Case Doctrines in Legal Ethics (part I)

CASE DOCTRINES IN LEGAL ETHICS (part I)

Prepared by Glenn Rey Anino

WHAT CONSTITUTES PRACTICE OF LAW

Cayetano vs. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210 , September 03, 1991

Constitutional Law; Qualifications of COMELEC Chairman; “Practice of law” defined.—Practice of law
means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience. “To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service,
which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.” (111 ALR 23)
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term “practice of law”, particularly the modern
concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construc-tion intended by the framers
of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod’s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a
lawyerentrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the
rich and the poor—verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement—that he has been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years.

Same; Same; Judicial review of judgments rendered by the Commission on Appointments.—The

Commission on the basis of evidence submitted during the public hearings on Monsod’s confirmation,
implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment
rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial
interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly
shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission’s judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion
for the exercise of the Court’s corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion,
that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed,
for has been clearly shown.

Lim-Santiago vs. Sagucio, 486 SCRA 10 , March 31, 2006

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Practice of Law; Conflict of Interests; Canon 6 provides that the Code “shall
apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official duties.” A government lawyer
is thus bound by the prohibition “not [to] represent conflicting interests.” Not only that, he is likewise
prohibited from engaging in “unlawful conduct” which includes violation of the statutory prohibition
on a government employee to “engage in the private practice of [his] profession unless authorized by
the Constitution or law.”— Canon 6 provides that the Code “shall apply to lawyers in government service
in the discharge of their official duties.” A government lawyer is thus bound by the prohibition “not [to]
represent conflicting interests.” However, this rule is subject to certain limitations. The prohibition to
represent conflicting interests does not apply when no conflict of interest exists, when a written consent
of all concerned is given after a full disclosure of the facts or when no true attorney-client relationship
exists. Moreover, considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of
the Bar, clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty.
Respondent is also mandated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 not to engage in “unlawful x x x conduct.”
Unlawful conduct includes violation of the statutory prohibition on a government employee to “engage
in the private practice of [his] profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that
such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with [his] official functions.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; In Quiambao vs. Bamba, 468 SCRA 1 (2005), the Supreme Court enumerated
various tests to determine conflict of interests.—In Quiambao v. Bamba, the Court enumerated various
tests to determine conflict of interests. One test of inconsistency of interests is whether the lawyer will
be asked to use against his former client any confidential information acquired through their connection
or previous employment. In essence, what a lawyer owes his former client is to maintain inviolate the
client’s confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter in
which he previously represented him.

Same; Same; Same; Same; A lawyer’s immutable duty to a former client does not cover transactions
that occurred beyond the lawyer’s employment with the client.—The fact alone that respondent was
the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat and the case he resolved as government
prosecutor was labor-related is not a sufficient basis to charge respondent for representing conflicting
interests. A lawyer’s immutable duty to a former client does not cover transactions that occurred beyond
the lawyer’s employment with the client. The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to
protect the client’s interests only on matters that he previously handled for the former client and not
for matters that arose after the lawyer-client relationship has terminated.

Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Private practice of law” contemplates a succession of acts of
the same nature habitually or customarily holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer.—The Court has
defined the practice of law broadly as—x x x any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. “To engage in the practice of
law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to
give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill.” “Private practice of law” contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature
habitually or customarily holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer.

Same; Same; Same; For as long as respondent performed acts that are usually rendered by lawyers with
the use of their legal knowledge, the same falls within the ambit of the term “practice of law.”—
Respondent argues that he only rendered consultancy services to Taggat intermittently and he was not
a retained counsel of Taggat from 1995 to 1996 as alleged. This argument is without merit because the
law does not distinguish between consultancy services and retainer agreement. For as long as respondent
performed acts that are usually rendered by lawyers with the use of their legal knowledge, the same
falls within the ambit of the term “practice of law.”

Same; Same; Same; Violations of RA 6713 are not subject to disciplinary action under the Code of
Professional Responsibility unless the violations also constitute infractions of specific provisions of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.—Violations of RA 6713 are not subject to disciplinary action under
the Code of Professional Responsibility unless the violations also constitute infractions of specific
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Certainly, the IBP has no jurisdiction to investigate
violations of RA 6713—the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees—
unless the acts involved also transgress provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Here,
respondent’s violation of RA 6713 also constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which mandates
that “[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” Respondent’s
admission that he received from Taggat fees for legal services while serving as a government prosecutor
is an unlawful conduct, which constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01.

Same; Same; Same; Civil Service; Penalties; Under Civil Service Law and rules, the penalty for
government employees engaging in unauthorized private practice of profession is suspension for six
months and one day to one year.—The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise
of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts. Under Civil Service Law and rules, the penalty
for government employees engaging in unauthorized private practice of profession is suspension for six
months and one day to one year. We find this penalty appropriate for respondent’s violation in this case
of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. [Lim-Santiago vs. Sagucio, 486 SCRA
10(2006)].

GOOD MORAL CHARACTER

 Aquino vs. Pascua, 539 SCRA 1 , November 28, 2007
Attorneys; Notarial Law; Statutory Construction; Words and Phrases; “Misconduct” Defined; A lawyer is
guilty of misconduct in the performance of his duties for failing to register in his Notarial Register
affidavits-complaints.—After a close review of the records of this case, we resolve to adopt the findings
of facts and conclusion of law by the Office of the Bar Confidant. We find Atty. Pascua guilty of
misconduct in the performance of his duties for failing to register in his Notarial Register the affidavit-
complaints of Joseph B. Acorda and Remigio B. Domingo. “Misconduct” generally means wrongful,
improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. The term,
however, does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent.

Same; Same; Misconduct; Penalties; The penalty to be imposed for acts of misconduct committed by a
lawyer is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court; A three-month suspension from practice of
law for a first time offender is in order, and since the offense is a ground for revocation of his notarial
commission, the same should likewise be imposed.—The penalty to be imposed for such act of misconduct
committed by a lawyer is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court. In Arrieta v. Llosa, 282 SCRA
248 (1997), wherein Atty. Joel A. Llosa notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale knowing that some of the
vendors were already dead, this Court held that such wrongful act “constitutes misconduct” and thus
imposed upon him the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for six months, this being his first
administrative offense. Also, in Vda. de Rosales v. Ramos, 383 SCRA 498 (2002), we revoked the notarial
commission of Atty. Mario G. Ramos and suspended him from the practice of law for six months for
violating the Notarial Law in not registering in his notarial book the Deed of Absolute Sale he notarized.
In Mondejar v. Rubia, 496 SCRA 1 (2006), however, a lesser penalty of one month suspension from the
practice of law was imposed on Atty. Vivian G. Rubia for making a false declaration in the document she
notarized. In the present case, considering that this is Atty. Pascua’s first offense, we believe that the
imposition of a three-month suspension from the practice of law upon him is in order. Likewise, since his
offense is a ground for revocation of notarial commission, the same should also be imposed upon him.
[Aquino vs. Pascua, 539 SCRA 1(2007)]

Re: Non-Disclosure before the Judicial and Bar Council of the Administrative Case Filed
against Judge Jaime V. Quitain, 530 SCRA 729 , August 22, 2007
Courts; Judges; It behooves every prospective appointee to the Judiciary to apprise the appointing
authority of every matter bearing on his fitness for judicial office, including such circumstances as may
reflect on his integrity and probity.—It behooves every prospective appointee to the Judiciary to apprise
the appointing authority of every matter bearing on his fitness for judicial office, including such
circumstances as may reflect on his integrity and probity. These are qualifications specifically required
of appointees to the Judiciary by Sec. 7(3), Article VIII of the Constitution. In this case, Judge Quitain
failed to disclose that he was administratively charged and dismissed from the service for grave
misconduct per A.O. No. 183 dated April 10, 1995 by no less than the former President of the Philippines.

Same; Same; Resignation; Due Process; A judge ought to know that cessation from office by his
resignation does not warrant the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against him while he
was still in the service nor does it render said administrative case moot and academic; In administrative
proceedings, the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or an opportunity to
explain one’s side or opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.—No
amount of explanation or justification can erase the fact that Judge Quitain was dismissed from the
service and that he deliberately withheld this information. His insistence that he had no knowledge of
A.O. No. 183 is belied by the newspaper items published relative to his dismissal. It bears emphasis that
in the Mindanao Times dated April 18, 1995, Judge Quitain stated in one of his interviews that “I was
dismissed from the (Napolcom) office without due process.” It also reads: “Quitain, who was one of the
guests in yesterday’s Kapehan sa Dabaw, wept unabashedly as he read his prepared statement on his
dismissal from the government service.” Neither can we give credence to the contention that he was
denied due process. The documents submitted by the NAPOLCOM to the OCA reveal that Commissioner
Alexis C. Canonizado, Chairman Ad Hoc Committee, sent him summons on March 19, 1993 informing him
that an administrative complaint had been filed against him and required him to file an answer. Then on
March 29, 1993, respondent, through his counsel, Atty. Pedro Castillo, filed an Answer. In administrative
proceedings, the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or an opportunity to explain
one’s side or opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Where
opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there is no
denial of due process. Furthermore, as we have earlier mentioned and which Judge Quitain ought to
know, cessation from office by his resignation does not warrant the dismissal of the administrative
complaint filed against him while he was still in the service nor does it render said administrative case
moot and academic. Judge Quitain was removed from office after investigation and was found guilty of
grave misconduct. His dismissal from the service is a clear proof of his lack of the required qualifications
to be a member of the Bench.

Same; Same; It is clear that respondent judge deliberately misled the Judicial and Bar Council in his bid
to gain an exalted position in the Judiciary.—It is clear that Judge Quitain deliberately misled the JBC
in his bid to gain an exalted position in the Judiciary. In Office of the Court Administrator v. Estacion,
Jr., 181 SCRA 33, this Court stressed: x x x The important consideration is that he had a duty to inform
the appointing authority and this Court of the pending criminal charges against him to enable them to
determine on the basis of his record, eligibility for the position he was seeking. He did not discharge that
duty. His record did not contain the important information in question because he deliberately withheld
and thus effectively hid it. His lack of candor is as obvious as his reason for the suppression of such a
vital fact, which he knew would have been taken into account against him if it had been disclosed.”
Thus, we find respondent guilty of dishonesty. “Dishonesty” means “disposition to lie, cheat or defraud;
unworthiness; lack of integrity.”

Same; Same; Resignation; The jurisdiction that the Court had at the time of the filing of the
administrative complaint is not lost by the mere fact that the respondent judge by his resignation and
its consequent acceptance—without prejudice—by the Court, has ceased to be in office during the
pendency of his case.—On August 9, 2007, the Court received a letter from Judge Quitain addressed to
the Chief Justice stating that he is tendering his irrevocable resignation effective immediately as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Davao City. Acting on said letter, “the Court
Resolved to accept the irrevocable resignation of Judge Jaime V. Quitain effective August 15, 2007,
without prejudice to the decision of the administrative case.” Verily, the resignation of Judge Quitain
which was accepted by the Court without prejudice does not render moot and academic the instant
administrative case. The jurisdiction that the Court had at the time of the filing of the administrative
complaint is not lost by the mere fact that the respondent judge by his resignation and its consequent
acceptance—without prejudice—by this Court, has ceased to be in office during the pendency of this
case. The Court retains its authority to pronounce the respondent official innocent or guilty of the
charges against him. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and
dangerous implications. Indeed, if innocent, the respondent official merits vindication of his name and
integrity as he leaves the government which he has served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to
receive the corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the situation.

Bernardo, Jr. vs. Mejia, 211 SCRA 852 , July 29, 1992
Attorneys; An attorney who appropriated money entrusted by his client, and who falsely gave assurances
that he used the money for the purposes intended, and who issued bad checks to re-pay them is ordered
debarred.—A thoroughgoing review of the affidavits, pleadings and other papers filed by the parties
convinces this Court of the correctness of the foregoing conclusions of the IBP Board of Governors. They
are consequently hereby adopted and approved. WHEREFORE, the Court DECLARES the respondent, Atty.
Ismael F. Mejia, guilty of all the charges against him and hereby imposes on him the penalty of
DISBARMENT. Pending finality of this judgment, and effective immediately, Atty. Ismael F. Mejia is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law. Let a copy of this Decision be spread in his record in the
Bar Confidant’s Office, and notice thereof furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as well as the
Court Administrator who is DIRECTED to inform all the Courts concerned of this Decision.
 Velez vs. De Vera, 496 SCRA 345 , July 25, 2006
Attorneys; Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP); The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) By-Laws
do not allow for preelection disqualification proceedings—absent a final judgment by the Supreme Court
in a proper case declaring otherwise, every lawyer aspiring to hold the position of IBP Regional Director
is presumed morally fit.—The distinctions between the two cases are far from trivial. The previous case
was resolved on the basis of the parties’ rights and obligations under the IBP By-laws. We held therein
that Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified from running as Regional Governor as there is nothing in the
present IBP By-laws that sanctions the disqualification of candidates for IBP governors. Consequently, we
stressed that the petition had no firm ground to stand on. Likewise, we held that the complainants
therein were not the proper parties to bring the suit as the IBP By-laws prescribes that only nominees—
which the complainants were not—can file with the IBP President a written protest against the candidate.
The Court’s statement, therefore, that Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified on the ground that he was
not morally fit was mere obiter dictum. Precisely, the IBP By-laws do not allow for pre-election
disqualification proceedings; hence, Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified on the basis of the
administrative findings of a hearing officer of the State Bar of California suspending him from the practice
of law for three years. We held in that case that—There is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides
that one must be morally fit before he can run for IBP governorship. For one, this is so because the
determination of moral fitness of a candidate lies in the individual judgment of the members of the
House of Delegates. Indeed, based on each member’s standard of morality, he is free to nominate and
elect any member, so long as the latter possesses the basic requirements under the law. For another,
basically the disqualification of a candidate involving lack of moral fitness should emanate from his
disbarment or suspension from the practice of law by this Court, or conviction by final judgment of an
offense which involves moral turpitude. What this simply means is that absent a final judgment by the
Supreme Court in a proper case declaring otherwise, every lawyer aspiring to hold the position of IBP
Regional Director is presumed morally fit. Any person who begs to disagree will not be able to find a
receptive audience in the IBP through a petition for disqualification but must first file the necessary
disbarment or suspension proceeding against the lawyer concerned.

