1. US VS.

PANLILIO

The orders (rules and regulations) of an administrative officers or body issued pursuant to a
statute have the force of law but are not penal in nature and a violation of such orders is
not an offense punishable by law unless the statute expressly penalizes such violation.

FACTS:

The accused was convicted of violation of Act 1760 relating to the quarantining of animals
suffering from dangerous communicable or contagious diseases and sentencing him to pay
a fine of P40 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs of trial.
It is alleged that the accused illegally and without being authorized to do so, and while
quarantine against the said carabaos exposed to rinder pest was still in effect, permitted
and ordered said carabaos to be taken from the corral in which they were quarantined and
drove them from one place to another. The accused contends that the facts alleged in the
information and proved on the trial do not constitute a violation of Act No. 1760

ISSUE:

Whether accused can be penalized for violation of the order of the Bureau of Agriculture?

HELD:

NO. Nowhere in the law is the violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture
prohibited or made unlawful, nor is there provided any punishment for a violation of such
orders. Section 8 of Act No. 1760 provides that any person violating any of the provisions of
the Act shall, upon conviction, be punished. However, the only sections of the Act which
prohibit acts and pronounce them as unlawful are Sections 3, 4 and 5. This case does not fall
within any of them. A violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, as authorized by
paragraph, is not a violation of the provision of the Act. The orders of the Bureau of
Agriculture, while they may possibly be said to have the force of law, are statutes and
particularly not penal statutes, and a violation of such orders is not a penal offense unless
the statute itself somewhere makes a violation thereof unlawful and penalizes it. Nowhere
in Act No. 1760 is a violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture made a penal
offense, nor is such violation punished in any way therein. However, the accused did violate
Art. 581, ¶2 of the Penal Code which punishes any person who violates regulations or
ordinances with reference to epidemic disease among animals.
2. PEOPLE VS. MACEREN

Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department

must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of
carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, the law itself cannot be
extended. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.

FACTS:

The respondents were charged with violating Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1 which
penalizes electro fishing in fresh water fisheries. This was promulgated by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old
Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries Commission. The municipal court quashed
the complaint and held that the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, hence the
executive and judicial departments cannot consider the same. On appeal, the CFI affirmed
the dismissal. Hence, this appeal to the SC.

ISSUE:

Whether the administrative order penalizing electro fishing is valid?

HELD:

NO. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries
exceeded their authority in issuing the administrative order. The old Fisheries Law does not
expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are
powerless to penalize it. Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a
penal provision to that effect could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law. The
lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts
should constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition
of the penalty provided for in the law itself. Where the legislature has delegated to
executive or administrative officers and boards authority to promulgate rules to carry out
an express legislative purpose, the rules of administrative officers and boards, which have
the effect of extending, or which conflict with the authority granting statute, do not
represent a valid precise of the rule-making power.
3. VICTORIAS MILLING VS. SSS

When an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, it "makes" a new law
with the force and effect of a valid law, while when it renders an opinion or gives a
statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law.

FACTS:

The SSS issued Circular No. 22 which provides that, in computing the premiums due, all
employers will include in the employee’s remuneration all bonuses and overtime pay.
Victorias Milling Company protested the circular as being contradictory to its previous
Circular which expressly excluded overtime pay and bonus in the computation of premium
contributions. Victorias questioned its validity for lack of authority on the part of the SSS to
promulgate it without the approval of the President and for lack of publication in the OG.
SSS argues that Circular No. 22 is not a rule or regulation, but a mere administrative
interpretation in light of the amendments introduced by an amendatory law. Hence, there
is no need for approval of the President and publication in the OG to be effective.

ISSUE:

Whether Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation?

HELD:

NO, Circular No. 22 is an administrative interpretation. There is a distinction between an

administrative rule or regulation and an administrative interpretation of a law whose
enforcement is entrusted to an administrative body. When an administrative agency
promulgates rules and regulations, it "makes" a new law with the force and effect of a valid
law, while when it renders an opinion or gives a statement of policy, it merely interprets a
pre-existing law. Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or
authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law, partake of the nature of a
statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal sanction provided in the law.
A rule is binding on the courts so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is
followed and its scope is within the statutory authority granted by the legislature, On the
other hand, administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the
courts that finally determine what the law means. In this case, Circular No. 22 was issued by
the SSS, in view of the amendment of the provisions of the Social Security Law defining the
term “compensation.” While prior to the amendment, bonuses and overtime pay were
expressly exclude, such exemption was deleted by the amendatory law. Hence, it thus
became necessary for the SSS to interpret the effect of such deletion through Circular No.
22.
4. PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION, INC. VS. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, CULTURE
AND SPORTS

If the rates prescribed by an administrative agency is in the exercise of its quasi-legislative

powers, prior notice and hearing is not essential to the validity of its issuance.

