2004 Neuroticismo Extraversion y Estres Postraumatico

European Journal of Personality
Eur. J. Pers. 19: 409–426 (2005)

Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI: 10.1002/per.544
Constructive Thinking as a Mediator of the

Relationship Between Extraversion, Neuroticism,
and Subjective Well-Being
PETER RUSTIN HARRISy and OWEN RICHARD LIGHTSEY, JR.*

Department of Counseling, Educational Psychology and Research, The University of Memphis,
100 Ball Education Building, Memphis, TN 38152, USA
Abstract
Mechanisms by which personality affects well-being are not well understood. Following
recommendations to examine intermediate process variables that may help explain the
personality–subjective well-being (SWB) relationship, the authors tested whether
constructive thinking (CT) mediated the relationships between both neuroticism and
extraversion and SWB components. Measures of each construct were administered to 147
undergraduate volunteers twice over four weeks. In analyses controlling for time 1 SWB
and time 2 mood, time 2 CT fully mediated the relationship between time 1 neuroticism and
time 2 negative affect and emerged as a strong predictor of negative affect (inversely),
positive affect, and happiness. Copyright # 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
INTRODUCTION
What is happiness, and how is it determined or achieved? Only recently have scientific
answers to these perennial questions begun to emerge (for reviews, see Diener, 2000;
Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 1999; Schmutte & Ryff, 1997; Veenhoven, 1995). Most
contemporary research operationalizes happiness as ‘subjective well-being’ (SWB),
individuals’ self-evaluations about their degree of positive affect, negative affect, and
overall life satisfaction (Andrews & Withey, 1976; Diener & Emmons, 1984), which are
interrelated but empirically separable dimensions (Lucas, Diener, & Suh, 1996; Stones &
Kozma, 1985).
According to Diener (1984), psychological theories of SWB can be differentiated based
on whether they emphasize bottom-up (external/situational) or top-down (internal traits
and processes) influences on SWB. In bottom-up theories, SWB is the product of summed
pleasurable and unpleasurable moments (Diener, 1984)—a person is happy because he or
*Correspondence to: Owen Richard Lightsey, Jr., Department of Counseling, Educational Psychology and
Research, The University of Memphis, 100 Ball Education Building, Memphis, TN 38152, USA.
E-mail: OLIGHTSY@MEMPHIS.EDU
y
Peter Rustin Harris is now in private psychotherapy practice, 1410 17th Avenue South, Nashville, TN 37212,
USA.
Received 10 September 2003

Copyright # 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Accepted 20 October 2004
410 P. R. Harris and O. R. Lightsey, Jr.
she experiences more pleasurable moments than unpleasurable moments (Brief, Butcher,
George, & Link, 1993). Summed external correlates of SWB (e.g. material comforts and
social connectedness) typically account for only 10–15 per cent of the SWB variance
(Argyle, 1999), however. In top-down approaches, SWB is seen as the product of internal
traits and psychological processes (Diener, 2000; Watson, 2000), such as dispositions,
goals, coping styles, and adaptive processes (Diener et al., 1999).
Top-down research has found that temperament and personality dimensions such as
neuroticism and extraversion are powerful determinants of SWB (Diener, 2000). Neuro-
ticism, conceptualized as the opposite of emotional stability, embodies a broad range of
negative emotional traits such as anxiety, irritability, sadness, moodiness, and nervous
tension (Benet-Martinez & John, 1998). Extraversion incorporates more specific traits
related to activity and energy, expressiveness, dominance, sociability, surgency, and
warmth (Diener, 1998).
Neuroticism is associated both with negative affect and (inversely) with positive affect,
while extraversion is associated only with positive affect (see DeNeve and Cooper, 1998;
Diener & Lucas, 1999; Watson, 2000; Watson & Clark, 1992). Some (Fujita, 1991, as cited
by Diener, 1996) have argued that neuroticism and negative affect on the one hand, and
extraversion and positive affect on the other, may be factorially inseparable. Others
(Watson, 2000) have maintained that these personality dimensions are related to a broad
range of attitudinal, cognitive, and behavioural characteristics and cannot be reduced to
affect. In this regard, evidence suggests that personality traits lead to actions and events
and thereby shape affect (Watson, 2000).
The fact that high-neuroticism persons tend toward unhappiness and extraverted people
tend toward happiness, however, provides little guidance about how to promote or foster
SWB. Personality is difficult to change; up to 80 per cent of the variance in SWB may be
heritable (Lykken & Tellegen, 1996; Tellegen et al., 1988); and one’s affect is highly stable
across widely varying situations (Watson, 2000). Pinpointing malleable factors that help to
explain the link between personality and SWB, then, is the formidable task that faces
current researchers.
Constructive thinking, personality, and subjective well-being