Disbarment; Conflict of Laws; Where there is technically no foreign judgment to speak of, the
recommendation by the hearing officer of the State Bar of another jurisdiction does not constitute
prima facie evidence of unethical behavior by a Philippine lawyer practicing in said jurisdiction.—In
Philippine Aluminum Wheels, Inc. v. Fasgi Enterprises, Inc., 342 SCRA 722 (2000), we explained that “[a]
foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until a contrary
showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity of proceedings and the giving of due notice in the
foreign forum.”In herein case, considering that there is technically no foreign judgment to speak of, the
recommendation by the hearing officer of the State Bar of California does not constitute prima facie
evidence of unethical behavior by Atty. de Vera. Complainant must prove by substantial evidence the
facts upon which the recommendation by the hearing officer was based. If he is successful in this, he
must then prove that these acts are likewise unethical under Philippine law.

Conflicts of Laws; The statutory enumeration of the grounds for disbarment or suspension is not to be
taken as a limitation on the general power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer—the inherent power
of the court over its officers cannot be restricted.—Disciplinary action against a lawyer is intended to
protect the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court and to protect the
administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be competent,
honorable and reliable men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. The statutory
enumeration of the grounds for disbarment or suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general
power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent power of the court over its officers cannot
be restricted

Malpractice; Unprofessional Conduct; Words and Phrases; Malpractice ordinarily refers to any
malfeasance or dereliction of duty committed by a lawyer; Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that
which violates the rules on ethical code of his profession or which is unbecoming a member of that
profession.—Malpractice ordinarily refers to any malfeasance or dereliction of duty committed by a
lawyer. Section 27 gives a special and technical meaning to the term “Malpractice.” That meaning is in
consonance with the elementary notion that the practice of law is a profession, not a business.
Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that which violates the rules on ethical code of his profession
or which is unbecoming a member of that profession.

Burden of Proof; In cases filed before administrative and quasijudicial bodies, a fact may be deemed
established if it is supported by substantial evidence or that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion—it means such evidence which affords
a substantial basis from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred.—In fact, Atty. de Vera did
not deny complainant’s allegation in the latter’s memorandum that he (de Vera) received US$12,000.00
intended for his client and that he deposited said amount in his personal account and not in a separate
trust account and that, finally, he spent the amount for personal purposes. At this point, it bears stressing
that in cases filed before administrative and quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if
it is supported by substantial evidence or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. It means such evidence which affords a substantial
basis from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred.

Unprofessional Conduct; Beyond doubt, the unauthorized use by a lawyer of his client’s funds is highly
unethical.—Beyond doubt, the unauthorized use by a lawyer of his client’s funds is highly unethical.
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is emphatic about this, thus: CANON 16. A LAWYER
SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME TO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of
others kept by him.

Attorneys; When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the
charges against him—he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him.—Aside from these
self-serving statements, however, we cannot find anywhere in the records of this case proof that indeed
Atty. de Vera was duly authorized to use the funds of his client. In Radjaie v. Atty. Alovera, 337 SCRA
244 (2000), we declared that—When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough
that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him.
He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is
expected of him. Atty. de Vera cannot rely on the statement made by the hearing officer that the elder
Willis had indeed testified that he “expected de Vera might use the money for a few days.” As Atty. de
Vera had vigorously objected to the admissibility of the document containing this statement, he is now
estopped from relying thereon. Besides, that the elder Willis “expected de Vera might use the money
for a few days” was not so much an acknowledgment of consent to the use by Atty. de Vera of his client’s
funds as it was an acceptance of the probability that Atty. de Vera might, indeed, use his client’s funds,
which by itself did not speak well of the character of Atty. de Vera or the way such character was
perceived.

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP); Transferring Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) membership
to a chapter where the lawyer is not a resident is not a ground for his suspension or disbarment—the
Code of Professional Responsibility as well as the Lawyer’s Oath do not prohibit nor punish lawyers from
aspiring to be IBP National President and from doing perfectly legal acts in accomplishing such goal.—
As it was perfectly within Atty. de Vera’s right to transfer his membership, it cannot be said that he is
guilty of unethical conduct or behavior. And while one may incessantly argue that a legal act may not
necessarily be ethical, in herein case, we do not see anything wrong in transferring to an IBP chapter
that—based on the rotation rule—will produce the next IBP EVP who will automatically succeed to the
National Presidency for the next term. Our Code of Professional Responsibility as well as the Lawyer’s
Oath do not prohibit nor punish lawyers from aspiring to be IBP National President and from doing
perfectly legal acts in accomplishing such goal.

Same; Due Process; The position of Executive Vice President (EVP) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) is not property within the constitutional sense especially since there is no right to
security of tenure over said position.—It needs stressing that the constitutional provision on due process
safeguards life, liberty and property. It cannot be said that the position of EVP of the IBP is property
within the constitutional sense especially since there is no right to security of tenure over said position
as, in fact, all that is required to remove any member of the board of governors for cause is a resolution
adopted by 2/3 of the remaining members of the board.

Due Process; Words and Phrases; The term “due process of law” as used in the Constitution has no fixed
meaning for all purposes due “to the very nature of the doctrine which, asserting a fundamental
principle of justice rather than a specific rule of law, is not susceptible of more than one general
statement”—the phrase is so elusive of exact apprehension, because it depends on circumstances and
varies with the subject matter and the necessities of the situation; The due process clause guarantees
no particular form of procedure and its requirements are not technical.—Even if the right of due process
could be rightfully invoked, still, in administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the
opportunity to explain one’s side. At the outset, it is here emphasized that the term “due process of
law” as used in the Constitution has no fixed meaning for all purposes due “to the very nature of the
doctrine which, asserting a fundamental principle of justice rather than a specific rule of law, is not
susceptible of more than one general statement.” The phrase is so elusive of exact apprehension,
because it depends on circumstances and varies with the subject matter and the necessities of the
situation. Due process of law in administrative cases is not identical with “judicial process” for a trial in
court is not always essential to due process. While a day in court is a matter of right in judicial
proceedings, it is otherwise in administrative proceedings since they rest upon different principles. The
due process clause guarantees no particular form of procedure and its requirements are not technical.
Thus, in certain proceedings of administrative character, the right to a notice or hearing are not essential
to due process of law. The constitutional requirement of due process is met by a fair hearing before a
regularly established administrative agency or tribunal. It is not essential that hearings be had before
the making of a determination if thereafter, there is available trial and tribunal before which all
objections and defenses to the making of such determination may be raised and considered. One
adequate hearing is all that due process requires. What is required for “hearing” may differ as the
functions of the administrative bodies differ.

Same; The right to cross-examine is not an indispensable aspect of due process.—The right to cross-
examine is not an indispensable aspect of due process. Nor is an actual hearing always essential especially
under the factual milieu of this case where the members of the IBP Board—upon whose shoulders the
determination of the cause for removal of an IBP governor is placed subject to the approval of the
Supreme Court—all witnessed Atty. de Vera’s actuations in the IBP National Convention in question. It is
undisputed that Atty. de Vera received a copy of the complaint against him and that he was present
when the matter was taken up. From the transcript of the stenographic notes of the 13 May 2005 meeting
wherein Atty. de Vera was removed, it is patent that Atty. de Vera was given fair opportunity to defend
himself against the accusations made by Atty. Rivera.

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP); Words and Phrases; The phrase “remaining members” in Section
44 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) By-Laws refers to the members exclusive of the
complainant member and the respondent member.—Under the rules, a resolution for expulsion of an IBP
Governor is done via a resolution adopted by 2/3 of the remaining members. The phrase “remaining
members” refers to the members exclusive of the complainant member and the respondent member.
The reason therefore is that such members are interested parties and are thus presumed to be unable to
resolve said motion impartially. This being the case, the votes of Attys. Rivera and de Vera should be
stricken-off which means that only the votes of the seven remaining members are to be counted. Of the
seven remaining members, five voted for expulsion while two voted against it which still adds up to the
2/3 vote requirement for expulsion.

Same; Doctrine of Majority Rule; Indubitably, conflicts and disagreements of varying degrees of
intensity, if not animosity, are inherent in the internal life of an organization, but especially of the IBP
since lawyers are said to disagree before they agree; The effectiveness of the IBP, like any other
organization, is diluted if the conflicts are brought outside its governing body for then there would be
the impression that the IBP, which speaks through a Board of Governors, does not and cannot speak for
its members in an authoritative fashion; As a means of self-preservation, internecine conflicts must be
adjusted within the governing board itself so as to free it from the stresses that invariably arise when
internal cleavages are made public.—After weighing the arguments of the parties and in keeping with
the fundamental objective of the IBP to discharge its public responsibility more effectively, we hereby
find that Atty. de Vera’s removal from the IBP Board was not capricious or arbitrary. Indubitably, conflicts
and disagreements of varying degrees of intensity, if not animosity, are inherent in the internal life of
an organization, but especially of the IBP since lawyers are said to disagree before they agree. However,
the effectiveness of the IBP, like any other organization, is diluted if the conflicts are brought outside
its governing body for then there would be the impression that the IBP, which speaks through the Board
of Governors, does not and cannot speak for its members in an authoritative fashion. It would accordingly
diminish the IBP’s prestige and repute with the lawyers as well as with the general public. As a means of
self-preservation, internecine conflicts must thus be adjusted within the governing board itself so as to
free it from the stresses that invariably arise when internal cleavages are made public.

Same; Same; The doctrine of majority rule is almost universally used as a mechanism for adjusting and
resolving conflicts and disagreements within the group after the members have been given an
opportunity to be heard; When the IBP Board is not seen by the bar and the public as a cohesive unit, it
cannot effectively perform its duty of helping the Supreme Court enforce the code of legal ethics and
the standards of legal practice as well as improve the administration of justice.—The doctrine of
majority rule is almost universally used as a mechanism for adjusting and resolving conflicts and
disagreements within the group after the members have been given an opportunity to be heard. While it
does not efface conflicts, nonetheless, once a decision on a contentious matter is reached by a majority
vote, the dissenting minority is bound thereby so that the board can speak with one voice, for those
elected to the governing board are deemed to implicitly contract that the will of the majority shall
govern in matters within the authority of the board. The IBP Board, therefore, was well within its right
in removing Atty. de Vera as the latter’s actuations during the 10th National IBP Convention were
detrimental to the role of the IBP Board as the governing body of the IBP. When the IBP Board is not seen
by the bar and the public as a cohesive unit, it cannot effectively perform its duty of helping the Supreme
Court enforce the code of legal ethics and the standards of legal practice as well as improve the
administration of justice. In view of the importance of retaining group cohesiveness and unity, the
expulsion of a member of the board who insists on bringing to the public his disagreement with a
policy/resolution approved by the majority after due discussion, cannot be faulted. The effectiveness of
the board as a governing body will be negated if its pronouncements are resisted in public by a board
member. Indeed, when a member of a governing body cannot accept the voice of the majority, he should
resign therefrom so that he could criticize in public the majority opinion/decision to his heart’s content;
otherwise, he subjects himself to disciplinary action by the body.

Same; To be Executive Vice President (EVP) of the IBP, one must necessarily be a member of the IBP
Board of Governors, and a lawyer’s removal from the Board of Governors automatically disqualifies him
from acting as IBP EVP.—The removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the Board of Governors ipso facto
meant his removal as EVP as well. Section 47, Article VII of the By-Laws of the IBP provides: SEC. 47.
National Officers.—The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a President and Executive Vice
President to be chosen by the Board of Governors from among nine (9) regional governors, as much as
practicable, on a rotation basis. x x x Thus, to be EVP of the IBP, one must necessarily be a member of
IBP Board of Governors. Atty. de Vera’s removal from the Board of Governors, automatically disqualified
him from acting as IBP EVP. To insist otherwise would be contrary to Section 47 of the IBP ByLaws.

Same; Supreme Court; The power of supervision of the Supreme Court over the IBP should not preclude
the IBP from exercising its reasonable discretion especially in the administration of its internal affairs
governed by the provisions of its By-Laws.—While it is true that the Supreme Court has been granted an
extensive power of supervision over the IBP, it is axiomatic that such power should be exercised
prudently. The power of supervision of the Supreme Court over the IBP should not preclude the IBP from
exercising its reason able discretion especially in the administration of its internal affairs governed by
the provisions of its By-Laws. The IBP By-Laws were precisely drafted and promulgated so as to define
the powers and functions of the IBP and its officers, establish its organizational structure, and govern
relations and transactions among its officers and members. With these By-Laws in place, the Supreme
Court could be assured that the IBP shall be able to carry on its day-to-day affairs, without the Court’s
interference.

