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Labor Cases
On March 23, 1979, the master of the vessel who is one of the private respondents sent a cable to petitioner, while said
vessel was en route to Australia which is an ITF controlled port, stating that private respondents were not contented with
the salary and benefits stipulated in the manning contract, and demanded that they be given 50% increase thereof, as the
"best and only solution to solve ITF problem
The seamen were accordingly disembarked in Japan and repatriated to Manila. They then filed a complaint with the NSB
for illegal dismissal and non-payment of wages.
Art. 34. Prohibited practices.—It shall be unlawful for any individual, entity, licensee or holder of authority:
xxx xxx xxx
(i) To substitute or alter employment contracts approved and verified by the Department of Labor from the time of actual
signing thereof by the parties up to and including the period of expiration of the same without the approval of the
Department of Labor;
While the Board recognizes the rights of the Seamen to seek higher wages provided the increase is arrived at thru mutual
consent, it could not however, sanction the same if the consent of the employer is secured thru threats, intimidation or
force. In the case at bar, the Company was compelled to accede to the demand of the Seamen for a salary increase to
forestall the possibility of the vessel being interdicted by the ITF at Kwinana, Australia, for in the event the vessel would be
detained and/or interdicted the Company would suffer more losses than paying the Seamen 25% increase of their
With respect to the second issue, the Board believes that the termination of the services of the Seamen was legal and in
accordance with the provisions of their respective employment contracts. Considering the findings of the Board that the
Seamen breached their contracts, their subsequent repatriation was justified. While it may be true that the Seamen were
hired for a definite period their services could be terminated prior to the completion of the fun term thereof for a just and
valid cause.
Case Brief: St. Luke’s Medical Center Employee’s Foundation AFW v NLRC
February 3, 2017Jeff Rey
G.R. No. 162053 March 7, 2007
ST. LUKE’S MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEE’S FOUNDATION AFW
v.
NLRC
Facts:
Congress passed and enacted Republic Act No. 7431 known as the “Radiologic Technology Act of 1992.” Said law requires that no
person shall practice or offer to practice as a radiology and/or x-ray technologist in the Philippines without having obtained the proper
certificate of registration from the Board of Radiologic Technology. Petitioner Maribel Santos was hired as X-Ray Technician in the
Radiology department of private respondent St. Luke’s Medical Center, Inc. (SLMC).
Pursuant to RA 7431 the assistant Executive Director-Ancillary Services and HR Director of private respondent SLMC issued a final
notice to all practitioners of Radiologic Technology to comply with the requirement otherwise, the unlicensed employee will be
transferred to an area which does not require a license to practice if a slot is available.
The Director of the Institute of Radiology issued another memorandum to petitioner Maribel S. Santos advising her that only a license
can assure her of her continued employment at the Institute of Radiology of the private respondent SLMC and that the latter is giving
her the last chance to take and pass the forthcoming board examination scheduled in June 1998; otherwise, private respondent SLMC
shall be constrained to take action which may include her separation from employment. On November 23, 1998, the Director of the
Institute of Radiology issued a notice to petitioner Maribel S. Santos informing the latter that the management of private respondent
SLMC has approved her retirement in lieu of separation pay. SLMC issued a “Notice of Separation from the Company” to petitioner
Maribel S. Santos effective December 30, 1998 in view of the latter’s refusal to accept private respondent SLMC’s offer for early
retirement.
Petitioner Maribel Santos files a complaint against private respondent illegal dismissal and non-payment of salaries, allowances and
other monetary benefits. She
further contends that her failure to pass the board licensure exam for exam for X-ray
technicians did not constitute just cause for termination as it violated her
constitutional right to security of tenure. The appellate court finds this contention
untenable, hence this petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is legally dismissed pursuant to R.A. 7431
exercising police power of the State?
Held:
Yes, the petitioner dismissal is valid due to her inability to secure a certificate
of registration from Board of Radiologic Technology.
While the right of workers to security of tenure is guaranteed by the Constitution, its exercise may be reasonably regulated
pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and the general welfare
of the people. Consequently, persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may
be required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers. The state is justified in prescribing the specific
requirements for x-ray technicians and/or any other professions connected with the health and safety of its citizens. Respondent being
engaged in the hospital and health care business, is a proper subject of the cited law; thus, having in mind the legal requirements of
these laws, the latter cannot close its eyes and complainant private interest override public interest. The law is clear that the Certificate
of Registration cannot be substituted by any other requirement to allow a person to practice as a Radiologic Technologist and/or X-ray
Technologist (Technician
FACTS: Petitioner is Jocelyn Galera (GALERA), an American citizen who was recruited from the United States of America by private
respondent John Steedman, Chairman-WPP Worldwide and Chief Executive Officer of Mindshare, Co., a corporation based in Hong
Kong, China, to work in the Philippines for private respondent WPP Marketing Communications, Inc. (WPP), a corporation registered
and operating under the laws of Philippines.
Employment of GALERA with private respondent WPP became effective on September 1, 1999 solely on the instruction of the CEO
and upon signing of the contract, without any further action from the Board of Directors of private respondent WPP.
Four months had passed when private respondent WPP filed before the Bureau of Immigration an application for petitioner GALERA
to receive a working visa, wherein she was designated as Vice President of WPP. Petitioner alleged that she was constrained to sign
the application in order that she could remain in the Philippines and retain her employment.
On December 14, 2000, petitioner GALERA alleged she was verbally notified by private respondent STEEDMAN that her services had
been terminated from private respondent WPP. A termination letter followed the next day. Thus, a complaint for illegal dismissal was
filed against WPP.
The LA held that WPP, Steedman, Webster, and Lansang liable for illegal dismissal and damages. Arbiter Madriaga stated that Galera
was not only illegally dismissed but was also not accorded due process. The NLRC reversed the LA decision. The NLRC stressed that
Galera was WPPs Vice-President, and therefore, a corporate officer at the time she was removed by the Board of Directors. Such
being the case, the imperatives of law require that we hold that the Arbiter below had no jurisdiction over Galeras case as, again, she
was a corporate officer at the time of her removal.
On appeal, the CA reversed the NLRC decision. It ruled that a person could be considered a "corporate officer" only if appointed as
such by a corporations Board of Directors, or if pursuant to the power given them by either the Articles of Incorporation or the By-
Laws.
ISSUE:
Galera being an employee, then the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have jurisdiction over the present case.
***
WPPs dismissal of Galera lacked both substantive and procedural due process. Apart from Steedman's letter dated 15 December 2000
to Galera, WPP failed to prove any just or authorized cause for Galeras dismissal.
The law further requires that the employer must furnish the worker sought to be dismissed with two written notices before termination
of employment can be legally effected: (1) notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his
dismissal is sought; and (2) the subsequent notice which informs the employee of the employers decision to dismiss him. Failure to
comply with the requirements taints the dismissal with illegality. WPPs acts clearly show that Galeras dismissal did not comply with
the two-notice rule.
***
The law and the rules are consistent in stating that the employment permit must be acquired prior to employment. The Labor Code
states: "Any alien seeking admission to the Philippines for employment purposes and any domestic or foreign employer who desires to
engage an alien for employment in the Philippines shall obtain an employment permit from the Department of Labor."
Galera cannot come to this Court with unclean hands. To grant Galeras prayer is to sanction the violation of the Philippine labor laws
requiring aliens to secure work permits before their employment. We hold that the status quo must prevail in the present case and we
leave the parties where they are. Hence, Galera is not entitled to monetary awards. This ruling, however, does not bar Galera from
seeking relief from other jurisdictions.
Aliviado vs. Procter and Gamble DIGEST
December 19, 2016 ~ vbdiaz
Aliviado vs. Procter and Gamble
G.R. No. 160506 June 6, 2011
Facts:
Petitioners worked as merchandisers of P&G. They all individually signed employment contracts with either Promm-Gem or
SAPS. They were assigned at different outlets, supermarkets and stores where they handled all the products of P&G. They received
their wages from Promm-Gem or SAPS.
SAPS and Promm-Gem imposed disciplinary measures on erring merchandisers for reasons such as habitual absenteeism, dishonesty
or changing day-off without prior notice.
To enhance consumer awareness and acceptance of the products, P&G entered into contracts with Promm-Gem and SAPS for the
promotion and merchandising of its products.
In December 1991, petitioners filed a complaint against P&G for regularization, service incentive leave pay and other benefits with
damages.
Issue: WON P&G is the employer of petitioners.
Held:
In order to resolve the issue of whether P&G is the employer of petitioners, it is necessary to first determine whether Promm-Gem and
SAPS are labor-only contractors or legitimate job contractors
.Clearly, the law and its implementing rules allow contracting arrangements for the performance of specific jobs, works or services.
However, in order for such outsourcing to be valid, it must be made to an independent contractor because the current labor rules
expressly prohibit labor-only contracting.
To emphasize, there is labor-only contracting when the contractor or sub-contractor merely recruits, supplies or places workers to
perform a job, work or service for a principal and any of the following elements are present:
1. i) The contractor or subcontractor does not have substantial capital or investment which relates to the job, work or service to
be performed andthe employees recruited, supplied or placed by such contractor or subcontractor are performing activities which are
directly related to the main business of the principal; or
1. ii) The contractor does not exercise the right to control over the performance of the work of the contractual
Under the circumstances, Promm-Gem cannot be considered as a labor-only contractor. We find that it is a legitimate independent
contractor.