Several researchers have proposed that cognitive styles or tendencies may help explain the
personality–SWB relationship (Erez, Johnson, & Judge, 1995), and preliminary evidence
supports the possibility. Dispositional optimism, a penchant for expecting favorable
outcomes, predicts SWB and may help to maintain SWB in the face of stress (Scheier &
Carver, 1987). Similarly, positive automatic thoughts appear to buffer the impact of
negative life events: the higher the level of positive thoughts, the weaker the relationship
between increasing stress and depression (Lightsey, 1994a, 1994b), although the buffering
effect occurs consistently only in cross-sectional analyses (Lightsey, 1999). Even illusory
self-enhancing thought processes appear to result in higher SWB (Taylor & Brown, 1988).
Conversely, dysfunctional thinking styles such as perfectionism and overgeneralization
have been linked to greater unhappiness (Haaga, Dyck, & Ernst, 1991), and negative
thoughts are related to depression (see e.g. Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989; Beck,
Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979) and predict future depression (Lightsey, 1994b).
Less is known, however, about the types of thought or belief that link personality to
SWB. In one of the few studies in this domain, Brief and his colleagues (1993) found that
both objective life circumstances and personality traits indirectly predicted SWB through
Copyright # 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Pers. 19: 409–426 (2005)
Constructive thinking, personality, and well-being 411
their effects on the interpretation of life events and circumstances. These findings support
the idea that the effects of personality on SWB may be explained by consideration of
interpretative tendencies or ‘thinking styles’ (Erez et al., 1995, p. 597).
Among ‘thinking styles’, constructive thinking (CT) has particular promise in helping to
explain the relationship between personality and SWB. CT emerges from Cognitive–
Experiential Self Theory (CEST; Epstein, 1973, 1983, 1994a, 1998b), which maintains
that humans automatically construct both explicit and implicit models of the self and
world (Epstein, 1994a, 1998a). In CEST, two information-processing systems, one rational
and one experiential, foster adaptive behaviour, but the unconscious and preconscious
schemata that form the experiential system often have a greater effect on behaviour than
the conscious thoughts and beliefs that form the rational system. Moment to moment
experiences are coloured not only by temperament, then, but by schemas that filter and
organize experience as it unfolds, providing both interpretations and explanations (Teglasi
& Epstein, 1998).
CT is information processing of the experiential system, which consists of habitual
patterns of automatic thought that facilitate problem solving while minimizing stress in
daily living. CT is flexible (Epstein, 1993), in that individuals who think constructively are
better able to revise their thinking contextually to aid problem appraisal, coping with
negative emotions, fostering positive self-feelings, and acting more effectively (Lopez,
1996; Park, Moore, Turner, & Alder, 1997).
CT has successfully predicted success in varied life-domains (e.g. school, work, and
interpersonal relationships) and could help to explain both SWB and the relationship
between personality and SWB (Epstein & Meier, 1989). Compared to other measures of
personality and coping, CT as measured by the CT Inventory (CTI) has demonstrated a
stronger relationship to life satisfaction and sense of coherence (Wissing & Du Toit, 1994).
The CTI Emotional Coping subscale has correlated 0.46 with a measure of psychological
symptoms (Epstein & Meier, 1989) and displaced other symptom correlates such as locus
of control and optimism. Similarly, the CTI Behavioural Coping scale produced the
highest correlation (inverse) with self-control or self-discipline problems.
Good constructive thinkers experience less stress in living than poorer constructive
thinkers because they behave in ways that produce less stress (Epstein & Katz, 1992). In
regard to associations with personality, persons scoring lower on the CTI Global Scale
tend to be more neurotic and less extraverted, as well as less agreeable, conscientious, and
open-minded (Epstein, 1993). Individual differences in CT and CT subtypes, then, lead to
differences in accurately appraising problems, coping with negative feelings, generating
self-esteem, and engaging in effective action. In these ways, CT may serve as a cognitive
‘link’ between personality and SWB.
In summary, understanding how personality is linked to happiness or SWB is one of the
central goals of current SWB research. Neuroticism and extraversion are consistently
related to SWB, and thinking styles may help to mediate or account for this relationship
(Erez et al., 1995). One such thinking style, CT, has been linked to neuroticism and
extraversion as well as to varied facets of well-being such as life satisfaction, school and
work success, and health. No study, however, has examined whether CT may in fact
systematically mediate the relationship between neuroticism and extraversion, on the one
hand, and SWB on the other.
We hypothesized that, after controlling for time 1 SWB indices and time 2 mood, CT
would mediate the relationship between both extraversion and neuroticism and each
component of time 2 SWB, with one exception: in light of previous evidence that
extraversion is not associated with negative affect, CT was not postulated to mediate the
extraversion–negative affect relationship. Specifically, it was hypothesized that time 2 CT
will mediate the relationship between (a) time 1 neuroticism and time 2 trait positive affect;
(b) time 1 extraversion and time 2 trait positive affect; (c) time 1 neuroticism and time 2
trait negative affect; (d) time 1 neuroticism and time 2 life satisfaction; (e) time 1
extraversion and time 2 life satisfaction; (f) time 1 neuroticism and time 2 ‘happiness’ (as
measured by a composite SWB measure); and (g) time 1 extraversion and time 2 happiness.
METHODOLOGY
Participants
One hundred and forty-seven students attending an urban university in the mid-south
USA participated in exchange for extra credit in a variety of psychology classes. Of
these volunteers, 108 were women (73.5 per cent) and 39 were men (26.5 per cent), with an
age range of 17–49 years (M ¼ 21.7 years; SD ¼ 6.1). The sample was comprised of
38 African Americans (26 per cent), eight Asian Americans (five per cent), 93 Caucasians
(63 per cent), 1 Hispanic/Latino, 1 Native American (1 per cent), and six persons who
reported ‘other’ ethnicity (four per cent). Freshmen represented 58 per cent of the sample
(n ¼ 85), sophomores 22 per cent (n ¼ 32), juniors 13 per cent (n ¼ 20), seniors four -
per cent (n ¼ 6), and graduate students three per cent (n ¼ 4).
PROCEDURE
Packets of self-report instruments were administered in a classroom setting on two

