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Blast Buildings
Research · August 2015

DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.1.3904.4962
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Morteza Asgharpour Hassan Kiadeh

Amirkabir University of Technology
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Buildings of Hazard Areas
All drawings and documents prepared by the CONSULTANT and submitted to EMPLOYER in accordance with the provisions of CONTRACT shall be
the property of the EMPLOYER.
Page 1
Table of Content
I. Overview ..................................................................................................................... 2
II. Definitions .................................................................................................................... 2
III. Chapter 1: Blast Buildings ............................................................................................ 3
1. Purpose ....................................................................................................................... 3
2. Concepts ..................................................................................................................... 3
2.1 Objectives of hazard analysis ........................................................................................... 3
2.2 Hazard area ................................................................................................................... 3
3. Blast resistance structure (Explosion and fire) ...................................................................... 4
3.1 ARE .............................................................................................................................. 4
3.2 BSE .............................................................................................................................. 7
3.3 BMS .............................................................................................................................. 7
3.4 BEE .............................................................................................................................. 9
4. Toxic Material ............................................................................................................. 10
4.1 ARE ............................................................................................................................ 10
4.2 BMS ............................................................................................................................ 10
IV. Chapter 2: Bunkers and Safe rooms ............................................................................. 11
1. Purpose ..................................................................................................................... 11
2. Concepts ................................................................................................................... 11
3. Bunker ...................................................................................................................... 11
3.1 ARE ............................................................................................................................ 11
3.2 BSE ............................................................................................................................ 15
3.3 BMS ............................................................................................................................ 15
3.4 BEE ............................................................................................................................ 18
4. Safe Room ................................................................................................................. 20
4.1 ARE ............................................................................................................................ 20
4.2 BSE ............................................................................................................................ 21
4.3 BMS ............................................................................................................................ 21
4.4 BEE ............................................................................................................................ 21
V. Reference ............................................................................................................... 22
Page 1
I. Overview
This document is collection and combination of existence data and information including related
standards of different countries, related books, experience of others and us.
Following diagram is a help for following this specification's subjects
Buildings of hazard areas
Chapter 1 Chapter 2
Blast Buildings Bunkers and
(Above ground) safe room
Explosion/ Fire/Toxic
II.Definitions
• Building
A rigid, enclosed structure (As API 752 Definition)
• Shall and should
The word "Shall" is to be understood as mandatory and the word "Should" as
strongly recommended complying with the requirements.
• ARE
Architectural Part
• BSE
Structural Part
• BMS
Mechanical Part
• BEE
Electrical Part
• Donor System
Amount, type and location of the potentially detonating explosive
• Acceptor System
Personnel, equipment, or explosives that require protection
Page 1
III. Chapter 1: Blast Buildings

1. Purpose
This chapter is prepared to use as a handbook for designer of special buildings which are
built to resistant in hazard situation of blast.
2. Concepts
The chosen concept of this charter is defined based on combination of regular standards
of oil and gas companies also Sazeh Company specially API and ASCE.
1.1. Objectives of hazard analysis
The primary objectives for providing blast resistant design for buildings are:
a) Personnel safety in occupied building:

Blast resistant design should provide a level of safety for persons in the building that is no
less than that for persons outside the building in the event of an explosion. Evidence from
past incidents has shown that many of the fatalities and serious injuries were due to
collapse of buildings onto the persons inside the building. This objective is to reduce the
probability that the building itself becomes a hazard in an explosion.
A building is occupied if
• Occupied >400 hours per week,
• Peak occupancy > 40 persons for one hour,
• Must be occupied during incident for safe shutdown of the facility,
• Designated as an emergency response shelter;
b) Controlled shutdown (need to be available for Emergency Response):

Preventing cascading events due to loss of control of process units not involved in the
event is another objective of blast resistant design. An incident in one unit should not affect
the continued safe operation or orderly shutdown of other units.
c) Financial consideration (Cost of repair):

Preventing or minimizing financial losses is another objective of blast resistant design.
Buildings containing business information, critical or essential equipment, expensive and
long lead time equipment, or equipment which, if destroyed, would constitute significant
interruption or financial loss to the owner, should be protected.
1.2. Hazard area
Building which is objective of hazard analysis (in each above category) will be checked by
API 752 in three (3) primary hazard scenarios of explosion, fire and toxic material release.
If the analysis results clarify that the building is in hazard area this document is available 1.
a) Explosion: Vapor cloud explosions are typically the dominant explosion scenario for refineries and
petrochemical plants.
For example, the Free Field Overpressure commonly referred to the blast intensity and the blast
duration, are blast characteristics that are provided by the sitting analysis and determine the
structural design and integrity of a particular building system.
Page 1
3. Blast resistant structure (Explosion and fire)

Following means could be selected if the analyses (based on chosen criteria) confirm
that mentioned buildings are located in Vapor Cloud Explosion (VCE) (of course
because the blast regularly is accompanied with fire, two items will be united):
1. Relocate the building:
Sufficient distance between the donor and acceptor systems to attenuate the
hazardous effects of the donor to a level tolerable to the acceptor
2. Blast resistance structure
A structure to directly protect the acceptor system from the hazardous output of
the donor system
3. Non building approaches:
Some actions may be done out of building and usually to halt the hazard resource
like:
• A structure to fully contain or confine the hazardous output of the donor system.
• Considering safety instrumented system (API 752. Table1).
• Considering high level criteria for fabrication and installation.
4. A combination of the above means.
The best solution is relocated buildings in a unified zone and substituted the zone out of
VCE.
If it is not possible, "the decision regarding blast resistant requirements is made by

owner" because of extra cost and avoiding further comments (ASCE, 2010, p7).
So if the building is confirmed to be blast resistance, following requirement should be
met.
1.3. ARE
1.1.1. Doors
♦ External doors shall be blast resistant.
♦ Blast "doors need to be designed for the required blast load (for more see clause
3.2.9).
b) Fire: Fire hazards are potential threats either in or of themselves through the inherent flammable
and combustible products in refineries and petrochemical plants, or as a result of an explosion.
Fires in process areas can be pool fires, jet fires, flash fires, or fireballs and modeling is typically
used to predict the effects and duration. So engineering Team will be given design parameters
such as a 1, 2 or 3-Hour fire wall and/or ceiling requirement.
For example, when designing for specific thermal protection, architects could specify wall/ ceiling/
flooring materials with low heat transfer properties. For moderate to extreme temperatures
varying thicknesses of mineral wool insulation are used to provide a high resistance to a heat
transfer flux such as experienced in many fire related scenarios. In extreme conditions, an
intumescing coating can be applied to the exterior of a building.
c) Toxic material release: When mitigating potential flammable vapors involves the ingress of
flammable vapor concentrations into the building which can then ignite with the occupants inside
For example, NFPA 496 addresses this concern and allows for internal building pressurization to
eliminate infiltration into the building. HVAC systems should be designed to protect the building in
hazard situation.
Page 1
1.1.2. Windows
♦ Windows should be considered for manned part of building. These windows shall
be Blast resistance and support blast load required for building.
♦ Windows shall be remaining gastight to protect entrancing gas, fire, smoke and
heat after explosion.
♦ Normal glass with a minimum thickness of 3 mm could be used for internal
windows, since the overpressure inside the building without outer windows or with
only a few small windows will be low enough during an explosion to prevent
fragmented glass flying (Shell company, 1990, p19).
1.1.3. Accessibility & Location
♦ Using posts, bollards or any elements in buildings site shall not blocked emergency
vehicle access.
♦ The distance between control building and equipment containing flammable
substance shall be at least 15m. Depending on size, pressure and contents of this
equipment, the minimum distance can be up to 30m (Shell company, 1990, p7).
1.1.4. Building form
♦ Orient buildings horizontally rather than vertically to reduce the building's profile
and exposure (FEMA 426, 2003, p3-3).
♦ The shape of building shall be rectangular, with no protruding canopies, etc., no
equipment on the roof except for the air intake and exhaust facilities (Shell company,
1990, p14). Air-cooled condensers shall be located next to the building at grade and
not on top of the roof (Shell company, 1990, p24).
♦ Items such as re-entrance corners and set back doors can experience loadings
that are considerably higher than the peak reflected overpressures and should be
avoided(ASCE, 2010, p134).
♦ The building design should not contribute to the likelihood of flying debris.
Canopies and vestibules should be avoided since they frequently become
dislodged and could block. (ASCE, 2010, p134).
♦ The overall height of building and the flat span of the roof of that building shall be
to a minimum to limit the effects of an explosion (Shell company, 1990, p14).
1.1.5. Plan
♦ Building should be as compact of possible (Shell company, 1990, p 8).
♦ Eliminate hiding places within the building (FEMA 426, 2003,p3-6).
Page 1
1.1.6. Finishing
♦ Blast waves may have internal effects on non-structural partitions that can cause
substantial injury if failure occurs. These shall be designed and installed to
resistance about the effects.
♦ Suspended ceiling components particularly are susceptible to being dislodged
during the blast. Ceiling lighting fixtures, diffusers, etc should be supported
independently of the suspended ceiling (ASCE, 2010, p133).
♦ There should not be installed any heavy suspended mechanical units in suspended
ceiling provided that structural requirements have been considered.
♦ The roof shall be well insulated, but shall not be covered with gravel or loose
concrete tiles as these will fly in the event of an explosion (Shell company, 1990,
p14).
♦ External finishing on walls increases their vulnerability in explosion Exposed
concrete is the best finishing. Cement rendering is better than bricks façade
(17‫ﺹ‬،1391،‫) ﺩﻓﺗﺭ ﻣﻘﺭﺭﺍﺕ ﻣﻠﯽ ﺳﺎﺧﺗﻣﺎﻥ‬.
1.1.7. Sun protection

