EJUSDEM GENERIS

EJUSDEM GENERIS
• The Latin expression “ejusdem generis” which means “of the
same kind or nature or family”.
• Ejusdem Generis pronounced as “eh-youse-dem generous”.
• It is a rule of construction/  a canon of statutory
construction.

• It is applied in cases general words are followed by specific

words in the end.

• Where a law lists specific classes of persons or things and

then refers to them in general, the general statements only
apply to the same kind of persons or things specifically listed.
For example:
• if a law refers to automobiles, trucks, tractors, motorcycles
and other motor-powered vehicles, “vehicles” would not
include airplanes, since the list was of land-based
transportation.

• The term ‘Ejusdem Generis’ in other words means words of

a similar class.

• The rule is that where particular words have a common

characteristic (i.e. of a class) any general words that follow
should be construed as referring generally to that class;

• no wider construction should be afforded.

• Evans v. Cross:- S.48(9) of the Road
Traffic Act, 1930- “traffic sign” to include all
signals, warning sign posts, signs or other
devices.
• Can white line on road be termed as a
traffic sign?
• Normally, general words should be given their natural
meaning like all other words unless the context requires
otherwise.
• But when a general word follows specific words of a
distinct category, the general word may be given a
restricted meaning of the same category.
• The general expression takes it's meaning from the
preceding particular expressions because the legislature
by using the particular words of a distinct genus has
shown its intention to that effect.
• So, by the use of specific words the scope of general
words is deemed to be reduced to the same extent.
Limitation
• This principle is limited in its application to general word
following less general word only.

• If the specific words do not belong to a distinct Genus

(kind/type), this rule is inapplicable.

• Consequently, if a general word follows only one particular

word, that single particular word does not constitute a distinct
genus and, therefore, Ejusdem Generis rule cannot be applied
in such a case.

• The principle of Ejusdem Generis is not a universal application.

If the context of legislation rules out the applicability of this rule,
it has no part to play in the interpretation of general words.
In State of Bombay v. Ali Gulshan,
the interpretation of Section 6 (4) (a) of the Bombay Land
Requisition Act, 1948 was which said:
• 'State Government may requisition for the purpose of
State or any other public purpose , was' involved.
• It was contended that under the provision the appellant was
entitled to requisition premises for housing a member of the
foreign consulate.
• The High Court held that the expression any other public
purpose should be read Ejusdem Generis with purpose of
state, and providing accommodation to a member of the
foreign consulate being a purpose of the Union and not of the
State, the State Government had no authority to requisition.
.
• The Supreme Court held that the High Court was in error
in applying the principle of Ejusdem Generis.
• The general expression any other public purpose follows
only a single expression for the purpose of a State which
is not a distinct genus.
• In the absence of a genus the rule has no application.
• Further, the intention of the legislature is quite clear by the
words used in the enactment.
• By giving the words their natural meaning it is apparent
that the expression any other public purpose includes
providing accommodation to a member of a foreign
consulate
• Re Latham Deceased:- S. 8(4) of Finance
Act, 1894- “Trustee, guardian, committee
or any other person”
• Can minor be included within the purview
of ‘any other person’?
Conditions for esjusdem generis
Uttar Pradesh State Electricity Board v. Harishanker. 
Here, the Supreme Court has laid down five different
conditions that needs to be fulfilled this rule of
construction is used. They are:
1.      The statute contains an enumeration of general
words.
2.      The subjects of enumeration constitute a class or
category.
3.      That class or category is not exhausted by the
enumeration.
4.      The specific term follow the enumeration.
5.      There is no indication of a different legislative
intent.
• In the case of Tillmans & Co. v. S.S. Knutsford
Ltd., Judge Farwell tried to interpret the word “in
consequence of war, disturbance or any other
cause” said that, “any other cause”.

• Additionally, he also said that if the words here

was “in consequence of war, disturbance or any
other cause whatsoever, whether similar to those
preceding or not”, then in this case this rule of
construction cannot be used as it is clearly
intended by the legislature.