FACTS:

The Task Force on Private Higher Education created by DECS submitted a report
recommending an increase in school fees. DECS took note of the report and issued an Order
authorizing a 15% to 20% increase as recommended. Petitioner sought for reconsideration
on the ground that the increases were too high. Thereafter, the Order was modified
reducing the increases to a lower ceiling of 10% to 15%. Petitioner still protested the
increases and filed a petition for prohibition, seeking to declare the questioned Department
Order unconstitutional for it was issued without any legal basis and for violation of the due
process clause for lack of due notice and hearing before issuance.

ISSUE:

Whether the Department Order is valid?

HELD:

YES. The power of the DECS, as granted by law, to regulate school fees include the power to
prescribe school fees. No other government agency has been vested with the authority to
fix school fees and as such, the power should be considered lodged with the DECS if it is to
properly and effectively discharge its functions and duties under the law. As to the issue of
due process, there is no such violation. The function of prescribing rates by an
administrative agency may be either a legislative or an adjudicative function. If it were a
legislative function, the grant of prior notice and hearing to the affected parties is not a
requirement of due process. As regards rates prescribed by an administrative agency in the
exercise of its quasi-judicial function, prior notice and hearing are essential to the validity of
such rates. When the rules and/or rates laid down by an administrative agency are meant to
apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the country, they may partake of a
legislative character. Where the rules and the rates imposed apply exclusively to a particular
party, based upon a finding of fact, then its function is quasi-judicial in character. In this
case, the Department Order prescribes the maximum school fees that may be charged by all
private schools in the country for the school year 1987 to 1988. Hence, it applies to all
enterprises of a given kind throughout the country and the issuance of the department
order is in the exercise of DEC’s quasi-legislative power. This being so, prior notice and
hearing is not essential to the validity of its issuance.
5. SUNVILLE vs. JUDGE ABAD

The application of the expertise of the administrative agency in the resolution of the issue
raised is a condition precedent for the eventual examination, if still necessary, of the same
question by a court of justice.

FACTS:

Sunville was granted a Timber License Agreement (TLA) authorizing it to exploit timber in
Lison Valley, Zamboanga del Sur. Respondents filed a petition with the DENR to annul the
said TLA due to some serious violations of its conditions and provisions of forestry laws,
carried out by petitioner. They likewise filed a complaint for injunction in the RTC, based on
the same causes of action. Sunville filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction of the
court and non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. The motion was denied by Judge
Abad of the RTC. The CA affirmed and held that the the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies was not without exception and pointed to the several instances
approved by this Court where it could be dispensed with. The respondent court found that
in the case before it, the applicable exception was the urgent need for judicial intervention
given the petitioner’s operations have caused heavy siltation in various rivers.

ISSUE:

Whether the respondents should first exhaust administrative remedies?

HELD:

YES. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the
appropriate administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their
jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review. One of the
reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers, which enjoins upon the
Judiciary a becoming policy of non-interference with matters coming primarily (albeit not
exclusively) within the competence of the other departments. As correctly suggested by the
respondent court, however, there are a number of instances when the doctrine may be
dispensed with and judicial action validly resorted to immediately. Among these exceptional
cases are: (1) when the question raised is purely legal; (2) when the administrative body is
in estoppel; (3) when the act complained of is patently illegal; (4) when there is urgent need
for judicial intervention; (5) when the claim involved is small; (6) when irreparable damage
will be suffered; (7) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (8) when
strong public interest is involved; (9) when the subject of the controversy is private land;
and 10) in quo warranto proceedings. In this case, the Forest Management Bureau of the
DENR should be allowed to rule in the first instance on this controversy coming under its
express powers before the courts of justice may intervene. The respondents have failed to
satisfactorily establish that the extraordinary circumstances to justify deviation from the
doctrine by exhaustion of administrative remedies and immediate resort to the courts. In
fact, Sunville has stopped its operations in compliance with the order of the DENR.
6. MORCOSO V. CA

As an exception to the general rule, administrative remedies need not be exhausted if the
agency has no longer jurisdiction.

