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The Concept of Problem

GENE P. AGRE
Published online: 17 Sep 2010.

To cite this article: GENE P. AGRE (1982) The Concept of Problem, Educational
Studies: A Journal of the American Educational Studies Association, 13:2,
121-142, DOI: 10.1207/s15326993es1302_1

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/s15326993es1302_1

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 The Concept of Problem

GENE P. AGRE
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Studying and solving problems has been understood widely in

twentieth-century America to be the chief means by which science,
technology, philosophy, education, and democratic society progress.
Learning how to solve problems has been recommended therefore as
an important activity of the school. Some thinkers have even gone so
far as to suggest that it is impossible to learn anything in o r outside of
school except as the outcome of solving problems. S o what then makes
any problem a problem? This paper is devoted to answering this
question.
There exist surprisingly few sources to which one can turn for
clarification about the concept of problem. By far the most famous is
John Dewey's How We Think,' but unfortunately his comments which
bear on the concept of problem are unsystematic and incidental to his
exposition of a theory of thinking. There exists in educational
psychology a huge literature on problem solving, but in it the word
problem is used n o more reflectively and self-consciously than, say, the
word book. Another well-known source is T.D. Weldon's The
Vocabulary of Politics,* but he uses a Procrustean bed approach and
only discusses how the concept of problem differs from the concepts of
difficulty and puzzle. Policy analysts Horst W.J. Ritteland Mervin M.
Webber3and Aaron Wildavsky4 have made many helpful observations
about talking about problem solving in the context of social and
political affairs, but their scattered comments are incidental to
discussing what policy analysts do. J.N. Hattaingadis has argued in a
systematic manner that for a class of problems he calls "intellectual,"
the basic logical form of the statement of a problem is that of a pair of
logically inconsistent statements which people are prompted to try to
resolve by finding a consistent set of statements within a single
explanatory theory. However, he says that his analysis does not

G E N E P . AGRE is an Associate Professor in the College of Education,

University of Maryland.
 122 G E N E P. A C R E

concern "practical" p r ~ b l e m s .And

~ Karl Popper has made some
comments about the nature of problems, primarily in Objective
Knowledge,' but they are made incidentally in the presentation of his
view, not unlike Dewey's, that solving problems relates theorizing to
reality. Taken together these few sources are about all that exist that
might clarify the concept.
It is the purpose of this essay to articulate the network of concepts
which are tied to the concept of problem and t o state the conditions
necessary for assertions about problems to be made meaningfully on
particular occasions in all areas-education, politics, mathematics,
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arts, sciences, etc. A statement of the necessary conditions does not

disclose the ties with the concept of problem directly. In fact, it is only
by virtue of the ties with other concepts that the conditions necessary
for the word's use in assertions are what they are. But what the
statement does. in addition to showing how the concept connects with
the world, is to show the connections between the concept and each of
the four principal connected concepts: consciousness, undesirability,
difficulty, and solvability. And in the process of explaining those
connections, further conceptual relationships are pointed out, as, for
example, the link between the notion of difficulty of a problem and
concept of effort and the notion of "out-of-the-ordinary" expenditure
of effort.
A coherent theory of meaning of words is assumed rather than a
truth condition theory of word meanings. In spite of the fact that many
conceptual analyses which have developed necessary-conditions state-
ments have assumed the latter theory, the device at least in one form
will not be discarded. In the form of a statement of what is implied
when a problem is asserted to exist, it is a valuable device for
displaying the richness of the concept's ties to other concepts. (A bare
statement of the conditions necessary for the justified application of
the word problem would be: A problem is a n undesirable situation
which may be solvable by some agent although probably with some
difficulty. But explaining and justifying this "bare statement" would
take far more space than is available here.)

Whenever someone decides that a problem exists there is implied a

consciousness of a physical, social, psychological, or intellectual
situation or object8 which is said to be the problem. The idea of
becoming aware or conscious, in a n occurrent rather than disposi-
tional sense, of a situation or object must be understood as covering
any occurrence that brings about the belief that some object or state of
 EDUCATIONAL STUDIES 123

affairs exists. One need not personally experience the object or state.
The person having cancer need not personally view the cancerous cells
or even the results of the clinical tests. He may take the word of a
physician. One need only develop the belief that the body contains
cancerous cells. The word problem is applied by the person on the
assumption that his belief as to the facts is true. If later he becomes
convinced that his conclusion is false, he will withdraw the label of
problem: "I guess there wasn't a problem after all."
Consciousness of the state or object on the part of the person with
the problem is not required unless the speaker is the person with the
problem. The person with the cancer who is not yet aware of it can be
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said to have a problem whether he knows it or not. What is required is

that the speaker, the one who is deciding whether or not t o apply the
word problem, be conscious of it. That the speaker must be conscious
or possess the belief that the basis for asserting that a problem exists
follows from the convention that a person does not assert with
sincerity that a problem exists unless he thinks that something exists
that constitutes the basis for the belief.
The notion of consciousness must also be understood broadly
enough to cover the case of someone who, upon reflection, decides that
someone had a problem a t some time in the past and acted then so as to
have in effect solved it. In this case, it is the data from one's memory or
thinking o r study which one must be conscious of.
For some writers problems are created through consciousness of or
articulation about situations rather than being situations, and hence
they cannot exist without prior consciousness. John Dewey9 for
example describes his "second phase of reflective thought" as an
"intellectualization of the difficulty or perplexity that has been felt
(directly experienced) into a problem to be solved." In the same vein
for Jerome Ravetzlo a problem is a "statement" which has been
consciously prepared. And for Edward C. Banfield" a difficulty is a
problem only if all of the elements of the situation are "brought
together within the purview of some single mind."
This thesis, however, may be faulted on several grounds. First, it can
be said of a problem that one is having a difficult time "defining it,"
"locating it," or "formulating it." None of these expressions suggests
that "it," the problem, won't exist unless and until the defining, etc., is
successful. Second, it can be said that one is only "dimly aware" of a
problem and that it "siowly dawned" on one that he or she has a
problem. The dimness of the awareness, or indeed, complete unaware-
ness, doesn't prevent the situation from being a problem. And the
dawning neither creates the problem nor dates its origination. Third,
 GENE P. ACRE

contrary to what is implied by Dewey in the cited pa~sage,~~difficulties

need not be cognitively indistinct or apprehended emotionally.
Britain's current economic difficulties for instance have been analyzed
extensively, but remain difficulties. Nor do they seem to have been first
apprehended in an emotional haze. And last, some problems, like
riddles and picture puzzles, can be said to be "made up," "dreamed
up," and "created." These problems exist because they have been
authored to be problems and thus are from the start articulated or
defined. Such problems d o not arise except incidentally from diffi-
culties experienced prior to their authors' ihtentions to create
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problems.
Another interpretation of the consciousness condition holds that a
problem is some form of consciousness. Andreas Faludi,l3 one of
many who hold this view, states his "definition of a problem as a
subjective state of tension" in a particularly direct manner: "tension
arises (and a problem exists) in the subject's mind, and it is only here
that a problem exists."The tension arises from the difference "between
the ends pursued by a subject and his image of the environment. " He
interprets G. Chadwick's equation, "Problem = Goal+ Impediment to
the Goal," to be expressing the same view.14 (On this view, solving a
problem is a matter of removing the sources of the tension.)
What Faludi has adopted perhaps unconsciously is one version of
the theory about values commonly called "ethical subjectivism."
According to this version of the theory, values and disvalues are
feelings or states of consciousness, and when one ascribes values and
disvalues to objects or situations one actually is only expressing one's
feelings and is not stating that the object or situation has any sort of
property or characteristic. What may look like an assertion about
objects is actually autobiographical. Faludi's choice of the word
tension suggests it is an undesirable or disvalued state of consciousness
which is being expressed.
T o judge something to be a problem is to judge it to have a disvalue,
but using the ethical subjectivist construal ofjudgments of disvalues to
interpret the concept of problem cannot be successful because one c'an
be said to be mistaken about the existence of problems. I t matters not
whether a persan who mistakenly believes that he has cancer has a
tension or a related mental or psychological manifestation, he does not
have that problem. He may have a million other problems but he
doesn't have that one. What he feels is absolutely irrelevant.
Another failing comes from the theory's treatment of ethical
judgments as facts. Tensions and similar mental responses are end
products of various psychological processes. and may persist, imper-
 EDUCATIONAL STUDIES 125

vious to reason. Roy Wood Sellarsls makes the point in this way:
The inadequacy of ethical and aesthetic relativism, or subject-
ivism, has been that it left us with brute facts without possibility of
revision through discussion and investigation. It is a brute fact
that 1 like this picture now and dislike this piece of music. It is also
a brute fact that you dislike this picture and like this piece of
music. If this is all that can be done about it, we can only register
attitudes as facts. Discussion would seem to be meaningless
because irrelevant.

Reasons and e v i d r ~ c egiving, however, are presupposed in the

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concept of problem. Evidence giving is relevant in considering the

factual bases of problem predications as in the case of mistakenly
believing one has a cancer problem. Also, reasons and evidence are
relevant in judging whether a problem situation would affect one in the
way or to the extent that one believes it would. And lastly, reasons may
move one to modify his goals or plans in the light of which the facts are
deemed to be a problem.
The subjectivist's "problems-are-conscious-states" theory can also
be faulted as a n analysis of the concept of problem on the grounds that
according to it there can be n o undetected problems. If one is
conscious that one is conscious whenever one is conscious of
something, then one cannot have a problem consciousness without
having immediately detected it. By this theory, to have a problem is to
be conscious, so the problem could not exist without consciousness
and could not exist before consciousness. However, as noted before,
problems can be said t o be undetected. Similar remarks apply on the
point of discovering prob1ems.f"
In assessing the subjectivist's thesis that the word problem has as its
referents undifferentiated combinations of conscious acts of judging
(that something is a problem) and the so-called "contents" of those
judgings, one must not confuse the fused combination with personal
characteristics such as neuroses, attitudes, inclinations, andfeelings of
tension which a person might want to change in himself. A person can
judge that his own tension, for example, is a problem. These
characteristics may be unconscious, and may be undetected and
discovered, and the person may be mistaken about them. But that
problem should not be confused with the "I" which judges the tension
to be a problem and in need of change. The subjectivists must hold that
the problem-consciousness entity is attached to the "IWandnot to the
"me" that is judged to be in need of change. If this were not the case,
then judgments about nonpersonal problems would not be tensions or
 126 GENE P. ACRE

any other conscious fact, which, of course. is exactly what Faludi et

alia must deny.
The subjectivist's analysis of the concept of problem is made more
attractive by the fact that two people can view a situation very
differently, with one seeing it as a problem and the other person seeing
it as, for example, a n opportunity. Because the situation itself has no
simple, sensible quality whose detectability by intersubjective scien-
tific methods could be used to settle the issue, it is not unreasonable to
assume that the referent of the word problem is some quality of the
person.I7 The central failing of the subjectivist position is that it fails to
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understand the function of statements about the value or disvalue of

situations, acts, objects and the like. The function is not to state the
contents or states of the mind (or of the world). The function is to
appraise particular facts on the basis of what it means to creatures,
given the situation's or object's nature and its power to affect them.18
In the case of the disvalue word problem the appraisal concerns how
the world currently is affecting them in unwanted ways or how the
world might negatively affect themselves and others and how the
world might not negatively affect them if designated parts of the world
were changed. The word problem is used both to appraise and to locate
what should be changed. Pointing to a situation or object while saying
that "it is a problem" is not to call attention to its length, size, color, or
to any other so-called "primary" or "secondary" quality. The purpose
is to call attention to something the speaker believes should be
changed.
To summarize part I of the paper, the consciousness presupposed in
every assertion of the existence of a problem is the consciousness of a
relevant situation, object, etc., the asserter must have in order to assert
sincerely that a problem exists. Further, the word consciousness must
be interpreted broadly enough t o include the formation of the belief
about the facts which is based on someone else's assertion of fact, e.g.,
the patient may take the word of the physician rather than observe the
medical conditions personally. T o be rejected is the stronger require-
ment that problems to be problems must be preceded by definition or
analysis of the situation. Also to be rejected is the requirement that
problems be construed to be identical with some form of consciousness
such as tensions.
I1
Asserting that a problem exists follows upon an evaluation of the
situation in which one finds something about it that is undesirable.
Situations and objects are seen as not only affecting adversely one's
 EDUCATIONAL STUDIES 127

self or group, but also as affecting adversely one's beliefs or

expectations, as pointing out gaps in one's understanding or know-
ledge, or as being undesirable or unwanted in some other way. Having
cancer, for example, may be seen as undesirable because it can lead t o
death (but it may not be seen as undesirable by someone looking for a
socially acceptable way to commit suicide). But having something
happen that doesn't fit one's theory or expectation also may be
undesirable to a person because it challenges one's sense of under-
standing or mastery of the environment. Science and daily life abound
with surprising and sometimes baffling phenomena, and one's under-
standing and sense of control can be called into question. Even more
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unnerving is the phenomenon that is so strange and unusual that one

doesn't have any expectation at all about it.19
The sense in which all problems can be called undesirable is not easy
to express. There is no particular difficulty in understanding life-
threatening problems as undesirable to the person whose life is
threatened. But in what sense can problems in branches of mathe-
matics which are highly unlikely ever to have any practical application
be called undesirable? The same can be asked of some hoary
philosophical problems. Instances such as these are particularly
difficult to call undesirable particularly if the person encountering
them does so in a spirit of enjoying a good intellectual challenge and
workout. The required sense of undesirable is the negative of
desirable, where, by the latter is meant that it is desired by the
creature involved in the situation that he understand or master
whatever he sees any reason to want to understand or master, that his
theories successfully explain everything they are expected to explain,
that his expectations always are fulfilled, or that the plans he
undertakes for any reason always are realized without incident. The
remote problems of mathematics and philosophy are embodiments of
the fact that fundamental theories haven't yet explained all they should
or that they are in essential conflict with facts or with other
fundamental theories. T o have a theory (if it's valid) is to understand,
and it is desirable to understand. Not to understand is therefore
undesirable. In similar fashion it is undesirable that a n expectation be
unfulfilled, that a plan's execution be prevented, that a theory fail, that
a theorem's derivation be stalled, that a life be lost, that a condition
persist, or that some other condition fail to persist.
The undesirability of a problem is such that it can be altered only
through an achievement which leaves the situation finished or
completed in a way which is implied in how the problem is framed,
which, in turn, is based in part on ideas about what are stable o r
 128 GENE P. ACRE

terminal versus transitional states of objects and situations. The

family's housing problem, for example, is solved by finding a larger
but affordable house and settling down in it. The algebra problem is
solved when one has completed what was ordered, namely, reducing
the algebraic expression to "the simplest terms" or terminal state as
understood in algebra. Having finally gotten the new engine to
perform up to standard dependably, there is nothing further to d o on
that problem. Any amount of improvement in a situation will count as
having it improved, but only a completed situation will count as
having it solved. The undesirability of the situation does not neces-
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sarily have to be totally eradicated (see n. 24). but the improvement

must be achieved in the face of difficulty (see part III), and it must be a
completed situation rather than one left in that condition solely
because work on it stopped.
Not every situation that is deemed undesirable is a problem. An
undesirable situation assumed to be inevitable would not be thought of
as a problem (see part IV). An undesirable situation that has nothing
difficult connected with it isn't a problem either. And a situation isn't a
problem if it is not too undesirable. But at what point isn't it
considered a problem? The answer can be approached in terms of the
idea that the person who is deciding whether to call something a
problem has an idea of what is important in the context in which
deliberation takes place. And that person, given the number and
seriousness of the other problems currently being faced, has an idea of
at what point undesirable situations are too minor or unimportant or
trivial to be so considered. A person's interests and values sensitize him
to particular aspects or qualities of situations. It is these interests and
values when combined with prior beliefs as to how various types of
situations might affect him that give him reason to becomeconcerned,
intrigued, puzzled, perplexed, etc. It is these interests, values and
beliefs about the world which cause one person to notice or dwell upon
qualities of situations to which another person may be quite blind or
indifferent. Of course, people vary in their thresholds of tolerance of
imperfections and in their self-centeredness, and these too will make a
difference in how much it takes t o consider something to be a problem.
And some minor imperfections aren't problems because they are
manageable or tolerable the way they are. A situation may be
rectifiable, but it isn't undesirable enough to be worth the effort and
cost required to fix it. It may require some occasional attention, but it
is manageable and, hopefully, can be kept from becoming serious
enough to constitute being a problem. Or it may be a bit annoying
from time to time, "but I really can't say it's a problem."
 EDUCATIONAL STUDIES 129

Deciding what the problem is is tantamount t o deciding what ought

to exist. It is moral inquiry informed by empirical inquiry. My
neighbor mows his lawn at 7 A.M. and it wakes me up. What is the
problem? That is, what should be changed-when he mows, o r my
attitude about people who don't lie around in bed in the morning? O r
should my neighbor's deep-seated hostility toward the world be
changed? O r my general irritability? O r are both part of some larger
problem? In this example there is conflict in the neighborhood, and
resolution and reconstruction are called for, but what is to be modified
into existence in the name of resolution and reconstruction necessarily
involves moral deliberation as well as factual inquiry. Defining the
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problem may lay the basis for solution through location o r clarifica-
tion of what is at issue but it is no more a mere exercise in logic than it is
a mere exercise in fact-finding. Observation and inquiry get their
direction in this way. Every decision as to the definition of the problem
is implicitly a decision as to what is relevant. And relevance involves
reference to what ought to exist.20 Even in mathematical cases there is
a judgment that the problem's answer ought to be brought into
existence.
It is one thing to imply by calling a situation a problem that it should
be solved: it is quite another matter to decide who should d o it. In some
instances a person may find himself "feeling" the problem personally.
He becomes engaged intellectually, emotionally, and physically in
trying to solve it. This personalization of the problem is the paradigm
assumed in psychological and pedagogical discussions of problem
solving, but it is not the only paradigm possible. A person can "see" a
problem in the sense of gaining an awareness of the relevant facts,
concluding that an undesirable factor is present, and understanding
what is difficult as well as factors which may well make it solvable, but
not "feel" any personal responsibility or urge t o solve it. The
perception of disvalue does not obligate the perceiver to try personally
t o right the situation. This relatively passive perception may be neither
aimless nor irresponsible. There must be a limit to how many problems
any one person can be expected to try to solve if for no other reason
than that there is a limit to the time available to any one person for
solving problems. Some problems must be left for others. Besides,
many problems require expert skill or knowledge for their solutions,
which may explain why students can remain so unmoved by problems
over which their professors agonize.
Seeing situations as problems is a function of a clash between what is
and what should be. And where a person elects to solve problems
through his own efforts, seeing the problems is the beginning of a
 130 GENE P. AGRE

process of intruding his energies into the natural order. It is a mode of

legitimizing willful man's impulses. At one and the same time man
imposes his will on the universe and sets it right.
III
T o be labeled a problem, a situation must have something about it
which is believed to be difficult. The task of pinpointing or defining or
clarifying or analyzing a problem may be difficult or the task of solving
it may be difficult or both. In some cases defining the problem is easy-
a glance at the gas gauge reminds one that he forgot to stop for gasoline
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yesterday. In other instances solving the problem is easy. Having

finally figured out why the automobile's headlights aren't on (because
one had only thought he had turned them on), it is easy to solve the
problem of having no lights-turn the knob.
It should be explained before going further that what is being talked
about here is "being difficult" rather than "difficulty" as in the
expression "a difficulty."*' The antonym of dfficult is easy but
difficulty as in a difficulty has none.2'
If there is nothing difficult connected with figuring out what the
problem is, and if there is nothing difficult connected with solving the
problem, then the speaker can say, "That isn't a problem." If asked by
a frustrated motorist to get his car out of a tight parking space, a n
obliging bystander may conclude upon surveying the situation that
getting the car out would be routine and easy, and would require of
him no special exercise of skill or unusual effort. If so, he could say,
"That won't be a problem." If, however, he assesses the situation as
calling for a little extra effort and display of skill, he could say, "That
won't be much of a problem." What is a problem for one person may
not be a problem for another person, and what is a problem for a
person one day may not be a problem the next day (because the
person's strength has returned perhaps, or because the plaster cast has
been removed from his hand).
T o qualify as a problem the solving process or the defining process
must be judged to be at least a bit difficult. How arduous and
demanding must either activity be in order for it to be judged to be
difficult? The answer is that the level of effort needed to complete the
activity must be judged to be above the level required to carry out
adequately what are viewed as one's regular, routine tasks. Solving a
problem or defining it requires a n out-of-the-ordinary effort. It is
necessary to try because the outcome is in doubt (because one is up
against obstacles and not merely because one cannot know the future).
The amount of effort, skill, or both needed to solve a problem can
 EDUCATIONAL STUDIES 131

vary due t o a variation in the amount and kinds of resources available

for use in solving the problem. Money, tools, friends, and material
supplies can make the job easier and their lack can make the solving
process more difficult. Due to the connection between the level of
effort and skill required and the availability of aids and materials,
judgments of being difficult (and hence whether on this basis a
problem can be said to exist) can be based in some instances on the
availability of various means, for example, "Fixing the lawnmower is
going to be a problem because I don't have the right tools." Similarly,
locating and diagnosing the problem can be made much easier if the
appropriate instruments are available. (The amounts of effort and skill
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required are inversely related, with a lower bound on the level of skill
and an upper bound on the level of effort available to get the problem
solved at all.)
S o far what is difficult in connection with solving or defining a
problem has been portrayed in terms of the effort that has to be
expended and the degree of skill that must be brought to bear in
solving or defining it. There is, however, an alternative, albeit indirect,
way of pointing to the problem's being difficult. That alternative is to
articulate a problem in terms of some sort of disparity, discontinuity,
anomaly, inequity, tension, discrepancy, friction, strain, or incom-
pleteness which would be difficult to remedy. A labor problem for
instance is a problem because, in addition to its undesirability and its
presumed changeability, there is a friction between the employees and
the employer the removal of which will be difficult (and of course the
amount of friction must be over and above the amount thought to be
inherent in normal relations between employees and employer).
Discrepancies in statements made before a grand jury may be a
problem for the witness because explaining them away would be
difficult. Discontinuity of income is a problem for many poor people
because achieving continuity would be difficult. Effort, skill, or both
are required to fill the gap, explain the discrepancy, remove the source
of friction, etc., according to a criterion which is backed by a theory or
by some less formal proposition.
What makes solutions difficult, if they are difficult at all, is that the
world's ways severely limit the success of efforts to change situations so
as to conform to the heart's desire. If a time-tested procedure exists for
bringing about a desired state of affairs, there may not exist a problem,
because carrying out the procedure may be easy. But if extra effort is
required because the outcome is in doubt, the situation may qualify as
a problem. If no already known procedure is suggested from an
analysis of the situation and the solving is not easy, then one must
 132 G E N E P. AGRE

create one's own novel procedure if the problem is t o be solved. Similar

remarks will explain why defining problems can be difficult. Stated
negatively, if the outcome isn't in doubt due to some difficulty in the
defining or the solving, then there is no problem. If one need not try
(for the word try comes into play when the outcome is in doubt), then
there can be no problem. If the outcome is in doubt because no cut-
and-dried method is available, then the word "creative" and the
criterion-of-creativity word "novel" must be applicable.
"Making a big problem out of something" is to overestimate how
difficult is the barrier standing in the way of a solution, or it is to
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overestimate the undesirability of the problem situation. Being "a

minor problem" or "not much of a problem" is to downplay either how
difficult the solution is or its undesirability. A major problem, on the
other hand, is very undesirable, very difficult to solve, or perhaps both.
Some problems "take care of themselves," "evaporate" or "dissolve"
rather than get solved either because the person involved forgot about
them, decided they weren't undesirable or difficult, or because the
desired states came about through other causes-the problem of how
to get rid of an unwanted employee evaporated when he suddenly died
of a heart attack. T o overcome something difficult is to one's credit but
sometimes no credit is due because the problem disappeared before
one could start trying to define or to solve it. It is just this sort of case
that appears to be an exception to the statement that every problem
has something difficult connected with it-the problem simply ceased
to exist before any effort or skill could be expended on its clarification
or its solution. However, these problems, like all problems, are so
labeled with the normal expectation that they are not going to
disappear suddenly.
It is no mere accident that the notion of barrier and the incorporat-
ing metaphor and definition by hypothetical example of travel
interrupted by a barrier are used commonly in talking about problems.
The Greek word problema meant bulwark, shield, or impediment to
action.23 This meaning is preserved today as illustrated in the following
example in which the word barrier can be substituted for the word
problem without changing the meaning: "The main problem [barrier]
standing in the way of a complete settlement is the issue of how union
dues are to be collected." Not only does someone think he sees that a
barrier has been thrown forth out onto the roadway (cf., Oxford
English Dictionary entry for problem), the barrier's presence on the
roadway and resulting interruption of steady progress are undesirable
from the traveler's point of view (the undesirability condition),
removing or surmounting the barrier will be at least somewhat difficult
 EDUCATIONAL STUDIES 133

(the difficulty condition), and because what lies across a roadway

normally can be removed or gotten around by a diligent traveler, the
problem is probably solvable (the solvability condition). The road's
condition has been corrected and-the traveler's interruption has been
terminated. Further, the metaphor suggests several alternative criteria
for judging whether the problem has been solved: whether the barrier
has been removed, whether it has been surmounted or bypassed,
whether travel can resume or resumes at the previous rate, whether the
traveler gets closer to the goal or eventually reaches the goal, whether
the traveler could make up lost time, and whether injuries or extra
costs were avoided.24 It is to the matter of solutions of problems that
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we now turn.

The fourth and last concept that is connected directly with the
concept of problem is that of solvability. Their relationship can best be
explained in the following way. To say that a problem exists is to imply
that, in the absence of strong evidence t o the contrary, a situation may
be presumed to be solvable, or, if it is already believed to be
unsolvable, the situation at least appears similar in other respects to
situations which were solvable.25 In either case, one is actingappropri-
ately in utilizing the concept of solvability (and the concepts of solving
and solution [qua result]) in responding to it. A person is warranted
prima facie in trying t o solve it, or he is warranted in spending time in
the study of issues related to its solvability. This analysis covers cases
in which a problem was called a problem by its originator or
discoverer, and became known to a wide audience as "the x problem,"
and continues to be referred to as "the x problem" even after it
subsequently was proved to be unsolvable. The explanation is that it
continues to be called a problem, not because someone still believes
that it is solvable, but because someone once imagined that it was
solvable. And it continues to be called a problem under a sort of
grandfather clause covering cases too well known to make a with-
drawal of the title problem possible, practical, or polite.
"Seeing" or "finding" a problem is the result of having it occur to
one's mind that there may exist a sequence of physical, social, or
mental actions which could be performed on the material which could
qualify as an activity of solving. In other words, to come to imagine,
conjecture, or hypothesize that a problem exists is in part the product
of coming to believe that the situation contains causal or logical
strands or possibilities with which someone might work so as to B
produce a solution. Problems "should" be solvable, so one does not
 134 GENE P.ACRE

decide that a problem exists unless and until one decides that solving it
is not out of the question. One never can be certain in advance except
perhaps in some cases in logic and mathematics that a problem can be
solved-perhaps some unappreciated limits of nature or logic prevent
it, perhaps there will be an error in the reasoning o r in the execution of
method, perhaps a successful method exists but has never been chosen,
or perhaps the situation has now become uncontrollable. But this is a
matter for the person himself to decide. The person may have only the
foggiest of notions about what might be done with the situation and
about what would fit his mental template of a solution. In any case, a
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person, as it were, backs into a conclusion that a problem exists.

In addition to the problem-solvability relationship just described,
there exist relationships between the concepts of problem and solution
(qua result) and between the concepts of problem and solving (the
activity). As will be explained elsewhere, these two relationships are
derivatives of the problem-solvability one because they reflect the idea
that problem attributions have a "problematic" modality. But
although they are derivative they are important for the purposes of this
paper. The problem-solving relationship need be described only
briefly. But the forms of the problem-solution relationship will be
described in greater detail. The last of the three relationships is
especially important for understanding the concept of problem in
social-political contexts, particularly in contexts in which the suita-
bility of the concepts of problem and solution becomes borderline or
doubtful. What is being referred t o here is the use of the labelsproblem
and solution for complex, rapidly changing situations by members of
complex social institutions in which a certain kind of social-political
dynamic process occurs. In the field of public affairs one is particularly
likely t o be confronted by situations which may be more accurately
and helpfully described by such words as crisis, threat, dzfliculty, and
predicament than by the word problem. And rather than the word
solution, it may be more accurate and helpful to apply to other
situations words such as reconciliation, stand-off; adjustment, and
appeasement.
An appreciation of the problem-solving relationship which is
adequate for the purposes of this paper can be gained by considering
cases in which the statement of a problem includes a more or less direct
reference to the kind of activity which would solve it. When the
problem is stated to be "how to get the car out of that crowded parking
space," for instance, the solving activity is mentioned, namely, getting
the car out. When the goal-oriented traveler encounters a barrier
across his path, he may well incorporate a solving activity reference
 EDUCATIONAL STUDIES 135

into his functional conceptualization of his problem, "how to remove

or surmount the barrier."
One form of the problem-solution conceptual relationship might
seem at first to be the same as the one just mentioned. In the example,
"the problem of understanding ourselves as part of the world. . . ,"the
problem is specified as understanding. If the word is interpreted as
standing for a state (of understanding something) rather than for an
activity (of empathizing), then the problem's statement contains a
reference to the desired state or solution. It is a proleptic identification
of the problem. Many examples of this kind can be generated, each
with its own considerable conceptual ~ o m p l e x i t y"The
: ~ ~ problem of
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hanging onto one's money," "The problem of keeping one's integrity,"

"The problem of being honest in a dishonest world,"and "Recognizing
true love is the young woman's biggest problem."Solvingeach of these
problems involves developing a viewpoint, policy, o r testing proced-
dure, and the solution is to possess an understanding, a policy, or a
testing procedure.
The second form of the problem-solution relationship is the
executive context of decision, action, and completion whether of
physical, social, or purely intellectual sorts. The word problem is used
to pick out something that has been deemed t o be changeable and
worth changing; the word's application serves in a complex way as a
warrant justifying human action or intervention. And the word
solution is used to refer to a n accceptable completion of that change (in
addition to being used routinely t o refer to the process of changing or
solving). The words question and answer have their home in the
similar context of inquiry and learning, and both pairs, problem and
solution, question and answer, are related by a n intellectual and social
sequential relationship of the first "calling for" the second: to label
something a problem is to call for its solution, and to pose a question is
to call for an answer. T o pose a question is t o direct attention to
considerations of an answer; to label something a problem is to guide
the mind toward consideration of a solution. S o close are these two
pairs that frequently in mathematics classes problems will be said to
have answers, and questions will be said to have solutions.
The third form of the problem-solution relationship is, from one
perspective, the most important. The two concepts are linked together
in a social-political dynamic process that is the life of complex social
institutions. It relates problems and solutions in a process of focusing
and directing human efforts in public, commercial, academic and
professional activities where consensus seldom exists as to what
exactly the problem is or what solution to it would be.
 136 G E N E P. A G R E

In textbooks, problems usually are presented as discrete units

clearly separated from other problems and from the rest of the world.
Perfected, efficient methods are frequently specified, and solutions are
definite, discrete, and final. Students can feel confident as they
completely conquer each problem one after another. But in the real
world, especially in complex institutional and public affairs, such
confidence is seldom well-grounded. The world presents itself all
intermeshed, which makes it difficult to decide what to designate as the
problem or even a problem. And the methods available for solving
these social-political problems tend to be, especially under conditions
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of a democracy, very uncertain procedures. And solutions, not that

any are ever fully realized, come entangled with all sorts of other
evolving and changing conditions and may produce new problems. T o
add to the uncertainty of applying the words problem and solution to
these situations is the fact that frequently a great variation exists in the
values and the world-views participants use in deciding whether
something is undesirable, how undesirable it is, and what is undesir-
able about it.27
In these sorts of cases one does not so much achieve a solution as one
declares some actual or possible state of affairs to be a solution. It is a
decision. If the causes of inflation were better understood, for instance,
if economic theory were further developed, and if the ability of
politicians to fuel inflation could be weakened, then a definite
achievement of a solution to the problem could be manifested clearly
in the world. But lacking understanding, power, and agreed-upon
criteria, one can only decide, and then try to persuade others.
One thing that can be done in talking about such fluid, complex
states of affairs is to direct attention through picking new targets for
human effort: one designates something else to be the problem. A
process of problem substitution o r redefinition is engaged in.28 When it
became clear to one member of the U.S. Senate that the U.S. military
could not win the war in Vietnam and thus could not solve the problem
officially defined as "containing communism in Southeast Asia," he
proposed that the old problem should be discarded and that a new
problem should be substituted. S o he proposed that the U.S. announce
that the real problem was "helping South Vietnam defend itself until
such time as it is capable of doing so entirely by itself." (Then the U.S.
military was to announce that it had solved the new problem and that
therefore it could go home at once!)
Such inspired acts of creative problem redefinition or substitution
are a function of the fact that if one solution condition relevant to a
problem isn't obtainable, then one can always stipulate or define the
 EDUCATIONAL STUDIES 137

problem some other way so that its solution might well be obtainable.
At its worst, redefinition diverts public attention from ruinous
conditions or from the politician's failure; at its best, it is anact of pure
political genius. What may occur is that ends are matched to available
means.29 This permits the political process of consensus formation to
occur, and it also permits the public to focus its energies successfully
cm wliat' may well' be accomplishable.
Complex social institutions exist in a world which is in a permanent,
often rapid and unpredictable flux-a diaphanous, boiling, rolling fog
in which nothing is clearly unrelated to anything else. In it, every
problem is unique,30 and unrepeatable, and no solution is noncon-
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tingent, nontenuous, or completely faultless. The social world usually

is stable enough to make some instances of problem-solving effort
worthwhile, but frequently one can only strive to improve the situation
and hope that in retrospect it can be said that one solved the problem.
The interlocked concepts of problem and solution have an
extremely important place in the conceptual resources of persons
living in modern industrial societies. No doubt these two concepts are
valuable to possess and to use, but, if we may editorialize for a
moment, they are valuable only if they are used in a restrained and
discriminating manner, and only if their users possess a sizable battery
of related concepts which are used in an equally restrained and
discerning manner. Modern life is constantly confronted with situa-
tions about which it is simply not clear whether the optimistic label
problem is the most appropriate label (optimistic because its use
suggests that the unwanted situation can be rectified or eliminated).
Perhaps the terms threat or handicap would be better clues to relevant
action. Or perhaps difficulty or trouble or to be very optimistic,
opportunity rather than problem. Rather than solution perhaps
reconciliation, adjustment, or settlement would be a better aid to
recognition of what actually occurred. Because the label placed on a
situation is an indirect recommendation to the persons involved as to
how to respond, the words cope or struggle may be more appropriate
than the word solve to the capabilities of those involved and to the
limitations of the times and circumstances. The words problem and
solution may be important and valuable words in our technologically
saturated world, but their ubiquitous presence and their indiscrimi-
nate application to any and every situation creates the serious risk that
our view of reality will be grossly overconfident and thus may be
dangerously self-deceiving and self-defeating.
In summary, the concept of problem is connected directly to the
concept of solvability and indirectly to the concepts of solving and
 138 GENE P. AGRE

solution. All three relationships may be grouped together for conven-

ience by saying that if someone believes that a situation is a problem,
then the person believes that it is appropriate to use the concepts of
solvability, solving and solution in considering that situation.

It should be apparent by now that the concept of problem does not

lend itself to neat, orderly summarization. What will be offered in
place of a summary is a five-part statement of the conditions implied
when a problem is asserted to exist. It includes reference to all cases of
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presently existing problems, including grandfather-clause problems

and problems created by textbook authors which of course cannot be
said to be discovered a t the moment of their conception. Excluded in
the interest of keeping the statement readable is reference to three
kinds of nonpresent problems: (1) problems discovered and solved in
the past, (2) retrospective problems (mentioned in part I ) which
occurred and were solved in the past but are only now conceived as
having been problems, and (3) future problems.
If some situation or object is asserted sincerely to be a problem, then
necessarily someone:
1) Is or was conscious of some relevant and detectable situation or
object or of something he created, or for plausible reasons believes or
believed that it exists or existed,
2) Judged that situation or object to be in some manner undesir-
able, and undesirable enough that it should be changed into something
at least less undesirable, or would have judged it so if he were aware of
the situation, or posed some situation with the expectation that it be
altered or completed in a desired manner,
3) Judged that it is, was, or would be at least somewhat difficult for
himself or for some other person to solve o r to define,
4) Believes or believed that the available evidence makes it possible
that the situation is solvable, or that it is similar to problems which
have been solved in the past, and
5) Believes or believed that it is appropriate to use the concepts of
solvability, solving, and solution in considering that situation.
No explication of a concept's ties can in principle be exhaustive, and
there are several major kinds of ties to other concepts which are not
discussed here. One of them concerns the relationship of the concept of
problem to other concepts which are used to interpret the world
confronting persons and which are used by them to formulate
responding attitudes or principles of action,3' such as the concepts of
 EDUCATIONAL STUDIES 139

difficulty, opportunity, crisis, and uncontrollability. Some of these

relationships were hinted at, but anything like a comprehensive theory
has yet to be developed. Another important aspect of the concept on
which no work has been done concerns the precise details of the
relationship between problem solving and learning. It would appear
that there exists a complex mixture of conceptual connections among
the concepts of learning, problem, and solving. A closely related topic
which was not explored systematically in this paper concerns the
epistemological or knowledge-lacking aspect of the concept. This
aspect is especially important to philosophers, and accounts for the
emphases they place on inquiry and on experimenting. And of course
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all sorts of new conclusions could emerge from further analyses of the
concept of problem not only because there is no such thing as an
absolutely philosophically neutral analysis of any concept but also
because the concept of problem has such intimate ties to so many of the
world's most complex and notoriously slippery concepts-
consciousness, believing, appraising, value, desirability, and making
an effort.

Notes
1. John Dewey, How We Think (Boston: D.C. Heath, 1st ed., 1910, 2nd ed., 1933).
See also his Logic: 7he 7heory of Inquiry (New York: Henry Holt, 1938), chap. 6; and
Democracy and Education (New York: Macmillan, 1916), chap. 11.
2. T.D. Weldon, The Vocabulary of Politics (London: Penguin Books, 1953). pp. 75-
81.
3. Horst W.J. Rittel and Mervin M. Webber, "Dilemmas in a General Theory of
Planning." Policy Science 4 ( 1973): 155-69.
4. Aaron Wildavsky, Speaking Truth to Power: The Art and Craft of Policy Analysis
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1979).
5. J . N . Hattiangadi, "The Structure of Problems," Philosophy of Social Sciences,
Part 1, 8 (1978): 345-65; Part 11. 9 (1979): 49-76.
6. Ibid.. 11, p. 51. He attributes the germ of his formalization of the gap between the
facts and the desiderata to Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations (New York:
Basic Books, 1962), chap. 15. Jerome R. Ravetz hasattempted to definevarious kinds
of problems in terms of Aristotle's four "causes" in his Scientific Knowledge and Its
Social Problems (London: Oxford University Press, 1971).
7. Karl Popper, Objective Knouvledge (London: Oxford University Press, 1972).
chap. 6.
8. Situations, conditions, circumstances, states of affairs, regular sequences, objects,
propositions, theorems, and anything else that can be said to endure or exist can be
said to be problems, but in this paper they are all rather uniformly referred to as
"situations." For some other purposes these differences would be important. What
one changes when one solves a problem is quite different for each class of cases. In
what particular way the situation, etc., is to be changed depends sometimes on what
particular aspect is seen to be undesirable, and sometimes it depends in part on what
 140 GENE P. ACRE

solution resultant is chosen. Statements of a problem may only name or identify the
situation to be changed, but they may provide additional details concerning what
aspect is to be changed, how it is to be changed, or what it is to be changed into.
9. Dewey, How We Think, 2nd ed., p. 108, his italics. Dewey also has the
incompatible view that problems are tertiary properties of situations.
10. Ravetz, Scientrfic Knowledge, p. 133. Also see pp. 132 and 134-137.
1 I. Edward C. Banfield, Political Influence (New York: Free Press. 1951). p. 326.
12. Perhaps it should be explained that while, on this thesis. the problem is the
product of intellectualizing consciousness, the problem product itself need not be a
form of consciousness. Nor need it be thereafter always accompanied by conscious-
ness. For example, for Ravetz in Scientifc Knowledge, p. 132, the "statement" which
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is the problem product is not itself a form of consciousness. For Max Black in Critical
Thinking, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972), p. 272, the problem
product is a "question" which arises in a context of "inquiry." By way of contrast, for
Irving M. Copi in Introduction to Logic (New York: Macmillan, 1953). p. 401, a
problem is a "fact": "A problem may be characterized as a fact or group of facts for
which we have no acceptable explanation,. . . "
13. Andreas Faludi. Planning Theory (Oxford: Pergamon Press. 1973). pp. 8 2 4 . his
italics. What is not at issue is whether awareness of problems is always accompanied
by an emotion of tension, puzzlement, concern, etc. No one has addressed that issue
directly. and indirect remarks of various writers are too sketchy to determine whether
such a connection would be thought to be a factual connection or an analytic one. If
taken to be a factual claim. then its truth is doubtful because, assuming common
definitions of the key words. some notably cool-headed and cold-hearted men have
become aware of problems. But whether true or false, no revision of the points made in
this paper would be required. If taken to be a'nonempiricalclaim, then theclaim would
be "true by definition" if the word "emotion" were construed so broadly as to include
the normal "tension" of being awake and alert.
14. Quoted from Faludi, Planning Theorv, p. 82. G. Chadwick. A Svstems View of
Planning (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1971).
15. Roy Wood Sellars. The Philosophy of Phvsical Realism (New York: Macmillan;
1932), pp. 453-54.
16. Led by Jacob W. Getzels, a number of psychologists have begun to investigate the
psychology of "finding" problems. For a bibliography, see Frank Barron and David
M. Harrington, "Creativity, Intelligence, and Personality," Annual Review of
Psychology 32 (198 1): 452.
17. One common variation of this theory calls textbook exercises problems and calls
the student's perception of them real or true or genuine problems if the student is
moved to try to solve them, and mere tasks if the student isn't. Yet another variation
places both problems and real problems within the student's mind, with the difference
being that problems are passive, purely intellectualapprehensions(e.g., apprehension
of the statement. "Solve for x: x + 2 = 6")and real problems are intellectual appre-
hensions plus the desire (born of a conviction of their undesirability) to solve them.
The objections to thesevariations are basically the same as the objections to the others.
Incidentally, real problems may be merely extra difficult to solve, or extra undesirable.
These real problems may not have a form of consciousness interpretation at all. With
the phrase, " . . . i s now a real problem," a developing situation is declared to be
definitely no longer a mere inconvenience, annoyance, or borderline case. (For
Dewey's variation, see Democracy and Education, p. 182.)
18. Sellars, Physical Realism, pp. 466ff.
 EDUCATIONAL STUDIES 141

19. Cf. Larry Laudan, Progress and Its Problems (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1977), chaps. I and 2.
20. Kingsley Price, "On Educational Relevance and Irrelevance," in Educational
Judgments, ed. J . Doyle (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), pp. 219-231.
21. Weldon, Vocabulary, pp. 76f. Widespread interest developed some years ago in
Weldon's analysis of the relationships among problems, difficulties, and puzzles (pp.
75-83). After noting that, "'Problem' as it is commonly used is vague and slightly
confusing since it is equivalent sometimes to 'puzzle' and sometimes to 'difficulty',"
Weldon proposes to "clear up" this "common confusion" in the following way:
Difficulties "occur naturally," but cannot be solved. lnstead they may be surmounted,
reduced, avoided, ignored, or "dealt with in various ways, none of which can correctly
be described as 'right'." Puzzles, on the other hand, are deliberately fabricated and
have "demonstrably correct," predetermined solutions. Between them are problems.
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They occur naturally but "it is as if someone had fabricated" them deliberately. They
have solutions but "they usually are not expressible by simple numbers." One way in
which one may be able to "deal with" a difficulty is to find some aspect of it that is a
problem and hence can be solved. Scientists in many cases hav; been able to "replace"
difficulties first with problems and then with puzzles for which the solutions can be
produced. On "being puzzled," see Howard P. Kamler, "Puzzlement," Philosophia,
9(1980): 155-65.
22. The meaning of d i f f u l t in "a difficult decision" must be distinguished from the
meaning in "I don't know how difficult the decision will be." The difference
corresponds to the two senses of hardin "a hard decisionwand"I don't know how hard
the decision will be." It is a difference between degrees of hardness, which all decisions
can be rated for, and a high degree of hardness, which only some decisions are. This
difference makes it meaningful to ask how difficult some task must be in order to be
considered difficult. The sense of djflicult being used in this paper is the highdegree of
hardness sense.
23. Hattiangadi, "Structure of Problems," p. 353.
24. A solution condition need not be judged desirable; it, plus the required effort plus
the extraneous outcomes of the methods used, together need only be seen as less
undesirable than the problem condition. The problem of polio could be declared
solved if, say. only one child in a hundred thousand gets it, but even one child getting
polio is not in itself desirable. It is only less undesirable than having more children'
contract the disease. But of course the moral calculus could be complicated if
objectionable methods of administering vaccine to the children are used or if they
suffer some serious side effects of the vaccine. In any case, imperfect solutions are
nonetheless solutions.
25. For an analysis of the concept of solving, see my "The Concept of Problem
Solving," forthcoming.
26. See F.N. Sibley, "Seeking, Scrutinizing and Seeing," Mind 64 (1955): 467-71 for
"retention-words" such as "hanging on" and "keeping."
27. Sekeral points in this paragraph are made by Horst W.J. Rittel and Melvin M.
Webber, "Dilemmas in a General Theory," pp. 162-66.
28. Wildavsky, Speaking Truth, pp. 56-60.
29. Albert Wohlstetter. "Analysis and Design of Conflict Systems," in Analysis for
Military Decisions, ed. Edward S. Quade (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), pp. 122,
154. See Wildavsky. Speaking Truth, p. 58.
30. Rittel and Webber, "Dilemmas in a General Theory," p. 164.
 142 G E N E P. AGRE

31. Richard M . Hare. The Language of Morals (London: Oxford University Press,
1952). p. 70.
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INSIDE THINGS

Matthew Diomede

The buildings
walking by me
pass
into my skull.
They get frozen there,
held without ice and
I walk into
them like
walking into libraries,
looking for titles
of some books
on shelves,
neatly stacked.
I keep passing in and out
of buildings and
books.
I keep searching for
the guts of things:
the insides, the
texts.
I know I can
see and read-
my problem is I keep
thinking too much,
never letting the insides of things
open up to the darkness
thnt lip.7 out.~i&.