Case

129

Institute for the Study of Diplomacy

Case Study

The Cuban Missile Crisis:

U.S. Deliberations and Negotiations
at the Edge of the Precipice

Rodney A. Snyder
photo source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/
wikipedia/commons/9/9e/Cuban_crisis_map_
missile_range.jpg
 Case 129

The Cuban Missile Crisis:

U.S. Deliberations and Negotiations at the
Edge of the Precipice

Gabrielle S. Brussel

ISBN 1-56927-334-0
Copyright © 1988 by the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy

All rights reserved. No part of this publication

may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system,
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or otherwise without the prior permission
of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy.

The opinions and analysis contained in this

case study are solely those of the author(s),
and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, the School
of Foreign Service, or Georgetown University.

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This case study was made possible (in part) by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The
statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.
BACKGROUND
On Monday, October 22, 1962, after six days of secret
U.S. government deliberations, President John F. Ken-
nedy announced on television that the Soviet Union
had placed offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba. The Sovi-
ets had staged a sealift to Cuba, which had begun in July
of that year and continued over the next few months,
which constituted a major military deployment involv-
ing more than one hundred shiploads and containing
several thousand vehicles and more than twenty thou-
sand men. U.S. policymakers interpreted these actions
as contradictions of explicit Soviet pledges and state-
ments that Soviet aid to Cuba was defensive and would
remain so.
The United States employed political pressure on
bilateral and multilateral levels—through both formal
and informal channels. It also applied military pressure
while policymakers sought to resolve the crisis short of
war. The United States succeeded in presenting a firm
and resolved stance, but it stopped short of a bellicose
response. The administration, and particularly the pres-
ident, was not interested in beginning a military con-
frontation with the Soviet Union, but the United States
was strongly committed to proving to its allies and
adversaries that it could meet whatever it perceived as a
threat to its national security and its sphere of influence.
Furthermore, since the Soviets had been warned
against employing such a display of force, the adminis-
tration wanted to prove it would back up statements of
policy with actions.
Publicly the crisis lasted for six days—from Ken-
nedy’s speech on October 22 until the official Soviet
statement on October 28 that the missiles in Cuba
would be dismantled and removed from the island. For
U.S. policymakers, however, the crisis began on Octo-
ber 16 at 11:45 A.M. during the first meeting of the
group of advisors that became known as the ExComm.1
The group served the president almost twenty-four
hours a day as the United States managed the situation.
When they were presented with the evidence of
the missiles, U.S. government officials were surprised
and angered by the Soviet deception. Kennedy person-
ally assembled a politically diverse group of advisors
comprising representatives of the public and private
sectors that he believed would contribute to a success-
ful resolution. They were men he depended on regard-
1
2 Gabrielle S. Brussel
less of rank or political affiliation, men he believed
served their country and his administration above all.
They were recruited regardless of seniority, the criteria
for their selection being President Kennedy’s assess-
ment of their intelligence, judgment, and loyalty. Dur-
ing the crisis this advisory group consisted of:
• Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson
• Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy
• Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon
• Secretary of State Dean Rusk (who was absent
during a large part of the deliberations)
• Under Secretary of State George Ball
• Soviet expert and Ambassador at Large Llewellyn
“Tommy” Thompson2
• Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara
• Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric
• General Maxwell Taylor, chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff
• Assistant Secretary for International Security
Affairs Paul Nitze
The Central Intelligence Agency members
included:
• Deputy Director Marshall Carter for the first day
and
• Director John McCone, who returned to Wash-
ington on October 16, thereafter.
The special assistants/advisors to the president
included:
• McGeorge Bundy, advisor on national security
affairs
• Presidential Counsel Theodore “Ted” Sorenson
• Kenneth O’Donnell
Other intermittent participants included:
• Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs
Edwin M. Martin
• Deputy Under Secretary U. Alexis Johnson
• Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, U.S. representative
to the United Nations
• USIA Deputy Director Donald Wilson
• State Department Director of Intelligence and
Research Roger Hilsman
• Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who left
the deliberations after a naval quarantine was cho-
sen as the U.S. policy response but served as Ken-
nedy’s personal emissary to France and West
Germany
• Former Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett
• Wall Street lawyer and former High Commis-
sioner of Germany John McCloy
The ExComm was primarily divided into two
camps—the hawks and the doves3—with the hawks
advocating a military confrontation and the doves
stressing negotiation. The hawks included Taylor,
Acheson, the Joint Chiefs (without U.S. Marine Corps
Commandant David Shoup), McCloy, Nitze, and, ini-
tially, Dillon and McCloy. The doves were Robert Ken-
nedy, McNamara, Gilpatric, Ball, Thompson, Sorenson,
Stevenson and Lovett. The others were indecisive,
shifting their opinions as the days wore on.
The president mandated, and his advisors agreed,
that the crisis remain secret until the United States for-
mulated a plan. Consequently, to avoid leaks, the circle
of people in government who knew about the crisis
remained extremely tight. The group met almost con-
tinuously for the two weeks of the crisis. It broke up
into smaller groups for purposes of analysis and debates
while experts presented information, but the composi-
tion of the general group remained consistent.
The Soviets placed missiles on an island that the
United States had viewed as its backyard since the late
nineteenth century. U.S.-Cuban relations, though cer-
tainly strained by 1962, had been closely tied for almost
a hundred years. As far back as 1808, U.S. foreign policy
and government officials had viewed Cuban interests
“as their own.” Repeated offers to buy Cuba culminated
in the Ostend Manifesto of 1854, which stated that the
United States had the “right” to acquire Cuba. Later
U.S. government officials asserted that Cuba was “indis-
pensable to the United States.”
On January 1, 1959, Cuban rebels took control of
the government. The United States officially recognized
the new regime on January 7. Not long after, U.S.-
Cuban relations began to deteriorate. Tensions
increased steadily, and the two nations went head-to-
head in public forums. Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Cas-
tro refused to back the United-States in its Cold War
with the Soviet Union. In April 1959, President Dwight
D. Eisenhower publicly refused to meet with Castro
during his trip to the United States, instead leaving
Washington to play golf. By December Castro had
declared himself and his revolution Communist and had
received substantial Soviet backing. Soon the United
 The Cuban Missile Crisis
States reduced trade with Cuba and refused to purchase
sugar from Cuba above world sugar prices. Cuba
increased its anti-American rhetoric. The Soviets began
to purchase sugar at premium prices, sent aid packages,
and promised to “support the Cuban people with . . .
rocket fire if aggressive forces in the Pentagon dare[d]
to launch an intervention against Cuba.”
Trade between the United States and Cuba dimin-
ished quickly. In 1958 exports from the United States
totaled 69.8 percent of Cuban imports; by 1961 this fig-
ure was down to 3.7 percent. In contrast, Soviet
imports from Cuba rose during the same period from 0
to 48.2 percent. Trade with Soviet bloc countries
accounted for 73.4 percent of Cuba’s trade in 1961,
while just three years earlier it had been a mere 2.5 per-
cent. Tensions culminated in expropriation of all U.S.
property in Cuba (1960–61) and the 1962 U.S. trade
embargo. Further exacerbating the relationship was the
1961 Bay of Pigs episode. Supported by the CIA and
personally approved by President Kennedy, anti-Cas-
tro Cuban exiles attempted to invade Cuba. The inva-
sion failed, and the U.S. government withdrew its air
support of the exiles after they reached the island.
Although Kennedy made a public apology and the
administration pursued diplomatic negotiations to
secure the release of captured exiles from Cuban jails,
the crisis contributed greatly to strained relations.
Moreover, the Kennedy administration employed poli-
cies that had the potential to cause the ouster or death
of Fidel Castro. The United States also encouraged the
political and diplomatic isolation of Cuba with the dec-
laration by the Organization of American States (OAS)
in January 1962 that Cuba’s government was incompati-
ble with the inter-American system. These incidents
and policies created an atmosphere of mistrust and mis-
apprehension, with the Soviets and the Cubans expect-
ing an invasion and the United States fearing increased
Soviet-Cuban ties and military build-ups.
Cuba’s importance to the United States is a result of
its geography and politics. it is ninety miles from the tip
of Florida, closer than Puerto Rico to the coast of
United States. It lies on the Windward Passage, the
Straits of Florida, the Yucatan Channel, and the ship-
ping lanes from the east coast of the United States. It has
direct access to the strategic sea lanes of South and
Central America, the Caribbean and the Western allies
of the United States. Since its early role as a colony of
Spain, Cuba’s proximity to the Caribbean sea lanes that
3
carry trade to Latin America has given it strategic
importance.
Cuba was the only communist country that had a
U.S. naval base on its territory. It was also the only
country that maintained both Soviet and U.S. military
installations and by which Soviet naval vessels freely
passed. Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, covering forty-
five square miles, 1 percent of Cuban territory, trains
more than 40,000 U.S. military personnel every year.
Built after the Treaty of Paris that ended the Spanish-
American War, Guantánamo was leased in perpetuity to
the United States. The Castro government has long
maintained that the agreement for the base is illegiti-
mate because the governments were not “on equal foot-
ing” and because Cuba was coerced into the contract by
a foreign government. Many U.S. government officials
and analysts feared that the Soviet Union would request
a U.S. withdrawal from Guantánamo in exchange for
the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba. This prop-
osition was never brought to the negotiating table, and
President Kennedy maintained during the ExComm
deliberations that it would be rejected “out of hand.”
The Soviet placement of missiles in Cuba went
beyond actual military and strategic importance; it was
a modern, post-nuclear affront to U.S. perceived inter-
ests dating back to the early nineteenth century. On
December 2, 1823, President James Monroe delivered
an address to Congress in which he asserted that the
United States viewed the Western Hemisphere as its
sphere of influence and that European expansionism in
the Western Hemisphere would be regarded as “danger-
ous to [United States] peace and safety.” The United
States would respond in whatever manner was neces-
sary to protect itself. In May 1904 President Theodore
Roosevelt’s “Roosevelt Corollary” to the Monroe Doc-
trine refined the U.S. view of European expansionism
by asserting that the United States had the “right” to
intervene in the Western Hemisphere and Caribbean.
Thus, the United States has long considered the West-
ern Hemisphere a special region of influence.
Although the Monroe Doctrine was originally
directed at Western European expansion, subsequent
interpretations were directed at the Soviet Union and
the possibility of Soviet expansion in the region. The
1962 decision to put missiles in Cuba made Cuba the
first Soviet ally to receive ballistic missiles. The United
States viewed this policy as a direct attack against its
public and private perceptions of regional influence and
4 Gabrielle S. Brussel
global balance. “Ever since the Monroe Doctrine, the
United States has perceived a special interest in exclud-
ing European military power from the Western Hemi-
sphere. This was a powerful fact of [U.S.] political
consciousness. . . .4
President Kennedy intended to address the Soviet
decision immediately and firmly. His administration
believed that the missiles would affect global percep-
tions of U.S. strength and resolve, causing allies and
adversaries to question U.S. ability and commitment to
global alliances. Furthermore, the missiles in Cuba
would threaten the global power structure that the
United States sought to maintain.
The missile balance also contributed to uneasy
relations between the United States and the Soviet
Union. When Kennedy became president, he received
contradictory evidence and intelligence. By late sum-
mer and certainly by fall 1961 the administration real-
ized that Soviet missile superiority, which had been a
campaign issue in 1960, did not exist—that the United
States, in fact, was ahead. Kennedy and his advisors dis-
cussed their options and decided to inform the Soviets
that they knew the U.S. missile gap did not exist. In
October 1961 Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gil-
patric was selected to give a speech disclosing U.S.
armed strength and revealing that the missile gap was
actually reversed—the Soviets were at a military disad-
vantage, not the United States. The United States
briefed its allies, including allies who the United States
knew had been penetrated by Soviet intelligence offi-
cers, in order to reinforce its position.
U.S. POLICY RESPONSE
The ExComm began by trying to understand why the
missiles were deployed in Cuba. What could Khrush-
chev hope to gain by such a dangerous gamble? If the
United States could understand the motivations of the
Soviets, it could better manage an end to the crisis and
communicate more effectively with the opposition.
U.S. Deliberations
Dean Acheson told Charles de Gaulle that the Soviets
placed missiles in Cuba because they believed that they
could get away with it.5 The discussions about the
deployment went deeper than Acheson’s answer, how-
ever. At the first meetings of the ExComm, the advisors
debated five hypothetical answers to the question of
Soviet motivation.
The first hypothesis was based on the Soviet
Union’s strong commitment to maintaining a position
in Latin America and, specifically, to supporting the
social and political revolution in Cuba. It was already
sending great amounts of aid to Cuba. Although the
United States had not continued its planned military
and air support during the actual invasion of the Bay of
Pigs, it had sponsored an invasion of Cuba less than two
years before. The Soviet government saw an opportu-
nity to defend a firm ally and decided to take it.
Constant discussions were going on in Congress, in
the White House, and in the Cuban exile community
regarding invasion. On September 4 President Kennedy
stated that “. . . the Castro regime will not be allowed to
export aggressive purposes by force or the threat of
force. It will be prevented by whatever means may be
necessary from taking action against any part of the
Western Hemisphere. . . .” Three days later he asked
Congress for standby authority to call up reserves. On
September 13 Kennedy reiterated his stand against
Cuba and the Castro regime “exporting aggressive pur-
poses by force or threat of force” [emphasis added]. One
week later Congress passed a joint resolution on Cuba
stating that the United States would “prevent by what-
ever means may be necessary, including the use of arms,
the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from extending,
by force or the threat of force, its aggressive or subver-
sive activities to any part of this hemisphere.”
Although Kennedy and his administration repeat-
edly declared that the United States would not attempt
additional military action against Cuba, the belligerent
statements Kennedy made throughout September 1962
did not persuade the Cuban and Soviet governments
that Cuba’s safety was ensured. Kennedy questioned
whether the U.S. mistake was “in not saying sometime
before this summer that if they do this we’re [going] to
act.”6
The second hypothesis was that missiles in Cuba
would alter the geopolitical and psychological situation,
showing the world unequivocally that the United States
was unable to control its sphere of influence, the West-
ern Hemisphere. These missiles would tell U.S. allies
that the United States could not stop Soviet influence
ninety miles off the coast of Florida, in a country that
had been a U.S. territory and, for more than sixty years,
 The Cuban Missile Crisis
a U.S. satellite. The perception that even the Western
Hemisphere was unmanageable for the United States
would have lead the world to ask: How could the
United States be expected to extend protection to its
allies all over the world if it could not protect itself from
missiles in Cuba? The United States considered that
even this question in the minds of allies or adversaries
would have altered the global balance of power.
The third hypothesis raised the possibility that the
missiles were placed in Cuba simply to be removed.
Rusk suggested that “Mr. Khrushchev may have . . .
known that [the United States does not] really live