♦ Due to louvers, canopies or venetian blinds are not allowed at the outside, interior
sun protection may be provided (Shell company, 1990, p19).
♦
1.1.8. Interior design
♦ Use interior barriers to differentiate level of security within a building.
♦ Since in the case of an explosion, the external walls will be subjected to a sudden
movement inwards, the installation of important equipment, such as panels or
switchgear, or radio base station etc. against such walls is not permitted (Shell
company, 1990, p14).
1.1.9. Toxic Material
♦ All penetrations, both inside and outside, shall be well sealed according to the gas.
♦ Both door of air lock (external and internal) should be sealed and gastight.
♦ A clean area should be considered in air lock for arrived person (e.g. help) and a
cupboard keeping some masks and needed accessories.
♦ Means to warn building occupants to the presence of a toxic material release.
Page 1
1.4. BSE
1.1.10. Types of Construction

Reinforced concrete is generally considered the most suitable and economical
construction material for blast resistant buildings, however steel structure could be used
but is not recommended. Concrete also provides effective resistance to fire and
projectile penetration which are important considerations in many explosion accidents.
Brittle material is not suitable for blast resistant structures. Unreinforced concrete, brick
and unreinforced masonry are examples of this type of construction material.
1.1.11. Material
A minimum concrete compressive strength of minimum 30 MPa should be used. UFC 3-
340-02 indicates that Grade 60 (AIII) reinforcing bars have sufficient ductility for dynamic
loading. Low and medium carbon structural steels, such as A36, A572, A500 and A992,
are sufficiently ductile for blast design applications to prevent problems with decreased
ductility.
1.1.12. Building Configuration
• According to existing codes and standards, all the procedures for the
determination of the external blast loads on structures are restricted to generally
rectangular structures. It means that any irregularity in plan and elevation, re-
entrant corners and offsets are not allowed.
• It is recommended to avoid designing multi story building.
• The building design should not contribute to the likelihood of flying debris
• Canopies and vestibules should be avoided since they frequently become
dislodged and could block critical means of egress.
1.1.13. Building Orientation
The orientation of the building should be such that the blast induced loads are reduced
as much as possible. This requires that as small an area of the building as possible
should face the most probable source of an explosion.
1.1.14. Building Location
The blast resistant buildings should be preferably located in the manner that reflected
waves from one building do not strike to the other building.
1.1.15. Structural System
Reinforced concrete walls, flat floor and roof slab in addition with RC structure moment
frame will provide resistance against blast loads.
1.1.16. Maximum Area of Openings
According to IPS, The total area of openings, excluding doors, shall not exceed 0.0066
m2/m3 of the internal volume of the building. The total area of openings on any one side
of the building shall not exceed one-half this limit.
1.1.17. Windows
According to IPS & NPCS, windows are not permitted. In the case that the client
overrules mentioned standards, windows should be certified to withstand the same blast
loads as the walls.
Page 1
1.1.18. Doors
Doors in external blast resistant walls shall be kept to a minimum. They shall be
fabricated from mild steel and shall open outwards and butt on all four edges against
steel frames cast into the concrete. According to ASCE, external doors for main
personnel access shall conform to Category I. External doors for others (e.g. equipment
access) doors shall conform to Category II. Mid-Range level of blast pressure shall be
considered for both categorizes.
1.1.19. Blast Load
Blast resistant buildings will be designed to withstand a high pressure-short duration
external explosion which generates peak side-on overpressure of 69 kPa with duration
of 20 milliseconds. This is roughly equivalent to the overpressure created by a free-air
explosion of one US ton of TNT at 30 m with a margin of safety of 2.5 against collapse
considering moderate structural damage. Moreover, the structure shall withstand low
pressure-long duration side-on over pressure of 21 kPa with duration of 100
milliseconds, too. The intent is that personnel are kept safe and facilities remain
operable in such an event.
1.1.1.1.Below Grade Pressure

Referring to ASCE Manual 42, the pressure acting against walls below grade can be
evaluated multiplying the blast pressure at grade by a horizontal load factor depending
upon the soil:
Where:
K 0 = coefficient of lateral earth pressure at rest
1.1.1.2.Peak Reflected Pressure (Pr)

According to ASCE, when the free field blast wave from an explosion strikes a surface, it
is reflected. The effect of this blast wave reflection is that the surface will experience a
pressure much more than the incidence side-on value.
The magnitude of the reflected pressure is usually determined as an amplifying ratio of
the incidence pressure:
Where:
C r = Reflected Coefficient
The reflected coefficient depends on the peak overpressure and the angle of incidence.
For angle of incidence equal to 0°, C r is calculated as follow:
Page 1
1.5. BMS
1.1.20. Mechanical Systems

When designing Mechanical systems for blast mitigation, the following should be
considered:
• Each utility should have two or more service entrances, sufficiently separated so
that one incident does not disable all service to the building.
• A minimum 50-foot (15-meter) separation should be provided between utility
service entrances, primary and backup equipment for the same building system,
and primary and backup distribution for system cabling and piping, and between
critical system components and high-risk areas. This separation is to prevent an
explosive event in one location from disrupting the operations of all important ser-
vice systems.
• Fixtures, equipment, and piping should not be mounted on the inside of exterior
walls, but on a separate wall at least 6 inches (15 centimeters) from the exterior
wall face.
• Equipment, fixtures, conduits, and piping should not be suspended from the
ceiling, unless supported and braced in accordance with seismic design
requirements that also take into account additional blast loads.
• Vibration isolators should be installed on rotating equipment and flexible piping
connections.
• Fire requirements (fire stopping), air infiltration and leakage requirements (sealing
and smoke stopping), and sound transmission requirements (sound proofing)
should be observed wherever system components penetrate a roof, ceiling, wall,
or floor.
• Emergency backup electric power should be provided for all systems that must be
operational at all times.
• In addition to separation, rooms for primary and backup systems should be
hardened to improve their resilience.
• Sufficient storage capacity for fuel, oil, water, and other materials should be
provided to allow the building to operate as long as required.
• If necessary, location of the utility and harmful elements near together, each of
them should be installed completely separated and protected among the
structures that can withstand the explosive load.
• Minimum diameter should be used for ducts and air intake in the building.
• All opening on external walls/roof shall be equipped with blast valve/damper.
• HVAC system should be shutdown in the agent.
• Refractory and fireproof materials should be used for thermal insulation to achieve
high safety in the supply duct.
1.1.21. Heating, Ventilating, and Air-Conditioning Systems

 Heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning (HVAC) systems are indispensable for
continued operation of a building after a hazard event.
 Strategies for Reducing Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Vulnerability
Page 1
There are four basic strategies for protecting a building and its occupants from CBR
attack:
1) Physical security. This strategy involves measures that limit or prevent access to a
building or deter potential attackers. This includes the application of physical
barriers, surveillance, and access-control procedures as preventive measures.
2) Air purification. This strategy involves high-efficiency filtration, neutralization, or
disinfection of the air in or entering the building. It typically involves mechanical
filtration of aerosols and adsorption of chemical vapors/gases, but it may also
involve the use of ultraviolet light or other non-mechanical air purification, mainly
for biological agents.
3) Unventilated sheltering. This strategy, commonly referred to as sheltering in place,
involves temporarily reducing the air-exchange rate of the building or safe room,
before contaminated air reaches it, and increasing the air-exchange rate after the
hazardous condition passes.
4) Individual protection. This strategy involves building occupants' use of individual
protection equipment, primarily respirators capable of filtering aerosols, vapors,
and gases at very high efficiency.
Each of these strategies has limitations; that is, none is comprehensive in its
effectiveness. For this reason, achieving complete protection requires a combination
of strategies and involves several protective measures- architectural, mechanical,
electrical, and operational-to reduce the vulnerability of a building and its occupants
to airborne hazards. These measures vary in cost as well as effectiveness.
Each strategy involves a combination of two or more protective measures. For
example, unventilated sheltering in an office building is most effective when
combined with the use of a single-switch HVAC system control, to quickly deactivate
all fans in the building, and a public address system, to move people into a
protective posture rapidly. Employed against a potential terrorist attack, sheltering
also requires external surveillance, a detection system, or a community warning sys-
tem. On the other hand, the full effectiveness of air purification can be achieved only
when the building or the spaces selected for protection are pressurized.
Pressurization is most economically achieved by tightening the building envelope
with sealing measures during construction.
 Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning System Configurations to Accommodate

Air Purification
If resources are not available to employ air purification and pressurization to achieve
the highest efficiency (at the highest cost) in new construction or retrofit, HVAC
systems can be configured or selected for adaptability to strategies of air
purification, unventilated sheltering in place, and physical security.
For the air-purification strategy, air-water HVAC systems provide the most effective
means of applying high-efficiency or medium-efficiency filtration. With such systems,
the most efficient and effective approach is to supply and temper fresh air only
through central air-handling units with no return air. High-efficiency filtration is
applied to these central ventilation units. Occupant-controlled heating and cooling is
supplied by fan coil units that do not supply outdoor air.
 Details on designing HVAC systems for blast resistance:
Page 1
• Buildings should be avoided as little as possible from the use of high leakage
risk or refrigeration systems with direct coil. If the system likely to high leakage
risk or refrigeration systems with direct coil to be applied, the refrigerant gas
should be driven out, through drain valves, when the risk is high.
• Plumbing and ducting in the HVAC systems should be equipped with
expansion components and flexible joints in the equipment installation place
and also interface between the pipe and duct with walls to reduce the damages
of explosion.
• Supports and braces should not be completely rigid to have some flexibility.
• HVAC room should be built in safe place to continue activity after damage
building.
• Pumps and water tanks should be installed horizontal in the HVAC room to
prevention of reversal against the explosion.
1.1.22. Plumbing Systems