FACTS:

Respondent Tirol filed a complaint against Morcoso for recovery of possession of a

fishpond situated in Ibajay, Aklan. She alleged that the said fishpond is part of the land she
inherited from her father and that she entered into a lease agreement with Morcoso
allowing him to lease a portion and develop it into a fishpond. Morcoso was later informed
by the BFAR that the land Tirol leased to him is within the area of alienable and disposable
public land, thus Morcoso applied for a fishpond permit. Morcoso refused to surrender
possession of the fishpond. Morcoso assailed the jurisdiction of the trial court because of a
pending administrative case before the BFAR regarding their conflicting claims. The trial
court ruled in favor of Tirol. CA affirmed said decision.

ISSUE:

Whether the trial court had jurisdiction over the case?

HELD:

YES. As an exception to the general rule, administrative remedies need not be exhausted if
the agency has no longer jurisdiction. The doctrine requiring prior exhaustion of
administrative remedies before recourse to courts is inapplicable because the fishpond in
dispute is private and not public land. The plaintiffs have sufficiently established that they
and their predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the land in question under
claim of ownership for a very long period of time. The fishpond not having been part of the
public domain, the trial court correctly adjudged Tirol as the rightful owner thereof.
7. NFA VS. CA

The doctrine of administrative remedies is inapplicable where there is urgency or

irreparable damage.

FACTS:

Earlier, the NFA conducted a public bidding to award security contracts for the protection of
its facilities. Among those awarded were the private respondents. When David became the
new Administrator of the NFA, he caused the review of all security contracts and created a
Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC). When the time of the bidding came,
some bids were disqualified for failure to comply with documentary requirements including
those of Respondents. Respondents Lanting Security and Watchman Agency filed
complaints with the RTC to restrain the Administrator from proceeding with the public
bidding. During the pendency of the writ of preliminary injunction, David terminated the
contracts of the security agencies and engaged the services of seven new agencies.
Respondents filed another complaint to restrain the NFA from terminating their services.
The lower court ruled in favor of Respondents. On appeal to the SC, the NFA contends that
respondents did not exhaust administrative remedies and hence, their complaint is
premature.

ISSUE:

Whether the Respondents should have first exhausted administrative remedies?

HELD:

NO. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to some limitations

and exceptions. In the case at bar, respondent’s contracts were terminated in the midst of
bidding preparations and their replacements hired barely five days after. An appeal to the
NFA Board or Council of Trustees and the Secretary of Agriculture as mandated by the
provisions of the Administrative Code was not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. The urgency of the situation which necessitated a recourse to the
courts is justified.
8. ESPIRITU vs. MELGAR AND JUDGE VIROLA

Absent any of the exceptions to the rule, the doctrine of administrative remedies cannot be
disregarded.

FACTS:

Mayor Melgar allegedly attacked one Ramir Garing and had him arrested and detained in
abuse of his position as Mayor in Oriental Mindoro. Ramir Garing filed a complaint and
asked that Provincial Governor Espiritu to be placed under preventive suspension. After
evaluating the complaint, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental Mindoro passed
Resolution No. 55 recommending that the Provincial Governor place the Mayor under
preventive suspension pending investigation of the administrative complaint. This was
based on reasonable grounds in the complaint corroborated by several witnesses. The
Provincial Governor concurred. Mayor Melgar resorted to the RTC to issue a TRO on the
Provincial Governor and alleged that the Provincial Governor committed GADLEJ. Judge
Virola granted the TRO. The Governor appealed to the SC, citing that the judge committed
GADLEJ in issuing the TRO.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether the Provincial Governor committed GADLEJ by placing the Mayor under
preventive suspension?

(2) Whether the Judge committed GADLEJ in issuing the TRO

HELD:

NO. There is nothing improper in suspending an officer before the charges against him are
heard and before he is given an opportunity to prove his innocence. Preventive suspension
is allowed so that the respondent may not hamper the normal course of the investigation
through the use of his influence and authority over possible witnesses. As a general rule,
the office or body that is invested with the power of removal or suspension should be the
sole judge of the necessity and sufficiency of the cause. The provincial governor of is
authorized by law to preventively suspend the municipal mayor at anytime after the issues
had been joined and any of the following grounds were shown to exist: (1) When there is
reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts
complained of; (2) When the evidence of culpability is strong; (3) When the gravity of the
offense so warrants; or (4) When the continuance in office of the respondent could
influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other
evidence.