Same; Article VI, Section 41(g) of the IBP By-Laws expressly grants to the Board the authority to fill
vacancies, however arising, in the IBP positions.—With the removal of Atty. de Vera from the Board, by
virtue of the IBP Board Resolution dated 13 May 2005, he was also removed from his post as EVP; thus,
there was a resultant vacancy in the position of IBP EVP. Article VI, Section 41(g) of the IBP By-Laws
expressly grants to the Board the authority to fill vacancies, however arising, in the IBP positions, subject
to the provisions of Section 8 of the Integration Rule, and Section 11 (Vacancies), Section 44 (Removal
of members), Section 47 (National officers), Section 48 (other officers), and Section 49 (Terms of Office)
of the By-Laws. The IBP Board has specific and sufficient guidelines in its Rules and By-Laws on how to
fill-in the vacancies after the removal of Atty. de Vera. We have faith and confidence in the intellectual,
emotional and ethical competencies of the remaining members of the 2005-2007 Board in dealing with
the situation within the bounds of the IBP Rules and By-Laws.

Same; Rotation Rule; Automatic Succession Rule; The rotation rule pertains in particular to the position
of IBP EVP, while the automatic succession rule pertains to the Presidency—the rotation with respect to
the Presidency is but a consequence of the automatic succession rule provided in Section 47 of the IBP
By-Laws.—In Bar Matter 491, it is clear that it is the position of IBP EVP which is actually rotated among
the nine Regional Governors. The rotation with respect to the Presidency is merely a result of the
automatic succession rule of the IBP EVP to the Presidency. Thus, the rotation rule pertains in particular
to the position of IBP EVP, while the automatic succession rule pertains to the Presidency. The rotation
with respect to the Presidency is but a consequence of the automatic succession rule provided in Section
47 of the IBP By-Laws. In the case at bar, the rotation rule was duly complied with since upon the election
of Atty. De Vera as IBP EVP, each of the nine IBP regions had already produced an EVP and, thus, the
rotation was completed. It is only unfortunate that the supervening event of Atty. de Vera’s removal as
IBP Governor and EVP rendered it impossible for him to assume the IBP Presidency. The fact remains,
however, that the rotation rule had been completed despite the non-assumption by Atty. de Vera to the
IBP Presidency.

Same; Same; The application of the rotation rule is not a license to disregard the spirit and purpose of
the automatic succession rule, but should be applied in harmony with the latter; The automatic
succession rule affords the IBP leadership transition seamless and enables the new IBP National President
to attend to pressing and urgent matters without having to expend valuable time for the usual
adjustment and leadership consolidation period.—The application of the rotation rule is not a license to
disregard the spirit and purpose of the automatic succession rule, but should be applied in harmony with
the latter. The automatic succession rule affords the IBP leadership transition seamless and enables the
new IBP National President to attend to pressing and urgent matters without having to expend valuable
time for the usual adjustment and leadership consolidation period. The time that an IBP EVP spends
assisting a sitting IBP President on matters national in scope is in fact a valuable and indispensable
preparation for the eventual succession. It should also be pointed out that this wisdom is further
underscored by the fact that an IBP EVP is elected from among the members of the IBP Board of
Governors, who are serving in a national capacity, and not from the members at large. It is intrinsic in
the IBP ByLaws that one who is to assume the highest position in the IBP must have been exposed to the
demands and responsibilities of national leadership.

MEMBERSHIP IN GOOD STANDING

LAW STUDENT PRACTICE

Cruz vs. Mina, 522 SCRA 382 , April 27, 2007

Criminal Procedure; Law Student Practice Rule; As succinctly clarified in Bar Matter No. 730, by virtue
of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear, as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without
the supervision of a lawyer before inferior courts.—Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before
the inferior courts by a non-lawyer is allowed, irrespective of whether or not he is a law student. As
succinctly clarified in Bar Matter No. 730, by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear,
as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without the supervision of a lawyer before inferior courts.

Same; Recovery of Civil Liability; When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery
of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with criminal action, unless
the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the
civil action prior to the criminal action.—Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable except in instances when no actual damage results from
an offense, such as espionage, violation of neutrality, flight to an enemy country, and crime against
popular representation. The basic rule applies in the instant case, such that when a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be
deemed instituted with criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the
right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

Same; Same; Petitioner is correct in stating that there being no reservation, waiver nor prior institution
of the civil aspect in Criminal Case No. 00-1705, it follows that the civil aspect arising from Grave
Threats is deemed instituted with criminal action; Private prosecutor may rightfully intervene to
prosecute the civil aspect.—The petitioner is correct in stating that there being no reservation, waiver,
nor prior institution of the civil aspect in Criminal Case No. 00-1705, it follows that the civil aspect arising
from Grave Threats is deemed instituted with the criminal action, and, hence, the private prosecutor
may rightfully intervene to prosecute the civil aspect.

MEMBERSHIP IN THE IBP

In re Atty. Marcial Edillon, 84 SCRA 554, August 03, 1978

Bar Integration; Attorneys; Disbarment; Payment of membership dues; Integration of the Bar, its
concept and purpose.—An “Integrated Bar” is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong,
as distinguished from bar associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which
is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded
an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to hear his
portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an Integrated Bar is an
official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to
all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a
reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of
professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for
investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or
disbarment of the offending member. The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by
overriding considerations of public interest and public welfare to such an extent as more than
constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that integration imposes upon the personal interests
and personal convenience of individual lawyers.

Same; Same; Same; Police power; Integration of the Bar is a valid exercise of police power of the State;
Practice of law, nature of.—Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the
integration of the Bar have been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police
power over an important profession. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege
moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client,
but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the
most important functions of the State—the administration of justice—as an officer of the court. The
practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree
of control for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme Court
through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the expression “affected with a public interest” is the equivalent
of “subject to the exercise of the police power”.

Same; Same; Same; Courts; Supreme Court authorized to adopt rules of court to effect integration of
the Philippine Bar; Purposes of integration of the Bar.—When, therefore. Congress enacted Republic Act
No. 6397 authorizing the Supreme Court to “adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine
Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit,” it did so in the exercise of the paramount-police power of
the State. The Act’s avowal is to “raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration
of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.” Hence, the
Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution
promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution of
the IBP into a body corporate through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by
fundamental considerations of public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing
public necessity. The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate
personal liberty, property and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and
burdens in order to secure the general prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. Gomez, Jesus, 31 Phil.
218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, “Salus populi eat suprema lex.” The public welfare is the supreme
law. To this fundamental principle of government the rights of individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a
blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because
then society will fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70, Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the
State to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some freedom.

Same; Same; Same; Practice of law and exercise of the legal profession clothed with public interest and
lawyers must be bound by such regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for the
common good; Reasons.—Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his
practice of law and his exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are)
subject to the power of the body politic to require him to conform to such regulations as might be
established by the proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent of interfering with some
of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he
should not have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns.

Same; Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Constitutionality and validity of Bar integration sustained by
explicit grant of precise power to the Supreme Court under Art. X of the 1973 Constitution resting the
Court with plenary power in all cases regarding admistion to and supervision of the practice of law.—
But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar Integration in the
Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of
Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines. xxx Quite apart from the above, let it be stated
that even without the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and looking solely to the language of the
provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power “to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law,” it at once
becomes indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary power in
all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Membership dues; Effect of Bar integration upon a lawyer’s freedom of
association; Compelling a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar not violative of the constitutional
freedom to associate but the only compulsion a lawyer is subjected is the payment of annual dues which
is not violation of the Constitution; Compulsion upon a lawyer if any justified by exercise of police
power of the State; Reasons.—The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without
power to compel him to become a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of
the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and
not to associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is no violative
of his constitution freedom to associate. Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of
which he is not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations.
All that integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but
unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member. Bar Integration does not
compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his
Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to
which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State’s
legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of
improving the professional in his fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory
program—the lawyers. Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be
member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the
State.

Same; Same; Same: Same; Same; Provisions of the Court Rule requiring payment of membership dues
by lawyers not violative of the Constitution; The 1973 Constitution does not prohibit the Supreme Court
from requiring lawyers to pay reasonable membership fees; Nature of membership fees.—The second
issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule repairing payment of a membership
fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power
and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the
Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution)—which power the respondent
acknowledges—from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable
fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite
apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying
out the objectives and purposes of integration.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Penalties; Enforcement of penalty provisions for non-payment of
membership dues not a deprivation of due process; Reasons; Practice of law in the courts subject to
regulation and inquiry; Practice of law is not property right but mere privilege.—That respondent further
argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a deprivation of property without
due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights. Whether the practice of law is
property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a license to practise of law is a
property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a license to practise a profession,
we do not here pause to consider at length, as it is clear that under the police power of the State, and
under necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent’s right to
practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry.
And, if the power to imposed the fee as regulatory measure is recognized, then a penalty designed to
enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable
or arbitrary. But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere
privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with
the lawyer’s public responsibilities.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Supreme Court; Jurisdiction; The Supreme Court has power and
jurisdiction to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys; Court’s jurisdiction provided for
in the 1973 Constitution.—Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of
admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision
have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the
authorities holding such are legion. The Court’s jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973
Constitution when it explicitly granted to the Court the power to “promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice . . . . . . . and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar . . . . .”
(Article X, Sec. 5[5]) The power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a member of the
legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Rule of Court 139-A and ByLaws of the Integrated Bar providing for
payment of membership dues are neither unconstitutional nor illegal; Respondent lawyer disbarred and
his name striken from the Roll of Attorneys in the Supreme Court for repeated failure to pay
membership dues; Case at bar.—We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A
and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional
nor illegal. x x x It is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be
as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the
Court.

THE LAWYER & SOCIETY/NOTARIAL PRACTICE

Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan, 170 SCRA 1 , February 01, 1989

Constitutional Law; Bill of Rights; Freedom of Expression; Contempt of Court; Direct and Indirect
Contempt; In convicting respondent Gonzalez of contempt of court in facie curiae, the Court did not
use the phrase in facie curiae as a technical equivalent of direct contempt.—In respondent’s point A, it
is claimed that it was error for this Court “to charge respondent [with] indirect contempt and convict
him of direct contempt.” In the per curiam Resolution, the Court concluded that “respondent Gonzalez
is guilty both of contempt of court in facie curiae and of gross misconduct as an officer of the court and
member of the bar.” The Court did not use the phrase “in facie curiae” as a technical equivalent of
“direct contempt,” though we are aware that courts in the United States have sometimes used that
phrase in speaking of “direct contempts” as “contempts in the face of the courts.” Rather, the Court
sought to convey that it regarded the contumacious acts or statements (which were made both in a
pleading filed before the Court and in statements given to the media) and the misconduct of respondent
Gonzalez as serious acts flaunted in the face of the Court and constituting a frontal assault upon the
integrity of the Court and, through the Court, the entire judicial system. What the Court would stress is
that it required respondent, in its Resolution dated 2 May 1988, to explain “why he should not be punished
for contempt of court and/or subjected to administrative sanctions” and in respect of which, respondent
was heard and given the most ample opportunity to present all defenses, arguments and evidence that
he wanted to present for the consideration of this Court. The Court did not summarily impose punishment
upon the respondent which it could have done under Section 1 of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court
had it chosen to consider respondent’s acts as constituting “direct contempt.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Legal Ethics; Lawyers; Complaints against lawyers; Referral of a complaint
filed against an attorney to the Solicitor General for investigation is not required where the Supreme
Court itself has initiated the charges against the respondent lawyer.—In its per curiam Resolution, the
Court referred to Rule 139 (b) of the Revised Rules of Court pointing out that: “[R]eference of complaints
against attorneys either to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor General is not
mandatory upon the Supreme Court; such reference to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the
Solicitor General is certainly not an exclusive procedure under the terms of Rule 139 (b) of the Revised
Rules of Court, especially where the charge consists of acts done before the Supreme Court.” x x x Thus,
there is no need to refer a case to the Solicitor General, which referral is made “for investigation to
determine if there is sufficient ground to proceed with the prosecution of the respondent” (Section 3,
Rule 139), where the Court itself has initiated charges against the respondent. The Court may, of course,
refer a case to the Solicitor General if it feels that, in a particular case, further factual investigation is
needed. In the present case, as pointed out in the per curiam Resolution of the Court, there was “no
need for further investigation of facts in the present case for it [was] not substantially disputed by
respondent Gonzalez that he uttered or wrote certain statements attributed to him” and that “in any
case, respondent has had the amplest opportunity to present his defense: his defense is not that he did
not make the statements ascribed to him but that those statements give rise to no liability on his part,
having been made in the exercise of his freedom of speech.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Clear and present danger rule; The clear and present danger test is not the
only test which has been recognized and applied by courts for making out the appropriate limits of
freedom of speech and of assembly.—The “clear and present danger” doctrine invoked by respondent’s
counsel is not a magic incantation which dissolves all problems and dispenses with analysis and judgment
in the testing of the legitimacy of claims to free speech, and which compels a court to exonerate a
defendant the moment the doctrine is invoked, absent proof of impending apocalypse. The “clear and
present danger” doctrine has been an accepted method for making out the appropriate limits of freedom
of speech and of assembly in certain contexts. It is not, however, the only test which has been recognized
and applied by courts. In Lagunzad v. Vda. de Gonzales, this Court, speaking through Mme. Justice
Melencio-Herrera said: x x x The prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present danger rule is such a
limitation. Another criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of speech and of the press, which
includes such vehicles of the mass media as radio, television and the movies, is the ‘balancing-of-
interests test’ (Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando of the Bill of Rights, 1970 ed., p. 79). The principle
‘requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in
a given situation or type of situation’ (Separate Opinion of the late Chief Justice Castro in Gonzales v.
Commission on Elections, supra, p. 899).” Under either the “clear and present danger” test or the
“balancing-of-interest test,” we believe that the statements here made by respondent Gonzalez are of
such nature and were made in such a manner and under such circumstances, as to transcend the
permissible limits of free speech. This conclusion was implicit in the per curiam Resolution of October 7,
1988. It is important to point out that the “substantive evil” which the Supreme Court has a right and a
duty to prevent does not, in the instant case, relate to threats of physical disorder or overt violence or
similar disruptions of public order. What is here at stake is the authority of the Supreme Court to confront
and prevent a “substantive evil” consisting not only of the obstruction of a free and fair hearing of a
particular case but also the avoidance of the broader evil of the degradation of the judicial system of a
country and the destruction of the standards of professional conduct required from members of the bar
and officers of the courts. The “substantive evil” here involved, in other words, is not as palpable as a
threat of public disorder or rioting but is certainly no less deleterious and more far reaching in its
implications for society.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Cruel and Unusual Punishments; The imposition of the penalty of indefinite
suspension from the practice of law against respondent is not cruel, degrading and inhuman.—In his
point J, respondent’s counsel pleads that the imposition of indefinite suspension from the practice of
law constitutes “cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment.” The Court finds it difficult to consider this a
substantial constitutional argument. The indefiniteness of the respondent’s suspension, far from being
“cruel” or “degrading” or “inhuman,” has the effect of placing, as it were, the key to the restoration of
his rights and privileges as a lawyer in his own hands. That sanction has the effect of giving respondent
the chance to purge himself in his own good time of his contempt and misconduct by acknowledging such
misconduct, exhibiting appropriate repentance and demonstrating his willingness and capacity to live up
to the exacting standards of conduct rightly demanded from every member of the bar and officer of the
courts.