under fear of his nuclear weapons to the extent that . . .
he has to live under fear of ours.”7 The missiles could be
used as bargaining chips to secure the Soviet borders
with Turkey or traded to obtain a more positive settle-
ment of the Berlin arrangement for the Soviets. If the
United States made military concessions, it would
diminish its prestige. Soviet statements suggested that
they would “trade Cuba for Berlin” support this
hypothesis.8
The fourth hypothesis, advanced by Nitze and Tay-
lor, was that the missiles would, in fact, alter the strate-
gic strength of the Soviet Union with relatively little
cost. The Soviets knew that the missile gap did not
exist, but they traded on the fact that the United States
believed it to be true. The newly announced U.S. mili-
tary superiority made them vulnerable. Placing mis-
siles in Cuba would help the Soviets change the balance
of missile power. Bases in Cuba for Soviet medium-
range ballistic missiles and intermediate-range ballistic
missiles (MBRMs and IRBMs) were a quick and rela-
tively inexpensive means of cutting the U.S. warning
time. Although the United States would still retain a 2-
to-1 military superiority over the Soviet Union, the mis-
siles in Cuba would substantially change the appearance
of that superiority. Kennedy noted later that “appear-
ances contribute to reality,” and the United States could
ill afford the appearance of weakness or decreasing
strength.
The fifth hypothesis assumed that the Soviets
wanted the United States to discover the missiles and
attack the island, thereby splitting the allies and fueling
anti-American sentiment through the world. Question-
ing this theory, however, President Kennedy wondered
“if . . . any other time since the Berlin blockade . . . the
Russians [had] given [the United States] so clear provo-
cation . . . because they’ve been awfully cautious
5
really.”9 Discussing U.S. policy options for response to
the emplacement, Robert Kennedy effectively argued
that such an attack would horrify the world. The United
States was one of two superpowers in the world, he
said; for it to attack Cuba would “destroy” the “essence
[of ] our history and our ideals.”10
The ExComm members discussed these five possi-
bilities at length. In the end they decided that the
answers to the question were the perceived balance of
military power and a basic testing of Kennedy’s will.
The missiles would embarrass the U.S. government and
demonstrate its inability to control its sphere of influ-
ence. Furthermore, according to the U.S. advisors, the
Soviets believed that the risk they were taking was not
great. They were testing the will of a young and rela-
tively inexperienced administration. Khrushchev
thought “Kennedy too young, intellectual, not prepared
well for decision-making in crisis situations.”11
Soviet Motivations
The ExComm assessments were somewhat accurate,
though they were also bound by U.S. perceptions of
reality, which did not coincide with Soviet and Cuban
perceptions. The primary Soviet reasons for deploying
the missiles were to defend the Cuban revolution and to
deter a U.S. attack. ExComm policymakers immedi-
ately discounted this motivation. The United States
knew it did not intend to invade Cuba and believed it
had communicated this intention to the Soviets and the
Cubans. In fact, it had not. The Soviets believed the
United States thought it was in its interest to launch a
first strike against Cuba. “We had no doubt the United
States would repeat the attack on Cuba after the Bay of
Pigs.12 Furthermore, in the Soviet view, and most espe-
cially in Khrushchev’s eyes, the loss of Cuba would
“have been a terrible blow to Marxism-Leninism,”
diminishing Soviet “stature throughout the world, but
especially in Latin America.”13
The placement of missiles in Cuba was first dis-
cussed in April of 1962 between Anastas Mikoyan,
Soviet first deputy premier and special envoy to Cuba at
the end of the Cuban missile crisis, and Khrushchev.14
Khrushchev continued personal discussions with advi-
sors throughout the spring. By July some Presidium
(now called Politburo) members were let in on the dis-
cussions with Cuba, but there was no written corre-
spondence.15
6 Gabrielle S. Brussel
Khrushchev believed estimates that a Soviet inva-
sion of Cuba would take “three or four days, a week,
maybe,” and, therefore, “the same time would be
needed for a U.S. invasion. [Since t]hat was not long
enough to defend against it, even by retaliating some-
where else . . . [i]t was thought [to] deter an invasion
beforehand.”16 The Cubans did not agree with the
Soviet defense assessment, asserting that they had
270,000 armed and mobilized troops and could fight an
invasion much longer than several days. In fact, this was
double McNamara’s 1962 estimate.17
The Soviets also believed that the missiles would
repair the strategic imbalance in deliverable missiles.18
Deploying missiles on the U.S. periphery would estab-
lish Soviet strength, countering the U.S. missiles posed
on the Soviet borders.19 During his 1959 U.S. tour,
Khrushchev asked, “How would [the United States] feel
if there were Soviet military bases in Mexico and Can-
ada.”20 The ExComm discussed this on Tuesday, Octo-
ber 16. Rusk reminded the policymakers that McCone
“suggested some weeks ago that one thing Mr. Khrush-
chev may have in mind is that . . . we don’t really live
under fear of his nuclear weapons to the extent, that . . .
he has to live under fear of ours. Also we have nuclear
weapons nearby, in Turkey and places like that.”21
Khrushchev maintained exactly that view: “In
addition to protecting Cuba, our missiles would have
equalized what the West likes to call ‘the balance of
power’ . . . now [the United States] would learn just
what it feels like to have enemy missiles pointing at you;
we’d be doing nothing more than giving them a little of
their own medicine.”22 Soviet officials later said that
correcting the nuclear balance was “important” to
Khrushchev “because there were only two thoughts:
defend Cuba and repair the imbalance. But defending
Cuba was the first thought.”23
U.S. Response
On Tuesday, October 16, members of the ExComm
assembled in the White House Cabinet room for their
first meeting. CIA analysts and photo reconnaissance
intelligence experts made a formal presentation. After
the initial presentation of the U-2 photographs, the
ExComm discussions turned to the significance of the
missiles. The men present in the room had a wide range
of responses. President Kennedy was angered by the
Soviet actions and quite aware of the implications of
such a ploy. It was, he said, “an effort to materially
change the balance of power . . . a deliberately provoca-
tive and unjustified change in the status quo.”24
Although Kennedy’s advisors were not unanimous
about the U.S. response, they agreed that the political
implications of the missiles were serious and that their
emplacement was a deliberate challenge to U.S. prestige
and influence. Even Adlai Stevenson, whose relations
with the president were strained after the crisis25 and
who encouraged nonmilitary solutions, said, “No politi-
cian could have missed the significance of Russian mis-
siles in Cuba. We just had to get them out of there.”26
The advisors, however, were not in accord on the
U.S. policy response, nor were they all concerned with
the military consequences of the Soviet actions.
MRBMs and IRBMs were placed in four missiles sites
on the southern edge of Sierra del Rosario in west cen-
tral Cuba—Guanajay and Sagua la Grande (to have
three battalions of MRBMs each), and San Cristó bal
and Remedios (to have two battalions of IRBMs each).
In total there would be forty launch pads—San Cristó
bal and Sagua la Grande would each have twelve, and
Guanajay and Remedios would each have eight.
The weapons transfers were accomplished in two
phases, with the defensive weapons first and the offen-
sive missiles and weapons later. The plan included
MRBMs with ranges up to 1,100 nautical miles; IRBMs
with ranges up to 2,200 nautical miles; IL-28s (Beagle
bombers) with ranges of 600 nautical miles and the abil-
ity to deliver nuclear or nonnuclear payloads of 6,000
pounds; surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) with the ability
to strike at targets at altitudes of 80,000 feet and at a
horizontal distance of 30 nautical miles; Cruise missiles;
KOMAR guided-missile patrol boats; and MiG-21 air-
craft capable of speeds up to 1,000 knots at 40,000 feet.
Soviet technicians, operators, mechanics, and soldiers
sent to the four installation points numbered more than
20,000. The MRBMs had an estimated ability to hit one-
third of the United States, including the District of
Columbia, St. Louis, and Dallas; Panama; and all of
Central America. The IRBMs stationed in Cuba were
estimated to be able to hit southeastern Canada, all of
the United States, Mexico, Central America, Panama,
and most of South America.
The U.S. policy was not one that “came out of the
blue”; it was publicly and privately reiterated by many
advisors. From the beginning McNamara maintained
that “a missile is a missile. It makes no great difference
 The Cuban Missile Crisis
whether you are killed by a missile fired from the Soviet
Union or from Cuba.”27 He did not believe that the
Soviets were attempting to alter the military balance.
“The military balance [has not] changed.”28 McNamara
argued in favor of limited action because it could be
increased as the situation warranted it. At the 6:30 P.M.
meeting on that first day, he urged the president to con-
sider the consequences of an air strike against Cuba,
saying, “The consequences of these actions have not
been thought through clearly.”29 He said further, “I
don’t know quite what kind of a world we live in after
we’ve struck Cuba, and . . . we’ve started it . . . After
we’ve launched . . . sorties, what kind of world do we
live in. . . . I think State and [Defense] ought to work on
the consequences of any one of these courses of actions,
consequences which I don’t believe are entirely clear.”30
The options that the ExComm addressed included
inaction, private diplomatic advances, an expression of
outrage at the United Nations, limited military action in
the form of a blockade of Cuba, surgical air strike
against the island, and general invasion. The president
did not believe that the missiles changed the global mil-
itary balance, but he did believe that they had serious
political ramifications, and, consequently, the United
States had to respond to their emplacement. After
months of reassurances against such an action, the
United States would not tolerate a Soviet action carried
out in such a deliberate and deceitful manner.31 Fur-
thermore, missiles in the Western Hemisphere point-
ing directly at the United States would not be judged in
the same manner as missiles similarly targeted but
located in the Soviet Union.
Kennedy believed that not addressing the Soviet
actions would have severe consequences in Soviet mili-
tary and political expansionism. He said, “[W]hen we
said we’re not going to and then they go ahead and do
it, and then we do nothing, then . . . I would think that
our risks increase. . . . After all this is a political struggle
as much as military.”32 Soviet expert and newly
appointed U.S. Ambassador to France Charles Bohlen
attended the meetings on the first two days. In a memo-
randum to the president he noted that “no one can
guarantee that this can be achieved by diplomatic
action—but it seems to me essential that this channel
should be tested out before military action is
employed.”33 The Bohlen plan suggested sending a let-
ter to the Kremlin before pursuing a military response.
Although Sorenson worked on composing such a letter
7
for several days, he concluded that it was impossible to
write a letter to Khrushchev “to which his reply could
not outmaneuver us.”34 Consequently, the Bohlen plan
as such was rejected.
Diplomatic advances were not discounted com-
pletely, although they were not considered without
other concurrent actions. They were rejected outright
as a preliminary to U.S. actions. Diplomatic notes
would provide the Soviets and the Cubans with warn-
ing time and would not change the U.S. position. A pri-
vate diplomatic approach would be time consuming,
but the administration feared the possibility that noth-
ing would be accomplished in a public forum. Further-
more, Kennedy and his advisors believed that they had
already on many occasions warned the Soviets against
this type of action. Bringing the issue to the U.N. Secu-
rity Council alone was discounted because, as a perma-
nent member, the Soviet Union had an automatic veto
and, ironically, Soviet Ambassador Valerian I. Zorin
was serving as the chairman of the Council.
Another alternative, which seemed especially
attractive in light of the possibility of disengaging the
Soviet-Cuban alliance, was to approach Castro directly.
The ExComm considered sending a message that would
highlight the problems for Castro. The United States
saw it as “action [by] the Soviets . . . [which] threatened
[Castro] with attack from the United States, and . . .
therefore the overthrow of this regime.” The United
States would point to Soviet statements suggesting the
possibility of “bargaining” Soviet “support [for Cuba]
and these missiles, against concessions in Berlin, and
elsewhere, and therefore . . . threatening to bargain him
away.”35
This approach was not rejected, but it was “set
aside” for the time being as Kennedy believed this to be
a U.S.-Soviet confrontation and crisis. Since the weap-
ons were Soviet-designed, Soviet-built, Soviet con-
structed, and Soviet-controlled, he did not believe that
addressing Castro on this issue would be useful.
Approaching Castro would have afforded the Soviets
advance notice. Furthermore, Castro might have
responded defensively, thereby forcing a faster or more
difficult military confrontation if he had not perceived
the approach to be genuine.36
The ExComm members next discussed the alterna-
tive of military action. The hawks believed that the
Soviet missiles had strategic as well as political value.
General Taylor and Assistant Secretary Nitze argued
8 Gabrielle S. Brussel
that the missiles exposed part of the U.S. strategic
bomber force to sudden ground attack and cut the U.S.
warning time from approximately fifteen minutes to
three minutes or less.37 Advocates of military action
against Cuba pointed out that military action was the
only option that would physically remove the missiles.
The direct surgical air strike on the missiles in Cuba
option came to be known as the “fast track.” Propo-
nents of this alternative maintained that the missiles
were not defensive or placed for the sake of Cuba but
were, in fact, designed to enhance the Soviet position
and to intimidate the United States and its allies.
The other option that claimed ExComm’s attention
was the “slow track.” Advocated by the doves, this plan
called for a limited military embargo of Soviet ship-
ments to Cuba, enforced by a naval blockade of the
island. McNamara was one of the earliest advocates of
the blockade. “He argued that it was limited pressure,
which could be increased as the circumstances war-
ranted. Further, it was dramatic and forceful pressure,
which would be understood38 yet, most importantly,
still leave [the United States] in control of events.”39
Both of these alternatives constituted direct con-
frontations with the Soviets. The naval blockade, how-
ever, would be somewhat less provocative as it did not
entail the immediate risk of casualties. It could be grad-
uated and tightened, and, although it would be a show
of force, it would not be immediately life threatening. In
addition, the United States had planned military
maneuvers off the coast of Florida that could be used to
cover the preparations.
Opponents of the blockade, including Acheson,
Taylor, and General Curtis LeMay, criticized the policy
because the Soviets could take advantage of it. They
correctly concluded that it would not remove the mis-
siles. It could easily drag on while the world debated its
legality and legitimacy. At the same time, the Soviets
could continue their missile construction and build-up.
Furthermore, if the Soviets attempted to “run the
blockade,” the United States would be forced into firing
the first shot. Above all, traditional rules in interna-
tional relations protected the freedom of the seas. A
blockade was an act of war. Vice-President Johnson had
recently characterized it as such in response to Republi-
can Senator Kenneth Keating’s demand for an embargo
of Cuba. By Wednesday, October 17, Secretary McNa-
mara, in Robert Kennedy’s words, “became the block-
ade’s strongest advocate,” arguing that limited pressure
could be increased as the circumstances warranted.
“Further, it was dramatic and forceful pressure, which
would be understood yet, most importantly, still leave
[the United States] in control of events.”40
The “fast track” had advocates as well. At the first
ExComm meeting, the majority of advisors encour-
aged an air strike. They perceived the United States as
threatened strategically and believed it would have to
respond in a quick military manner that left no room for
debate; a surprise attack on Cuba would have removed
the missiles and proved to the Soviets and to the world
that the United States stood by its word. The United
States had warned the Soviet Union repeatedly against
emplacement of missiles in Cuba, and now the United
States should respond in a forceful manner, according
to advocates of the position. The joint Chiefs of Staff,
Acheson, and Taylor remained strong proponents of a
surgical air strike against Cuba, while other advisors
changed their opinions sharply.
Advisors quickly pointed to the ramifications in
other U.S. military posts and situations. Deputy Secre-
tary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric pointed to the “points
of vulnerability around the world,” suggesting that “pre-
cautionary measures” might have to be taken. He also
said that the measures adopted must be military and
political.41 McNamara was also concerned with the con-
sequences and ramifications of a surgical air attack, sug-
gesting that U.S. forces around the world must be put
on alert.”42
Under Secretary of State George Ball was among
