EUGENE A. TAN, SILVESTRE J. ACEJAS and ROGELIO V.
FERNANDEZ, on their behalf and on of the State for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication
behalf of the People of the Philippines, petitioners,
vs.
DIOSDADO P. MACAPAGAL, on his behalf and on behalf of the other Delegates to the 1971
Constitutional Convention, respondents.
A five-page petition filed on October 6, 1971 by Eugene A. Tan, Silvestre J. Acejas and Rogelio V.
Fernandez, respectively, of Roxas City, Romblon and Davao City, for declaratory relief as
taxpayers, but purportedly suing on behalf of themselves and the Filipino people, in assailing the
validity of the Laurel-Leido Resolution,1 dealing with the range of the authority of the 1971
Constitutional Convention, would have this Court declare that it is "without power, under Section
1, Article XV of the Constitution and Republic Act 6132, to consider, discuss and adopt proposals
which seek to revise the present Constitution through the adoption of a form of government
other than the form now outlined in the present Constitution [the Convention being] merely
empowered to propose improvements to the present Constitution without altering the general
plan laid down therein."2 Such a plea of the utmost seriousness was sought to be compressed in a
five-page pleading. It is understandable, therefore, why the petition could hardly be characterized
as possessed of merit. Accordingly, on October 8, 1971, this Court issued a resolution dismissing
it. Then came on the last day of that month a printed thirty-two page motion for reconsideration.
It is evident that petitioners took some pains this time, although the main reliance seems to be on
a secondary authority, American Jurisprudence.3 The show of diligence is impressive but the
persuasive quality is something else. A perusal thereof yields the conclusion that petitioners are
oblivious of the authoritative precedents in this jurisdiction. The approach is not distinguished by
its conformity with the law as it stands. In this sphere as elsewhere, new cults may be eroding
considering, however, the compulsion of the ancient faiths. Considering, however, the
compulsion of the fundamental principle of separation of powers, this Court cannot exercise the
competence petitioners would erroneously assume it possesses, even assuming that they have
the requisite standing, which is the first question to be faced.
1. What calls for prior determination is whether or not petitioners had the requisite standing to
seek a declaration of the alleged nullity of a resolution of the Constitutional Convention.4 In the
categorical and succinct language of Justice Laurel: "The unchallenged rule is that the person who
impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement." 5 There has been
a relaxation of this rule. So it was announced by the present Chief Justice inPascual v. The
Secretary of Public Works.6 Thus: "Again, it is well settled that the validity of a statute may be
contested only by one who will sustain a direct injury, in consequence of its enforcement. Yet,
there are many decisions nullifying, at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the
disbursement of public funds, upon the theory that the "expenditure of public funds, by an officer
of such funds," which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer."7 Moreover, where a
constitutional question is raised, a Senator has usually been considered as possessed of the
requisite personality to bring a suit. Thus in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito,8 it was a member of the
Senate who was heard by this Court in a suit for prohibition to prevent the enforcement of the
congressional resolution proposing the parity rights amendment.9 Likewise, in the latest case in
point, Tolentino v. Commission on Elections, it was a Senator who brought action challenging the
validity of Organic Resolution No. 1 of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. He was quite sucessful
too. Petitioners in the present case cannot be heard to assert that they do qualify under such a
category.
Moreover, as far as a taxpayer's suit is concerned, Court is not devoid of discretion as to whether
or not it should be entertained. It is our view that a negative answer is indicated. Nor should
petitioners feel discriminated against just because in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 10 a
member of the Philippine Bar, now Delegate Ramon Gonzales, was allowed to prosecute his
action for prohibition instituted by him as a taxpayer. Petitioners have no cause for legitimate
resentment as such suit could be distinguished from the present.
2. Petitioner Gonzales in accordance with the controlling doctrine had the good sense to wait
before filing his suit until after the enactment of the statute 11 for the submission to the
electorate of certain proposed amendments to the Constitution. 12 It was only then that the
matter was ripe for adjudication. Prior to that stage, the judiciary had to keep its hands off. The
doctrine of separation of powers calls for the other departments being left alone to discharge
their duties as they see fit. The judiciary as Justice Laurel emphatically asserted "will neither
direct nor restrain executive [or legislative]
action ... ." 13 The legislative and executive branches are not bound to seek its advice as to what
to do or not to do. Judicial inquiry has to be postponed in the meanwhile. It is a prerequisite that
something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may
come into the picture. At such a time, it may pass on the validity of what was done but only
"when ... properly challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding."14
Such a principle applies as well when the inquiry concerns the scope of the competence lodged in
the Constitutional Convention. The judiciary must leave it free to fulfill its responsibility according
to its lights. There is to be no interference. Its autonomy is to be respected. It cannot be
otherwise if it is to perform its function well. Such should be the case not only because it is a
coordinate agency but also because its powers are transcendent, amounting as it does to
submitting for popular ratification proposals which may radically alter the organization and
functions of all three departments, including the courts. It is therefore much more imperative
that the rule of non-interference be strictly adhered to until the appropriate time comes.
1
More specifically, as long as any proposed amendment is still unacted on by it, there is no room
for the interposition of judicial oversight. Only after it has made concrete what it intends to
submit for ratification may the appropriate case be instituted. Until then, the courts are devoid of
jurisdiction. That is the command of the Constitution as interpreted by this Court. Unless and
until such a doctrine loses force by being overruled or a new precedent being announced, it is
controlling. That is implicit in the rule of law. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration cannot
therefor be sustained. WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied. No costs.
Poe vs Ullman
Primary Holding
The ripeness doctrine prevents bringing claims to challenge criminal statutes that are not
enforced.
Facts
Paul and Pauline Poe, a married couple, decided to use contraceptives to prevent a fourth
pregnancy after their first three children had died in infancy. Another woman, Jane Doe, sought
to obtain access to contraceptives in order to forestall a second pregnancy that could be life-
threatening. Since the late 1800s, Connecticut had prohibited the distribution and use of medical
advice on contraceptives, although these laws were not regularly forced.. The Poes and Doe
argued that the laws violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
Opinions
Plurality
 Felix Frankfurter (Author)
 Earl Warren
 Tom C. Clark
 Charles Evans Whittaker
Only once since 1940 had the laws giving rise to this claim been enforced. The plaintiffs in this
case have not been charged or threatened with being charged with a violation. Since there is no
immediate injury, there is no standing to confer jurisdiction.
Dissent
 William Orville Douglas (Author)
The plaintiffs should not be forced to break the law to get this vital information, even though the
statutes are not regularly enforced. Courts should not require an actual arrest or prosecution
before they review the constitutional rights at issue.
Syllabus
These are appeals from a decision of the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut affirming
dismissals of complaints in three cases in which the plaintiffs sued for declaratory judgments that
certain Connecticut statutes which prohibit the use of contraceptive devices and the giving of
medical advice on their use violate the Fourteenth Amendment by depriving the plaintiffs of life
and property without due process of law. The complaints alleged that two plaintiffs who were
married women needed medical advice on the use of such devices for the protection of their
health, but that a physician, who was the plaintiff in the third case, was deterred from giving such
advice because the State's Attorney intended to prosecute offenses against the State's laws and
he claimed that the giving of such advice and the use of such devices were forbidden by state
statutes. However, it appeared that the statutes in question had been enacted in 1879, and that
no one ever had been prosecuted thereunder except two doctors and a nurse, who were charged
with operating a birth control clinic, and that the information against them had been dismissed
after the State Supreme Court had sustained the legislation in 1940 on an appeal from a
demurrer to the information.
Held: The appeals are dismissed, because the records in these cases do not present controversies
justifying the adjudication of a constitutional issue.
US vs Richardson
There is no standing for a taxpayer bringing a generalized grievance against regulations of an
agency's accounting and reporting procedures.
Facts
Article I, Section 9, Clause 7 of the U.S. Constitution requires a public accounting of the receipts
and expenditures of public money. Richardson, a taxpayer, sought to challenge parts of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 on the grounds that it violated this clause of the
Constitution. Although he did not argue that Congress was exceeding its authority under the
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taxing and spending power in allocating its funds, he sought information from the government on Dissent
how the CIA spends its funds.
 William Joseph Brennan, Jr. (Author)
Opinions
Case Commentary
Majority
Courts would be unreasonably clogged if private citizens could bring actions based merely on the
 Warren Earl Burger (Author) government's perceived failure to follow the law. The only exception to the ban on standing for
 Byron Raymond White generalized grievances concerns the Establishment Clause.
 Harry Andrew Blackmun
 Lewis Franklin Powell, Jr. Syllabus
 William Hubbs Rehnquist
Respondent, as a federal taxpayer, brought this suit for the purpose of obtaining a declaration of
Status as a taxpayer may give rise to a claim that Congress has violated the taxing and spending unconstitutionality of the Central Intelligence Agency Act, which permits the CIA to account for its
power in allocating its funds. However, there is no connection between taxpayer status and any expenditures "solely on the certificate of the Director. . . ." 50 U.S.C. § 403j(b). The complaint
lack of disclosure of the CIA's expenditures. This claim is simply a generalized grievance about the alleged that the Act violated Art. I, § 9, cl. 7, of the Constitution insofar as that clause requires a
way that the government is going about its business. Every individual in the nation would suffer a regular statement and account of public funds. The District Court's dismissal of the complaint
similar type of harm if Congress withholds this information, so the standing requirement of for, inter alia, respondent's lack of standing under Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, was reversed by
showing a particular injury has not been met. He must use the political system to address his the Court of Appeals. That court held that respondent had standing as a taxpayer on the ground
concerns. that he satisfied Flast's requirements that the allegations (1) challenge an enactment under the
Taxing and Spending Clause of Art I, § 8, and show (2) a "nexus" between the plaintiff's status and
Dissent a specific constitutional limitation on the taxing and spending power.

 Potter Stewart (Author)
 Thurgood Marshall
This claim is based on a plaintiff's pursuit of a judicial decision that the defendant owes him a
duty. He argues that Congress has a duty to provide him, as a citizen, with an accounting of how it
is allocating public funds. The judicial system is the proper place to determine whether such a
duty exists.
Held: Respondent lacks standing to maintain this suit. Pp. 418 U. S. 171-180.
(a) Flast, which stressed the need for meeting the requirements of Art. III, did not
"undermine the salutary principle . . . established by Frothingham \[v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447] . . .
that a taxpayer may not 'employ a federal court as a forum in which to air his generalized
grievances about the conduct of government or the allocation of power in the Federal System.'"