Santuyo vs. Hidalgo, 448 SCRA 282 , January 17, 2005

Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Notarial Law; Respondent lawyer had been negligent not only in the supposed
notarization but foremost in having allowed the office secretaries to make the necessary entries in his
notarial registry which was supposed to be done and kept by him alone.—In finding respondent negligent
in performing his notarial functions, the IBP reasoned out: x x x xxx x x x. Considering that the
responsibility attached to a notary public is sensitive respondent should have been more discreet and
cautious in the execution of his duties as such and should not have wholly entrusted everything to the
secretaries; otherwise he should not have been commissioned as notary public. For having wholly
entrusted the preparation and other mechanics of the document for notarization to the secretary there
can be a possibility that even the respondent’s signature which is the only one left for him to do can be
done by the secretary or anybody for that matter as had been the case herein. As it is respondent had
been negligent not only in the supposed notarization but foremost in having allowed the office secretaries
to make the necessary entries in his notarial registry which was supposed to be done and kept by him
alone; and should not have relied on somebody else.

Sicat vs. Ariola, Jr., 456 SCRA 93 , April 15, 2005

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Notarial Law; The act of a lawyer of notarizing a Special Power of Attorney
knowing that the person who allegedly executed it was already dead is a serious breach of the sacred
obligation imposed upon him by the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 1.01 of Canon
1, which prohibited him from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct—as a lawyer
and as an officer of the court, it is his duty to serve the ends of justice, not to corrupt it.—After a
careful review of the records, we find that respondent never disputed complainant’s accusation that he
notarized the SPA purportedly executed by Benitez on January 4, 2001. He likewise never took issue with
the fact that on said date, Benitez was already dead. His act was a serious breach of the sacred obligation
imposed upon him by the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which
prohibited him from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. As a lawyer and as
an officer of the court, it was his duty to serve the ends of justice, not to corrupt it. Oath-bound, he was
expected to act at all times in accordance with law and ethics, and if he did not, he would not only
injure himself and the public but also bring reproach upon an honorable profession.

Same; Same; Same; Lawyers commissioned as notaries public should not authenticate documents unless
the persons who signed them are the very same persons who executed them and personally appeared
before them to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein.—In the recent case of
Zaballero v. Atty. Mario J. Montalvan, where the respondent notarized certain documents and made it
appear that the deceased father of complainant executed them, the Court declared the respondent there
guilty of violating Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Court was
emphatic that lawyers commissioned as notaries public should not authenticate documents unless the
persons who signed them are the very same persons who executed them and personally appeared before
them to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. The Court added that notaries public
must observe utmost fidelity, the basic requirement in the performance of their duties, otherwise the
confidence of the public in the integrity of notarized deeds and documents will be undermined.

Same; Same; Same; Notarization is not an empty, meaningless and routinary act—it converts a private
document into a public instrument, making it admissible in evidence without the necessity of
preliminary proof of its authenticity and due execution.—In the case at bar, the records show that
Benitez died on October 25, 2000. However, respondent notarized the SPA, purportedly bearing the
signature of Benitez, on January 4, 2001 or more than two months after the latter’s death. The notarial
acknowledgement of respondent declared that Benitez “appeared before him and acknowledged that
the instrument was his free and voluntary act.” Clearly, respondent lied and intentionally perpetuated
an untruthful statement. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless and routinary act. It converts a
private document into a public instrument, making it admissible in evidence without the necessity of
preliminary proof of its authenticity and due execution.

Same; Same; Same; A lawyer’s assertion of falsehood in a public document contravenes one of the most
cherished tenets of the legal profession and potentially cast suspicion on the truthfulness of every
notarial act.—Neither will respondent’s defense that the SPA in question was superfluous and
unnecessary, and prejudiced no one, exonerate him of accountability. His assertion of falsehood in a
public document contravened one of the most cherished tenets of the legal profession and potentially
cast suspicion on the truthfulness of every notarial act. As the Municipal Administrator of Cainta, he
should have been aware of his great responsibility not only as a notary public but as a public officer as
well. A public office is a public trust. Respondent should not have caused disservice to his constituents
by consciously performing an act that would deceive them and the Municipality of Cainta. Without the
fraudulent SPA, the erring parties in the construction project could not have encashed the check
amounting to P3,700,000 and could not have foisted on the public a spurious contract—all to the extreme
prejudice of the very Municipality of which he was the Administrator.

Isenhardt vs. Real, 666 SCRA 20 , February 15, 2012

Attorneys; Notary Public; Code of Professional Responsibility; A notary public should not notarize a
document unless the person who signs it is the same person who executed it, personally appearing
before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what are stated therein.—Respondent violated his
oath as a lawyer and the Code of Professional Responsibility when he made it appear that complainant
personally appeared before him and subscribed an SPA authorizing her brother to mortgage her property.
It cannot be overemphasized that a notary public should not notarize a document unless the person who
signs it is the same person who executed it, personally appearing before him to attest to the contents
and the truth of what are stated therein. This is to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of
the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party’s free act.

Same; Same; By notarizing the questioned document despite the absence of one of the parties, the
notary public engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.—The duties of a notary
public is dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest. It is not a meaningless ministerial
act of acknowledging documents executed by parties who are willing to pay the fees for notarization. It
is of no moment that the subject SPA was not utilized by the grantee for the purpose it was intended
because the property was allegedly transferred from complainant to her brother by virtue of a deed of
sale consummated between them. What is being penalized is respondent’s act of notarizing a document
despite the absence of one of the parties. By notarizing the questioned document, he engaged in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. A notarized document is by law entitled to full credit
upon its face and it is for this reason that notaries public must observe the basic requirements in
notarizing documents. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in notarized documents will be
undermined.

NO UNLAWFUL, DISHONEST, IMMORAL, DECEITFUL CONDUCT- RULE 1.01

Ui vs. Bonifacio, 333 SCRA 38 , June 08, 2000

Administrative Law; Attorneys; Disbarment; Practice of law is a privilege; Requisites for admission to
the practice of law.—The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy
the practice of the legal profession simply by passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege that can be
revoked, subject to the mandate of due process, once a lawyer violates his oath and the dictates of legal
ethics. The requisites for admission to the practice of law are: (a) he must be a citizen of the Philippines;
(b) a resident thereof; (c) at least twenty-one (21) years of age; (d) a person of good moral character;
(e) he must show that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, are filed or pending in court; (f)
possess the required educational qualifications; and (g) pass the bar examinations.

Same; Same; Same; Possession of good moral character must be continuous as a requirement to the
enjoyment of the privilege of law practice.—Clear from the foregoing is that one of the conditions prior
to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good moral character. More importantly,
possession of good moral character must be continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the
privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege.

Same; Same; Same; Lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with a higher degree of social
responsibility and thus must handle their personal affairs with greater caution.—Simple as the facts of
the case may sound, the effects of the actuations of respondent are not only far from simple, they will
have a rippling effect on how the standard norms of our legal practitioners should be defined. Perhaps
morality in our liberal society today is a far cry from what it used to be before. This permissiveness
notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with a higher degree of social
responsibility and thus must handle their personal affairs with greater caution. The facts of this case
lead us to believe that perhaps respondent would not have found herself in such a compromising situation
had she exercised prudence and been more vigilant in finding out more about Carlos Ui’s personal
background prior to her intimate involvement with him.

Same; Same; Same; To warrant disciplinary action, conduct must be “grossly immoral,” that is, it must
be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree.—All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent was imprudent in
managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed
as it was with what respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For
immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of
good and respectable members of the community. Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary
action, the same must be “grossly immoral,” that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.

Same; Same; Same; A member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from
adulterous relationships x x x but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by
creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards.—We have held that “a member of the Bar
and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships x x x but must also
so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral
standards.” Respondent’s act of immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon discovering his true
civil status belies just that alleged moral indifference and proves that she had no intention of flaunting
the law and the high moral standard of the legal profession. Complainant’s bare assertions to the contrary
deserve no credit. After all, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the Court will exercise
its disciplinary powers only if she establishes her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence.
This, herein complainant miserably failed to do. [Ui vs. Bonifacio, 333 SCRA 38(2000)]

Figueroa vs. Barranco, Jr., 276 SCRA 445 , July 31, 1997
Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Gross Immorality; Words and Phrases; A person’s engaging in premarital sexual
relations with another, making promises to marry, suggests a doubtful moral character but the same
does not constitute grossly immoral conduct; A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as
to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree.—
Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyer’s oath in 1971 because of the charges of gross
immorality made by complainant. To recapitulate, respondent bore an illegitimate child with his
sweetheart, Patricia Figueroa, who also claims that he did not fulfill his promise to marry her after he
passes the bar examinations. We find that these facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting the
permanent exclusion of respondent from the legal profession. His engaging in premarital sexual relations
with complainant and promises to marry suggests a doubtful moral character on his part but the same
does not constitute grossly immoral conduct. The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment
the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. “A grossly immoral act is one that
is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be
reprehensible to a high degree.” It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the community.

Same; Same; Same; Mere intimacy between a man and a woman, both of whom possess no impediment
to marry, voluntarily carried on and devoid of any deceit on the part of the former, is neither so corrupt
nor so unprincipled as to warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction against him, even if as a result
of such relationship a child was born out of wedlock.—We find the ruling in Arciga v. Maniwang quite
relevant because mere intimacy between a man and a woman, both of whom possess no impediment to
marry, voluntarily carried on and devoid of any deceit on the part of respondent, is neither so corrupt
nor so unprincipled as to warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction against him, even if as a result
of such relationship a child was born out of wedlock.

Same; Same; Same; Marriages; The Supreme Court cannot castigate a man for seeking out the partner
of his dreams, for marriage is a sacred and perpetual bond which should be entered into because of
love, not for any other reason.—Respondent and complainant were sweethearts whose sexual relations
were evidently consensual. We do not find complainant’s assertions that she had been forced into sexual
intercourse, credible. She continued to see and be respondent’s girlfriend even after she had given birth
to a son in 1964 and until 1971. All those years of amicable and intimate relations refute her allegations
that she was forced to have sexual congress with him. Complainant was then an adult who voluntarily
and actively pursued their relationship and was not an innocent young girl who could be easily led astray.
Unfortunately, respondent chose to marry and settle permanently with another woman. We cannot
castigate a man for seeking out the partner of his dreams, for marriage is a sacred and perpetual bond
which should be entered into because of love, not for any other reason.

Same; Same; Same; Even assuming that a person’s indiscretions are ignoble, the twenty-six years that
he has been prevented from being a lawyer constitute sufficient punishment therefor.—We cannot help
viewing the instant complaint as an act of revenge of a woman scorned, bitter and unforgiving to the
end. It is also intended to make respondent suffer severely and it seems, perpetually, sacrificing the
profession he worked very hard to be admitted into. Even assuming that his past indiscretions are ignoble,
the twenty-six years that respondent has been prevented from being a lawyer constitute sufficient
punishment therefor. During this time there appears to be no other indiscretion attributed to him.
Respondent, who is now sixty-two years of age, should thus be allowed, albeit belatedly, to take the
lawyer’s oath.