those concerned with the costs of such a response. On
October 17, the second day of the meetings, he became
the first firm opponent of an air strike.43 Ball said that
the bombing of Cuba would be in distinct contradiction
of U.S. traditions and history. Robert Kennedy agreed
and became the staunchest advocate of this philosophy.
Kennedy believed that the U.S. response must be con-
sistent with U.S. values. He maintained that the United
States was fighting for something more than just sur-
vival and that all our heritage and our ideals would be
repugnant to such a sneak military attack.”44 In an argu-
ment with Acheson, he said that “advocating a surprise
attack by a very large nation against a very small one . . .
could not be undertaken by the United States if we were
to maintain our moral position at home and around the
world.”45 Furthermore, he said, “My brother is not
going to be the Tojo of the 1960s,” nor would he initiate
a “Pearl Harbor in reverse.”46
 The Cuban Missile Crisis
Acheson staunchly opposed the analogy of Pearl
Harbor. He argued that the United States had warned
the Soviet government for months against placing
offensive weapons in Cuba. The president had specifi-
cally discussed this in his public statements of Septem-
ber 4 and September 13, 1962. On October 3 Congress
had authorized the president to prevent “by whatever
means may be necessary” Cuba from endangering U.S.
security. Furthermore, Acheson stated, the Western
Hemisphere had, since the Monroe Doctrine, been in
the U.S. military and political sphere of influence. The
doctrine unequivocally stated that European interfer-
ence in that sphere will not be tolerated by the United
States. For Acheson, these warnings negated the “sur-
prise attack” suggestion of the Pearl Harbor analogy.
For the president and the attorney general, however,
these statements and warnings were not enough to jus-
tify a surprise attack. In fact, the attorney general later
characterized President Kennedy’s decision against the
attack as based on “his belief in what is right and what is
wrong.”47
The final option the ExComm considered was a
general invasion of Cuba. Few of the advisors believed
that the U.S. response should begin with such extreme
action, though several advisors saw it as an opportunity
to “take Cuba away from Castro.” This response was
quickly discounted as risking a world war. At the very
least it was a step that would give the world cause to
indict U.S. aggression and interventionism for years to
come.
Mindful of previous crises during which the presi-
dent had not received complete information, President
Kennedy set an informal agenda for the ExComm meet-
ings encouraging discussion by all present regardless of
rank. Open discussion of all alternatives was encour-
aged, with advisors presenting and updating reports,
analyses, and suggestions. The president believed that
his presence had a constraining effect on the discussion,
arresting interaction between less senior advisors and
their supervisors and overwhelming the possibility for
“true give-and-take.” For this reason and because he
wanted to maintain his schedule to convey the appear-
ance of normality, Kennedy did not attend the delibera-
tions during the first days.48 Robert Kennedy served as
an informal chair at the meetings, although the discus-
sions were rarely directed and largely unstructured.
The president instructed the group to develop a con-
sensus in favor of one or two specific responses, which
9
he would consider in making his decision. Discussion
quickly centered on whether the immediate U.S.
response should be a blockade or an air strike.
On the third day of the crisis, Thursday, October
18, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko called on
the president. During the meeting, which had been
planned weeks before, Gromyko told Kennedy that the
Soviets would do nothing about Berlin or a German
peace treaty until after the November 6 congressional
elections. He said that U.S. hostilities against Cuba
could lead to problems between the Soviet Union and
the United States. The Soviet Union, he continued, had
given Cuba assistance for purely defensive purposes. At
that point, Kennedy stopped him, saying that the
United States had no intention of invading Cuba and the
Soviet Union’s supplying of arms to Cuba was having a
profound effect on the people of the United States and
was a source of great concern.49 Kennedy then read
Gromyko his statement of September 4, which declared
that Soviet placement of offensive weapons in Cuba
would have serious consequences and that the United
States would go to any length to stop Cuban aggression
and Soviet expansionism in Latin America. He did not
ask Gromyko directly whether there were offensive
missiles in Cuba. If Gromyko was puzzled by the presi-
dent’s actions, he did not appear so. Upon leaving the
White House, Gromyko described the meeting as “use-
ful, very useful.”50
As the days wore on, the meetings and debates con-
tinued. Certain people, from government analysts to
reporters, began to be aware that a major policy issue
was under discussion, although they were not quite sure
of its content. The president ordered the armed forces
to stand at DefCon 2, a stage of military preparation
that is one step away from actual confrontation. As the
United States fortified its position, it publicly defended
the build-up as part of long-planned naval activities in
the Caribbean—Philbriglex-62.51 Arthur Sylvester,
information chief of the Defense Department, denied
the significance of the build-up, saying that the exercise
had “nothing to do with any possible imminent action
against Cuba.”52 Time was running short, however.
Speculation centered on Berlin, on India, and on
the Far East as well as on Cuba. At one point during the
deliberations W. Averill Harriman, assistant secretary of
state for Far Eastern affairs, was summoned to a private
anteroom in the west wing of the White House and left
there as a decoy to encourage journalists to speculate
10 Gabrielle S. Brussel
about a crisis in the Far East rather than in Latin Amer-
ica. Martin Hillenbrand of the German Affairs Office
and Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs
Philips Talbot were also called to the White House in a
public manner as decoys.53 Government officials did
everything they could think of to avoid publicity. One
evening a mid-level official told Secretary Rusk, “I
know there is something going on that you don’t want
to talk about. But if security is all that tight, maybe
you’d better tell all those big wheels from across the
river to get their cars off the street.”54 After that the lim-
ousines were left in the basement garage
On the evening of Thursday, October 18, when the
State Department gave a dinner party for Gromyko, the
ExComm was divided into two clear camps—air strike
versus blockade. At the beginning the group was
divided almost evenly. McCone, Dillon, Taylor, Ache-
son, and Nitze favored a strategic air strike. Initially
McGeorge Bundy had supported a blockade, but by
that time he also favored an air strike. Robert Kennedy,
McNamara, Gilpatric, Thompson, Ball, and Lovett,
however, believed that the United States must pursue a
blockade, at least before resorting to more drastic mili-
tary action. The air strike proponents suggested an
advance warning to both the Cubans and the Soviets
through contacts in the Swiss government.55
Soviet expert Llewellyn Thompson, resuming an
argument he had supported in earlier meetings, main-
tained that the missiles were placed and controlled by
the Soviets. To consider Castro as a major policymaker
in this crisis, he believed, would be futile. Since this was
a dramatic departure from previous Soviet military pol-
icy (they had never before placed missiles outside the
Soviet Union), Thompson argued, the plan must have
originated in the Kremlin. A resolution, therefore, had
to be negotiated with the Kremlin. Furthermore,
attacking the Soviet missiles meant killing Soviets, and
it was unlikely that Khrushchev would not respond in
kind somewhere in the world. President Kennedy
agreed. During a briefing with Air Force Chief of Staff
General Curtis LeMay, Kennedy said that although he
understood the position of the joint Chiefs of Staff in
calling for immediate military action, there would in all
probability be some Soviet military retaliation to a U.S.
military action. “They, no more than we,” Kennedy
said, “can let these things go by without doing some-
thing. They can’t, after all their statements, permit us to
take out their missiles, kill a lot of Russians and then do
nothing.”56
Robert Kennedy, continuing an argument that he
and others, including McNamara and Ball, supported,
maintained that the president was not faced with a
“zero-sum” choice. Instead, he suggested that the presi-
dent should begin with responses that offered the least
risk of war and increase pressure if necessary. The
blockade was a limited action that could be tightened or
supplemented with an air strike as time went on. A
turning point occurred when Secretary of the Treasury
Douglas Dillon shifted his opinion away from support of
an air strike to a blockade. “What changed my mind,”
he suggests, “was Bobby Kennedy’s argument that we
ought to be true to ourselves as Americans, that sur-
prise attack was not in our tradition. Frankly, these con-
siderations had not occurred to me. . . .”57
Around 10:00 P.M. the advisors left the State
Department to meet with the president. In a meeting
that lasted past midnight, they presented two policy
options they had been debating for days: the air strike
and the blockade. In the course of the meeting the advi-
sors were not able to answer all of the president’s ques-
tions, and their own opinions began to shift again. The
president sent them back to the State Department for
further deliberations. The next day the advocates of the
two plans split up to write recommendations outlining
the steps each policy would require. Presidential Assis-
tant Theodore Sorenson was asked to draft a speech
that would justify the blockade. It was to include an
analysis of the Latin American countries that could
assist in the blockade and the military procedures that
would be used to stop ships. The advocates of immedi-
ate military action were required to draw up a list of
riot-control equipment that would be used to maintain
domestic security throughout Latin America; weapons
that would be barred from Cuba; an analysis of the
Cuban exile groups in the United States; and a pro-
posed communication to Khrushchev designed to per-
suade him that it would be inadvisable to move
militarily against us in the Caribbean, in Berlin, or else-
where in the world.58 The Justice and State depart-
ments were entrusted with the task of building the legal
defense for the blockade.
The deliberations were not over, however. On Fri-
day, October 19, the opponents of a blockade continued
to raise criticisms of the plan and to argue the futility of
such action. Furthermore, they suggested that the “slow
 The Cuban Missile Crisis
track” of a blockade would remove any advantage that
the United States might have with a surprise attack.
Reporters were becoming more persistent as the
global U.S. military mobilization continued. At 1:20
P.M. an alert went out to Atlantic and Caribbean bases
and commands warning them against possible attacks.
High-level policymakers were canceling appointments
and speaking engagements. Government officials were
remaining in Washington when they were scheduled to
be in other places. Troop movements and mobilizations
were being questioned, even though they were covered
somewhat by the naval exercises. The president main-
tained his scheduled campaign stops in Illinois while his
advisors continued their discussions, but questions
were being raised about what was going on. Time was
running out.
International and Legal Ramifications
The ExComm now began a new debate: What could be
the justification for the limited response, or “slow
track,” which was, in fact, an act of war? Furthermore,
what domestic constitutional questions were involved?
Although the blockade was considered a less provoca-
tive response, it was not in accord with international
law or with U.S. traditions. The history of foreign policy
provides numerous examples of the importance to gov-
ernments of freedom of the seas. Indeed, the United
States had fought the War of 1812 to protect American
access to the seas.
Deputy Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach and
State Department Deputy Legal Advisor Leonard
Meeker were responsible for creating a legal frame-
work to justify the naval blockade. Although the admin-
istration already believed that it was important for its
actions to have a legal basis, Thompson emphasized the
importance of this point in dealing with the Soviet gov-
ernment. He noted that although the Soviets might
manipulate the legal justifications or ramifications of a
situation, they consistently sought legal interpretations
to justify their actions in the international sphere.
Katzenbach maintained that U.S. military actions
(including a blockade) could be justified on the interna-
tional principle of self-defense based on Chapter VII,
Article 51, of the United Nations Charter. Moreover, a
blockade would not require a declaration of war.
Meeker agreed that U.S. actions were valid on the basis
of “self-defense,” but he maintained that a blockade or
11
“defensive quarantine”59 would be considered “use of
force” prohibited by Article 2(4) of the UN Charter,
which states:
All Members shall refrain in their international rela-
tions from the threat or use of force against the ter-
ritorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations.
There are, however, exceptions to the “use of
force” prohibition, including self-defense in an armed
attack, action by the United Nations itself, and regional
arrangements. The regional arrangements exception,
stated in Article 52(1) and Article 52(2), sanctions
“appropriate” actions for the maintenance of regional
peace and security. Katzenbach believed that the block-
ade with a regional sanction would provide a solid legal
basis. He also felt that the United States could, without
the sanction, defend the blockade in view of a state’s
right of self defense.
An Organization of American States (OAS) sanc-
tion, under the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocity,
or Rio Treaty (a treaty to which Cuba is a signatory),
established cooperative relations and a forum to deal
with internal and external conflicts among the Ameri-
can states. Meeker argued that this treaty would legiti-
mize a quarantine of Cuba. Meeker especially noted
Articles 6 and 8 of the Rio Treaty, which condone mea-
sures taken within the organization (including the rec-
ommendation of force by one or more members) to
resolve a situation that endangers the peace and secu-
rity of the hemisphere:
Article 6: If the inviolability or the integrity of the
territory or the sovereignty or political indepen-
dence of any American State should be affected by
an aggression which is not an armed attack or by an
extra-continental or intra-continental conflict, or
by any other fact or situation that might endanger
the peace of America, the Organ of Consultation
shall meet immediately in order to agree on mea-
sures which must be taken in case of aggression to
assist the victim of the aggression or, in any case,
measures which should be taken for the common
defense and for the maintenance of the peace and
security of the Continent.
12 Gabrielle S. Brussel
Article 8: For the purposes of this treaty, the mea-
sure on which the Organ of Consultation may agree
will comprise one or more of the following: recall
of chiefs of diplomatic missions; breaking of diplo-
matic relations; breaking of consular relations; par-
tial or complete interruption of economic relations
or of sea, air, postal, telephonic, and radiotele-
phonic or radiotelegraphic communications; and
the use of armed force.
The advisors recognized that the language used to
describe the crisis was critical. Meeker was careful,
therefore, to qualify the naval response as a “defensive
quarantine” rather than a “blockade.” A defensive quar-
antine would not necessarily imply a state of war, while
a blockade would be subject to considerable retaliation
as an act of war. Both advisors underscored the state-
ment in Article 2(4), which outlaws “use of force” that
is “inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations.” They suggested that the quarantine would be
“legal” in the context of Article 2(4) as it supported the
aim of maintaining international peace. Furthermore,
within the sanction of the regional institution, the OAS,
a “defensive quarantine” would not be illegal. Sorenson
began a draft that announced a blockade but suggested
that the United States would increase the pressure of
the blockade and proceed to more offensive actions if
the Soviet build-up continued.
The Presidential Decision
At 2:30 P.M. on Saturday, October 20, after five days of
almost constant deliberations, the ExComm presented
two alternative proposals to President Kennedy:
1. Begin with a naval blockade and increase the mili-
tary pressure as the crisis demands; or
2. Begin with an air strike of Cuba, probably accom-
panied by an invasion of Cuba.
Assistant Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric
summarized the general opinion of the ExComm:
“Essentially, Mr. President, this is a choice between
limited action and unlimited action; and most of us
think that it’s better to start with limited action.”60
Adlai Stevenson said that the United States should
be prepared to negotiate to remove the missiles. He
suggested that the president should consider proposing
that Cuba be demilitarized, neutralized, and its territo-
rial integrity guaranteed by the demobilization of U.S.
forces at Guantánamo Bay Naval Base. Additionally,
either as an alternative or as an accompanying proposal,
the president should consider dismantling the obsolete
Jupiter missiles in Turkey and Italy.
Kennedy discounted both options. He did not want
to give up Guantánamo at that time, and he refused to
be perceived as trading away an ally for the safety of the
United States, whether the missiles in the Mediterra-
nean were militarily useful or not. Primarily, the United