Plumbing systems include water distribution, water storage, sanitation systems, storm
water drainage, water heaters and softeners, and onsite treatment, as well as
distribution of natural gas, laboratory gases, and medical gases. To protect against
terrorist attacks and other threats and hazards, plumbing designers should evaluate at
all potential scenarios: a broken water pipe can cause a flood, or a broken gas pipe can
cause an explosion. To reduce the risk of these events, emergency shut-off valves and
one-way check valves should be installed.
Floors in mechanical rooms where water is used should be sloped to prevent standing
water near electrical equipment where personnel work.
Plumbing designers should consider the following recommendations to mitigate the
effects of potential terrorist attacks, but also to improve building performance under
other threats and hazards:
• The placement of plumbing on the roof surface should be avoided.
• Backflow prevention equipment should be installed at the water utility service
entrance and where the potable water system supplies processing equipment.
Redundancy of the fire-suppression system may be increased by
connecting it to the potable water system, with backflow prevention that
a l l o w s f l o w f r o m p o t a b l e t o f i r e s u p p r e s s i o n s ys t e m o n l y .
Electric-operated valves should be used to open these connections when
n e e d e d .
• Water usage throughout the building should be reviewed for all possible
scenarios. A sufficient water supply for all services or operations should be
maintained at all times.
Event scenarios should evaluate potential damage and its effects.
Automatic emergency shut-off valves triggered by excessive flow rates
should be installed at the bottom of vertical risers.
 W here leaks or damage can occur, drains should be installed.
Page 1
• Natural gas usage throughout the building should be reviewed to enable the
gas supply to be maintained throughout the period it is used.
 Automatic emergency shut-off valves triggered by excessive flow rates
should be installed at the bottom of vertical risers.
 Where leaks or damage can occur vents should be installed to prevent the
gas concentration from reaching its lower explosive limit.
 Current building codes require that natural gas utility piping exit the ground
prior to entering a building, which allows venting of underground leaks to
the atmosphere and protects the building from leakage that can cause
e x p l o s i o n .
1.1.23. Equipment Specification
1.1.1.3. Ambient Conditions for Equipment

The equipment and supplies in a civil defense shelter shall remain operational at an
ambient temperature of between -30°C and +70°C and function properly when the
temperature at the location of the equipment or supplies is between -20°C and +40°C.
If, during sheltering, the temperature at the location of the equipment or supplies is
0°C or above, the equipment or supplies shall function properly at a temperature of
between 0°C and +40°C.
1.1.1.4. Impact Loading

Blast and gastight doors, blast hatches, gastight blast hatches, shut-off devices, wall
sleeves, safety, pressure and exhaust air valves sewer shut-off valves, overpressure
meters, supply air valves, leakage pumps, backup lighting fixtures, ground shock
isolators, gas sensors and analysers, ventilation units and pre-filters shall withstand an
impact on the platform on which they are attached in which the peak point velocity in
any direction is 1.5 m/s and maximum acceleration 300 m/s2.
1.1.1.5. Weld Joints

The weld joints of the equipment shall be made in accordance with standard SFS-EN
25817 or corresponding requirements so that they conform with weld class D. The
weld class of the weld joints critically impacting the durability of the equipment shall
conform to weld class C.
1.1.24. Doors, hatches, shut-off devices, wall sleeves and the air intake duct of the civil
defense shelter
1.1.1.6. General
1) The equipment for closing the doors, the hatches and the gastight shut-off devices
shall be equipped with markings showing the ‘open' and ‘closed' positions. If
necessary, they shall be equipped with sensors indicating the ‘open' and ‘closed'
positions. The closing time of the doors, the hatches and the gastight shut-off devices
may not be more than 1 minute.
2) It shall also be possible to disassemble the parts keeping the door and hatch in place
from inside the shelter with manual tools when the door or hatch has been
permanently deformed.
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1.1.1.7. Tightness of the gastight equipment

The tightness of the gastight doors, hatches and shut-off devices shall be such that the
leakage flow rate through the structure is not more than 0.2dm3/s for each square
meter of the opening when the external overpressure is 150 Pa.
1.1.1.8. Shut-off devices for civil defence shelter wall sleeves

1) It shall be possible to close the wall sleeves from inside the shelter in a gastight
manner. The structure of the shut-off device shall be such that in normal conditions, it
can remain attached to the wall sleeve duct. A shut-off device with a mass of more
than 20 kg shall have a lifting lug or it shall be hinged to the wall sleeve duct. The
shut-off plate shall be hot-galvanised in accordance with standard SFS-EN ISO 1461.
2) It shall be possible to use the gastight shut-off valve to control the air flowing through it.
1.1.1.9. Wall Sleeves

1) The wall sleeves of the gastight shut-off devices shall withstand the blast loads. The
pressure-tight wall sleeves shall withstand three times the blast loads given.
2) The wall sleeve shall be tight. If the nominal size of the wall sleeve is more than 40mm
it shall be equipped with a flange ring. The wall sleeve shall be made of a pipe that is
in accordance with standard SFS-EN 10220.
3) The wall sleeves shall be hot-galvanised in accordance with standard SFS-EN ISO
1461 or with a corresponding method.
1.1.1.10. Air Intake Ducts

1) The properties of the air intake ducts shall be in accordance with standard SFS- EN
10220.
2) The air intake ducts shall withstand a vertical or horizontal load of 20 kN.
3) The air intake ducts shall be hot-galvanized in accordance with standard SFS-EN ISO
1461.
1.1.25. Pressure, Safety, Supply Air and Exhaust Air Valves, Sewer Shut-off Valves and
Overpressure Meters
1.1.1.11. Relief valves

1) A relief valve open in a manner corresponding to an air flow of 85dm3/s shall withstand
three times the blast loads given in Table 4 of Appendix 2.
2) An open relief valve shall close as a result of the impact of an external blast shock. The
size of the overpressure impulse flowing through the relief valve shall not exceed 10Ns
when the peak reflected pressure of the blast shock, as expressed in overpressure, is
between 10 and 40kPa, and 4Ns when the peak reflected pressure, as expressed in
overpressure is between 40 and 300kPa. The leakage flow rate through a closed valve
may not exceed 15cm3/s when the external overpressure is 150Pa. The opening
pressure of the relief valve shall be between 30 and 60Pa. It shall be possible to close
the relief valve from inside the shelter by hand.
3) The leakage flow rate through a closed relief valve may not exceed 10dm3/s when the
peak reflected pressure of the blast load, as expressed in overpressure, is 300 kPa.
Page 1
4) The characteristic curve of the relief valve shall be continuously rising. The combined
flow resistance of the valve and a 300-mm-long straight wall sleeve duct may not
exceed 95 Pa when the air flow is 54dm3/s. When the air flow is 65dm3/s, the flow
resistance may not exceed 115 Pa. When the air flow corresponding to the rising part
of the characteristic curve is at most 70dm3/s, the effect of the hysteresis phenomenon
may not exceed 20dm3/s.
5) It shall be possible to attach the relief valve to the flange of a wall sleeve duct with a
nominal size of 160mm the measurements of which are given in Table 8 of Appendix
3. The protrusion of the relief valve from the wall surface may not be more than 150
mm and its horizontal protrusion may not be more than 130mm from the centre line of
the wall sleeve duct.
1.1.26. Supply Air Valves

1) It shall be possible to connect the supply air valve (TV-3) of the civil defence shelter
with a duct measuring 160 mm in diameter and that meets the requirements laid down
in standard SFS-EN 1506.
2) At an increasing air flow, the flow resistance curve of the supply air valve shall be
continuously rising. The flow resistance of a supply air valve installed at the end of a
duct may not exceed 60 Pa when the air flow is 25dm3/s. When the air flow is 25dm3/s,
the flow resistance shall be at least 20Pa.
3) The supply air valve shall direct the supply air into the shelter so that the throw length,
as determined in accordance with standard SFS-EN 12238 is, at an air flow of
25dm3/s, at least 1.0 m on both sides of the duct when measured from the centre line
of the duct and so that the air flow end velocity is 0.5m/s.
1.1.27. Exhaust Air Valves

1) It shall be possible to attach the exhaust air valves to a wall sleeve duct measuring 160
mm in diameter.
2) The leakage flow rate through a closed exhaust air valve may not exceed 15cm3/s
when the external pressure is 150Pa. It shall be possible to open and close the
exhaust air valve from inside the civil defence shelter by hand.
3) A closed exhaust air valve shall withstand a static overpressure of 20kPa from both
sides.
1.1.28. Sewer Shut-Off Valves

The leakage flow rate through a closed shut-off valve may not exceed 15cm3/s when the
external pressure is 150Pa. It shall be possible to open and close the shut-off valve from
inside the civil defence shelter by hand.
1.1.29. Toxic Material

For details of HVAC design in Toxic material cloud buildings, please refer to chapter
2/4.3
Page 1
1.6. BEE
This specification is especially for electrical design in blast buildings. So the other
requirements shall be considered based on general standard.
1.1.30. General
• It is recommended to use positive pressurized HVAC system in technical room

for avoiding dust entering to it.
1.1.31. Lighting
• Two separate lighting systems shall be supplied, one normal lighting system and
one essential lighting system. As a minimum, 30% of the lighting shall be
essential, fed from the emergency generators.
• Inside buildings, essential lighting system shall be completely separated from

normal lighting system; however both systems cabling could be routed in same
route.
Vital lighting fixture shall be provided over all exit doors and in corridors to
indicate direction of exits. In addition to ‘exit' lights, 10% of (minimum one)
indoor lighting shall be vital lighting.
Vital lighting shall normally be supplied from the emergency distribution board
system.
Vital lighting shall be of the self-contained type with included autonomous

battery pack.
• Installation of pendant lighting fixture shall be avoided.

1.1.32. Building Distribution Boards
• All panels shall be protected by minimum over current and over voltage relays.
1.1.33. Fire Alarm
• Fire detection devices shall be installed to detect hazardous conditions resulting

from fire and to initiate appropriate alarms and actions in blast building.
• The alarms and actions generated by the activation of each detector shall be
detailed in Fire and Gas Causes and Effects Charts during design stage of the
project.
• Fire alarm panel shall be supplied from emergency power.
• Fire resistant cable shall be used between fire alarm panel and
detectors/sounder/manual call point.
1.1.34. Public Address and General Alarm System
• In order to warning people in danger time, paging system shall be designed.
• PA/GA panel shall be supplied from emergency power.

1.1.35. Telephone System
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• Telephone system shall be designed for calling in case of normal and emergency
time.
• Telephone system shall be supplied from emergency power.

