Escape From Freedom and Dignity PDF

Escape from Freedom and Dignity
Author(s): Phillip H. Scribner

Source: Ethics, Vol. 83, No. 1 (Oct., 1972), pp. 13-36
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2380154
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Escape from Freedom and Dignity
Phillip H. Scribner
American University
Arguments for curtailing specific political rights have not been uncom-
mon, but proposals for the wholesale abolition of political freedom, pun-
ishment, individual responsibility and merit are less common and all the
more noteworthy when they are made in the name of science. Professor
B. F. Skinner has recently resumed his attack on such practices in his most
recent book, Beyond Freedom and Dignity.
Skinner's arguments are particularly interesting because he is discus-
sing these problems from the point of view of a behaviorist. In some mea-
sure, they overlap traditional philosophical discussions, but Skinner ap-
parently believes that the nature of behavioristic discoveries enables him
to make a more decisive case than philosophers have been able to make
in the past. Science can now show the way where philosophical argument
has been indecisive.
I shall attempt to state Skinner's arguments clearly, so that their as-
sumptions and conclusions can be identified. My interest is not especially
in Skinner's own views. Rather, I shall use Skinner's arguments as a stand-
in for the sort of position that many behaviorist psychologists are inclined
to take. I shall not dispute the truth of behaviorism; rather, I shall try to
make clear what does and does not follow from its principles. I argue that
the institutions of freedom are no less defensible, given the truth of be-
haviorism, than they have been thought to be on other views of human
nature.
Assuming that behavioristic psychology has discovered the correct
manner of explaining behavior, Skinner hopes to show, in the first phase
of his argument, that man is not autonomous; that, therefore, the institu-
tions of freedom are not particularly suited to him; and that other institu-
tions, more effective in their control of his behavior, might just as well
replace them. In the second phase, he tries to argue that we ought to re-
place the institutions of freedom with more direct behavioral controls
because our culture would then be more likely to survive in the long run.
13
14 Ethics
Neither phase of his argument succeeds. And, in the end, what has misled
Skinner is not so much behaviorism as an oversimplified application of its
principles to the problems of political control. Before turning to the two
phases of his argument (in Sections II and III, respectively) I shall set the
stage by connecting Skinner's arguments with more traditional philosophi-
cal discussions.
Skinner believes that, if behavior is determined in accordance with

behavioristic laws of psychology, then man is not autonomous. Although
he is apparently unacquainted with the philosophical discussions about this
issue, Skinner defends a position similar to "hard" determinism, which
takes the fact that behavior and choice are caused in accordance with uni-
form laws of nature as sufficient reason to deny that man is free or au-
tonomous. After all, hard determinists argue, if a man was determined to
behave as he did, he could not have done otherwise. Thus, he is not re-
sponsible. The cause, whatever it was, is responsible.
Much of the plausibility of the hard determinist's argument rests on
opposing a "spiritualistic" conception of human freedom. On this view,
man is free because his behavior, at least part of the time, is not determined
by natural causes, although it may be determined by nonnatural, mental,
or spiritual causes.
Skinner, in marshalling his arguments against autonomous man, has
an easy argument against "spiritualistic" freedom. He assumes that auton-
omy means either that behavior is uncaused or that it is caused by a "little
man" inside. The former is unacceptable because it contradicts the de-
terminism of behaviorism.' The latter is rejected because little men inside,
like minds, feelings, thoughts, and other purported contents of conscious-
ness, are mythical entities postulated to fill the gaps in our knowledge of
the causes of behavior.2 If there is anything actually referred to by such
descriptions, it can be understood and described as consisting of patterns
of behavior.
In the traditional philosophical debtate, however, some have argued
against the hard determinist that another conception of human freedom is
compatible with the claim that behavior is determined by natural causes.
Those who take this view have been called "soft" determinists, for the
thrust of their argument is that man is unfree, and thus not responsible,
only when his behavior results from disruption of his normal processes.
Normally, they argue, the causes of behavior are of a sort which permit
us to say, in a sufficiently strong sense, that he could have done otherwise;
1. B. F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity (New York, 1971), pp. 19-21.
Skinner is even more explicit in Walden Two (New York, 1948): "I deny that freedom
exists at all. I must deny it-or my program would be absurd. You can't have a science
about a subject matter which hops capriciously about" (p. 257).
2. Beyond Freedom and Dignity, pp. 13-15.
15 Escape from Freedom and Dignity
and, therefore, he is responsible for his behavior. That is, the soft deter-
minist wants us to distinguish between cases in which a person's behavior
is caused by a compulsion, posthypnotic suggestion, drugs, or other ab-
normal pathology, and cases at the other extreme in which his behavior
is the result of reflection on the alternatives, evaluation of the various
outcomes, and a reasonable judgment as to the worth of different results.
The hard determinist's response at this point is to argue that behavior
which is subject to the laws of nature is not sufficiently autonomous to
justify holding a person responsible. Skinner follows this line of argument
in presenting his behavioristic account of how behavior is determined,
claiming that the concept of autonomous man is a mere invention to ac-
count for behavior when we are ignorant of the real causes.3 Before turn-
ing to his discussions of the institutions of freedom, I shall discuss his
positive behavioristic account of human behavior and attempt to construct
a model of autonomy within his assumptions.
Although we were previously forced to postulate autonomous man
to hide our ignorance of how behavior was determined, the discovery of
behaviorism has enabled us to identify the causes. "The environment not
only prods or lashes, it selects. Its role is similar to that in natural selection,
though on a very different time scale. It is now clear that we must take
into account what the environment does to an organism not only before,
but after it responds. Behavior is shaped and maintained by its conse-
quences."4 Because behavior is selected by its environment, the way a
person behaves is controlled by his environment. The environment, not
the person, is the cause: "Behavior which operates upon the environment
to produce consequences ("operant" behavior) can be studied by arrang-
ing environments in which specific consequences are contingent upon it.
The contingencies under investigation have become steadily more com-
plex, and one by one, they are taking over the explanatory functions pre-
viously assigned to personalities, states of mind, feeling, traits of character,
purposes, and intentions."5 To explain why the behavior occurs, one shows
how the subject's environment provided reinforcements contingent on
the occurrence of similar behavior in the past. It is those reinforcements,
not the person, which are responsible for the behavior.
To counter his argument, the soft determinist must show that there
is a kind of conditioning, based on contingencies of reinforcement, which
will result in an autonomous man-or, at least, a person sufficiently au-
tonomous to justify the institutions of freedom. However, if one can de-
scribe the pattern of behavior that distinguishes an autonomous man from
a nonautonomous one, it is a matter of behavioristic engineering to con-
struct contingencies of reinforcement which will result in that pattern of
3. Ibid., p. 14.
4. Ibid., p. 18.
5. Ibid.; also see Walden Two, p. 257.
16 Ethics
behavior. As Skinner insists, "The outlines of a technology are already

clear. An assignment is stated as behavior to be produced or modified, and
relevant contingencies are then arranged. A programmed sequence of con-
tingencies may be needed."6 Thus, the soft determinist has made his case
if he can give a behavioristic description of those patterns of behavior by
virtue of which a person is autonomous. The technology of behavioral
control can take it from there.
The model of autonomy I shall construct (the PCM) can be grasped
by contrast with the behavior of someone who is conditioned to be "auto-
matically good." We can arrange the contingencies for a person so that
desires which would lead to socially undesirable behavior become extin-
guished, while inclinations which would produce socially compatible be-
havior are rewarded. This phrasing is not acceptable to Skinner, of course,
for he insists that feelings, desires, and inclinations are merely the "felt"
side of behavioral dispositions and not their cause. But nothing turns on
how we describe it; the automatically good person has only those behav-
ioral dispositions which are compatible with the behavior of others. In
making this program work on a group scale, the crucial trick is to con-
struct the patterns of behavior so that the individuals manifesting them
automatically constitute the right contingencies of reinforcement for one
another. The problem of making an individual fit into a society is to de-
termine the content of his desires (or, in behaviorese, the content of his
dispositions) so that his behavior fits into that mutually reinforcing social
pattern. Everyone is automatically good.7
By contrast, it is possible to condition a person in a way which does
not determine the specific content of his desires and behavior but which
ensures that the behavior he exhibits, whatever its content, is the result
of certain "cognitive processes." Before showing how to translate this
mentalistic account into behavioristic language, I will indicate, in the nec-
essarily crude language of ordinary terms, the kind of person I have in
mind.
In ideal cases of deliberate behavior, we might expect that, between
confrontation with a situation and his response, a person would identify
the alternatives open to him on the basis of his information about the situ-
ation and his appraisal of his own powers and abilities; trace out the con-
sequences of each alternative; assess the effects of each on himself and
others in the light of his desires and interests as well as those of others;
and, on the basis of these considerations and the various moral and pru-
dential principles of practical reasoning he follows, choose the course he
judges to be best. I cannot hope to give a thorough account of practical
6. Beyond Freedom and Dignity, p. 149.

7. Ibid., pp. 66, 73. That Skinner's goal is to create a utopia of the automatically
good is abundantly clear throughout (see also pp. 74-75). In Walden Two he de-
scribes such a utopia in detail. He mentions, for example, the technique of conditioning
out emotions to control the behavior which results (pp. 101-3).
reasoning here, but I need only suggest the sorts of cognitive process
which are involved. Nor do I mean to suggest that autonomy requires each
response to be the result of fully explicit deliberation. One quickly learns
shortcuts, and most of one's conclusions about how to handle typical cases
can be filed away as programmed responses for future cases, subject only
to certain self-corrective procedures.
The first step in articulating a conception of autonomy will be ac-
ceptable in a behavioristic framework only if it can be translated into a
description of the patterns of behavior the autonomous man would exhibit
because of his autonomy. I cannot, of course, give a complete behavioral
analysis of such cognitive processes here, any more than behaviorists can
actually state fully the analysis of any other mentalistic descriptions. What
I can do, as Skinner and other behaviorists have done, is indicate what sorts
of behavior would count for or against saying that a person is autonomous.
The sorts of behavior which might indicate he had, say, identified the
various alternatives in a given situation would be his verbal behavior in
describing them, answering questions about them, notes he might write
about them, false starts in the direction of one or more alternatives, plus
innumerable other and more specific signs in more concrete situations.
Likewise, one can list the signs of a person tracing out consequences or
being aware of the effects of others. His verbal behavior is some indication,
but we would also expect that he would be less likely to wind up in bad
situations in unusual circumstances and better able to adjust his behavior
to long-range goals in novel situations.
Once one gets the hang of behavioristic translations, carrying them
out is not of much interest. Of course, the above descriptions should be
translated further, for such terms as "notes," "false starts," "answers to
questions" are still mentalistic. But, since these are the sorts of terms be-
haviorists spend their time analyzing, I will leave it to them.
Some have argued that no such behavioral translation of mentalistic
expressions is possible,8 but I am not much concerned to dispute them
here. For the purposes of the present argument, if the translation cannot
be successfully carried out, or if behavioristic descriptions cannot be de-
veloped which mark out the same differences we note among mentalistic
descriptions, then so much the worse for behaviorism. Its failure would
make the current argument irrelevant, for behaviorism would obviously
not be an adequate account of behavior, and no political proposals based
on it would be of any interest. However, the thrust of Skinner's argument
for his political proposals is not based on this translation thesis but on the
thesis that behavior is controlled by the contingencies of reinforcement
in the environment. That is an independent thesis.
However, if it is not obvious that it must be possible to condition a
8. Charles Taylor, The Explanation of Behavior (New York, 1964). Skinner ap-
parently believes the contrary (Beyond Freedom and Dignity, p. 72).
18 Ethics
person to deliberate about behavior in the manner I have indic

may think that I have reintroduced the mind, or that deliberation cannot
be spelled out in terms of behavior), then imagine the following elabora-
tion which is fully behavioristic. Suppose that, when confronted with a
situation in which he much choose, a person is conditioned to pull out pad,
pencil, and notebook recording previous deliberations, write his way
through the deliberations involved in practical reasoning, read off what
he concludes at the end, put away pad and pencil, and act in accordance
with the conclusion. Since this procedure can surely be described behav-
ioristically if any actions can be, and since a person can be conditioned
to behave according to this pattern, the less overt procedures postulated
above should provide no special conceptual problems.
The model of autonomy I am constructing consists, in part, in con-
ditioning a person to deliberate about his behavior in the manner I have
indicated. One difference between such a procedurally conditioned man
(or PCM) and an automatically good man can be pointed out now. The
PCM will be reinforced for following a procedure, that is, deliberating
as indicated above, regardless of which way he decides. The aim in condi-
tioning the automatically good man, however, is to control what he de-
cides to do in recurrent situations, and reinforcements are therefore ar-
ranged to reward those responses which are desired over those not desired
in the type of situation at hand.
As I suggested, the model of autonomous man must be elaborated
further to include a procedure which makes him responsible. Not only
must his response in a situation be mediated by a deliberative process, the
PCM must also treat himself as the author of his behavior in the sense
that he holds himself responsible for what he does. That is, roughly, after
he has responded in some way, he may come to realize (as a result of fail-
ing, or having new information about the consequences, or because of
better appreciation of how others are affected, or the criticisms of others)
that he has acted in a way he would not have chosen had he reflected more
carefully on his decision in advance. Under such circumstances, the PCM
is conditioned to feel guilty (a self-imposed negative reinforcement) and
to identify in retrospect what went wrong in the decision-making process
which accounts for the unwanted results. It might have been the under-
valuation of the interests of others, a careless appraisal of the situation, a
too-rigid adherence to principle, or the overestimation of his powers; and
deciding which it is may itself be the result of deliberation. But, on pain
of yet greater guilt, he resolves to follow a decision-making procedure
in the future which will make a similar outcome less likely. The effect, as
will be seen, is to introduce a self-correcting mechanism for the principles
and rules a person follows.
Again, a behavioristic translation can be given. We are all familiar
with the sorts of behavior which are typical of guilt and pride, and we
can identify remorse. If there is any doubt that the processes are compati-
ble with behaviorism, then we can again make them overt by using pen,
paper, and physical punishment.
There is neither space nor need to specify in detail how the mecha-
nism of holding oneself responsible must work, but, before I use the PCM
to show that a behaviorist model of autonomy is sufficient for a justifica-
tion of the institutions of freedom, I should stave off some immediate
objections.
In the first place, although the PCM is not the only model of auton-
omy one could develop within behaviorism, that in no way weakens the
argument; for any model of autonomy which undercuts Skinner's argu-
ment will do. Those who would hold a stronger model to be more accu-
rate can also make these arguments. Second, the model is highly rational-
istic in that I am invoking a traditional analysis of practical reason to de-
scribe the cognitive processes which are supposed to mediate the individ-
ual's responses to the envronment. I would agree that one would be more
faithful to actual decision-making processes by describing them in terms
of, say, myths and symbols, instead of principles and rules. But, again, the
rationalistic account does characterize the features of the decision-making
process which, as I shall argue, make the individual autonomous; and its
inaccuracy need not disturb us. Further, one might like to see the mecha-
nism of self-control supplemented with a pride-and-shame mechanism.9
Pride, for example, could be a positive version of the guilt mechanism.
But, for simplicity, the PCM need not include such features to show where
Skinner has gone wrong. Finally, it might be objected that not many peo-
ple are similar enough to the PCM to make the argument any more than
academic. But my argument need not suppose that everyone, at every
decision, deliberates about and evaluates his behavior as the PCM does. I
suspect that those who very frequently, if ever, deliberate in these ways
are a minority among us. But it is enough that procedures like these come
into play at the margin between behavior which has become habitual and
the perception of possibilities on the horizon which such habitual re-
sponses structure. At important junctures, at least, something like this
occasionally happens, and the effect is cumulative.
II
The brunt of Skinner's argument consists in showing that, if behav-

iorism is true, then the institutions of freedom-such as praise, blame,
punishment, persuasion, and political freedom-are not particularly ap-
propriate. His method is to show that these institutions are really means
by which the environment controls behavior and then to argue from
their relative inefficacy for stronger means of control. Against Skinner, I
shall try to show that they are especially suited for controlling PCMs and,
9. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity, p. 13.
20 Ethics
consequently, that they are not replaceable by direct conditionin

severe costs. I shall restrict my discussion to the institutions of
and political freedom, since the issues raised by other practices merely
repeat these.
Punishment
Skinner argues that punishment is merely a means for controlling

behavior, and, because it is less effective than alternative means, we should
abandon it in favor or more certain, positive conditioning of the behavior
we want.
By punishment, Skinner means the arrangement of negative reinforce-
ments, contingent upon certain behavior, designed to keep people from
exhibiting that behavior.10 Natural punishments are to be contrasted with
intentionally arranged negative contingencies: for example, carelessness
with knives is naturally extinguished. Once a person has been punished,
he seeks to avoid it. Among the ways open, some, such as neurotic fears
and displaced aggression, are not desirable. The more desirable strategies
for avoiding punishment include, according to Skinner, avoiding tempting
circumstances, using drugs to control aggression, busying oneself with
other interests, and surgery (that is, lobotomy or castration). All such
strategies work by "strengthening contingencies which teach [a person]
to stop behaving in punishable ways.""
But if punishment works,, when it works well, because a person sets
up contingencies of positive reinforcement which make the punishable
behavior improbable, then, Skinner points out, the contingencies can be
arranged for him by others and we do not need the punishment. "It should
be possible to design a world in which behavior likely to be punished
seldom or never occurs. We try to design such a world for those who can-
not solve the problem of punishment for themselves, such as babies, re-
tardates, or psychotics, and if it could be done for everyone, much time
and energy would be saved."'12 Punishment is an indirect control of be-
havior, in Skinner's view, for it works only by forcing the person to find
positive reinforcements which cause him to behave differently. Conse-
quently, direct positive conditioning to make a person "automatically
good" would be less demanding on him and control him more effectively.
In fact, in some cases, such as alcoholism and juvenile delinquency, it is
the only effective means.13
Given the apparent painfulness, inefficiency, and inefficacy of pun-
ishment, Skinner feels he must explain why the defenders of freedom still
advocate it. His explanation assumes what he argued elsewhere, that credit
for behavior is awarded inversely as the conspicuousness of its condition-
10. Ibid., p. 61. 12. Ibid., p. 66.

11. Ibid., p. 64. 13. Ibid., pp. 73-74.
ing, and such credit is itself a learned reinforcer.14 "When we punish a

person for behaving badly, we can leave it up to him to discover how to
behave well, and he can then get credit for behaving well. But if he be-
haves well for the reasons we have just examined, it is the environment
that must get the credit."15 By preserving the illusion of the autonomous
man, we refuse to take effective control of behavior and retain the prac-
tice of giving credit for good behavior. The advantage for the defenders
of freedom is that they need not be weaned from the praise that rein-
forces their behavior.
Skinner suggests another ulterior motive which the partisans of free-
dom have for defending punishment. By holding the offender responsible
for his behavior, those of us who are responsible for the environment
which caused him to act as he did avoid blame, and even the executioner
can inflict his punishment without remorse. All blame is heaped on the
offender, while the punishers and controllers get off free.'
The argument against his opponents is ad hominem, but it has a point.
What the defenders of freedom in fact defend in the name of freedom, he
says, is the inconspicuousness of control over behavior. And they do so
because, when control is inconspicuous, they receive credit for their be-
havior. But, if we discount their interests in retaining the practice of giv-
ing credit, which is merely a conditioned reinforcer, there is no objective
reason to prefer inconspicuous control to the conspicuous variety. In fact,
since blame and the pain of punishment are unnecessary costs involved in
such inconspicuous control, there is reason to prefer the more positive,
direct kind.
By insisting that, on behaviorist principles, there are no criteria ex-
cept efficacy of control for judging the institutions of punishment, Skin-
ner's argument rejects the soft determinist's contention that punishment
is a device having special advantages for man's autonomy. Thus, the argu-
ment can be undercut by showing that there is a reason, given the nature
of the control afforded by punishment and the nature of the persons con-
trolled, for preferring it to the more direct controls that Skinner plans.
The model of the procedurally conditioned man developed in the first
section enables us to make such a distinction between punishment and
direct, nonaversive control.
The most obvious difference is that the practice of punishment is
peculiarly useful in providing the contingencies of reinforcement needed
to produce and maintain procedural conditioning, for it is, in effect, the
social model on which inner control is based. In other words, the prac-
tice of punishing people, or holding them responsible in other ways, rein-
forces the mechanism by which an individual, in effect, punishes himself
when he acts wrongly. On the other hand, if a person were never held
14. Ibid., pp. 44-52. 16. Ibid., pp. 75-78.

15. Ibid., pp. 66-67.
22 Ethics
responsible for his behavior, it is unlikely, on behavioristic assumptions,

that he would ever learn to hold himself responsible for his behavior, and
thus also unlikely that his behavior would be subject to self-correction.
Skinner seems to recognize at certain points, especially in his last
chapter, that something like self-control is possible within his behavior-
istic principles.17 Skinner rightly asserts that self-control can be explained
by the contingencies of reinforcement going far back into a person's life
history-what I have called procedural conditioning, perhaps. But he in-
sists that it is merely a "less visible" control of the content of behavior
than the more usual form of direct conditioning by the environment. In
Skinner's version, the "Judeo-Christian conscience and the Freudian super-
ego" are "acquired from the community." "The conscience and the super-
ego are the vicars of society, and theologians and psychoanalysts alike
recognize their external origin."18
In these passages, he interprets the superego as a rigid set of princi-
ples which "speak for what is good for others"-a kind of internal map
for good behavior. He fails to appreciate the autonomy of which the PCM
is capable, because he thinks only of determining the content of behavior.
Should the PCM behave in a way which, because of its consequences, he
thinks is wrong, and should he go back to check where his decision mak-
ing went astray, he might resolve to give up or alter some of his principles
rather than repress a desire or fault his carelessness. What he finally iden-
tifies as error may itself be the result of complex deliberations, but the
effect of holding himself responsible is to incorporate a self-correcting
mechanism into his decision-making process. The only constraint for the
PCM is that his principles, values, long-range goals, etc., must hang to-
gether and mutually modify one another in the light of new experience;
and this is the effect of following certain principles of rationality. The
superego becomes, not a rigid pattern for invariant responses to certain
situations, as Skinner seems to believe, but a mechanism which permits the
development, after a wide variety of errors, of a relatively coherent set of
principles and other commitments more adequately adjusted to the en-
vironment.
There is, by the way, a long-range advantage for the society in using
punishment as its means of control; for, since the institution of punish-
ment is the social pattern of inward punishment or guilt, the institution
is subject to pressures to refine its principles in the face of criticism from
PCMs just as the principles which a PCM holds are subject to correction
when he feels guilt. That is, in a society of PCMs, there is a tendency for
social pressure to change the grounds for punishing a person when they
are contrary to what the individuals can justify according to their own
experience and principles. This amounts to a self-controlling social mecha-
nism which would not be available with Skinner's more direct control.
17. Ibid., p. 199. 18. Ibid., p. 68.
Although it may not incorporate all the features defenders of free-

dom may want to include in autonomy, the PCM is a model of autonomy
which is sufficient to demonstrate a special advantage of punishment as a
means of control, an advantage which would be lost if it were replaced, as
Skinner proposes, by direct, positive conditioning of the desired behavior.
Therefore, Skinner has failed to show that the only difference between
punishment and direct conditioning lies in the inconspicuousness of the
control of the behavior which finally results. In short, it does not follow
immediately from behavoristic principles that the environment of adults
ought to be designed to control them in the same way as we control
"babies, retardates and psychotics."
Not only does punishment reinforce procedures of self-control, it has
the complementary advantage over direct conditioning that it respects the
integrity of the PCM. That is, punishment is designed to make offensive
behavior so costly that it (ordinarily) rules out that alternative for the
PCM; but it does not require that he also give up the interests, desires,
goals, etc., which motivate the punishable behavior. The only demand is
that he so control himself that he not commit the offensive acts. What he
is to do instead to satisfy his desires, goals, etc., is not determined. Skinner,
in his analysis of punishment, takes this as a disadvantage. It will be re-
membered that Skinner said that punishment works by forcing the person
to find an alternative set of reinforcements to condition himself positively
to behave in ways other than the punishable way. It would be easier, he
supposed, if we were to arrange a set of positive contingencies so that he
would not have to bear the burden of devising his own. From the point
of view of the PCM, such direct, nonaversive control demands far more
of him than punishment, for it removes the opportunity to choose, in the
light of his own interests, principles, etc., an alternative, nonpunishable
behavior to replace his offensive responses. Given the way the PCM has
been conditioned, such direct control short-circuits the cognitive pro-
cesses which the PCM has been conditioned to allow to influence his be-
havior, and the coherence of the person's commitments is compromised.
The issues on this level reduce to the more general one of the value of
political freedom, which Skinner argues is also inappropriate for behavior-
istic man.
Freedom
Believing that all behavior is controlled, Skinner's first task in discuss-

ing freedom is to identify it. He has in mind political freedom, the con-
dition so obviously lacking for the stereotypical slave, spurred by the
lash of his master's whip to backbreaking labor. But the difference be-
tween the freeman and the slave is not that the freeman can, while the
slave cannot, do what he wants. Both are behaving as they are disposed to
do by the contingencies of their reinforcements. The important difference
24 Ethics
between them, Skinner argues, is that the slave's behavior is controlled by

aversive stimuli or negative reinforcement, while the freeman's behavior
is controlled by nonaversive or positive reinforcers.19 Freedom, for Skin-
ner, is the absence of aversive control.
The behavior, and the mistake, of the defenders of freedom can be
explained on behavioristic principles. In the face of aversive conditions
generated by other people, one can either submit, like the slave, and there-
by diminish their aversiveness,20 or one can try to do away with the aver-
sive conditions. The defenders of freedom have struggled against aversive
control either by escaping from those imposing the aversive conditions or
by attacking and attempting to destroy the ability of others to impose
such conditions.21 But the defenders of freedom have gone too far, Skinner
argues, for they have overgeneralized their goal by identifying their ene-
my as any control of behavior.22 "They have taken the extreme position
that all control is wrong. In so doing they exemplify a behavioral process
called generalization. Many instances of control are aversive, in either
their nature or their consequences, and hence all instances are to be
avoided. . . . The literature of freedom has encouraged escape from or
attack upon all controllers. It has done so by making any indication of
control aversive. . . . Control is clearly the opposite of freedom, and if
freedom is good, control must be bad."23 The attack overgeneralizes by
opposing nonaversive as well as aversive control. But nonaversive control,
when it does not lead to aversive consequences, should not generate at-
19. Aversive control is to be distinguished from punishment by the fact that it is

directed at forcing a person to behave in a certain prescribed way, e.g., the slave to
work, while punishment is designed only to keep the person from behaving in a pro-
scribed way, i.e., committing a crime (p. 61). The aversive control would appear to
involve a sustained and repeated imposition of negative reinforcers, while punishment
is an occasional and easily avoided matter.
21. Ibid., pp. 30-31.
22. Actually Skinner says the defenders of freedom make another mistake as well.
They identify freedom, he says, with a feeling, namely, "feeling free" or "doing what
one wants" (p. 32). His argument seems to be that wanting is merely the inner or
"felt" side of a disposition and thus not a cause of behavior. "Wanting is not . . . a
feeling, nor a feeling the reason a person acts to get what he wants. Certain contingen-
cies have raised the probability of behavior and at the same time have created conditions
which may be felt. Freedom is a matter of contingencies of reinforcement, not of the
feelings the contingencies generate" (pp. 37-38). As such, Skinner's argument is merely
the repetition of his demand that we not explain action by appeal to feelings. But the
insistence on his orthodoxy blinds him again, for the error of identifying freedom with
the feeling of being free seems to be his, not the defenders of freedom. For it is Skinner,
not the defenders of freedom, who insists that the only evil in the lack of freedom is
the presence of aversive control, and it is the presence of aversive control, he says, which
causes us to lose the sense of "feeling free" (see Walden Two, p. 262, for a revealing
discussion of Skinner's position on "feeling free"). The defenders of freedom have
been inclined to argue that man is not free in circumstances where he feels free, and that
is precisely the point Skinner's argument is designed to disprove. Thus, Skinner, not
the defenders of freedom, defends the feeling criterion of freedom.
tempts to escape or counterattack.24 And, since there is no motive to

object to nonaversive control. the only real interest in freedom is to resist
aversive control. Thus Skinner bemoans the historical trap into which
our civilization has backed. "Were it not for the unwarranted generaliza-
tion that all control is wrong, we should deal with the social environment
as simply as we deal with the non-social."25
Skinner sympathizes with the genuine incentive of the defenders of
freedom, for he too opposes aversive control. He believes, however, that
since circumstances demand greater control, we must now turn away
from our historical position and impose extensive nonaversive controls
on behavior.
Unfortunately, Skinner is not always clear about the measures he has
in mind when he refers to nonaversive control. Some of these he cites
would not normally be thought to violate our freedom. He mentions
positive controls ranging from wage incentives and governmental sub-
sidies to a teacher's approval and the promise of God's love.26 Economic
incentives influence people's choices through situations in which alterna-
tives are structured by others, but it is hard to see how such practices
limit one's freedom-in any sense in which the defenders of freedom have
understood it-unless the alternatives were so narrowed as to make the
situation aversive. Freedom does not require that no one else influence
one's environment.27
If Skinner is recommending nonaversive controls which transgress the
traditional boundaries of freedom, then he must have something else in
mind. His references to the nonaversive reinforcements of teacher's ap-
proval and the promise of God's love are more like the behavioristic con-
trol devices which have chilled the hearts of the defenders of freedom in
his descriptions of the utopia of the automatically good. If it can be shown
that our traditional interest in political freedom-which includes opposi-
tion to some kinds of nonaversive controls-can be vindicated within the
constraints of behaviorism, then it will be clear that Skinner has not shown
that the only interest in freedom is the avoidance of aversive conditions.
We also have an interest in avoiding the utopia of the automatically good.
What is wrong with Skinner's account of the value of freedom can
be revealed by discussing a particularly ambiguous passage about the hap-
24. Ibid., p. 32.

25. Ibid., p. 42.
26. Ibid., pp. 32-33; see also pp. 38-39.
27. Skinner sometimes confuses his opponents. Generally, he is attacking the tradi-
tional defenders of the institutions of freedom. But at times he identifies them with the
rabid individualists who oppose all governmental action or the recognition of any
social needs. For example, at one point he insists that the defender of freedom is too
selfish to take cultural survival as a good (Beyond Freedom and dignity, p. 210). And,
elsewhere, he blames the lack of social planning, which led to the superabundance of
automobiles, on the defender of freedom (ibid., p. 117). But his enemy here is a kind
of extreme individualism, familiar in capitalist dogma, and not the defender of freedom.
26 Ethics
py slave, in which he seems to be attacking the defenders of freedom.

After explaining that the defenders of freedom generate opposition to the
masters by reminding the slave of his misery, he comments that "a system
of slavery so well designed that it does not breed revolt is the real threat.
The literature of freedom has been designed to make men conscious of
'aversive' control, but in its choice of methods it has failed to rescue the
happy slave."28 What is not clear in this passage is whether Skinner would
agree that the happy slave ought to be saved, for if the only real interest
in freedom is the absence of aversive control, then there is no reason to
free him. To insist, as Skinner did earlier, that " the word 'slave clarifies the
nature of the ultimate consequences being considered: they are exploitive
and hence aversive," is really to skirt the problem of the happy slave by
defining it away. Surely it is possible, given behaviorist technology, to
condition people with positive reinforcers alone, so that what they do
benefits the controller, say, economically, without benefiting the people
controlled. A clear case can be made that it is exploitive: the controller
has enormous wealth and power as a result of the efforts of the controlled,
and yet he never resorts to aversive methods. Nor, if he is clever enough in
his behavioristic technology, need he ever have to resort to them.
The interest in freedom which extends beyond merely avoiding aver-
sive control to opposing certain forms of positive control can be made
clearer by considering what would have to be done to the PCM to make
him a happy slave.
1. Deception might work, although it is precarious. To mention this
means, however, makes it clear that the PCM has an interest in avoiding
it, for the usefulness of his deliberation depends on having reliable infor-
mation about the situation in which he acts.
2. One might try to persuade the PCM to believe that it is fair for
the controller to keep the surplus economic product.29 But such persuasion
is not likely to succeed because it will require further adjustments. The
PCM is likely to ask, for example, why the controller and not himself
should receive the surplus. Unless they destroy his autonomy, the con-
trollers must then persuade him to accept other principles so that he can
reason to this one. Historically, ideologies have performed this role, but
even ideologies are subject to rational criticism. Some grounds of equity,
appeals to analogy, and the like will be sanctioned by reason and available
in the ideology.30 The PCM has no shortcut to truth and the right, but
he is conditioned to be able to pursue them. The effect is to preclude
effective control by persuasion.
28. Beyond Freedom and Dignity, p. 40.

29. Skinner rejects the idea that persuasion and reasoning are methods to be pre-
ferred over more direct behavioral controls, and the limitations in its effectiveness in
changing minds is his reason (ibid., pp. 93-97).
30. The role of reason in challenging such inequities is illustrated in R. M. Hare's
Freedom and Reason (Oxford, 1963).
3. For the proficient behaviorist, however, the most likely method

would be to condition the slave to approve of the exploitive arrangement.
In terms of the decision procedures postulated for the PCM, this method
would involve conditioning the person to believe that it is just and de-
sirable that the controller retain the surplus product. The PCM would be
controlled by controlling the content of his operative principles.
Either this method reduces to rational persuasion (2), or it is inimical
to the PCM because it removes one of his principles from the possibility
of correction. Principles order responses on different levels, some more
basic than others, but in the PCM each is adjusted to the others as ex-
perience brings out new connections and conflicts among them. Nor is
there any reason to suppose that the weight of many less fundamental
principles would not lead to the revision of more fundamental ones. "Pro-
gramming" into the PCM, by such conditioning, an overriding principle
to approve of his exploitation would be effective only if the principle
were not subject to criticism and modification. But to alter the PCM in
this way is to destroy his autonomy, at least in those areas affected by the
principles, for the result is something like an isolated, neurotic conviction
which is not subject to change as a result of experience. Unless the prin-
ciples and other commitments hang together in their rational connections
and modify one another as they are used in new situations, the self-cor-
recting mechanism will not work.
Thus, either the controller undermines the PCM's autonomy by de-
ceiving him or by programming him with an overriding principle, or he
is forced to generate ideologies and enter into debates about the justice
of his practices which may result in his overthrow. The latter course
preserves the PCM's autonomy but precludes his being a happy slave.
The PCM's interest in avoiding the plight of the happy slave accounts
for at least part of the reason for wanting a kind of freedom which ex-
tends beyond merely avoiding aversive conditions. His interest is the pres-
ervation of his procedural conditioning. It does not reduce to a desire to
avoid being exploited; for the PCM would have the same objection to a
behaviorist utopia which was not exploitive. In the utopia of the automati-
cally good, for example, by acting spontaneously in accordance with the
dispositions reinforced in the society, one behaves in socially useful ways-
indeed, in ways which maintain the complementary contingencies of rein-
forcement for others. What the PCM must reject is not the actual con-
tents of his behavior (say, the way the work is divided), but the manner
in which the utopia ensures that the proper behavior will be exhibited.
The behavior of a PCM results as much from his entrenched principles
and interests, developed over a long history of testing, as it does from
the contingencies of his immediate environment, while the behavior of
the automatically good man reflects little more than the current contin-
gencies of reinforcement in his environment. The autonomy of the PCM
28 Ethics
can be seen in the coherence of policy and interests in his behav

a wide span of time and situations. His interest in freedom is h
in preserving this integrity, but the utopia of the automatically
cludes it.
As partial evidence that the interest in political freedom ex
yond the avoidance of aversive control, to maintaining autonomy
merely note the historically important demands for freedom o
press, and association. These areas must be kept free or the pr
criticism and debate, on which the PCM depends, are subverted
cannot account for the special place accorded these rights in hi
because he overlooks the possibility, consistent with behaviorism
havior is mediated by cognitive processes.
It might be objected that the argument, at best, shows that there is
an interest in freedom only if it is desirable to have PCMs. But no more
is required to rebut Skinner's argument than to admit their possibility.
Skinner insisted that, as long as we assume that behavior is determined
in accordance with the laws of behaviorism, there is no special reason to
oppose direct nonaversive control. I have argued that direct, nonaversive
control could be significantly more destructive for the PCM than the in-
direct control involved in the institutions of freedom, and that, therefore,
there is a reason to prefer the institutions of freedom over the controls
used in the utopia of the automatically good. Thus, Skinner is wrong in
saying that the only possible interest in freedom, for a behaviorist, is avoid-
ing aversive controls.
The introduction of the PCM made it possible to cite those features
of control which defenders of freedom have traditionally advocated in
justification of the institutions of freedom. It is effectively, a rule for
translating the traditional defenses of freedom into a behavioristic frame-
work; and, since the traditional arguments have been adequately explored
in detail, there is no need to reproduce them here. The behavioristic as-
sumptions which appeared to be a special strength of Skinner's position
turn out to be of no more advantage to the hard determinist in opposing
the institutions of freedom than the more general assumption of universal
determinism.
The reason Skinner fares no better than his predecessors is that his
premises are not significantly stronger than theirs. Skinner argued that
behaviorism shows that autonomy is a myth. "A scientific analysis of be-
havior dispossesses autonomous man and turns the control he has been
said to exert over to the environment."'31 The premise of his argument was
the behavioristic principle that all behavior can be accounted for, ulti-
mately, by appeal to the contingencies of reinforcement. But this assump-
tion is little more than an assumption of determinism, and it does not
entail that there is no difference between direct control by such reinforce-
ments and the very indirect control preserved with procedural condition-
ing and the institutions of freedom. There is no difference in the sense
that, in either case, the behavior is determined by reinforcement. But there
is a significant difference in how reinforcement determines it, and it is
this difference which allows one to restate, in the behaviorist framework,
the traditional justifications of the institutions of freedom. The PCM per-
mits that difference to be presented more dramatically, by showing that
a choice to abolish the institutions of freedom, far from a mere choice
among means of control, is a choice of what sort of man we shall have.
III
In the foregoing section I have spoken as if it were desirable that

behavioral responses be mediated by the cognitive processes which pro-
cedural conditioning affords, although my argument does not turn on that
assumption. Yet, one can interpret Skinner as proposing in the second
phase of his argument, not that procedural conditioning is impossible, but
rather that we ought to give it up for a greater good: "Our culture has
produced the science and technology it needs to save itself. It has the
wealth needed for effective action. It has, to a considerable extent, a con-
cern for its own future. But if it continues to take freedom and dignity,
rather than its own survival, as its principal value, then it is possible that
some other culture will make a greater contribution to the future."32
Skinner thus seems to argue that we should abandon the institutions of
freedom for the sake of survival. In the following, I shall show that sur-
vival can be a value only for those who have capacities similar to the
PCM and, therefore, that to replace him with the automatically good man
undermines the value, and therefore the justification, of the proposal.
Skinner's solution to the problems of ethics is strikingly simple.
"Good things are positive reinforcers."33 Also, positive reinforcers are
good, for he says, "To make a value judgment by calling something good
or bad is to classify it in terms of its reinforcing effects."34 Although some
have thought that the fact-value distinction marked a difference between
facts and something else, Skinner insists that it merely indicates which
science establishes the truth of the judgment: "When we say that a value
judgment is not a matter of fact but of how someone feels about a fact,
we are simply distinguishing between a thing and its reinforcing effect.
Things themselves are studied by physics and biology, usually without
reference to their value, but the reinforcing effects of things are the
province of behavioral science, which, to the extent that it is concerned
with operant reinforcement, is a science of values."35
One might dispute Skinner's position on the issues of ethics, but it
rests on the behaviorist principle that it is impossible for anything to be a
32. Ibid., p. 181. 34. Ibid., p. 105.

33. Ibid., p. 103. 35. Ibid., p. 104.
30 Ethics
goal for someone unless it is a possible reinforcer. And, if one cannot

choose as one's goal things other than positive reinforcers, then the point
of insisting that other things are valuable is surely lost.
This psychological constraint is not quite as limiting as it sounds, for,
on the basis of natural reinforcers such as food, sex, sleep, and the warmth
of others, other things become conditioned reinforcers. For example, if
we enjoy the taste of the apple, the sight of it, which preceded our eating
it, becomes reinforcing.36 Activities which have been reinforced by their
consequences become reinforcers themselves and thus possible goals.
The behavioristic analysis of intentionality is a consequence of this
psychological principle. "[Behavior] becomes intentional if the effect is
reinforcing. A person acts intentionally, as we have seen, not in the sense
that he possesses an intention which he then carries out, but in the sense
that his behavior has been strengthened by consequences. A child who
cries until caressed begins to cry intentionally."37 Speaking elsewhere of
operant conditioning, Skinner insists that one can find the purpose of the
behavior in the reinforcing conditions which have followed it in the past.38
There is a conflict, however, which reflects a deeper problem in
Skinner's account of the behavior of an individual by means of the rein-
forcers it is directed at bringing about, that is, the sorts of things which
have reinforced it in the past. The reinforcers may be either natural or
conditioned, either in the interest of the actor ("personal reinforcers") or,
because of conditioning, for the good of others. But, whichever it is, the
behavior must have been reinforced in the past, and its present goal is
always the recurrence of the reinforcer. Skinner insists that no other
goals are possible, even that no other items are called good.39
The conflict arises because it is crucial to Skinner's argument for the
replacement of the institution of freedom that the long-range survival of
the culture be called a value and taken as a goal by at least some members
of the society. But it is not possible for the survival of a culture to have
been a reinforcer of anyone's behavior. Thus, by his theory, there is no
possible way for survival to be good or to be anyone's goal. Skinner states
his problem quite candidly:
When it has become clear that a culture may survive or perish, some of its
members may begin to act to promote its survival. The two values which, as we
have seen, affect those in a position to make use of a technology of behavior-
the personal "goods," which are reinforcing because of the human genetic en-
dowment, and the "goods for others," which are derived from personal rein-
forcers-we must now add a third, the good of the culture. But why is it effec-
tive? Why should people in the last third of the twentieth century care about
what the people in the last third of the twenty-first century will look like, how
36. Ibid., p. 104. He calls it "respondent conditioning." See also p. 110.

37. Ibid., p. 18.
38. Ibid., p. 204.
39. Ibid., p. 128.
they will be governed, how and why they will work productively, what they
will know, or what their books, pictures, and music will be like? No current
reinforcers can be derived from anything so remote. Why, then, should a per-
son regard the survival of his culture as a "good?"40
Skinner does not resolve the conflict satisfactorily. I will mention

briefly a few stabs he makes in the course of three chapters on the issue,
but they merely sink him deeper into the same conflict. The reason that
Skinner does not resolve it, I shall argue, is that a successful solution would
force him to accept the distinction between something like the PCM and
the automatically good man.
Skinner tries to avoid the problem by insisting that "the survival of a
culture . . . emerges as a special kind of value."41 He seems willing merely
to assert it, almost as a stipulative definition. "Survival is the only value
according to which a culture is eventually to be judged, and any practice
that furthers survival has survival value by definition."42 Skinner says noth-
ing more about why survival should be thought to be a value except to
suggest, by analogy, that it functions as the principle of selection among
cultures, much as biological survival selects among species in the theory
of evolution.43 But no such analogy will explain how individuals can come
to value it, and he concludes at one point, "it is a matter of the good of
the culture, not of the individual."44
Although redefining "good" to include cultural survival along with
positive reinforcers may solve the problem for his theory of values, the
psychological issue remains. How is it possible for individuals to pursue
cultural survival as a goal when it is not a possible reinforcer?
At times Skinner speaks of those working for cultural survival doing
so as an accidental by-product of their pursuit of other goals. "Much of
what a person does to promote the survival of a culture is not 'intentional'
-that is, it is not done because it increases survival value."45 So much is
consistent with his theory. But it hardly amounts to working for cultural
survival intentionally, and Skinner needs and uses this stronger sense. Try-
ing to explain why one should be concerned about the survival of his
culture, he writes, "There is no good reason why you should be con-
cerned, but if your culture has not convinced you that there is, so much
the worse for your culture."46 He seems to be asking the impossible of
culture. Later on, he speaks of those few among us who "take an interest
in its survival," who are "concerned primarily with survival value," to
40. Ibid., p. 134.

41. Ibid., p. 150.
42. Ibid., p. 136.
43. Ibid., pp. 132, 151. He seems to be committed to a kind of superorganicism.
44. Ibid., p. 144.
45. Ibid., p. 135.
46. Ibid., p. 137.
32 Ethics
whom "the survival value of a community can be made important," and

who "act to further its survival through design."47
From the beginning of the slur to the end, he moves from a psycho-
logical impossibility to a moral virtue. The conflict can be resolved with-
out abandoning behaviorism but at a cost fatal to Skinner's argument about
autonomy and freedom. There is no question that Skinner takes himself,
at least, to be acting intentionally to bring about the survival of our cul-
ture. I shall try to show what else he must accept to make it possible for
him to take cultural survival as his goal.
The explanation most compatible with behavioristic principles would
suppose that Skinner's behavior is not really directed at cultural survival
at all but that, rather, like the "hero" he mentions, he has been seduced by
other reinforcements into a behavior that appears to be aimed at cultural
survival.
Suppose, for example, that a group is threatened by a predator.... Someone

possessing special strength or skill attacks and kills the monster or drives him
away. The group, released from threat, reinforces the hero with approval,
praise, honor, affection, celebration, statues, arches of triumph, and the hand of
the princess.... The important fact about such contingencies is that the greater
the threat, the greater the esteem accorded the hero who alleviates it. The hero,
therefore, takes on more and more dangerous assignments until he is killed.48
Skinner, like the hero, may have been induced by the esteem of his public,
or other reinforcers, to promote the survival of the culture. His real goal
is the esteem, or other reinforcers, and he has found that arguing for cul-
tural survival is an effective means for getting that reinforcement. That is,
after all, the same sort of explanation Skinner repeatedly gives of the be-
havior of the defenders of freedom: they claim their goal is defending
the autonomy of men, but their real goal is the reinforcement of being
admired.
One might argue that this account explains how it is possible for cul-
tural survival to become a person's goal,49 because the means to other re-
inforcers may themselves become reinforcers. The means become ends.
But, even so, this account would only explain Skinner's taking the pursuit
of cultural survival (e.g., lecturing, writing books, doing experiments,
arguing on TV talk shows) as his end, not his taking cultural survival (the
distant state of affairs) as his goal. As we shall see, there is a difference
between the psychological goal (the esteem) and the goal one might claim
(as Skinner claims his is cultural survival). And, even though his behavior
may have the consequence of bringing about a greater likelihood of the
culture's surviving, his principles provide no way for us to take such a
47. Ibid., pp. 150, 151, 154, and 180, respectively.

48. Ibid., p. 111.
49. Ibid., p. 136.
goal as explaining what he is doing. The psychological reinforcers are the

goal, and what Skinner claims is irrelevant.
In order for Skinner's argument to be acceptable, it must be possible,
at least, for cultural survival to be a value and, therefore, to be a goal of
his behavior. Thus far, however, it has been possible only to show that
the pursuit of cultural survival is itself a conditioned goal or a means to
further psychological reinforcements. But a resolution of the difficulty is
easy, if the pursuit of cultural survival is reasonable enough. If the actual
behavior exhibited is continually adjusted, in changing circumstances, to
remain effective in bringing about the distant goal, then surely it can be
understood and explained as being directed at cultural survival, regardless
of what the psychological explanation may be.
The difference between the two sorts of goals can be marked by the
distinction between the psychological goal which, as Skinner insists, is the
(recurrence of) past reinforcers of the behavior, and the intended goal,
which is the future state to which present behavior is adjusted as a means
to its realization.50 The intended goal, unlike the psychological goal, need
never have occurred before, nor, it might be noted, need it be a reinforcer
of behavior, natural or learned.
The distinction marks a difference, as I noted above, only if the be-
havior purportedly directed at the distant goal is a reasonable means of
attaining the end. It is not enough that one merely say that he takes some
future state of affairs as his end. If he never engages in behavior which
would reasonably be expected to bring any such claimed goal about, his
verbal behavior must be discounted and explained away, as, perhaps, be-
havior which pleases people around him and thus for which he gets rein-
forcement. Stated positively, the condition for introducing the distinction
between intended goals and psychological goals entails that the person to
whom it applies is capable of certain processes, namely, adjusting present
behavior in a reasonable way to goals which are not psychological rein-
forcers.
But is it possible for a creature subject to the laws of behavioristic
psychology to satisfy the conditions for applying the distinction? The
answer is twofold. The automatically good man surely cannot satisfy the
conditions. His behavior is goal directed, to be sure, but the goals must
be reinforcers. The whole point of his conditioning is to condition his
desires and wants so that, in acting to fulfill them, he behaves in socially
desirable ways. Any kind of conditioning which would enable him to
choose a goal which was not a reinforcer would remove him from direct,
nonaversive control by his environment, so that his behavior would not
be controlled by structuring the contingencies of reinforcement in his
environment.
50. For an excellent account of intentionality, see D. C. Dennett, "Intentional

