Assessment and Management

of
Equipment Integrity

S.K. Hazra
Process Safety Centre
Indian Chemical Council
 Life Cycle Asset Integrity

Mechanical Pressure RBI

Integrity
Integrity
 What is Asset Integrity Management
(AIM) and Optimization

AIMS is the set of discipline, methods, procedures,
and tools to optimize the whole business impact of
Cost, Performance and Risk exposures( associated
with the availability, efficiency, quality, longivity
and regulatory/ safety/environment
compliance) of the Co’s Physical Asset ……
Institute of Asset Management, UK

AIMS is the systematic and coordinated activities and
procedures through which an organization optimally
manages its physical assets and their associated
performance Risks ……. BS Standard
 Pressure Equipment Integrity
Management (PEIM)

A System for assessment of
Engineering Risk, life and integrity
of pressure containing equipment
used in Energy Production, Chemical
Processing, Storage and Transportation
of Oil/Gas, Refinery and Petrochemicals
must be in place
 Pressure Equipment Integrity
Management (PEIM)

Structured approach by Cos. for best
utilization of Assets in most cost effective
way

Fundamentals of PEIM should be clearly
outlined

Stakeholders outside Co. must understand
scope and play their part

Formal approach to PIEM is through 101
essential elements
 PEIM-An Optimization

Optimize work priority against resource
availability

Prioritize Issues to be attended by PEIM

High Risk segments to be attended first

Total 101 elements to be attended as per
priority to avoid major failure

Implementation is likely to take substantial
time for complex aged facilities
 Essential elements of PEIM

MOC

Positive Material
Identification (PMI)

Temporary Repairs

Temporary Installation

Key/Critical Materials
degradation variables

Materials and Corrosion

Environmental Cracking

Furnace Monitoring

Brittle fracture

Record Keeping

Flare Systems

Training and Certification

Inspection Procedures

Welding QA/QC

Qualified Suppliers

Fabrication QA/QC

Inspection Scheduling

Remaining life calculation

Equipment Overdue

Piping Inspection

Inspection Points

Deadlegs

Thickness Measurement

Small bore Piping Insp.
 Essential elements of PEIM

Critical Check Valves

Soil to Air Interfaces

Failure Reporting

Bundle Classification

Inspection Recommendation
Wire wrapping/Boxing
Tracking

Relief Valve Propping

Risk Management
Hydrotesting Safety

Corrosion under Insulation
On-stream Injection

External Corrosion
NDE Specialist
Prevention
Carbon -1/2 Molly Inspection

Hot Spots
Knowledge Transfer

Bull Plugs
Localized Corrosion

Fatigue Failures
Hot Tapping

Flange Gaskets
Grey Zone Equipment

Fitness for Service
Pressure Relief Valve
Auditing

Cast Iron

Tank Bottom Inspection

Heat Tracing
 Essential elements of PEIM

Water Drop Out Points

Inspection Staffing

ERW Pipe and Tubing

Process Contamination

Inspection of Tank Roofs

Inspection of Inaccessible
Locations

External Chloride Cracking

Process Creep

Mixed Metallurgy Piping
Systems

Third Party Equipment

Corrosive Mix Points

Dummy Leg Corrosion

Corporate Failure Memorry

Ammonium Salts

Hydrotest Water Quality

Pipe Rack Inspections

Total Cost of Ownership

Flange Bolting Procedures

Valve Quality

Surface Cleaning

Bad Actor Pumps

Plugged Vent on AST’s

PWHT Problems

Risk based T/A Planning

Failure Analysis
 Brittle Fracture

Carbon Steel exposure to cryogenic

condition to be avoided as all cost

Potentially susceptible equipment to be
identified and closely monitored

Effective knowledge transfer to Operating
Personnel

Esso, Longdord Australia experienced
major accident
L

API RP 920 or API RP 579 for reference
 Carbon – ½ Moly
Inspection

Highly susceptable to High Temperature

Hydrogen Attack (HTHA)