1.1.36. Installation Requirements
• Cable entries to blast resistance structure must be protected by MCT (Multi

Cable Transit). It suitable for routing one/more cables with a seal made up of
one/more separated elastomeric modules which are compressed together when
device is assembled and mounted. MCT applications should be defined by
environmental performance requirements. It shall be provided protection against
blast load.
• Where conduit/tray cross expansion joint, flexible conduit/devices shall be

considered for connecting them.
• In case of using pendant type, suitable support shall be considered to provide

protection against blast load.
• If possible, generator shall be installed inside building and located in separated

space inaccessible to public.
• Sufficient space shall remain for outgoing cable trench/tray. Cable entries to
building shall be sealed with compound which shall maintain the floor/wall fire
ratings.
• Transit cable route shall be suitably sealed when passing through fire wall.
Page 1
IV. Chapter 2: Bunkers and Safe rooms
4. Purpose
This chapter is prepared to use as a handbook for designer of bunkers and safe rooms
which usually are used in military attacks.
5. Concepts
Bunkers or self shelter is utilized for keeping persons safe during hazardous conditions.
Numerous forms of bunkers are used specially during the wars. Different items are used for
categorizing these buildings like:
• Type of threats (bombs, biological and chemical, Radon),
• Protection level,
• Capacity,
• Length of stay.
In process plants the bunkers could be used in non-industrial zone where the personnel of
the site are convened. Due to non-industrial buildings zone is out of hazardous area of
plant (if not the occupant buildings should be designed as safe shelter and there is no need
for separated bunker), these buildings are designed for armory attack.
Considering mentioned functional concerns, two forms of bunker will be specified to give
details in this specification:
1- Independent bunker building,

2- Safe room in a building.
And with following assumptions:
• Threats are armory attacks of explosive tools and chemical threats(specially chemical
pollution arising from plant material),
• High level of protection with slight loss of building and peoples,
• The maximum capacity of bunker considers as 150 persons,
• The length of stay considers as maximum 24 hours.
6. Bunker
Bunker is separated building to save people from defined hazardous situations with
defined level of protection. In this specification bunker is considered as underground
building.
1.7. ARE
Min area of the bunker could be calculated:

• Net area of 0.75 to 0.9 square meters per a head,
• Use Coefficient 1.35 for gross Area,
• The least area of 6 square meters for each room.
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Min height of bunker should be:

• 2.3 Meters for rooms,
• Unobstructed height (without beams and ducts occupied height) should be
Min. 2 Meters.
Location
• The building should be located far from dangerous source like chemical
storage or gas stations.
• Access way should not be blocked by other buildings' debris after bursting
event.
Following rooms should be considered in bunker:

Air lock/Gas lock: At least 2.5 square meters should be considered with 2 blast doors,
Access way:
• At least 1 main entrance way (for up to 150 people) should be considered. It
shall be designed to minimize the probability of being blocked by debris.
♦ Use a porch with stable roof to protect the entrance door from blocking by
debris. Minimum size of the roof should be 2*1.3 square meters
♦ Use a safe covered corridor with blast structure from entrance door to
further safe outside area. The corridor should have some (min 2) 90o
curve to deduct the blast wave.
♦ It should be separated structurally from main building.
• Some emergency exits should be considered for evacuation of bunker when
main entrance is unusable. Air entrance channels are good choice using as
emergency exit. Emergency exists should be located in different directions
and out of debris zone. There are 2 forms of emergency exists:
1- An opening on shared wall of a vertical shaft;
♦ Min. size of 60*80 cm shall be considered for opening and the shaft plan,
♦ If the vertical distance of escape is more than 1.5 m (2m for slope), stairs
shall be considered on the shaft's wall.
♦ The door shall be gas and pressure resistance and opens inward.
(212 ‫ ﺹ‬،1390 ،‫)ﻫﺎﺷﻣﯽ‬
2- An opening reaches to a horizontal tunnel which is ended to a vertical

shaft outside of debris zone.
♦ Min. size of 60*80 cm shall be considered for opening,
♦ The door shall be gas and pressure resistance and opens inward,
♦ Length of the tunnel should be Min. 10 m,
♦ Horizontal tunnel shall be drained,
Page 1
♦ Horizontal tunnel should be buried at Min. 50 cm soil,

♦ If the vertical distance of escape is more than 1.5 m, stairs shall be
considered on the shaft's wall.
(213 ‫ ﺹ‬،1390 ،‫)ﻫﺎﺷﻣﯽ‬
• Access requirements for the handicapped should be considered.
First aid: is a room with about 10% of total area,

U U
It should be located immediate vicinity of the airlock room.

Hall: is the main area of bunker which should be separated for every 50 person.
U U
Toilets: 1 toilet per each 25 men and Min. 1 toilet for women should be considered,
U U
Normal toilets are preferred but dry toilets could be considered too,
1 square meters is needed for each dry toilet area,
They usually are located near entrance and air exit channel.
Storage requirement
U
• Waste container
• Tank of water
• Drawer for flashlights, radio, gas masks
• Storage of food for 24 hours
Others
U
• Air Entrance channel:

It should be located out of debris zone and be short as possible usually in
corners to be protected by soil.
Channel rout should be designed with two 90o curves before connecting to
P P
the bunker.
• Control room:
It should be checked by related expert but for preliminary design about 7
Square meters should be considered for installation related equipment for
controlling and checking outside condition.
• Mechanical room:
It should be checked by related expert but for preliminary design 2 square
meters for ventilation equipment and 1.5 for filters should be considered.
Following items should be considered in Interior design of the bunker:

U U
• For resting of people some beds could be considered in the rooms. Folded
beds could be installed to use as chairs in normal situations.
• Sharp edges should be avoided.
• Hanging facilities like chandelier should be avoided. The others should be
fixed or designed to tolerate the blast wave's vibration.
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• Virtual windows could be used to calm and improve the interior environment.
Some examples of bunkers in different countries:
• Swiss - for 123 people with area of 140 square meter
(316 ‫ ﺹ‬،1390 ،‫)ﻫﺎﺷﻣﯽ‬
• United state- for 50 people with area of 45 square meter

(331 ‫ ﺹ‬،1390 ،‫)ﻫﺎﺷﻣﯽ‬
• United state- for 100 people with area of 160 square meter
(336 ‫ ﺹ‬،1390 ،‫)ﻫﺎﺷﻣﯽ‬
Page 1
1.8. BSE
1.1.37. Types of Underground Bunker

An underground structure is a structure located below grade and buried in soil or rock. It
is usually constructed as a cut and cover structure with soil cover on top.
Due to the protection provided by the soil on all sides, underground structures are less
susceptible to damage due to overhead surface explosions.
Surface explosions and soil penetrating weapons, however, can transfer significant
energy to the underground structure through the soil.
According to ASCE-Manual No.42, two classes of structures are considered in
underground bunkers:
• Shallow-buried structures
• Surface-flush structures
For purpose of defining loads, shallow-buried structures have a depth of buried (DOB)
over the roof or crown, such that:
In which:
L=the clear span between supporting walls of a roof slab or the horizontal
diameter of an arch or cylindrical structure.
Structures for which are considered surface-flush.
A large surface explosion can result in the formation of a crater that can extend deep
into the ground and cause substantial damage to the portion of the roof and exterior
walls of a buried structure within the crater.
UFC 3-340 suggest using a "Burster Slab" with minimum thickness of 1400mm, to
prevent a weapon from penetrating through the soil and detonating adjacent to the
structure (See Figure 3-1).
In case of using, the burster slab must extend far enough beyond the edge of the
building to form at least a 45 degree angle with the bottom edge of the building. It may
have to be extended further, though, if it is possible for a bomb to penetrate at a very
shallow angle, travel beneath the burster slab and detonate adjacent to the structure
(See Figure 3-1).
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Figure 3-1: Depth of buried over the roof with burster slab
Sand is used as backfill because materials with high volume of air-filled voids and low
relative densities are poor transmitters of ground shock. In addition, sand resists
penetration better than soil.
This burster slab is not mandatory, but if it is not used the structure will have to be
buried much deeper.
1.1.38. Bunker Configuration
Rectangular, arch and cylindrical structures are used for underground bunkers.
1.1.39. Design Load
Bunkers shall be design to resist the effects of an attack with conventional weapons.
The magnitude of the ground surface overpressure (P SO ) is affected by:
− The size of the explosive charge (the weight of TNT charge in the bomb, W) and
its distance from the structure (r)
− The mechanical properties of the soil, rock, and/or concrete between the
detonation point and the structure
− The depth of penetration at the time of detonation
NIOEC as a reference, suggest 267 Ib for W and depth of penetration is assumed at

ground surface.
Figure 3-2: Distribution of blast load on underground Structures
Due to soil arching, ground surface overpressure will be redistributed as below:
Page 1
In which:
a: factor relating the length of a structure to its span length
b: factor relating depth of burial to span length
Underground structures are subject to significant lateral soil pressures and possibly
hydrostatic pressures if these are partially or fully submerged in ground water.
It should be noted that some part of the soil overburden will influence the period of
structure. For design purposes it is assumed that the mass of soil overburden that is
directly over the arch but has a thickness no longer greater than the radius of the arch
influences the period.
Reinforced concrete shall be considered as construction material for underground
bunkers.
1.1.41. Material
According to chapter 1, clause 3.2.2.
1.1.42. Doors
All the exit doors shall conform to Category I of ASCE. High-Range level of blast
pressure shall be considered for this category.
1.9. BMS
 Details on designing HVAC systems for shelter & bunker:
• For heating, cooling and hot water system in the shelters, electric-type
recommended.
• Each shelter should be equipped with emergency power for lighting, air change,
heating, cooling and hot water.
• Gas lines should not be use in the shelters.
• Safe shelter should be pressurized to prevent possible contamination.
• The equipments of HVAC should be withstood against of weapons such as
pressure, shock wave, vibration and debris.
• Smoke, dust should not penetrate into the shelter.
• In case of power failure, Fresh air / ventilation equipment should be worked with
manpower.
For more details of HVAC design, please refer to chapter 2/4.3
Page 1
1.10. BEE
This specification is especially for electrical design in blast buildings. So the other
requirements shall be considered based on general standard.
1.1.43. General
• It is recommended to use positive pressurized HVAC system in technical room

for avoiding dust entering to it.
1.1.44. Lighting
• A reliable lighting system will help calm shelter occupants during a disaster.
Failing to provide proper illumination in a shelter may make it difficult for shelter
owners/operators to minimize the agitation and stress of the shelter occupants
during the event.
• All lighting fixtures in bunker rooms, escape route shall be supplied from battery
backup system.
• Vital lighting shall be supplied by individual UPS system installed inside building
and designed for min 8 hour without supplying normal power
• One torch per 10 persons with extra battery shall be provided.