(2) The regional trial court had no jurisdiction over the special civil action and gravely
abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss the case. If the Mayor thought that preventive
suspension was unjustified and politically motivated, he should have sought relief first from
the Secretary DILG and not from the courts. Mayor Melgar's direct recourse to the courts
without exhausting administrative remedies was premature,
9. INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES, INC VS. CA
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever
enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special
competence of an administrative body, in such case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative
body for its view.

FACTS:

Petitioner Industrial Enterprises Inc. (IEI) was granted a coal operating contract by the
Government through the Bureau of Energy Development (BED). It was also granted a coal
operating contract in the so-called “Giporlos Area.” IEI was later advised that in line with the
objective of rationalizing the country’s coal supply-demand balance, the logical coal
operator in the area would be Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation (MMIC). IEI
assigned and transferred to MMIC its rights in the area but later filed an action for
rescission with damages against MMIC for failure of the latter to comply with its obligations.
IEI prayed that the Energy Minister approve the return of the contract from MMIC to IEI.
Strangely enough, Mr. Jesus S. Cabarrus is the President of both IEI and MMIC. Trial Court
ordered the rescission and declared the continued efficacy of the coal contract in favor of
IEI and ordered the BED to issue its written affirmation of the contract and to give due
course to IEI’s application. CA reversed the decision and ruled that the trial court had no
jurisdiction over the action considering that under PD 1206, it is the BED that has the power
to decide controversies relative to the exploration, exploitation and development of coal
blocks.

ISSUE:

Whether the doctrine of primary jurisdiction should apply in this case?

HELD:

YES. It has been the jurisprudential trend to apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in
many cases involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative
agencies. It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case,
which means that the matter involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is
such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the
proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are
involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy
will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a
court. Clearly, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this case since the
question of what coal areas should be exploited and developed and which entity should be
granted coal operating contracts over said areas involves a technical determination by the
BED as the administrative agency in possession of the specialized expertise to act on the
matter. The application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, however, does not call for
the dismissal of the case below. It need only be suspended until after the matters within the
competence of the BED are threshed out and determined.
10. BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, et al vs. LILIA B. ORGANO
G.R. No. 14995, February 26, 2004

COMMISSION OF SIMPLE NEGLIGENCE, VIOLATION OF REVENUE REGULATION NO. 4-93

Facts:

Respondent Lilia B. Organo is a revenue collection officer of the BIR, Revenue Region 7,
Quezon City. On May 13, 1997, then BIR Commissioner Liwayway Vinsons-Chato filed
with the BIR a formal administrative charge against petitioner for grave misconduct and
dishonesty. Respondent filed a verified answer, in which she admitted that she had no
specific authority allowing her to receive withholding tax returns and check payments.
She alleged in her counter-affidavit that her duties as collection officer consisted merely
of collecting delinquent accounts and performing other tasks that her supervisor would
assign to her from time to time; and that her acceptance of the withholding tax returns
and check payments for transmittal to BIR-authorized banks was a mere assistance
extended to taxpayers, without any consideration.The administrative case against
respondent was transferred to the Office of Ombudsman, which adopted the
“proceedings, evidence/exhibits presented at the administrative proceedings before the
BIR.” In due course, it rendered its decision finding respondent guilty of grave
misconduct.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent is liable for grave misconduct.

Held:

The Court held that by accommodating and accepting withholding tax returns and
checks payments respondent disregarded as established BIR rule. Revenue Regulation
No. 4-93 requires payments through the banks precisely to avoid, whenever possible,
BIR employee’s direct receipt of tax payments. Yet, respondent was not deterred from
making accommodations that circumvented this provision. To compound matters, her
acts were essential ingredients paving the way for the commission of fraud against, and
consequent damage to, the government. Her claimed ignorance thereof cannot erase
her liability. Obviously, she disregarded the established practice and rules. In the face of
her silence, the fact that the checks ended up in an unauthorized BIR account eloquently
speaks, at the very least, of her gross negligence in taking care of collections that should
not have passed through her hands in the first place. Because of her complicity in the
transgression of the cited BIR regulation as well as her gross negligence, respondent is
administratively liable for simple misconduct and is suspended for six months.
11. RODOLFO S. DE JESUS, ET AL. vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. No. 149154, June 10, 2003

POWER OF COA

Facts:

The Board of Directors (BOD) of the Catbalogan Water District granted to themselves
RATA, rice allowance, productivity incentive, anniversary, and year-end bonus and cash
gifts, as authorized by Resolution No. 313 of the Local Water Utilities Administration
(LWUA). The COA disallowed and ordered the refund of these allowances as they are
not allowed by P.D. No. 198, the Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973.