occasions, separated by one month. Participants were told that the researcher was investi-
gating the relationships between dispositions and well-being. After general instructions
were read aloud by the proctor, respondents reviewed and completed a consent form and a
demographics sheet. Volunteers then completed the questionnaire packets at their own
pace. Each participant received one of two instrument orders. The second testing session
was administered in an identical fashion, followed by the disbursement of debriefing
forms. One hundred and fifty-five of the original 168 participants returned for the second
session. Of these, eight participants’ responses were not utilized due to missing data or an
elevated (score of 25 or above) CTI Lie scale.
Measures
Extraversion and neuroticism
The Big Five Inventory (BFI; John, Donahue, & Kentle, 1991) was used to assess
extraversion and neuroticism. The 44-item BFI consists of short phrases based on
prototypical trait markers of the Big Five personality traits. Respondents are asked to
complete the phrase ‘I see myself as someone who . . . ’ as it is coupled with the 44 phrases.
For neuroticism, sample phrases include ‘Is depressed, blue’ and ‘Remains calm in tense
situations’ (reverse scored). Extraversion is comprised of phrases such as ‘Has an assertive
personality’ and ‘Is reserved’ (reverse scored). Alpha reliabilities of the BFI scales range
from 0.75 to 0.90, with a mean above 0.80. The reliabilities of neuroticism and
extraversion are 0.84 and 0.88 respectively. Three-month test–retest reliabilities for the
BFI averaged 0.85 (John & Srivastava, 1999). The BFI has also demonstrated impressive
convergent and divergent relationships with other Big Five measures. For example, the
BFI and NEO-FFI (Costa & McCrae, 1992) demonstrated corrected pairwise convergent
validities of 0.90 for neuroticism and 0.83 for extraversion, with a mean value of 0.92
across all five factors. The BFI retains the convenience and simplicity of measures such as
Trait Descriptive Adjectives (Goldberg, 1992) that use single adjectives to assess the Big
Five traits, while avoiding such measures’ potential problems, such as ambiguous or
multiple meanings of the single terms (John & Srivastava, 1999).
Constructive thinking
CT was measured by the 108-item CT Inventory (CTI; Epstein & Meier, 1989), which was
designed to measure habitual, automatic patterns of everyday thinking that are related to
general coping abilities. Participants are asked to rate on a five-point Likert scale the
degree to which the items accurately describe them. The CTI was derived through factor
analytic methods and contains a Global CT Scale and six main scales: Emotional Coping
(e.g. ‘I don’t worry about things I can do nothing about’, Behavioural Coping (e.g. ‘I look
at challenges not as something to fear, but as an opportunity to test myself and learn’),
Personal Superstitious Thinking (e.g. ‘I sometimes think if I want something to happen too
badly, it will keep it from happening’), Categorical Thinking (e.g. ‘I think there are many
wrong ways, but only one right way, to do almost anything’), Esoteric Thinking (e.g. ‘I
have at least one good-luck charm’), and Naive Optimism (e.g. ‘I believe it is best, in most
situations, to emphasize the positive side of things’). Each of these main scales is further
subdivided into subscales or ‘facets’, which provide greater detail about individuals’
automatic tendencies of destructive or constructive thinking (Epstein, 2000). Analysis of
facets is beyond the scope of this paper, however.
Some of the CTI scales measure the content of beliefs (e.g. Emotional Coping and
Behavioural Coping), whereas others measure the style or form of information processing
(e.g. Esoteric Thinking and Polarized Thinking; Pacini, Muir, & Epstein, 1998). For the
global CTI scale, Epstein (2000) reported a coefficient alpha of 0.90 and test–retest
reliability of 0.86. As noted earlier, the CTI’s construct validity has been well documented,
as seen in its theoretically consistent relationships with a variety of coping measures that
are related to physical and mental health, as well as to successful functioning in the
workplace and to establishing and maintaining intimate relationships (Epstein, 1992;
Epstein & Katz, 1992; Epstein & Meier, 1989; Scheuer & Epstein, 1997). For example,
Epstein (1993) reported that global CT correlated significantly (r ¼ 0.74) with the Life
Orientation Test, a measure of dispositional optimism (Scheier & Carver, 1985, 1987).
Global CT correlated significantly (r ¼ 0.54) with neuroticism, as measured by the
Primary Emotions and Traits Scale (Epstein, 1983, cited by Epstein, 2000).
Subjective well-being
The affective component of SWB was measured by the Positive and Negative Affect
Scales (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), a 20-item self-report instrument
designed to measure positive and negative affect using items that load heavily on either
negative or positive affect, and that have a loading near zero with the opposite factor. The
instrument can be used to measure affect as it pertains to different time frames (e.g. in this
moment, the past two weeks, in general or on average, and so on). Alpha coefficients
ranged from 0.86 to 0.90 for positive affect, and 0.84 to 0.87 for negative affect. This study
utilized the PANAS directions that measured affect in a general time frame (i.e. one’s
affect on average or in general). Current mood or affect was assessed by the question
(Pavot & Diener, 1993a) ‘How would you describe the mood you are feeling right now?’,
on a 1 ‘very negative’ to 7 ‘very positive’ Likert scale.
The cognitive component of SWB was measured by the Satisfaction with Life Scale
(SWLS, Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985; Pavot & Diener, 1993b), whose five
statements reflect general life satisfaction (e.g. ‘In most ways my life is close to my ideal’
and ‘If I could live my life over, I would change almost nothing’). Respondents rate their
level of agreement with each statement on a seven-point Likert scale from 1 (strongly
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The Cronbach alpha for the SWLS was 0.85 (Pavot &
Diener, 1993b), and the two-month test–retest reliability was 0.82 (Diener et al., 1985).
Test–retest reliabilities tend to decrease over longer time periods, suggesting that while life
satisfaction is largely stable some change may occur, perhaps due to life events.
Happiness
Measuring SWB at two points per administration with different instruments may increase
reliability (Diener, 1994). Therefore, the Short Happiness and Affect Research Protocol