1.1.45. Building Distribution Boards
• If possible, one feeder shall be designed in panel for supplying building by

portable diesel.
1.1.46. Fire Alarm
• Fire detection devices shall be installed to detect hazardous conditions resulting

from fire and to initiate appropriate alarms and actions in bunker building.
detailed in Fire and Gas Causes and Effects Charts during design stage of the
project.
• Fire alarm panel shall be supplied from emergency power.
• Fire resistant cable shall be used between fire alarm panel and
detectors/sounder/manual call point.
1.1.47. Public Address and General Alarm System
• A public address system was installed in the building so that voice messages
could be broadcast throughout the building to notify people at any location of an
emergency
• In order to warning people in danger time, paging system shall be designed.
• PA/GA panel shall be supplied from emergency power.

1.1.48. Telephone System
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• A means of communication other than a landline telephone is recommended for

all shelters. Blasts and the other dangerous event are likely to cause a disruption
in telephone service. At least one means of backup communication should be
stored in or brought to the shelter. This could be considered emergency radio,
cellular telephone, satellite telephone, citizens band radio, or emergency radio
capable of reaching police, fire or other emergency service. If cellular telephones
are relied upon for communications, the owners/operators of the shelter should
install a signal amplifier to send/receive cellular signals from within the shelter. It
should be noted that cellular systems may be completely saturated in the hours
immediately after an event if regular telephone service has been interrupted. The
shelter should also contain either a battery-powered radio transmitter or a signal-
emitting device that can be used to signal the location of the shelter to local
emergency personnel should occupants in the shelter become trapped by debris
blocking the shelter access door. The shelter owner/operator is also encouraged
to inform police, fire and rescue organizations of the shelter location before an
event occurs. These recommendations apply to both above and underground
shelters.
1.1.49. Installation Requirements
• Cable entries to blast resistance structure must be protected by MCT (Multi

Cable Transit). It suitable for routing one/more cables with a seal made up of
one/more separated elastomeric modules which are compressed together when
device is assembled and mounted. MCT applications should be defined by
environmental performance requirements. It shall be provided protection against
blast load.
• Where conduit/tray cross expansion joint, flexible conduit/devices shall be

considered for connecting them.
• In case of using pendant type, suitable support shall be considered to provide

protection against blast load.
• If possible, generator shall be installed inside building and located in safe area
with separated space inaccessible to public.
• Emergency system shall be designed for 8~24 hour.
• Fire and gas detection devices shall be installed throughout the plant to detect
hazardous Conditions resulting from gas leakage or fire and to initiate
appropriate alarms and actions.
detailed in Fire and Gas Causes and Effects Charts during the detailed design
stage of the project
• Toxic gas detector shall be installed at air intakes to building and fresh Air Inlets
of all HVAC building When detector active by toxic gas detector,
8.8.8. Emergency system
• As HVAC design specially essential in bunker building so, electrical emergency

system shall be designed for supplying mentioned system
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• Consideration of generator with sufficient fuel inside building for duration of used
bunker is essential.
• Backup power source for lighting is essential during a disaster because the main
power source is often disrupted.
• A battery-powered system (UPS) is recommended as the backup source

because it can be located and fully protected, within the building. Flashlights
stored in cabinets are useful as secondary lighting provisions, but should not be
used as the primary backup lighting system.
• If the backup power supply system for the lighting system is not contained within
the building, it should be protected with a structure designed to the same criteria
as the shelter itself
7. Safe Room
Whether the independent bunker is not propounded in project planning, safe room could
be used in main buildings. Safe room is a room in a building which is equipped to be
used as a bunker in hazardous situations.
Following requirements are requested for this room although other related requirements
of bunker (mentioned above) should be met too.
1.11. ARE
• The room which will be chosen as safe room should be analyzed for
♦ If internal access ways are the shortest to access for all residents,
♦ If it could have independent structure,
♦ If its location is proper by service areas,
♦ If Minimum needed area could be supported by the room.
Conference rooms in basement and underground floors are two best choices in this
regard.
• Debris of main building shall not blocked the exit way,

• Elevators shaft closed to the safe room could be used as emergency exit with adding
a wall opening in each level,
• Sanitary service and drinkable water source should be usable for the safe room. It
could be considered adding or equipping in emergency situation.
• Ventilation system is better to design independent from main building
Some examples of safe room:

United state- (335 ‫ ﺹ‬،1390 ،‫)ﻫﺎﺷﻣﯽ‬
Page 1
1.12. BSE
1.1.1. Safe Room Configuration

Structural system of safe room shall be completely isolated from main building.
Since there is no need to design main building as a blast resistant structure, attaching
the safe room to main building will result in extending explosion damages and collapses
in main building into the safe room.
1.1.2. Doors
All the exit doors shall conform to Category I of ASCE. High-Range level of blast
pressure shall be considered for this category.
1.1.3. Design Load
Since the safe room shall be design to resist the effects of an attack with conventional
weapons too, the magnitude of loads shall be calculated based on chapter 2 clause
3.2.3. But the load shall be distributed over the structure based on chapter one clause
3.2.10.
1.1.5. Material
1.13. BMS
1.1.6. CBR Threat Protection
A CBR safe room protects its occupants from contaminated air outside it by providing
clean, breathable air in two ways:
a) Unventilated Safe Room
By trapping air inside the room and minimizing the air exchange.
Unventilated safe rooms that are tightly sealed cannot be occupied for long periods
without the risk of high carbon dioxide levels.
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Obtaining protection from an unventilated safe room can be as simple as selecting a

relatively tight room, entering it, and closing the door. This procedure is commonly
referred to as expedient sheltering in-place. In this simple form, a safe room protects its
occupants by retaining a volume of clean air and minimizing the infiltration of
contaminated outdoor air. In practice, however, a safe room is not perfectly tight. The
natural forces of wind and buoyancy act on small, distributed leakage paths to exchange
air between the inside and outside.
As contaminated air infiltrates a safe room, the level of protection to the occupants
diminishes with time. With infiltration in a sustained exposure, the concentration of toxic
vapor, gas, or aerosol in the safe room may actually exceed the concentration outdoors
because the sealed safe room tends to retain the airborne contaminants when they
infiltrate. Once contaminants have entered, they are released slowly after the outdoor
hazard has passed.
To minimize the hazard of this retention, an unventilated safe room requires two actions
to achieve protection:
• The first is to tighten the safe room, to reduce the indoor outdoor air exchange rate,
before the hazardous plume arrives. This is done by closing doors and windows and
turning off fans, air conditioners, and combustion heaters.
• The second is to aerate, to increase the indoor-outdoor air exchange rate as soon as
the plume has passed. This is done by opening doors and windows and turning on all
fans and/or exiting the building into clean outdoor air.
b)Ventilated Safe Room
By passing contaminated air through a filter to purify it as it is supplied to the room
Ventilated safe rooms can be occupied for long periods without the risk of high carbon
dioxide levels.
Ventilated safe rooms can therefore be used on a routine basis, although most are
designed as standby systems, not for continuous, routine use.
The protection a safe room provides can be increased substantially by adding high-
efficiency air filtration. Filtration is employed in two different ways to remove contaminants
from the air as it enters the safe room or to remove contaminants as air is circulated
within the room.
1.1.7. Safe Room Classification
 Class 3 Safe Room

This class has no air-filtering capability and is unventilated. It is a basic safe room that
derives protection only by retained clean air within its tight enclosure. Use of the Class
3 Safe Room is commonly referred to as sheltering-in-place.
A Class 2 Safe Room may be ventilated or unventilated.
This class also includes air filtration, but with little or no internal pressure. Without
positive pressure, the safe room does not prevent the infiltration of contaminated air.
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In an unventilated Class 2 Safe Room, air is drawn from inside the safe room, filtered,
and discharged inside it.
In a ventilated Class 2 Safe Room, air is drawn from outside but at a flow rate too
small to create a measurable differential pressure.
The Class 1 Safe Room, which involves a more complex application of a filter unit,
In a Class 1 Safe Room, air is drawn from outside the room, filtered, and discharged
inside the room at a rate sufficient to produce an internal pressure. The safe room is
thus ventilated with filtered air, eliminating the constraints related to carbon dioxide
accumulation. The internal pressure produced with filtered air prevents infiltration of
outside air through leakage paths.
Table 3-1: Comparison of the Three General Classes of Toxic-agent Safe Rooms
Class Protection Cost Advantages and Limitations
Class 1
Protection has no time limits, but it provides no
Ventilated and High High protection against some toxic chemicals of high
pressurized with vapor pressure.
filtered air
Class 2
Unventilated Class 2 is protective against all gases,
Filtration with little Medium Medium but protection diminishes with duration of exposure
or no (And against non-filterable gases).
pressurization
Class 3 Protective against all agents, but protection

