POLICE

POWER
 DECS vs. San Diego
G.R. No. 89572, December 21, 1989

FACTS:
Roberto Rey San Diego, a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of B.S.
Zoology, had taken and flunked 4 National Medical Admission Tests and was applying to take
another test. NMAT Rule provides that a student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take
the test. After three successive failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the
fourth time. The Regional Trial Court held that the petitioner had been deprived of his right to
pursue a medical education through an arbitrary exercise of the police power.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent was deprived of his right to a medical education through an
arbitrary exercise of the police power.

Held:
No. The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police
power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession
is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health.
The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical
profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors.

The private respondent has failed the NMAT five times. While his persistence is
noteworthy, to say the least, it is certainly misplaced, like a hopeless love. No depreciation is
intended or made against the private respondent. It is stressed that a person who does not qualify
in the NMAT is not an absolute incompetent unfit for any work or occupation. The only inference
is that he is a probably better, not for the medical profession, but for another calling that has not
excited his interest. In the former, he may be a bungler or at least lackluster; in the latter, he is
more likely to succeed and may even be outstanding.

It is for the appropriate calling that he is entitled to quality education for the full harnessing
of his potentials and the sharpening of his latent talents toward what may even be a brilliant future.
We cannot have a society of square pegs in round holes, of dentists who should never have left the
farm and engineers who should have studied banking and teachers who could be better as
merchants. It is time indeed that the State took decisive steps to regulate and enrich our system of
education by directing the student to the course for which he is best suited as determined by initial
tests and evaluations. Otherwise, we may be "swamped with mediocrity," in the words of Justice
Holmes, not because we are lacking in intelligence but because we are a nation of misfits.
 CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY v. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA
GR No. L-34915, 1983-06-24
Facts:
Section 9 of ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled "ORDINANCE REGULATING THE
ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE
CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND
PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF" provides:
"Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set
aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon
City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City
Authorities. The area so designated shall immediately be developed and should be open for
operation not later than six months from the date of approval of the application."
For several years, the aforequoted section of the Ordinance was not enforced by city authorities
but seven years after the enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed the following
resolution:
"RESOLVED by the council of Quezon assembled, to request, as it does hereby request
the City Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park
lots in Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6%... space
intended for paupers burial."
Pursuant to this resolution, the Quezon City Engineer notified respondent Himlayang
Pilipino, Inc. in writing that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 would be enforced.
There being no issue of fact and the questions raised being purely legal, both petitioners and
respondent agreed to the rendition of a judgment on the pleadings.
The respondent court, therefore, rendered the decision declaring Section 9 of ordinance No. 6118,
S-64 null and... void
A motion for reconsideration having been denied, the City Government and City Council
filed the instant petition
Petitioners argue that the taking of the respondent's property is a valid and reasonable exercise of
police power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of
paupers.
On the other hand, respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contends that the taking or
confiscation of property is obvious because the questioned ordinance permanently restricts the use
of the property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner... of
all beneficial use of his property.

Issues:
WON Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the police power?

Ruling:
NO. We find the stand of the private respondent as well as the decision of the respondent Judge to
be well-founded.There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent
of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the
promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance
is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit
paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public
cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.
The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by
Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city
council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and to provide
for their burial in a proper place subject to the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds
and cemeteries.
As a matter of fact, the petitioners rely solely on the general welfare clause or on implied powers
of the municipal corporation, not on any express provision of law as statutory basis of their exercise
of power.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of the respondent
court is affirmed.
Principles:
there are three inherent powers of government by which the state interferes with the property rights,
namely: (1) police power, (2) eminent domain, (3) taxation. These are said to exist independently
of the Constitution as necessary attributes of sovereignty.
"Police power is defined by Freund as 'the powers of promoting the public welfare by restraining
and regulating the use of liberty and property' (Quoted in Political Law by Tañada and Carreon,
V-II, p. 50). It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of property of
the owner.
 PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC vs. HON. DRILON
G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988

Facts:
The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI), a recruitment
firm for overseas placement," challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1,
Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of
"GUIDELINESGOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF
FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS.”
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition, PASEI, challenges the validity of Department Order
No. 1 (deployment ban) of the DOLE on the following grounds:1) it is discriminatory as it only
applies to female workers; 2) it is an invalid exercise of the law-making power. The respondents
invoke the police power of the Philippine State.

Issue:
Whether or not the enactment of DO No. 1 is a valid exercise of police power.