(SHARP; Stones et al., 1996) was also employed. Derived from the Memorial University of
Newfoundland Scale of Happiness (MUNSH; Kozma & Stones, 1980), the SHARP
balances short-term affective and long-term dispositional components. The MUNSH
demonstrated internal consistencies above 0.8 and test–retest reliabilities of 0.4–0.7 over
intervals of 18–48 months. It correlated significantly with several related measures (e.g.
indices of satisfaction, affect intensity, and health) and with peer and other ratings, and has
demonstrated utility across all adult ages. The SHARP is a 12-item instrument comprised of
six yes/no questions about recent experiences (i.e. asking respondents whether they have
felt in the last month ‘in high spirits’ ‘particularly content with your life’, and so on) and six
yes/no questions regarding general life experiences (e.g. ‘I am just as happy as when I was
younger’ and ‘Life is hard for me most of the time’. The SHARP correlates 0.95 with the
MUNSH across several data sets, and like the MUNSH demonstrates solid psychometric
properties, such as an internal consistency of 0.8 and higher (Stones et al., 1996). The
briefer SHARP, then, retains the properties of its parent instrument (Stones et al., 1996).
RESULTS
Multivariate analysis of variance and follow-up univariate tests indicated that instrument
scores did not differ across participants’ partner status (living alone versus married/living
with partner), and Pearson correlations indicted that age was related to time 2 global CT
and time 2 negative affect r ¼ 0.28, p < 0.01, and r ¼ 0.20, p < 0.01, respectively but age
predicted only time 2 global CT in preliminary regressions and so was included only in
analyses involving this variable. Additionally, women reported higher neuroticism than
men, F(1, 145) ¼ 8.21, p < 0.005; and nonwhite participants reported higher CT than white
participants, F(1, 145) ¼ 6.05, p < 0.02. Effects of gender and ethnicity in regressions were
therefore ascertained by entry of both variables sequentially in each initial regression, and
by entry of relevant interaction terms after all main effects (e.g. gender neuroticism and
ethnicity neuroticism). Neither gender, ethnicity nor the interaction terms were
significant, which indicated that gender and ethnicity did not affect the results of
hypothesis tests. Therefore, these variables were not included in primary analyses.
As recommended by Diener (1994), the criterion variables—time 2 SWB sub-
components positive affect, negative affect, and life satisfaction, as well as happiness—
were tested in separate hierarchical regressions. Time 1 SWB components were entered
as covariates in the first step and time 2 mood was controlled in the second step. Although
recent evidence suggests that occasion-specific relationships between mood and both
SWB and personality are small and inconsistent in nonexperimental or ecological settings
(Eid & Diener, 2004), time 2 mood had significant relationships with several variables
(see Table 1). Personality dimensions of neuroticism and extraversion were entered in the
third step of regressions, and CT was entered in the fourth step. In testing mediation, we
report not only full mediation, in which the relationship between predictor and criterion is
reduced to zero, but also partial mediation. This is based on the observation by Baron and
Kenny (1986) that, in psychological research, mediators often significantly decrease the
relation between the predictor and the outcome rather than accounting for the relationship
entirely.
Regressions met assumptions of randomness of errors, normality, linearity, and homo-
geneity of variance. No problematic multicollinearity was present, as indicated by variable
inflation factors less than 1.99 for each regression. Mean instrument scores appeared
similar to means reported in the literature. Coefficient alphas for the overall scale scores
(time 1) were also at expected levels. The BFI displayed an alpha of 0.83 for neuroticism
and 0.85 for extraversion. The alpha for the CTI Global CT scale was 0.89, that for the
SWLS 0.84, and that for the SHARP 0.84. The PANAS negative affect scale alpha was
0.81, and the positive affect scale alpha was 0.86. Table 1 presents means, standard
deviations, and correlations.
To test the hypothesis that CT mediates the relationships between extraversion and
neuroticism on the one hand, and SWB on the other, the method of Baron and Kenny
(1986) was used. In order for mediation to be established, the following conditions must
hold: (a) personality (i.e. neuroticism or extraversion) must be significantly related to CT
in the first equation; (b) personality must be significantly related to SWB in the second
equation; when CT is entered with personality in prediction of SWB in the third equation,
(c) CT must be significant, and (d) the effect of personality on SWB must be less in the
third equation than in the first.
In line with these criteria, four series of regressions were conducted, one series for
each of the time 2 SWB outcome variables. In each series, (a) time 2 CT was regressed
on time 1 personality traits (neuroticism and extraversion), (b) time 2 SWB was regres-
sed on time 1 personality, and (c) time 2 SWB was regressed on both time 1 personality
and time 2 CT. Because extraversion and neuroticism covary but represent parallel yet
distinct higher-order personality constructs, they were tested in separate regressions as in
prior studies and per Watson (personal communication, February 2002). As noted, CT
was not hypothesized to mediate the relationship between extraversion and negative
affect.
When time 1 measures of SWB are controlled in this way, what is left to be predicted is
change in SWB in the four weeks between time 1 and time 2 testings. Yet SWB has
traitlike properties and changes little over four weeks, as indicated by test–retest reli-
abilities of 0.76, 0.87, 0.73, and 0.75 for life satisfaction, positive affect, negative affect,
and happiness, respectively, in the present study (see Table 1).
Controlling for time 1 SWB in prediction of time 2 SWB, then, constitutes a quite
conservative test of the ability of independent variables to predict later affect, and may
underestimate the predictor–criterion relationships (Zuroff, Igreja, & Mongrain, 1990).
This procedure also partials out variance shared between preceding CT and time 1 SWB,
which can obscure true causal pathways (see Bandura, 1997, for elaboration of this
argument in relation to self-efficacy).
416
Table 1. Pearson product moment correlation coefficients (n ¼ 147)

Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 M SD
1. Mood (T2) — 22** 28** 26* 33** 23** 27** 24** 31** 40** 42** 16 25** 21* 31** 5.09 1.27
2. Neuroticism (T1) — 82** 18* 16* 59** 57** 64** 58** 43** 38**39** 27** 50**38** 24.63 6.76
3. Neuroticism (T2) — 23** 28** 62** 67** 58** 65** 43** 46**39** 38** 52**54** 23.97 6.68
Copyright # 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

4. Extraversion (T1) — 89** 30** 31** 08 13 51** 55** 32** 23** 25** 22** 26.12 6.81
5. Extraversion (T2) — 26** 32** 12 21* 52** 59** 34** 32** 31** 30** 26.24 7.28
6. Constructive thinking (T1) — 87** 55** 49** 48** 48** 40** 28** 45** 42** 99.12 16.50
P. R. Harris and O. R. Lightsey, Jr.
7. Constructive thinking (T2) — 48** 52** 45** 51** 34** 31** 39** 47** 101.29 16.50
8. Negative affect (T1) — 73** 28** 26**35** 33** 48**37** 21.91 6.42
9. Negative affect (T2) — 33** 32**31** 41** 52**50** 21.04 6.46
10. Positive affect (T1) — 87** 56** 44** 62** 53** 35.57 6.71
11. Positive affect (T2) — 49** 46** 58** 63** 35.63 7.43
12. Life satisfaction (T1) — 76** 70** 60** 22.82 6.96
13. Life satisfaction (T2) — 67** 74** 24.08 6.84
14. Happiness (T1) — 75** 2.97 2.96
15. Happiness (T2) — 3.40 2.78
All correlations are fractional; decimals are omitted.
**p < 0.01 (two tailed); *p < 0.05 (two tailed).
T1 ¼ time 1; T2 ¼ time 2.
Eur. J. Pers. 19: 409–426 (2005)

Table 2. Summary of hierarchical regressions for time 1 mood, neuroticism, and extraversion
predicting time 2 global constructive thinking (N ¼ 147)
Step Variable B SE B Beta R2 (Step) R2
Regression 1: neuroticism as a predictor

1 Age 0.63 0.22 0.23** 0.05** 0.05
2 Age 0.58 0.21 0.21** 0.06** 0.12
T2 mood 3.30 1.02 0.25**
3 Age 0.51 0.18 0.19** 0.26*** 0.38
T2 mood 1.83 0.88 0.14*
T2 neuroticism 1.28 0.17 0.52***
Regression 2: extraversion as a predictor
1 Age 0.63 0.22 0.23** 0.05** 0.05
2 Age 0.58 0.21 0.21** 0.06*** 0.12
T2 mood 3.30 1.02 0.25**
3 Age 0.58 0.21 0.21** 0.06*** 0.18
T2 mood 2.42 1.02 0.19**
T1 extraversion 0.64 0.19 0.26***
***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05.
Mediation (step 1): are neuroticism and extraversion significantly

related to global constructive thinking?
After controlling for age and time 2 mood, time 1 neuroticism was significantly and
negatively related to time 2 CT (beta ¼ 0.52, p < 0.001). Extraversion was significantly
and positively related to CT (beta ¼ 0.26, p < 0.001). Table 2 presents these results.
Controlling for time 1 CT in supplementary analyses reduced to nonsignificance the
relationships between time 1 extraversion and neuroticism and time 2 CT. However, as
noted, controlling for time 1 CT leaves only what has changed in CT between time 1 and
time 2 to be predicted, and CT was little changed between time 1 and time 2, as indicated
by the test–retest correlation of 0.87. We were interested in ascertaining not whether
changes in CT over brief periods mediated or accounted for the relationship between
personality and SWB, but whether time 2 CT per se accounted for these relationships.
Mediation (step 2): are extraversion and neuroticism significantly

related to SWB?
Time 1 personality measures had strong zero-order correlations with time 2 SWB
components (see Table 1). However, control of time 1 SWB factors in regressions reduced
or eliminated these relationships. Neither neuroticism nor extraversion remained
associated with time 2 life satisfaction or happiness when entered after time 1 SWB
indices and time 2 mood (see Tables 3 and 6); only extraversion remained associated with
time 2 positive affect (beta ¼ 0.13, t(1, 143) ¼ 2.94, p < 0.004; see Table 4), and only
neuroticism remained associated with time 2 negative affect (beta ¼ 0.17, t(1, 143) ¼ 2.30,
p < 0.03). Although neuroticism became significant with entry of CT in prediction of
happiness, this is considered a statistical artifact or suppressor effect.
Thus, CT could potentially mediate only the relationship between extraversion and
positive affect, and the relationship between neuroticism and negative affect.
Table 3. Summary of hierarchical regressions for time 1 neuroticism or extraversion, and global
constructive thinking predicting time 2 life satisfaction (N ¼ 147)
Step Variable B SE B Beta R2 (for step) R2
Regression 1: neuroticism and constructive thinking as predictors

1 T1 life satisfaction 0.75 0.05 0.76*** 0.58*** 0.58
2 T1 life satisfaction 0.73 0.05 0.74*** 0.02* 0.60
T2 mood 0.70 0.29 0.13*
3 T1 life satisfaction 0.75 0.06 0.76*** 0.00 0.60
T2 mood 0.74 0.29 0.14*
T1 neuroticism 0.05 0.06 0.05
T2 mood 0.69 0.30 0.13*
T2 constructive thinking 0.03 0.03 0.07
Regression 2: extraversion and constructive thinking as predictors
1 T1 life satisfaction 0.75 0.05 0.76*** 0.58*** 0.58
2 T1 life satisfaction 0.73 0.05 0.74*** 0.02* 0.60
T2 mood 0.70 0.29 0.13*
T2 mood 0.75 0.30 0.14*
T1 extraversion 0.04 0.06 0.04
T2 mood 0.71 0.30 0.13*
T2 constructive thinking 0.02 0.02 0.04
***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05.
Mediation (steps 3 and 4)