Considering that SAPS has no substantial capital or investment and the workers it recruited are performing activities which are
directly related to the principal business of P&G, we find that the former is engaged in “labor-only contracting”.
Where labor-only contracting exists, the Labor Code itself establishes an employer-employee relationship between the employer and
the employees of the labor-only contractor. The statute establishes this relationship for a comprehensive purpose: to prevent a
circumvention of labor laws. The contractor is considered merely an agent of the principal employer and the latter is responsible to the
employees of the labor-only contractor as if such employees had been directly employed by the principal employer.
Petition Granted
Servaña started out as a security for the Agro-Commercial Security Agency (ACSA) since 1987. The agency had a contract with TV
network RPN 9.
On the other hand, Television and Production Exponents, Inc (TAPE). is a company in charge of TV programming and was handling
shows like Eat Bulaga! Eat Bulaga! was then with RPN 9.
In 1995, RPN 9 severed its relations with ACSA. TAPE retained the services of Servaña as a security guard and absorbed him.
In 2000, TAPE contracted the services of Sun Shield Security Agency. It then notified Servaña that he is being terminated because he
is now a redundant employee.
Servaña then filed a case for illegal Dismissal. The Labor Arbiter ruled that Servaña’s dismissal is valid on the ground of redundancy
but though he was not illegally dismissed he is still entitled to be paid a separation pay which is amounting to one month pay for every
year of service which totals to P78,000.00.
TAPE appealed and argued that Servaña is not entitled to receive separation pay for he is considered as a talent and not as a regular
employee; that as such, there is no employee-employer relationship between TAPE and Servaña. The National Labor Relations
Commission ruled in favor of TAPE. It ruled that Servaña is a program employee. Servaña appealed before the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC and affirmed the LA. The CA further ruled that TAPE and its president Tuviera should pay
for nominal damages amounting to P10,000.00.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an employee-employer relationship existing between TAPE and Servaña.
HELD: Yes. Servaña is a regular employee.
In determining Servaña’s nature of employment, the Supreme Court employed the Four Fold Test:
1. Whether or not employer conducted the selection and engagement of the employee.
Servaña was selected and engaged by TAPE when he was absorbed as a “talent” in 1995. He is not really a talent, as termed by TAPE,
because he performs an activity which is necessary and desirable to TAPE’s business and that is being a security guard. Further, the
primary evidence of him being engaged as an employee is his employee identification card. An identification card is usually provided
not just as a security measure but to mainly identify the holder thereof as a bona fide employee of the firm who issues it.
2. Whether or not there is payment of wages to the employee by the employer.
Servaña is definitely receiving a fixed amount as monthly compensation. He’s receiving P6,000.00 a month.
3. Whether or not employer has the power to dismiss employee.
The Memorandum of Discontinuance issued to Servaña to notify him that he is a redundant employee evidenced TAPE’s power to
dismiss Servaña.
4. Whether or not the employer has the power of control over the employee.
The bundy cards which showed that Servaña was required to report to work at fixed hours of the day manifested the fact that TAPE
does have control over him. Otherwise, Servaña could have reported at any time during the day as he may wish.
Therefore, Servaña is entitled to receive a separation pay.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court ruled that Tuviera, as president of TAPE, should not be held liable for nominal damages as there
was no showing he acted in bad faith in terminating Servaña.
Regular Employee Defined:
One having been engaged to perform an activity that is necessary and desirable to a company’s business.
MAUNLAD TRANS., INC./CARNIVAL CRUISE LINES, INC., and MR. AMADO L. CASTRO, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
RODOLFO M. CAMORAL
Antecedent Facts
For 18 years since 1991, Camoral was continuously deployed overseas by Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., a foreign shipping company,
through its local agent, Maunlad Trans., Inc. (petitioners). In April 2009, they took him on board M/S Carnival Sensation as ice carver
for a period of eight months, the company doctors having declared him "Fit for Sea Duty (Without Restriction)" after the requisite
physical evaluations. As ice carver, Camoral’s job required lifting and carrying heavy blocks of ice and using heavy equipment and
tools, working for hours inside the freezer in sub-zero temperature. One day inSeptember 2009 while at work, he suddenly felt
excruciating pain in his neck. The pain quickly radiated to his shoulder, chest and hands. It became so intense that he dropped to the
floor. Pain relievers could not relieve the pain, and the ship’s doctor advised the Chief Chef that Camoral was unfit for further duty on
board. On advice of the company doctor in Florida, United States of America, Dr. James E. Carter (Dr. Carter), a Magnetic Resonance
Imaging scan was performed on Camoral’s cervical spine on September 25, 2009, revealing the following:3
IMPRESSION:
1. At C5-6, there is a moderately large, broad-based posterior disc herniation of the protrusion type with resultant obliteration of the
subarachnoid space ventrally and severe right greater than left bilateral neural foraminal stenosis. There is probable compression of the
exiting right greater than left C6 nerves bilaterally.
2. At C4-5, there is a small-to-moderate sized, diffuse, posterior broad-based disc herniation of the protrusion type. There is resultant
effacement of the subarachnoid space ventrally and a mild amount of right-sided neural foraminal stenosis.
3. There is slight reversal of the normal lordotic curvature of cervical spine consistent with muscle spasm.4
In his medical report dated September 28, 2009, Dr. Carter found Camoral with "Cervical Disc Herniation and Radiculopathy" and
declared him "unfit for duty". Camoral was repatriated on October 4, 2009, and on arrival in Manila he was referred to company
doctors at the Marine Medical Services of the Metropolitan Medical Center. On October 26, 2009, he underwent a surgical procedure
known as "Anterior C5 Discectomy Fusion with Pyramidal Cage and Mastergraft Putting, Plating." In the Operation Sheet, his pre-
operative and post-operative diagnosis showed "Cervical Spondylotic Radiculopathy secondary to C4-C5, C5-C6 Disc Protrusion,"
while the portion on "Description of Organs" stated that he had a "compressed end at C4-5 to C5-6 level and thickened posterior
ligaments." He underwent rigorous physical therapy, but after more than five months his condition barely improved, and the pain in
his neck, chest and shoulder persisted. He then consulted Dr. Rogelio P. Catapang, Jr. (Dr. Catapang), a renowned Orthopaedic and
Traumatology Surgeon, who after a thorough clinical and physical examination of Camoral issued a report on February 22, 2010.5 The
report stated that: Present physical examination revealed neck pain more on flexion; presence of a post operative scar anterior neck;
neck movement is limited, sudden and strenuous activities may aggravate the condition. Mr. Camoral continues to complain and suffer
from neck pain despite continuous therapy. The pain is made worse by neck rotation. He has lost his pre-injury capacity and is UNFIT
to work back at his previous occupation as a seafarer.
x x x If a long term and more permanent result are [sic] desired however, he should refrain from activities producing torsional stress
on the neck and those that require repetitive bending and lifting, things Mr. Camoral is expected to do as a Seafarer.
Some restriction must be placed on Mr. Camoral’s work activities. This is in order to prevent the impending late sequelae of his
current condition. He presently does not have the physical capacity to return to the type of work he was performing at the time of his
injury. He is therefore UNFIT in any capacity for further sea duties.6
Camoral failed to get further financial assistance from the petitioners for his subsequent treatment and medications, as well as total
disability benefits. He was instead offered $10,075.00 corresponding to Grade 10 disability the company gave him. With no income
for more than 120 days and having been declared unfit to return to his previous job due to loss of his pre-injury capacity, he sued the
petitioners before the LA for total disability benefits of US$60,000.00, citing Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on board Ocean-going Vessels (POEA SEC for
brevity).7 In their answer, the petitioners argued that Camoral was not entitled to total and permanent disability benefits since he was
not assessed by the company doctors with a Grade 1 disability; that Dr. Robert Lim (Dr. Lim), one of the company doctors, noted in
his medical report dated December 11, 2009 that after surgery and rehabilitation Camoral was recovering well, and that in his follow-
up report dated January 8, 2010, X-Ray examination showed good alignment and fusion, and he advised Camoral to continue
medications and rehabilitation; that on January 29, 2010, Dr. Lim noted that Camoral’s muscle strength in both upper extremities were
graded 5/5, indicating improvement, and on March 5, 2010, Dr. Lim noted that he had reached maximum medical cure; that Dr. Ibet
Marie Y. Sih (Dr. Sih), a company neuro and spine surgeon, assessed him with Grade 10 disability with moderate stiffness or one-third
limitation of motion of the neck, not Grade 1 disability; that petitioners paid all of his sickness allowance and medical expenses.8
Rulings of the LA and the NLRC
On November 10, 2010, the LA rendered judgment, the pertinent portion of which reads: Section 20 B of the Standard Terms and
Conditions Governing the Employment of Seafarers On-Board Ocean Going Vessels, provides:
B. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS
The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work- related injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows:
1. The employer shall continue to pay the seafarer his wages during the time he is on board the vessel;
2. If the injury or illness requires medical and/or dental treatment in a foreign port, the employer shall be liable for the full cost of such
medical, serious dental, surgical and hospital treatment as well as board and lodging until the seafarer is declared fit to work to be
repatriated. However, if after repatriation, the seafarer still requires medical attention arising from said injury or illness, he shall be so
provided at cost to the employer until such time he is declared fit or the degree of his disability has been established by the company-
designated physician.
3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until
he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case
shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.
xxxx
Under the Section 20B of Standard Contract, an injury or illness to be compensate [sic] must be work-related and has occurred during
the effectivity of the contract.