Systems," Journal of Philosophy 68, no. 4 (February 1971): 87-106.
34 Ethics
Although the automatically good man is not capable of having in-

tended goals which are different from psychological reinforcers, it is ap-
parent that the PCM is. Procedural conditioning equips him with the
capacity to reason in ways which would allow him, among other things,
to determine, on the basis of his information about the situation, what he
must do now to bring about a state of affairs in the future and to act on
his conclusions. Such behavior would qualify as being reasonably directed
toward a goal, if it were done intelligently. The psychological goals for
the PCM are the reinforcements he has received, and continues to receive,
for maintaining his deliberative and self-controlling processes. Moreover,
it is clear that the intended goal need not itself be a reinforcer. The PCM
chooses his course of action in accordance with the conclusion of his
practical reasoning, and there is no requirement that it select only states
of affairs which have been rewarding in the past. The principles he em-
ploys are the result of complex contingencies of reinforcement in the past
and of the modifications resulting from the self-correcting function of
holding oneself responsible, but there is no need, on behavioristic grounds,
to suppose that what the principle indicates as a goal has itself ever been,
or ever will be, a reinforcer.
Although the distinction between psychological and intended goals
may apply to other types of people as well, it is hard to see how the in-
tended goals will diverge from psychological goals unless the choice of
behavior and ends is mediated by something like cognitive processes in a
way similar to those of the PCM.
But, if it is not possible for automatically good men to take cultural
survival as a value, much less to work for it, then how can Skinner justify
anything to them by appeal to it? Their culture may survive indefinitely
if Skinner can carry out his reforms (although that is far from plausible),
but, even so, that is nothing to them. Nor, once all have been recondi-
tioned into automatically good men, can anyone intentionally work for
cultural survival.
At this point, it is clear that Skinner's proposal is either self-defeating
or grossly unjust. It is self-defeating if he is proposing that everyone be
transformed into an automatically good man, for the means makes the
end worthless. Once we are all automatically good, cultural survival can-
not be a value for anyone. Thus, it is hard to see how it could be a value
at all. On the other hand, if Skinner is proposing that only the masses be
reconditioned into automatically good men, while he and a few others
retain the capacity to work for goals which have never been reinforcers,
then the proposal seems unjust. The few would be imposing conditions
on the others which they are unwilling to have imposed on themselves.
They may try to justify it on the grounds that it is in the interest of those
who are reconditioned, although they do not know it, but even an in-
veterate paternalist must be a little uneasy about insisting that everyone

has an overriding interest which he cannot possibly come to recognize.
The deeper error in Skinner's account of behavior, which gives rise
to this puzzle, is his inability to see how the content of a person's behavior
can be directed by cognitive processes. He thinks he does not have to take
account of purported cognitive processes, but the possibility of the PCM
shows that they are compatible with behavioristic assumptions. Once they
are introduced, behavior can be described in terms of the beliefs, goals,
and principles the agent himself uses to justify and guide it, and one need
not limit descriptions of behavior to bodily movements. Further, the be-
havior can then be seen to exhibit a directedness toward certain ends and
a consistency of pattern which can be explained in terms of intended goals
and reasons as well as by citing various reinforcements in the past which
have indirectly affected it. In short, Skinner overlooks, and behaviorism
does not preclude, the mediation of behavior by cognitive processes.
IV
I have tried to show how Skinner's argument fails. In the first phase,
I have argued that behaviorism does not preclude autonomy and that,
therefore, the traditional justifications of the institutions of freedom are
no less strong than they ever were (however strong that may be). I have
tried to demonstrate this by developing a model of autonomy, the PCM,
within the constraints of behavioristic principles, and by contrasting the
behavior and conditioning of a PCM with that of an automatically good
man. The superiority of the institutions of freedom over their proposed
replacements is that they preserve the indirect control of behavior ap-
propriate for maintaining procedural conditioning and, hence, autonomy,
while their substitutes would involve direct, nonaversive controls that
would subvert autonomy.
In the second phase, I have argued against Skinner that the survival
of our culture can not justify replacing the institutions of freedom with
direct, nonaversive controls, for such replacement results in the destruc-
tion of procedural conditioning in favor of automatic goodness, and auto-
matically good men cannot take cultural survival as a value. The distinc-
tion between intended and psychological goals can be made out only
when we assume that people are not automatically good but are similar
to PCMs in that their behavior is mediated by cognitive processes. Thus,
the means Skinner advocates would undermine the goal which he uses to
justify it.
The connection between the two phases is apparent. The features of
the institutions of freedom he scorned-that is, the indirectness of their
control of behavior-are precisely the conditions which permit the cogni-
tive processes of the PCM to be effective in directing behavior. By advo-
cating their replacement with more direct controls, he proposes means
36 Ethics
which tend to undermine his own argument, not only because taking
cultural survival as one's intended goal requires cognitive processes, but
because any argument does.
Behaviorism does not require that one accept Skinner's proposals.
The PCM represents an alternative conditioning within its assumptions,
and it models a sufficiently strong sense of autonomy for the soft deter-
minist to defend the institutions of freedom. Yet, if behaviorism is true, it
does make the choice a genuine one, for it is possible to recondition us
into automatically good men. Skinner is right when he says that "no the-
ory changes what it is a theory about. Nothing is changed because we
look at it, talk about it, or analyze it in a new way."'5' But it can change
if we use the theory to change it. One might see something ominous in
what Skinner has in mind.
Man has not changed because we look at him, talk about him, and analyze him
scientifically. His achievements in science, government, religion, art, and liter-
ature remain as they have always been, to be admired as one admires a storm
at sea or autumn foliage or a mountain peak, quite apart from their origins and
untouched by a scientific analysis. What does change is our chance of doing
something about the subject of a theory. Newton's analysis of the light in a
rainbow was a step in the direction of the laser.52
Yes, and the application of modern chemistry to industrial and domestic

needs was the first step in the destruction of Lake Erie.

52. Ibid., p. 213.

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Escape from Freedom and Dignity

Author(s): Phillip H. Scribner

Skinner believes that, if behavior is determined in accordance with

behavior. As Skinner insists, "The outlines of a technology are already

6. Beyond Freedom and Dignity, p. 149.

person to deliberate about behavior in the manner I have indic

The brunt of Skinner's argument consists in showing that, if behav-

9. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity, p. 13.

consequently, that they are not replaceable by direct conditionin

Skinner argues that punishment is merely a means for controlling

10. Ibid., p. 61. 12. Ibid., p. 66.

ing, and such credit is itself a learned reinforcer.14 "When we punish a

14. Ibid., pp. 44-52. 16. Ibid., pp. 75-78.

responsible for his behavior, it is unlikely, on behavioristic assumptions,

17. Ibid., p. 199. 18. Ibid., p. 68.

Although it may not incorporate all the features defenders of free-

Believing that all behavior is controlled, Skinner's first task in discuss-

between them, Skinner argues, is that the slave's behavior is controlled by

19. Aversive control is to be distinguished from punishment by the fact that it is

tempts to escape or counterattack.24 And, since there is no motive to

24. Ibid., p. 32.

py slave, in which he seems to be attacking the defenders of freedom.

28. Beyond Freedom and Dignity, p. 40.

3. For the proficient behaviorist, however, the most likely method

can be seen in the coherence of policy and interests in his behav

31. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity, p. 205.

In the foregoing section I have spoken as if it were desirable that

32. Ibid., p. 181. 34. Ibid., p. 105.

goal for someone unless it is a possible reinforcer. And, if one cannot

36. Ibid., p. 104. He calls it "respondent conditioning." See also p. 110.

Skinner does not resolve the conflict satisfactorily. I will mention

40. Ibid., p. 134.

whom "the survival value of a community can be made important," and

Suppose, for example, that a group is threatened by a predator.... Someone

47. Ibid., pp. 150, 151, 154, and 180, respectively.

goal as explaining what he is doing. The psychological reinforcers are the

50. For an excellent account of intentionality, see D. C. Dennett, "Intentional

Although the automatically good man is not capable of having in-

veterate paternalist must be a little uneasy about insisting that everyone

Yes, and the application of modern chemistry to industrial and domestic

51. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity, p. 213.

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