Major fire due to failure of HE nozzle,HE being operated
750F below “Nelson Curve”

API 941 can be used as a guide

Technique “Automated Ultrasonic
Backscatter Technique (AUBT)” can find
and measure HTHA damage

Is there a monitoring program in place L
 Corrosion Fatigue

Corrosion-fatigue is
the result of the
combined action of an
alternating or cycling
stresses and a
corrosive
environment. The
fatigue process is
thought to cause
rupture of the
protective passive
film, upon which
corrosion is
accelerated.
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Corrosion Under Insulation
(CUI)

Influence of “ Out of Sight” and “Out of

Mind” Syndrome

CUI rate Monitoring (10 to 40 micron/Yr.)

API 570 for guidance

NZ Refinery Hydrocracker incident

Is effective CUI Inspection Program in
place
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Corrosion Under Insulation
(CUI)

Influence of “ Out of Sight” and “Out of

Mind” Syndrome

CUI rate Monitoring (10 to 40 micron/Yr.)

API 570 for guidance

NZ Refinery Hydrocracker incident

Is effective CUI Inspection Program in
place
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 Critical Check Valves

To function in a Safe and Reliable

manner in Critical Locations

Important locations eg. Furnace Outlets
which must close in case of Tube rupture

A Schedule for Swing Check Valves
operability

Shell Deer Park Cracker suffered $ 300
million loss in 1997

Is there a list and inspection Schedule L
 Deadlegs

Often experience varying corrosion

rate

Differing Detection Methods
necessary

API 570 for guidence

Hydroprocess deadleg incident in

1996 –Incident in a Californian
L
Refinery

Environmental cracking refers to a corrosion cracking
caused by a combination of conditions that
can specifically result in one of the
following form of corrosion damage:

Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC)

Corrosion fatigue

Hydrogen embrittlement

Stresses that cause environmental cracking arise

from residual cold work, welding, grinding, thermal
treatment, or may be externally applied during
service and, to be effective, must be tensile

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 Fatigue Failure

Faituge failures are generally of serious nature

Leads generally to sudden full bore rupture

A phenomena almost un-detectable

US Petrochemical Plant Reported dislodging
of a 4” Nozzle Valve with a blind flange
caused major fire

Another PetroChemical Plant had full line
rupture of a 2”line releasing 10 Tons of
Hydrocarbon

Vibration a major cause

Awareness Program for Operators to understand
implication and report vibration in place? L
 Flange Gasket
Selection and QA

One of the fundamental of PIEM building

blocks

Improper /makeshift selection of gaskets
caused innumerable incidents

Spiral Wound Gasket with CS inner ring failure due
to CREEP

Is a effective Gasket Selection and QA/QC

Program at Plant?

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 Flare System

To operate 365 days with total reliability

Prone to Corrosion and Fouling

Ultrasonic scanning and radiography for
corrosion/crack detection

Density radiography for detection of
fouling/plugging

Non-functional flare line and absence of MOC
caused Bhopal disaster
L
 Furnace Monitoring

Furnace coils structural integrity to be

examined and ensured through scheduled
inspection and maintenance

Effective inspection and data analysis
necessary (MPC Omega Analysis)

Haldia and other instances of major
furnace failures L
 Heat Tracing

Vital for prevention of plugging in Safety
Devices and Emergency lines

Inadvertent shut-off likely to plug vital
exhaust line by solidification of Process
material

Twilight zone of responsibility between
Process and Maintenance

Is an Audit with specified responsibility in
place
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 Hotspots

Furnace and Refractory lined piped are

vulnerable

Canadian Refinery furnace tube rupture
resulted fatality

US Refinery line rupture due to Hotspot in
refractory lined flue gas transfer header