Low Low diminishes with time of exposure. Carbon dioxide
Unventilated, No
buildup may limit time in the shelter.
filtration
1.1.8. How Air Filtration Affects Protection
To protect against the many gases, vapors, and aerosols that could be released in an
accident or terrorist act requires three different filtering processes.
• Mechanical filtration is most commonly used for aerosols;
• Physical adsorption, for chemical agents of low vapor pressure;
• Chemisorptions, for chemical agents of high vapor pressure.
These three processes can be provided by a combination of two types of filters: the
HEPA filter to remove aerosols and a high-efficiency gas absorber with impregnated
carbon to remove vapors and gases. A filter system for a safe room must contain at least
one HEPA and one gas absorber in series, with the HEPA normally placed first in the
flow stream.
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HEPA adequately removes all toxic aerosols, including sub-micron size biological
agents. A gas absorber works for most, but not all gases/vapors. Several of the common
industrial gases, such as ammonia, are not removed by the best broad-spectrum
impregnated carbon available.
To protect against highly toxic chemicals, a Class 1 system requires ultra high-efficiency
filtration, at least 99.999 percent removal in a single pass. HEPA filters, which are
defined as having at least 99.97 percent efficiency against the most penetrating particle
size (about 0.3 micron), have efficiencies greater than 99.999 percent against aerosols
of 1- to 10-micron size, the most likely size range for biological-agent aerosols.
With a filtration system drawing outside air, the level of protection the safe room provides
is a function of the filter efficiency.
With an unventilated Class 2 system, the level of protection is not affected as greatly by
changes in filter efficiency. For example, increasing filter efficiency from 99 percent to
99.999 percent in an unventilated Class 2 system improves the protection factor by
about 1 percent. The same change in a Class 1 system yields a protection factor 1,000
times higher.
1.1.9. Safe Room Criteria
1) HVAC System
The safe room must be isolated or capable of being isolated quickly from the HVAC
system of the building.
If the selected room is served by supply and return ducts, modifications or
preparations must include a means of temporarily closing the ducts to the safe room.
In the simplest form, this involves placing duct tape or contact paper over the supply,
return, and exhaust grilles and turning off fans and air handling units. If there is a
window-type or through-the-wall air conditioner in the selected room, plastic sheeting
and tape must be available to place over the inside of the window and/or air
conditioner, which must be turned off when sheltering in the safe room.
1) Ventilation
For Class 1 Safe Rooms, 15cfm per person is the desired ventilation rate; however,
the minimum ventilation rate is 5cfm per person if that rate is adequate for
pressurization. Class 3 and unventilated Class 2 Safe Rooms are suitable only for
short-duration use, not only because the low Ventilation rate when occupied can
cause carbon dioxide levels to rise, but also because protection diminishes as the
time of exposure to the hazard increases.
1) Water and Toilets

Drinking water and a toilet(s) should be available to occupants of a safe room. This
may involve the use of canned/bottled water and portable toilets. Toilet fixture
allowance is presented in FEMA 361.
1) Preparing for Rapidly Sealing the Room

The selected safe room may have one or all of the following intentional openings,
which are necessary for normal operation. The openings must be sealed so that the
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safe room can be used in a toxic-materials emergency unless the HVAC system for
the safe room is designed to safely operate in the protective mode (as described
below).
• Supply and return ducts
• Exhaust fan
• Door louvers
• Window-type air conditioner or unit ventilator
• Door undercut
It is neither practical nor advisable to seal these openings beforehand if the room is
one that has normal day-to-day use, in which case plans and preparations should be
made for sealing them temporarily during rapid transition to the protective mode. The
sealing capability can be either permanent or expedient.
1.1.10. Design and Installation of a Toxic agent Safe Room
Design details for the three classes of safe rooms are presented below.
1) Class 3 Safe Room
 Preparing for Deactivation of Fans

Some safe room systems have been designed with the capability to automatically
deactivate all fans in the building with a single switch. This single switch control can
also be designed to close dampers in outside-air ducts serving the safe room. This
includes air-handling units, exhaust fans, supply fans, window air conditioners, and
combustion heaters.
 Accommodating Air Conditioning and Heating

Conventional air conditioning and heating systems must not be operated in the
protective mode because the fans directly or indirectly introduce outside air. This
includes the air-handling units and fans serving spaces outside the safe room. An
exception is combustion heaters of hydronic systems that are located in separately
ventilated mechanical rooms.
In extreme weather conditions, however, confining people in a sealed room without air
conditioning or heating can result in intolerable conditions, causing people to exit the
safe room before it is safe to do so.
The mechanical ventilation system often has a higher potential for indoor-outdoor air
exchange than the leakage paths of the enclosure subjected to wind and buoyancy
pressures. Window type air conditioners and unit ventilators cannot be used in the
protective mode, because they introduce outdoor air, even when
Set to the recirculation mode. The dampers for outside air in such units seal poorly
even when well maintained.
 Ductless Mini Split-Type Air-Conditioner

This type of room air conditioner, an alternative to the standard unitary window air
conditioner, circulates air across the indoor coils without ducts and does not introduce
outdoor air in either the normal or protective mode. The only required penetration
Page 1
through the safe room boundary wall is for a conduit for refrigerant tubing, suction
tubing, condensate drain, and power cable.
 Fully Enclosed Air-Handling Unit

An air-handling unit can be operated in a safe room in the protective mode only if the
unit and its ducts are fully within the safe room (i.e., the unit is in an interior mechanical
closet and the return ducts are not above the ceiling, beneath the floor, or outside the
walls). If the air-handling unit draws outdoor air through a duct, it must also have a
damper system for reliably cutting off outside air in the protective mode. This may
require a set of three dampers: two dampers in the outside air duct with a relief damper
between them that opens (to protected space) when the other two close. The air-
handling unit must serve the safe room exclusively.
 Makeup Air Unit

This is a once-through type unit for introducing fresh air; it is not applicable to an
unventilated safe room. The makeup-air unit does not recalculate air through ducts; it
supplies filtered air through duct coils for cooling and heating.

The ventilated Class 2 Safe Room is one that supplies filtered air from outside the safe
room, but has inadequate air flow to pressurize the room.
For the unventilated Class 2 Safe Room, the improvement in protection over the Class 3
Safe Room is determined by the flow rate and the efficiency of the particulate filter for
aerosols and the efficiency of the adsorber for gases and vapors. These filter units,
commonly referred to as indoor air purifiers, indoor air cleaners, or indoor air quality
units, recalculate air within the safe room. There are four configurations:
• Free-standing table top unit
• Free-standing floor unit
• Ceiling-mounted unit
• Duct-mounted unit (with ducts completely inside the safe room)
 Filter Unit Requirements for the Unventilated Class 2 Safe Room

The protection provided by an unventilated Class 2 Safe Room is determined by the
clean-air delivery rate of the filter unit and the tightness of the enclosure.
The clean-air delivery rate is a product of the filter removal efficiency (expressed as a
decimal fraction) and the actual flow rate of the filter unit. If a high-efficiency filter unit
is used, the clean-air delivery rate approaches the actual flow rate of the unit. If the
filter has a single-pass efficiency of 50 percent, for example, the clean-air delivery
rate is half the actual flow rate.
The following are criteria for selection of recirculating filter units for use in safe
rooms:
• The filter unit must have both an adsorber containing activated carbon and a
particulate filter.
Page 1
• The adsorber must have at least 1 pound of activated carbon for each 20cfm of
flow rate. For example, a 200-cfm unit requires at least 10 pounds of carbon
adsorbent.
• The particulate filter must have an efficiency of at least 99 percent against 1-micron
particles.
• The unit(s) must provide a total clean-air delivery rate of at least 1 cfm per square
foot of floor area.
• The adsorber must have the capability for chemisorptions (i.e., for removal of
gases that are not removed by physical adsorption).
There are also ventilated Class 2 Safe Rooms and essentially these are ones for
which the filter unit has inadequate capacity to produce a measurable overpressure
with the size of the selected safe room.
Generally, if a filter unit capacity in cfm is less than one-fourth the area (in square
feet) of the selected safe room, depending on the type of construction, it will not
produce a measurable overpressure.

Pressurization requires introducing air from outside the protective enclosure; therefore,
the removal efficiency of the filters is more critical in determining the protection provided.
The system must employ ultra-high efficiency filters, and it must allow no air to bypass
the filter as it is forced into the safe room.
Except for military standards, there are no performance standards specifically for ultra-
high efficiency absorbers intended for protection of people from highly toxic chemicals.
Performance of HEPA filters for aerosols is defined by ASME AG-1, Code on Nuclear Air
and Gas Treatment, and N509, Nuclear Power Plant Air-Cleaning Units and Components. The
specifications for filter units available commercially may present information that only
partially defines the performance of an absorber.
 Selecting a Filter Unit for a Class 1 Safe Room

Generally, filter units shall be designed to standards that ensure protection against
highly toxic chemical, biological, and radiological materials.
Minimum requirements for the Class 1 applications are listed below. In purchasing a
filter unit, certifications relative to the following requirements should be provided by
the vendor:
• The filter unit must have both a HEPA filter and an ultra-high efficiency gas
adsorber in series.
• The adsorber must contain carbon impregnated ASZM-TEDA or the equivalent.
Carbon mesh size should be 12x30 or 8x16.
• The adsorber must have efficiency of at least 99.999 percent for physically
adsorbed chemical agents and 99.9 percent for chemisorbed agents.
• The adsorber must have a total capacity of 300,000 milligram (mg)-minutes per
cubic meter for physically adsorbed chemical agents.
Page 1
• Bypass at the seals between the adsorber and its housing must not exceed 0.1
percent.
• For installation of the filter unit outside the safe room, the fan must be upstream of
the filters (blow-through configuration).For installation inside with a duct from the
wall to the filter unit; the fan must be downstream of the filters (draw-through
configuration).
• If a flexible duct is used outside the shelter to convey air from the filter unit to the
safe room, it must be made of a material resistant to the penetration of toxic
chemicals.
• If chemical manufacturing and storage facilities in the community present a special
risk for release of toxic materials, special sorbents or sorbent layers may be
required. In some cases, the chemicals produced/stored may not be filterable with
a broad-spectrum impregnated carbon. For example, a nearby ammonia plant
requires a special absorber for protection against ammonia.
 Sizing the Filter Unit for Pressurization

Filter unit(s) must be sized to provide makeup air at a flow rate sufficient to produce
a pressure of at least 0.1 inch water gauge (iwg) in the shelter for protected zones of
one or two stories. Taller buildings require an internal pressure higher than 0.1 iwg to
overcome the buoyancy pressures that result in extreme weather conditions (i.e.,
large temperature differences between the inside and outside of the safe room).
For safe rooms of frame construction and standard ceiling height, most can be
pressurized to 0.1 inwg with airflow in the range of 0.5 to 1cfm per square foot.
Table 3-2 provides additional guidance in estimating the size of a filter unit for a safe
room based on square footage. The recommended procedure for ensuring that
pressurization can be achieved is to perform a blower door test after all permanent
sealing measures have been completed. The test should be conducted per ASTM
E779-03, (Standard Test Method for Determining Air Leakage by Fan Pressurization)
with temporary sealing measures in place.
Table: Leakage per Square Foot for 0.1 Iwg (estimated makeup airflow rate per
square foot (floor area) to achieve an overpressure of 0.1 inch water gauge)
CFM Per Square