Issue:

Whether COA is vested with authority to disallow release of allowance not authorized
by law even if authorized by the LWUA.

Held:

Art. IX, Sec. 2 D of the Constitution mandates the COA to audit all the government
agencies, including government-owned and controlled corporations (GOCC) with
original charters. The COA is vested with authority to disallow illegal or irregular
disbursements of government funds. A Water District is a GOCC with a special charter
since it is created pursuant to special law, PD 198. The COA can disallow allowances not
authorized by law, even if authorized by the LWUA.
Considering that the disallowed allowances were received in good faith, without
knowledge that payment had no legal basis, the allowances need not to be refunded.
12. SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. ET AL. V. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION (NTC) G.R. 151908, August 12, 2003

QUASI-LEGISLATIVE & QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS; RULE ON EXHAUSTION OF

ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION;WHEN APPLICABLE

Facts:

The NTC issued Billing Circular 13-6-2000 which promulgated rules and regulations on
the billing of telecommunications services. Petitioners filed with the RTC a petition to
declare the circular as unconstitutional. A motion to dismiss was filed by the NTC on the
ground of petitioner’s to exhaust administrative remedies. The RTC denied the motion
to dismiss but on certiorari, the CA reversed RTC.

Issue:

Whether or not the Billing circular 13-6-2000 issued by NTC unconstitutional.

Held:

Administrative bodies had (a) quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and (b) quasi-
judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is
the power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is
within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and
separability of powers. To be valid, such rules and regulations must conform to, and be
consistent with, the provisions of enabling statute. Quasi-judicial or administrative
adjudicatory power is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the
legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by
law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. In carrying out their quasi-judicial
functions, the administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or
ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions
from them for their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial. The
determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative body
contravenes the law or the constitution is within the judicial power as defined by the
Constitution which is “ the duty of the Courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there have been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.” The
NTC circular was issued pursuant to its quasi-legislative or rule-making power. Hence,
the action must be filed directly with the regular courts without requiring exhaustion of
administrative remedies. Where the act of administrative agency was performed
pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, exhaustion of administrative remedy is required,
before going to court. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the
administrative agency exercises its quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function. Thus, in cases
involving specialized disputes, the same must be referred to an administrative agency of
special competence pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. This doctrine of
primary jurisdiction applies where the claim requires the resolution of issues which,
under a regulatory scheme, has been placed within the special competence of an
administrative body. In such case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral of
such issues to the administrative body for its view.
13. RENATO HERRERA v. ELMER BOHOL
G.R. No. 155320. February 5,2004

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6770 ( THE OMBUDSMAN ACT OF 1998) PENALTIES WHICH ARE
FINAL AND UNAPPEALABLE;

Facts:

Renato F. Herrera, former Director III at DAR Central Office, approved the request for
shift of item number of Plaridel Elmer J. Bohol, a Senior Agrarian Reform officer at the
BARIE. The shift or item number from 577-1 of Fund 108 to 562-3 of Fund 101 resulted
to Bohol ontaining his salary under Fund 101. When Bohol was informed that he could
not draw his salary under such item anymore because his item was recalled and was
given to another person, he charged Herrera before the Office of the Ombudsman, with
Grave Misconduct and/or Inefficiency and Incompetence. The Ombudsman found
Renato Herrera guilty of simple misconduct and was suspended for one month without
pay. Such decision was contested by Herrera and he even appealed to the CA on the
ground that he did not fail to take measures to correct respondent’s recall; but, such
petition was just denied by the CA.A petition for review was raised to the SC stressing
that one month suspension, as stated in the Ombudsman Act of 1998, is appealable
considering that it is not among those enumerated as final and unappealable.

Issue:

Whether or not the provision in R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman
Act of 1998, providing suspension of not more than one month’s salary is final and
unappealable.