Temperature resistant paints and
Thermographic detection techniques

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 Hydrogen Embrittlement

The embrittlement of
of metal or alloy by
atomic hydrogen
involves the ingress of
hydrogen into a
component, an event
that can seriously
reduce the ductility
and load-bearing
capacity, cause
cracking and
catastrophic brittle
failures at stresses Hydrogen embrittlement occurs in a
below the yield stress number of forms but the common
of susceptible features are an applied tensile stress
materials and hydrogen dissolvedin the metal
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 Key and Critical (K/C) Materials
Degradation Variables

K/C Variables not restricted to pressure, temperature,
composition only

K/C Variables that can cause material degradation to
be
▪ Identified
▪ Documented
▪ Communicated
▪ understood

Effective Knowledge to Operating Personnel

Relevant Standards as available eg. API RP 941
(material limit for high temp. Hydrogen attack)

Establishment of Integrity Operating Windows
L
 Establishing Integrity Operating
Window

Historical operating, maintenance &
inspection records

Design data; lab data; operating data

Metallurgical and corrosion data and
modules

Process chemistry and engineering
knowledge

Reactive chemistry knowledge
 Establishing Integrity Operating
Window

Recommended practices (industry and
company)

Process and corrosion modeling tools

Subject matter expertise and experience
(heavy dose)

Metallurgical and corrosion data and
modules
Reasonable, practical IOW’s –
Not too conservative
 Integrity Operating Windows –
Examples

Physical

Limits on pressures and temperatures
(design, operating),

Partial pressures,

Dew points,

Dry points,

Heating and Cooling rates,

Delta P, etc.
 Integrity Operating Windows –
Examples

Physical

Flow rates,

Injection rates,

Inhibitor dosage,

Amperage levels motors,

Slurry content,

Hydrogen flux,

Vibration limits,

Corrosivity probes, etc.
 Integrity Operating Windows –
Examples

Chemical

pH,

Water content,

Acid gas loading,

Sulfur content,

Salt content in crude,

NH4HS content,

NH3 content,
 Integrity Operating Windows –
Examples

Chemical

TAN,

Acid strength,

Amine strength,

Inhibitor concentration,

Chloride contamination levels,

Oxygen content, etc.

 IOW Example – Hot Hydrogen
Service
Temperature
Mechanical Design Limits

Mechanical design window
set by the design code e.g.
EOR Process Temp IOW
ASME

IOW set by material limit
for high temperature SOR Process Temp

hydrogen attack in API RP

941

SOR process temperature
definitely within the IOW

EOR process temperature Pressure

possibly beyond the IOW –

need to know the hydrogen Based on H2 pp Based on
Total Pressure
partial pressure and
duration of EOR conditions
 SOR EOR Present
Temperature, C 450 500
Pressure, MPa 3 3.1
Service,
Position Stress, MPa hr
T-piece 59.35 66.24 249660

249660
SOR - Start of Run
Straight 1a 36.70 41.02

36.70 41.02 249660

Field weld
1b2a 35.10 38.98 249660

Straight 2b 47.50 51.28 249660

Bend 1 33.60 36.66 249660

32.90 34.90 249660

Straight 3a
47.40 51.31 249660
Straight 3b
31.20 34.44 249660
Bend 2
38.30 42.16 249660
Straight 4a 249660
53.90 58.41
Straight 4b 37.20 40.38 249660
EOR - End of Run
Bend 3 37.20 249660

249660
Straight 5a 37.20 39.99
 Integrity Operating Windows –
Typical Numbers per Operating Unit
(before & after an intensive review)

Typically start with 5 -10 IOW’s that may
already be in place, along with other
operating quality variable limits

Typically end up with 30 – 50 IOW’s with
about 5 -10% being critical limits
(requires drastic and/or immediate
action), and the rest being standard limits
(requires attention within a specified
timeframe to get back into control)
Definitions: IOW Critical Limit
A limit at which the operator has one last
opportunity to return the process to a
safe condition and, if exceeded, could
result in one of the following in a fairly
short timeframe:

• A Catastrophic Release of Hydrocarbons or

Hazardous fluids
• Loss of Containment
• Non-orderly Shutdown
• Significant Environmental Impact
• Other Unacceptable Risk
Critical IOW Limit – Examples

Boiler Feed Water Level

Loss of boiler feed water level could quickly cause
boiler tube rupture

Hydroprocess Reactor Temperature

Metal temperatures below the MDMT could give
rise to brittle fracture

Heater Tube Skin Temperature

Tube could rupture quickly if overheated, caused,
for example, by a no flow or hot spot condition.