States could not and would not negotiate under threat.
The president did agree, however, that the political
importance of the U.S. negotiating position had to be
addressed and strengthened. With the exception of Ste-
venson, the ExComm fully agreed with the president’s
refusal to include the U.S. missiles in a negotiation
package. A straw vote revealed that the ExComm
remained split, with six advisors voting for a surgical
strike and eleven advocating a naval quarantine within a
context of international negotiations.61
That morning the president ordered the U.S. mis-
siles stationed in Turkey to be defused. This rendered
them incapable of firing without a direct order by an
authority.62 This was done to consolidate the responsi-
bility of the crisis into the hands of the executive and to
prevent, to the best of the administration’s ability, esca-
lation through mistake, misperception, or miscalcula-
tion of an unauthorized government official. This
action did not affect the U.S. strategic position or
diminish its security. By the fall of 1962, only Air Force
General LeMay believed that the Jupiters were “good
military weapons.”63 Turkey maintained that the mis-
siles were a physical sign of the U.S. commitment to
NATO, and to Turkey in particular. In May and June
1962 the State Department had broached the subject
with the Turkish government; both times the Turkish
government refused to discuss it. Although in August
1962 Bundy had pursued the subject of how to remove
the missiles, no action had as yet begun.64
President Kennedy decided in favor of a blockade
or “defensive quarantine.”65 Although he realized that
the quarantine would not remove the missiles, he knew
that an air strike would not necessarily remove all of
them either, thereby forcing an escalation to higher lev-
els of military confrontation. This course allowed the
United States to increase pressure as required. Once the
 The Cuban Missile Crisis
United States went forward with an attack, there would
have been little recourse. The quarantine bought some
time.
The president was scheduled to make a statement
on Monday October 22, but the administration was not
sure it could keep the crisis from reaching the press.
James Reston of the New York Times had many of the
facts. Alfred Friendly of the Washington Post also had a
fair idea of what was going on. Both the New York Times
and the Washington Post, in addition to the New York
Herald Tribune, complied with the request that they
wait on the story until the president had gone public
hours later.
The final hours of the weekend were spent drafting
the president’s speech to the public; contacting con-
gressional leaders; coordinating the military mobiliza-
tion and naval buildup; establishing support systems,
including doctors and nurses, that would be needed in
the event of a military confrontation; and dispatching
ambassadors to inform our allies. Kennedy also sent
personal envoys to French President Charles de Gaulle,
Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker, West Ger-
man Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, and British Prime
Minister Harold Macmillan. Presidential letters, sent
through U.S. embassies, went to forty-three heads of
state.
The president gave a final, last-minute consider-
ation to an air strike during a meeting with General
Walter C. Sweeney, Jr., commander-in-chief of the Tac-
tical Air Command, on the morning of Sunday, October
21. Sweeney explained that an air attack could not be
certain of destroying all the missile sites in Cuba. In
fact, he said, approximately ten percent of the missiles
would remain, necessitating a U.S. invasion. That con-
firmed the president’s decision to begin with the naval
quarantine. The air strike plan as outlined by the mili-
tary included bombing several populated areas as well
as military installations. Later reports suggested that
U.S. intelligence advisors had estimated that 25,000
Cubans would be killed if the decision had been made
to bomb the missiles sites and destroy the bases.66
Once the president made his decision, time and
energy were channeled into reviewing the speeches to
be made and deciding on the exact presentation the
president would make. There were many questions:
How would he explain the U.S. evidence? Would he
present the photographs on television? Should the
president admit to illegal reconnaissance flights over
13
Cuban air space? Should he state that the United States
would continue its blockade whether it received
regional approval from the OAS or not? Should the
speech mention Berlin and try to forestall a retaliatory
action there?
Kennedy decided against showing the enlarged
photographs on the grounds that the viewer would
probably not be able to discern the missile sites in the
photographs. Robert Kennedy later admitted that the
first time he looked at the photographs he had to take
the photo reconnaissance analysts at their word, since
what he saw “appeared to be no more than the clearing
of a field for a farm or the basement of a house.” This
had been the reaction of many of the experts in the
room, including President Kennedy.67 Although the
public would have seen later stages of construction, the
president did not want to present questionable evi-
dence. At the same time the administration did not
want to heighten panic, so the president removed any
specific references to Hiroshima and megatonnage.
The speech would admit the secret surveillance of
Cuba and would announce that the United States would
increase this surveillance until the crisis abated. Sur-
veillance was justified in an earlier OAS communiqué
condemning secret military preparations. Although the
United States would institute the blockade in any event,
the ExComm chose not to review that point in the
speech in the hope that the statement about “the
defense of [U.S.] security and of the entire Western
Hemisphere” would encourage regional unity and
approval. The speech discouraged Soviet advances in
Berlin, stating that the United States would resist any
hostile retaliations anywhere in the world “including in
particular [against] the brave people of West Berlin.”68
At 2:30 P.M., October 21, the National Security
Council formally ratified the decisions of the ExComm.
Admiral George W. Anderson outlined the navy’s plan
for the blockade. Orders from the Pentagon readied
Guantánamo naval base for a possible confrontation,
evacuating family dependents and assigning operational
control of specified army and air force units. In the eve-
ning Secretary of Defense McNamara formally
approved the procedures and authorized air force inter-
ceptors flying in the United States to carry nuclear
weapons.
On Monday, October 22, the political and military
preparations continued. John McCloy flew back to the
United States from Europe to join the Stevenson team
14 Gabrielle S. Brussel
at the United Nations. A blockade-planning directive
was ordered to the Atlantic fleet, and the air force mis-
sile crews received maximum alert orders. One hundred
fifty-six Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs)
were readied for firing. The bomber force was dis-
persed, with B-47s sent to forty civilian airports and the
B-52 bomber force ordered into the air. During the fol-
lowing month a significant portion of the B-52s were in
the air at all times. In addition, the force on the ground
carried a full load of fuel and bombs and was ready to
take off on fifteen minutes notice. Five army divisions
were on full alert, and 180 ships were deployed in the
Caribbean.69
The ExComm met to discuss the presidential
announcement. Abram Chayes, the legal advisor of the
State Department, stressed that the legal basis of the
quarantine was the right of collective action found in
the Rio Treaty and in the UN Charter. He emphasized
the OAS right to take collective actions to guard the
security of the region and Article 52 of the UN Charter,
maintaining a state’s right to make regional arrange-
ments.
The United States did not point to Article 51 of the
UN Charter protecting the right of all nations to self-
defense because that article allowed a broad interpreta-
tion of self-defense. International justifications and
pleas of self-defense had been established over many
years. Chayes maintained that a dangerous and difficult
precedent would be set if the United States extended
the interpretation of “self-defense” to “anticipatory self-
defense” in regard to the placement of offensive missiles
close to U.S. borders when an attack, although possible
in the future, was obviously not imminent.
The legal advisors urged policymakers to support
the U.S. position with the other available avenues of
international legal posture. This was agreed upon, and
the text of the president’s speech was changed. Chayes
agreed with Meeker’s emphasis on terminology,
strongly recommending that the U.S. action be termed
a “defensive quarantine” rather than a blockade. The
president also accepted this idea. Action Memorandum
No. 196 was approved, formally establishing the advi-
sors as the Executive Committee of the National Secu-
rity Council “for the purpose of effective conduct of the
operations of the executive branch in the current crisis.”
Later that day President Kennedy met with leading
members of Congress, many of whom had been flown
back to Washington. McCone, Rusk, and McNamara
began the briefing with a description of the intelligence
reports and a report of the U.S. response. Members of
the congressional group were fairly uniform in their
criticism of a blockade. Believing it slow and ineffec-
tive, they called for stronger action. Some, including
Senator Richard Russell of Georgia and Senator J. Wil-
liam Fulbright of Arkansas (both Democrats), went so
far as to call for an invasion.
President Kennedy later suggested that the con-
gressional leaders were responding as the executive
advisors had at first. He believed that “if they had gone
through the five-day period we had gone through—in
looking at the various alternatives, advantages and dis-
advantages . . .—they would have come out the same
way we did.”70 Kennedy responded to the congressional
leaders by stating that he was acting by executive order,
presidential proclamation, and inherent powers, not
under a resolution or an act of Congress.”71 He was
seeking bipartisan governmental unity, he explained,
but the planned U.S. response of a quarantine would
continue in any event. Congressional support was
important to Kennedy, but he had already decided that
the executive branch would formulate a response with-
out contacting Congress.
The State Department was also preparing briefings.
Secretary Rusk left the meeting with Congress for a
meeting with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin.
Dobrynin was given an advance copy of the president’s
speech. Rusk recalled that Dobrynin “age[d] ten years
right in front of [his] eyes.”72 In fact, Dobrynin’s own
government had not informed him of the missile
deployment. In the State Department’s international
conference room, Under Secretary Ball briefed the
ambassadors of forty-six allied countries, showing them
photographs of the sites. U.S. ambassadors all over the
world, including Foy Kohler in Moscow, were giving
similar briefings
At 7:00 P.M. (EST) President Kennedy broadcast
on an international network arranged by the U.S. Infor-
mation Agency:73
This government as promised, has maintained the
closest surveillance of the Soviet military build-up
on the island of Cuba. Within the past week,
unmistakable evidence has established the fact that
a series of offensive missile sites is now in prepara-
tion on that imprisoned island. The purpose of
these bases, can be none other than to provide a
 The Cuban Missile Crisis
nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemi-
sphere. . . .
This urgent transformation of Cuba into an impor-
tant strategic base—by the presence of these large,
long-range and clearly offensive weapons of sudden
mass destruction—constitutes an explicit threat to
the peace and security of all the Americas. . . .
This secret, swift and extraordinary build-up of
Communist missiles—in an area well-known to
have a special and historical relationship to the
United States and the nations of the Western Hemi-
sphere, in violation of Soviet assurances, and in
defiance of American and hemispheric policy—this
sudden, clandestine decision to station strategic
weapons for the first time outside of Soviet soil is a
deliberately provocative and unjustified change in
the status quo which cannot be accepted by this
country, if our courage and our commitments are
ever to be trusted again by either friend or foe. . . .
Our unswerving objective, therefore, must be to
prevent the use of these missiles against this or any
other country, and to secure their withdrawal or
elimination from the Western Hemisphere. . . .
The president went on, outlining the initial
response planned by the United States, including the
naval quarantine, continued surveillance, reinforce-
ment of Guantánamo Bay, and a diplomatic approach
consisting of negotiations at the UN, through the OAS,
and in bilateral discussions with Khrushchev. He
warned that the United States would retaliate if neces-
sary:
It shall be the policy of this nation to regard any
nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any
nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by
the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a
full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union.
Kennedy concluded with a statement reaffirming
the U.S. commitment to freedom and peace, “Our goal
is not the victory of might, but the vindication of right;
not peace at the expense of freedom, but both peace
and freedom, here in this hemisphere, and, we hope,
15
around the world. God willing, that goal will be
achieved.”
During the president’s speech, the State Depart-
ment continued addressing world opinion to gain a
world consensus favoring or at least understanding the
proposed U.S. actions. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson
requested that the Security Council convene to address
the “dangerous threat to peace and security of the world
caused by the secret establishment in Cuba” of long-
range offensive missiles. He delivered this request to the
chairman of the Security Council, Soviet Ambassador
Valerian Zorin.74 The United States had ready a draft
resolution calling for the dismantling of the missiles
under the jurisdiction of the UN Observer Corps. If this
were done, the blockade would be called off.
Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American
Affairs Edwin Martin briefed the ambassadors of the
OAS, while Secretary Rusk met with members of the
nonaligned and neutral nations. Characterizing the
Soviet emplacement as a “gross . . . error of judgement,”
Rusk appealed to the nations to “look at this situation in
terms of national purposes, national commitments,
national interests.” Further, he suggested that “one of
the issues . . . involved . . . the independence of states . .
.” and that Cuba was the victim rather than the perpe-
trator of the act.75 McNamara and Ball also held brief-
ings that evening for the correspondents of the State
Department and the Pentagon. When asked how far the
navy would go to stop a Soviet vessel, McNamara
responded, “If there is an indication of offensive weap-
ons on board” and the captain refuses another course or
port, “we will use force.”76
The OAS met at 9:00 A.M. on Tuesday, October
23, to discuss the U.S. resolution proposing a U.S.
“quarantine” of Cuba. Martin estimated that the United
States would get fourteen votes—the minimum neces-
sary to approve the collective action under the Rio
Treaty (two-thirds of the twenty-one member nations).
The U.S. delegation, including Secretary of State Rusk,
urged the OAS to act in concert for the defense of the
entire hemisphere. The nations discussed the blockade
throughout the day. Eighteen favored the blockade. The
Bolivian ambassador, under instructions from his gov-
ernment to boycott the OAS for reasons relating to an
earlier border dispute, was unable to participate in the
proceeding. Deciding, however, to take a stand on what
was viewed as one of the most important decisions the
OAS would ever make, he abstained on a paragraph and
16 Gabrielle S. Brussel
voted with the majority. Uruguay alone abstained, mak-
ing the vote nineteen to zero in favor of a U.S. naval
quarantine of Cuba.
U.S.-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS
On Tuesday, October 23, the UN Security Council held
its first meeting on the Cuban missile crisis. U.S.
Ambassador Adlai Stevenson denounced the Soviet
actions in Cuba, while Soviet Ambassador Valerian
Zorin accused the United States of risking world war
and making “false accusations.” The Soviet ambassador
introduced a resolution calling for condemnation of the
United States for violating the UN Charter and increas-
ing the likelihood of world war. The Cuban ambassador
also condemned the U.S. actions, announcing that
Cuba would never accept UN observers on the island.
The United States estimated that it could depend
on seven votes (including its own) from its allies among
the permanent members, France, Great Britain, and
China, and Venezuela, Chile, and Ireland who, by rota-
tion, were sitting on the council. The Soviet bloc on the
Security Council consisted of Romania and the Soviet
Union, which, as a permanent member, had an auto-
matic veto. The other alternate members during the
rotation were neutral.77 Secretary General U Thant was
asked to mediate the crisis.
Edge of the Precipice
In Washington the CIA presented evidence to the
ExComm that “as of the day before, four MRBM sites
were ‘operational’ and many others had ‘emergency
capability.’" The Soviet technicians continued to
improve the sites. The “emergency capability” would
become “fully operational” shortly. The ExComm
decided, with the president’s approval, that if a U-2
reconnaissance plane flying surveillance over Cuba was
fired on, the United States would, with specific permis-
sion from President Kennedy, use bomber and fighter
planes to destroy the Surface-to-Air missile site (SAM)
that had shot down the U.S. plane. The United States
did not know if nuclear warheads were on the island, so
the administration shaped its strategy assuming the