These conditions are met in the instant case x x x.
xxxx
This Office rules in favor of the complainant [finding him] entitled to total disability. This finds support in the [string] of Supreme
Court decisions that the inability of the seafarer to return to the same kind of work he was trained to render him permanently disabled.
xxxx
There is no disagreement between the findings of the company- designated physician and complainant’s private doctor because both
declared that complainant is not fit to go back to work. x x x.
Considering that complainant’s position is (sic) an Ice Carver, it is required that he should have full movement of his neck in the
performance of his function and the pain and the limitation of his neck movement effectively prevents him from engaging in the same
kind of work he was trained for.
The Grade 10 disability made by the company physician is not binding to this Office as it is clear that complainant can no longer
return to work.
xxxx
Complainant’s claim for damages cannot be granted for lack of basis. But as complainant availed of the services of a lawyer, he is
entitled to an award of attorney’s fees.
WHEREFORE, a Decision is hereby rendered ordering Respondents jointly and solidarily to pay complainant US$60,000.00 plus ten
(10%) percent thereof as and by way of attorney’s fees.
SO ORDERED.9
The petitioners appealed to the NLRC, which however denied the same in its Decision dated July 27, 2011, the pertinent portion of
which reads:
Indeed, it is not disputed that the conditions for compensability of an incapacity resulting from work-connected illness/injury during
the term of the contract, have been met in this case.
xxxx
Perusal of the respondents’ submitted medical report and disability assessment fails to show how the partial permanent disability
assessment was arrived at, as it simply states that complainant is suffering from impediment Grade 10 disability, without any evidence
that indeed only 1/3 limitation of motion of the neck or moderate stiffness had affected the complainant.
On the other hand, as shown by the certification issued by Dr. Catapang on February 22, 2010 complainant’s disability is permanent
and prevents him from further sea duties. The medical opinion also categorically declares that complainant continues "to suffer from
neck pain despite continuous therapy" and that "he should refrain from activities producing torsional stress on the neck and those that
require repetitive bending and lifting; things that Mr. Camoral is expected to do as a Seafarer."
xxxx
x x x The test to determine its gravity is the impairment or loss of one’s capacity to earn and not its mere significance. Permanent total
disability means disablement of the employee to earn wages in the same kind of work or work of similar nature that he was trained for
or accustomed to perform or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainment can do.
xxxx
Accordingly, We find the medical opinion of complainant’s own doctor to be more credible, and sustain the assessment as to
complainant’s permanent incapacity that has rendered him unfit to work as seafarer, thus entitling him to [sic] awarded disability
compensation.
We sustain the award of attorney’s fees of ten (10%) percent as the complainant had sought legal representation pursuing his valid
contractual claims.
WHEREFORE, respondents’ appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Decision dated November 10, 2010 stands AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.10
The petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied in the Resolution dated October 14, 2011 of the NLRC.
Ruling of the CA
On petition for certiorari to the CA, citing Section 20B(6) of the POEA SEC, the petitioners insisted that regardless of whether the
disability is total or partial, any compensation should be based on the grading provided in the POEA SEC, which in this case is Grade
10 disability as assessed by the company doctors.11
But the appellate court upheld the NLRC, ruling that firstly, Section 20 of POEA SEC, which is deemed written into the seafarer’s
contract, provides for the minimum requirements acceptable to the government before it approves the deployment of Filipino seafarers
on foreign ocean-going vessels, and that secondly, the two elements required for an injury or illness to be compensable concurred in
the case: a) the injury or illness is work related, and b) and it occurred during the term of the seafarer’s contract.12 The pertinent
portion of Section 20 reads: SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS. —
(B) COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS
xxxx
3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until
he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case
shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.
For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post employment medical examination by a company-designated physician
within three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the
agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement
shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.
If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the employer and the
seafarer. The third doctor’s decision shall be final and binding on both parties.
4. Those illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this Contract are disputably presumed as work related.
5. Upon sign-off of the seafarer from the vessel for medical treatment, the employer shall bear the full cost of repatriation in the event
the seafarer is declared (1) fit for repatriation; or (2) fit to work but the employer is unable to find employment for the seafarer on
board his former vessel or another vessel of the employer despite earnest efforts.
6. In case of permanent total or partial disability of the seafarer caused by either injury or illness the seafarer shall be compensated in
accordance with the schedule of benefits arising from an illness or disease shall be governed by the rates and the rules of
compensation applicable at the time the illness or disease was contracted.13
The CA cited Maersk Filipinas Crewing, Inc./Maersk Services Ltd. v. Mesina14 on what constitutes permanent as well as total
disability, thus:
Permanent disability is inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of
any part of his body. Total disability, on the other hand, means the disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work
of similar nature that he was trained for, or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and
attainments could do. A total disability does not require that the employee be completely disabled, or totally paralyzed. What is
necessary is that the injury must be such that the employee cannot pursue his or her usual work and earn from it. A total disability is
considered permanent if it lasts continuously for more than 120 days.15 (Italics ours)
In concluding that Camoral’s disability is permanent and total, the CA noted that "he became unfit to continue the same kind of work
he was hired for by the [p]etitioners for more than 120 days as also established by the findings and recommendations made by the
company doctors and by Dr. Catapang, the private physician whom private respondent hired."16 The CA also held that while under
Section 32 of the POEA SEC, only injuries or disabilities classified as Grade 1 may be considered as total and permanent, if, however,
even with a disability grading from 2 to 14, hence, partial and permanent, the seafarer is incapacitated to perform his usual sea duties
for more than 120 days or 240 days, depending on the need for further medical treatment, under legal contemplation he is totally and
permanently disabled. The CA further said that "an impediment should be characterized as partial and permanent not only under the
Schedule of Disabilities found in Section 32 of the [POEA SEC] but should be sounder the relevant provisions of the Labor Code and
the Amended Rules on Employee Compensation (AREC) implementing Title II, Book IV of the Labor Code."17
In contrast, the CA cited Article 192(c)(1) of the Labor Code expressly granting to Camoral total permanent disability:
Art. 192 (c). The following disabilities shall be deemed total and permanent:
(1) Temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than one hundred twenty days, except as otherwise provided for in the
Rules[.]
xxxx
The CA also invoked Section 2(b), Rule VII of the AREC which provides, to wit:
Sec. 2. Disability
xxxx
b. A disability is total and permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee is unable to perform any gainful occupation
for a continuous period exceeding 120 days, except as otherwise provided for in Rule X of these Rules.
xxxx
The CA also concurred in the award of attorney’s fees to Camoral on the basis of Article 2208 of the Civil Code, since he was
compelled to hire a lawyer due to the petitioners’ unreasonable refusal to pay his benefits.
Petition for Review in the Supreme Court
In the instant petition, insisting that the factual conclusion of the appellate court as to Camoral’s disability was based on speculation
and manifestly mistaken inferences, the petitioners point out that Camoral was assessed with a Grade 10 disability within the 240-day
period allowed to the employer by law; that Camoral was seen by his private doctor only on one single consultation, whereas the
company-designated doctors treated him over an appreciable length of time; and the award of attorney’s fees was erroneous since they
complied with all their obligations under the POEA SEC, and the denial of Camoral’s claim for total disability benefits was based on
just, legal, and valid grounds.
Ruling of the Court
The petition is devoid of merit.
The petitioners admit in their petition that on the 150th day of Camoral’s treatment, March 5, 2010, his maximum medical cure or
recovery was reached, at which time he was finally assessed with a Grade 10 disability, with moderate stiffness, or one-third limitation
of motion of the neck. Thereafter, the petitioners refused further medical assistance and offered him $10,075.00 as partial permanent
disability benefit, which Camoral however declined, insisting that his disability is total and permanent.18
Camoral’s treatment extended beyond 120 days and although the maximum cure was attained, both the company doctor and Camoral’s
private doctor agreed that in his condition he could no longer return to his job as ice carver. Significantly, the company’s neuro-spine
surgeon, Dr. Sih, in her letter-bulletin19 particularly noted that "considering the patient’s nature of work (entailing heavy weight
lifting), he is assessed to be disabled/not fit to go back to work." Camoral’s own physician, Dr. Catapang, found that he continued to
complain and suffer from neck pain despite continuous therapy, and the pain is made worse by neck rotation, something that obviously
cannot be prevented in a manual occupation, and he concluded that Camoral has lost his pre-injury capacity and is UNFIT to work
back at his previous occupation as a seafarer. The issue now before the Court is whether the disability grading provided by the
petitioners for Camoral’s impediment must control. The Court says no.
In Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc., et al.,20 the Court harmonized the POEA SEC with the Labor Code and the AREC in
holding that: (a) the 120 days provided in Section 20-B(3) of the POEA SEC is the period given to the employer to determine the
fitness of the seafarer to work, during which the seafarer is deemed to be in a state of total and temporary disability; (b) the 120 days
of total and temporary disability may be extended by a maximum of 120 days, or up to 240 days, should the seafarer require further
medical treatment; and (c) a total and temporary disability becomes permanent when so declared by the company-designated
physician within 120 days or 240 days, as the case may be, or upon the expiration of the said periods without a declaration of either
fitness to work or permanent disability and the seafarer is still unable to resume his regular seafaring duties.21
As noted in Kestrel Shipping Co., Inc. v. Munar,22 the POEA SEC provides merely the minimum acceptable terms in a seafarer’s
employment contract, and that in the assessment of whether a seafarer’s injury is partial and permanent, the same must be so
characterized not only under the Schedule of Disabilities found in Section 32 of the POEA SEC, but also under the relevant provisions
of the Labor Code and the AREC implementing Title II, Book IV of the Labor Code.23 Article 192(c) of the Labor Code provides that
temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than 120 days, except as otherwise provided in the AREC, shall be deemed
total and permanent; Section 2(b) of Rule VII of the AREC also provides that:
[D]isability is total and permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee is unable to perform any gainful occupation for
a continuous period exceeding 120 days, except as otherwise provided under Rule X of these Rules. (Italics ours)
Thus, according to Kestrel, while the seafarer is partially injured or disabled, he must not be precluded from earning doing the same
work he had before his injury or disability or that he is accustomed or trained to do. Otherwise, if his illness or injury prevents him
from engaging in gainful employment for more than 120 days or 240 days, as is the case here, then he shall be deemed totally and
permanently disabled.24 In Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad,25 the Court specifically ruled that it is of no consequence that he
recovered, for what is importantis that he was unable to perform his customary work for more than 120 days, and this constitutes
permanent total disability:
Petitioners tried to contest the above findings by showing that respondent was able to work again as a chief mate in March
2001.1âwphi1 Nonetheless, this information does not alter the fact that as a result of his illness, respondent was unable to work as a
chief mate for almost three years. It is of no consequence that respondent was cured after a couple of years. The law does not require
that the illness should be incurable. What is important is that he was unable to perform his customary work for more than 120 days
which constitutes permanent total disability. An award of a total and permanent disability benefit would be germane to the purpose of
the benefit, which is to help the employee in making ends meet at the time when he is unable to work.26 (Citations omitted and italics
ours)
In Alpha Ship Management Corporation v. Calo,27 the Court said:
An employee’s disability becomes permanent and total when so declared by the company-designated physician, or, in case of absence
of such a declaration either of fitness or permanent total disability, upon the lapse of the 120- or 240-day treatment period, while the
employee’s disability continues and he is unable to engage in gainful employment during such period, and the company-designated
physician fails to arrive at a definite assessment of the employee’s fitness or disability.28
Significantly, the NLRC noted that the medical report and disability assessment submitted by the petitioners after more than 120 days
of treatment and rehabilitation did not show how the partial permanent disability assessment of Camoral was arrived at. It simply
stated that he was suffering from impediment Grade 10 disability, but without any evidence that in fact only one-third limitation of
motion of the neck or moderate stiffness had affected Camoral. But even without this observation, it is not, disputed that Camoral has
been declared unfit by both the petitioners' and Camoral 's doctors to return to his previous occupation. This, to the Court, is akin to a
declaration of permanent and total disability.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
C.F. SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT,INC., RONALD AUSTRIA, and ABU DHABI NATIONAL TANKER CO., Petitioners,
vs.
LEGAL HEIRS OF THE LATE GODOFREDO REPISO, represented by his wife LUZVIMINDA REPISO, Respondents.
On April 24, 2002, Godofredo Repiso (Godofredo) was hired as a Messman on board M/T Umm Al Lulu by petitioner C.F. Sharp, a
local manning agency, on behalf of its principal, petitioner ADNATCO, a marine transportation company based in the United Arab
Emirates. Godofredo and petitioner Austria, as representative of petitioners C.F. Sharp and ADNATCO, signed a Contract of
Employment,[6] which was approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) on May 9, 2002.
Prior to embarkation, Godofredo underwent a pre-employment medical examination (PEME) and was declared physically fit to work.
Godofredo boarded M/T Umm Al Lulu on May 20, 2002. Godofredo was repatriated in Manila on March 16, 2003. The next day,
March 17, 2003, Godofredo went to a medical clinic in Kawit, Cavite where he was examined by Doctor Cayetano G. Reyes, Jr. (Dr.
Reyes). Dr. Reyes diagnosed Godofredo with "Essential Hypertension" and advised Godofredo to take the prescribed medication and
rest for a week.[7]
At about 10:00 in the morning on March 19, 2003, Godofredo was waiting for a ride when he suddenly lost consciousness and fell to
the ground. Good Samaritans brought Godofredo to Del Pilar Hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival. [8] Based on
Godofredo's Certificate of
Godofredo died leaving behind respondents as his legal heirs, namely, his wife, Luzviminda,[10] and three children, Marie Grace (20
years old), Gerald (17 years old), and Gretchen (13 years old).[11]
Respondents also posited that although Godofredo's Contract of Employment was executed on April 24, 2002, it was governed by the
1996 POEA-Standard Employment Contract (SEC)[14] rather than the 2000 POEA-SEC[15] because the implementation of the latter was
enjoined by a temporary restraining order (TRO) issued by the Court.[16] To be compensable under the 1996 POEA-SEC, it was not
necessary to prove that the illness or death was work-related, it being sufficient that the same occurred during the term of the seafarer's
employment. According to respondents, the following facts established that Godofredo died of an illness which he acquired on board
M/T Umm Al Lulu and, thus, entitled respondents to recover death benefits: (1) Godofredo was declared fit to work by petitioners'
designated physician prior to embarkation; (2) Godofredo served on board M/T Umm Al Lulu until his repatriation; and (3) Godofredo
died within 72 hours upon arrival in the Philippines.
Petitioners' Arguments
Petitioners contended that Godofredo's death is not compensable as it did not occur during the term of his employment. A seafarer's
term of employment commenced from his actual departure from the airport or seaport in the point of hire and ceased upon completion
of his period of contractual service, signing-off, and arrival at the point of hire. Godofredo's 10-month contract was about to expire on
March 20, 2003 when he was safely repatriated without any medical condition a few days earlier, on March 16, 2003, as he was
already in a convenient port. Godofredo finished his employment contract upon signing off from M/T Umm Al Lulu and arriving in
Manila, his point of hire, on March 16, 2003. Clearly, Godofredo's death on March 19, 2003 was not compensable because it happened
beyond the term of his contract.
"Strict rules of evidence, it must be remembered, are not applicable in claims for compensation and disability benefits. Private
respondent having substantially established the causative circumstances leading to his permanent total disability to have transpired
during his employment, we find the NLRC to have acted in the exercise of its sound discretion in awarding permanent total disability
benefits to private respondent. Probability and not the ultimate degree of certainty is the test of proof in compensation proceedings."
Whether or not Godofredo's death is compensable depends on the terms and conditions of his Contract of Employment. The
employment of seafarers, including claims for death benefits, is governed by the contracts they sign at the time of their engagement.
As long as the stipulations in said contracts are not contrary to law, morals, public order, or public policy, they have the force of law
between the parties. Nonetheless, while the seafarer and his employer are governed by their mutual agreement, the POEA Rules and
Regulations require that the POEA-SEC be integrated in every seafarer's contract. [38]
The prevailing rule under the 1996 POEA-SEC was that the illness leading to the eventual death of seafarer need not be shown to be
work-related in order to be compensable, but must be proven to have been contracted during the term of the contract. Neither is it
required that there be proof that the working conditions increased the risk of contracting the disease or illness. An injury or accident is
said to arise "in the course of employment" when it takes place within the period of employment, at a place where the employee
reasonably may be, and while he is fulfilling his duties or is engaged in doing something incidental thereto. (Emphases supplied,
citations omitted.)
1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no other, who may issue warrants of arrest and
search:
2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the President or the Commissioner of
Immigration may order arrested, following a final order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal is the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 132, in Criminal Cases Nos. 95-653 to 95-656, convicting
appellant Nimfa Remullo and sentencing her to suffer the following penalties: (1) in Criminal Case No. 95-653, involving illegal
recruitment on a large scale, life imprisonment and the payment of a P100,000 fine, (2) for each case of estafa in Criminal Cases Nos.
95-654 to 95-656, two years, four months, and one day of prision correccional to six years and one day of prision mayor, and to
indemnify the private complainants P15,000 each, and (3) to pay the costs.
In Criminal Case No. 95-653, appellant was indicted in an information that reads:chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
That in or about and during the months from March to May 1993, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, falsely representing herself to have the capacity and power
to contract, enlist and recruit workers for job/placement abroad, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously collect for a
fee, recruit and promise employment job placement abroad to the complainants, ROSARIO CADACIO, JENELYN QUINSAAT and
HONORINA MEJIA, without first securing the required license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment, thus
committing illegal recruitment in large scale in violation of [Article 38(2) in relation to Article 39 (b) of the Labor Code]. 2
In Criminal Case No. 95-654, the allegations in the information read:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
That in or about and during the months from March to May 1993 in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, by means of false pretenses and fraudulent representation
made prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, with intent to defraud the complainant JENELYN QUINSAAT to
the effect that she would send her abroad for the purpose of employment and would need certain amount for the expenses in the
processing of papers thereof, which representations the accused well knew was (sic) false and fraudulent and was only made by her to
induce said complainant to give and pay, as in fact the latter gave and paid to her the amount of P15,000.00 which the accused once in
possession of the said amount, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously appropriate and convert to her own personal
use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the complainant JENELYN QUINSAAT in the aforementioned amount of P15,000.00.
3
Except for the name of the private complainants, the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 95-655 and 95-656 read substantially the
same as that for Criminal Case No. 95-654. 4 Instead of Jenelyn Quinsaat, the alleged victims of estafa were Rosario Cadacio and
Honorina Mejia, respectively.