Construction Type
Foot of Floor Area
Very tight: 26 -inch thick concrete walls and roof with no windows 0.04
Tight: 12 -inch thick concrete or block walls and roof with tight
0.20
windows and multiple, sealed penetrations
Typical: 12 -inch thick concrete or block walls with gypsum wall
board ceilings or composition roof and multiple, sealed 0.50
penetrations
Loose: Wood-frame construction without special sealing measures 1.00
Page 1
 Heating and Cooling the Safe Room

A safe room does not require heating and cooling; however, in extreme weather, the
conditions in the safe room may become uncomfortable due to the lack of ventilation
or the introduction of outdoor air that is not tempered. In hot weather, this can be
worsened by the temperature rise that occurs as air passes through the filter unit.
Because of the relatively high pressure drop across the high efficiency filters, the
temperature of the air typically increases by 5 to 10 degrees Fahrenheit as it passes
through the filter unit. The use of inefficient fans, such as brush-type high-speed
fans, should be avoided for this reason, because a temperature rise of 15 degrees
can result.
 Control System
An interlocking system should be considered for closing automatic dampers turning
off air-handling units, exhaust fans, and ventilation fans serving the building's
unprotected spaces while the safe room is in the protective mode. This increases the
level of protection the safe room provides against an outdoor release of agent.
 Heating System Safety

If a fuel-fired indirect heater (i.e., heat exchanger) is used to heat the safe room, a
carbon monoxide detector with a visual display and an audible alarm should be
installed in the safe room. Electric coil and hot water coil systems do not require a
carbon monoxide detector.
 Pressure Gauge
For Class 1 Safe Rooms, the pressure gauge is the indicator that the system is
operating properly. This gauge displays the pressure in the safe room relative to
outdoors or outside the safe room indoors. If the reference pressure is measured
indoors, the readings can be subject to variations caused by fan pressures unless
other building heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) fans are turned off
when the safe room is in use. Reading the reference pressure outdoors can be
subject to positive and negative variations caused by air flows over and around the
building. If the pressure sensor is outdoors, it should be shielded from the wind.
Indoors is the best location if the building HVAC fans are turned off when the safe
room is in use.
1.1.11. Operations and Maintenance
For a shelter to be successful, it is critical to have an understanding and dedication to
operations and maintenance. Depending on the shelter type, specific operations
instructions and` maintenance are needed.
 Instructions and Checklists

As a minimum for operating procedures, the condensed operatinand maintenance
instructions should be posted in each safe room. The operating instructions should
explain the steps of placing the safe room into operation and may be as simple as
a one-page typed checklist; instructions that should be included are safe room
operating procedures, a list of doors to be secured, a list of switches for fans to be
Page 1
turned off, stations/channels for emergency instructions, emergency phone

numbers, and dates by which filters should be changed, if applicable.
 Status Indicators
For safe rooms that require multiple automatic dampers to isolate the safe room
from the HVAC ducts in the protective mode, status lights and/or visual indicators
should be used to show the position of each damper. Indicators can also be used
to show door position, if there are multiple boundary doors in the safe room. Each
status light should be marked with a reference number corresponding to a diagram
so an operator can easily determine the location of any damper/door and conduct
troubleshooting if problems occur. The indicator lights should have push-to-test
capability for the light bulbs of the status lights.
 Public-Address System
For safe rooms in large buildings, a public address system is the most efficient
means of instructing building occupants to proceed to a safe room in an
emergency. Telephone or audible alarm systems can also be used, but they are
less efficient than a broadcast voice system. Communications systems telephone,
alarm, and mass notification systems) should be tied to emergency phone systems.
Non-verbal warning systems are generally less effective because they require
training on the meaning of different types of alarm sounds.
 Auxiliary or Battery Power

Class 3 Safe Rooms do not require electrical power to protect their occupants.
Class 1 and Class 2 Safe Rooms require power for the air-filtration units to protect
at a higher level than Class 3. If power is lost in a Class 1 or Class 2 Safe Room, it
will continue to protect at the level of a Class 3 Safe Room as long as the room
remains sealed. Power failure, therefore, does not lead to protective failure, but
rather a reduced level of protection and reduced level of comfort in some
conditions. For this reason, auxiliary power is not essential for a CBR safe room.
Auxiliary power is provided on some CBR safe rooms so that the highest level of
protection and comfortable conditions can be maintained if a power loss is caused
by or coincides with the event causing the release of toxic agent.
a) Maintenance for a Class 3 Safe Room

The Class 3 Safe Room has no air filtration equipment and, therefore, requires little
or no routine maintenance. It has no mechanical equipment unless there are
dampers for isolating the air conditioner (configured for fail-safe operation).
Maintenance requirements are limited to periodically checking supplies for
deterioration or loss: duct tape, plastic sheeting, radio spare batteries, flashlight
spare batteries, drinking water, and first aid kit.
b) Maintenance for a Class 2 Safe Room

The filter unit used in a Class 2 safe room is an indoor air quality filter unit (see
Figure 3-3) and, as such, it can be used routinely to improve the air quality in the
spaces in or around the designated safe room. If this is done, a spare filter set, both
Page 1
absorber and HEPA filter, should be stored in a sealed bag in the safe room along
with instructions and any tools needed for changing the filter quickly in an
emergency. Other supplies to be checked on a regular basis are the same as listed
for the Class 3 Safe Room above.
c) Maintenance for a Class 1 Safe Room

Maintenance of the Class 1 Safe Room consists primarily of serviceability checks
and replacing filters. Serviceability checks should be performed about every 2
months by turning the system on and checking for the following while it is operating:
 System Pressure
The system pressure is indicated by a gauge typically mounted on the control
panel, with the correct operating range marked on the gauge. If the pressure is
outside this range while the system operates, troubleshooting should be initiated.
 Isolation Dampers
Correct damper positioning is indicated by damper status lights on the control
panel. Troubleshooting should be initiated if the status lights indicate a damper is
not properly positioned.
It should be visually inspected while the system is operating. A properly functioning
relief damper should be open when the safe room is pressurized, and it should
close immediately when a door is opened into the safe room, releasing pressure.
 HEPA filter Resistance

The differential pressure across the HEPA filter is measured by a gauge mounted
on the filter unit with taps on either side of the HEPA filter. If the pressure across
the filter is greater than specified (approximately 3 iwg or higher), it is an indication
that the HEPA filter has become loaded with dust and its higher resistance is
reducing the flow rate of the filter unit. If such is the case, the HEPA filter should be
changed.
 Cooling System
If the safe room supply air is cooled and heated, the temperature of the air flowing
from the supply register should be checked with a thermometer during
serviceability checks. In warm weather, this should be approximately 55 degrees if
the cooling system is operating properly.
Door Latches. All doors into the safe room should be adjusted to latch
automatically with the force of the door closer. For safe rooms with multiple doors,
leakage past unlatched doors can cause internal pressure to fall below the
specified operating range.
 Weather Stripping
Page 1
The weather stripping on each door on the boundary of the safe room should be
visually inspected to ensure it has not been removed or damaged through wear
and tear. For wipe seals at the bottom of the door, the alignment and height of the
seal above the floor should be inspected and adjusted as necessary.
 Filters
Routine maintenance includes replacing filters. If a canister-type filter is used, it is
replaced as a unit at its expiration date. For other types of filter units, three types of
filters are replaced: the pre-filter, HEPA filter, and carbon absorber. Ideally, with
only intermittent operation, all three types of filters should be replaced at the same
time, every 3 to 4 years. This period is defined mainly by the service life of the
absorber.
Each time the CBR filters are replaced, in-place leakage testing should be
performed, except in the case of canister filters (see Figure 3-4), to ensure the
critical seals between the filters and/or between the mounting frame and the filters
are established properly (i.e., there is no leakage past the filters' peripheral seals).
To test the seals of the HEPA filter, the unit is challenged with an aerosol; poly-
alpha olefin (PAO) is the industry standard. To test the seals of the absorbers
requires a chemical that is loosely adsorbed in the filter bed. Halide gases are
typically used for this purpose. For the adsorber, the criterion is that the leak must
be less than 0.1 percent of the upstream concentration. For the HEPA filter, the
criterion is 0.03 percent. Procedures for both tests are described in American
National Standards Institute/American Society of Mechanical Engineers
(ANSI/ASME) N510, Testing of Nuclear Air Treatment Systems.
1.14. BEE
Page 1
V. Reference
Below table is the list of documents which are applied for preparation of the Document.
Related Department Remark

Document title
ARE BMS BSE BEE
International Electro technical commission

1 X
(IEC)
2 Deutche Institute fur Normmung e.v. (DIN) X
Verband Deutscher Electrotechniker e.v.

3 X
(VDE)
5 British Standard (BS) X
6 National Electrical Code (NEC) X
7 National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) X
Gunter G.seip,Electrical Installation Hand

8 nook (SIEMENS)
X
O.Dusenberry, Donald. (2010).Handbook for

9 Blast-Resistant Design of Buildings. New X X
Jersey: John Wiley & Sons
10 ASHRAE Handbook HVAC Applications X X
FEMA 435. (2006). Design guidance for

11 shelter and safe rooms.USA
X X X
FEMA 426. (2006). Reference manual to
12 mitigate potential terrorist attacks against X X X
building. USA
Finland Government Standards,
-Government Decree on Civil Defense
Shelters (408/2011)
-Government Decree on the Equipment and
Supplies in Civil Defense Shelters
13 (409/2011) X X X
-Ministry of the Interior Decree
on the Technical Requirements for Civil
Defense Shelters and the
Maintenance of the Equipment in Civil
Defense Shelters (506/2011)
American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE).
(2010). Design of Blast Resistant Buildings
14 in Petrochemical Facilities. Virginia: X X
Alexander Bell Drive.
Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC). (2002).