RULING:
Yes, it is a valid exercise of police power. Police power has been defined as the "state
authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to
promote the general welfare." It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. However,
police power is not without its own limitations. It may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably.
DO No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not thereby make an undue
discrimination between the sexes. “Equality before the law" admits of classifications, provided
that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes
of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all
members of the same class. It is the avowed objective of DO No. 1 to "enhance the protection for
Filipino female overseas workers. Discrimination in this case is justified. Police power is the
domain of the legislature, but it does not mean that such an authority may not be lawfully
delegated. The Labor Code itself vests the DOLE with rulemaking powers in the enforcement
whereof. Hence it is a valid exercise of police power.
 Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines
vs. Honorable Secretary of Agrarian Reform
G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989

Facts
These are consolidated cases which involve common legal, including serious challenges to
the constitutionality of the several measures such as P.D. No. 27, E.O. No. 228, Presidential
Proclamation No. 131, E.O. No. 229, and R.A. No. 6657.

G.R. No. 79777 The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on
grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional
limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.

G.R. No. 79310. This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and
E.O. No. 229. They contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation
as it is traditionally understood

G.R. No. 79744. The petitioner argues that E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are violative of the
constitutional provision that no private property shall be taken without due process or just
compensation.

G.R. No. 78742. Petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy
their right of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the
implementing rules required under the above-quoted decree.

Issue
Whether agrarian reform is an exercise of police power or eminent domain

Held
There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of eminent
domain. Property condemned under the police power is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose,
such as a building on the verge of collapse, which should be demolished for the public safety, or
obscene materials, which should be destroyed in the interest of public morals. The confiscation of
such property is not compensable, unlike the taking of property under the power of expropriation,
which requires the payment of just compensation to the owner.

The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of compensable
taking is concerned. To the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention
limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of private property
in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary
to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed,
there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just
compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the
land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said excess
and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely
an exercise not of the police power but of the power of eminent domain
 ICHONG VS HERNANDEZ
G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957

FACTS:
Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents corporations and
partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, brought this action
to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of
Finance and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from
enforcing its provisions.

Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it
nationalizes the retail trade business. The main provisions of the Act are: a prohibition against
persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the
capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or
indirectly in the retail trade; a prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually
engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business; a provision
requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business to present for registration with the proper
authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses

Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that: it denies to alien
residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due
process of law ; the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof; and
the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines.

Issue:
Whether or not Republic Act No. 1180 is a valid exercise of police power.

Ruling:
Yes. The disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national
economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and country
from dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power
of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and
future; that the law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because
sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the
occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the law is prospective in operation
and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects
their privilege.
 YNOT vs APPELATE COURT
G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987

FACTS;
President Marcos amended Executive Order No. 626-A which orders that no
carabao and carabeef shall be transported from one province to another; such violation shall be
subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable
institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection
Commission may see fit for the carabeef and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director
of Animal Industry may see fit in the case of the carabaos.
Petitioner’s 6 carabaos were confiscated by the police stationcommander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo
for having been transported from Masbate to Iloilo inviolation of EO 626-A. He issued a writ
for replevin, challenging the constitutionality of said EO.

Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT IT IS AN INVALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER

Ruling:
Yes. The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method
employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and,
worse, is unduly oppressive.In the case at bar, E.O.626-A has the lawful subject but NOT a lawful
method. The reasonable connection between the means employedand the purpose sought to be
achieved by the questioned measure is missing. Due process is violated because the owner of the
property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned
and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt
of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the
doctrine of separation of powers.
EMINENT
DOMAIN
 AMIGABLE V. CUENCA
GR NO. L-26400 FEBRUARY 29, 1972

FACTS:
Victoria Amigable is the owner of a lot. No annotation in favor of the government of any
right or interest in the property appears at the back of the TCT. Without prior expropriation or
negotiated sale, the government used a portion of said lot with an area of 6,167sqm for the
construction of Mango and Gorordo Avenues. Amigable’s counsel wrote the President of the
Philippines requesting payment of the portion of her lot which has been appropriated by the
government. The claim was disallowed by the Auditor General. Amigable filed in the court a
complaint against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicoloas Cuenca for the recovery of
ownership and possession of the 6,16 sqm of land traversed by the Mango and Gorordo Avenues
as well as the payment of compensatory damages. Defendants denied the allegations of the
complaint.
The Court of First Instance held that it had no jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s cause of
action for the recovery of possession and ownership of the portion of her lot in question on the
ground that the government cannot be sued without its consent. Accordingly, the complaint was
dismissed. The plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals which subsequently certified the case to
Supreme Court, there being no question of fact.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant may properly sue the government under the facts of the case.