worst. In fact, two-thirds of the Soviet warheads were
either on the island or en route to it. Thirty-six war-
heads for use on medium-range missiles and twenty-
four launchers were in Cuba, as well as nine Luna short-
range, nuclear-tipped missiles with six mobile launch-
ers. Moreover, the local Soviet commander in Cuba had
permission to fire a nuclear retaliation in response to a
U.S.-ordered invasion of the island. The atomic war-
heads on the Soviet rockets had yields of six to twelve
kilotons, or 6,000 to 12,000 tons of TNT.
At 11:56 A.M. (EST) the U.S. Embassy in Moscow
transmitted the response by Chairman Nikita Khrush-
chev to President Kennedy’s public statement:78
[M]easures outlined in your statement represent
serious threat to peace and the security of peoples.
United States has openly taken path of gross viola-
tion of Charter of United Nations, path of violation
of international norms of freedom of navigation on
high seas, path of aggressive actions both against
Cuba and against Soviet Union.
Statement of Government of United States Amer-
ica cannot be evaluated in any other way than as
naked interference in domestic affairs of Cuban
Republic, Soviet Union, and other states. Charter
of United Nations and international norms do not
give right to any state whatsoever to establish in
international waters control of vessels bound for
shores of the Cuban Republic.
It is self-understood that we also cannot recognize
right of United States to establish control over
armaments essential to Republic of Cuba for
strengthening of its defensive capacity.
We confirm that armaments now on Cuba, regard-
less of classification to which they belong, are des-
tined exclusively for defensive purposes, in order to
secure Cuban Republic from attack of aggressor.
I hope that Government of United States will show
prudence and renounce actions pursued by you,
which could lead to catastrophic consequences for
peace throughout the world. . . .
Kennedy responded immediately, transmitting a
letter through the U.S. State Department to the U.S.
Embassy in Moscow. It was delivered in Moscow at 7:00
A.M. October 24 (Moscow time). Briefly discussing the
 The Cuban Missile Crisis
cause of the crisis, Kennedy firmly announced that the
quarantine would go into effect:79
I think you will recognize that the steps80 which
stated the current chain of events was the action of
your government in secretly furnishing offensive
weapons to Cuba. We will be discussing this matter
in the Security Council. In the meantime, I hope
that we both show prudence and do nothing to
allow events to make the situation more difficult to
control than it already is.
I hope that you will issue immediately the neces-
sary instruction to your ships to observe the terms
of the quarantine, the basis of which was estab-
lished by the vote of the Organization of American
States this afternoon, and which will go into effect
at 1400 hours Greenwich time October twenty-
four. . . .
That evening the president signed the interdiction
orders that were to go into effect the next day. The
materials to be stopped included SAMs, bomber air-
craft, bombs, air-to-surface rockets and guided missiles,
warheads, support equipment for the banned weapons,
and any other materials so designated by the secretary
of Defense “for the purpose of effectuating this procla-
mation.” McNamara, as secretary of Defense, ordered
the quarantine: Any ships headed for Cuba would be
interdicted. The president reserved to himself the right
to order each ship to be intercepted or boarded. Again,
as with the order to defuse the Turkish missiles, by
completely centralizing the orders the President aimed
to reduce the ability of government officials to take
matters into their own hands and unwittingly increase
the levels of tension.
The United States asked its African allies to refuse
landing rights to Soviet planes seeking to refuel on Afri-
can territory. This was especially important for Senegal
and Guinea, the most practical refueling stops for
planes en route to Cuba from the Soviet Union. Both
nations disavowed the Soviet buildup in Cuba and
agreed to refuse landing rights to Soviet planes.
In Washington, Ambassador Dobrynin met with
Robert Kennedy to discuss the events of the past six
weeks. Kennedy reminded him of the repeated Soviet
pledges not to place offensive missiles in Cuba and to
give Castro only defensive assistance. Dobrynin
17
renewed those pledges and denied the existence of
offensive missiles in Cuba. Kennedy observed that the
president had chosen a less belligerent attitude toward
the Soviet Union than other political figures in the
United States would have and suggested that the Soviet
actions had “devastating implications for the peace of
the world.”81 Dobrynin questioned the U.S. silence
regarding the missiles during the Kennedy-Gromyko
meeting the previous week. The attorney general
replied that “there was nothing the President could tell
Gromyko that Gromyko didn’t already know—after all,
why didn’t Gromyko tell the President.”82 The presi-
dent had met Soviet demands for the “withdrawal of
American troops from Thailand.” He believed that he
was negotiating in good faith and “sneaking missiles
into Cuba now displayed the Soviet leaders as hypocrit-
ical, misleading and false.” Kennedy asked if the Soviet
ships were continuing on their course toward Cuba.
Dobrynin replied that “that had been their instructions
and he knew of no change.”83 The meeting ended in a
stalemate, neither man secure in his knowledge of the
other.
That evening the president met with British
Ambassador David Ormsby-Gore. Ormsby-Gore sug-
gested that Kennedy should release the aerial photo-
graphs proving the U.S. position. This would help to
rally public opinion behind the U.S. position. It was
absolutely imperative that the world accept that the
missiles represented a real crisis rather than a political
attempt to increase public support before the important
congressional elections on November 6. The president
agreed with the ambassador on this point and decided
to publish enlarged versions of the pictures the next
day.
The quarantine line was drawn at 10:00 A.M. on
Wednesday, October 24, by nineteen U.S. ships operat-
ing as Task Force 136. If the Soviet ships bound for
Cuba continued at their current speed, two ships would
be intercepted before noon.84 More than twenty Soviet
ships bound for Cuba had been tracked by navy recon-
naissance planes.
President Kennedy received a warning from
Khrushchev stating that the Soviet Union would not
accept the U.S. “ultimatum:”85
Having posed these conditions to us with these
conditions, you, Mr. President, have challenged us.
Who asked you to do this? By what right have you
18 Gabrielle S. Brussel
done this? Our relations with the Republic of Cuba,
like our relations with other states, regardless of
what sort of state it may be, concern only the two
countries between which those relations exist. . . .
You, Mr. President, are not declaring quarantines,
but advancing an ultimatum and threatening that
unless we subordinate ourselves to your demands,
you will use force . . . You are no longer appealing
to reason, but wish to intimidate us. . . .
Reference to the decision of the Organization of
American States cannot in any way substantiate the
demands now advanced by the United States. This
organization has absolutely no authority or basis to
make decisions like that of which you speak of in
your letter.
Consequently, we do not recognize these decisions.
International law exists, generally recognized
norms of conduct exist. We firmly support the
principles of international law, strictly observe the
norms regulating navigation on the high seas and in
international waters. We observe these norms and
enjoy the rights recognized by all states.
You wish to compel us to renounce the rights that
every sovereign state enjoys, you are attempting to
legislate in questions of international law, and you
are trampling upon the generally accepted norms
of this law. . . . What morality, what law can justify
such approach by the American Government to
international affairs? You cannot find such a moral-
ity and such a law. . . .
The Soviet Government considers that violation of
freedom of the use of international waters and
international air space is an act of aggression, push-
ing mankind toward the abyss of a world missile-
nuclear war. . . . Of course, we shall not be simply
observers of piratical actions of American ships on
high seas. We will then be forced on our part to
take the measure we deem necessary and adequate
in order to protect our rights. For this we have all
that is necessary.
Just after 10:00 A.M. McNamara announced that
the ships Gagarin and Komiles were going to reach the
interdiction line within one hour. A Soviet submarine
had moved into position between the two ships. The
U.S. Navy planned to meet the Soviets with an aircraft
carrier supported by anti-submarine equipped helicop-
ters. The U.S.S. Essex would signal the submarine by
sonar. If it failed to respond, depth charges would be
released to force the submarine to surface.
The administration had come to the moment it had
carefully attempted to avoid, the “first exchange with an
Russian submarine.” Even at that moment the presi-
dent asked if “there was some way we can avoid” it. This
moment was characterized as “the edge of the precipice
with no way off.”86 The U.S. government began to make
final preparations for a retaliation by the Soviets in Ber-
lin. At 10:25 A.M., however, a report stating that the
Soviet ships had stopped “dead in the water” was
received. Seven minutes later the report was confirmed.
The fourteen ships closest to the quarantine line had
stopped in the water or had turned back toward the
Soviet Union, although the tankers bound for Cuba
continued. The president was determined to afford
both nations the time necessary to negotiate their way
out of the crisis. “No ships will be stopped or inter-
cepted. . . . If the ships have orders to turn around, we
want to give them every opportunity to do so. Get in
direct touch with the Essex and tell them not to do any-
thing . . . give the Russian vessels an opportunity to turn
back. We must move quickly because the time is expir-
ing.”87
Avoiding the Confrontation
The U.S. military community was not completely reas-
sured by the Soviet actions. Some officers speculated
that ships might have altered their course in order to
rendezvous with Soviet submarines, six of which had
been tracked in the area, and then attempt to force their
way through the line. The president ordered the Soviet
ships followed but not boarded. This, he believed
would keep the United States in an alert position, afford
Khrushchev time to plan his next move, aware of U.S.
pressure and restraint, but not cause precipitate action.
At 1:00 P.M. the administration released the photo-
graphs of Soviet bases in Cuba. This was especially
important in London where public opinion was run-
ning against the U.S. administration. Many critics felt
that the Democratic administration was creating a pro-
 The Cuban Missile Crisis
paganda campaign to aid its party during the upcoming
elections
U Thant, attempting to mediate between the two
governments, proposed the simultaneous suspension of
the quarantine and the arms shipments. This, he main-
tained, would facilitate and establish the groundwork
for an immediate summit meeting between Khrushchev
and Kennedy. Kennedy and Khrushchev responded to
the secretary general the next day, Thursday, October
25. Khrushchev accepted the proposal: “I declare that I
agree with your proposals which accord with the inter-
est of peace.” Kennedy did not: “As we made clear in
the Security Council, the existing threat was created by
the secret introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba,
and the answer lies in the removal of such weapons.”
First, remove the missiles then the United States will
negotiate. Otherwise, the quarantine will remain.
Khrushchev decided to approach the U.S. govern-
ment in an unofficial manner. He settled on inviting vis-
iting businessman William Knox, president of
Westinghouse International, to meet with him on
Wednesday in the Kremlin. During the ensuing discus-
sion, Khrushchev presented the Soviet view to a man
he viewed as an informal channel to the U.S. govern-
ment. Discussing semantic questions of “offense and
defense,” he admitted what his ambassadors and offi-
cial statements had been denying, namely that there
were missiles and other offensive weapons in Cuba.
Furthermore, the Soviet Union would use them if nec-
essary. He warned that they would also sink the Ameri-
can vessels if the United States attempted to stop and
board the Soviet ships.
On Thursday, October 25, Walter Lippmann’s col-
umn in the Washington Post suggested that there were
“three ways to get rid of the missiles already in Cuba:”—
invasion and occupation, total blockade and what he
termed a “face-saving agreement,” a trade of the U.S.
missiles in Turkey for the Soviet missiles in Cuba.
At 8:00 A.M. (EST) on Thursday, October 25, a
Soviet tanker, the Bucharest, was intercepted but was
allowed to pass through the quarantine line without a
U.S. boarding. An East German passenger ship was also
allowed through. The United States decided that since
it was only a matter of time until a ship was boarded,
contingency plans would have to be made. After long
discussions the ExComm, the State Department, and
the Pentagon agreed that the first ship to be boarded
19
must not be a Soviet ship nor the ship of a Western ally,
but preferably should belong to a neutral state.
That day at the United Nations, Ambassador Zorin
denied the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba, chal-
lenging Ambassador Stevenson to present evidence
proving their existence. Stevenson obliged with a dra-
matic flair:
Mr. Ambassador we do have the evidence. We have
it and it is clear and incontrovertible. . . . You, the
Soviet Union, have sent these weapons to Cuba.
You, the Soviet Union, have created this new dan-
ger not the United States. . . .
I remind you that the other day you did not deny
the existence of these weapons, but today . . . you
now say that they do not exist, or that we haven’t
proved they exist. . . .
All right, Sir, let me ask you one question. Do you,
Ambassador Zorin, deny that the U.S.S.R. has
placed and is placing medium and intermediate
range missiles and sites in Cuba? Yes or no? Don’t
wait for the translation, yes or no?
Zorin: I am not in an American courtroom. . . . In
due course, Sir, you will have your answer.
Stevenson: You are in the courtroom of world
opinion right now and you can answer yes or no.
You have denied that they exist and I want to know
whether I have understood you correctly.
Zorin: Continue with your statement. You will have
your answer in due course.
Stevenson: I am prepared to wait for my answer
until hell freezes over, if that’s your decision. And I
am also prepared to present the evidence to this
room.
With that Stevenson turned to a set of easels
behind him and presented the enlarged photographs of
the Soviet missile sites to the Security Council. Zorin
did not respond. Stevenson said, “We know the facts,
and so do you, Sir, and we are ready to talk about them.
Our job here is not to score debating points. Our job,
Mr. Zorin, is to save the peace. And if you are ready to
20 Gabrielle S. Brussel
try, we are.” The Security Council adjourned later that
day and did not meet again until the crisis had ended.
At 7:00 A.M. (EST) Friday, October 26, the U.S.S.
Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr., stopped the American-built, Pan-
amanian-owned, Lebanese-registered freighter Mar-
cula. The Marcula was bound for Cuba with a Soviet
charter. It had been tracked since the previous evening.
The encounter had been specifically planned by the
White House; it was selected as a neutral ship sailing
under a Soviet charter. The U.S. Navy stopped and
searched the vessel. The Marcula cooperated with little
protest, presumably under Soviet instructions. But con-
struction of the missile sites continued at an increasing
pace.
Kennedy stepped up the psychological and politi-
cal pressure. Low-level photo reconnaissance flights
over Cuba were increased to one every two hours.
From Florida to Washington, contingency plans were
made in the event that the United States was forced to
bomb and invade Cuba. The State Department was
ordered to proceed with preparations for establishing a
civilian government in Cuba after the occupation of
that country by U.S. troops.88
On Friday, October 26, statements went to the
press that there was no evidence to date indicating that
there is any [Soviet] intention to dismantle or discon-
tinue work on these missile sites. On the contrary, the
Soviets are rapidly continuing their construction of
missile support and launch facilities, and serious
attempts are under way to camouflage their efforts.”89
Early that afternoon, John Scali of ABC News was
contacted by Fomin, who urgently requested that Scali
meet him for lunch. Although Fomin was listed as a
Soviet Embassy counselor, the U.S. intelligence com-
munity knew that he was a KGB colonel and the direc-
tor of Soviet intelligence operations in the United
States. Fomin asked if the State Department would be
willing to settle the crisis under the following agree-
ment: The missile sites would be dismantled under UN
supervision and sent back to the Soviet Union, Castro
would state publicly that he would not accept any fur-
ther offensive weapons, and the United States would
give an unconditional pledge never to invade Cuba.
Scali said that although he believed the United States
would be interested, he did not speak for the govern-
ment and would have to contact the administration.
Fomin urged Scali to send this proposal to the White
House, observing that Zorin would also be prepared to
pursue an agreement along this terms.
Scali went directly to Roger Hilsman, director of
the Department of Intelligence and Research for the
State Department. He dictated a memorandum, indi-
cating what Fomin had said, and gave it to the secretary
of state. The secretary brought the proposal to the pres-
ident and returned to Scali with the following message
for Fomin:
I have reason to believe that the USG sees real pos-