Hypothesis A: does CT mediate the relationship between neuroticism and positive affect?
Because there was no relationship between neuroticism and positive affect in regressions,
there was no effect to mediate. However, global CT accounted for a significant portion of
the variance in time 2 positive affect when entered after neuroticism, R2 ¼ 0.02,
F(1, 142) ¼ 13.10, p < 0.001.
According to Epstein (S. Epstein, personal communication, 12 February 2002), analysis
of CTI main scales and facets provides important and potentially clinically relevant
information about the types of thinking that contribute to CT’s effects. Supplemental
analyses of main scales revealed that behavioral coping helped account for the ability of
CT to predict positive affect. For example, when entered after time 1 positive affect, time 2
mood, and neuroticism in prediction of time 2 positive affect, behavioral coping was
associated with a beta of 0.11, t(1, 142) ¼ 2.32, p < 0.05. Other CTI main scales entered
after emotional coping were nonsignificant.
Hypothesis B: does CT mediate the relationship between extraversion and positive affect?
Extraversion and global CT predicted unique variance in time 2 positive affect after time 1
positive affect and time 2 mood were controlled, R2 ¼ 0.01, F(1, 143) ¼ 8.63, p < 0.004,
and R2 ¼ 0.01, F(1, 142) ¼ 9.02, p < 0.003, respectively. With entry of CT in this
regression, the beta associated with extraversion dropped from 0.134 to 0.12, a reduction
of about 10 per cent. In supplementary analyses, the behavioural coping main scale was
significant in prediction of positive affect when entered first among CTI subscales,
constructive thinking predicting time 2 positive affect (N ¼ 147)
Step Variable B SE B Beta R2 (step) R2

1 T1 positive affect 0.97 0.04 0.87*** 0.76*** 0.76
2 T1 positive affect 0.93 0.05 0.84*** 0.01 0.77
T2 mood 0.48 0.26 0.08
T2 mood 0.47 0.26 0.08
T2 mood 0.39 0.25 0.07
T2 constructive thinking 0.08 0.02 0.18***
T2 mood 0.48 0.26 0.08
3 T1 positive affect 0.86 0.05 0.78*** 0.01** 0.78
T2 mood 0.43 0.25 0.07
T1 extraversion 0.15 0.05 0.13**
4 T1 positive affect 0.81 0.05 0.73*** 0.01** 0.80
T2 mood 0.35 0.24 0.06
T1 extraversion 0.13 0.05 0.12**
T2 constructive thinking 0.06 0.02 0.13**
***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05.
beta ¼ 0.10, t(1, 142) ¼ 2.17, p < 0.04. Entry of both main scales in a single regression
resulted in nonsignificance for each, however, leaving only extraversion and time 1
positive affect significant.
Hypothesis C: does CT mediate the relationship between neuroticism and negative affect?
CT remained significant in prediction of time 2 negative affect, whether entered after
neuroticism (R2 ¼ 0.02, F(1, 142) ¼ 5.84, p < 0.02) or extraversion (R2 ¼ 0.03,
Table 5. Summary of hierarchical regression for time 1 neuroticism and global constructive
thinking predicting time 2 negative affect (N ¼ 147)
1 T1 negative affect 0.74 0.06 0.73*** 0.53*** 0.53

2 T1 negative affect 0.70 0.06 0.70*** 0.02* 0.55
T2 mood 0.73 0.29 0.14*
T2 mood 0.66 0.29 0.13*
T1 neuroticism 0.16 0.07 0.17*
T2 mood 0.55 0.29 0.11
T2 constructive thinking 0.06 0.03 0.16*
***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05.
constructive thinking predicting time 2 happiness (N ¼ 147)