HELD:
The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for
perpetrating injustice on a citizen. When the government takes a property for public use, which is
condition upon the payment of just compensation, to be judicially ascertained, it makes manifest
that it submits to the jurisdiction of a court. There is no thought then that the doctrine of immunity
from suit could still be appropriately invoked.
Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of her
certificate of title and that she has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of her lot
the government, the appellant, remains the owner of the whole lot. As registered owner, she could
bring an action to recover possession. The case was remanded to the court a quo for determination
of compensation.
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS FAJARDO
GR NO. L-12172 AUGUST 29, 1958

FACTS:
During the incumbency of defendant-appellant Juan F. Fajardo as mayor of Camarines Sur
the municipal council passed the ordinance in question. Four years later, Fajardo and his son-in-
law filed a written request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to construct a building
adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo’s name, located along
the national highway and separated from the public plaza by a creek. The request was denied
because the proposed building would allegedly destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza.
Defendants reiterated request for a building permit but the request was turned down. Appellants
proceeded with the construction of the building without a permit, because they needed a place to
stay since their residence very badly damaged.
Appellants were charged and convicted for the violation of the ordinance in question.
Defendants appealed to the Court of First Instance which affirmed the conviction, which made the
accused appeal to the Court of Appeals but the CA forwarded the records to the SC because the
appeal attacks the constitutionality of the ordinance in question.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the conviction can stand.

HELD:
No. the conviction cannot stand. The ordinance in question does not control the discretion
vested in the respondents. It prescribes no uniform rule upon which the special permission of the
city is to be granted. The danger of such an ordinance is that it makes possible arbitrary
discriminations and abuses in its execution, depending upon no conditions or qualifications.
The ordinance should have established a rule by which its impartial enforcement could be secured.
The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants
of the right to use their own property. Hence it oversteps the bounds of police power and amounts
to a taking of appellants’ property without just compensation.
The state may not, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property and
practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the community.
A regulation which substantially deprive an owner of all beneficial use of his property is
confiscation and is a deprivation within the meaning of the 14th amendment. The conviction of
appellants is reversed and accused are acquitted.
 CITY OF MANILA VS. CHINESE COMMUNITY
40 Phil 349; No. 14355; 31 Oct 1919

Facts:
The City of Manila, plaintiff herein, prayed for the expropriation of a portion
private cemetery for the conversion into an extension of Rizal Avenue. Plaintiff claims that it is
necessary that such public improvement be made in the said portion of the private cemetery and
that the said lands are within their jurisdiction.
Defendants herein answered that the said expropriation was not necessary because other
routes were available. They further claimed that the expropriation of the cemetery would create
irreparable loss and injury to them and to all those persons owing and interested in the graves and
monuments that would have to be destroyed.
The lower court ruled that the said public improvement was not necessary on the particular-
strip of land in question. Plaintiff herein assailed that they have the right to exercise the power
of eminent domain and that the courts have no right to inquire and determine the necessity of the
expropriation. Thus, the same filed an appeal.

Issue:
Whether or not the courts may inquire into, and hear proof of the necessity of the
expropriation.

Held:
Yes. The courts have the power of restricting the exercise of eminent domain to the actual
reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the law. The moment the
municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with
the conditions accompanying the authority. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a
municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of
the legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a
particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question that the courts
have the right to inquire to.
 Philippine Press Institute v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 119694, May 22, 1995

FACTS
Respondent COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2772 directing newspapers to
provide free COMELEC space of not less than one half page for the common use of political
parties and candidates. The said space will be used by the candidates to enable them to make
known their qualifications, stand on public issues, and present their platforms. The space shall also
be utilized by COMELEC for dissemination of vital election information.

Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc., a non-profit organization of newspaper and

magazine publishers, asks the Supreme Court to declare COMELEC Resolution No. 2772
unconstitutional on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon
the government against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation.
Respondent COMELEC, on the other hand, claims that it is a valid exercise of Police Power over
the information operations of print media enterprises during the election period to ensure an
impartial and credible election.

ISSUE
Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional.