Barrios vs. Martinez, 442 SCRA 324 , November 12, 2004

Attorneys; Duties; Gross Misconduct; Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the
Bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any of the
following reasons.—Under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred
or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice,
or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing
as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so.

Same; Same; Same; “Moral Turpitude,” Defined.—Moral turpitude “includes everything which is done
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.” It involves “an act of baseness, vileness, or
depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to
the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Issuance of a check knowing that he or she does not have sufficient funds is
a manifestation of moral turpitude.—The act of a person in issuing a check knowing at the time of the
issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the check
in full upon its presentment, is a manifestation of moral turpitude.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The act of a lawyer in issuing a check without sufficient funds to cover the
same constitutes such willful dishonesty and immoral conduct as to undermine the public confidence in
law and lawyers.—The act of a lawyer in issuing a check without sufficient funds to cover the same
constitutes such willful dishonesty and immoral conduct as to undermine the public confidence in law
and lawyers. And while “the general rule is that a lawyer may not be suspended or disbarred, and the
court may not ordinarily assume jurisdiction to discipline him for misconduct in his non-professional or
private capacity, where, however, the misconduct outside of the lawyer’s professional dealings is so
gross a character as to show him morally unfit for the office and unworthy of the privilege which his
licenses and the law confer on him, the court may be justified in suspending or removing him from the
office of attorney.”

Same; Same; Same; Disbarment; The Court may disbar or suspend lawyers for any professional or private
misconduct showing them to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor—or to
be unworthy to continue as officers of the Court.—The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is “to
protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall
be competent, honorable and reliable; men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence.” “A
proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant is
plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest
and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public
welfare, and for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministrations of persons
unfit to practice them.” “Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to
the bar, to the courts and to their clients. Their conduct must always reflect the values and norms of
the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. On these considerations, the
Court may disbar or suspend lawyers for any professional or private misconduct showing them to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor—or to be unworthy to continue as
officers of the Court.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; It is noteworthy that in the past, the Court has disciplined lawyers and judges
for willful disregard of its orders to file comments or appellant’s briefs, as a penalty for disobedience
thereof.—In Pajares v. Abad Santos, we reminded attorneys that “there must be more faithful adherence
to Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court [now Rule 7, Section 3] which provides that the signature of an
attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading and that to the best of his
knowledge, information and belief, there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for
delay, and expressly admonishes that for a willful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to
disciplinary action. It is noteworthy that in the past, the Court has disciplined lawyers and judges for
willful disregard of its orders to file comments or appellant’s briefs, as a penalty for disobedience
thereof.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Membership in the legal profession is a privilege, demanding a high degree
of good moral character.—We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege, demanding a
high degree of good moral character, not only as a condition precedent to admission, but also as a
continuing requirement for the practice of law. Sadly, herein respondent falls short of the exacting
standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal profession.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold
the laws.—In this case as well, we find disbarment to be the appropriate penalty. “Of all classes and
professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for
him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample them underfoot and to
ignore the very bands of society, argues recreancy to his position and office and sets a pernicious example
to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body politic.”

NO COUNSELING TO DEFY LAW- RULE 1.02

Donton vs. Tansingco, 493 SCRA 1 , June 27, 2006

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating
the law commits an act which justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer.—The Court finds
respondent liable for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code. A lawyer should not render any
service or give advice to any client which will involve defiance of the laws which he is bound to uphold
and obey. A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating the law
commits an act which justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer.

Same; Same; The act of a lawyer in using his knowledge of the law to achieve an unlawful end amounts
to malpractice in his office, for which he may be suspended.—Respondent had sworn to uphold the
Constitution. Thus, he violated his oath and the Code when he prepared and notarized the Occupancy
Agreement to evade the law against foreign ownership of lands. Respondent used his knowledge of the
law to achieve an unlawful end. Such an act amounts to malpractice in his office, for which he may be
suspended.

Velez vs. De Vera, 496 SCRA 345 , July 25, 2006 (supra)

In re Terell, 2 Phil. 266

 Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, 416 SCRA 465 , November 25, 2003
Administrative Law; Attorneys; Court will not countenance any wrongdoing nor allow the erosion of our
people’s faith in the judicial system, let alone, by those who have been privileged by it to practice law
in the Philippines.—The Supreme Court does not claim infallibility; it will not denounce criticism made
by anyone against the Court for, if well-founded can truly have constructive effects in the task of the
Court, but it will not countenance any wrongdoing nor allow the erosion of our people’s faith in the
judicial system, let alone, by those who have been privileged by it to practice law in the Philippines.

Same; Same; A lawyer should observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers
and, indeed, should insist on similar conduct by others.—Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility mandates that the lawyer should observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and
judicial officers and, indeed, should insist on similar conduct by others. In liberally imputing sinister and
devious motives and questioning the impartiality, integrity, and authority of the members of the Court,
Atty. Paguia has only succeeded seeking to impede, obstruct and pervert the dispensation of justice.

Same; Same; Attorney Allan Paguia is indefinitely suspended from the practice of law.—WHEREFORE,
Attorney Alan Paguia is hereby indefinitely suspended from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt
hereof, for conduct unbecoming a lawyer and an officer of the Court.

NOT TO ENCOURAGE LAWSUIT OR PROCEEDINGS- RULE 1.03

Saburnido vs. Madrono, 366 SCRA 1 , September 26, 2001

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private
capacity, that renders him unfit to continue to be an officer of the court.—A lawyer may be disciplined
for any conduct, in his professional or private capacity, that renders him unfit to continue to be an officer
of the court. Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers to at all times
uphold the dignity and integrity of the legal profession. Specifically, in Rule 7.03, the Code provides:
Rule 7.03.—A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor shall he whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.

Same; Same; A lawyer’s act of filing multiple complaints against the complainants reflects on his fitness
to be a member of the legal profession.—Clearly, respondent’s act of filing multiple complaints against
herein complainants reflects on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession. His act evinces
vindictiveness, a decidedly undesirable trait whether in a lawyer or another individual, as complainants
were instrumental in respondent’s dismissal from the judiciary. We see in respondent’s tenacity in
pursuing several cases against complainants not the persistence of one who has been grievously wronged
but the obstinacy of one who is trying to exact revenge.

Same; Same; Disbarment; The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of
misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court.—
Complainants ask that respondent be disbarred. However, we find that suspension from the practice of
law is sufficient to discipline respondent. The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear
cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the
court. While we will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of
lawyers, where the evidence calls for it, we will also not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice
to accomplish the desired end. In this case, we find suspension to be a sufficient sanction against
respondent. Suspension, we may add, is not primarily intended as a punishment, but as a means to
protect the public and the legal profession.

Linsangan vs. Tolentino, 598 SCRA 133 , September 04, 2009

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Disbarment; Malpractice; Solicitations; Advertisements; Time and time again,
lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and not a business—lawyers should not
advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares.—Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all
lawyers must adhere to, including the manner by which a lawyer’s services are to be made known. Thus,
Canon 3 of the CPR provides: CANON 3 — A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE
ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF FACTS. Time and
time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and not a business; lawyers
should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares. To allow a lawyer to advertise his
talent or skill is to commercialize the practice of law, degrade the profession in the public’s estimation
and impair its ability to efficiently render that high character of service to which every member of the
bar is called.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers, an actuation which constitutes malpractice, a
ground for disbarment.—Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides: RULE 2.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT DO OR PERMIT
TO BE DONE ANY ACT DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO SOLICIT LEGAL BUSINESS. Hence, lawyers are prohibited
from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers. Such
actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Ambulance Chasing; Words and Phrases; Ambulance chasing is the
solicitation of almost
any kind of legal business by an attorney, personally or through an agent, in order to gain employment.—
Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides: RULE 1.03. A LAWYER
SHALL NOT, FOR ANY CORRUPT MOTIVE OR INTEREST, ENCOURAGE ANY SUIT OR PROCEEDING OR DELAY
ANY MAN’S CAUSE. This rule proscribes “ambulance chasing” (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal
business by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain employment) as a measure to
protect the community from barratry and champerty.

Same; Same; Same; Same; A lawyer should not steal another lawyer’s client nor induce the latter to
retain him by a promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for his services.—With regard to
respondent’s violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a lawyer should not steal another
lawyer’s client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good result or reduced
fees for his services. Again the Court notes that respondent never denied having these seafarers in his
client list nor receiving benefits from Labiano’s “referrals.” Furthermore, he never denied Labiano’s
connection to his office. Respondent committed an unethical, predatory overstep into another’s legal
practice. He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.

Same; Same; Lending to Clients; The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client; Exception.—
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when in the interest
of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographer’s fees for transcript
of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for
the client.

Same; Same; Solicitations; Violation of anti-solicitation statutes warrants serious sanctions for initiating
contact with a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining employment.—As previously mentioned,
any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice which calls for the exercise of the Court’s disciplinary
powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes warrants serious sanctions for initiating contact with a
prospective client for the purpose of obtaining employment. Thus, in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the
rule to protect the public from the Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold
the nobility of the legal profession.

Same; Same; Advertisements; Calling Cards; Professional calling cards may only contain the following
details: (a) lawyer’s name; (b) name of the law firm with which he is connected; (c) address; (d)
telephone number; and, (e) special branch of law practiced.—A final word regarding the calling card
presented in evidence by petitioner. A lawyer’s best advertisement is a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his character and conduct. For this reason, lawyers
are only allowed to announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple
professional cards. Professional calling cards may only contain the following details: (a) lawyer’s name;
(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected; (c) address; (d) telephone number; and, (e) special
branch of law practiced.

ENCOURAGE CLIENT TO AVOID CONTROVERSY- Rule 1.04

De Ysasi III vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 231 SCRA 173 , March 11, 1994
Ethics; Lawyers; A lawyer should be a mediator for concord and conciliator for compromise, rather than
a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation.—The conduct of the respective counsel of the
parties, as revealed by the records, sorely disappoints the Court and invites reproof. Both counsel may
well be reminded that their ethical duty as lawyers to represent their clients with zeal goes beyond
merely presenting their clients’ respective causes in court. It is just as much their responsibility, if not
more importantly, to exert all reasonable efforts to smooth over legal conflicts, preferably out of court
and especially in consideration of the direct and immediate consanguineous ties between their clients.
Once again, we reiterate that the useful function of a lawyer is not only to conduct litigation but to avoid
it whenever possible by advising settlement or withholding suit. He is often called upon less for dramatic
forensic exploits than for wise counsel in every phase of life. He should be a mediator for concord and a
conciliator for compromise, rather than a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation.

Same; Code of Professional Responsibility; A lawyer should encourage his client to avoid, end or settle
the controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement.—Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
explicitly provides that “(a) lawyer shall encourage his client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it
will admit of a fair settlement.” On this point, we find that both counsel herein fell short of what was
expected of them, despite their avowed duties as officers of the court. The records do not show that
they took pains to initiate steps geared toward effecting a rapprochment between their clients. On the
contrary, their acerbic and protracted exchanges could not but have exacerbated the situation even as
they may have found favor in the equally hostile eyes of their respective clients.

Labor Law; Labor Arbiter; A labor arbiter shall exert all efforts towards the amicable settlement of a
labor dispute within his jurisdiction.—In the same manner, we find that the labor arbiter who handled
this regrettable case has been less than faithful to the letter and spirit of the Labor Code mandating that
a labor arbiter “shall exert all efforts towards the amicable settlement of a labor dispute within his
jurisdiction.” If he ever did so, or at least entertained the thought, the copious records of the proceeding
in this controversy are barren of any reflection of the same.

Castañeda vs. Ago, 65 SCRA 505 , July 30, 1975

Courts; Non-interference with order of co-equal court; Case at bar.—The doctrine that a court may not
interfere with the orders of a co-equal court does not apply in the case at bar. The Court of First Instance
of Manila, which issued the writ of possession, ultimately was not interfered with by its co-equal court,
the Court of First Instance of Quezon City as the latter lifted the restraining order it had previously issued
against the enforcement of the Manila court’s writ of possession; it is the Court of Appeals that enjoined,
in part, the enforcement of the writ.

Injunction; Purpose of; Injunction issued to protect present right; Case at bar.—The decision enjoined
the enforcement of the writ of possession to and ejectment from the one-half share in the properties
involved. This half-share is not in esse, but is merely an inchoate interest, a mere expectancy,
constituting neither legal nor equitable estate, and will ripen into title when only upon liquidation and
settlement there appears to be assets of the community. The decision sets at naught the well-settled
rule that injunction does not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may never arise.
Attorneys; Duty to advise client on merit or lack of merit of case.—It is the duty of a counsel to advise
his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricaries and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of
his case. If he finds that his client’s cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter
to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and
caprices of his client, and temper his client’s propensity to litigate. A lawyer’s oath to uphold the cause
of justice is superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable.

Same; Counsel as true exponent of the primacy of truth and moral justice.—Forgetting his sacred mission
as a sworn public servant and his exalted position as an officer of the court, counsel has allowed himself
to become an instigator of controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and
a conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a true
exponent of the primacy of truth and moral justice.
Laches; Laches defined and explained.—Laches, in a general sense, is a failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert
it.