Upon her arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to all the charges against her. 5 Trial ensued thereafter.
The prosecution presented as its witnesses private complainants Honorina Mejia, Rosario Cadacio, and Jenelyn Quinsaat; Corazon
Aquino of the licensing department of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA); and Evelyn Landrito, vice
president and general manager of Jamila and Co., Inc., appellant’s employer.
Private complainants JENELYN QUINSAAT, ROSARIO CADACIO, and HONORINA MEJIA testified on essentially the same facts.
They averred that they went to appellant’s house sometime in March 1993, where appellant told them she was recruiting factory
workers for Malaysia. Appellant told them to fill up application forms and to go to the office of Jamila and Co., the recruitment agency
where appellant worked. Appellant also required each applicant to submit a passport, pictures, and clearance from the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI); and then to undergo a medical examination. Appellant told them the placement fee was P15,000 for each
applicant, which private complainants gave her. Part of the fee was paid in appellant’s house and part was paid at the Jamila office.
Appellant did not issue receipts for any of the payments.
At the Jamila office, private complainants met a certain Steven Mah, the alleged broker from the company in Malaysia that was
interested in hiring the women. Mah was supposed to interview private complainants but instead just looked at them and told them
they were fit to work.
Private complainants were supposed to leave for Malaysia on June 6, 1993. On May 28, 1993, private complainant Quinsaat testified
that she and the others met with appellant at the Philippine General Hospital where appellant showed them their plane tickets.
Appellant also told them to fill up departure cards by checking the word "holiday" thereon.
At the airport on June 6, 1993, an immigration officer told private complainants they lacked a requirement imposed by the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). 6 Their passports were cancelled and their boarding passes marked "offloaded."
Private complainant Mejia testified that appellant told them they were not able to leave because their visas were for tourists only. 7
Appellant told private complainants they would be able to leave on June 20, 1993 but this, too, did not push through.
Private complainant Mejia inquired from Jamila and Co. regarding their application papers. In response, Evelyn Landrito, vice
president and general manager to Jamila, denied any knowledge of such papers. Landrito told Mejia that appellant did not submit any
document to Jamila. She further certified that appellant was not authorized to receive payments on behalf of Jamila. 8
EVELYN LANDRITO testified that appellant was a marketing consultant for Jamila. 9 As such, her work was limited to securing job
orders for the company through contacts abroad. According to Landrito, appellant went on absence without leave in late 1993.
Landrito did not know the private complainants. She stated that Jamila did not have job orders accredited by the POEA for Malaysia.
10 She knew of a Steven Mah who represented Manifield Enterprise but the agreement with that company did not push through and
POEA did not accredit Manifield. 11
CELYNIA CUYA testified that she was a clerk at the Jamila office, responsible for processing documents for submission to the POEA.
She also assisted in interviewing job applicants. She narrated that Amado Pancha, one of the witnesses for the defense who claimed
that he applied for a job abroad through Jamila, never applied at Jamila based on their records. She presented in court a certification to
this effect, signed by Evelyn Landrito. 12
In her defense, appellant NIMFA REMULLO denied having recruited private complainants and receiving any money from them.
According to her testimony, she met private complainants sometime in March 1993 at the Jamila office where she was a marketing
consultant. They asked for her help in obtaining jobs abroad, so she had them fill up bio-data forms and told them to wait for job
openings. 13 She alleged that Jamila had an agreement with Wearness Electronics, based in Malaysia, concerning the recruitment of
workers for Wearness. 14 Private complainants were supposed to have been recruited for Wearness. 15
Appellant explained that Steven Mah was the owner of Manifield 16 Enterprise, 17 a recruitment agency. Appellant said that Mah
"went to Malaysia to look for job opening and he was able to find this company, Wearness Electronics." 18
Appellant insisted that private complainants did not hand their placement fees to her but to Steven Mah and to a certain Lani Platon.
19 She presented in evidence photocopies of receipts allegedly signed by Platon. 20 She said private complainants sought her
assistance after they were unable to leave for abroad. She pointed out that she helped private complainants fax a letter to Steven Mah
in Singapore asking for the return of their money. 21 She also accompanied them to Batangas where Lani Platon was supposed to be
residing. 22
On cross-examination, appellant insisted that her job at Jamila was not limited to finding prospective employers abroad. She said that
her duties included those assigned by Virginia Castro, Jamila’s deputy manager, among them entertaining job applicants. 23 She said
that it was actually Castro who told Mah to interview private complainants at the Jamila office. 24 Mah went to Jamila sometime on
May 24, 1993 to deliver documents regarding job openings in Singapore and Malaysia. 25 On that same day, private complainants
happened to be at the Jamila office. 26
Appellant also claimed that private complainants later transacted business with Mah without the knowledge of Jamila. According to
her, Lani Platon told her that private complainants were supposed to leave on June 6, 1993.
Also for the defense, witness AMADO PANCHA testified that he came to know appellant when he was applying for a job abroad
through Jamila. He claimed that he was at the Jamila office on May 30, 1993 and saw some people, presumably private complainants,
inside appellant’s office. 27 He met Lani Platon and asked her what she was doing at Jamila. Platon allegedly replied that she was
recruiting female workers for jobs abroad. She introduced Pancha to her Singaporean companion, Steven Mah. 28 Thereafter,
according to Pancha, private complainants gave Platon an envelope containing money that Platon put inside her bag. Private
complainants then handed Platon a piece of bond paper with something typewritten on it, which the latter signed. 29 Appellant signed
on the same piece of paper.
In a decision dated December 11, 1995, the trial court found appellant guilty as charged, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. In Criminal Case No. 95-653, the accused is sentenced to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P100,000.00 and the costs;
2. In Criminal Case No. 95-654, she is sentenced to suffer imprisonment from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
prision correccional to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor; to indemnify Jenelyn Quinsaat the sum of P15,000.00, and to
pay the costs;
3. In Criminal Case No. 95-655, she is sentenced to suffer imprisonment from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
prision correccional to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor; to indemnify Rosario Cadacio the sum of P15,000.00, and to
pay the costs;
4. In Criminal Case No. 95-656, she is sentenced to suffer imprisonment from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
prision correccional to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor; to indemnify Honorina Mejia the sum of P15,000.00; and to pay
the costs.
SO ORDERED. 30
Hence, this appeal. Appellant contends that the trial court erred:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I
. . . IN NOT FINDING THAT EXHIBITS "3", "4" AND "16" ARE CREDIBLE AND COMPETENT PROOFS THAT THE
COMPLAINANTS TRANSACTED WITH AND GAVE THEIR MONEY TO LANI PLATON AND STEVEN MAH IN
CONNECTION WITH THEIR APPLICATIONS FOR OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT.
II
. . . IN NOT FINDING THAT THE VERSIONS OF THE COMPLAINANTS ARE NOT CREDIBLE.
III
. . . IN FINDING THE APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED. 31
Essentially, appellant is assailing the credibility of the witnesses presented by the prosecution, while shifting by way of her defense the
onus of illegal recruitment and estafa to third parties in order to create a reasonable doubt.
Time and again, however, the trial court’s assessment concerning the credibility of witnesses and their testimony has been sustained
and accorded great weight by appellate courts, because of the trial court’s vantage position to observe firsthand the witnesses’
demeanor and deportment in the course of their testimony under oath. The exception is when the trial court has overlooked or
misapprehended certain facts or circumstances that, if considered, would alter the result of the case. 32
In this case, we find no exceptional facts or circumstances, hence no reason to deviate from the general rule. The trial court’s findings
and conclusions are duly supported by the evidence on record, thus there is no sufficient reason to disturb them.
In Criminal Case No. 95-653, appellant was charged with illegal recruitment in large scale. For such a charge to prosper, the following
elements must concur: (1) the accused was engaged in recruitment activity defined under Article 13 (b), or any prohibited practice
under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) he or she lacks the requisite license or authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and
placement of workers; and (3) he or she committed such acts against three or more persons, individually or as a group. 33
(b) "Recruitment and placement" refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring
workers, and includes referrals, contact services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not:
Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be
deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
We are convinced that private complainants, the main witnesses for the prosecution, were enticed by appellant to apply for jobs
abroad. The three private complainants filled up application forms at appellant’s house, and each paid appellant the amount of P15,000
as placement fee. However, she acted without license or lawful authority to conduct recruitment of workers for overseas placement.
The POEA’s licensing branch issued a certification stating that appellant, in her personal capacity, was not authorized to engage in
recruitment activities. 34 Evelyn Landrito, general manager of the placement agency where appellant used to work, denied that the
scope of appellant’s work included recruiting workers and receiving placement fees. Such lack of authority to recruit is also apparent
from a reading of the job description of a marketing consultant, 35 the post that appellant occupied at Jamila and Co.
In the face of evidence pointing to her wrongdoing, appellant only offers denials, while pointing to an alleged ill motive on the part of
private complainants that prompted them to testify against her. According to appellant, private complainants failed to find the
responsible parties, namely Steven Mah and his companion Lani Platon, and so are now going after her.