HELD
To compel print media enterprises to provide a space, free of charge for COMELEC is
tantamount to “taking” of private property without just compensation as required in the exercise
of the power of expropriation. The element of necessity for the taking is not present in the instant
case. There is also no evidence of the existence of national emergency to take private property of
print media enterprises that will render the resolution a valid exercise of police power, as the
COMELEC invokes.

Therefore, the questioned COMELEC Resolution No, 2772 is unconstitutional.

 Sumulong v. Guerrero
G.R. No. L-48685, September 30, 1987

FACTS

The National Housing Authority (NHA) filed a complaint for expropriation of parcels of
land for the expansion of Bagong Nayon Housing Project, which provides housing facilities to
low-salaried government employees. The lots of petitioners Lorenzo Sumulong and Emilia
Vidanes-Balaoing were included in the said expropriation.

The complaint filed by NHA was coupled with a motion for immediate possession of the
properties. A certain amount representing the total market value of the lands in question was
deposited by the NHA with the Philippine National Bank, pursuant to P.D. No. 1224 which defines
“the policy on the expropriation of private property for socialized housing upon payment of just
compensation”.

Respondent Judge Buenaventura Guerrero issued a writ of possession pertaining to the

subject parcels of land. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that they had
been deprived of the possession of their property without due process of law. Their petition was
however, denied.

ISSUES

Whether or not P.D. 1224 is a valid exercise of the state’s power of Eminent Domain.
Whether or not petitioners were denied due process because their property were
immediately possessed by the NHA by virtue of the writ of possession ordered by the respondent
judge.

HELD

P.D. 1224 defines “socialized housing” as “the construction of dwelling units for the
middle and lower class members of our society, including the construction of the supporting
infrastructure and other facilities”. The “public use” requirement for a valid exercise of the power
of Eminent Domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing conditions. The
taking to be valid must be for public use. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, the power
of eminent domain comes into play. In the present case, the requirement of public use is satisfied.
Hence, P.D. 1224 is a valid exercise of Eminent Domain.

P.D. 1224 as amended, violates procedural due process as it allows immediate taking of
possession, control and disposition of property without giving the petitioners their day in court. In
the instant case, respondent judge ordered the issuance of a writ of possession without notice and
without hearing, to the prejudice of the constitutional right of the petitioners. Therefore, it is held
that the petitioners were denied of due process by the issuance of the writ of possession.
 MUNICIPALITY OF PARAÑAQUE vs.V.M. REALTY CORPORATION
[G.R. No. 127820; July 20, 1998]

FACTS:
The Municipality of Parañaque filed an expropriation case against Private Respondent
V.M. Realty Corporation over two parcels of land pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution. The
expropriation was allegedly “for the purpose of alleviating the living conditions of the
underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless through a socialized housing project.”
Petitioner, pursuant to the resolution made an offer to enter into a negotiated sale of the property
with private respondent, which the latter did not accept.
Private respondent, on the other hand, filed its Answer alleging that (a) the complaint of
petitioner was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by the Local
Government Code; and (b) the cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res
judicata.

ISSUES:
Whether a resolution has the same force and effect of an ordinance for expropriation case.
Whether Res Judicata can bar the right of the State or its agent to expropriate private
property.

HELD:
First Issue: Resolution Different from an Ordinance
A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution
is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An
ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. An
LGU may exercise the power to expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress
and subject to the latter’s control and restraints. Thus, the following essential requisites must
concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain:
An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council;
The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the
benefit of the poor and the landless;
There is payment of just compensation;
A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to
be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.

Second Issue: Eminent Domain Not Barred by Res Judicata

The Court holds that the principle of res judicata cannot bar the right of the State or its
agent to expropriate private property. The very nature of eminent domain, as an inherent power of
the State, dictates that the right to exercise the power be absolute and unfettered even by a prior
judgment or res judicata.
POWER OF
TAXATION
 ABRA VALLEY COLLEGE, INC. VS. HON. JUAN P. AQUINO
G.R. No. L-39086 June 15, 1988

FACTS:
Abra Valley College, Inc., an educational corporation and institution of higher learning
duly incorporated, was issued a “Notice of Seizure” and “Notice of Sale” of its lot and building
located at Bangued, Abra, for non-payment of real estate taxes and penalties amounting to
P5,140.31. They then filed a complaint to annul and declare void said notices. They contend that
the primary use of the lot and building which is for educational purposes, and not the incidental
use thereof, determines the exemption from property taxes under Section 22(3), Article VI of the
1935 Constitution, which is the provision which finds application in this case. On the other hand,
respondents maintain that the college lot and building are used for the educational purpose of the
college, as permanent residence of the President and Director thereof, and for commercial
purposes.