sibilities in this and supposes that representatives
of the two governments could work this matter out
with U Thant and with each other. My impression
is, however, that time is very urgent.
Scali met with Fomin later that day. After being
assured that the message “came from the highest
sources,” Fomin rushed to send the communiqué back
to his own government.
That day Robert Kennedy met with Dobrynin.
Dobrynin was puzzled about the U.S. reluctance to
accept the missiles in Cuba on the same level that the
Soviets viewed the U.S. missiles in Turkey. “Robert
Kennedy said, ‘You are interested in the missiles in Tur-
key?’ He thought pensively and [continued], ‘One min-
ute, I will go and talk to the President.’ He went out of
the room . . . [He] came back and said, ‘The President
said that we are ready to consider the question of Tur-
key, to examine favorably the question of Turkey.’”90
Dobrynin quickly contacted Moscow.
That evening the White House received a long per-
sonal message from Khrushchev. In it, he debated the
offensive character of the missiles and discussed the
total destruction and devastation that would occur in a
U.S.-Soviet nuclear confrontation:91
I see, Mr. President, that you too are not devoid of
a sense of anxiety for the fate of the world, of
understanding, and of what war entails. . . . I have
participated in two wars and know that war ends
when it has rolled through cities and villages,
everywhere sowing death and destruction.
You are mistaken if you think that any of our means
on Cuba are offensive. However, let us not quarrel
now. It is apparent that I will not be able to con-
vince you of this. But I say to you: you, Mr. Presi-
 The Cuban Missile Crisis
dent, are a military man and should understand:
can one attack, if one has on one’s territory even an
enormous quantity of missiles of various effective
radiuses and various power, but using only these
means. These missiles are a means of extermination
and destruction. But one cannot attack with these
missiles, even nuclear missiles of 100 megatons
because only people, troops, can advance. Without
people, any means however powerful cannot be
offensive. . . .
But, Mr. President, do you really seriously think
that Cuba can attack the United States and that
even we together with Cuba, can attack you from
the territory of Cuba?. . . . Has something so new
appeared in military strategy that one can think
that it is possible to attack thus? I say precisely
attack, and not destroy, since barbarians, people
who have lost their sense, destroy.
I believe that you have no basis to think this way.
You can regard us with distrust, but, in any case,
you can be calm in this regard, that we are of sound
mind and understand perfectly well that if we
attack you, you will respond the same way. . . .
This indicates that we are normal people, that we
correctly understand and correctly evaluate the sit-
uation. Consequently, how can we permit the
incorrect actions which you ascribe to us? Only
lunatics or suicides, who themselves want to perish
and to destroy the whole world before they die,
could do this,. We, however, want to live and do
not at all want to destroy your country. We want
something quite different: to compete with your
country on a peaceful basis. We quarrel with you,
we have differences on ideological questions. But
our view of the world consists in this, that ideologi-
cal questions, as well as economic problems,
should be solved not by military means, they must
be solved on the basis of peaceful competition. . . .
Let us normalize relations. . . . You asked what hap-
pened, what evoked the delivery of weapons to
Cuba. . . . We were very grieved by the fact . . . that
a landing took place, that an attack on Cuba was
committed, as a result of which many Cubans per-
ished. . . .
21
If you are really concerned about the peace and
welfare of your people, and this is your responsibil-
ity as President, then I . . . am concerned for my
people. Moreover, the preservation of world peace
should be our joint concern, since if, under con-
temporary conditions, war should break out, it
would be a war not only between reciprocal claims,
but a worldwide cruel and destructive war.
Why have we proceeded to assist Cuba with mili-
tary and economic aid? The answer is: we have
proceeded to do so only for reasons of humanitar-
ian conditions. . . .
If assurances were given by the President and gov-
ernment of United States that the USA would not
participate in an attack on Cuba and would restrain
others from action of this sort, if you recall your
fleet, this would immediately change everything. I
am speaking for Fidel Castro, but I think that he
and the government of Cuba, evidently, would
declare demobilization and would appeal to the
people to get down to peaceful labor. . . .
Let us therefore show statesmanlike wisdom. I pro-
pose: we, for our part, will declare that our ships,
bound for Cuba, will not carry any kind of arma-
ments. You would declare that the United States
will not invade Cuba with its forces and will not
support any sort of forces which might intend to
carry out any invasion of Cuba. Then the necessity
for the presence of our military specialists in Cuba
would disappear. . . .
Mr. President, we and you ought not now to pull
on the ends of the rope in which you have tied the
knots of war, because the more the two of us pull,
the tighter this knot will be tied. And a moment
may come when this knot is tied so tight that even
he who tied it will not have the strength to untie it,
and then it will be necessary to cut the knot. And
what that would mean is not for me to explain to
you, because you yourself understand perfectly of
what terrible forces our two countries dispose. . . .
These thoughts are dictated by a sincere desire to
relieve the situation, to remove the threat of war.
22 Gabrielle S. Brussel
This letter arrived in four sections. The ExComm
debated the legitimacy of the letter and the possibility
of the Soviet government proceeding with its proposal.
Acheson did not believe that the Soviets would go
through with the deal. He viewed it as a personal plea
from Khrushchev, dispatched without the consent of
the Politburo. Although it did not ask for more than the
United States was willing to give, it also did not specify
how the missiles would be withdrawn. The ExComm
decided to regard the letter as an actual proposal. The
Soviet experts in the State Department were instructed
to analyze it in conjunction with the memoranda on the
Fomin discussions.
The next day, Saturday, October 27, participants in
the ExComm morning meeting learned that another
Khrushchev proposal had arrived. In a formal and pre-
cisely composed response, which was broadcast over
Moscow Radio, Khrushchev requested a quid pro quo. If
the United States wanted the Cuban missiles disman-
tled, they would have to dismantle the missiles in Tur-
key:92
You are worried over Cuba. You say that it worries
you because it lies at a distance of ninety miles
across the sea from the shores of the United States.
However, Turkey lies next to us. Our sentinels are
pacing up and down and watching each other. Do
you believe that you have the right to demand secu-
rity for your country and the removal of such weap-
ons that you qualify as offensive, while not
recognizing this right for us?
You have stationed devastating rocket weapons,
which you call offensive, in Turkey literally right
next to us. How then does recognition of our equal
military possibilities tally with such unequal rela-
tions between our great states. . . .
This is why I make the proposal: We agree to
remove those weapons from Cuba which you
regard as offensive weapons. We agree to do this
and to state this commitment in the United
Nations. Your representatives will make a state-
ment to the effect that the United States, on its part
. . . will evacuate its analogous weapons from Tur-
key. . . .
We, having assumed this commitment in order to
give satisfaction and hope to the peoples of Cuba
and Turkey and to increase their confidence in this
security, will make a statement in the Security
Council to the effect that the Soviet Government
gives a solemn pledge to respect the integrity of the
frontiers and the sovereignty of Turkey, not to
intervene in its domestic affairs, not to invade Tur-
key, not to make available its territory as a place
d’armes for such invasion, and also will restrain
those who would think of launching an aggression
against Turkey either from the Soviet territory or
from the territory of other states bordering Turkey.
The United States will make the same statement in
the Security Council with respect to Cuba. It will
declare that the United States will respect the
integrity of the frontiers of Cuba, its sovereignty,
and undertakes not to intervene in its domestic
affairs, not to invade and not to make its territory
available as [a] place d’armes for the invasion of
Cuba, and also will restrain those who would think
of launching an aggression against Cuba either
from U.S. territory or from the territory of other
states bordering on Cuba. . . .
These are my proposals, Mr. President. . . .
Fomin and Scali met again that afternoon. Fomin
pointed to the Lippmann article of Thursday, October
25, linking the missiles in Turkey with the missiles in
Cuba. Scali cautioned Fomin that it did not matter what
anyone wrote without the authority of the U.S. govern-
ment. James Reston’s columns in the New York Times
were specifically designed to present the White House
in a cautious light and to refute Lippmann’s proposal.
Reston argued that the Soviets had placed missiles in
Cuba as bargaining chips to negotiate the removal of the
U.S. missiles in Turkey or even the missiles defending
Berlin, and therefore, to trade them was exactly what
the Soviets had intended.
During the October 27, ExComm meeting, the
United States was confronted with a second problem:
Rudolf Anderson, the U-2 pilot who flew one of the
early flights that discovered the missiles, was shot down
over Cuba. Earlier the ExComm had decided that, in
the event of a U.S. casualty, it would respond with mili-
tary force against the SAM site that had shot down its
pilot. In the message the ExComm had just received,
 The Cuban Missile Crisis
Khrushchev specifically stated that the missiles were in
Soviet control:93
The weapons on Cuba that you have mentioned
and which, as you say, alarm you, are in the hands
of Soviet officers. Therefore any accidental use of
them whatsoever to the detriment of the United
States of America is excluded. These means are sit-
uated in Cuba at the request of the Cuban Govern-
ment and only in defensive aims. Therefore, if there
is no invasion of Cuba, or attack on the Soviet
Union, or any of our other allies then, of course,
these means do not threaten anyone and will not
threaten. For they do not pursue offensive aims.
Here was a confirmation that the Soviet SAMs in
Cuba were fully operational and had attacked and killed
a U.S. Air Force officer. The ExComm was shaken—the
crisis was escalating and capable of getting out of con-
trol. Who had shot down Anderson? The Soviet stand-
ing order, it was learned later, “to fire on any aircraft
that flies overhead in wartime,” was followed. The local
Soviet commanders had twenty minutes to decide once
the U-2 was spotted. They were unable to contact their
superiors and General Georgy A. Voronkov gave the
order to shoot.” The president said, “It isn’t the first
that concerns me [now], but both sides escalating to the
fourth and fifth steps—and we don’t go to the sixth
because there is no one around to do so.”95 First, there
was a U.S. military casualty; second, the ExComm was
not sure exactly how to respond to the Soviet proposal;
and third, even more puzzling, what was the Soviet pro-
posal?
The advisors debated whether Khrushchev had
been outvoted or overruled. Why did a second proposal
contradictory to the first arrive? Had he lost control of
the government? Perhaps the first letter had indeed
been written without the knowledge of the other mem-
bers of the Soviet government; when they learned of
the letter, they unanimously vetoed the overtures it
contained. Llewellyn Thompson did not believe this to
be true. Instead, he theorized that the Soviets had con-
strued Lippmann’s proposal as inside information from
the White House. Thompson also thought that the
Soviets were probably divided in their assessment of
the situation and its resolution. Therefore, when they
read the column, although Scali had denied its validity
23
to Fomin, they decided to take the more forceful
approach.
Although it seemed a fair quid pro quo, the admin-
istration knew immediately that it would not be pub-
licly acceptable. Thompson warned Kennedy that the
Soviets would interpret Kennedy’s acceptance as proof
of the weakness of his government and his presidency.
Secretary Rusk suggested that the United States could
accept the proposal and have Turkey reject it. In that
way the Soviets would honor their agreement, while the
missiles would remain in Turkey.
The withdrawal would not affect the actual military
balance because the Polaris submarines in the Mediter-
ranean would provide protection to NATO and Turkey.
In fact, the Jupiter missiles constituted less than three
percent of the U.S. capacity to deliver a first strike. The
president had been pursuing a tentative course toward
removing the missiles, but no clear decision had yet
been reached. In fact, Rusk had informally discussed
the removal of the missiles with a Turkish government
official. Although Turkey did not object to the U.S. mil-
itary assessment of the missiles, the domestic costs of
removing the missiles so quickly would be high, and
Turkey preferred to wait for the stationing of Polaris
submarines before removing the Jupiters. Obsolete mis-
siles were now hostage to a crisis resolution. The presi-
dent said, “I am not going to go to war over worthless
missiles in Turkey. I don’t want to go to war anyhow,
but I am certainly not going to go to war over worthless
missiles in Turkey. Now I don’t know how to get out of
this.”96
The missiles were committed to NATO. Trading
them for the Cuban missiles would make U.S. allies and
adversaries think that their doubts about the value of
“extended deterrence” were well founded. Alliance
security would be sacrificed at the cost of U.S. security.
The president later said, “appearances contribute to
reality.” The United States was in a crisis confrontation
with the Soviet Union because of the importance of
perceptions. It could not allow the impression to be cre-
ated that it had traded an ally or lessened its commit-
ment to an ally in a crisis.
The ExComm addressed the question of the next
step the U.S. government would have to take. Although
the decision was not yet firm, the advisors began to fear
that the initiation of an air strike would be a likely
response. The president decided that the United States
would agree to the trade, but he preferred that it be a
24 Gabrielle S. Brussel
private agreement between the two governments nego-
tiated by Robert Kennedy and Anatoly Dobrynin. Ken-
nedy also instructed Rusk to prepare a contingency
plan. Andrew Cordier, president of Columbia Univer-
sity, said that he would be willing to contact U Thant
and have him appeal to both nations to pursue a missile
trade. Cordier was to speak with U Thant upon further
signal by the U.S. government.”97 The United States
issued a public statement that the current threat must
be addressed—the build-up must stop, the weapons
must be rendered inoperative, and all shipments must
be stopped—before negotiations and arms control
efforts could continue.
Robert Kennedy then made a proposal to the presi-
dent and the ExComm that at worst would delay the
escalation of U.S. military responses and at best would
resolve the crisis: respond to the first Khrushchev cor-
respondence and ignore the formal letter. He argued
that the U.S. letter should accept the Soviet proposal
clearly, specifying the U.S. understanding of the pro-
posal and thus avoiding a debate on the missiles in Tur-
key. The president agreed that that might be a viable
alternative and sent the attorney general and Sorenson
to draft the letter. The success of the endeavor
depended on whether Fomin was actually acting as a
representative of his government when he met with
Scali. The U.S. government did not reject the Soviet
offer; it simply accepted a previous one:98
I have read your letter of October 26th with great
care and welcomed the statement of your desire to
seek a prompt solution to the problem. The first
thing that needs to be done, however, is for work to
cease on offensive missile bases in Cuba and for all
weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use
to be rendered inoperable, under effective United
Nations arrangements.
Assuming this is done promptly, I have given my
representatives in New York instructions that will
permit them to work out . . . an arrangement for a
permanent solution to the Cuban problem along
the lines suggested in your letter of October 26th.
As I read your letter, the key elements of your pro-
posals—which seem generally acceptable as I
understand them—are as follows:
1. You would agree to remove these weapons sys-
tems from Cuba under appropriate United
Nations observation and supervision; and under-
take, with suitable safeguards, to halt the further
introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba.
2. We, on our part, would agree—upon the estab-
lishment of adequate arrangements through the
United Nations to ensure the carrying out and
continuation of these commitments—(a) to
remove promptly the quarantine measures now in
effect and (b) to give assurances against an inva-
sion of Cuba. I am confident that other nations of
the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do
likewise.
If you give your representative similar instructions,
there is no reason why we should not be able to
complete these arrangement and announce them
to the world within a couple of days. . . . I would
like to say again that the United States is very much
interested in reducing tensions and halting the
arms race; and if your letter signified that you are
prepared to discuss a detente affecting NATO and
the Warsaw Pact, we are quite prepared to consider
with our allies any useful proposals.