Sulfuric Acid Strength in Alkylation

Too low acid strength could cause runaway
reaction
Definition: Standard Level
A limit that, if exceeded over a defined
period of time, could cause one of the
following to eventually occur:

• A catastrophic release of hydrocarbons or hazardous

fluids
• Loss of containment
• Non-orderly shutdown
• A negative impact to the long term unit performance
and its ability to meet turnaround run length
• Excessive financial impact
 Standard Level Examples

REAC NH4HS Concentration

Corrosion of the air cooler and downstream
piping

Heater Tube Skin Temperature

Metallurgical creep could lead to eventual tube
failure.

Crude Fractionator Dew Point
Temperature

Sustained operation below dew point could cause
damage to fractionator internals or potential loss
of containment
 Standard Level Examples

pH of Crude Tower Overhead

Sustained operation below standard pH level
could lead to corrosion of tubing and piping and
potential loss of containment.

Desalter Outlet Salt Content

Sustained operation above standard level could
lead to corrosion and potential loss of
containment
L
 Integrity Operating Windows –
Successes

In the CCD review, one IOW team noticed that a previous
project had installed the wrong construction materials –
immediate inspection revealed significant HTHA damage

An operator on the team disagreed with the unit process
engineer and said that “we actually operate much hotter
than you think because we use the by-pass” – immediate
inspection revealed significant localized damage

A corrosion engineer questioned the higher level of NH4HS
in the REAC system of an HCU – immediate inspection
revealed a previously-missed localized spot of significant
corrosion

An IOW was set on NH4HS concentration at another
refinery, which then began to take routine lab samples –
soon thereafter discovered the concentration was too high
and took steps to increase wash water and adjust
feedstock
 Operator Training on CCD’s and
IOW’s

Level 1

Awareness and Overview of the PEI Process Safety
Initiative

SSA Video / CCD / RBI / OEMI / Operator Training

Level 2

Introduction to Corrosion Control Documents

What they contain; where they’re stored; how to use
them

Level 3

Details contained within each operator’s unit-specific
CCD

Specific IOW’s and the reasoning behind them

What can happen if the IOW is exceeded
Life Cycle estimation
The remaining life of critical
components can be determined
through rigorous analysis of
- Thermal/ mechanical stresses,
- Natural frequencies and mode
shapes,
- Scale formation
- Crack initiation,
- Crack propagation
- Creep.
- Stress testing
- Vibration monitoring
 Life Cycle estimation
For life assessment estimation expertise
required in

Stress Corrosion Cracking

Solid Particle Erosion

Crack Propagation

Low and High Cycle Fatigue

LifeCycle Fatigue Crack Analysis Services

Probabilistics

Nuclear Steam Generator Tube Wear and Life
Assessment Services

Customized System Health Management
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 On Stream Inspection
Injection Point (IP)

Injection points undergo corrosion

Potential corrosive IP’s to be listed

Technical Dept./Process Engineers involvement
necessary

API 570 for guidance

Shell (1988) and Conoco known cases of
incidents arising out of IP corrosion

Is effective On-Sream Inspection Program in
place
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 Pipe (Bull) Plug

An overlooked source of releases and fire

Vibration and thread connection main
factor for failure

Major Fire in a Refinery in France arising out
of a sudden ejection of a Bull (Pipe Plug)
from a pump case

US Midwest Refinery fire due to dislodging
of a Bull Plug when an Inspector stepped on
it

A Structured inspection schedule exists?
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 Positive Material
Identification

New construction have 2-4% material

error

Running plants too can face upto 1-2%
material error

IPCL (Nagothane. India) ,Baton Rouge
(Louisina, US) incidents

API 578 to be used effectively for material
verification
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 Small Bore Piping
(SBP) Inspection

Normally escapes attention

SBP failure can cause serious
incidents:

Hydrocracker fire in a California
Refinery (1980)-fracture of a 1” H2 line

US Midwest refinery fire (2000)-
rupture of a ¾”SS line

Practice to monitor and inspect high Risk
SBP in place?
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Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC)

(SCC) is the cracking
induced from the
combined influence of
tensile stress and a
corrosive X 500
environment. The
impact of SCC on a
material usually falls
between dry cracking
and the fatigue
threshold of that
material
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Wire wrapping/Boxing
of Flanged Leaks

Considered a safe and successful practice for

attending leaks in Equipment and Pipelines

To be supervised by Specialist/Material
Engineers

Selant can overload bolted boxes and chemical
in it can cause corrosion at times

HE head in a California Refinery blew off as
enclosed bolting corroded

Case of Valve Bonnet blowing off

Are these points covered-Mtc. Procedure ? L

L
API RP 941 Steels for Hydrogen
Service at Elevated
Temperatures and Pressures in
Petroleum Refineries and
Petrochemical Plants

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API RP 920 -1990, PREVENTION OF
FRACTURE OF PRESSURE VESSELS
( withdrawn but still followed) L
Managing Effects of Aging

Intelligence •Influence the Future proactive

Risk

Knowledge •Ability to predict

future Condition

•Recognise Parameters
Information that affect
susceptibility to failure

•Recording Last
Data Condition after
reactive
Inspection)
Managing Effects of Aging
20

18

16

14

wallthickness[mm]
12

10

Tools to establish corrosion rates0 0 5 15 20

time [y] 25
Tools to establish technical condition 10

Tools to establish prediction confidence

Tools to establish minimum required wall thickness
Integration of Multiple Work
Processes Leading To
Sustained Asset
Long Term Integrity
Asset Integrity

Focused Asset Integrity Reviews

Design and
Materials Selection
Corrosion Risk-Based
Control & IOW’s Inspection

Asset integrity management is a balancing process

designed to achieve lowest total cost of ownership

59
 Achieved Maintenance Cost& Plant Availability

1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999

0.0 95.0
% Reduction of Maintenance Cost

2.0
94.0

General Availability (%)

4.0
6.0 % plant 93.0
availability
8.0
92.0
10.0
12.0 91.0
% cost reduction vs.
14.0 Plant availability
90.0
Average of 10
16.0
Sites
89.0
18.0
20.0

…and Incident Free

 Mechanical Integrity

Written procedures to maintain the on-going
mechanical integrity of process equipment
are established and implemented

Follow recognized and generally accepted
good engineering practices for inspections
and testing procedures

Document each inspection and test

Correct equipment deficiencies that were
found outside acceptable limits defined by the
process safety information/data sheet before
further use or in a safe and timely manner
 Risk Based Inspection (RBI)

Identify the probable damage mechanisms

Review the equipment history and last
known condition

Review any special inspection programs
underway, e.g. PMI, CUI, HTHA, D/L’s,
etc.

Establish inspection
techniques/strategies/intervals

Establish probability of failure before and
after planned inspection and mitigation
activities

Estimate most likely failure mode, e.g. pin
hole leak, cracking, rupture, etc.
Remaining Lifecycle of Power plant Tubes
subject to overheat Creep damage
 Remaining Life Assessment of Power
Plant Re heater Tubes

Oxide scale technique is used to
determine RCLA of Boiler
RH/SH Tubes

At high temp. scale forms inside
Tubes

The scale grows on a
predictable rate depending on
tube wall temperature

By measuring the thickness of Long-term Creep damage lead
scale, average time at a to costly Tube failure which
temperature can be assessed
can be prevented by RCLA

The informations can be
entered into a software eg.
EPRI TubelifeIII to predict the
Remaining Time to failure
Example – Remaining Life Assessment
of Primary reformer Tubes

The primary reformer is the most
critical asset in a Hydrogen
plant

Reformer tube failure due to
Creep presents a particularly high
risk of unplanned outages

Remnant life assessment of
reformer tubes minimizes the risk
of unplanned shutdowns due to
tube failures

Tube harvesting/replacement
strategies can be based on sound
principles rather than arbitrary
criteria

Reformers to be operated more
aggressively, resulting in
increased production and
profitability
Example – Remaining Life Assessment
of Primary reformer Tubes (Contd…)

HP Alloys used in reformer tubes are not
amenable to standardized creep
condition assessment procedures such
as those in API 530 and API 579.

Temperature and stress vary through
the tube wall and along the axis of the
tube e primary reformer is the most

Due to variability in creep properties
a detailed database of alloy behavior
is required

Laser-Optic Tube Inspection
System

Hundreds of thousands of data points
recorded in a typical inspection.

inspections Analyze 100% of data
following

4 API RP579 Level III Fitness-for Service
and Remaining Life
 Creep Behavior of HP Alloys
Primary Reformer
LCA
 Creep Behavior of HP Alloys

Macrocracking
STRAIN 1 2 3

1. Primary Creep Microcracking

2. Secondary Creep
3. Tertiary Creep
Aligned
Cavities
Steady-
State
Creep Rate Isolated
Cavities

TIME

Cavities and Microcracks only display

themselves near end of life of tubes.
They do not allow
remnant life predictability.
Plant Data
LOTIS®
Inspection
Inspection Technology Comparison

Other technologies
are useful only at or
very near Tube Failure.
This is often too late to
predict Remnant Life
or to provide useful
tube replacement
strategy

L
Software

Operates Nuclear aircraft carriers 365 days

Landing and launching of Aircraft every
few minutes

Young crew with average intelligence

Near 100% availability w/o incident
 Whose Job is Asset Integrity
Management

Management

Operations Grp

Engineering/Maintenance Services

Reliability Engineering

Process Emgineering

Project Engineering

Corrosion Engeneering

Inspection
 Best Practice – Implementation of
Asset Integrity Program

Corrective Action is the implementation
to eliminate a detected nonconformity.

Preventive Action, which is the action to
eliminate the cause of a detected
nonconformity or other undesirable
situation.

Elimination Action, which eliminates the
cause of a potential nonconformity or
other undesirable potential situation.
 Key to Success in
Asset Integrity Management

Effectiveness which is:

Producing

Decisive

Decided

Desired Results

Procedures and Training not good enough

Allocating Time and Money not good enough

Knowledge transfer and Effective
implementation is the Key
 PIEM- Structured vs Informal

Structured approach is the Key

Mere informal approach can not ensure
best asset integrity

Structured approach to be adopted
immediately if not done

Minimizes incidents (fire, explosion, toxic
release)
 PEIM Shop level
Commitment and Approach

Blocking and tackling

Back to basics

Perseverance

No distraction on a/c of “Fire fighting”

No distraction due to Production Pressure or
Poor Economic Environment

Procedure

Training

Discipline
 Common problem

When oil prices are high,
production requirements tend to
take precedence, and

When price is low—maintenance
and rejuvenation is seen as a
costly burden, which can be
deferred
 Asset Integrity Management
Indicators
Co. Practice Status

Leadership
Rate of Maintenance

Responsibility problem

Accountability
Ratio of Breakdown to

Data Management Predictive Maintenance

Quality for Critical Equipments

Interpretation
Rate of Plant Changes

Organization Learning not incorporated into

Communication documentation before

Employee involvement next Turnaround