ISSUE:
WON the lot and building in question are used exclusively for educational purposes, and
are therefore exempt from tax.

RULING:
No. Text of exemption from taxation is the use of the property for purposes mentioned in
the Constitution. While the Court allows a more liberal and non-restrictive interpretation of the
phrase “exclusively used for educational purposes” as provided in Section 22(3), Article VI of the
1935 Constitution, reasonable emphasis has always been made that exemption extends to facilities
which are incidental to and reasonable necessary for the accomplishment of the main purposes.
The lease of the first floor of the building to the Northern Marketing Corporation cannot be
considered incidental to the purposes of education. Said floor is being used for commercial
purposes. However, since only a portion is used for purposes of commerce, it is only fair that half
of the assessed tax be returned to the school involved.
REV. FR. CASIMIRO LLADOC VS. The COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. No. L-19201 June 16, 1965

FACTS:
In 1958, M.B. Estate filed a donor’s gift tax return for a donation they had made to Fr.
Crispin Ruiz, then parish priest of Victorias, Negros Occidental amounting P10,000.00. Under
date of April 29, 1960, respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued an assessment for
donee’s gift tax against the Catholic Parish of Victorias, Negros Occidental amounting to
P1,370.00 including surcharges, interest of 1% monthly from May 15, 1958 to June 15,1960, and
the comprise for the late filing of the return.
Fr. Ladoc filed a protest and claimed that the assessment of the gift tax even against the
Roman Catholic Church, would not be valid for such would be a clear violation of the provisions
of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
WON the donation of P10,000 to Rev. Fr. Crispin Ruiz, then parish priests of Negros
Occidental, for the construction of a new Catholic Church should be exempt from tax, because
otherwise it would be a violation of the provisions of the Constitution.

RULING:
No. Section 22(3), Art. VI of the Constitution of the Philippines, exempt from taxation
cemeteries, churches, and parsonages or convents, appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings,
and improvements used exclusively for religious purposes. The exemption is only from the
payment of taxes assessed on such properties enumerated, as property taxes, as contra
distinguished from excise taxes. A gift tax is not a property tax, but an excise imposed on the
transfer of property by way of gift inter vivos, the imposition of which on property used exclusively
for religious purposes, does not constitute an impairment of the Constitution. The phrase “exempt
from taxation” as employed in the Constitution should not be interpreted to mean exemption from
all kinds of taxes.
PASCUAL v. THE SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS, GR
No. L-10405, December 29, 1960

FACTS:
Wenceslao Pascual, as Provincial Governor of Rizal, instituted an action for declaratory
relief with injunction on the ground that an item worth P85, 000 for the construction,
reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement of Pasig feeder road terminals was appropriated
at the time of approval and passage of RA 920 entitled as an “Act Appropriating Funds for Public
Works”. Said appropriation of P85,000 was made by Congress because its members were made to
believe that the projected feeder roads were public roads and not private streets of a private
subdivision. Petitoner prayed that the contested item of the Act be declared unconstitutional and
illegal. This is in order for the prevention of further making and securing any new and further
releases and payments out of said illegally appropriated funds.

ISSUE:
WON the appropriation in question was for a private, not a public purpose

HELD:
Yes. The land on which the projected feeder roads were to be constructed belonged to a
private respondent which results to the appropriation being sought for a private purpose. The
Legislature is without power to appropriate public revenues for anything but a public purpose. A
law passed by Congress and approved by the President can never be illegal because Congress is
the source of laws. It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to appropriate public
revenue for anything but a public purpose. Money raised by taxation can be expended only for
public purpose and not for the advantage of private individuals.
 PUNSALAN v. THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF THE CITY OF MANILA
GR No. L-4817, May 26, 1954

FACTS:
The suit was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by two lawyers, a medical
practitioner, a public accountant, a dental surgeon and a pharmacist in their own behalf and in
behalf of other professionals practising in the City of Manila. Object of the suit is the annulment
of Ordinance No. 3398 of the City of Manila together with the provision of the Manila Charter
authorizing it and the refund of taxes collected under the ordinance. The ordinance approved by
the municipal board of the City of Manila imposes a municipal occupation tax on persons
exercising various professions in the city. Having already paid their occupation tax under Section
201 of the National Internal Revenue Code, they were also required to pay the additional tax
prescribed in the ordinance.