Appellant’s arguments fail to persuade us of her innocence. The defense of denial is intrinsically weak, a self-serving negative
evidence that cannot prevail over the testimony of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative matters. 36
For appellant to say that she was merely chosen as a scapegoat for appellees’ misfortune, having failed to bring the alleged real
recruiter to justice, does not appear well-founded. It is but a hasty generalization of no probative significance. Without credible
evidence proffered by the defense, bad faith or ulterior motive could not be imputed on the part of the appellees in pointing to the
accused as the illegal recruiter who victimized them. When there is no showing that the principal witnesses for the prosecution were
actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that the witnesses were not so actuated and their testimonies are thus entitled to full
faith and credit. 37
Further, appellant faults the trial court for not finding the receipts and fax message she presented in evidence as competent and
credible proofs of the alleged transaction between private complainants and Steven Mah and Lani Platon. Appellant insists that it was
Lani Platon, not her, who received private complainants’ placement fees. According to her, Platon even issued receipts to prove that
she had taken the money. But mere insistence on her part that Platon was the culprit could not defeat positive testimonies of
complainants to the contrary.
Indeed, it would have been easy for private complainants to pin down Platon if she were the one who received the money and issued
the corresponding receipts. Private complainants would have had the receipts to prove their claim. But why would private
complainants not go after Platon if they had evidence to prove that she took their money? If appellant’s assertions were true, there
would have been no rhyme nor reason for private complainants to file a case against appellant and go through the rigors and expenses
of a court trial if somebody else caused them harm. We note that the natural tendency of one who has been wronged is to seek redress
from the person who caused the harm or injury, not from anyone else.
Defense witness Amado Pancha attempted to corroborate appellant’s testimony that private complainants handed their money to Lani
Platon and not to appellant. However, Pancha did not specifically identify the persons whom he allegedly saw handing Platon an
envelope containing money. He only said that there were visitors inside appellant’s office, that they were "four girls", 38 and that he
would be able to identify them if he sees them again. However, he was not asked to identify the alleged four girls nor the private
complainants in any way. His testimony is patently incomplete, with hardly any probative value.
Anent appellant’s conviction for estafa in Criminal Cases Nos. 95-654 to 95-656, we find no error committed by the trial court. Their
conviction and sentence are fully supported by the evidence on record. For charges of estafa to prosper, the following elements must
be present: (1) that the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit, and (2) that damage or prejudice
capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person. 39 In this case, appellant clearly defrauded private
complainants by deceiving them into believing that she had the power and authority to send them on jobs abroad. By virtue of
appellant’s false representations, private complainants each parted with their hard-earned money. Each complainant paid P15,000 as
recruitment fee to appellant, who then appropriated the money for her own use and benefit, but failed utterly to provide overseas job
placements to the complainants. In a classic rigmarole, complainants were provided defective visas, brought to the airport with their
passports and tickets, only to be offloaded that day, but with promises to be booked in a plane flight on another day. The recruits wait
in vain for weeks, months, even years, only to realize they were gypped, as no jobs await them abroad. No clearer cases of estafa
could be imagined than those for which appellant should be held criminally responsible.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 132, is hereby AFFIRMED. In Criminal Case
No. 95-653, for illegal recruitment in large scale, appellant NIMFA REMULLO is found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment
and to pay a fine of P100,000; and in Criminal Cases Nos. 95-654, 95-655 and 95-656 for estafa, she is declared guilty sentenced in
each case to two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor,
and to pay by way of restitution P15,000 to each of the private complainants, Jenelyn Quinsaat, Rosario Cadacio and Honorina Mejia,
together with the costs.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 200114, August 24, 2015
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, Petitioner, v. DEBBIE UBA�A, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assails: 1) the July 29, 2011 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the Petition for
Certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 110006 and affirming the March 6, 2007 Order3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Daet, Camarines
Norte, Branch 39 in Civil Case No. 7304; and 2) the CA's January 10, 2012 Resolution4 denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration of the herein assailed Decision.
Factual Antecedents
On December 26, 2002, respondent Debbie Ubana filed a civil case for damages against the DBP Service Corporation, petitioner
Social Security System (SSS), and the SSS Retirees Association5 before the RTC of Daet, Camarines Norte. The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 7304 and assigned to RTC Branch 39.
In her Complaint,6 respondent alleged that in July 1995, she applied for employment with the petitioner. However, after passing the
examinations and accomplishing all the requirements for employment, she was instead referred to DBP Service Corporation for
"transitory employment." She took the pre-employment examination given by DBP Service Corporation and passed the same. On May
20, 1996, she was told to report for training to SSS, Naga City branch, for immediate deployment to SSS Daet branch. On May 28,
1996, she was made to sign a six-month Service Contract Agreement 7 by DBP Service Corporation, appointing her as clerk for
assignment with SSS Daet branch effective May 27, 1996, with a daily wage of only P171.00. She was assigned as "Frontliner" of the
SSS Members Assistance Section until December 15, 1999. From December 16, 1999 to May 15, 2001, she was assigned to the
Membership Section as Data Encoder. On December 16, 2001, she was transferred to the SSS Retirees Association as Processor at the
Membership Section until her resignation on August 26, 2002. As Processor, she was paid only P229.00 daily or P5,038.00 monthly,
while a regular SSS Processor receives a monthly salary of P18,622.00 or P846.45 daily wage. Her May 28, 1996 Service Contract
Agreement with DBP Service Corporation was never renewed, but she was required to work for SSS continuously under different
assignments with a maximum daily salary of only P229.00; at the same time, she was constantly assured of being absorbed into the
SSS plantilla. Respondent claimed she was qualified for her position as Processor, having completed required training and passed the
SSS qualifying examination for Computer Operations Course given by the National Computer Institute, U.P. Diliman from May 16 to
June 10, 2001, yet she was not given the proper salary. Because of the oppressive and prejudicial treatment by SSS, she was forced to
resign on August 26, 2002 as she could no longer stand being exploited, the agony of dissatisfaction, anxiety, demoralization, and
injustice. She asserted that she dedicated six years of her precious time faithfully serving SSS, foregoing more satisfying employment
elsewhere, yet she was merely exploited and given empty and false promises; that defendants conspired to exploit her and violate civil
service laws and regulations and Civil Code provisions on Human Relations, particularly Articles 19, 20, and 21. 8 As a result, she
suffered actual losses by way of unrealized income, moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
Respondent prayed for an award of P572,682.67 actual damages representing the difference between the legal and proper salary she
should have received and the actual salary she received during her six-year stint with petitioner; P300,000.00 moral damages;
exemplary damages at the discretion of the court; P20,000.00 attorney's fees and P1,000.00 appearance fees; and other just and
equitable relief.
Petitioner and its co-defendants SSS Retirees Association and DBP Service Corporation filed their respective motions to dismiss,
arguing that the subject matter of the case and respondent's claims arose out of employer-employee relations, which are beyond the
RTC's jurisdiction and properly cognizable by the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
Respondent opposed the motions to dismiss, arguing that pursuant to civil service rules and regulations, service contracts such as her
Service Contract Agreement with DBP Service Corporation should cover only a) lump sum work or services such as janitorial,
security or consultancy services, and b) piece work or intermittent jobs of short duration not exceeding six months on a daily basis. 9
She posited that her service contract involved the performance of sensitive work, and not merely janitorial, security, consultancy
services, or work of intermittent or short duration. In fact, she was made to work continuously even after the lapse of her 6-month
service contract. Citing Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 40, respondent contended that the performance of
functions outside of the nature provided in the appointment and receiving salary way below that received by regular SSS employees
amount to an abuse of rights; and that her cause of action is anchored on the provisions of the Civil Code on Human Relations.
On October 1, 2003, the RTC issued an Order10 dismissing respondent's complaint for lack of jurisdiction, stating that her claim for
damages "has a reasonable causal connection with her employer-employee relations with the defendants" 11 and "is grounded on the
alleged fraudulent and malevolent manner by which the defendants conspired with each other in exploiting [her], which is a clear case
of unfair labor practice,"12 falling under the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter of the NLRC. Thus, it decreed:cralawlawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the aforementioned Motion to Dismiss the complaint of the herein plaintiff for lack of
jurisdiction is hereby GRANTED. The above-entitled complaint is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.13
Respondent moved for reconsideration. On March 6, 2007, the RTC issued another Order14 granting respondent's motion for
reconsideration. The trial court held:cralawlawlibrary
Section 2(1), Art. K-B, 1987 Constitution, expressly provides that "the civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporation[s] with original charters."
Corporations with original charters are those which have been created by special law[s] and not through the general corporation law.
In contrast, labor law claims against government-owned and controlled corporations without original charters fall within the
jurisdiction of the Department of Labor and Employment and not the Civil Service Commission. (Light Rail Transit Authority vs.
Perfecto Venus, March 24, 2006.)
Having been created under an original charter, RA No. 1161 as amended by R.A. 8282, otherwise known as the Social Security Act of
1997, the SSS is governed by the provision[s] of the Civil Service Commission. However, since the SSS denied the existence of an
employer-employee relationship, and the case is one for Damages, it is not the Civil Service Commission that has jurisdiction to try
the case, but the regular courts.
A perusal of the Complaint filed by the plaintiff against the defendant SSS clearly shows that the case is one for Damages.
xxx. Likewise, they are contrary to the Civil Code provisions on human relations which [state], among others, that Every person, must
in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good
faith (Article 19) and that Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently [causes] damages to another, shall indemnify the
latter for the same. (Art. 20)
"Article 19 provides a rule of conduct that is consistent with an orderly and harmonious relationship between and among men and
women It codifies the concept of what is justice and fair play so that abuse of right by a person will be prevented. Art. 20 speaks of
general sanction for all other provisions of law which do not especially provide their own sanction. Thus, anyone, who, whether
willfully or negligently, in the exercise of his legal right or duty, causes damage to another, shall indemnify his or her victim for
injuries suffered thereby." (Persons and Family Relations, Sta. Maria, Melencio, Jr. (2004) pp. 31-32.)