Concurrence (b) Respondent's challenge, not being addressed to the taxing or spending power, but to the
statutes regulating the CIA's accounting and reporting procedures, provides no "logical nexus"
 Lewis Franklin Powell, Jr. (Author) between his status as "taxpayer" and the asserted failure of Congress to require more detailed
reports of expenditures of the CIA. Pp. 418 U. S. 174-175.
Dissent
(c) Respondent's claim that, without detailed information on the CIA's expenditures, he cannot
 William Orville Douglas (Author) properly follow legislative or executive action, and thereby fulfill his obligations as a voter, is a

3
generalized grievance insufficient under Frothingham or Flast to show that "he has sustained or is
immediately in danger of sustaining direct injury as the result" of such action. Ex parte Levitt, 302
U.S. 633, 634. Pp. 418 U. S. 176-178.
Lacson vs. Perez
Facts: On 01 May 2001, Gloria Arroyo, faced by an angry and violent mob armed with deadly
weapons assaulting and attempting to break into Malacaang, issued Proclamation No. 38
declaring that there was a state of rebellion in the National Capital Region. She likewise issued
General Order No. 1 directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National
Police to suppress the rebellion in the National Capital Region. Warrantless arrests of several
alleged leaders and promoters of the rebellion were thereafter effected. On 06 May 2001 she
ordered the lifting of the declaration of a state of rebellion in Metro Manila. Petitioners, Panfilo
Lacson, Cezar Mancao and Michael Rey Aquino filed with an urgent application for the issuance
of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction and Miriam Santiago filed
mandamus and/or review of the factual basis for the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, with prayer for a temporary restraining order. The petitions assail the
declaration of a state of rebellion by Gloria Arroyo and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected
by virtue thereof, as having no basis both in fact an in law.
Issue: Whether or not the Proclamation No 38 and General Order No 1 are constitutional.
Decision: Petitions are dismissed. The instant petitions have been rendered moot and academic
as Gloria Arroyo ordered the lifting of the declaration of a state of rebellion on 06 May 2001.
SANLAKAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (2004)
FACTS:
During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers and enlisted men of
the AFP, acting upon instigation, command and direction of known and unknown leaders have
seized the Oakwood Building in Makati. Publicly, they complained of the corruption in the AFP
and declared their withdrawal of support for the government, demanding the resignation of the
President, Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief. These acts constitute a violation of Article 134
of the Revised Penal Code, and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, the
Philippines was declared under the State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the officers
went back to their barracks in the evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003, both the
Proclamation and General Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessation
of the State of Rebellion was issued.
ISSUE:
Whether Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional?
HELD:
The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are
constitutional. Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state or rebellion. The
President in addition to its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the Constitution
executive powers. It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call out the
armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. While the Court may
examine whether the power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting
grave abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their
assertion that the President acted without factual basis.
In declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, the President was merely
exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely
executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the
delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI. The fear on warrantless
arrest is unreasonable, since any person may be subject to this whether there is rebellion or not
as this is a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and as long as a valid warrantless
arrest is present.
Defunis vs. Odegaard
Primary Holding
Mootness ends a case when the parties no longer have opposing legal interests or any concrete
or definite controversy between them.
Facts
DeFunis was denied admission at the University of Washington Law School, a state-operated
institution. He sued a state education official, Odegaard, as well as the law school admissions
committee on the basis that it had violated the Equal Protection Clause because its policies and
procedures had resulted in discrimination against him because of his race. He sought a
mandatory injunction from the trial court that would compel Odegaard to grant him admission
into the first-year law school class because his application had been unconstitutionally denied. He
prevailed in the lower court and was admitted to the law school, pending Odegaard's appeal. The
state Supreme Court eventually ruled that the law school admissions policy was constitutional.
DeFunis received a writ of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court, which stayed the judgment of
4
the Washington Supreme Court until the U.S. Supreme Court had resolved the case. DeFunis was
already in his third and final year of law school when the Court granted his petition.
Opinions
Per Curiam
No matter the decision that the Court might eventually reach on the constitutionality of the
admissions policy, the student will complete his law school program at the end of the current
term, for which he has already registered. This factual situation makes the case moot, and Article
III prevents the Court from reviewing the substantive constitutional questions associated with it.
Dissent
 William Orville Douglas (Author)
It is important to resolve these issues on their merits, so the case should not be deemed to be
moot.
Dissent
 William Joseph Brennan, Jr. (Author)
It is possible that the student might not graduate after this term because of illness or another
unforeseen development. The case thus should not be deemed moot. Moreover, the voluntary
cessation of illegal conduct does not allow a party to cite this doctrine. The same issue could arise
again with another applicant of the same race to whom the school applies the same policy, and
the public interest would be served by a judicial resolution of these issues that forestalls
duplicative litigation. It is inevitable that another similar case will arise in the future, and the
record does not require a finding of mootness. The principle of avoiding constitutional questions
when possible does not equate to avoidance of all potentially challenging issues.
Case Commentary
Mootness is the opposite of ripeness in a sense, since it applies to dismiss a case when the issues
have been resolved rather than when they are not yet ready to be resolved.
Syllabus
After being denied admission to a state-operated law school, petitioner brought this suit on
behalf of himself alone for injunctive relief, claiming that the school's admissions policy racially
discriminated against him in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The trial court agreed and ordered the school to admit him in the fall of 1971. The
Washington Supreme Court reversed, holding that the school's admissions policy was not
unconstitutional. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, as Circuit Justice, stayed that judgment pending this
Court's final disposition of the case, with the result that petitioner was in his final school year
when this Court considered his petition for certiorari. After oral argument, the Court was
informed that petitioner had registered for his final quarter. Respondents have assured the Court
that this registration is fully effective regardless of the ultimate disposition of the case.
Held: Because petitioner will complete law school at the end of the term for which he has
registered regardless of any decision this Court might reach on the merits, the Court cannot,
consistently with the limitations of Art. III of the Constitution, consider the substantive
constitutional issues, and the case is moot.
(a) Mootness here does not depend upon a "voluntary cessation" of the school's admissions
practices, but upon the simple fact that petitioner is in his final term, and the school's fixed policy
to permit him to complete the term.
(b) The case presents no question that is "capable of repetition, yet evading review," since
petitioner will never again have to go through the school's admissions process, and since it does
not follow that the issue petitioner raises will in the future evade review merely because this case
did not reach the Court until the eve of petitioner's graduation.
EL BANCO ESPAÑOL-FILIPINO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
VICENTE PALANCA, administrator of the estate of Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng, defendant-
appellant.
STREET, J.:
This action was instituted upon March 31, 1908, by "El Banco Espanol-Filipino" to foreclose a
mortgage upon various parcels of real property situated in the city of Manila. The mortgage in
question is dated June 16, 1906, and was executed by the original defendant herein, Engracio
Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco, as security for a debt owing by him to the bank. Upon March
5
31, 1906, the debt amounted to P218,294.10 and was drawing interest at the rate of 8 per
centum per annum, payable at the end of each quarter. It appears that the parties to this
mortgage at that time estimated the value of the property in question at P292,558, which was
about P75,000 in excess of the indebtedness. After the execution of this instrument by the
mortgagor, he returned to China which appears to have been his native country; and he there
died, upon January 29, 1810, without again returning to the Philippine Islands.
As the defendant was a nonresident at the time of the institution of the present action, it was
necessary for the plaintiff in the foreclosure proceeding to give notice to the defendant by
publication pursuant to section 399 of the Code of Civil Procedure. An order for publication was
accordingly obtained from the court, and publication was made in due form in a newspaper of
the city of Manila. At the same time that the order of the court should deposit in the post office
in a stamped envelope a copy of the summons and complaint directed to the defendant at his last
place of residence, to wit, the city of Amoy, in the Empire of China. This order was made pursuant
to the following provision contained in section 399 of the Code of Civil Procedure:
In case of publication, where the residence of a nonresident or absent defendant is
known, the judge must direct a copy of the summons and complaint to be forthwith
deposited by the clerk in the post-office, postage prepaid, directed to the person to be
served, at his place of residence
Whether the clerk complied with this order does not affirmatively appear. There is, however,
among the papers pertaining to this case, an affidavit, dated April 4, 1908, signed by Bernardo
Chan y Garcia, an employee of the attorneys of the bank, showing that upon that date he had
deposited in the Manila post-office a registered letter, addressed to Engracio Palanca
Tanquinyeng, at Manila, containing copies of the complaint, the plaintiff's affidavit, the summons,
and the order of the court directing publication as aforesaid. It appears from the postmaster's
receipt that Bernardo probably used an envelope obtained from the clerk's office, as the receipt
purports to show that the letter emanated from the office.
The cause proceeded in usual course in the Court of First Instance; and the defendant not having
appeared, judgment was, upon July 2, 1908, taken against him by default. Upon July 3, 1908, a
decision was rendered in favor of the plaintiff. In this decision it was recited that publication had
been properly made in a periodical, but nothing was said about this notice having been given
mail. The court, upon this occasion, found that the indebtedness of the defendant amounted to
P249,355. 32, with interest from March 31, 1908. Accordingly it was ordered that the defendant
should, on or before July 6, 1908, deliver said amount to the clerk of the court to be applied to
the satisfaction of the judgment, and it was declared that in case of the failure of the defendant
to satisfy the judgment within such period, the mortgage property located in the city of Manila
should be exposed to public sale. The payment contemplated in said order was never made; and
upon July 8, 1908, the court ordered the sale of the property. The sale took place upon July 30,
1908, and the property was bought in by the bank for the sum of P110,200. Upon August 7, 1908,
this sale was confirmed by the court.
About seven years after the confirmation of this sale, or to the precise, upon June 25, 1915, a
motion was made in this cause by Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the estate of the original
defendant, Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco, wherein the applicant requested the
court to set aside the order of default of July 2, 1908, and the judgment rendered upon July 3,
1908, and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto. The basis of this application, as set
forth in the motion itself, was that the order of default and the judgment rendered thereon were
void because the court had never acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of
the action.
At the hearing in the court below the application to vacate the judgment was denied, and from
this action of the court Vicente Planca, as administrator of the estate of the original defendant,
has appealed. No other feature of the case is here under consideration than such as related to
the action of the court upon said motion.
The case presents several questions of importance, which will be discussed in what appears to be
the sequence of most convenient development. In the first part of this opinion we shall, for the
purpose of argument, assume that the clerk of the Court of First Instance did not obey the order
of the court in the matter of mailing the papers which he was directed to send to the defendant
in Amoy; and in this connection we shall consider, first, whether the court acquired the necessary
jurisdiction to enable it to proceed with the foreclosure of the mortgage and, secondly, whether
those proceedings were conducted in such manner as to constitute due process of law.
The word "jurisdiction," as applied to the faculty of exercising judicial power, is used in several
different, though related, senses since it may have reference (1) to the authority of the court to
entertain a particular kind of action or to administer a particular kind of relief, or it may refer to
the power of the court over the parties, or (2) over the property which is the subject to the
litigation.
The sovereign authority which organizes a court determines the nature and extent of its powers
in general and thus fixes its competency or jurisdiction with reference to the actions which it may
entertain and the relief it may grant.
6
Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the voluntary appearance of a party in court and his
submission to its authority, or it is acquired by the coercive power of legal process exerted over
the person.
Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either from a
seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the
law, or it may result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of
law, the power of the court over the property is recognized and made effective. In the latter case
the property, though at all times within the potential power of the court, may never be taken into
actual custody at all. An illustration of the jurisdiction acquired by actual seizure is found in
attachment proceedings, where the property is seized at the beginning of the action, or some
subsequent stage of its progress, and held to abide the final event of the litigation. An illustration
of what we term potential jurisdiction over the res, is found in the proceeding to register the title
of land under our system for the registration of land. Here the court, without taking actual
physical control over the property assumes, at the instance of some person claiming to be owner,
to exercise a jurisdiction in rem over the property and to adjudicate the title in favor of the
petitioner against all the world.
In the terminology of American law the action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding
quasi in rem, by which is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an action in
rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially such. The expression "action in rem" is, in
its narrow application, used only with reference to certain proceedings in courts of admiralty
wherein the property alone is treated as responsible for the claim or obligation upon which the
proceedings are based. The action quasi rem differs from the true action in rem in the
circumstance that in the former an individual is named as defendant, and the purpose of the
proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property. All
proceedings having for their sole object the sale or other disposition of the property of the
defendant, whether by attachment, foreclosure, or other form of remedy, are in a general way
thus designated. The judgment entered in these proceedings is conclusive only between the
parties.
In speaking of the proceeding to foreclose a mortgage the author of a well known treaties, has
said:
Though nominally against person, such suits are to vindicate liens; they proceed upon
seizure; they treat property as primarily indebted; and, with the qualification above-
mentioned, they are substantially property actions. In the civil law, they are styled
hypothecary actions, and their sole object is the enforcement of the lien against the res;
in the common law, they would be different in chancery did not treat the conditional
conveyance as a mere hypothecation, and the creditor's right ass an equitable lien; so,
in both, the suit is real action so far as it is against property, and seeks the judicial
recognition of a property debt, and an order for the sale of the res. (Waples,
Proceedings In Rem. sec. 607.)
It is true that in proceedings of this character, if the defendant for whom publication is made
appears, the action becomes as to him a personal action and is conducted as such. This, however,
does not affect the proposition that where the defendant fails to appear the action is quasi in
rem; and it should therefore be considered with reference to the principles governing actions in
rem.
There is an instructive analogy between the foreclosure proceeding and an action of attachment,
concerning which the Supreme Court of the United States has used the following language:
If the defendant appears, the cause becomes mainly a suit in personam, with the added
incident, that the property attached remains liable, under the control of the court, to
answer to any demand which may be established against the defendant by the final
judgment of the court. But, if there is no appearance of the defendant, and no service of
process on him, the case becomes, in its essential nature, a proceeding in rem, the only
effect of which is to subject the property attached to the payment of the defendant
which the court may find to be due to the plaintiff. (Cooper vs. Reynolds, 10 Wall., 308.)
In an ordinary attachment proceeding, if the defendant is not personally served, the preliminary
seizure is to, be considered necessary in order to confer jurisdiction upon the court. In this case
the lien on the property is acquired by the seizure; and the purpose of the proceedings is to
subject the property to that lien. If a lien already exists, whether created by mortgage, contract,
or statute, the preliminary seizure is not necessary; and the court proceeds to enforce such lien in
the manner provided by law precisely as though the property had been seized upon attachment.
(Roller vs. Holly, 176 U. S., 398, 405; 44 L. ed., 520.) It results that the mere circumstance that in
an attachment the property may be seized at the inception of the proceedings, while in the
foreclosure suit it is not taken into legal custody until the time comes for the sale, does not
materially affect the fundamental principle involved in both cases, which is that the court is here
exercising a jurisdiction over the property in a proceeding directed essentially in rem.
Passing now to a consideration of the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance in a mortgage
foreclosure, it is evident that the court derives its authority to entertain the action primarily from
the statutes organizing the court. The jurisdiction of the court, in this most general sense, over
the cause of action is obvious and requires no comment. Jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant, if acquired at all in such an action, is obtained by the voluntary submission of the
7
defendant or by the personal service of process upon him within the territory where the process
is valid. If, however, the defendant is a nonresident and, remaining beyond the range of the
personal process of the court, refuses to come in voluntarily, the court never acquires jurisdiction
over the person at all. Here the property itself is in fact the sole thing which is impleaded and is
the responsible object which is the subject of the exercise of judicial power. It follows that the
jurisdiction of the court in such case is based exclusively on the power which, under the law, it
possesses over the property; and any discussion relative to the jurisdiction of the court over the
person of the defendant is entirely apart from the case. The jurisdiction of the court over the
property, considered as the exclusive object of such action, is evidently based upon the following
conditions and considerations, namely: (1) that the property is located within the district; (2) that
the purpose of the litigation is to subject the property by sale to an obligation fixed upon it by the
mortgage; and (3) that the court at a proper stage of the proceedings takes the property into
custody, if necessary, and expose it to sale for the purpose of satisfying the mortgage debt. An
obvious corollary is that no other relief can be granted in this proceeding than such as can be
enforced against the property.
We may then, from what has been stated, formulated the following proposition relative to the
foreclosure proceeding against the property of a nonresident mortgagor who fails to come in and
submit himself personally to the jurisdiction of the court: (I) That the jurisdiction of the court is
derived from the power which it possesses over the property; (II) that jurisdiction over the person
is not acquired and is nonessential; (III) that the relief granted by the court must be limited to
such as can be enforced against the property itself.
It is important that the bearing of these propositions be clearly apprehended, for there are many
expressions in the American reports from which it might be inferred that the court acquires
personal jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by publication and notice; but such is not
the case. In truth the proposition that jurisdiction over the person of a nonresident cannot be
acquired by publication and notice was never clearly understood even in the American courts
until after the decision had been rendered by the Supreme Court of the United States in the
leading case of Pennoyer vs. Neff (95 U. S. 714; 24 L. ed., 565). In the light of that decision, and of
other decisions which have subsequently been rendered in that and other courts, the proposition
that jurisdiction over the person cannot be thus acquired by publication and notice is no longer
open to question; and it is now fully established that a personal judgment upon constructive or
substituted service against a nonresident who does not appear is wholly invalid. This doctrine
applies to all kinds of constructive or substituted process, including service by publication and
personal service outside of the jurisdiction in which the judgment is rendered; and the only
exception seems to be found in the case where the nonresident defendant has expressly or
impliedly consented to the mode of service. (Note to Raher vs. Raher, 35 L. R. A. [N. S. ], 292; see
also 50 L .R. A., 585; 35 L. R. A. [N. S.], 312
The idea upon which the decision in Pennoyer vs. Neff (supra) proceeds is that the process from
the tribunals of one State cannot run into other States or countries and that due process of law
requires that the defendant shall be brought under the power of the court by service of process
within the State, or by his voluntary appearance, in order to authorize the court to pass upon the
question of his personal liability. The doctrine established by the Supreme Court of the United
States on this point, being based upon the constitutional conception of due process of law, is
binding upon the courts of the Philippine Islands. Involved in this decision is the principle that in
proceedings in rem or quasi in rem against a nonresident who is not served personally within the
state, and who does not appear, the relief must be confined to the res, and the court cannot
lawfully render a personal judgment against him. (Dewey vs. Des Moines, 173 U. S., 193; 43 L. ed.,
665; Heidritter vs. Elizabeth Oil Cloth Co., 112 U. S., 294; 28 L. ed., 729.) Therefore in an action to
foreclose a mortgage against a nonresident, upon whom service has been effected exclusively by
publication, no personal judgment for the deficiency can be entered. (Latta vs. Tutton, 122 Cal.,
279; Blumberg vs. Birch, 99 Cal., 416.)
It is suggested in the brief of the appellant that the judgment entered in the court below offends
against the principle just stated and that this judgment is void because the court in fact entered a
personal judgment against the absent debtor for the full amount of the indebtedness secured by
the mortgage. We do not so interpret the judgment.
In a foreclosure proceeding against a nonresident owner it is necessary for the court, as in all
cases of foreclosure, to ascertain the amount due, as prescribed in section 256 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, and to make an order requiring the defendant to pay the money into court. This
step is a necessary precursor of the order of sale. In the present case the judgment which was
entered contains the following words:
Because it is declared that the said defendant Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y
Limquingco, is indebted in the amount of P249,355.32, plus the interest, to the 'Banco
Espanol-Filipino' . . . therefore said appellant is ordered to deliver the above amount
etc., etc.
This is not the language of a personal judgment. Instead it is clearly intended merely as a
compliance with the requirement that the amount due shall be ascertained and that the evidence
of this it may be observed that according to the Code of Civil Procedure a personal judgment
against the debtor for the deficiency is not to be rendered until after the property has been sold
and the proceeds applied to the mortgage debt. (sec. 260).
The conclusion upon this phase of the case is that whatever may be the effect in other respects of
the failure of the clerk of the Court of First Instance to mail the proper papers to the defendant in
8
Amoy, China, such irregularity could in no wise impair or defeat the jurisdiction of the court, for in
our opinion that jurisdiction rest upon a basis much more secure than would be supplied by any
form of notice that could be given to a resident of a foreign country.
Before leaving this branch of the case, we wish to observe that we are fully aware that many
reported cases can be cited in which it is assumed that the question of the sufficiency of
publication or notice in a case of this kind is a question affecting the jurisdiction of the court, and
the court is sometimes said to acquire jurisdiction by virtue of the publication. This phraseology
was undoubtedly originally adopted by the court because of the analogy between service by the
publication and personal service of process upon the defendant; and, as has already been
suggested, prior to the decision of Pennoyer vs. Neff (supra) the difference between the legal
effects of the two forms of service was obscure. It is accordingly not surprising that the modes of
expression which had already been molded into legal tradition before that case was decided have
been brought down to the present day. But it is clear that the legal principle here involved is not
effected by the peculiar language in which the courts have expounded their ideas.
We now proceed to a discussion of the question whether the supposed irregularity in the
proceedings was of such gravity as to amount to a denial of that "due process of law" which was
secured by the Act of Congress in force in these Islands at the time this mortgage was foreclosed.
(Act of July 1, 1902, sec. 5.) In dealing with questions involving the application of the
constitutional provisions relating to due process of law the Supreme Court of the United States
has refrained from attempting to define with precision the meaning of that expression, the
reason being that the idea expressed therein is applicable under so many diverse conditions as to
make any attempt ay precise definition hazardous and unprofitable. As applied to a judicial
proceeding, however, it may be laid down with certainty that the requirement of due process is
satisfied if the following conditions are present, namely; (1) There must be a court or tribunal
clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must be
lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property which is the subject of
the proceeding; (3) the defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and (4) judgment
must be rendered upon lawful hearing.
Passing at once to the requisite that the defendant shall have an opportunity to be heard, we
observe that in a foreclosure case some notification of the proceedings to the nonresident owner,
prescribing the time within which appearance must be made, is everywhere recognized as
essential. To answer this necessity the statutes generally provide for publication, and usually in
addition thereto, for the mailing of notice to the defendant, if his residence is known. Though
commonly called constructive, or substituted service of process in any true sense. It is merely a
means provided by law whereby the owner may be admonished that his property is the subject of
judicial proceedings and that it is incumbent upon him to take such steps as he sees fit to protect
it. In speaking of notice of this character a distinguish master of constitutional law has used the
following language:
. . . if the owners are named in the proceedings, and personal notice is provided for, it is
rather from tenderness to their interests, and in order to make sure that the
opportunity for a hearing shall not be lost to them, than from any necessity that the
case shall assume that form. (Cooley on Taxation [2d. ed.], 527, quoted in Leigh vs.
Green, 193 U. S., 79, 80.)
It will be observed that this mode of notification does not involve any absolute assurance that the
absent owner shall thereby receive actual notice. The periodical containing the publication may
never in fact come to his hands, and the chances that he should discover the notice may often be
very slight. Even where notice is sent by mail the probability of his receiving it, though much
increased, is dependent upon the correctness of the address to which it is forwarded as well as
upon the regularity and security of the mail service. It will be noted, furthermore, that the
provision of our law relative to the mailing of notice does not absolutely require the mailing of
notice unconditionally and in every event, but only in the case where the defendant's residence is
known. In the light of all these facts, it is evident that actual notice to the defendant in cases of
this kind is not, under the law, to be considered absolutely necessary.
The idea upon which the law proceeds in recognizing the efficacy of a means of notification which
may fall short of actual notice is apparently this: Property is always assumed to be in the
possession of its owner, in person or by agent; and he may be safely held, under certain
conditions, to be affected with knowledge that proceedings have been instituted for its
condemnation and sale.
It is the duty of the owner of real estate, who is a nonresident, to take measures that in
some way he shall be represented when his property is called into requisition, and if he
fails to do this, and fails to get notice by the ordinary publications which have usually
been required in such cases, it is his misfortune, and he must abide the consequences.
(6 R. C. L., sec. 445 [p. 450]).
It has been well said by an American court:
If property of a nonresident cannot be reached by legal process upon the constructive
notice, then our statutes were passed in vain, and are mere empty legislative
declarations, without either force, or meaning; for if the person is not within the
jurisdiction of the court, no personal judgment can be rendered, and if the judgment
cannot operate upon the property, then no effective judgment at all can be rendered, so
9
 that the result would be that the courts would be powerless to assist a citizen against a
nonresident. Such a result would be a deplorable one. (Quarl vs. Abbett, 102 Ind., 233;
52 Am. Rep., 662, 667.)
It is, of course universally recognized that the statutory provisions relative to publication or other
form of notice against a nonresident owner should be complied with; and in respect to the
publication of notice in the newspaper it may be stated that strict compliance with the
requirements of the law has been held to be essential. In Guaranty Trust etc. Co. vs. Green Cove
etc., Railroad Co. (139 U. S., 137, 138), it was held that where newspaper publication was made
for 19 weeks, when the statute required 20, the publication was insufficient.
With respect to the provisions of our own statute, relative to the sending of notice by mail, the
requirement is that the judge shall direct that the notice be deposited in the mail by the clerk of
the court, and it is not in terms declared that the notice must be deposited in the mail. We
consider this to be of some significance; and it seems to us that, having due regard to the
principles upon which the giving of such notice is required, the absent owner of the mortgaged
property must, so far as the due process of law is concerned, take the risk incident to the possible
failure of the clerk to perform his duty, somewhat as he takes the risk that the mail clerk or the
mail carrier might possibly lose or destroy the parcel or envelope containing the notice before it
should reach its destination and be delivered to him. This idea seems to be strengthened by the
consideration that placing upon the clerk the duty of sending notice by mail, the performance of
that act is put effectually beyond the control of the plaintiff in the litigation. At any rate it is
obvious that so much of section 399 of the Code of Civil Procedure as relates to the sending of
notice by mail was complied with when the court made the order. The question as to what may
be the consequences of the failure of the record to show the proof of compliance with that
requirement will be discussed by us further on.
The observations which have just been made lead to the conclusion that the failure of the clerk to
mail the notice, if in fact he did so fail in his duty, is not such an irregularity, as amounts to a
denial of due process of law; and hence in our opinion that irregularity, if proved, would not avoid
the judgment in this case. Notice was given by publication in a newspaper and this is the only
form of notice which the law unconditionally requires. This in our opinion is all that was
absolutely necessary to sustain the proceedings.
It will be observed that in considering the effect of this irregularity, it makes a difference whether
it be viewed as a question involving jurisdiction or as a question involving due process of law. In
the matter of jurisdiction there can be no distinction between the much and the little. The court
either has jurisdiction or it has not; and if the requirement as to the mailing of notice should be
considered as a step antecedent to the acquiring of jurisdiction, there could be no escape from
the conclusion that the failure to take that step was fatal to the validity of the judgment. In the
application of the idea of due process of law, on the other hand, it is clearly unnecessary to be so
rigorous. The jurisdiction being once established, all that due process of law thereafter requires is
an opportunity for the defendant to be heard; and as publication was duly made in the
newspaper, it would seem highly unreasonable to hold that failure to mail the notice was fatal.
We think that in applying the requirement of due process of law, it is permissible to reflect upon
the purposes of the provision which is supposed to have been violated and the principle
underlying the exercise of judicial power in these proceedings. Judge in the light of these
conceptions, we think that the provision of Act of Congress declaring that no person shall be
deprived of his property without due process of law has not been infringed.
In the progress of this discussion we have stated the two conclusions; (1) that the failure of the
clerk to send the notice to the defendant by mail did not destroy the jurisdiction of the court and
(2) that such irregularity did not infringe the requirement of due process of law. As a
consequence of these conclusions the irregularity in question is in some measure shorn of its
potency. It is still necessary, however, to consider its effect considered as a simple irregularity of
procedure; and it would be idle to pretend that even in this aspect the irregularity is not grave
enough. From this point of view, however, it is obvious that any motion to vacate the judgment
on the ground of the irregularity in question must fail unless it shows that the defendant was
prejudiced by that irregularity. The least, therefore, that can be required of the proponent of
such a motion is to show that he had a good defense against the action to foreclose the
mortgage. Nothing of the kind is, however, shown either in the motion or in the affidavit which
accompanies the motion.
An application to open or vacate a judgment because of an irregularity or defect in the
proceedings is usually required to be supported by an affidavit showing the grounds on which the
relief is sought, and in addition to this showing also a meritorious defense to the action. It is held
that a general statement that a party has a good defense to the action is insufficient. The
necessary facts must be averred. Of course if a judgment is void upon its face a showing of the
existence of a meritorious defense is not necessary. (10 R. C. L., 718.)
The lapse of time is also a circumstance deeply affecting this aspect of the case. In this connection
we quote the following passage from the encyclopedic treatise now in course of publication:
Where, however, the judgment is not void on its face, and may therefore be enforced if
permitted to stand on the record, courts in many instances refuse to exercise their quasi
equitable powers to vacate a judgement after the lapse of the term ay which it was
entered, except in clear cases, to promote the ends of justice, and where it appears that
the party making the application is himself without fault and has acted in good faith and
10
 with ordinary diligence. Laches on the part of the applicant, if unexplained, is deemed
sufficient ground for refusing the relief to which he might otherwise be entitled.
Something is due to the finality of judgments, and acquiescence or unnecessary delay is
fatal to motions of this character, since courts are always reluctant to interfere with
judgments, and especially where they have been executed or satisfied. The moving
party has the burden of showing diligence, and unless it is shown affirmatively the court
will not ordinarily exercise its discretion in his favor. (15 R. C. L., 694, 695.)
It is stated in the affidavit that the defendant, Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco, died
January 29, 1910. The mortgage under which the property was sold was executed far back in
1906; and the proceedings in the foreclosure were closed by the order of court confirming the
sale dated August 7, 1908. It passes the rational bounds of human credulity to suppose that a
man who had placed a mortgage upon property worth nearly P300,000 and had then gone away
from the scene of his life activities to end his days in the city of Amoy, China, should have long
remained in ignorance of the fact that the mortgage had been foreclosed and the property sold,
even supposing that he had no knowledge of those proceedings while they were being
conducted. It is more in keeping with the ordinary course of things that he should have acquired
information as to what was transpiring in his affairs at Manila; and upon the basis of this rational
assumption we are authorized, in the absence of proof to the contrary, to presume that he did
have, or soon acquired, information as to the sale of his property.
The Code of Civil Procedure, indeed, expressly declares that there is a presumption that things
have happened according to the ordinary habits of life (sec. 334 [26]); and we cannot conceive of
a situation more appropriate than this for applying the presumption thus defined by the lawgiver.
In support of this presumption, as applied to the present case, it is permissible to consider the
probability that the defendant may have received actual notice of these proceedings from the
unofficial notice addressed to him in Manila which was mailed by an employee of the bank's
attorneys. Adopting almost the exact words used by the Supreme Court of the United States in
Grannis vs. Ordeans (234 U. S., 385; 58 L. ed., 1363), we may say that in view of the well-known
skill of postal officials and employees in making proper delivery of letters defectively addressed,
we think the presumption is clear and strong that this notice reached the defendant, there being
no proof that it was ever returned by the postal officials as undelivered. And if it was delivered in
Manila, instead of being forwarded to Amoy, China, there is a probability that the recipient was a
person sufficiently interested in his affairs to send it or communicate its contents to him.
Of course if the jurisdiction of the court or the sufficiency of the process of law depended upon
the mailing of the notice by the clerk, the reflections in which we are now indulging would be idle
and frivolous; but the considerations mentioned are introduced in order to show the propriety of
applying to this situation the legal presumption to which allusion has been made. Upon that
presumption, supported by the circumstances of this case, ,we do not hesitate to found the
conclusion that the defendant voluntarily abandoned all thought of saving his property from the
obligation which he had placed upon it; that knowledge of the proceedings should be imputed to
him; and that he acquiesced in the consequences of those proceedings after they had been
accomplished. Under these circumstances it is clear that the merit of this motion is, as we have
already stated, adversely affected in a high degree by the delay in asking for relief. Nor is it an
adequate reply to say that the proponent of this motion is an administrator who only qualified a
few months before this motion was made. No disability on the part of the defendant himself
existed from the time when the foreclosure was effected until his death; and we believe that the
delay in the appointment of the administrator and institution of this action is a circumstance
which is imputable to the parties in interest whoever they may have been. Of course if the minor
heirs had instituted an action in their own right to recover the property, it would have been
different.
It is, however, argued that the defendant has suffered prejudice by reason of the fact that the
bank became the purchaser of the property at the foreclosure sale for a price greatly below that
which had been agreed upon in the mortgage as the upset price of the property. In this
connection, it appears that in article nine of the mortgage which was the subject of this
foreclosure, as amended by the notarial document of July 19, 1906, the parties to this mortgage
made a stipulation to the effect that the value therein placed upon the mortgaged properties
should serve as a basis of sale in case the debt should remain unpaid and the bank should
proceed to a foreclosure. The upset price stated in that stipulation for all the parcels involved in
this foreclosure was P286,000. It is said in behalf of the appellant that when the bank bought in
the property for the sum of P110,200 it violated that stipulation.
It has been held by this court that a clause in a mortgage providing for a tipo, or upset price, does
not prevent a foreclosure, nor affect the validity of a sale made in the foreclosure proceedings.
(Yangco vs. Cruz Herrera and Wy Piaco, 11 Phil. Rep., 402; Banco-Español Filipino vs. Donaldson,
Sim and Co., 5 Phil. Rep., 418.) In both the cases here cited the property was purchased at the
foreclosure sale, not by the creditor or mortgagee, but by a third party. Whether the same rule
should be applied in a case where the mortgagee himself becomes the purchaser has apparently
not been decided by this court in any reported decision, and this question need not here be
considered, since it is evident that if any liability was incurred by the bank by purchasing for a
price below that fixed in the stipulation, its liability was a personal liability derived from the
contract of mortgage; and as we have already demonstrated such a liability could not be the
subject of adjudication in an action where the court had no jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant. If the plaintiff bank became liable to account for the difference between the upset
price and the price at which in bought in the property, that liability remains unaffected by the
disposition which the court made of this case; and the fact that the bank may have violated such
11
an obligation can in no wise affect the validity of the judgment entered in the Court of First
Instance.
In connection with the entire failure of the motion to show either a meritorious defense to the
action or that the defendant had suffered any prejudice of which the law can take notice, we may
be permitted to add that in our opinion a motion of this kind, which proposes to unsettle judicial
proceedings long ago closed, can not be considered with favor, unless based upon grounds which
appeal to the conscience of the court. Public policy requires that judicial proceedings be upheld.
The maximum here applicable is non quieta movere. As was once said by Judge Brewer,
afterwards a member of the Supreme Court of the United States:
Public policy requires that judicial proceedings be upheld, and that titles obtained in
those proceedings be safe from the ruthless hand of collateral attack. If technical
defects are adjudged potent to destroy such titles, a judicial sale will never realize that
value of the property, for no prudent man will risk his money in bidding for and buying
that title which he has reason to fear may years thereafter be swept away through some
occult and not readily discoverable defect. (Martin vs. Pond, 30 Fed., 15.)
In the case where that language was used an attempt was made to annul certain foreclosure
proceedings on the ground that the affidavit upon which the order of publication was based
erroneously stated that the State of Kansas, when he was in fact residing in another State. It was
held that this mistake did not affect the validity of the proceedings.
In the preceding discussion we have assumed that the clerk failed to send the notice by post as
required by the order of the court. We now proceed to consider whether this is a proper
assumption; and the proposition which we propose to establish is that there is a legal
presumption that the clerk performed his duty as the ministerial officer of the court, which
presumption is not overcome by any other facts appearing in the cause.
In subsection 14 of section 334 of the Code of Civil Procedure it is declared that there is a
presumption "that official duty has been regularly performed;" and in subsection 18 it is declared
that there is a presumption "that the ordinary course of business has been followed." These
presumptions are of course in no sense novelties, as they express ideas which have always been
recognized. Omnia presumuntur rite et solemniter esse acta donec probetur in contrarium. There
is therefore clearly a legal presumption that the clerk performed his duty about mailing this
notice; and we think that strong considerations of policy require that this presumption should be
allowed to operate with full force under the circumstances of this case. A party to an action has
no control over the clerk of the court; and has no right to meddle unduly with the business of the
clerk in the performance of his duties. Having no control over this officer, the litigant must
depend upon the court to see that the duties imposed on the clerk are performed.
Other considerations no less potent contribute to strengthen the conclusion just stated. There is
no principle of law better settled than that after jurisdiction has once been required, every act of
a court of general jurisdiction shall be presumed to have been rightly done. This rule is applied to
every judgment or decree rendered in the various stages of the proceedings from their initiation
to their completion (Voorhees vs. United States Bank, 10 Pet., 314; 35 U. S., 449); and if the
record is silent with respect to any fact which must have been established before the court could
have rightly acted, it will be presumed that such fact was properly brought to its knowledge. (The
Lessee of Grignon vs. Astor, 2 How., 319; 11 L. ed., 283.)
In making the order of sale [of the real state of a decedent] the court are presumed to
have adjudged every question necessary to justify such order or decree, viz: The death
of the owners; that the petitioners were his administrators; that the personal estate was
insufficient to pay the debts of the deceased; that the private acts of Assembly, as to the
manner of sale, were within the constitutional power of the Legislature, and that all the
provisions of the law as to notices which are directory to the administrators have been
complied with. . . . The court is not bound to enter upon the record the evidence on
which any fact was decided. (Florentine vs. Barton, 2 Wall., 210; 17 L. ed., 785.)
Especially does all this apply after long lapse of time.
Applegate vs. Lexington and Carter County Mining Co. (117 U. S., 255) contains an instructive
discussion in a case analogous to that which is now before us. It there appeared that in order to
foreclose a mortgage in the State of Kentucky against a nonresident debtor it was necessary that
publication should be made in a newspaper for a specified period of time, also be posted at the
front door of the court house and be published on some Sunday, immediately after divine service,
in such church as the court should direct. In a certain action judgment had been entered against a
nonresident, after publication in pursuance of these provisions. Many years later the validity of
the proceedings was called in question in another action. It was proved from the files of an
ancient periodical that publication had been made in its columns as required by law; but no proof
was offered to show the publication of the order at the church, or the posting of it at the front
door of the court-house. It was insisted by one of the parties that the judgment of the court was
void for lack of jurisdiction. But the Supreme Court of the United States said:
The court which made the decree . . . was a court of general jurisdiction. Therefore
every presumption not inconsistent with the record is to be indulged in favor of its
jurisdiction. . . . It is to be presumed that the court before making its decree took care of
12
 to see that its order for constructive service, on which its right to make the decree
depended, had been obeyed.
It is true that in this case the former judgment was the subject of collateral , or indirect attack,
while in the case at bar the motion to vacate the judgment is direct proceeding for relief against
it. The same general presumption, however, is indulged in favor of the judgment of a court of
general jurisdiction, whether it is the subject of direct or indirect attack the only difference being
that in case of indirect attack the judgment is conclusively presumed to be valid unless the record
affirmatively shows it to be void, while in case of direct attack the presumption in favor of its
validity may in certain cases be overcome by proof extrinsic to the record.
The presumption that the clerk performed his duty and that the court made its decree with the
knowledge that the requirements of law had been complied with appear to be amply sufficient to
support the conclusion that the notice was sent by the clerk as required by the order. It is true
that there ought to be found among the papers on file in this cause an affidavit, as required by
section 400 of the Code of Civil Procedure, showing that the order was in fact so sent by the clerk;
and no such affidavit appears. The record is therefore silent where it ought to speak. But the very
purpose of the law in recognizing these presumptions is to enable the court to sustain a prior
judgment in the face of such an omission. If we were to hold that the judgment in this case is void
because the proper affidavit is not present in the file of papers which we call the record, the
result would be that in the future every title in the Islands resting upon a judgment like that now
before us would depend, for its continued security, upon the presence of such affidavit among
the papers and would be liable at any moment to be destroyed by the disappearance of that
piece of paper. We think that no court, with a proper regard for the security of judicial
proceedings and for the interests which have by law been confided to the courts, would incline to
favor such a conclusion. In our opinion the proper course in a case of this kind is to hold that the
legal presumption that the clerk performed his duty still maintains notwithstanding the absence
from the record of the proper proof of that fact.
In this connection it is important to bear in mind that under the practice prevailing in the
Philippine Islands the word "record" is used in a loose and broad sense, as indicating the
collective mass of papers which contain the history of all the successive steps taken in a case and
which are finally deposited in the archives of the clerk's office as a memorial of the litigation. It is
a matter of general information that no judgment roll, or book of final record, is commonly kept
in our courts for the purpose of recording the pleadings and principal proceedings in actions
which have been terminated; and in particular, no such record is kept in the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila. There is, indeed, a section of the Code of Civil Procedure which
directs that such a book of final record shall be kept; but this provision has, as a matter of
common knowledge, been generally ignored. The result is that in the present case we do not
have the assistance of the recitals of such a record to enable us to pass upon the validity of this
judgment and as already stated the question must be determined by examining the papers
contained in the entire file.
But it is insisted by counsel for this motion that the affidavit of Bernardo Chan y Garcia showing
that upon April 4, 1908, he sent a notification through the mail addressed to the defendant at
Manila, Philippine Islands, should be accepted as affirmative proof that the clerk of the court
failed in his duty and that, instead of himself sending the requisite notice through the mail, he
relied upon Bernardo to send it for him. We do not think that this is by any means a necessary
inference. Of course if it had affirmatively appeared that the clerk himself had attempted to
comply with this order and had directed the notification to Manila when he should have directed
it to Amoy, this would be conclusive that he had failed to comply with the exact terms of the
order; but such is not this case. That the clerk of the attorneys for the plaintiff erroneously sent a
notification to the defendant at a mistaken address affords in our opinion very slight basis for
supposing that the clerk may not have sent notice to the right address.
There is undoubtedly good authority to support the position that when the record states the
evidence or makes an averment with reference to a jurisdictional fact, it will not be presumed
that there was other or different evidence respecting the fact, or that the fact was otherwise than
stated. If, to give an illustration, it appears from the return of the officer that the summons was
served at a particular place or in a particular manner, it will not be presumed that service was
also made at another place or in a different manner; or if it appears that service was made upon a
person other than the defendant, it will not be presumed, in the silence of the record, that it was
made upon the defendant also (Galpin vs. Page, 18 Wall., 350, 366; Settlemier vs. Sullivan, 97 U.
S., 444, 449). While we believe that these propositions are entirely correct as applied to the case
where the person making the return is the officer who is by law required to make the return, we
do not think that it is properly applicable where, as in the present case, the affidavit was made by
a person who, so far as the provisions of law are concerned, was a mere intermeddler.
The last question of importance which we propose to consider is whether a motion in the cause is
admissible as a proceeding to obtain relief in such a case as this. If the motion prevails the
judgment of July 2, 1908, and all subsequent proceedings will be set aside, and the litigation will
be renewed, proceeding again from the date mentioned as if the progress of the action had not
been interrupted. The proponent of the motion does not ask the favor of being permitted to
interpose a defense. His purpose is merely to annul the effective judgment of the court, to the
end that the litigation may again resume its regular course.
13
There is only one section of the Code of Civil Procedure which expressly recognizes the authority
of a Court of First Instance to set aside a final judgment and permit a renewal of the litigation in
the same cause. This is as follows:
SEC. 113. Upon such terms as may be just the court may relieve a party or legal
representative from the judgment, order, or other proceeding taken against him
through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; Provided, That
application thereof be made within a reasonable time, but in no case exceeding six
months after such judgment, order, or proceeding was taken.
An additional remedy by petition to the Supreme Court is supplied by section 513 of the same
Code. The first paragraph of this section, in so far as pertinent to this discussion, provides as
follows:
When a judgment is rendered by a Court of First Instance upon default, and a party
thereto is unjustly deprived of a hearing by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence, and the Court of First Instance which rendered the judgment has finally
adjourned so that no adequate remedy exists in that court, the party so deprived of a
hearing may present his petition to the Supreme Court within sixty days after he first
learns of the rendition of such judgment, and not thereafter, setting forth the facts and
praying to have judgment set aside. . . .
It is evident that the proceeding contemplated in this section is intended to supplement the
remedy provided by section 113; and we believe the conclusion irresistible that there is no other
means recognized by law whereby a defeated party can, by a proceeding in the same cause,
procure a judgment to be set aside, with a view to the renewal of the litigation.
The Code of Civil Procedure purports to be a complete system of practice in civil causes, and it
contains provisions describing with much fullness the various steps to be taken in the conduct of
such proceedings. To this end it defines with precision the method of beginning, conducting, and
concluding the civil action of whatever species; and by section 795 of the same Code it is declared
that the procedure in all civil action shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code. We
are therefore of the opinion that the remedies prescribed in sections 113 and 513 are exclusive of
all others, so far as relates to the opening and continuation of a litigation which has been once
concluded.
The motion in the present case does not conform to the requirements of either of these
provisions; and the consequence is that in our opinion the action of the Court of First Instance in
dismissing the motion was proper.
If the question were admittedly one relating merely to an irregularity of procedure, we cannot
suppose that this proceeding would have taken the form of a motion in the cause, since it is clear
that, if based on such an error, the came to late for relief in the Court of First Instance. But as we
have already seen, the motion attacks the judgment of the court as void for want of jurisdiction
over the defendant. The idea underlying the motion therefore is that inasmuch as the judgment is
a nullity it can be attacked in any way and at any time. If the judgment were in fact void upon its
face, that is, if it were shown to be a nullity by virtue of its own recitals, there might possibly be
something in this. Where a judgment or judicial order is void in this sense it may be said to be a
lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and
whenever it exhibits its head.
But the judgment in question is not void in any such sense. It is entirely regular in form, and the
alleged defect is one which is not apparent upon its face. It follows that even if the judgment
could be shown to be void for want of jurisdiction, or for lack of due process of law, the party
aggrieved thereby is bound to resort to some appropriate proceeding to obtain relief. Under
accepted principles of law and practice, long recognized in American courts, a proper remedy in
such case, after the time for appeal or review has passed, is for the aggrieved party to bring an
action to enjoin the judgment, if not already carried into effect; or if the property has already
been disposed of he may institute suit to recover it. In every situation of this character an
appropriate remedy is at hand; and if property has been taken without due process, the law
concedes due process to recover it. We accordingly old that, assuming the judgment to have
been void as alleged by the proponent of this motion, the proper remedy was by an original
proceeding and not by motion in the cause. As we have already seen our Code of Civil Procedure
defines the conditions under which relief against a judgment may be productive of conclusion for
this court to recognize such a proceeding as proper under conditions different from those defined
by law. Upon the point of procedure here involved, we refer to the case of People vs. Harrison (84
Cal., 607) wherein it was held that a motion will not lie to vacate a judgment after the lapse of the
time limited by statute if the judgment is not void on its face; and in all cases, after the lapse of
the time limited by statute if the judgment is not void on its face; and all cases, after the lapse of
such time, when an attempt is made to vacate the judgment by a proceeding in court for that
purpose an action regularly brought is preferable, and should be required. It will be noted taken
verbatim from the California Code (sec. 473).
The conclusions stated in this opinion indicate that the judgment appealed from is without error,
and the same is accordingly affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
14
 ANG TIBAY, REPRESENTED BY TORIBIO TEODORO, MANAGER AND PROPIETOR, AND
NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, PETITIONERS, VS.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC., RESPONDENTS.
Facts:
Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the Philippine
Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of a number of his
employees. However, the National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned the validity of said lay off
as it averred that the said employees laid off were members of NLU while no members of the
rival labor union National Workers Brotherhood (NWB) were laid off. NLU claims that NWB is a
company dominated union and Toribio was merely busting NLU.
The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where Toribio and NWB won. Eventually,
NLU went to the Supreme Court invoking its right for a new trial on the ground of newly
discovered evidence. The Supreme Court agreed with NLU. The Solicitor General, arguing for the
CIR, filed a motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the National Labor Union, Inc. is entitled to a new trial.
HELD:
Yes. The records show that the newly discovered evidence or documents obtained by NLU, which
they attached to their petition with the SC, were evidence so inaccessible to them at the time of
the trial that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained
them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations. Further, the attached
documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their admission
would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered (said newly
obtained records include books of business/inventory accounts by Ang Tibay which were not
previously accessible but already existing).
The SC also outlined that administrative bodies, like the CIR, although not strictly bound by the
Rules of Court must also make sure that they comply to the requirements of due process. For
administrative bodies, due process can be complied with by observing the following:
 The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to
present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
 Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce
evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the
evidence presented.
 While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does
imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its
decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly
attached.
 Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the
evidence must be “substantial.” Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
 The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
 The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
 The administrative body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such
a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the
reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the
authority conferred upon it.
Ateneo vs. CA
Fact: In a letter-complaint dated December 13, 1967 addressed to Rev. William Welsh S.J., Dean
of Men, Dean of Resident Students, and Chairman of the Board of Discipline, College of Arts and
Sciences, Ateneo de Manila, Carmelita Mateo, a waitress in the cafeteria of Cervini Hall inside the
university campus charged Juan Ramon Guanzon, son of private respondents Romeo Guanzon
and Teresita Regalado, and a boarder and first year student of the university with unbecoming
conduct committed on December 12, 1967 at about 5:15 in the evening at the Cervini Hall’s
cafeteria. that Mr. Guanzon struck the complainant in the left temple. The university conducted
an investigation of the slapping incident. On the basis of the investigation results, Juan Ramon
was dismissed from the university. The dismissal of Juan Ramon triggered off the filing of a
complaint for damages by his parents against the university in the Court stating that Juan Ramon
was expelled from school without giving him a fair trial in violation of his right to due process and
that they are prominent and well known residents of Bacolod City, with the unceremonious
15
expulsion of their son causing them actual, moral, and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s
fees. After due trial, the lower court found for the Guanzons and ordered the university to pay
them P92.00 as actual damages; P50,000.00 as moral damages; P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees and
to pay the costs of the suit. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals by the university, the trial
court’s decision was initially reversed and set aside. The complaint was dismissed. However, upon
motion for reconsideration filed by the Guanzons, the appellate court reversed its decision and
set it aside through a special division of five. In the resolution issued by the appellate court, the
lower court’s decision was reinstated. The motion for reconsideration had to be referred to a
special division of five in view of the failure to reach unanimity on the resolution of the motion,
the vote of the regular division having become 2 to 1. adrianantazo.wordpress.com
Issue: Whether the petitioner deprived the respondent due process in the administrative
proceeding? adrianantazo.wordpress.com
Held: No, the respondent was accorded administrative due process in his dismissal cases
according to the minimum standards laid down by the Court to meet the demands of procedural
due process are:
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against
them;
(2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if
desired:
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by
the school authorities to hear and decide the case.
When the letter-complaint was read to respondent, he admitted the altercation with the waitress
and his slapping her on the face. petitioner did not stop with the admission. The Board of
Discipline was made up of distinguished members of the faculty and there is nothing in the
records to cast any doubt on their competence and impartiality insofar as this disciplinary
investigation is concerned. respondent himself appeared before the Board of Discipline. He
admitted incident, then begged to be excused so he could catch the boat for Bacolod City. Juan
Ramon, therefore, was given notice of the proceedings; he actually appeared to present his side;
the investigating board acted fairly and objectively; and all requisites of administrative due
process were met.
ARIEL NON ET.AL., petitioners. vs. HON. SANCHO DAMES II, in his capacity as the Presiding
Judge of the
5th Regional Trail Court, Br. 38, and
MABINI COLLEGES, INC., respondents
G.R. No. 89317. May 20, 1990
FACTS:
Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini Colleges, Inc. were not allowed to re-enroll by
the school for the academic year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in student mass actions
against the school in the preceding semester. The subject of the protests is not, however, made
clear in the pleadings.
The trial court dismissed the petition referring to the ruling in Alcuaz vs. PSBA stating, that being
a mere privilege and not a legal right for a student to be enrolled or re-enrolled, respondent
Mabini College is free to admit or not admit the petitioners for re-enrollment in view of the
academic freedom enjoyed by the school.
The respondents, in justifying their action, stated that 8 of the petitioners have incurred failing
grades. In response, the petitioners stated that: (a) three of them were graduating. (b) Their
academic deficiencies do not warrant non-readmission. (c) The improper conduct attributed to
them was during the exercise of the cognate rights of free speech and peaceable assembly. (d)
There was no due investigation that could serve as basis for disciplinary action. (e) Respondent
school is their choice institution near their places of residence, which they can afford to pay for
tertiary education.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the school has the right not to re-admit the petitioners.
16
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court cannot anchor the “Termination of Contract” theory
the contract between the school and the student is not an ordinary contract. It is imbued with
public interest, considering the high priority given by the Constitution to education and the grant
to the State of supervisory and regulatory powers over all educational institutions. It is intended
merely to protect schools wherein tuition fees are collected and paid on installment basis. It
cannot be construed to mean that a student shall be enrolled for only one semester.
The right of an institution of higher learning to set academic standardscannot be utilized to
discriminate against students who exercise their constitutional rights to speech and assembly, for
otherwise there will be a violation of their right to equal protection. It provides that every
student has the right to enroll in any school college or university upon meeting its
specific requirements and reasonable regulations; . . . and that “the student is presumed to be
qualified for enrollment for the entire period he is expected to complete the course, without
prejudice to his right to transfer.”
Goldberg v. Kelly
397 U.S. 254, 90 S. Ct. 1011 (1970)
RULE:
The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard. The hearing must
be at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. These principles require that a recipient
have timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for a proposed termination, and an
effective opportunity to defend by confronting any adverse witnesses and by presenting his own
arguments and evidence orally. These rights are important in cases where recipients have
challenged proposed terminations as resting on incorrect or misleading factual premises or on
misapplication of rules or policies to the facts of particular cases.
FACTS:
Appellee residents of New York City, who were receiving financial aid under state or federally
assisted welfare programs, instituted actions alleging that state and city welfare officials had
terminated, or were about to terminate such aid without prior notice and hearing in violation of
due process. After the commencement of such actions which were consolidated, the welfare
authorities adopted procedures whereby the recipient, after informal discussion with a
caseworker, was given at least 7 days' notice of proposed termination of payments, of his right to
have the proposed termination reviewed by a higher official, and of his right to submit a written
statement for purposes of such review, and whereby the recipient, after an adverse decision by
the reviewing official and termination of payments, could obtain a post-termination hearing
before an independent hearing officer, at which hearing he could appear personally, offer oral
evidence, confront and cross- examine witnesses, and have a record made of the hearing. The
plaintiffs challenged the constitutional adequacy of such procedures. The District Court held that
only a pre-termination evidentiary hearing would satisfy due process requirements. On appeal,
the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed
ISSUE:
Was the termination procedure adopted by the welfare authorities a violation of appellees' right
to due process?
ANSWER:
Yes.
CONCLUSION:
On review the Court held that a pre-termination evidentiary hearing to produce an initial
determination of the validity of the termination was necessary to satisfy procedural due process.
The Court found that especially with welfare recipients who lacked independent resources,
termination of benefits while the issue was being decided deprived recipients of the very means
necessary to live. The Court noted that the need to concentrate upon finding the means for daily
subsistence adversely affected the ability to seek redress from the termination, and the
protection of due process outweighed the expense of a pre-termination hearing and continued
benefits pending decisions.
UP BOARD OF REGENTS VS TELAN
FACTS: THE UP Board of Regents imposed on Nadal the penalties of suspension for one year, non-
issuance of any certificate of good moral character during the suspension and/or as long as Nadal
has not reimbursed the STFAP benefits he had received with 12% interest per annum and non
issuance of his transcript of records until he has settled his financial obligations with the
university. The disciplinary action is meted after finally rendering a guilty verdict on Nadal’s
alleged willfull withholding of the following information in his application for scholarship
tantamount to acts of dishonesty, viz: (1) that he has and maintains a car and (2) the income of
his mother in the USA in support of the studies of his brothers. Nadal complained that he was not
afforded due process when, after the Board Meeting on his case on March 28, 1993 that resulted
in a decision of “NOT GUILTY” in his favor, the Chairman of the UP Board of Regents, without
17
notice to the petitioner, called another meeting the following day to deliberate on the Chairman’s
Motion for Reconsideration, which this time resulted in a decision of “GUILTY.” Upon petition,
Nadal was granted his action for mandamus with preliminary injunction.
ISSUE: WON Nadal was denied due process.
HELD: No. It is gross error to equate due process in the instant case with the sending of notice of
the March 29, 1993 BOR meeting. University rules do not require the attendance in BOR meetings
of individuals whose cases are included as items on the agenda of the Board. At no time did
respondent complain of lack of notice given to him to attend any of the regular and special BOR
meetings where his case was up for deliberation. Let it not be forgotten that respondent aspires
to join the ranks of professionals who would uphold truth at all costs so that justice may prevail.
Nadal has sufficiently proven to have violated his undertaking to divulge all information needed
when he applied for the benefits of the STFAP. Unlike in criminal cases which require proof
beyond reasonable doubt as basis for a judgment, in administrative or quasi-judiciall proceedings,
only substantial evidence is required, that which means a reasonable mind might accept a
relevant evidence as adequate to support a conclusion.
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. NLRC and NATIONAL MINES AND
ALLIED WORKERS UNION, Respondents.
Before us is a petition to set aside the NLRC Decision dated November 28, 1990 (Annex "C", p.
41, Rollo), disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appealed decision is hereby set aside and a new
judgment is entered, holding the Development Bank of the Philippines liable to the complainants
for their separation pay to the extent of the proceed of the foreclosure sale, subject to the
liquidation or bankruptcy proceeding that may be instituted against Midland Cement
Corporation.(pp. 47-48, Rollo).
Herein private respondent labor union filed on January 10, 1986, a complaint, the allegations of
which were paraphrased by the NLRC in this wise:
. . . that the individual complainants were all employees of respondent Midland Cement
Corporation who were terminated from employment on or about July 30, 1981 by reason of the
termination of the business operations of the Construction and Development Corporation of the
Philippines (CDCP) now PNCC, which was brought about by the expiration of the lease contract
between Midland Cement Corporation and CDCP; that at the time of the separation from the
service [of] the individual complainants, the complainant union was the certified sole and
exclusive bargaining agent; that as a consequence of said termination, the complainant union
filed with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment an opposition to the application for
clearance to terminate their services filed by CDCP, the lessee of the cement plant owned by
Midland Cement Corporation; that on April 27, 1983, the Ministry of Labor and Employment thru
then Deputy Minister Vicente Leogardo, Jr., ordered applicant CDCP to pay the 175 affected
employees separation pay equivalent to one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of service;
that the employees were paid only based on their length of service with CDCP from August 1,
1975 up to July 30, 1981; the said employees were not paid (with) their separation pay when they
were employees of respondent Midland Cement Corporation; that later, respondent DBP
foreclosed and assumed ownership over the cement plant, including land, buildings, machinery,
etc., of Midland Cement Corporation; that the individual complainants are claiming separation
benefits covering the period from date of hiring up to July 31, 1975 when CDCP took over the
operations of Midland Cement Corporation by virtue of lease contract. (pp. 43-44, Rollo).
After hearing, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision on January 5, 1990 (Annex "A", p. 26, Rollo),
finding DBP jointly and severally liable with Midland Cement for the payment of the separation
pay, as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered giving due course to the complaint thereby ordering
the respondents DBP and Midland Cement Corporation jointly and severally liable for the
separation pay of the affected members of the complainant union.
It appearing that as published in the morning dailies lately that the assets of Midland Cement
Corporation are now being offered for sale through public bidding by the Asset Privatization
Trust, (APT) let copies of this decision be served upon said APT to protect the interest of the
herein complainants. (pp. 30-31, Rollo)
DBP appealed, contending that its acquisition of the mortgaged assets of Midland through
foreclosure sale did not make it the owner of the defunct Midland Cement, and that the doctrine
of successor-employee is not applicable in this case, since DBP did not continue the business
operations of Midland. The NLRC, while finding merit in DBP's contention, nonetheless held DBP
liable since respondent's claim "constitutes a first preference with respect to the proceeds of the
foreclosure sale" as provided in Article 110 of the Labor Code:
Art. 110. Worker preference in case of bankruptcy. - In the event of bankruptcy or liquidation of
an employer's business, his workers shall enjoy first preference as regards their wages and other
monetary claims, any provisions of law to the contrary notwithstanding. Such unpaid wages and
18
monetary claims shall be paid in full before claims of the government and other creditors may be
paid. (p. 46, Rollo)
Following the denial of its motion for reconsideration, DBP filed the instant petition.
DBP correctly points out that its mortgage lien should not be classified as a preferred credit. The
issue raised was settled in Republic v. Peralta (150 SCRA 37 [1987]) and reinforced in DBP v.
NLRC (183 SCRA 328 [1990]) wherein we held because of its impact on the entire system of credit,
Article 110 of the Labor Code cannot be viewed in isolation but must be read in relation to the
Civil Code scheme on classification and preference of credits. Thus,
4. A distinction should be made between a preference of credit or a lien. A preference applies
only to claims which do not attach to specific properties, A lien creates a charge on a particular
property. The right of first preference as regards unpaid wages recognized by Article 110 does not
constitute a lien on the property of the insolvent debtor in favor of workers. It is but a preference
of credit in their favor, a preference in application. It is a method adopted to determine and
specify the order in which credits should be paid in the final distribution of the proceeds of the
insolvent's assets. It is a right to a first preference in the discharge of the funds of the judgment
debtor.
In the words of Republic vs. Peralta, supra:
Article 110 of the Labor Code does not purport to create a lien in favor of workers or employees
for unpaid wages either upon all of the properties or upon any particular property owned by their
employer. Claims for unpaid wages do not therefore fall at all within the category of specially
preferred claims established under Articles 2241 and 2242 of the Civil Code, except to the extent
that such claims for unpaid wages are already covered by Article 2241, number 6: claims for
laborer wages, on the goods manufactured or the work done, or by Article 2242, number
3: "claims of laborers and other workers engaged in construction, reconstruction or repair of
buildings, canals and other works, upon said buildings, canals and other works." To the extent
that claims for unpaid wages fall outside the scope of Article 2241, number 6 and Article 2242,
number 3, they would come within the ambit of the category of ordinary preferred credits under
Article 2244.
6. The DBP anchors its claim on a mortgage credit. A mortgage directly and immediately subjects
the property upon which it is imposed, whoever the possessor may be, to the fulfillment of the
obligation for whose security it was constituted (Article 2176, Civil Code). It creates a real right
which is enforceable against the whole world. It is a lien on an identified immovable property,
which a preference is not. A recorded mortgage credit is a special preferred credit under Article
2242 (5) of the Civil Code on classification of credits. The preference given by Article 110, when
not falling within Article 2241 (6) and Article 2242 (3) of the Civil Code and not attached to any
specific property, is an ordinary preferred credit although its impact is to move it from second
priority to first priority in the order of preference established by Article 2244 of the Civil Code.
(Republic vs. Peralta, supra.)
In fine, the right to preference given to workers under Article 110 of the Labor Code cannot exist
in any effective way prior to the time of its presentation in distribution proceedings. It will find
application when, in proceedings such as insolvency, such unpaid wages shall be paid in full
before the "claims of the Government and other creditors" may be paid. . . . (DBP vs, NLRC, supra;
pp. 337-339.)
The NLRC, therefore, erred in holding DBP liable "to the extent of the proceeds of the foreclosure
sale." And making such liability dependent on a bankruptcy or liquidation proceedings is really
beside the point, for these proceedings are relevant only to preferred credits, which is not the
situation in the case at bar. To equate DBP's mortgage lien with a preferred credit would be to
render inutile the protective mantle of the mortgage in DBP's favor and thus in the process wreak
havoc to commercial transactions.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the NLRC dated November 28, 1990 and
the Resolution of February 1, 1991 are hereby SET ASIDE, and a new judgment is entered
absolving Development Bank of the Philippines of any and all liabilities to private respondent and
its members. No special pronouncement is made as to costs. SO ORDERED.
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 14560, 36 SCRA 394 (November 19, 2001)
Facts:
1. Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Estrada), the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An
Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder) as amended by RA 7659..
2. Estrada wishes to impress the Court that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it
crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionality infirm. That
there was a clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.
Issue/s:
19
1. Whether or not the Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague.
2. Whether or not Plunder Law requires less evidence for providing the predicate crimes of plunder
and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process.
3. Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum.
Ruling:
1. No. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used therein,
or because of the employment of terms without defining them. There is no positive constitutional
or statutory command requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an enactment.
Congress’ inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessary result in the
vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be
gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.
It is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in
their natural, plain, and ordinary acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that the
legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words.
Every provision of the law should be construed in relation and with reference to every other part.
There was nothing vague or ambiguous in the provisions of R.A. 7080
2. No. The legislature did not in any manner refashion the standard quantum of proof in the crime
of plunder. The burden still remains with the prosecution to prove beyond any iota of doubt
every fact or element necessary to constitute a crime.
What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient
to form a combination or series which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at
least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the
information to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth.
3. No. It is malum in se. The legislative declaration in RA No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense
implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently
wrong, they are mala in se and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law,
especially since in the case of plunder that predicate crimes are mainly mala in se.
Its abomination lies in the significance and implications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme
of the larger socio-political and economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to
develop and provide for its poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt
tyrannical rule that bankrupted the government and impoverished the population, the Philippine
Government must muster the political will to dismantle the culture of corruption, dishonesty,
green and syndicated criminality that so deeply entrenched itself in the structures of society and
the psyche of the populace. [With the government] terribly lacking the money to provide even
the most basic services to its people, any form of misappropriation or misapplication of
government funds translates to an actual threat to the very existence of government, and in turn,
the very survival of people it governs over.
Note:
 A statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that
persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can
only be invoked against the specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which
cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by construction.
 The “Reasonable Doubt” standard has acquired such exalted statute in the realm of constitutional
law as it gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused against conviction except
upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which
he is charged.
 A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lack comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such
instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects it violates due process
for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to
avoid; and it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes
an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. The first may be “saved” by proper construction,
while no challenge may be mounted as against the second whenever directed against such
activities.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language
conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common
understanding and practice. It must be stressed, however, that the “vagueness” doctrine merely
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requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld – not absolute precision or interpreted to contain the freedom to contract among the rights encompassed by substantive
mathematical exactitude. due process.

Attorneys
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad
because of possible “chilling effect” upon protected speech. The theory is that “[w]hen statutes
regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for  Henry Weismann (defendant)
rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value of all society of
constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify along attacks on overly broad statutes Opinions
with no requirement that the persons making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could
not be regulated by a statute draw with narrow specificity. The possible harm to society in Majority
permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the
protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of  Rufus Wheeler Peckham (Author)
possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.  Melville Weston Fuller
 David Josiah Brewer
 Henry Billings Brown
This do not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terorrem effect resulting
 Joseph McKenna
from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may
well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal
law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. At the core of this case lay the conflict between the individual right to contract and the police
powers of the state. Peckham found that neither interest was absolute but seemed to disfavor
the state's assertion of authority. He argued that the government does not have the power to
Lochner vs. New York protect individuals from the consequences of their own poor decisions, unless they are wards of
the state. But he also pointed out that these decisions might not be as ill-advised as the state
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the individual right to freedom of thought in enacting the law. In Peckham's view, longer working hours did not dramatically
contract. undermine the health of employees, and this profession is not particularly dangerous.

Facts As a result, the majority opinion held that the New York law failed the rational basis test for
determining whether government action was constitutional. Peckham wrote that the Bakeshop
Act was not related in any real way to health.
The owner of a bakery in the New York city of Utica, Joseph Lochner, was charged with violating a
state law known as the Bakeshop Act. This law set maximum hour requirements for bakery
employees at 10 hours per day and 60 hours per week, in addition to regulating sanitary Dissent
conditions. While its provisions appeared benign, they may have resulted from anti-immigrant
sentiment in the industry, since foreign-born bakers who were willing to work longer hours were  John Marshall Harlan (Author)
seen as a threat to American bakers. Lochner was accused of permitting an employee to work  Edward Douglass White
more than 60 hours in one week.  William Rufus Day

The first charge resulted in a fine of $25, and a second charge a few years later resulted in a fine Offering a broader interpretation of the state authority to regulate under its police powers,
of $50. Although Lochner did not challenge the first conviction, he appealed the second but was Harlan articulated reasoning that would inform later decisions in the post-Lochner era. His
denied in state courts by narrow decisions. He argued that the Fourteenth Amendment should be deferential application of the rational basis standard more closely resembles the current way that

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the Court applies it. Rather than requiring the government to prove that a law met this test, he
would require the party challenging the law to prove that the test was not met. (This is also the
current rule.)
Harlan cited many studies that conflicted with the majority's view on the impact of long working
hours on the health of bakers, pointing out that plenty of evidence existed to support the
legislature's conclusions. He found that the government was entitled to use means that might not
be the best in the situation, as long as they fall within the government's police powers and are
not illegal.
Dissent
 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (Author)
In an eloquent companion to Harlan's dissent, Holmes based his opinion on what he saw as
excessive judicial activism that interfered with the legislative role. He also argued that judges do
not have the economic knowledge to make decisions in this area, and he used historical evidence
in rejecting the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the freedom to contract.
Case Commentary
Among the most controversial and criticized decisions in Supreme Court history, Lochner lasted
only a few decades before the Supreme Court implicitly repudiated its viewpoint. It limited the
police powers of states during the Great Depression and the early New Deal, but the 1934
decision in Nebbia v. New York and the 1937 decision in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish
abandoned the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment protects a freedom to contract. This is no
longer considered one of the fundamental rights under the Constitution. Moreover, the dissents'
lenient vision of the rational basis test has become the standard by which courts evaluate most
economic legislation, in contrast to the higher level of scrutiny used for state action that affects
personal liberties. On the other hand, the concept of substantive due process survived and
remains at the core of Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence.
Syllabus
The general right to make a contract in relation to his business is part of the liberty protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment, and this includes the right to purchase and sell labor, except as
controlled by the State in the legitimate exercise of its police power.
Liberty of contract relating to labor includes both parties to it; the one has as much right to
purchase as the other to sell labor.
There is no reasonable ground, on the score of health, for interfering with the liberty of the
person or the right of free contract, by determining the hours of labor, in the occupation of a
baker. Nor can a law limiting such hours be justified a a health law to safeguard the public health,
or the health of the individuals following that occupation.
Section 110 of the labor law of the State of New York, providing that no employes shall be
required or permitted to work in bakeries more than sixty hours in a week, or ten hours a day, is
not a legitimate exercise of the police power of the State, but an unreasonable, unnecessary and
arbitrary interference with the right and liberty of the individual to contract in relation to labor,
and, as such, it is in conflict with, and void under, the Federal Constitution.
This is a writ of error to the County Court of Oneida County, in the State of New York (to which
court the record had been remitted), to review the judgment of the Court of Appeal of that State
affirming the judgment of the Supreme Court, which itself affirmed the judgment of the County
Court, convicting the defendant of a misdemeanor on an indictment under a statute of that State,
known, by its short title, as the labor law. The section of the statute under which the indictment
was found is section 110, and is reproduced in the margin, * (together with the other sections of
the labor law upon the subject of bakeries, being sections 111 to 115, both inclusive). The
indictment averred that the defendant
"wrongfully and unlawfully required and permitted an employee working for him in his biscuit,
bread and cake bakery and confectionery establishment, at the city of Utica, in this county, to
work more than sixty hours in one week,"
after having been theretofore convicted of a violation of the same act, and therefore, as averred,
he committed the crime or misdemeanor, second offense. The plaintiff in error demurred to the
indictment on several grounds, one of which was that the facts stated did not constitute a crime.
The demurrer was overruled, and the plaintiff in error having refused to plead further, a plea of
not guilty was entered by order of the court and the trial commenced, and he was convicted of
misdemeanor, second offense, as indicted, and sentenced to pay a fine of $50 and to stand
committed until paid, not to exceed fifty days in the Oneida County jail. A certificate of
reasonable doubt was granted by the county judge of Oneida County, whereon an appeal was
taken to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, Fourth Department, where the judgment of
conviction was affirmed. 73 App.Div.N.Y. 120. A further appeal was then taken to the Court of
Appeals, where the judgment of conviction was again affirmed. 177 N.Y. 145.
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