ISSUE:
WON the above contention amounts to double taxation

HELD:
No. legislature may, in its discretion, select what occupations shall be taxed, and in the
exercise thereof, it may tax all or it may select for taxation certain classes and leave the others
untaxed. The argument against double taxation may not be invoked where one tax is imposed by
the state and the other is imposed by the city. The tax paid under Section 201 of the National
Internal Revenue Code is a national occupation tax. It is held that the two taxes are imposed by
different jurisdictions, one by the national government and the other by the city government.
 DUE
PROCESS
 PHIL. PHOSPHATE FERTILIZER CORP. VS. TORRES
G.R. NO.98050 17 MAR 1994

Facts:
Philphos Movement for Progress, Inc. (PMPI for brevity), filed with the Department of Labor and
Employment a petition for certification election among the supervisory employees of petitioner, alleging
that as a supervisory union duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment it was seeking
to represent the supervisory employees of Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation. Mediator-Arbiter
Rodolfo S. Milado issued an order directing the holding of a certification election among the supervisory
employees of petitioner, excluding therefrom the superintendents and the professional and technical
employees. However, the PMPI filed an amended petition with the Mediator-Arbiter wherein it sought to
represent not only the supervisory employees of petitioner but also its professional/technical
and confidential employees. The parties therein agreed to submit their respective position papers and to
consider the amended petition submitted for decision on the basis thereof and related documents. Mediator-
Arbiter Milado issued an order granting the petition and directing the holding of a
certification election among the "supervisory, professional (engineers, analysts, mechanics, accountants,
nurses, midwives, etc.), technical, and confidential employees. PHILPHOS appealed the order to the
Secretary of Labor and Employment who rendered a decision through Undersecretary Bienvenido
Laguesma dismissing the appeal. PHILPHOS moved for reconsideration but the same was denied; hence,
the instant petition alleging denial of due process on the part of the DOLE to which the mediator-arbiter
was under.

Issue:
Whether or Not there was denial of due process.

Held:
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action
or ruling complained of petitioner PHILPHOS agreed to file its position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter
and to consider the case submitted for decision on the basis of the position papers filed by the parties, there
was sufficient compliance with the requirement of due process, as petitioner was afforded
reasonable opportunity to present its side. Moreover, petitioner could have, if it so desired, insisted
on a hearing to confront and examine the witnesses of the other party. But it did not; instead it
opted to submit its position paperwith the Mediator-Arbiter. Besides, petitioner had all the
opportunity to ventilate its arguments in its appeal to the Secretary of Labor.
 Ynot Vs. IAC
148 SCRA 659; G.R. No. 74457; 20 Mar 1987

Facts:

Executive Order No. 626-A prohibited the transportation of carabaos and carabeef from one
province to another. The carabaos of petitioner were confiscated for violation of Executive Order No 626-
A while he was transporting them from Masbate to Iloilo. Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of
Executive Order No. 626-A. The government argued that Executive Order No. 626-A was issued in the
exercise of police power to conserve the carabaos that were still fit for farm work or breeding.

Issue:

Whether or Not EO No. 626-A is a violation of Substantive Due Process.

Held:

The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of police power, because it is not reasonably
necessary for the purpose of the law and is unduly oppressive. It is difficult to see how prohibiting the
transfer of carabaos from one province to another can prevent their indiscriminate killing. Retaining the
carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there. Prohibiting the transfer of carabeef, after
the slaughter of the carabaos, will not prevent the slaughter either.
 PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION vs.
JOSE LUIS A. ALCUAZ
G.R. No. 84818 December 18, 1989

FACTS:
PHILCOMSAT was granted "a franchise to establish, construct, maintain and operate in the
Philippines, at such places as the grantee may select, station or stations and associated equipment
and facilities for international satellite communications. The petitioner is also the sole signatory
for the Philippines in the Agreement and the Operating Agreement relating to the International
Telecommunications Satellite Organization.

Pursuant to Executive Order No. 196 issued on June 17, 1987, petitioner was placed under
the jurisdiction, control and regulation of respondent NTC, including all its facilities and services
and the fixing of rates. The NTC order now in controversy had further extended the provisional
authority of the petitioner for another six (6) months, counted from September 16, 1988, but it
directed the petitioner to charge modified reduced rates through a reduction of fifteen percent
(15%).

ISSUES:
Whether or not the order violated procedural due process;
Whether or not the rate reduction constituted a violation of substantive due process.