But the first ingredient, let me emphasize, is the
cessation of work on missile sites in Cuba and mea-
sures to render such weapons inoperable, under
effective international guarantees. The continua-
tion of this threat, or a prolonging of this discussion
concerning Cuba by linking these problems to the
broader questions of European and world security,
would surely lead to an intensification of the Cuban
crisis and a grave risk to the peace of the world. For
these reasons I hope we can quickly agree along the
lines outlined in this letter and in your letter of
October 26th.
The letter was transmitted and received by the
Soviet Foreign Ministry in Moscow at 10:30 A.M. on
October 28 (Moscow time).
Robert Kennedy took a copy of the text to
Dobrynin. He told Dobrynin that the United States
knew that the work in Cuba had been continuing at
increasing rates. Furthermore, the death of Rudolf
Anderson had put the crisis on another level. The presi-
dent did not want a military confrontation, but “they
 The Cuban Missile Crisis
had forced our hand.” He continued, saying that the
United States was ready to begin military action shortly.
Dobrynin said he believed that the Soviet leader-
ship was committed to its course of action. He did,
however, question Kennedy about the Turkey-Cuba
trade. Kennedy replied
there could be no quid pro quo or any arrangement
made under this kind of threat or pressure, and that
in the last analysis this was a decision that would
have to be made by NATO. However . . . President
Kennedy had been anxious to remove those mis-
siles from Turkey and Italy for a long period of time
. . . and it was our judgement that, within a short
time after the crisis was over, those missiles would
be gone.99
Furthermore, he told Dobrynin that “if the Soviets
ever discussed this, we would deny it.”100 President
Kennedy promised, “If this leaks into the press, I will
deny it. I give my word I will do this, but this promise
should not be made public.”101
Kennedy presented the agreement to Dobrynin as
“a settled intent [of the U.S. government].”102 Further,
“as long as it [was] not connected to the crisis, as long as
nobody represented it as a quid pro quo, which it was
not . . . and as long as nobody tried to make an open
affair of it” the arrangement would be consum-
mated.”103 It could not be publicly acknowledged, how-
ever, since the United States did not want the
agreement to be “taken by many people as a sellout of
our allies.”104 To avoid further U.S. military action,
Robert Kennedy stated that the Soviet agreement must
be forthcoming quickly, and he demanded an answer
the next day.
During discussions years later, McNamara said
it was important to frame [the withdrawal] as it was
framed, because . . . [the United States was] dealing
not with a military problem, but with a political
problem. And if [it] had not framed the withdrawal
from Turkey as [it] did, [the United States] would
have created another political problem. [It] would
have divided the Alliance. [The United States]
would have weakened it and the Soviets would
have faced a weakened Alliance, and this would
have been a danger to the Alliance.105
25
The president refused to approve a military escala-
tion, although the preparations continued for a military
confrontation beginning as early as Tuesday, October
31. The president did, however, order twenty-four
troop-carrier squadrons of the U.S. Air Force Reserve
to active duty. It was estimated that a 60,000–100,000
person ground force would be necessary to invade
Cuba. The army and marine corps units were already in
Florida or in the Panama Canal Zone. The U.S. military
was prepared for any contingency.
The U.S. government waited impatiently and
pessimistically for the Soviet response. McNamara
remembers the sunset of Saturday, October 27th. “I, at
least, was so uncertain as to whether the Soviets would
accept replying to the first instead of the second, or
accept . . . our acceptance of the formula of the first,
that I wondered if I’d ever see another Saturday sunset
like that.”106 Many of the advisors, including Robert
Kennedy, George Ball, and Alexis Johnson, had similar
feelings. On Sunday afternoon at 5:00 P.M. (Moscow
time), however, Khrushchev’s response was broadcast
over Moscow radio and delivered to the U.S. Embassy
there:107
I have received your message of October 27,1962. 1
express my satisfaction and appreciation for the
sense of proportion you have displayed, and for
realization of the responsibility which now
devolves on you for the preservation of peace
throughout the world. . . .
In order to eliminate as rapidly as possible the con-
flict which endangers the cause of peace, to give an
assurance to all people who crave peace, and to
reassure the American people, all of whom, I am
sure, also want peace, as do the people of the
Soviet Union, the Soviet Government, in addition
to earlier instructions on the discontinuance of fur-
ther work on the weapons constructions sites, has
given a new order to dismantle the weapons, which
you describe as offensive, and to crate and return
them to the Soviet Union. . . .
Cuba and the Cuban people were constantly under
the continuous threat of an invasion of Cuba. . . .I
should like to say clearly once more that we could
not remain indifferent to this. The Soviet Govern-
ment decided to render assistance to Cuba with
26 Gabrielle S. Brussel
means of defense against aggression—only meant
for defensive purposes. We have supplied the
defense means which you describe as offensive
means. . . .
I regard with respect and trust the statement you
made in your message of October 27,1962, that no
attack would be no attack, no invasion of Cuba, and
not only on the part of the United States, but also
on the part of other nations of the Western Hemi-
sphere, as you said in your same message. Then the
motives which induced us to render assistance of
such a kind to Cuba disappear.
It is for this reason that we instructed our officers
—these means as I had already informed you earlier
are in the hands of the Soviet officers—to take
appropriate measures to discontinue construction
of the aforementioned facilities, and to dismantle
them, and return them to the Soviet Union. As I
had informed you in my letter of 27 October, we
are prepared to reach agreement to enable U.N.
representatives to verify the dismantling of these
means. . . .
The letter also discussed the dangers of the nuclear
age and the possibility for better relations between
NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Khrushchev urged caution
in future military relations, stressing the necessity to
avoid provoking a fatal step.
Dobrynin called Robert Kennedy to arrange an
immediate meeting. He said that the Soviet government
had agreed to the U.S. proposal. The missiles would be
dismantled and shipped back to the Soviet Union.
Dobrynin also conveyed that Khrushchev wanted to
send his best wishes to the president and the attorney
general.
The president ordered the overflights of Cuba dis-
continued and instructed the navy not to halt any ships.
He also arranged for a watch of the Cuban exile groups
to forestall any behavior that might endanger the agree-
ment. Kennedy’s immediate response was released to
reporters and read over Voice of America:108
I welcome Chairman Khrushchev’s statesman-like
decision to stop building bases in Cuba, disman-
tling offensive weapons and returning them to the
Soviet Union under United Nations verification.
This is an important and constructive contribution
to peace.
We shall be in touch with the Secretary General of
the United Nations with respect to reciprocal mea-
sures to assure peace in the Caribbean area.
It is my earnest hope that the governments of the
world can, with the solution of the Cuban crisis,
turn their urgent attention to the compelling neces-
sity for ending the arms race and reducing world
tensions. This applies to the military confrontation
between the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries as
well as to other situations in other parts of the
world where tensions lead to the wasteful diversion
of resources to weapons of war.
President Kennedy insisted that the U.S. govern-
ment resist any attempt to present the resolution as a
U.S. victory. He appreciated the costs that the Soviet
Union and Khrushchev would pay to dismantle the mis-
siles. He did not want to raise the stakes for the Soviets
or risk a change in the resolution agreement. In a letter
to Khrushchev on December 14, however, President
Kennedy reiterated his insistence that U.S. “assurances
against an invasion of Cuba” were contingent on assur-
ances that offensive weapons be removed from Cuba
and not reintroduced, and that Cuba itself commit no
aggressive acts against its neighbors. Castro and the
Cuban government were not pleased with what they
perceived as a Soviet betrayal. Khrushchev later admit-
ted that Castro was not informed of the U.S.-Soviet deal
regarding the missiles in Turkey. Castro issued a state-
ment demanding that the United States end the “block-
ade,” economic pressure on Cuba, harassment by
Cuban exiles, overflights of Cuban territory, and raids
by exile commando groups and withdraw from Guantá-
namo Bay Naval Base. Furthermore, he refused to allow
on-site UN supervision of the withdrawal of the weap-
ons.
Upon receipt of the official text of Khrushchev’s
statement, Kennedy released a formal reply:109
I consider my letter to you of October twenty-sev-
enth and your reply of today as firm undertakings
on the part of both our governments which should
be promptly carried out. I hope that the necessary
measures can at once be taken through the United
 The Cuban Missile Crisis
Nations, as your message says, so that the United
States will be able to remove the quarantine mea-
sure now in effect. . . .
Mr. Chairman, both of our countries have great
unfinished tasks and I know that your people as
well as those of the United Sates can ask for noth-
ing better than to pursue them free from the fear of
war. Modern science and technology have given us
the possibility of making labor fruitful beyond any-
thing that could have been dreamed of a few
decades ago
I agree with you that we must devote urgent atten-
NOTES
The author acknowledges the guidance of Professor Roger
Hilsman and would like to express special gratitude to Profes-
sor Pamela S. Falk.
1. The advisory group that served Kennedy throughout
the crisis was known later as the Executive Committee of the
National Security Council (ExComm). For the sake of clarity,
the term ExComm will be used throughout.
2. Charles “Chip” Bohlen, was present at the original
meeting instead of Thompson, but, to avoid suspicion, he
assumed his duties as ambassador to France.
3. The terms were not used during the crisis but were
popularized later in an article in the Saturday Evening Post by
Stewart Alsop and Charles Bartlett, December 8,1962.
4. McGeorge Bundy, Proceedings of the Cambridge Con-
ference on the Cuban Missile Crisis, CSIA Working Paper No.
89–2, ed. D. Welch (Cambridge: Center for Science and Inter-
national Affairs, Kennedy School of Government, 1989), 32.
[Hereinafter CC Transcript].
5. Elie Abel, The Missile Crisis. Philadelphia: J.B. Lippin-
cott, 1966), 113.
6. John F. Kennedy, Kennedy Presidential Recordings
Transcript (16 October 1962), 36. Papers of John F. Kennedy,
Presidential Papers, President’s Office Files, John F. Kennedy
Library, Boston. [Hereinafter KPR Transcript].
7. Dean Rusk, KPR Transcript (Presidential Recordings,
11:50 A.M.–12:57 P.M.), 14.
8. Ibid., 15.
9. John F. Kennedy, KPR Transcript (Presidential
Recordings, 6:30 P.M.–7.55 P.M.), 35–36.
10. Robert F. Kennedy, The Thirteen Days: A Memoir of
the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969), 39;
see also 37–38.
11. Fyodor Burlatsky, CC Transcript, 24.
12. Georgi Shaknazarov, CC Transcript, 45.
13. R. Pope, ed., Soviet Views on the Cuban Missile Crisis
27
tion to the problem of disarmament, as it relates to
the whole world and also to critical areas. Perhaps
now, as we step back from danger, we can together
make real progress in this vital field. I think we
should give priority to the question relating to the
proliferation of nuclear weapons, on earth and in
outer space, and to the great effort for a nuclear test
ban. But we should also work hard to see if wider
measures of disarmament can be agreed and put
into operation at an early date. The U.S. govern-
ment will be prepared to discuss these questions
urgently, and in a constructive spirit, at Geneva or
elsewhere. . . .
(Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1982), 123; see
also Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers (Boston: Lit-
tle, Brown and Company), 1970, 493.
14. Sergo Mikoyan, CC Transcript, 26.
15. Ibid., 27.
16. Ibid., 29.
17. B. Allyn et al., “Essence of Revision: Moscow, Havana,
and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” International Security (14), no.
3 (Winter 1989–90), 140 and n.10.
18. Sergo Mikoyan, CC Transcript, 29–30.
19. Allyn, “Essence of Revision,” 138.
20. McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: The Political
History of the Nuclear Weapon (New York: Random House,
1988), 418.
21. Rusk, KPR Transcript, 14.
22. Bundy, Danger and Survival, 418.
23. Mikoyan, CC Transcript, 30.
24. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Robert Kennedy and His
Times (New York: Random House, 1978), 545.
25. Bundy, Danger and Survival, 458–59.
26. Abel, The Missile Crisis, 60.
27. Ibid., 51.
28. Robert McNamara, Proceedings of the Hawk’s Cay Con-
ference on the Cuban Missile Crisis, CSIA Working Paper No.
89–1, ed. D. Welch (Cambridge: Center for Science and Inter-
national Affairs, Kennedy School of Government, January
1989), 10.
29. McNamara, KPR Transcript (Presidential Recordings,
6:30 P.M.–7.55.PM.), 25.
30. Ibid, 22.
31. See CC Transcript, 32–35.
32. John F. Kennedy, KPR Transcript (Presidential
Recordings, 6:30 P.M.–7:55 P.M.), 15.
33. Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy and His Times, 553.
34. Sorenson memorandum, October 20, 1962, RFK
28 Gabrielle S. Brussel
Papers, in Robert Kennedy and His Times.
35. Edwin M. Martin, KPR Transcript (Presidential
Recordings, 6:30 P.M.–7:55 P.M.), 5.
36. Dean Rusk, KPR Transcript (Presidential Recordings,
6:30 P.M.–7:55 P.M.), 5.
37. Abel, The Missile Crisis, 52.
38. Although the United States was not initiating a life-
threatening situation with a naval blockade, such action was
considered against the freedom of the seas and could be inter-
preted as a violation of international law. Furthermore, prece-
dent was against the United States because it had gone to war
with England over a violation of the freedom to navigate the
seas (War of 1812).
39. Kennedy, Thirteen Days, 34.
40. Ibid.
41. Roswell Gilpatric, KPR Transcript (Presidential
Recordings, 6:30 P.M.–7:55 P.M.), 50.
42. Robert S. McNamara, KPR Transcript (Presidential
Recordings, 6:30 P.M.–7:55 PM.), 50.
43. Abel, The Missile Crisis, 64.
44. Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy and His Times, 549.
45. Kennedy, Thirteen Days, 38.
46. Ibid.; Abel, The Missile Crisis, 64; Schlesinger, Robert
Kennedy and His Times, 547.
47. Abel, The Missile Crisis, 64.
48. Kennedy, Thirteen Days, 33.
49. Ibid., 40–41.
50. Abel, The Missile Crisis, 77.
51. The purpose of the exercise was to liberate a mythical
Republic of Vieques from a dictator named Ortsac (Castro
spelled backward). It included 7,500 Marines, four aircraft
carriers, twenty destroyers, and fifteen troop carriers. The
exercise was scheduled to take place on the island of Vieques
off the coast of Puerto Rico. Invitations to the media had gone
out long before October 1962. Graham T. Allison, Essence of
Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1971), 47; Abel, The Missile Crisis, 102.
52. Abel, The Missile Crisis, 103.
53. Ibid., 102.
54. Ibid., 79.
55. The Swiss government seemed a likely choice for such
a task as it houses, even to this day, the U.S. Interest Section.
The Interest Section functions in place of an embassy, deal-
ing with U.S.-Cuban relations on a limited diplomatic basis.
56. Kennedy, Thirteen Days, 36.
57. Abel, The Missile Crisis, 81.
58. Kennedy, Thirteen Days, 45.
59. Meeker borrowed the phrase (with citation) from
FDRs “quarantine-the-aggressor” speech.
60. Theodore C. Sorenson, Kennedy (New York: Harper
and Row, 1965), 694.
61. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F.
Kennedy in the White House (New York: Fawcett Premier,
1965), 739.
62. George Ball, Alfred P. Sloan Transcript (New York),
56–57.
63. Bundy, Danger and Survival, 428.
64. Ibid.
65. Although some of the members of the ExComm,
including Secretary Dean Rusk, criticized questions of termi-
nology as “semantics,” President Kennedy was impressed by
the importance of terminology during the crisis.
66. Robert Kennedy Campaign Speech, October 13, 1964,
Rockville Centre, New York, 64.
67. Kennedy, Thirteen Days, 24.
68. John F. Kennedy, “Radio and Television Report to the
American People on the Soviet Arms Buildup in Cuba,” Octo-
ber 22, 1962, 7:00 P.M., cited in The Public Papers of the Presi-
dents, John F. Kennedy, 1962 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1963),
806–9.
69. Abel, The Missile Crisis, 132.
70. Ibid.; see also Kennedy, Thirteen Days, 55.
71. Sorenson, Kennedy, 702.
72. J. Blight and D. Welch, On the Brink: Americans and
Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Hill
and Wang, 1989), 185.
73. U.S. Department of State, Bulletin 47, no. 1220
(November 12, 1962): 715–30; see also D. Larson, ed., The
Cuban Crisis of 1962: Selected Documents, Chronology and Bib-
liography, 2nd ed. (New York: University Press of America,
1986), Document 17: President Kennedy’s Message of Octo-
ber 22, 1962, 59–63.
74. The chairmanship of the Security Council rotates.
During October 1962 the Soviet Union was serving in the
chairmanship.
75. Abel, The Missile Crisis, 125.
76. Ibid., 126.
77. The Security Council comprises fifteen members.
Five permanent members—the five Allies of World War II,
the United States, the Soviet Union (now the Commonwealth
of Independent States), France, Great Britain, and China—
have the special voting right of an automatic veto; and ten
rotating members are elected by the permanent members for
two-year terms based on geographic distribution. Although
the nonpermanent members have a vote on the Security
Council, their veto does not automatically defeat a res-
olution. A veto cast by a permanent member defeats the reso-
lution.
78. Informal translation by the American Embassy in
Moscow. U.S. Department of State, Bulletin 69, no. 1795
(November 19, 1973): 636–37, cited in Larson, The Cuban
Crisis, 67–68.
79. Ibid., 68–69.
80. This was transmitted to the American Embassy as
“steps” but was corrected there to read “step.”
81. Kennedy, Thirteen Days, 66.
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid.
84. Kennedy, Thirteen Days, 69.
85. Informal translation by the American Embassy in
Moscow. U.S. Department of State, Bulletin 69, no. 1795
(November 19, 1973): 636–37, cited in Larson, The Cuban
 The Cuban Missile Crisis
Crisis, 127–29.
86. Kennedy, Thirteen Days, 70.
87. Ibid., 72.
88. Ibid., 85.
89. New York Times, October 26, 1962, and Abel, The Mis-
sile Crisis, 176.
90. Allyn, “Essence of Revision,” 159.
91. Informal translation by the American Embassy in
Moscow. U.S. Department of State, Bulletin 69, no. 1795
(November 19, 1972): 640–43, cited in Larson, The Cuban
Crisis, 175–80.
92. U.S. Department of State, Bulletin 47, no. 1220
(November 12, 1962): 741–43, cited in Larson, The Cuban
Crisis, 183–86 (unofficial translation).
93. Ibid., 185.
94. Allyn, “Essence of Revision,” 161.
95. Kennedy, Thirteen Days, 94–95.
96. McNamara, Alfred P. Sloan Transcript (n.d.), 63.
97. Cordier was chosen because he had been a deputy to
U Thant, and Rusk believed that he could be discreet.
98. U.S. Department of State, Bulletin 47 no. 1220
(November 12, 1962): 743, cited in Larson, The Cuban Crisis,
187–88.
99. Kennedy, Thirteen Days, 108–9.
100. McNamara, Alfred P. Sloan Transcript, 59.
101. Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Glas-
nost Tapes (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1990), 179.
102. Bundy, Alfred P. Sloan Transcript, 65.
CHRONOLOGY OF U.S.-CUBAN
RELATIONS, 1960–63
1960
Aug. 6: The Cuban government nationalizes the prop-
erty of companies owned or partially owned by the
United States. Prime Minister Fidel Castro defends this
on the grounds that the U.S. reduction of the Cuban
sugar quota was, in effect, “economic aggression”
against the Cuban government.
Aug. 10: The United States releases an analysis of the
nationalization, concluding that more than $1 billion
was expropriated.
Sept. 17: The Cuban government expropriates U.S.-
operated banks in Cuba. The United States protests this
action.
Oct. 19: The United States embargoes all exports to
Cuba except nonsubsidized foodstuffs, medicines, and
medical supplies.
Nov. 24: The United States maintains that Soviet-bloc
military aid to Cuba has totaled more than 28,000 tons
since the revolution.
29
103. Ibid.
104. Bundy, Alfred P. Sloan Transcript, 66. Ambassador
Dobrynin made one attempt, two days later, October 27,
1962, to make the deal public. He brought the attorney gen-
eral an unsigned letter from Khrushchev to President Ken-
nedy specifying the details of the agreement. After reading
the letter, it is believed that Robert Kennedy told the ambas-
sador the next day that there was no quid pro quo, and the let-
ter makes it appear that there was. “If you feel it is necessary
to write letters then we will also write one which you cannot
enjoy.” Furthermore, evidence suggests that the attorney gen-
eral warned that if the Soviets published any document
regarding the deal, it would be automatically canceled.
Dobrynin replied that the “Soviet government would not
publish the correspondence. Kennedy said. ‘Speaking quite
frankly, you also told me that your government never
intended to put missiles in Cuba.”’ RFK, handwritten notes
(n.d.), and RFK to Dean Rusk, reporting on the interview,
October 30, 1962, RFK Papers, cited in Schlesinger, Robert F.
Kennedy, 564.
105. McNamara, Alfred P. Sloan Transcript, 67.
106. Ibid., 55.
107. U.S. Department of State, Bulletin 47, no. 1220
(November 12, 1962): 743–45, cited in Larson, The Cuban
Crisis, 189–93.
108. Ibid., 193–94.
109. Ibid., 194–95.
1961
Jan. 2: Cuba demands that the United States reduce its
embassy personnel to a total of eleven within two days.
Jan. 3: The United States and Cuba end diplomatic rela-
tions; their affairs are turned over to the Swiss and
Czechoslovakian embassies, respectively.
Feb. 1: Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa characterizes
the U.S.-Cuban agreement regarding Guantánamo Bay
Naval Base as illegitimate because Cuba was not on an
“equal footing with the United States” and “because the
Cuban people were coerced by a system of government
imposed upon them from abroad.”
Mar. 31: President John F. Kennedy reduces Cuban
sugar imports to zero.
Apr. 12: President Kennedy says that U.S. armed forces
will not intervene in Cuba to overthrow Castro.
Apr. 16: Castro mobilizes the Cuban armed forces
against a U.S. invasion. Castro characterizes his govern-
ment as “socialist.”
30 Gabrielle S. Brussel
Apr. 17: Miro Cardona, a Cuban exile leader, announces
a seaborne invasion of Cuba. The unsuccessful invasion,
which involves Cuban exiles supported and trained by
the United States, becomes known as the Bay of Pigs
Invasion. The United States denies involvement in the
invasion but expresses sympathy for the rebels. The
Cuban government captures 1,113 rebels. The United
States admits it supported the exiles.
Sept. 7: The U.S. Congress prohibits U.S. aid to any
country providing aid to Cuba unless the president
determines that such assistance is in the national inter-
est.
Dec. 2: Castro announces that he is “a Marxist-Leninist
and will be a Marxist-Leninist until the last day of . . .
[his] life.”
1962
Feb. 3: President Kennedy announces an embargo on
shipments of all goods except medical supplies to Cuba.
Mar. 2: The United States estimates that Cuba has
received more than $110 million in military and techni-
cal services from the Soviet Union.
May–Jun.: On orders contained in a National Security
Council memorandum, representatives of the State
Department attempt to discuss withdrawing the U.S.
Jupiter missiles deployed in Turkey. The Turkish gov-
ernment rebuffs the negotiators.
Jul. 1962: Soviet SA-2 surface-to-air missiles are sent
secretly to Cuba.
Aug. 1962: The National Security Council issues a sec-
ond action memorandum ordering the withdrawal of
the Jupiter missiles from Turkey.
Aug. 19: Castro announces that farm land in Cuba will
be taken over and “state farms” established.
Aug. 24: The United States announces that Soviet mili-
tary assistance to Cuba has increased more than twenty
cargo ships are thought to have arrived in Havana har-
bor carrying military equipment.
A Cuban exile group shells beach-front buildings in
Havana. The United States disavows prior knowledge of
the raid.
Aug. 30: President Kennedy rejects Senator Homer E.
Capehart’s proposal for a U.S. invasion of Cuba.
Sept. 1: Senator Kenneth Keating asserts that more than
1,000 Soviet military personnel and undisclosed
amounts of Soviet military assistance are in Cuba.
Sept. 2: The Kennedy administration asserts that the
Soviet military aid to Cuba is defensive. Senator Keat-
ing criticizes the Kennedy policy of “do[ing] nothing.”
Sept. 3: A Soviet-Cuban joint communiqué announces
Soviet military and technical assistance to Cuba.
Sept. 4: Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin promises
Attorney General Robert Kennedy that the Soviet
Union will not initiate a provocation in Berlin or in
Southeast Asia before the November 1962 election.
Dobrynin also says that the Soviet Union will not give a
third power the ability to start a nuclear war that would
involve the Soviet Union. President Kennedy says at a
press conference that the Soviet aid to Cuba is defen-
sive, but he maintains that the United States will do any-
thing to stop Cuban aggression and Soviet expansion in
Latin America.
Sept. 5: Secretary of State Dean Rusk tells nineteen
Latin American allies that the United States will work
to stop the expansion of communism in Latin America.
Sept. 7: Senator Everett Dirksen and Representative
Charles Halleck issue statements urging a stronger U.S.
policy toward Cuba. Both statements propose the presi-
dential authorization of troops to stop the expansion of
Cuban communism. President Kennedy calls for the
“readiness” of the reserves.
Sept. 11: The Soviet Union repeats the warning that
Cuba will be protected by Soviet military forces.
Sept. 13: President Kennedy repeats his warning against
Cuban expansion and offensive weapons in Cuba but
says that the weapons in Cuba are defensive. He encour-
ages US. allies to discontinue trade with Cuba.
In a meeting with Under Secretary of State Chester
Bowles, Dobrynin denies the possibility of offensive
missiles in Cuba.
Sept. 16: Senator Barry Goldwater attacks the “do noth-
ing” policy of the Kennedy administration.
Sept. 17–18: Senators Goldwater, Strom Thurmond,
and John Tower, and former Vice President Richard
Nixon call for a U.S. blockade of Cuba.
Sept. 18: In a meeting with Ambassador Foy D. Kohler,
Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev assures the ambassa-
dor that the “last thing he wanted to do was to embar-
rass the President on the eve of the elections.”
Sept. 19: The U.S. Intelligence Board meets and
approves an intelligence estimate concluding that the
“Soviets would not introduce offensive weapons in
Cuba.” CIA Director John McCone does not agree, but
 The Cuban Missile Crisis
he is away on his honeymoon and is only able to cable
his disapproval.
Sept. 21: The Soviet government asserts in the United
Nations that a U.S. attack on Cuba would mean war
between the Soviet Union and the United States; the
United States responds by asserting that the threat to
peace . . . comes not from the United States, but from
the Soviet Union.”
Sept. 26: Congress passes a resolution authorizing the
use of force if necessary to stop Cuban expansion in
Latin America.
Oct. 10: Alpha 66, a Cuban exile group, claims responsi-
bility for a raid in Cuba on October 7.
Oct. 15: Reconnaissance photographs taken from U-2
flights over Cuba disclose long-range missile sites in
Cuba. CIA Directors Lieutenant General Marshall S.
Carter and Dr. Ray Cline are notified; they, in turn,
notify the others in the chain of command.
Oct. 16: President Kennedy is informed of the missiles
and forms an advisory board, inviting officials from his
cabinet, the Justice Department, the CIA, the Depart-
ment of Defense, and the State Department and other
experts to meet in the Cabinet Room. All participants
are instructed to work on solutions in absolute secrecy.
Khrushchev and U.S. Ambassador Foy Kohler meet to
discuss a wide range of topics, including Cuba and Ber-
lin.
The Castro government asserts that U.S. planes were
flying “provocatively and repeatedly” over Cuban terri-
torial waters.
Oct. 17: Under Secretary of State George Ball presents
the first sustained argument against an air strike on
Cuba.
Oct. 17–20: The president’s advisory group, now called
the ExComm, debates the options for removing the
missiles. Secretary McNamara, supported by lawyers
from the justice and State departments, presents a case
for a blockade. General Maxwell Taylor presents the
option of immediate military action in the form of an air
strike.
Oct. 18: Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko meets with
President Kennedy at the White House to discuss U.S.-
Soviet relations. Gromyko repeats the Soviet denials
regarding offensive missiles in Cuba. Kennedy does not
confront the Soviet minister with the missile informa-
tion, but he reads Gromyko the text of his press release
of September 4. Gromyko does not respond.
31
The Department of Defense announces the transfer of
twelve navy jet fighters to the southern tip of Florida,
stating that the transfer occurred at the beginning of
October.
Oct. 20: President Kennedy meets with General Walter
C. Sweeney, Jr., commander in chief of the Tactical Air
Command; Sweeney says they could not be certain an
attack would eliminate all missile sites. Kennedy makes
his final decision in favor of a naval quarantine.
Oct. 22: Under Secretary Ball briefs the representatives
of forty-six NATO, SEATO, CENTO, and nonaligned
nation allies. Assistant Secretary of State for Latin
American Affairs Edward Martin briefs OAS allies.
The United States formally requests a meeting of the
UN Security Council.
The ExComm is established under National Security
Council Action Memorandum No. 196 as the Executive
Committee of the National Security Council.
President Kennedy meets with seventeen members of
Congress and his cabinet to discuss the issues.
Secretary of State Dean Rusk meets with Ambassador
Dobrynin, giving him an advance copy of President
Kennedy’s speech.
President Kennedy addresses the nation, explaining the
U.S. situation, announcing a “defensive quarantine” of
Cuba, and showing photographs of the Cuban missile
sites. He announces that the United States will respond
to any threat or to any action that endangers its citizens.
The Department of Defense puts U.S. military forces on
alert throughout the world.
Oct. 23: The United States submits a resolution to the
OAS citing Article 6 of the Rio Treaty of 1947 authoriz-
ing member states to proclaim and enforce a blockade
individually or collectively if the “integrity or sover-
eignty or political independence” of a nation is threat-
ened. The OAS unanimously approves the U.S.
blockade.
Ambassador Dobrynin meets with Robert Kennedy to
discuss the events. Dobrynin repeats the Soviet pledge
not to place missiles in Cuba and denies the existence of
missiles in Cuba.
The ExComm agrees that, in the event of a U-2 casu-
alty, the United States will hit a surface-to-air missile
site in Cuba.
The CIA presents evidence to the ExComm that four
MRBM sites are “fully operational,” the rest have
“emergency capability,” and technicians are continuing
to improve the sites.
32 Gabrielle S. Brussel
The reserves are mobilized to active duty. Secretary
McNamara orders the naval quarantine in effect.
Castro addresses the Cuban people, telling them that
the missiles are defensive and declaring that the U.S.
blockade was an “act of piracy.” He mobilizes the Cuban
military.
The Soviet oil tanker Bucharest is intercepted but
allowed to proceed with only alongside visual observa-
tion.
Oct. 24: Two Soviet ships, which would be intercepted
before noon stop dead in the water.
U Thant, acting secretary general of the United
Nations, proposes that President Kennedy and Premier
Khrushchev suspend all action while a summit is con-
vened to discuss the issues. Khrushchev accepts; Ken-
nedy does not, maintaining that the missiles must be
removed first, although he does agree to maintain com-
munications channels.
Oct. 25: Ambassador Adlai Stevenson challenges Soviet
Ambassador Valerian Zorin in the Security Council to
deny the Cuban missiles. Zorin refuses to respond, and
Stevenson produces the reconnaissance photographs;
the Security Council adjourns.
President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev, in letters
to Acting Secretary General U Thant, pledge coopera-
tion in the crisis. Khrushchev says that he will tempo-
rarily keep Soviet ships away from the quarantine line.
In his Washington Post column, Walter Lippmann sug-
gests a U.S.-Soviet missile trade—the Jupiter missiles in
Turkey for the Soviet missiles in Cuba.
Oct. 26: The American-built, Panamanian-owned, Leb-
anese-registered, and Soviet-chartered freighter Mar-
cula is stopped and boarded by the U.S. Navy. It is
allowed to continue to Cuba.
Premier Khrushchev writes a personal letter to Presi-
dent Kennedy discussing the instability and insanity of
the crisis, acknowledging the missiles, and agreeing to
remove them if Kennedy pledges that the United States
will not invade Cuba.
A U-2 reconnaissance pilot, Rudolf Anderson, is shot
down over Cuba.
Oct. 26, 28: James Reston attempts to refute Walter
Lippmann in his column in the New York Times, main-
taining that the Soviet missiles in Cuba were always
meant as bargaining chips, so bargaining with them is
exactly what the Soviets had planned.
Oct. 27: The United States receives a letter from the
Soviet government offering to trade the missiles in
Cuba for the missiles in Turkey.
ExComm members, especially military representatives,
begin to encourage the air strike option.
President Kennedy refuses to bargain “under fire” with
the missiles. Robert Kennedy suggests that the United
States respond to the first letter from Khrushchev and
ignore the second. A letter pledging that neither the
United States nor its allies will invade Cuba if the mis-
siles are removed (subject to international verification
and inspection) is sent to Khrushchev.
Robert Kennedy, meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin,
asserts that the United States will feel forced to go to
war if the Soviets do not withdraw the missiles immedi-
ately. He adds that the missiles in Turkey will be with-
drawn within a few months.
Oct. 28: Premier Khrushchev announces the with-
drawal of the Soviet missiles.
Oct. 29: A State Department-Defense Department task
force is convened to address the Cuban Missile Crisis
issues, including the removal of the Jupiter missiles in
Turkey.
Nov. 2: Castro rejects any form of international verifica-
tion or inspection of the missile withdrawal.
Nov. 5: The United States receives assurance from the
Soviet Union that it supported international verification
or inspection of the missile withdrawal; the United
States maintains that the “no invasion” pledge was sub-
ject to international inspection of the withdrawal pro-
cess.
Nov. 7: The United States and the Soviet Union agree to
a withdrawal procedure whereby U.S. naval ships will
inspect Soviet ships removing the missiles from Cuba.
November 20: President Kennedy announces that the
U.S. naval quarantine of Cuba has been lifted.
1963
Jan. 7: Following a Cuban decision to block interna-
tional verification of the missile withdrawal, the United
States and the Soviet Union issue a joint communiqué
ending direct negotiations over the Cuban Missile Cri-
sis.
Apr. 15: The United States withdraws its Jupiter mis-
siles from Turkey.
 The Cuban Missile Crisis
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