NOT TO REFUSE TO GIVE LEGAL ADVICE- Rule 2.02

Santiago vs. Rafanan, 440 SCRA 91 , October 05, 2004

Attorneys; Notarial Law; Duties; The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries
public.—The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries public. They are required
to certify that the party to every document acknowledged before them has presented the proper
residence certificate (or exemption from the residence tax); and to enter its number, place of issue and
date as part of such certification. They are also required to maintain and keep a notarial register; to
enter therein all instruments notarized by them; and to “give to each instrument executed, sworn to, or
acknowledged before [them] a number corresponding to the one in [their] register [and to state therein]
the page or pages of [their] register, on which the same is recorded.” Failure to perform these duties
would result in the revocation of their commission as notaries public.

Same; Same; Notary Public; Notaries public entering into their commissions are presumed to be aware
of the elementary requirements.—The formalities are mandatory and cannot be simply neglected,
considering the degree of importance and evidentiary weight attached to notarized documents. Notaries
public entering into their commissions are presumed to be aware of these elementary requirements.

Same; Same; Same; Notarization; A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon
its face.—The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be overemphasized. Notarization is
not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only
those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a private
document into a public document thus making that document admissible in evidence without further
proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face.
Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment
executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument.”

Same; Same; Same; Where notaries public are lawyers, a graver responsibility is placed upon them by
reason of their solemn oath to obey the laws.—It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers
is to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes. They are expected
to be in the forefront in the observance and maintenance of the rule of law. This duty carries with it the
obligation to be well-informed of the existing laws and to keep abreast with legal developments, recent
enactments and jurisprudence. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles. Unless
they faithfully comply with such duty, they may not be able to discharge competently and diligently their
obligations as members of the bar. Worse, they may become susceptible to committing mistakes. Where
notaries public are lawyers, a graver responsibility is placed upon them by reason of their solemn oath
to obey the laws. No custom or age-old practice provides sufficient excuse or justification for their failure
to adhere to the provisions of the law. In this case, the excuse given by respondent exhibited his clear
ignorance of the Notarial Law, the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the importance of his office as a
notary public.

Same; Duties; Integrity; Acting or appearing to act in the double capacity of lawyer and witness for the
client will provoke unkind criticism and leave many people to suspect the truthfulness of the lawyer
because they cannot believe the lawyer as disinterested.—“Acting or appearing to act in the double
capacity of lawyer and witness for the client will provoke unkind criticism and leave many people to
suspect the truthfulness of the lawyer because they cannot believe the lawyer as disinterested. The
people will have a plausible reason for thinking, and if their sympathies are against the lawyer’s client,
they will have an opportunity, not likely to be neglected, for charging, that as a witness he fortified it
with his own testimony. The testimony of the lawyer becomes doubted and is looked upon as partial and
untruthful.” Thus, although the law does not forbid lawyers from being witnesses and at the same time
counsels for a cause, the preference is for them to refrain from testifying as witnesses, unless they
absolutely have to; and should they do so, to withdraw from active management of the case.

NO SOLICITATION

Linsangan vs. Tolentino, 598 SCRA 133 , September 04, 2009 (supra)

CANON 3/ NO FALSE or UNFAIR CLAIM

Khan, Jr. vs. Simbillo, 409 SCRA 299 , August 19, 2003
Administrative Law; Attorneys; The practice of law is not a business; Lawyering is not primarily meant
to be a money-making venture and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits; Elements
distinguishing the legal profession from a business.—It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of
law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary
consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not
a capital that necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration.
The duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of
lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves. The following
elements distinguish the legal profession from a business: (1) A duty of public service, of which the
emolument is a by-product, and in which one may attain the highest eminence without making much
money; (2) A relation as an “officer of the court” to the administration of justice involving thorough
sincerity, integrity and reliability; (3) A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary; and (4) A
relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current
business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their
clients.

Same; Same; Solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed for solicitation to be proper, it
must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession.—The solicitation of legal business is not
altogether proscribed. However, for solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of
the legal profession. If it were made in a modest and decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the
lawyer and to the bar. Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name or names of the lawyers, the office
and residence address and fields of practice, as well as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the
same brief data, are permissible. Even the use of calling cards is now acceptable. Publication in reputable
law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief
biographical and informative data is likewise allowable.

Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc., 223 SCRA 378 , June 17, 1993
Attorneys; Words and Phrases; Meaning of “Practice of Law.”—Practice of law means any activity, in or
out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and
experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristic of the
profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal
knowledge or skill. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal
advice and counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights are
secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a court.

Same; Same; Same.—When a person participates in a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the
practice of law. One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the
business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing law. Giving
advice for compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the conduct with respect
thereto constitutes a practice of law. One who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a
statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law.

Same; The practice of giving out legal information constitutes practice of law.—What is palpably clear
is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that
such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing information,
for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court
that all that respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the
client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will
necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper
course of action to be taken as may be provided-for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent
and for which services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the
jurisprudential definition of “practice of law.” Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that
respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight of authority
holds, is not limited merely to court appearances but extends to legal research, giving legal advice,
contract drafting, and so forth.

Same; Same.—Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts
sufficiently establish that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for
various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple documentation to complex
litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of
paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law.

Same; Same; The services offered by respondent cannot be performed by paralegals here as
distinguished from the United States.—Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As
admitted by respondent, there are schools and universities there which offer studies and degrees in
paralegal education, while there are none in the Philippines. As the concept of the “paralegal” or “legal
assistant” evolved in the United States, standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the general
public. One of the major standards or guidelines was developed by the American Bar Association which
set up Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even
been proposed to certify legal assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in the United States
with their own code of professional ethics, such as the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and
the American Paralegal Association. In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited
acceptance of what may be considered as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not
duly licensed to practice law are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf of another or to
render legal services, but such allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or
regulations granting permission therefor.

Same; Lawyers may not advertise their services or expertise.—Anent the issue on the validity of the
questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making
known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement
of facts. He is not supposed to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. Nor
shall he pay or give something of value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in
return for, publicity to attract legal business. Prior to the adoption of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to
indirect advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper
comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in connection with causes in which the lawyer
has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved,
the importance of the lawyer’s position, and all other like self-laudation.

Same; Exceptions.—Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of
the profession enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define the extent
to which they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories, namely, those which are
expressly allowed and those which are necessarily implied from the restrictions.

Same; Same.—The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent
with the standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative data.

Same; Same.—The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain
only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone
number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the opening
of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the
convenience of the profession, is not objectionable.

Same; Legal profession here has been under attack on its integrity.—Secondly, it is our firm belief that
with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to allow the publication of advertisements
of the kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what is already a deteriorating public
opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has consistently been under attack lately by media and
the community in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such negative,
even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that level of professional conduct which is
beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the legal
profession.

NO FALSE OR MISLEADING
Dacanay vs. Baker & McKenzie, 136 SCRA 349 , May 10, 1985
Attorneys; Use by Philippine lawyers of the firm name of an American law firm is unethical.—We hold
that Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138,
Rules of Court). As admitted by the respondents in their memorandum, Baker & McKenzie is a professional
partner ship organized in 1949 in Chicago, Illinois with members and associates in 30 cities around the
world. Respondents, aside from being members of the Philippine bar, practising under the firm name of
Guerrero & Torres, are members or associates of Baker & McKenzie.

Same; Same.—As pointed out by the Solicitor General, respondents’ use of the firm name Baker &
McKenzie constitutes a representation that being associated with the firm they could “render legal
services of the highest quality to multinational business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade
and investment” (p. 3, respondents’ memo). This is unethical because Baker & McKenzie is not authorized
to practise law here.

In the Matter of the Petition for Authority To Continue use of the Firm name “Ozaeta, Romulo,
etc., 92 SCRA 1 , July 30, 1979
Same; Same; Same; Practice of Law; Partnership for the practice of law, nature of.—A partnership for
the practice of law cannot be likened to partnerships formed by other professionals or for business. For
one thing, the law on accountancy specifically allows the use of a trade name in connection with the
practice of accountancy. “A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere
relationship or association for a particular purpose. x x x It is not a partnership formed for the purpose
of carrying on a trade or business or of holding property.” Thus, it has been stated that “the use of a
nom de plume, assumed or trade name in law practice is improper.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Right to practice law, nature of.—“The right to practice law is not a natural
or constitutional right but is in the nature of a privilege or franchise. It is limited, to persons of good
moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The right does not only
presuppose in its possessor integrity, legal standing and attainment, but also the exercise of a special
privilege, highly personal and partaking of the nature of a public trust.”

Same; Same; Same; Custom; Continued use of a deceased or former partner’s name in the firm names
of law partnerships not sanctioned by local custom; Reason; Possibility of deception upon the public
where the name of a deceased partner continues to be used.—It is true that Canon 33 does not consider
as unethical the continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner in the firm name of a law
partnership when such a practice is permissible by local custom but the Canon warns that care should be
taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use. It must be conceded that in the
Philippines, no local custom permits or allows the continued use of a deceased or former partner’s name
in the firm names of law partnerships. Firm names, under our custom, identify the more active and/or
more senior members or partners of the law firm. A glimpse at the history of the firms of petitioners and
of other law firms in this country would show how their firm names have evolved and changed from time
to time as the composition of the partnership changed. The possibility of deception upon the public, real
or consequential, where the name of a deceased partner continues to be used cannot be ruled out. A
person in search of legal counsel might be guided by the familiar ring of a distinguished name appearing
in a firm title.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Evidence; Concept of Customs; To be admissible custom must be proved
as a fact; Distinctions between juridical custom and social custom.—Not so in this jurisdiction where
there is no local custom that sanctions the practice. Custom has been defined as a rule of conduct formed
by repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory.
Courts take no judicial notice of custom. A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of
evidence. A local custom as a source of right cannot be considered by a court of justice unless such
custom is properly established by competent evidence like any other fact. We find such proof of the
existence of a local custom, and of the elements requisite to constitute the same, wanting herein. Merely
because something is done as a matter of practice does not mean that Courts can rely on the same for
purposes of adjudication as a juridical custom. Juridical custom must be differentiated from social
custom. The former can supplement statutory law or be applied in the absence of such statute. Not so
with the latter.

Same; Same; Same; Practice of Law; Practice of law not considered money-making trade but peculiarly
related to the administration of justice.—The practice of law is intimately and peculiarly related to the
administration of justice and should not be considered like an ordinary "money-making trade."

PARTNERS ASSUMING PUBLIC OFFICE- Rule 3.03

Samonte vs. Gatdula, 303 SCRA 756 , February 26, 1999
Administrative Law; Courts; Court agrees with the investigating judge that the respondent is guilty of
an infraction.—We agree with the investigating judge that the respondent is guilty of an infraction. The
complainant, by her failure to appear at the hearings, failed to substantiate her allegation that it was
the respondent who gave her the calling card of “Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera Law
Offices” and that he tried to convince her to change counsels. We find however, that while the
respondent vehemently denies the complainant’s allegations, he does not deny that his name appears on
the calling card attached to the complaint, which admittedly came into the hands of the complainant.
Same; Same; The inclusion/retention of his name in the professional card constitutes an act of
solicitation which violates Section 7, sub-par. (b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as “Code
of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.”—Respondent does not claim that
the calling card was printed without his knowledge or consent, and the calling card carries his name
primarily and the name of “Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera with address at 220 Mariwasa
Bldg., 717 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City” in the left corner. The card clearly gives the impression
that he is connected with the said law firm. The inclusion/retention of his name in the professional card
constitutes an act of solicitation which violates Section 7, sub-par. (b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713,
otherwise known as “Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.”

Same; Same; The conduct and behavior of every one connected with an office charged with the
dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed with the
heavy burden of responsibility.—Time and again this Court has said that the conduct and behavior of
every one connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge
to the lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. His conduct, at
all times must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum but above all else must be above
suspicion.

CANON 6: LAWYERS IN THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE

Collantes vs. Renomeron, 200 SCRA 584 , August 16, 1991

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Misconduct as public official constitutes violation of oath as lawyer.—The issue
in this disbarment proceeding is whether the respondent register of deeds, as a lawyer, may also be
disciplined by this Court for his malfeasances as a public official. The answer is yes, for his misconduct
as a public official also constituted a violation of his oath as a lawyer. The lawyer’s oath (Rule 138,
Section 17, Rules of Court: People vs. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968), imposes upon every lawyer the duty to
delay no man for money or malice. The lawyer’s oath is a source of his obligations and its violation is a
ground for his suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action.

Same; Same; Same.—The Code of Professional Responsibility applies to lawyers in government service in
the discharge of their official tasks (Canon 6). Just as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials requires public officials and employees to process documents and papers expeditiously
(Sec. 5, subpars. [c] and [d] and prohibits them from directly or indirectly having a financial or material
interest in any transaction requiring the approval of their office, and likewise bars them from soliciting
gifts or anything of monetary value in the course of any transaction which may be affected by the
functions of their office (Sec. 7, subpars. [a] and [d]), the Code of Professional Responsibility forbids a
lawyer to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01, Code of Professional
Responsibility), or delay any man’s cause “for any corrupt motive or interest” (Rule 1.03).

Ramos vs. Imbang, 530 SCRA 759 , August 23, 2007

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Government Lawyers; Lawyers in government service are expected to be more
conscientious of their actuations as they are subject to public scrutiny.—Lawyers are expected to
conduct themselves with honesty and integrity. More specifically, lawyers in government service are
expected to be more conscientious of their actuations as they are subject to public scrutiny. They are
not only members of the bar but also public servants who owe utmost fidelity to public service.