Held:

Sec. 27 of RA No. 6770 states that: “any order, directive or decision imposing the
penalty of public censure, reprimand, suspension of not more than one month’s salary
shall be final and unappealable…” Salary suspension is an effect of work suspension
following the “no work, no pay” principle. It will be the employee concerned who will be
suspended and such suspension without pay, being final, and unappealable, is clearly
expressed the law. RA No. 6770, therefore, is a legal and clear basis of denying the
petitioner’s appeal.
14. ALBERTO V. REYES, ET AL. v. RURAL BANK OF SAN MIGUEL (BULACAN), INC.ET. AL,.
G.R. No. 154499, February 27, 2004

COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY;HEAD OF A DEPARTMENT OR A SUPERIOR OFFICER SHALL

NOT BE CIVILLY LIABLE FOR THE WRONGFUL ACTS.OMISSION OF DUTY, NEGLIGENCE
FOR MISFEASANCE OF HIS SUBORDINATE.UNLESS HE HAS ACTUALLY AUTHORIZE BY
WRITTEN ORDER OF THE SPECIFIC ACT OR MISCONDUCT COMPLAINED OF

Facts:

In a letter dated May 19,1999, addressed to then BSP Governor Singson, RBSMI charge
the petitioner with violation of RA No. 6713 ( code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees). The Monetary Board (MB) of the BSP created an Ad Hoc
Committee to investigate the matter. The ensuing investigation disclosed that sometime
in September 1996, RBSMI, which had a history of major violations/exceptions dating
back to 1995, underwent periodic examination by the BSP. The examination team
headed by Principio noted serious 20 exceptions/violations and deficiencies of RBSMI.
Through Resolution No. 96, the MB required RBSMI to submit within 15 days a written
explanation with respect to the findings of the examiner. It also directed the
Department of Rural Banks DRB), to verify, monitor and report to the Deputy Governor,
Supervision and Examination Sector (SES) on the findings noted, until the same shall
have been corrected. Meanwhile on June 13,1997, the MB approved Resolution No. 724
ordering RBSMI to correct the major exceptions noted within 30 days from receipt of
the advice, and to remit to the BSP the amount of P2,538,483.00 as fines and penalties
for incurring deficiencies in reserves against deposit liabilities. More than a year after,
however, the RBSMI asked for a reconsideration of MB Resolution No. 724 insofar as the
imposition of fine amounting to P P2,538,483.00.On January 21, 1999, the MB adopted
Resolution No. 71, authorizing the conditional reversal of sixty of the dispute on the
findings on reserve deficiency. Subsequently, on April 7, 1999, the MB approved the
interim reversal of the entire amount of the penalty “pending the outcome of the study
on the legal and factual basis for the imposition of the penalty.” The above incidents,
particularly the alleged “brokering” by Reyes and the petitioners’ “unsupported”
recommendation to impose a penalty of P2,538,483.00 for legal reserve deficiency,
prompted the respondent to file the letter-complaint charging the petitioners with
“unprofessionalism.” In the Decision if March 14,2003, this Court found Deputy
Governor Reyes and Director Domo-ong liable for violation of the “standards of
professionalism” prescribed by RA 6713in that they used the distressed financial
condition of respondent RBSMI as the subject of a case study in one of the BSP seminars
and did the “brokering” of the sale of RBSMI. The Court modified the decision of the CA
by reducing the penalty imposed from the a fine equivalent to six months’salary to a
fine of 2 months salary for Reyes and one month salary for Domo-ong.
The court exonerated petitioner Proncipio of the Administrative charges. The
exoneration is subject to RBSMI’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration.
Issue:

Whether or not the Superior officer shall not be civilly liable for the wrongful acts,
omissions of duty, negligence or misfeasance of his subordinate officer.

Held:

The immunity of public officers from liability for nonfeasance, negligence or omissions
of duty of their official subordinate and even for the latter’s misfeasance or positive
wrong rests, according to MECHEM, “upon obvious considerations of public policy, the
necessities of the public service and the perplexities and embarrassments of a contrary
doctrine.” These official subordinates are themselves public officers though of an
inferior grade, and therefore directly liable in the cases in which any public officer is
liable, for their own misdeeds or defaults. Under the Admin Code of 1987, which
provides that head of a department or a superior officer shall not be civilly liable for the
wrongful acts, omissions of duty, negligence, misfeasance of his subordinates, unless he
has actually authorized by written order the specific act or misconduct complained of.
15. Zambales Chromite Mining et al v. Court of Appeals

Facts:

ZCM filed an administrative case before the Director of Mines Gozon to have them be
declared the rightful and prior locators and possessors of 69 mining claims in Sta. Cruz,
Zambales. They are asserting their claim against the group of Martinez and Pabiloňa.
Gozon decided in favor of Martinez et al. ZCM appealed the case before the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. During pendency, Gozon was assigned as the Sec of
Agri. And Natural Resources. He did not inhibit himself from deciding on the appeal but
he instead affirmed his earlier decision when he was still the director of mines. ZCM
then appealed before the CFI of Zambales. The CFI affirmed the decision of Gozon. It
held that the disqualification of a judge to review his own decision or ruling (Sec. 1, Rule
137, Rules of Court) does not apply to administrative bodies; that there is no provision
in the Mining Law, disqualifying the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources from
deciding an appeal from a case which he had decided as Director of Mines; that
delicadeza is not a ground for disqualification; that the ZCM did not seasonably seek to
disqualify Gozon from deciding their appeal, and that there was no evidence that Gozon
acted arbitrarily and with bias, prejudice, animosity or hostility to ZCM. ZCM appealed
the case to the CA. The CA reversed Gozon’s finding and declared that ZCM had the
rights earlier attributed to Martinez et al by Gozon. Martinez et al appealed averring
that the factual basis found by Gozon as Director of Mines be given due weight. The CA
reconsidered after realizing that Gozon cannot affirm his own decision and the CA
remanded the case to the Minister of Natural Resources. Now both parties appealed
urging their own contentions; ZCM wants the CA’s earlier decision to be reaffirmed
while Martinez et al demanded that Gozon’s finding be reinstated. The CA denied both
petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Gozon can validly affirm his earlier decision w/o disturbing due process.

HELD:

The SC annulled the decision of Gozon calling it as a mockery of justice. Gozon had acted
with grave abuse of discretion. In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate
officer might not turn out to be a farce, the reviewing officer must perforce be other
than the officer whose decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no different
view or there would be no real review of the case. The decision of the reviewing officer
would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since being human, he
would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case. The SC affirmed the
2nd decision of the CA.
16. Makati Stock Exchange, Inc v Securities and Exchange Commission
14 SCRA 620 (1965)

FACTS:

The SEC in its resolution, denied the Makati Stock Exchange, Inc permission to operate a
stock exchange unless it agreed not to list for trading on its board, securities already
listed in the Manila Stock Exchange.

Objecting to the requirement, Makati Stock Exchange, Inc. Contends that the
Commission has no power to impose it and that anyway, it is illegal, discriminatory and
unjust. The Commission’s order or resolution would make impossible, for all practical
purposes, for the Makati Stock Exchange to operate, such that its “permission”
amounted to “prohibition”.

Issue:

Does the Commission have the authority to promulgate the rule in question?

Held:

None.

1. Test for determining the existence of authority

“The commission cites no provision of law expressly supporting its rule against
double listing. It suggests that the power is necessary for the execution of the
functions vested in it. It argues that said rule was approved by the Department Head
before the war and it is not in conflict with the provisions of the Securities Act. The
approval of the Department, by itself, adds no weight in judicial litigation.

The test is not whether the Act forbids Commission from imposing a prohibition but
whether it empowers the Commission to prohibit.

2. Commission without power to impose prohibition

“The Commission possesses no power to impose the condition of the rule which
results in discrimination and violation of constitutional rights. It is fundamental that
an administrative officer has such powers as are expressly granted to him by statute,
and those necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. Accordingly, the license of
Makati Stock Exchange is approved without such condition against double listing.
17. Weigall v. Shuster
11 Phil 340 (1908)

Facts:

Defendant Collector of Customs officially imposed a fine of $200 upon the plaintiff, the
Captain of the British steamer loonsang, for a violation of the Chinese Exclusion law, in
permitting the escape of an immigrant from his ship, and asserts a lien upon her,
refusing clearance papers unless the master paid the fine.

Instead of paying it, the plaintiff brought this action upon which an injunction was
issued, ordering the defendant to desist and refrain from further proceeding in any way
to levy upon or collect from the plaintiff the fine of $200 mentioned in the plaintiffs
complaint.

Issue:

Does the Collector of Customs have authority to impose a fine and seize the vessel in
question?

Held:

No. Power to impose fine, when not expressly conferred on administrative body vested in
the courts. – “The fine to be imposed upon the plaintiff and his vessel in the present
instance was not one for administrative action, because it has to be laid and enforced in
accordance with the laws of Congress in which it had authorized no such action. The
error of the defendant had root in the notion, expressed in his testimony ‘that the act of
Congress on April 29 had omitted to provide machinery for the enforcement of the laws
thereby enacted.’ That notion overlooked the fact that the usual machinery for the
enforcement of the laws is found in the regularly constituted courts.
18. Roxas v. Sayoc
200 Phil 448 (1956)

Facts:

The Collector of Customs declared certain belongings forfeited to the Government. His
decision was affirmed by the Commissioner of Customs. Subsequently, R.A. 650,
otherwise known as Import Control Law, expired. Roxas contend that upon the
expiration of the said law, the Commissioner f Customs lost the jurisdiction over the
case and, therefore, his decision was null and void.

Issue:

Did the expiration of R.A. No. 650 divest the Commissioner of Customs of his jurisdiction
duly acquired while said law was still in force?

Held:

No. Jurisdiction duly acquired is not affected by expiration of governing law. It is a

settled rule that a court, be it judicial or administrative, that has acquired jurisdiction
over a case, retains even after the expiration of the law governing the case. The case at
bar ids concerned with the expiration of the law, not with the abrogation of the law. The
Commissioner of Customs having acquired jurisdiction over the case, the mere
expiration of R.A. 650 did not affect such jurisdiction.
19. Balbuena v. Secretary of Education
110 Phil. 150 (1960)

Facts:

Section 1 of R.A. 1265 requires all educational institutions to observe daily flag
ceremony, which shall be simple and dignified and shall include the playing or singing of
the Philippine Nation al Anthem. Section 2 thereof authorizes the Secretary of Education
to issue rules and regulations on the proper conduct of flag ceremony.

Petitioners, member of religious sect “Jehovah’s Witnesses,” challenged the

constitutionality of the Act by virtue of which the Secretary of Education issued
Department Order No. 8 (prescribing compulsory flag ceremony in all schools), as an
undue delegation of legislative power.

Issue:

Do the requirements of simplicity and dignity of the flag ceremony and the singing of
the national anthem constitute an adequate standard?

Held:

Yes. Statute need not specify in detail, manner of exercise of delegated power. The
requirements constitute an adequate standard especially when contrasted with other
standards heretofore, upheld by the courts as “public interest, public welfare, interest
of law and order, justice and equity and the substantial merits of the case or adequate
and efficient instruction.” That the legislature did not specify the details of the flag
ceremony is no objection to the validity of the statute for all that is required of it is the
laying down of standard and policy that will limit the discretion of the regulatory agency.
To require the statute to establish in detail the manner of exercise of the delegated
power would be to destroy the administrative flexibility that the delegation is intended
to achieve.
20. Blanco v. The Board of Medical Examiners
46 Phil. 190 (1924)

Facts:

The petitioners took the examinations prescribed by law for a physician’s certificate and
apparently passed the same. The Board of Medical Examiners thereupon submitted the
final results of the examinations to the Department Head for confirmation. But the
Secretary of the Interior held the matter in abeyance, pending the outcome of an
investigation conducted by the Undersecretary of the Interior.

The finding of the special investigator was that the questions on the subjects of the
medical examinations had leaked out before said dates. Following the recommendation
of the Undersecretary, the Secretary of the Interior annulled the results of the
examinations.

The last paragraph of section 776 of the Medical law, as found in the Administrative
Code, and as last amended by Section 10 of act No. 3111, provides that the results of all
examinations including the average and grades obtained by each applicant, shall be
submitted for confirmation to the Department Head (secretary of the Interior) and
made known to the respective candidates within one month after the date of the
examinations.

Issue:

Is this duty of the Secretary of the Interior Ministerial in nature?

Held:

No.
1. Duty of Secretary under the law. –
Under the plain terms of the Medical Law, it is the discretionary duty of the
Secretary of the Interior to confirm or as in this instance, to annul the report of the
medical examiners. To hold that the secretary of the Interior must in all cases
confirm, shutting his eyes to any irregularity, no matter how glaring, would convert
him to an automatic rubber stamp for imprinting the requisite approval. That the
Department Secretary who appoints the members of the Board Medical Examiners,
who has the power of confirmation of the report of the Board, cannot do more than
perform the clerical duty of approving the results of the examinations, under any
and all circumstances, is too specious an argument to merit serious consideration.
2. Mandamus not available to review exercise of discretion by a public officer. –

It is elementary law that the writ of mandamus will not issue to control or review
the exercise of the discretion of a public officer. Where the law imposes upon a
public officer the right and duty to exercise judgement, in reference to any matter
to which he is called upon to act, it is his judgement that is to be exercised and not
that of court. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer, and gives him the right
to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and
nor ministerial.

3. Mandamus may issue to correct abuse of discretion. –

It is likewise elementary law that mandamus may issue to correct abuse of
discretion, if the case is otherwise proper. But here, the record discloses that the
Secretary of the Interior did not exercise the power granted to him to manifest
injustice, or with gross abuse.