15 (UFC 3-340-02) Structures to resist the X
effects of accidental explosions.
Page 1
Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC). (2011).

X
(UFC 3-101-01) Architecture.
American Society Of Civil Engineering

(ASCE). (1962).Manuals and reports on
16 engineering practice-No42 "Design of X
Structures to Resist Nuclear Weapons
Effects"
Manufacturing chemists Association. (1978).
Safety Guide Sg-22; Sitting and
17 Construction of new Control Houses for X
chemical Manufacturing Plant
American concrete Institute (ACI) Committee
18 370. (2014).Report For The Design Of X
Concrete Structures For Blast Effects.
Iranian Petroleum Standards (IPS).
20 (2010).Engineering Standard for Loads X
(IPS-E-CE-500)
National Petrochemical Company
21 Standards. (1993). (NPCS-ES-ST-04) X
Structural Standard
American Petroleum Institute (API) 752 .
(2009). Management of Hazards
24 Associated with Location of Process Plant X
Permanent Building. Washington: API
Services.
Edited by Mays,G.C. - Smith,P.D .(2003).
Blast effects on Building: Design of Building
25 to optimize Resistance to Blast
X
Loading.USA: Thomas Telford
Impact, Fragmentation and blast (vessels,
27 pipes,…)
Response on Geologic Materials to Blast

28 Loading and Impact
Shell company. (1990). Technical

specification Reinforced control
building/field auxiliary rooms DEP
34.17.10.30-Gen
X
‫ ﺑﺎﺭﻫﺎی ﻭﺍﺭﺩ ﺑﺭ‬.(1392).‫ﺩﻓﺗﺭ ﻣﻘﺭﺭﺍﺕ ﻣﻠﯽ ﺳﺎﺧﺗﻣﺎﻥ‬
‫ﻧﺷﺭ‬:‫ ﺍﻳﺭﺍﻥ‬.(‫ﺳﺎﺧﺗﻣﺎﻥ ) ﻣﺑﺣﺙ ﺷﺷﻡ ﻣﻘﺭﺭﺍﺕ ﻣﻠﯽ ﺳﺎﺧﺗﻣﺎﻥ‬ X
‫ﺗﻭﺳﻌﻪ ﺍﻳﺭﺍﻥ‬
)‫ ﭘﺩﺍﻓﻧﺩ ﻏﻳﺭ ﻋﺎﻣﻝ‬.(1391).‫ﺩﻓﺗﺭ ﻣﻘﺭﺭﺍﺕ ﻣﻠﯽ ﺳﺎﺧﺗﻣﺎﻥ‬
‫ ﻧﺷﺭ‬:‫ ﺍﻳﺭﺍﻥ‬.(‫ﻣﺑﺣﺙ ﺑﻳﺳﺕ ﻭ ﻳﮑﻡ ﻣﻘﺭﺭﺍﺕ ﻣﻠﯽ ﺳﺎﺧﺗﻣﺎﻥ‬ X X X
‫ﺗﻭﺳﻌﻪ ﺍﻳﺭﺍﻥ‬
‫ ﺩﻓﺎﻉ ﻏﻳﺭﻋﺎﻣﻝ ﺍﺯ ﺩﻳﺩﮔﺎﻩ‬.(1388) .‫ ﻣﺣﺳﻥ‬،‫ﺭﺩﺭﻭ‬

X
‫ ﺭﻣﺯ‬:‫ ﺍﻳﺭﺍﻥ‬. ‫ﺍﻧﺳﺎﻧﺷﻧﺎﺳﯽ ﻓﺭﻫﻧﮕﯽ‬
.(1390) .‫ ﻣﺣﺳﻥ‬،‫ ﺳﻳﺩ ﺟﻭﺍﺩ – ﻗﺭﺍﺑﺎﻏﯽ‬،‫ﻫﺎﺷﻣﯽ ﻓﺷﺎﺭﮐﯽ‬

: ‫ﺍﻳﺭﺍﻥ‬. ‫ﻣﺑﺎﻧﯽ ﻁﺭﺍﺣﯽ ﻭ ﺳﺎﺧﺕ ﻓﺿﺎﻫﺎی ﺍﻣﻥ ﭘﻧﺎﻫﮕﺎﻫﯽ‬ X
‫ﻧﺟﻣﻪ ﺳﺎﺯﺍﻥ‬
Latest Available
Code & Standard Code or Standard Title
Version
Page 1
IEC-60228 Conductors of insulated cables 1978

IEC-60364-4-44 Electrical installations of buildings 2006
IEC-60617 Graphical symboles for diagram 1996
Conduits for electrical purposes outside

IEC-60423 diameters of conduits for electrical installations 1993
and for threads for conduits and fittings
Protection against lightning electromagneti

IEC-61312-1 2000
impulse
IEC-61024-1 Protection of structures against lighting 1998
Extra-heavy duty rigid steel conduits for
IEC-60981 1989
electrical installations
IEC 60038 IEC standard voltages 2002
IEC 60044-1 Current transformer 1996
Plugs and socket-outlets for domestic and
IEC 60083 1997
similar general use
IEC 60127 Miniature fuses 2001
Plugs, socket-outlets and couplers for
IEC 60309 1999
industrial purposes
Low-voltage switchgear and controlgear
IEC 60439 2005
assemblies
Power cables with extruded insulation and
IEC 60502 their accessories for rated voltages from 1 kV 1998
(Um = 1,2 kV) up to 30 kV (Um = 36 kV)
Degrees of protection provided by enclosures
IEC 60529 2001
(JP Code)
IEC 60598 Luminaries 2002
IEC 60947 Low voltage switchgear and control gear 2002
IEC 61231 International lamp coding system 1999
IEC-60158-1 LOW-Voltage Controlgear 1985
Engineering Standard for Electrical System
IPS-E-EL100 2006
Design
Electrical installation in petroleum processing
API - 540 1999
plants
Standard for the installation of Lightning
NFPA-780 2004
protection system
NFC 17-102 Lightning protection 1995
BSI-6651 Protection of structures against lightning 1999
Specification for conduit system for electrical

BS EN 50086 1994
installations (Part1.General requirements)
Specification for conduit system for electrical

BS EN 50086-2-1 installations Part2.Particular requirements 1996
(Section 2.1 rigid conduit system)
Page 1
Outside diameters of conduits for electrical

BS EN 60423 installations and threads for conduits and 1995
fittings
BS 5266-1 The emergency lighting of premises 1999
Hot dip galvanized coatings on iron and steel
BS 729 1971
articles
BS 5372 Cable terminations for electrical equipment 1976
BS 8206 Lighting for buildings 1992
BS 7878 Materials used in communication cables 1997
Voltage characteristics of electricity supplied
BSEN 50160 2000
by public distribution systems
Insulating and sheathing materials for electric
BS EN 60811 2000
cable
IEEE 80 Guid Safety in AC Substation Grounding 2000
Guide for measuring earth resistively, ground
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impedance
IEEE 835 Standard power cable ampacity tables 1994
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Research · August 2015

Morteza Asgharpour Hassan Kiadeh

Senior Electrical Engineer View project

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

Buildings of hazard areas

III. Chapter 1: Blast Buildings

1.1. Objectives of hazard analysis

a) Personnel safety in occupied building:

b) Controlled shutdown (need to be available for Emergency Response):

c) Financial consideration (Cost of repair):

1.2. Hazard area

3. Blast resistant structure (Explosion and fire)

If it is not possible, "the decision regarding blast resistant requirements is made by

1.1.7. Sun protection

1.1.10. Types of Construction

1.1.1.1.Below Grade Pressure

1.1.1.2.Peak Reflected Pressure (Pr)

1.1.20. Mechanical Systems

1.1.21. Heating, Ventilating, and Air-Conditioning Systems

 Strategies for Reducing Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Vulnerability

 Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning System Configurations to Accommodate

 Details on designing HVAC systems for blast resistance:

1.1.22. Plumbing Systems

1.1.23. Equipment Specification

1.1.1.3. Ambient Conditions for Equipment

1.1.1.4. Impact Loading

1.1.1.5. Weld Joints

1.1.1.7. Tightness of the gastight equipment

1.1.1.8. Shut-off devices for civil defence shelter wall sleeves

1.1.1.9. Wall Sleeves

1.1.1.10. Air Intake Ducts

1.1.1.11. Relief valves

1.1.26. Supply Air Valves

1.1.27. Exhaust Air Valves

1.1.28. Sewer Shut-Off Valves

1.1.29. Toxic Material

• It is recommended to use positive pressurized HVAC system in technical room

• Inside buildings, essential lighting system shall be completely separated from

Vital lighting shall be of the self-contained type with included autonomous

• Installation of pendant lighting fixture shall be avoided.

• Fire detection devices shall be installed to detect hazardous conditions resulting

• Fire alarm panel shall be supplied from emergency power.

• In order to warning people in danger time, paging system shall be designed.

• PA/GA panel shall be supplied from emergency power.

• Telephone system shall be supplied from emergency power.

• Cable entries to blast resistance structure must be protected by MCT (Multi

• Where conduit/tray cross expansion joint, flexible conduit/devices shall be

• In case of using pendant type, suitable support shall be considered to provide

• If possible, generator shall be installed inside building and located in separated

IV. Chapter 2: Bunkers and Safe rooms

1- Independent bunker building,

And with following assumptions:

Min area of the bunker could be calculated:

Min height of bunker should be:

Following rooms should be considered in bunker:

(212 ‫ ﺹ‬،1390 ،‫)ﻫﺎﺷﻣﯽ‬

2- An opening reaches to a horizontal tunnel which is ended to a vertical

♦ Horizontal tunnel should be buried at Min. 50 cm soil,

(213 ‫ ﺹ‬،1390 ،‫)ﻫﺎﺷﻣﯽ‬

• Access requirements for the handicapped should be considered.

First aid: is a room with about 10% of total area,

It should be located immediate vicinity of the airlock room.

• Air Entrance channel: