning. However, when
this may lead to an irrational result that is unlikely to be the legislature's intention, the judge can
depart from this meaning. In the case of homographs, where a word can have more than one
meaning, the judge can choose the preferred meaning; if the word only has one meaning, but
applying this would lead to a bad decision, the judge can apply a completely different meaning.

In the case of Uttar Pradesh Bhoodan Yagna Samiti v. Brij Kishore , the supreme court held
that the expression “landless person’’ used in section 14 of U.P. Bhoodan Brij Kishore, the
supreme court held that the expression “landless person’’ used in Section 14 of U.P. Bhoodan
Yagna Act, 1953 which made provision for grant of land to persons, was limited to “landless
laborers’’. A landless labour is he who is engaged in agriculture but having no agricultural land.
The Court further said that “any landless person” did not include a landless businessman residing
in a city. The object of the Act was to implement the Bhoodan movement, which aimed at
distribution of land to landless labors who were verged in agriculture. A businessman though
landless cannot claim the benefit of the Act.
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Azad Bharat Financial Company,-A transporting company was
carrying a parcel of apples was challenged and charge-sheeted. The truck of the transporting
company was impounded as the parcel contained opium along with the apples. At the same time,
the invoice shown for the transport consisted of apples only. Section 11 of the opium act 1878,
all the vehicles which transport the contraband articles shall be impounded and articles shall be
confiscated. It was confiscated by the transport company that they were unaware of the fact that
opium was loaded along with the apples in the truck.

The court held that although the words contained in section 11 of the said act provided that the
vehicle shall be confiscated but by applying the literal rule of interpretation for this provision it is
leading to injustice and inequity and therefore, this interpretation shall be avoided. The words
‘shall be confiscated’ should be interpreted as ‘may be confiscated’.

3 Answer

ROLE OF PARLIAMENTRY HISTORY IN INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

Parliamentary history means the process by which an act is enacted. This includes
conception of an idea, drafting of the bill, the debates made, the amendments proposed etc.
Speech made in mover of the bill, amendments considered during the progress of the bill are
considered in parliamentary history whereas the papers placed before the cabinet which took the
decision for the introduction of the bill are not relevant since these papers are not placed before
the parliament. The historical facts of the statute that is the external circumstances in which it
was enacted in should also be taken into note so that it can be understood that the statute in
question was intended to alter the law or leave it where it stood. Statement of objective and
reasons as to why the statute is being brought to enactment can also be a very helpful fact in the
research for historical facts, but the same if done after extensive amendments in statute it may be
unsafe to attach these with the statute in the end. It is better to use the report of a committee
before presenting it in front of the legislature as they guide us with a legislative intent and place
their recommendations which come in handy while enactment of the bill.

The Supreme Court in a numbers of cases referred to debates in the Constituent Assembly for
interpretation of Constitutional provisions. Recently, the Supreme Court in S.R. Chaudhuri v
State of Punjab and others has stated that it is a settled position that debates in the Constituent
Assembly may be relied upon as an aid to interpret a Constitutional provision because it is the
function of the Court to find out the intention of the framers of the Constitution.

But as far as speeches in Parliament are concerned, a distinction is made between speeches of the
mover of the Bill and speeches of other Members. Regarding speeches made by the Members of
the Parliament at the time of consideration of a Bill, it has been held that they are not admissible
as extrinsic aids to the interpretation of the statutory provision. However, speeches made by the
mover of the Bill or Minister may be referred to for the purpose of finding out the object
intended to be achieved by the Bill. (K.S. Paripoornan v State of Kerala)
So far as Statement of Objects and Reasons, accompanying a legislative bill is concerned, it is
permissible to refer to it for understanding the background, the antecedent state of affairs, the
surrounding circumstances in relation to the statute and the evil which the statute sought to
remedy. But, it cannot be used to ascertain the true meaning and effect of the substantive
provision of the statute. (Devadoss L R v. Veera Makali Amman Koil Athalur)

Reports of Commissions including Law Commission or Committees including Parliamentary

Committees preceding the introduction of a Bill can also be referred to in the Court as evidence
of historical facts or of surrounding circumstances or of mischief or evil intended to be remedied.
Law Commission’s Reports can also be referred to where a particular enactment or amendment
is the result of recommendations of Law Commission Report. The Supreme Court in Rosy and
another v State of Kerala and others considered Law Commission of India, 41st Report for
interpretation of section 200 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.

ROLE OF DICTIONARIES IN INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

Words used in a statute should be interpreted in the light of their ordinary sense. When a word is
not defined in the Act itself, it is permissible to refer to dictionaries to find out the general sense
in which that word is understood in common parlance.

Dictionaries can be consulted by the courts whenever the need arises to know the ordinary sense
of a word. However, in selecting one out of the various meanings of a word, regard must always
be had to the context as it is a fundamental rule that meanings of words and expressions used in
an Act must take their colour from the context in which they appear. The court must be careful
because it is not necessary the dictionary meaning of a word may be the true meaning in a
particular context. It is for the court to interpret the statute as best as it may.

In so doing the court may no doubt assist themselves in the discharge of their duty by any literary
held they can find, including of course the consultation of standard authors and reference to well
known and authoritative dictionaries. In the words of A Jeevan Reddy “A statute cannot always
be constructed with the dictionary in one hand and the statute in other”. Regard must also be had
to the scheme, context and to the legislative history again Judicial decisions expounding the
meaning of words in construing statues in pari materia will have more weight than the meaning
furnished by dictionaries.

In A Ramavtar v. Assistant Sales Tax officer, the question before the court was whether betel
leaves are vegetables and, therefore, exempt from imposition of sales tax under the central
Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947 as amended by Act 16 of 1948. The dictionary meaning
of avegetable was sought to be relied on wherein it has been defined as pertaining to, comprised
or consisting of or derived or obtained from plants or their parts. It was held that the dictionary
meaning could not be said to reflect the true intention of the framers of the sales tax law and
betel leaves should be understood in the same sense in which they are commonly understood.
Therefore, sales tax could be levied on the sale of betel leaves.

It was held that the dictionary meaning could not be said to reflect the true intention of the
framers of the sales tax law and betel leaves should be understood in the same sense in which
they are commonly understood. Therefore, sales tax could be levied on the sale of betel leaves.

In Balram Kumawat v. Union of India, the supreme court remarked that where the object of
the Parliament was to stop not only trade in imported elephant ivory but ivory of every
description under the wildlife protection Act, 1972 as amended by Act 44-of 1991 vide Section
49-C, the word ivory will include ivory of every description imbedding mammoth ivory as is
clear from the dictionary meaning of the word Ivory.

In Peyare lal v Mahadeo Ramachandra, the appellant was charged under the Prevention of
Food Adulteration Act, 1954 for selling supari sweetened with a lamed artificial sweetener. The
question was whether such a supari was an adulterated food within the meaning of the Act. The
appellant relied on the dictionary meaning of the word food and contended that he had
committed no offence. Rejecting the contention, the Supreme Court held that dictionary meaning
is not of much value when the word is defined in the Act itself. The word food has been defined
under the Act very widely and covers all articles used as food as also every component entering
into it including flavoring and coloring matters and preservative.

4 Answer

The principle that a statute enacting an offence or imposing a penalty is to be strictly construed is
not of universal application which must necessarily be observed in every case. It is now only of
limited application and it serves in the selection of one when two or more constructions are
reasonably open. The rule was originally evolved to mitigate the rigour of monstrous sentences
for trivial offences and although that necessity and that strictness has now almost vanished, the
difference in approach made to a penal statute as against any other statute still persists.

According to Lord Esher the settled rule of construction of penal sections is that ‘if there is a
reasonable interpretation which will avoid the penalty in any particular case we must adopt that
construction. If there are two reasonable constructions we must give the more lenient one.’

1. Interpretation of penal provisions must be in consonance with the principles underlying

fundamental rights. Any provision which visits an accused with adverse consequences
without affording him any remedy to disprove an item of evidence which stands against
his innocence, is inconsistent with the philosophy enshrined in Art 21. It was held by the
Supreme Court that they should so interpret such a provision as to dilute it to make it
amenable to Art 21 of the Constitution.
2. When words employed in a penal statute are not clear the principle ‘against double
penalisation’ would be applied. Failure to comply with a statute may attract penalty. But
 only because a statute attracts penalty for failure to comply with the statutory provisions,
the same in all situations would not call for a strict construction. An interpretation which
strikes a balance between enforcement of law and protection of valuable human right of
accused (right of privacy) must be resorted to.
3. In applying and interpreting a penal statute, public policy is also taken into
consideration. In a recent case, the House of Lords held that consensual sadomasochistic
homosexual encounters which occasioned actual bodily harm to the victim were assaults
occasioning actual bodily harm, contrary to § 47 of the Offences Against the Person Act
1861 and unlawful wounding contrary to § 20 0f the Act, notwithstanding the victim’s
consent to the acts inflicted on him.

The following are some of the propositions important in relation to strict construction of penal
statutes:

(a) if the scope of prohibitory words cover only some class of persons or some well
defined activity, their scope cannot be extended to cover more on consideration of policy
or object if the statute
(b) prohibitory words can be widely construed only if indicated in the statute. On the
other hand if after full consideration no indication is found the benefit of construction
will be given to the subject.
(c) if the prohibitory words in their own signification bear wider meaning which also fits
in with the object or policy of the statute.

CASE LAWS

JK (Bombay) Ltd v. Bharti Matha Mishra

In this case, it was held that the expression ‘officer or employee of a company’ applies not only
to the existing officer or employee but also includes past officers or employees where such an
officer or employee either ·i. wrongfully obtains possession of any property ii.wrongfully
withholds the same after the termination of his employment.

The expression would also include the ‘legal heirs or representatives.’ It was held by the court
that the penal statutes should not be so liberally construed with the aid of presumptions,
assumptions and implications as to rope in for the purposes of prosecution such persons against
whom the prosecution is not intended by the statute and initiation of prosecution would be
violates Art 21 of the Constitution and against public policy.

Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Laxmi Narain Tondon

In this case, the definition of ‘sale’ in the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954 was
construed in the sense having regard to the mischief intended to be remedied. It was held that the
‘sale’ in the Act would include all commercial transactions where under an adulterated article of
food was supplied for consumption by one person to another person. Therefore, supply or offer
of food to hotelier to a customer when consolidated charge was made for residence and other
amenities including food fell within the definition.

Virtual Soft Systems Ltd v. CIT

The questions that arose before the Supreme Court in the case prior to the amendments by the
Finance Act 2002 with effect from 1 April 2003 were: i.What was meant by the words ‘in
addition to any tax payable’in the charging S27(1) (c ) ii. What was meant by the term ‘total
income’ in Explanation 4(a) therein.

Allowing the appeals, it was held by the court that the statute crating the penalty is the first and
the last consideration and the penal provision must be construed within the term and language of
the particular statute. Section 271 of the Act is a penal provision and there are well established
principles for interpretation of such a penal provision. Such a provision has to be construed
strictly and narrowly and not widely; with the object of advancing the object and intention of the
legislature.

Tolaram v. State of Bombay

In this case, Section 18 of the Bombay Rents, Hotels and Lodging Houses Rates (Control) Act
1947 was construed. This section provided that ‘if any landlord receives any fine, premium or
other like sum or deposit or any consideration other than the standard rent in respect of the grant,
renewal or continuance of a lease of any premise, such landlord shall be punished.’ It was held
by the Supreme Court that the section did not prohibit the taking of money by owner of an
incomplete building in consideration.

Kalpnath Rai Vs. State,,

Supreme Court considered section 3(4) of the Terrorists and Disruptive Activities (Prevention)
Act, 1987. This section enacts that ‘whoever harbours – any terrorist’ shall be punishable with
imprisonment which shall not be less than five years but which may extent to imprisonment for
life. The court held that the section provided for harsh punishment could not be held to have
excluded mens rea; and a person giving shelter to a terrorist without knowing that he was a
terrorist could not be punished under section 3(4).

5 Answer

Ordinarily, a legislature has power to make prospective laws, but Art.20 of the Indian
Constitution, 1950 provides certain safeguards to the persons accused of crime and so Art. 20(1)
of the Indian constitution imposes a limitation on the law making power of the constitution. It
prohibits the legislature to make retrospective criminal laws however it does not prohibit a civil
liability retrospectively i.e. with effect from a past date. So a tax can be imposed retrospectively.
Clause (1) of the Article 20 of the Indian Constitution guarantees rights against ex-post facto
laws. It provides that “ no person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law
in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence, nor be subjected to a
penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the
commission of the offence.” The American Constitution also constitutes a similar provision
prohibiting ex-post facto laws both by the Central and State legislatures.

The presumption against retrospective operation is strong in cases in which the statute, if
operated retrospectively, would prejudicially affect vested rights or the illegality of past
transaction, or impair contracts, or impose new duty or attach new disability in respect of past
transactions or considerations already passed, However, a statute is not properly called a
retrospective statute because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from a time antecedent
to its passing. The general scope and purview of the statute and the remedy sought to be applied
must be looked into and what was the former state of law and what the legislation contemplated
has to be considered. Every law that impairs or takes away rights vested agreeably to existing
laws is retrospective, and is generally unjust and may be oppressive. But laws made justly and
for the benefit of individuals and the community as a whole may relate to a time antecedent to
their commencement. The presumption against retrospectivity may in such cases be rebutted by
necessary implications from the language employed in the statute. It cannot be said to be an
invariable rule that a statute could not be retrospective unless so expressed in the very terms of
the section which had to be construed. The question is whether on a proper construction the
legislature may be said to have so expressed its intention.

In Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhry, AIR 1957 SC 540 the SC observed as thus :
"The golden rule of construction is that, in the absence of anything in the enactment to show that
it is to have retrospective operation, it cannot be so construed as to have the effect of altering the

In Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra (1994) this Court laid down the ambit
and scope of an amending Act and its retrospective operation as follows :

(i) A statute which affects substantive rights is presumed to be prospective in operation

unless made retrospective, either expressly or by necessary intendment, whereas a
statute which merely affects procedure, unless such a construction is textually
impossible, is presumed to be retrospective in its application, should not be given an
extended meaning and should be strictly confined to its clearly defined limits.
(ii) Law relating to forum and limitation is procedural in nature, whereas law relating to
right of action and right of appeal even though remedial is substantive in nature.
(iii) Every litigant has a vested right in substantive law but no such right exists in
procedural law.
(iv) A procedural statute should not generally speaking be applied retrospectively where
the result would be to create new disabilities or obligations or to impose new duties in
respect of transactions already accomplished.
 (v) A statute which not only changes the procedure but also creates new rights and liabilities
shall be construed to be prospective in Operation unless otherwise provided, either expressly
or by necessary implication.w applicable to a claim in litigation at the time when the Act was
passed.

It is crystal clear that the Statutes dealing with substantive rights - is prim facie / generally
prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implications made to have retrospective
operation. But the rule in general is applicable where the object of the statute is to affect the
vested rights or impose new burdens or to impair existing obligations. Statutes dealing with
procedure - In contrast to statutes dealing with substantive rights, statutes dealing with merely
matters of procedure are presumed to retrospective unless such a construction is textually
inadmissible.