1 T1 happiness 0.71 0.05 0.75*** 0.56*** 0.56
2 T1 happiness 0.67 0.05 0.72*** 0.02** 0.59
T2 mood 0.35 0.12 0.16**
3 T1 happiness 0.68 0.06 0.73*** 0.00 0.59
T2 mood 0.36 0.12 0.16**
4 T1 happiness 0.66 0.06 0.70*** 0.04*** 0.63
T1 mood 0.28 0.12 0.13*
T1 neuroticism 0.06 0.03 0.14*
T1 constructive thinking 0.04 0.01 0.24***
1 T1 happiness 0.71 0.05 0.75*** 0.56*** 0.56
2 T1 happiness 0.67 0.05 0.72*** 0.02** 0.59
T2 mood 0.35 0.12 0.16**
3 T1 happiness 0.67 0.05 0.72*** 0.00 0.59
T2 mood 0.35 0.12 0.16**
4 T1 happiness 0.62 0.05 0.66*** 0.03** 0.62
T1 mood 0.29 0.12 0.13*
T1 constructive thinking 0.03 0.01 0.19**
***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05.
F(1, 142) ¼ 8.91, p < 0.003). The beta associated with neuroticism in prediction of
negative affect decreased from 0.166, t(1, 143) ¼ 2.30, p < 0.03 to 0.097, t(1, 142) ¼ 1.28,
p > 0.20 with entry of CT in the final step. This indicates that CT mediated the relationship
between neuroticism and negative affect, accounting for about 42 per cent of this rela-
tionship (0.097/0.166 1). As anticipated, extraversion did not predict negative affect.
Supplementary analyses revealed that, of the CTI main scales, naive optimism predicted
time 2 negative affect, beta ¼ 0.14, t(1, 142) ¼ 2.43, p < 0.02. Other main scales,
entered in place of naive optimism, were nonsignificant. Entry of naive optimism reduced
the beta associated with neuroticism from 0.166, t(1, 143) ¼ 2.30, p < 0.03, to 0.136,
t(1, 142) ¼ 2.15, p < 0.03, a reduction of about 19%. Thus, naive optimism helped to
account for global CT’s ability to mediate neuroticism effects in this regression.
Hypotheses D and E: does CT mediate the relationships between neuroticism
and extraversion (predictors) and life satisfaction (the criterion)?
After controlling for time 1 life satisfaction, neither extraversion, neuroticism, nor CT
accounted for significant variance in time 2 life satisfaction. Therefore, there were no
effects to mediate, and no mediation occurred.
Hypotheses F and G: does CT mediate the relationship between neuroticism
and happiness, and the relationship between extraversion and happiness?
When entered last in prediction of time 2 happiness in regressions controlling for time 1
happiness, CT was highly significant whether entered after neuroticism (R2 ¼ 0.04,
F(1, 142) ¼ 14.11, p < 0.001) or extraversion (R2 ¼ 0.03, F(1, 142) ¼ 10.30, p < 0.002).
Because neither neuroticism nor extraversion was significant in these regressions,
however, there were no effects to be mediated. Supplementary analyses revealed that,
when entered immediately after either extraversion or neuroticism, no CTI main scales
predicted happiness.
In summary, CT proved a robust direct predictor of time 2 positive affect, negative
affect, and happiness, even after controlling for time 1 SWB indices. CT also mediated the
relationship between time 1 neuroticism and time 2 negative affect, but mediated only
10 per cent of the relationship between time 1 extraversion and time 2 positive affect, a
proportion that is not considered meaningful. The behavioural coping main scale helped to
account for the ability of CT to predict positive affect, while naive optimism helped to
account for CT’s ability to predict negative affect and mediate the relationship between
neuroticism and negative affect. No CT main scales predicted happiness. As noted,
controlling for time 1 measures is a conservative test of the ability of independent variables
to predict dependent variables (Zuroff, Igreja, & Mongrain, 1990).
DISCUSSION
Results of this study provide evidence consistent with the ‘top-down’ perspective: CT, an
information processing-based coping variable, robustly predicts SWB and helps to account
for the relationship between personality and SWB. In longitudinal analyses that controlled
for time 1 SWB indices, personality lost most of its ability to predict SWB, while CT
remained a strong predictor of SWB components positive affect and negative affect, as
well as happiness. The higher the CT, the higher the positive affect and happiness, and the
lower the negative affect.
In regard to mediational hypotheses, most were not supported because there was no effect
to mediate, since extraversion and neuroticism lost much of their predictive ability after
entry of time 1 SWB components. Of the two remaining personality effects on SWB, CT
mediated neuroticism’s relationship to negative affect, but showed little mediation of
extraversion’s relationship to positive affect. The behavioral coping main scale accounted
for much of CT’s ability to predict positive affect, and the naive optimism scale helped to
account for the ability of CT to predict negative affect. However, no CTI main scales
predicted happiness as measured by the SHARP, whose items measure positive affect,
negative affect, and life satisfaction.
As anticipated, the most powerful predictor of time 2 SWB was SWB four weeks earlier.
For example, time 1 positive affect accounted for about 76 per cent of the variance in time
2 positive affect, and time 1 negative affect accounted for 53 per cent of the variance in
time 2 negative affect. This is consistent with earlier findings that SWB possesses both
short-term (state) and long-term (trait) components (Diener, 1998; Stones & Kozma, 1986)
and tends to have quite high stability, as reflected by the high test–retest correlations in the
present study. As noted, controlling for time 1 SWB measures in prediction of time 2 SWB
is a quite stringent test of subsequently entered predictors, given the personality-like
stability of SWB. After controlling for time 1 SWB measures and time 2 mood, CT
accounted for 3.7 per cent of the variance in happiness when entered after neuroticism, and
2.8 per cent when entered after extraversion. Both CT and neuroticism combined
accounted for some 3 per cent of the variance in time 2 negative affect. Similarly, both
extraversion and CT accounted for some 2.6 per cent of the variance in positive affect.
Contrary to hypotheses, CT did not mediate the relationship between neuroticism/

extraversion and time 2 life satisfaction, since there was no relationship to mediate and
since CT did not account for significant variance in life satisfaction. CT’s failure to predict
life satisfaction is surprising, since the CTI is highly correlated with varied happiness-
related variables such as success in work and relationships, and indices of mental and
physical well-being (see e.g. Epstein & Meier, 1989). In this sample, correlations between
CT and satisfaction with life were apparently much lower than in another study that
employed these two measures. This may reflect differences in the samples: Wissing and
Du Toit (1994) used a South African sample.
These results have several potential clinical implications. In theory, people can
change the ways they automatically interpret the world (i.e. their CT). Indeed, change in
the experiential system (reflected by CT) must take place for counselling to be effective
(Epstein, 1998c). The objective of therapy in CEST, consequently, is to change the
experiential system. According to Epstein (1998b), there are three ways to achieve this
objective:
(a) using the rational system to correct the experiential system, as in providing
interpretations in psychodynamic approaches and in disputing irrational thoughts in
cognitive–behavioural approaches;
(b) learning directly from emotionally significant experiences in real life or through a
constructive relationship with the therapist; and
(c) communicating with the experiential system in its own medium, namely imagery and
narratives (pp. 129–130).
The CTI provides detailed information about specific cognitive tendencies that may aid
or thwart achievement of higher SWB. This can be particularly important with persons
high in neuroticism, who tend to use passive and ineffective coping strategies (Bolger,
1990; Watson & Hubbard, 1996) such as rumination, avoidance, and procrastination, and
who tend to have higher negative affect.
Augmenting such clients’ active, behavioural CT facets, then, may be one helpful way
of increasing their SWB. Specifically, teaching clients to (a) cope behaviourally by
thinking in realistically favorable ways (positive thinking or realistic optimism), (b)
engage in careful thought and planning in the face of stress (conscientiousness), and (c)
take action, as opposed to procrastinating and ruminating (action orientation) could help
high-neuroticism clients to develop more positive affect.
The finding that naive optimism inversely predicts negative affect may suggest that a
tendency to overgeneralize from a single positive outcome (i.e., unrealistic optimism) may
be helpful to some degree. This is reminiscent of findings that ‘positive illusions’—overly
positive self-evaluations, exaggerated perceptions of control or mastery, and unrealistic
optimism about the future—are linked to well-being (see Taylor and Brown, 1988, 1994).
These mistaken positive beliefs have been associated with greater persistence, higher
motivation, more effective performance, and greater success (Taylor & Brown, 1994), as
well as more happiness. Although augmenting clients’ ‘positive illusions’ may strike some
therapists as dubious, our findings suggest that helping clients to develop even overly
optimistic beliefs may lead to a reduction in future negative affect. An alternative but less
well-supported possibility is that persons with naive optimism tend to deny negative
emotion (Shedler, Mayman, & Manis, 1993).
These findings are consistent with evidence that poor constructive thinkers consistently
experience more negative emotions and less energy, enthusiasm, and affection than good
constructive thinkers (Epstein, 1992; Scheuer & Epstein, 1997). Unlike some previous
studies (Scheuer & Epstein, 1997), our results suggest that CT also may have a role in
shaping positive affect.
Of course, as any therapist knows, long-standing forms of perception, thinking, and
behaviour can be difficult to change. Nevertheless, our results suggest that a focus on CT in
counseling could help clients to increase positive affect, to decrease negative affect, and to
increase happiness.
Because most participants were college students, generalizability of these results may
not, however, be assumed: results should be replicated with older participants and in
clinical settings. Replication with older participants may be especially important in light of
age-related changes in CT that are posited in CEST (Epstein, 1998c). Clinical studies
designed to enhance specific forms of thought would provide a more direct test of whether
changes in CT augment SWB.
Although social desirability is not considered a confound in similar research (Pavot &
Diener, 1993a), and although survey designs remain popular, use of multiple methods to
assess SWB (e.g. diaries, experience sampling, interviews, peer reports, etc.) would help to
control any method bias. Of course, causation may not be inferred from the correlational
design of the present study, and some relationships between variables may be bi-
directional—a common and unresolved finding in studies of SWB and personality (Diener
& Lucas, 1999).
In a related vein, items of SWB measures, personality, and CTI show considerable
overlap: for example, the PANAS asks respondents to rate their general feeling of being
nervous, the BFI has a respondent rate whether ‘gets nervous easily’ is characteristic of
him or her, and both the PANAS and the CTI tap distress. This problem is definitional,
since (for example) neuroticism, negative affect, and CT are defined partly by virtue of
tendency to experience negative emotion. As noted, overlap between personality and SWB
has spurred rich ongoing debate (e.g. Fujita, 1991, cited by Diener, 1996; Watson, 2000).
However, in the present study, controlling for time 1 measures of SWB prior to entry of
personality or CT in prediction of time 2 SWB removed item overlap between SWB and
both personality and CT as a potential confound. Construing CT as a mediator of the
relationship between personality traits and SWB is also most consistent with empirical
evidence and with current theory.
Despite limitations, this study contributes to the SWB literature by demonstrating that
CT not only helps to explain the impact of neuroticism and extraversion on SWB but is a
powerful predictor in its own right. Although CT cannot be reduced to its subcomponents
on scales, the abilities to cope effectively with the outer world (i.e. behavioural coping)
and to maintain unrealistic optimism appear to be important components of CT’s effect on
SWB.
Results of our study are consistent with the idea that constructive thinkers possess a range
of flexible cognitive processes that facilitate accurate problem appraisals and thereby lead
to more positive self-related feelings. Augmentation of clients’ CT may allow them to
‘work on’ and modify even unhealthy experiential systems, reducing the impact of traits
such as neuroticism and helping them move toward greater well-being. In other words,
helping clients to augment both the behavioural and naive optimism components of CT, and
the aforementioned facets, may help reduce the deleterious effects of neuroticism while
enhancing the benefits of extraversion.
Our findings indicate, then, that personality has only weak effects on SWB over 4
weeks, once earlier SWB and CT are controlled. In contrast, concurrent, time 2 CT
emerged as an important predictor of negative affect, positive affect, and happiness, and as
a mediator of neuroticism’s effects on negative affect. Augmenting CT, then, could help
high-neuroticism clients to improve their SWB. More direct clinical tests of this
proposition await future studies.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This paper is based on reanalysis of data that were collected as part of the dissertation of
the first author, under the supervision of the second author.
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European Journal of Personality

Eur. J. Pers. 19: 409–426 (2005)

Constructive Thinking as a Mediator of the

PETER RUSTIN HARRISy and OWEN RICHARD LIGHTSEY, JR.*

Received 10 September 2003

Constructive thinking, personality, and subjective well-being

Packets of self-report instruments were administered in a classroom setting on two

Table 1. Pearson product moment correlation coefficients (n ¼ 147)

Copyright # 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Eur. J. Pers. 19: 409–426 (2005)

Regression 1: neuroticism as a predictor

Mediation (step 1): are neuroticism and extraversion significantly

Mediation (step 2): are extraversion and neuroticism significantly

Regression 1: neuroticism and constructive thinking as predictors

Mediation (steps 3 and 4)

Regression 1: neuroticism and constructive thinking as predictors

1 T1 negative affect 0.74 0.06 0.73* 0.53* 0.53

Regression 1: neuroticism and constructive thinking as predictors

Contrary to hypotheses, CT did not mediate the relationship between neuroticism/

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