Wherefore, all premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The case against defendant Social Security
System represented by its President is hereby reinstated in the docket of active civil cases of this court.
In a Petition for Certiorari17 filed with the CA and docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 110006, petitioner sought a reversal of the RTC's June
24, 2009 and March 6, 2007 Orders and the reinstatement of its original October 1, 2003 Order dismissing Civil Case No. 7304,
insisting that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over respondent's claims for "unrealized salary income" and other damages,
which constitute a labor dispute cognizable only by the labor tribunals. Moreover, it claimed that the assailed Orders of the trial court
were issued with grave abuse of discretion. It argued that the trial court gravely erred in dismissing the case only as against its co-
defendants DBP Service Corporation and SSS Retirees Association and maintaining the charge against it, considering that its grounds
for seeking dismissal are similar to those raised by the two. It maintained that DBP Service Corporation and SSS Retirees Association
are legitimate independent job contractors engaged by it to provide manpower services since 2001, which thus makes respondent an
employee of these two entities and not of SSS; and that since it is not the respondent's employer, then there is no cause of action
against it.
On July 29, 2011, the CA issued the assailed Decision containing the following pronouncement:cralawlawlibrary
Hence, petitioner seeks recourse before this Court via this Petition for Certiorari challenging the RTC Orders. For the resolution of
this Court is the sole issue of:cralawlawlibrary
WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND DECIDE CIVIL CASE NO. 7304.
The petition is devoid of merits.
The rule is that, the nature of an action and the subject matter thereof, as well as, which court or agency of the government has
jurisdiction over the same, are determined by the material allegations of the complaint in relation to the law involved and the character
of the reliefs prayed for, whether or not the complainant/plaintiff is entitled to any or all of such reliefs. A prayer or demand for relief
is not part of the petition of the cause of action; nor does it enlarge the cause of action stated or change the legal effect of what is
alleged. In determining which body has jurisdiction over a case, the better policy is to consider not only the status or relationship of
the parties but also the nature of the action that is the subject of their controversy.
A careful perusal of Ubana's Complaint in Civil Case No. 7304 unveils that Ubana's claim is rooted on the principle of abuse of right
laid in the New Civil Code. She was claiming damages based on the alleged exploitation [perpetrated] by the defendants depriving her
of her rightful income. In asserting that she is entitled to the damages claimed, [she] invoked not the provisions of the Labor Code or
any other labor laws but the provisions on human relations under the New Civil Code. Evidently, the determination of the respective
rights of the parties herein, and the ascertainment whether there were abuses of such rights, do not call for the application of the labor
laws but of the New Civil Code. Apropos thereto, the resolution of the issues raised in the instant complaint does not require the
expertise acquired by labor officials. It is the courts of general jurisdiction, which is the RTC in this case, which has the authority to
hear and decide Civil Case No. 7304.
Not every dispute between an employer and employee involves matters that only labor arbiters and the NLRC can resolve in the
exercise of their adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. Where the claim to the principal relief sought is to be resolved not by reference
to the Labor Code or other labor relations statute or a collective bargaining agreement but by the general civil law, the jurisdiction over
the dispute belongs to the regular courts of justice and not to the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. In such situations, [resolution] of the
dispute requires expertise, not in labor management relations nor in wage structures and other terms and conditions of employment,
but rather in the application of the general civil law. Clearly, such claims fall outside the area of competence or expertise ordinarily
ascribed to Labor Arbiters and the NLRC and the rationale for granting jurisdiction over such claims to these agencies disappears.
It is the character of the principal relief sought that appears essential in this connection. Where such principal relief is to be granted
under labor legislation or a collective bargaining agreement, the case should fall within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the
NLRC, even though a claim for damages might be asserted as an incident to such claim.
The pivotal question is whether the Labor Code has any relevance to the principal relief sought in the complaint. As pointed out
earlier, Ubana did not seek refuge from the Labor Code in asking for the award of damages. It was the transgression of Article[s] 19
and 20 of the New Civil Code that she was insisting in wagering this case. The primary relief sought herein is for moral and exemplary
damages for the abuse of rights. The claims for actual damages for unrealized income are the natural consequence for abuse of such
rights.
While it is true that labor arbiters and the NLRC have jurisdiction to award not only reliefs provided by labor laws, but also damages
governed by the Civil Code, these reliefs must still be based on an action that has a reasonable causal connection with the Labor Code,
other labor statutes, or collective bargaining agreements. Claims for damages under paragraph 4 of Article 217 must have a reasonable
causal connection with any of the claims provided for in the article in order to be cognizable by the labor arbiter. Only if there is such
a connection with the other claims can the claim for damages be considered as arising from employer-employee relations. In the
present case, Ubana's claim for damages is not related to any other claim under Article 217, other labor statutes, or collective
bargaining agreements.
All told, it is ineluctable that it is the regular courts that has [sic] jurisdiction to hear and decide Civil Case No. 7304. In Tolosa v.
NLRC,18 the Supreme Court held that, "[i]t is not the NLRC but the regular courts that have jurisdiction over action for damages, in
which the employer-employee relations is merely incidental, and in which the cause of action proceeds from a different source of
obligation such as tort. Since petitioner's claim for damages is predicated on a quasi-delict or tort that has no reasonable causal
connection with any of the claims provided for in Article 217, other labor statutes or collective bargaining agreements, jurisdiction
over the action lies with the regular courts not with the NLRC or the labor arbiters." The same rule applies in this case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED and the Order dated March 6, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 39 of Daet, Camarines Norte in Civil Case No. 7304 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.19
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,20 but the CA denied the same in its January 10, 2012 Resolution.21 Hence, the present
Petition.
Issue
Petitioner simply submits that the assailed CA dispositions are contrary to law and jurisprudence.
Petitioner's Arguments
Praying that the assailed CA dispositions be set aside and that the RTC's October 1, 2003 Order dismissing Civil Case No. 7304 be
reinstated, petitioner essentially maintains in its Petition and Reply22 that respondent's claims arose from and are in fact centered on
her previous employment. It maintains that there is a direct causal connection between respondent's claims and her employment,
which brings the subject matter within the jurisdiction of the NLRC. Petitioner contends that respondent's other claims are intimately
intertwined with her claim of actual damages which are cognizable by the NLRC. Moreover, petitioner alleges that its existing
manpower services agreements with DBP Service Corporation and SSS Retirees Association are legitimate; and that some of
respondent's claims may not be entertained since these pertain to benefits enjoyed by government employees, not by employees
contracted via legitimate manpower service providers. Finally, petitioner avers that the nature and character of the reliefs prayed for by
the respondent are directly within the jurisdiction not of the courts, but of the labor tribunals.
Respondent's Arguments
In her Comment,23 respondent maintains that her case is predicated not on labor laws but on Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code for
petitioner's act of exploiting her and enriching itself at her expense by not paying her the correct salary commensurate to the position
she held within SSS. Also, since there is no employer-employee relationship between her and petitioner, as the latter itself admits, then
her case is not cognizable by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) either; that since the NLRC and the CSC have no jurisdiction over
her case, then it is only the regular courts which can have jurisdiction over her claims. She argues that the CA is correct in ruling that
her case is rooted in the principle of abuse of rights under the Civil Code; and that the Petition did not properly raise issues of law.
Our Ruling
In Home Development Mutual Fund v. Commission on Audit,24 it was held that while they performed the work of regular government
employees, DBP Service Corporation personnel are not government personnel, but employees of DBP Service Corporation acting as
an independent contractor. Applying the foregoing pronouncement to the present case, it can be said that during respondent's stint with
petitioner, she never became an SSS employee, as she remained an employee of DBP Service Corporation and SSS Retirees
Association - the two being independent contractors with legitimate service contracts with SSS.
Indeed, "[i]n legitimate job contracting, no employer-employee relation exists between the principal and the job contractor's
employees. The principal is responsible to the job contractor's employees only for the proper payment of
wages."25cralawredcralawrednad
In her Complaint, respondent acknowledges that she is not petitioner's employee, but that precisely she was promised that she would
be absorbed into the SSS plantilla after all her years of service with SSS; and that as SSS Processor, she was paid only P229.00 daily
or P5,038.00 monthly, while a regular SSS Processor receives a monthly salary of P18,622.00, or P846.45 daily wage. In its pleadings,
petitioner denied the existence of an employer-employee relationship between it and respondent; in fact, it insists on the validity of its
service agreements with DBP Service Corporation and SSS Retirees Association - meaning that the latter, and not SSS, are
respondent's true employers. Since both parties admit that there is no employment relation between them, then there is no dispute
cognizable by the NLRC. Thus, respondent's case is premised on the claim that in paying her only P229.00 daily - or P5,038.00
monthly - as against a monthly salary of P18,622.00, or P846.45 daily wage, paid to a regular SSS Processor at the time, petitioner
exploited her, treated her unfairly, and unjustly enriched itself at her expense.