Same; Same; Same; Lawyers in government service cannot handle private cases for they are expected
to devote themselves fulltime to the work of their respective offices.—Government employees are
expected to devote themselves completely to public service. For this reason, the private practice of
profession is prohibited. Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees provides: Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions.—In addition to acts and omissions of
public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following
constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared
unlawful: x x x x x x x x x (b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto, public officials
and employees during their incumbency shall not: x x x x x x x x x (1) Engage in the private practice of
profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict with
their official function. Thus, lawyers in government service cannot handle private cases for they are
expected to devote themselves full-time to the work of their respective offices.

Same; Same; Same; Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship.—In
this instance, respondent received P5,000 from the complainant and issued a receipt on July 15, 1992
while he was still connected with the PAO. Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-
client relationship. Respondent’s admission that he accepted money from the complainant and the
receipt confirmed the presence of an attorney-client relationship between him and the complainant.
Moreover, the receipt showed that he accepted the complainant’s case while he was still a government
lawyer. Respondent clearly violated the prohibition on private practice of profession.

Same; Same; Same; Public Attorney’s Office (PAO); The Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) was created for
the purpose of providing free legal assistance to indigent litigants; A Public Attorney’s Office (PAO)
lawyer should not accept attorney’s fees from a party as this is inconsistent with the office’s mission.—
Aggravating respondent’s wrongdoing was his receipt of attorney’s fees. The PAO was created for the
purpose of providing free legal assistance to indigent litigants. Section 14(3), Chapter 5, Title III, Book V
of the Revised Administrative Code provides: Sec. 14. x x x The PAO shall be the principal law office of
the Government in extending free legal assistance to indigent persons in criminal, civil, labor,
administrative and other quasijudicial cases. As a PAO lawyer, respondent should not have accepted
attorney’s fees from the complainant as this was inconsistent with the office’s mission. Respondent
violated the prohibition against accepting legal fees other than his salary.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The undertaking to uphold the law includes the observance of the prohibitions
blatantly violated by respondent when he accepted the complainant’s cases and received attorney’s
fees in consideration of his legal services.—Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON 1.—A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE
RESPECT FOR THE LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. Every lawyer is obligated to uphold the law. This
undertaking includes the observance of the above-mentioned prohibitions blatantly violated by
respondent when he accepted the complainant’s cases and received attorney’s fees in consideration of
his legal services. Consequently, respondent’s acceptance of the cases was also a breach of Rule 18.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility because the prohibition on the private practice of profession
disqualified him from acting as the complainant’s counsel.

Same; Same; Same; Same; A government lawyer is a keeper of public faith and is burdened with a high
degree of social responsibil ity, higher than his brethren in private practice.—Respondent’s conduct in
office fell short of the integrity and good moral character required of all lawyers, specially one occupying
a public office. Lawyers in public office are expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which
tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government but also uphold the dignity of the
legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. A government lawyer
is a keeper of public faith and is burdened with a high degree of social responsibility, higher than his
brethren in private practice.

Same; Same; A lawyer could not be held guilty of violating Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility where he did not hold the money for the benefit of the client but accepted it as his
attorney’s fees.—There is, however, insufficient basis to find respondent guilty of violating Rule 16.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent did not hold the money for the benefit of the
complainant but accepted it as his attorney’s fees. He neither held the amount in trust for the
complainant (such as an amount delivered by the sheriff in satisfaction of a judgment obligation in favor
of the client) nor was it given to him for a specific purpose (such as amounts given for filing fees and bail
bond). Nevertheless, respondent should return the P5,000 as he, a government lawyer, was not entitled
to attorney’s fees and not allowed to accept them.

PRIMARY DUTY: THAT JUSTICE IS DONE- RULE 6.01

Cuenca vs. Court of Appeals, 250 SCRA 485 , December 01, 1995
“Under Rule 6.01 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, prosecutors who represent the
People of the Philippines in a criminal case are not duty bound to seek conviction of the accused but to
see that justice is done. Said Rule 6.01 of Canon 6 states:
‘Canon 6—These canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official
tasks.
‘Rule 6.01—The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to convict but to see that
justice is done. The suppression of facts or the concealment of witnesses capable of establishing the
innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible and is cause for disciplinary action.’ (Italics supplied.)
“The above duty is well founded on the instruction of the U.S. Supreme Court in Berger v. United States,
295 U.S. 78 (1935) that prosecutors represent a sovereign ‘whose obligation to govern impartially is
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore in a criminal prosecution is
not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done (Time to Rein in the Prosecution, by Atty.
Bruce Fein, published on p. 11, The Lawyers Review, July 31, 1994)

Remedial Law; New Trial; Rule that the court is not authorized to entertain a motion for reconsideration
and/or new trial predicated on allegedly newly discovered evidence appears to have been relaxed if not
abandoned in Helmuth, Jr. vs. People and People vs. Amparado.—Although in “Goduco v. CA” (14 SCRA
282 [1965]) decided some twenty (20) years ago, this Court ruled it is not authorized to entertain a
motion for reconsideration and/or new trial predicated on allegedly newly discovered evidence the
rationale of which being: “The judgment of the Court of Appeals is conclusive as to the facts, and cannot
be reviewed by the Supreme Court. Accordingly, in an appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court, the
latter has no jurisdiction to entertain a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence,
for only questions of fact are involved therein,” the rule now appears to have been relaxed, if not
abandoned, in subsequent cases like “Helmuth, Jr. v. People” and “People v. Amparado.”

NOT TO USE PUBLIC POSITION FOR PRIVATE INTEREST- RULE 6.02

Ali vs. Bubong, 453 SCRA 1 , March 08, 2005
Attorneys; Disbarment; Grounds; Grave Misconduct; Where a lawyer’s misconduct as a government
official is of such nature as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then
he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such grounds.—The Code of Professional Responsibility
does not cease to apply to a lawyer simply because he has joined the government service. In fact, by the
express provision of Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing the conduct of lawyers “shall apply to lawyers
in government service in the discharge of their official tasks.” Thus, where a lawyer’s misconduct as a
government official is of such nature as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral
delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such grounds. Although the general
rule is that a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for
infractions he committed as a government official, he may, however, be disciplined as a lawyer if his
misconduct constitutes a violation of his oath a member of the legal profession.

Same; Same; Same; Same; As an officer of the court one is subject to a rigid discipline that demands
that in his every exertion the only criterion be that truth and justice triumph.—[A] person takes an oath
when he is admitted to the bar which is designed to impress upon him his responsibilities. He thereby
becomes an “officer of the court” on whose shoulders rests the grave responsibility of assisting the courts
in the proper, fair, speedy and efficient administration of justice. As an officer of the court he is subject
to a rigid discipline that demands that in his every exertion the only criterion be that truth and justice
triumph. This discipline is what has given the law profession its nobility, its prestige, its exalted place.
From a lawyer, to paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, are expected those qualities of truth-speaking,
a high sense of honor, full candor, intellectual honesty, and the strictest observance of fiduciary
responsibility—all of which, throughout the centuries, have been compendiously described as moral
character.

Same; Same; Same; Same; A lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened
with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private practice.—[A]
lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which might tend to lessen
the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also uphold the dignity of the legal
profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer
in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of social
responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private practice.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The ill-conceived use of his knowledge of the intricacies of the law calls for
nothing less than the withdrawal of his privilege to practice law.—Respondent’s conduct manifestly
undermined the people’s confidence in the public office he used to occupy and cast doubt on the integrity
of the legal profession. The ill-conceived use of his knowledge of the intricacies of the law calls for
nothing less than the withdrawal of his privilege to practice law.

Same; Same; Nature; A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where
the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant.—A case of suspension or
disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is
whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral
conduct has been duly proven. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A
proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant is a
plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest
and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public
welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration
of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an
officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney’s
alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all
good citizens may have in the proper administrative of justice.

Olazo vs. Tinga, 637 SCRA 1 , December 07, 2010

Administrative Law; Attorneys; Public Officers; Misconduct; A lawyer who holds a government office
may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a
government official.—Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a
member of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. He may be
disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar only when his misconduct also constitutes a violation of
his oath as a lawyer.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Lawyers in the government service are subject to constant public scrutiny
under norms of public accountability.—Since public office is a public trust, the ethical conduct demanded
upon lawyers in the government service is more exacting than the standards for those in private practice.
Lawyers in the government service are subject to constant public scrutiny under norms of public
accountability.

Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Practice of Law; To practice law is to give notice or render any
kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.—In
Cayetano v. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210 (1991), we defined the practice of law as any activity, in and out of
court, that requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.
Moreover, we ruled that to engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics
of the profession; to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service
requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.
Same; Same; Same; Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (R.A. No.
6713); As a rule, government lawyers are not allowed to engage in the private practice of their
profession during their incumbency.—As a rule, government lawyers are not allowed to engage in the
private practice of their profession during their incumbency. By way of exception, a government lawyer
can engage in the practice of his or her profession under the following conditions: first, the private
practice is authorized by the Constitution or by the law; and second, the practice will not conflict or
tend to conflict with his or her official functions.

Attorneys; Disbarment; Suspension; Evidence; Considering the serious consequences of the penalty of
disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, the burden rests on the complainant to present clear,
convincing and satisfactory proof for the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers.—All told, considering
the serious consequences of the penalty of disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, the burden
rests on the complainant to present clear, convincing and satisfactory proof for the Court to exercise its
disciplinary powers. The respondent generally is under no obligation to prove his/her defense, until the
burden shifts to him/her because of what the complainant has proven. Where no case has in the first
place been proven, nothing has to be rebutted in defense. [Olazo vs. Tinga, 637 SCRA 1(2010)]

NOT TO ACCEPT EMPLOYMENT AFTER GOVERNMENT SERVICE- RULE 6.03

Huyssen vs. Gutierrez, 485 SCRA 244 , March 24, 2006
Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official task have more
restrictions than lawyers in private practice.—We begin with the veritable fact that lawyers in
government service in the discharge of their official task have more restrictions than lawyers in private
practice. Want of moral integrity is to be more severely condemned in a lawyer who holds a responsible
public office.

Same; Same; When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he deny the
charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him.—It is undisputed
that respondent admitted having received the US$20,000 from complainant as shown by his signatures in
the petty cash vouchers and receipts he prepared, on the false representation that that it was needed
in complainant’s application for visa with the BID. Respondent denied he misappropriated the said
amount and interposed the defense that he delivered it to a certain Atty. Mendoza who assisted
complainant and children in their application for visa in the BID. Such defense remains unsubstantiated
as he failed to submit evidence on the matter. While he claims that Atty. Mendoza already died, he did
not present the death certificate of said Atty. Mendoza. Worse, the action of respondent in shifting the
blame to someone who has been naturally silenced by fate, is not only impudent but downright
ignominious. When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he deny the
charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him. He must show proof
that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him. In the
case at bar, respondent clearly fell short of his duty. Records show that even though he was given the
opportunity to answer the charges and controvert the evidence against him in a formal investigation, he
failed, without any plausible reason, to appear several times whenever the case was set for reception of
his evidence despite due notice.

Same; Same; Evidence; Denial; It is settled that denial is inherently a weak defense.—The defense of
denial proffered by respondent is, thus, not convincing. It is settled that denial is inherently a weak
defense. To be believed, it must be buttressed by a strong evidence of non-culpability; otherwise, such
denial is purely self-serving and is with nil evidentiary value.

Same; Same; Respondent’s act of asking money from complainant in consideration of the latter’s
pending application for visas is violative of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
prohibits members of the Bar from engaging or participating in any unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful
acts—said acts likewise constitute a breach of Rule 6.02 of the Code which bars lawyers in government
service from promoting their private interest.—Respondent’s act of asking money from complainant in
consideration of the latter’s pending application for visas is violative of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which prohibits members of the Bar from engaging or participating in any
unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful acts. Moreover, said acts constitute a breach of Rule 6.02 of the Code
which bars lawyers in government service from promoting their private interest. Promotion of private
interest includes soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in any transaction requiring the approval
of his office or which may be affected by the functions of his office. Respondent’s conduct in office
betrays the integrity and good moral character required from all lawyers, especially from one occupying
a high public office. A lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission
which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government; he must also uphold
the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing.
Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high
degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than his brethren in private practice.

Same; Same; Gross Misconduct; Moral Turpitude; The issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross
misconduct and is also a manifestation of moral turpitude.—In a recent case, we have held that the
issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross misconduct, as the effect “transcends the private interests
of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large.
The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public since
the circulation of value less commercial papers can very well pollute the channels of trade and
commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.
Thus, paraphrasing Black’s definition, a drawer who issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges on
his private duties he owes his fellow men or society in a manner contrary to accepted and customary rule
of right and duty, justice, honesty or good morals.” Consequently, we have held that the act of a person
in issuing a check knowing at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in,
or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment, is also a
manifestation of moral turpitude.

Same; Same; Practice of Law; The practice of law is a special privilege bestowed only upon those who
are competent intellectually, academically and morally; The possession of good moral character must
be continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice—otherwise, the loss
thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege.—Time and again, we have declared that the
practice of law is a noble profession. It is a special privilege bestowed only upon those who are competent
intellectually, academically and morally. A lawyer must at all times conduct himself, especially in his
dealings with his clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.
He must faithfully perform his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. A violation
of the high standards of the legal profession subjects the lawyer to administrative sanctions which
includes suspension and disbarment. More importantly, possession of good moral character must be
continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice; otherwise, the loss thereof
is a ground for the revocation of such privilege.