DECISION:
1. The Court held that procedural due process was violated. While respondents may fix a
temporary rate pending final determination of the application of petitioner, it is not exempt from
the statutory procedural requirements of notice and hearing.g The respondent has no authority to
make such order without first giving petitioner a hearing, and it is immaterial whether the same is
made upon a complaint, a summary investigation, or upon the commission’s own motion.

2.The rate reduction constituted a violation of substantive due process. A commission has
no power to fix rates which are unreasonable or to regulate them arbitrarily. The basic requirement
of reasonableness comprehends such rates which must be so low to be confiscatory, or too high to
be oppressive. The petitioner is engaged in several projects and their projected undertaking were
formulated on the premise that rates are maintained at their present or reasonable levels. Hence,
an undue reduction thereof may practically lead to a cessation of its business.
 ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY VS. HON. JUDGE IGNACIO CAPULONG
(G.R. 99327 May 27, 1993)

FACTS:
Aguila Legis, a fraternity in Ateneo Law School, held its initiation rites upon neophytes.
As a result thereof, one neophyte named Leonardo "Lennie" H. Villa, a first year law student, died
of serious physical injuries. Another freshman student by the name of Bienvenido Marquez was
also hospitalized for acute renal failure occasioned by the serious physical injuries inflicted upon
him on the same occasion. Dean del Castillo created an investigating committee which was tasked
to investigate and submit a report regarding the circumstances surrounding the death of Lennie
Villa. The respondent students were asked to submit their written statements but failed to do so. In
the meantime, they were placed in preventive suspension. The investigating committee, after
receiving the written statements and hearing the testimonies of several witness, found a prima facie
case against respondent students for violation of Rule 3 of the Law School Catalogue entitled
"Discipline." Respondent students were then required to file their written answers to the formal
charge. Petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary Board to hear the charges against respondent
students. The Board found respondent students guilty of violating Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo Law
School Rules on Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing activities. However, in view
of the lack of unanimity among the members of the Board on the penalty of dismissal, the Board
left the imposition of the penalty to the University Administration. Accordingly, Fr. Bernas
imposed the penalty of dismissal on all respondent students. Respondent students filed with
RTC Makati a temporary restraining order(TRO) since they are currently enrolled.
Judge Capulong, upon student’s appeal, ordered
Ateneo to reverse its decision and reinstate the said students.

ISSUE/S:
Whether a school is within its rights in expelling students from its academic community
pursuant to its disciplinary rules and moral standards

RULING:
YES. As corporate entities, educational institutions of higher learning are inherently
endowed with the right to establish their policies, academic and otherwise, unhampered by external
controls or pressure. The Supreme Court consistently upheld the salutary proposition that
admission to an institution of higher learning is discretionary upon a school, the same being a
privilege on the part of the student rather than a right. While under the education Act of 1982,
students have a right "to freely choose their field of study, subject to existing curricula and to
continue their course therein up to graduation," such right is subject, as all rights are, to the
established academic and disciplinary standards laid down by the academic institution.
 EQUAL
PROTECTION
 ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 189698 February 22, 2010

FACTS:
Petitioners filed a petition for prohibition and certiorari against the COMELEC for issuing a
resolution declaring appointive officials who filed their certificate of candidacy as ipso facto
resigned from their positions. In this defense, COMELEC avers that it only copied the provision
from Section 13 of Republic Act 9369. Petitioners also contend that Section 13 of Republic Act
9369 contains two conflicting provisions.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679, violate the equal protection
clause of the constitution

RULING:
Yes. In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their
posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil servants,
specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact alone
that there is substantial distinction between those who hold appointive positions and those
occupying elective posts, does not justify such differential treatment. The classification simply
fails to meet the test that it should be germane to the purposes of the law.
 Almonte vs Vazques
GR No. 95367, May 23, 1995