For Article 217 of the Labor Code to apply, and in order for the Labor Arbiter to acquire jurisdiction over a dispute, there must be an
employer-employee relation between the parties thereto.chanrobleslaw
x x x It is well settled in law and jurisprudence that where no employer-employee relationship exists between the parties and no issue
is involved which may be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes or any collective bargaining agreement, it is
the Regional Trial Court that has jurisdiction, x x x The action is within the realm of civil law hence jurisdiction over the case belongs
to the regular courts. While the resolution of the issue involves the application of labor laws, reference to the labor code was only for
the determination of the solidary liability of the petitioner to the respondent where no employer-employee relation exists. Article 217
of the Labor Code as amended vests upon the labor arbiters exclusive original jurisdiction only over the
following:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
2. Termination disputes;
3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and
other terms and conditions of employment;
4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from employer-employee relations;
5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions involving legality of strikes and lockouts; and
6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and maternity benefits, all other claims, arising from
employer- employee relations, including those of persons in domestic or household service, involving an amount exceeding five
thousand pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement.
There being no employer-employee relation or any other definite or direct contract between respondent and petitioner, the latter being
responsible to the former only for the proper payment of wages, respondent is thus justified in filing a case against petitioner, based on
Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, to recover the proper salary due her as SSS Processor. At first glance, it is indeed unfair and
unjust that as, Processor who has worked with petitioner for six long years, she was paid only P5,038.00 monthly, or P229.00 daily,
while a regular SSS employee with the same designation and who performs identical functions is paid a monthly salary of P18,622.00,
or P846.45 daily wage. Petitioner may not hide under its service contracts to deprive respondent of what is justly due her. As a vital
government entity charged with ensuring social security, it should lead in setting the example by treating everyone with justice and
fairness. If it cannot guarantee the security of those who work for it, it is doubtful that it can even discharge its directive to promote the
social security of its members in line with the fundamental mandate to promote social justice and to insure the well-being and
economic security of the Filipino people.
In this jurisdiction, the "long honored legal truism of 'equal pay for equal work'" has been "impregnably institutionalized;" "[p]ersons
who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar
salaries."27 "That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our Constitution and laws reflect the policy
against these evils. The Constitution in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress to 'give highest priority to the
enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities.' The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, 'in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of
his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith'."28cralawrednad
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed July 29, 2011 Decision and January 10, 2012 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 110006 are AFFIRMED. The case is ordered remanded with dispatch to the Regional Trial Court of
Daet, Camarines Norte, Branch 39, for continuation of proceedings.
SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallawlibrary
Case Digest: Samonte et al. v. La Salle Greenhills, Inc.
November 3, 2017
|
Nathalie Pattugalan
Facts:
Petitioners are medical professional hired by LSGI under a uniform one-page Contract of Retainer for the period of a specific
academic calendar beginning in June of 1989 and the succeeding 15 years and terminating in March of the following year when the
school year ends. The contract specifically provides that the retainer is only temporary in character and exclusively limited to the
undertaking and/or to the job/task assigned to the retainer within the said undertaking. Furthermore, at any time prior to the expiration
or completion date/s, LSGI may upon written notice to the retainers, terminate the contract should the retainer fail in anyway to
perform his assigned job or task to the satisfaction of the school of for any just cause.
Accordingly, after 15 consecutive years of renewal each academic year, on the last day of the 15th year in 2004, the school (LSGI)
informed the petitioner that their contracts will no longer be renewed for the following school year.
When petitioners’ requests for payment of their separation pay were denied, they filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for
separation pay, damages and attorneys’ fees. They alleged that they were regular employees because received regular benefits, bonuses
& more, that they were subjected to the school’s administrative and disciplinary rules and regulations.
On the other hand, LSGI posited that petitioners were independent contractors retained by LSGI by reason of their medical skills and
expertise to provide ancillary medical and dental services to both students and faculty. More importantly, petitioners were paid
retainer fees and not regular salaries and whose performance is not subject to the control of the school.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint and ruled that the petitioners were independent contractors but on the ground of
compassionate social justice, awarded separation pay. Both parties appealed the decision to the NLRC. The NLRC disagreed with the
appealed decision, finding petitioners as fixed term employees according to the Contract of Retainer signed by the parties. In a petition
for certiorari, the court of appeals affirmed the NLRC decision.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners were regular employees who may only be dismissed for just and authorized causes.
Ruling:
The petitioners attained retained regular employment.
A fixed-term employment is allowable under the Labor Code wherein the parties agree upon the day certain for the commencement
and termination of their employment relationship. A day certain being understood to be "that which must necessarily come, although
it may not be known when. Furthermore, the term must be voluntarily and knowingly entered into by the parties who must have dealt
with each other on equal terms not one exercising moral dominance over the other.
Further, a fixed-term contract is an employment contract, the repeated renewals of which make for a regular employment. In Fuji
Network Television v. Espiritu, the court noted that Fuji's argument that Espiritu was an independent contractor under a fixed-term
contract is contradictory where employees under fixed-term contracts cannot be independent contractors because in fixed-term
contracts, an employer-employee relationship exists.
The uniform one-page Contracts of Retainer signed by petitioners were prepared by LSGI alone. Petitioners, medical professionals as
they were, were still not on equal footing with LSGI as they obviously did not want to lose their jobs that they had stayed in for fifteen
(15) years. There is no specificity in the contracts regarding terms and conditions of employment that would indicate that petitioners
and LSGI were on equal footing in negotiating it. Notably, without specifying what are the tasks assigned to petitioners, LSGI "may
upon prior written notice to the retainer, terminate [the] contract should the retainer fail in any way to perform his assigned job/task to
the satisfaction of La Salle Greenhills, Inc. or for any other just cause."
In all, given the following: (1) repeated renewal of petitioners' contract for fifteen years, interrupted only by the close of the school
year; (2) the necessity of the work performed by petitioners as school physicians and dentists; and (3) the existence of LSGI's power
of control over the means and method pursued by petitioners in the performance of their job, we rule that petitioners attained regular
employment, entitled to security of tenure who could only be dismissed for just and authorized causes. Consequently, petitioners were
illegally dismissed and are entitled to the twin remedies of payment of separation pay and full back wages.
[G.R. No. 101761. March 24, 1993] NATIONAL SUGAR REFINERIES CORPORATION vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION
FACTS: Petitioner National Sugar Refineries Corporation (NASUREFCO), a corporation which is fully owned and controlled by the
Government, operates three (3) sugar refineries located at Bukidnon, Iloilo and Batangas. Private respondent union represents the
former supervisors of the NASUREFCO Batangas Sugar Refinery.
On June 1, 1988, petitioner implemented a Job Evaluation (JE) Program affecting all employees, from rank-and-file to department
heads. As a result, all positions were re-evaluated, and all employees including the members of respondent union were granted salary
adjustments and increases in benefits commensurate to their actual duties and functions.
For about ten years prior to the JE Program, the members of respondent union were treated in the same manner as rank-and file
employees. As such, they used to be paid overtime, rest day and holiday pay. With the implementation of the JE Program, the
following adjustments among others were made: (1) the members of respondent union were re-classified under levels S-5 to S-8 which
are considered managerial staff for purposes of compensation and benefits; (2) there was an increase in basic pay of the average of
50% of their basic pay prior to the JE Program, with the union members now enjoying a wide gap (P1,269.00 per month) in basic pay
compared to the highest paid rank-and-file employee.
On May 11, 1990, petitioner NASUREFCO recognized herein respondent union as the bargaining representative of all the supervisory
employees at the NASUREFCO Batangas Sugar Refinery.
Two years after the implementation of the JE Program the members of herein respondent union filed a complaint for non-payment of
overtime, rest day and holiday pay allegedly in violation of Article 100 of the Labor Code.
ISSUE: W/N supervisory employees should be considered as officers or members of the managerial staff under Article 82, Book III of
the same Code, and hence are not entitled to overtime rest day and holiday pay.
HELD: YES. Article 212(m), Book V of the Labor Code on Labor Relations reads:
“(m) ‘Managerial employee’ is one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies and/or to
hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharged, assign or discipline employees. Supervisory employees are those who, in the
interest of the employer effectively recommend such managerial actions if the exercise of such authority is not merely
routinary or clerical in nature but requires the use of independent judgment. All employees not falling within any of those above
definitions are considered rank-and-file employees of this Book.”
Respondent NLRC, in holding that the union members are entitled to overtime, rest day and holiday pay, and in ruling that the latter
are not managerial employees, adopted the definition stated in the aforequoted statutory provision.
A cursory perusal of the Job Value Contribution Statements of the union members will readily show that these supervisory employees
are under the direct supervision of their respective department superintendents and that generally they assist the latter in planning,
organizing, staffing, directing, controlling communicating and in making decisions in attaining the company’s set goals and objectives.
These supervisory employees are likewise responsible for the effective and efficient operation of their respective departments. The
members of respondent union discharge duties and responsibilities which ineluctably qualify them as officers or members of the
managerial staff, as defined in Section 2, Rule I Book III of the aforestated Rules to Implement the Labor Code, viz.: (1) their
primary duty consists of the performance of work directly related to management policies of their employer; (2) they
customarily and regularly exercise discretion and independent judgment; (3) they regularly and directly assist the managerial
employee whose primary duty consist of the management of a department of the establishment in which they are employed (4)
they execute, under general supervision, work along specialized or technical lines requiring special training, experience, or
knowledge; (5) they execute, under general supervision, special assignments and tasks; and (6) they do not devote more than
20% of their hours worked in a work-week to activities which are not directly and clearly related to the performance of their
work hereinbefore described.
Under the facts obtaining in this case, the union members should be considered as officers and members of the managerial staff and
are, therefore, exempt from the coverage of Article 82 hence they are not entitled to overtime, rest day and holiday.
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