Same; Same; Government lawyers should be more sensitive to their professional obligations as their
disreputable conduct is more likely to be magnified in the public eye.—The primary objective of
administrative cases against lawyers is not only to punish and discipline the erring individual lawyers but
also to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the courts and the public from the
misconduct of lawyers, and to remove from the legal profession persons whose utter disregard of their
lawyer’s oath have proven them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of
the bar. These pronouncement gain practical significance in the case at bar considering that respondent
was a former member of the Board of Special Inquiry of the BID. It bears stressing also that government
lawyers who are public servants owe fidelity to the public service, a public trust. As such, government
lawyers should be more sensitive to their professional obligations as their disreputable conduct is more
likely to be magnified in the public eye. As a lawyer, who was also a public officer, respondent miserably
failed to cope with the strict demands and high standards of the legal profession.

Same; Same; Disbarment; Suspension; Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that
a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any of the acts enumerated therein.—Section 27, Rule 138
of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended by this Court for
any of the following acts: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral
conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyer’s oath; (7) willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party
without authority to do so.

Philippine National Bank vs. Cedo, 243 SCRA 1 , March 28, 1995
Administrative Law; Attorneys; Code of Professional Responsibility; IBP discovered that respondent was
previously fined by the Court in the amount of P1,000.00 for forum shopping.—During the investigation
conducted by the IBP, it was discovered that respondent was previously fined by this Court in the amount
of P1,000.00 in connection with G.R. No. 94456 entitled “Milagros Ong Siy vs. Hon. Salvador Tensuan, et
al.” for forum shopping, where respondent appeared as counsel for petitioner Milagros Ong Siy “through
the law firm of Cedo Ferrer Maynigo and Associates.”

Same; Same; Same; Charges against respondent found to be fully substantiated.—The IBP further found
that the charges herein against respondent were fully substantiated. Respondent’s averment that the
law firm handling the case of the Almeda spouses is not a partnership deserves scant consideration in the
light of the attestation of complainant’s counsel, Atty. Pedro Singson, that in one of the hearings of the
Almeda spouses’ case, respondent attended the same with his partner Atty. Ferrer, and although he did
not enter his appearance, he was practically dictating to Atty. Ferrer what to say and argue before the
court. Furthermore, during the hearing of the application for a writ of injunction in the same case,
respondent impliedly admitted being the partner of Atty. Ferrer, when it was made of record that
respondent was working in the same office as Atty. Ferrer.

Same; Same; Same; The alleged set-up of the firm is in itself a violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.—Moreover, the IBP noted that assuming the alleged set-up of the firm to be true, it is in
itself a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Rule 15.02) since the client’s secrets and
confidential records and information are exposed to the other lawyers and staff members at all times.

Same; Same; Same; Court finds the occasion appropriate to emphasize the paramount importance of
avoiding the representation of conflicting interests.—In addition to the findings of the IBP, this Court
finds this occasion appropriate to emphasize the paramount importance of avoiding the representation
of conflicting interests.

Same; Same; Same; Rule on conflicting interest applies with equal force and effect to respondent in the
case at bar.—The foregoing disquisition on conflicting interest applies with equal force and effect to
respondent in the case at bar. Having been an executive of complainant bank, respondent now seeks to
litigate as counsel for the opposite side, a case against his former employer involving a transaction which
he formerly handled while still an employee of complainant, in violation of Canon 6 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics on adverse influence and conflicting interests.

Zaguirre vs. Castillo, 465 SCRA 520 , August 03, 2005

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Suspension; In view of respondent’s show of repentance and active service to
the community, the Court deems it just and reasonable to convert the penalty of indefinite suspension
to a definite period of two years suspension.—In view of respondent’s show of repentance and active
service to the community, the Court deems it just and reasonable to convert the penalty of indefinite
suspension to a definite period of two years suspension. [Zaguirre vs. Castillo, 465 SCRA 520(2005)]
 Que vs. Revilla, Jr., 739 SCRA 459 , November 11, 2014
Attorneys; Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is not a natural, absolute
or constitutional right granted to everyone who demands it, but rather, a special privilege granted and
continued only to those who demonstrate special fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral
character.—Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is not a natural, absolute
or constitutional right granted to everyone who demands it, but rather, a special privilege granted and
continued only to those who demonstrate special fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral
character. The same reasoning applies to reinstatement of a disbarred lawyer. When exercising its
inherent power to grant reinstatement, the Court should see to it that only those who establish their
present moral fitness and knowledge of the law will be readmitted to the Bar. Thus, though the doors to
the practice of law are never permanently closed on a disbarred attorney, the Court owes a duty to the
legal profession as well as to the general public to ensure that if the doors are opened, it is done so only
as a matter of justice.

Same; Practice of Law; Reinstatement to the Practice of Law; The basic inquiry in a petition for
reinstatement to the practice of law is whether the lawyer has sufficiently rehabilitated himself or
herself in conduct and character.—The basic inquiry in a petition for reinstatement to the practice of
law is whether the lawyer has sufficiently rehabilitated himself or herself in conduct and character.
Whether the applicant shall be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys rests to a great extent on the sound
discretion of the Court. The lawyer has to demonstrate and prove by clear and convincing evidence that
he or she is again worthy of membership in the Bar. The Court will take into consideration his or her
character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge/s for which he
or she was disbarred, his or her conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed in
between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement.

Same; Same; Same; Considering the respondent’s earlier disbarment case (and subsequent reduction of
the penalty imposed as an act of clemency), and another disbarment case against him still pending
review by the Supreme Court (SC), the Court is not fully and convincingly satisfied that the respondent
has already reformed.—Considering the respondent’s earlier disbarment case (and subsequent reduction
of the penalty imposed as an act of clemency), and another disbarment case against him still pending
review by the Court, we are not fully and convincingly satisfied that the respondent has already
reformed. The period of five (5) years is likewise not considerably long considering the nature and
perversity of the respondent’s misdeeds. We believe that it is still early for the Court to consider the
respondent’s reinstatement. [Que vs. Revilla, Jr., 739 SCRA 459(2014)]

Camacho vs. Pangulayan, 328 SCRA 631 , March 22, 2000

Administrative Law; Attorneys; Respondent fell short of the demands required of him as a lawyer and
as a member of the Bar.—Although aware that the students were represented by counsel, respondent
attorney proceeded, nonetheless, to negotiate with them and their parents without at the very least
communicating the matter to their lawyer, herein complainant, who was counsel of record in Civil Case
No. Q-97-30549. This failure of respondent, whether by design or because of oversight, is an inexcusable
violation of the canons of professional ethics and in utter disregard of a duty owing to a colleague.
Respondent fell short of the demands required of him as a lawyer and as a member of the Bar. [Camacho
vs. Pangulayan, 328 SCRA 631(2000)]

People vs. Maceda, 323 SCRA 45 , January 24, 2000

Criminal Procedure; As a detention prisoner private respondent Javellana is not allowed to practice his
profession as a necessary consequence of his status as a detention prisoner.—Regarding his continued
practice of law, as a detention prisoner private respondent Javellana is not allowed to practice his
profession as a necessary consequence of his status as a detention prisoner. The trial court’s order was
clear that private respondent “is not to be allowed liberty to roam around but is to be held as a detention
prisoner.”—The prohibition to practice law referred not only to Criminal Case No. 4262, but to all other
cases as well, except in cases where private respondent would appear in court to defend himself.

Same; All prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence cannot practice their
profession nor engage in any business or occupation or hold office, elective or appointive, while in
detention.—As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed
under the custody of the law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound
to answer for the commission of the offense. He must be detained in jail during the pendency of the case
against him, unless he is authorized by the court to be released on bail or on recognizance. Let it be
stressed that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence cannot practice
their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in
detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention. Consequently, all the accused in
Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355 must be confined in the Provincial Jail of Antique. [People vs. Maceda,
323 SCRA 45(2000)]

Zeta vs. Malinao, 87 SCRA 303 , December 20, 1978

Attorneys; Courts; A lower court employee who has been appearing as counsel in court cases and
falsifying his time record is dismissed from the service the acts committed being grave in nature.—The
defense of respondent that “his participation (sic) for defendants’ cause was gratuitous as they could
not engage the services of counsel by reason of poverty and the absence of one in the locality” cannot,
even if true, carry the day for him, considering that in appearing as counsel in court, he did so without
permission from his superiors and, worse, he falsified his time record of service to conceal his absence
from his office on the dates in question. Indeed, the number of times that respondent acted as counsel
under the above circumstances would indicate that he was doing it as a regular practice obviously for
considerations other than pure love of justice.

Same; Same; Same.—In the premises, it is quite obvious that the offense committed by respondent is
grave, hence it warrants a more drastic sanction than that of reprimand recommended by Judge Zosa.
We find no alternative than to separate him from the service, with the admonition that he desist from
appearing in any court or investigative body wherein only members of the bar are allowed to practice.
Wherefore, respondent Felicisimo Malinao is hereby ordered dismissed from his position as interpreter in
the Court of First Instance, CFI, Zumarraga, Western Samar, with prejudice to reemployment in the
judicial branch of the government.

Tan vs. Balajadia, 484 SCRA 659 , March 14, 2006

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; The unauthorized practice of law by assuming to be an attorney and acting as
such without authority constitutes indirect contempt which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or
both.—In several cases, we have ruled that the unauthorized practice of law by assuming to be an
attorney and acting as such without authority constitutes indirect contempt which is punishable by fine
or imprisonment or both. The liability for the unauthorized practice of law under Section 3(e), Rule 71
of the Rules of Court is in the nature of criminal contempt and the acts are punished because they are
an affront to the dignity and authority of the court, and obstruct the orderly administration of justice.
In determining liability for criminal contempt, well-settled is the rule that intent is a necessary element,
and no one can be punished unless the evidence makes it clear that he intended to commit it. [Tan vs.
Balajadia, 484 SCRA 659(2006)]

Aguirre vs. Rana, 403 SCRA 342 , June 10, 2003

Administrative Law; Attorneys; Practice of law means any activity in or out of court which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience; To engage in the practice of
law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal profession.—In Cayetano v.
Monsod, the Court held that “practice of law” means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of
law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to
practice law is to render any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.

Same; Same; Having held himself out as “counsel” knowing that he had no authority to practice law,
respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar.—Verily, respondent was
engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed various
pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of unauthorized practice of
law. Respondent called himself “counsel” knowing fully well that he was not a member of the Bar. Having
held himself out as “counsel” knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown
moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar.

Same; Same; The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the
bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a license.—The right to
practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good
moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege
presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust since
a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by
passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who
has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a license.

Same; Same; Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the
unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court.—The regulation of the practice of
law is unques tionably strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad, a candidate passed the bar examinations but had
not taken his oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys. He was held in contempt of court for practicing law
even before his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who
engages in the unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court.

Same; Same; It is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-pledged lawyer; Fact
that respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial.—True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar
Examinations and took the lawyer’s oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally
makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial.
Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know that
two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer’s oath to be
administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.

Lijauco vs. Terrado, 500 SCRA 301 , August 31, 2006

Attorneys; Gross Misconduct; The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on those who show that they
possessed and continue to possess the legal qualifications for it.—The practice of law is a privilege
bestowed on those who show that they possessed and continue to possess the legal qualifications for it.
Indeed, lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency and morality,
including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. They must perform their fourfold duty to society, the legal
profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms of the legal profession
as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Same; Lawyers shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to them, and this negligence in connection
therewith shall render them liable.—Lawyers are prohibited from engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct and are mandated to serve their clients with competence and diligence.
They shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to them, and this negligence in connection therewith
shall render them liable.
Same; The canons of the legal profession require that once an attorney agrees to handle a case, he
should undertake the task with zeal, care and utmost devotion.—The duty of a lawyer to safeguard his
client’s interests commences from his retainer until his discharge from the case or the final disposition
of the subject matter of litigation. Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client
relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the client’s cause. The canons of the legal profession
require that once an attorney agrees to handle a case, he should undertake the task with zeal, care and
utmost devotion.

Same; A member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended on the following grounds.—Under Section
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended on the following
grounds: 1) deceit; 2) malpractice, or other gross misconduct in office; 3) grossly immoral conduct; 4)
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; 5) violation of the lawyer’s oath; 6) willful disobedience
to any lawful order of a superior court; and 7) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without
authority.

Same; When a lawyer takes a client’s cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in
protecting his rights.—When a lawyer takes a client’s cause, he covenants that he will exercise due
diligence in protecting his rights. The failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention makes
such lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed in him by his client and makes him answerable not just to his
client but also to the legal profession, the courts and society.

Same; Utmost fidelity is demanded once counsel agrees to take the cudgels for his client’s cause.—A
lawyer should give adequate attention, care and time to his client’s case. Once he agrees to handle a
case, he should undertake the task with dedication and care. If he fails in this duty, he is not true to his
oath as a lawyer. Thus, a lawyer should accept only as much cases as he can efficiently handle in order
to sufficiently protect his clients’ interests. It is not enough that a lawyer possesses the qualification to
handle the legal matter; he must also give adequate attention to his legal work. Utmost fidelity is
demanded once counsel agrees to take the cudgels for his client’s cause. [Lijauco vs. Terrado, 500 SCRA
301(2006)]