FACTS:
Petitioner Jose T. Almonte was formerly Commissioner of Economic Intelligence and
Investigation Bureau (EIIB), while Villamor C. Perez is Chief of the EIIB's Budget and Fiscal
Management Division. The subpoena duces tecum was issued by the Ombudsman in connection
with his investigation of an anonymous letter alleging that funds representing savings from unfilled
positions in the EIIB had been illegally disbursed.
Petitioner Almonte denied the allegations and asked that the complaint be dismissed and
the case considered close. Similarly petitioner Perez, budget chief of the EIIB, denied savings had
been realized from the implementation of EO No. 127 (dismissal of 190 personnel).
The Graft Investigation Officer of the Ombudsman’s office, Jose Sano asked for authority to
conduct a preliminary investigation. Anticipating the grant of his request, he issued a subpoena to
petitioner Almonte and Perez, requiring them to submit their counter-affidavits and the affidavits
of their witnesses, as well as a subpoena duces tecum to the Chief of the EIIB’s Accounting
Division.
Petitioners Almonte and Perez moved to quash the subpoena and the subpoena duces
tecum. Respondent Ombudsman granted the motion to quash the subpoena in the view of the fact
that there were no affidavits filed against petitioners. But he denied their motion to quash the
subpoena duces tecum. He ruled that petitioners were not being forced to produce evidence against
themselves, since the subpoena duces tecum was directed to the Chief Accountant.
Petitioners Almonte and Perez moved for reconsideration, stating that, the Ombudsman
can act only in any appropriate case and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law and
that the complaint in this case is not an appropriate one. According to them, those complainants
who wrote the letter should be identified and should sign the complaint. Otherwise, their right
under the equal protection clause of the Constitution will be violated. The motion for
reconsideration, having been denied, hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a violation of petitioners’ right to the equal protection of the laws.

HELD:
No. Petitioners complain that "in all forum and tribunals . . . the aggrieved parties . . . can
only hale respondents via their verified complaints or sworn statements with their identities fully
disclosed," while in proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman anonymous letters suffice
to start an investigation (Art XI, Sec 12; RA 6770, Sec 26(2). In the first place, there can be no
objection to this procedure because it is provided in the Constitution itself. In the second place, it
is apparent that in permitting the filing of complaints "in any form and in a manner," the framers
of the Constitution took into account the well-known reticence of the people which keep them
from complaining against official wrongdoings. As this Court had occasion to point out, the Office
of the Ombudsman is different from the other investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the
government because those subject to its jurisdiction are public officials who, through official
pressure and influence, can quash, delay or dismiss investigations held against them. On the other
hand complainants are more often than not poor and simple folk who cannot afford to hire lawyers.
Petition is dismissed.
 BIRAOGO vs THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010
G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010
FACTS:
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC)
dated July 30, 2010.
PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task
to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and
employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration,
and to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
PTC has all the powers of an investigative body.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from
performing its functions. They argued that E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it
selectively targets for investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the previous
administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other
administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.
Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued that
the Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly created
for laudable purposes.

ISSUE:
Whether or not E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.

HELD:
Yes. Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection
clause. The clear mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning
the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to
single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations.
It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes
arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and
institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal
protection clause is to secure every person within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional and
arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper
execution through the state’s duly constituted authorities.
There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification.
Equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass
the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial
distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions
only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly
treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the
authority to investigate all past administrations.
 DUMLAO vs. COMELEC
95 SCRA 392 L-52245 January 22, 1980

Facts:
Petitioner Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his
certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30,
1980. Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the
Constitution which provides that “….Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who
has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who shall
have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be
elected shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired.”
He likewise alleges that the provision is directed insidiously against him, and is based on “purely
arbitrary grounds, therefore, class legislation.

Issue:
Whether or not 1st paragraph of section 4 of BP 22 is valid.

Held:
In the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from a provincial, city
or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which
he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision. The need for new blood assumes
relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is emphatically
significant is that the retired employee has already declared himself tired and unavailable for the
same government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume again.
It is for this very reason that inequality will neither result from the application of the challenged
provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal protection, neither does it permit of such
denial.

The equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. What is proscribes is a
classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not violated by
a reasonable classification based upon substantial distinctions, where the classification is germane
to the purpose of the low and applies to all those belonging to the same class.

WHEREFORE, the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby

declared valid.
 Himagan vs. People

FACTS:
Himagan is a policeman assigned in Camp Catititgan, Davao City. He was charged for the
murder of and attempted murder. Pursuant to Sec 47 of RA 6975, Himagan was placed into
suspension pending the murder case. The law provides that “Upon the filing of a complaint or
information sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where
the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately
suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to
continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused.
Himagan assailed the suspension averring that Sec 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service Decree, that
his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days. He claims that an imposition of preventive
suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of his
constitutional right to equal protection of laws.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection guaranteed by the Constitution.

HELD:
No. The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of
persons charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive
suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be
used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative
discussions. If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to
his post while his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed
to constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform
and armed. The imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Sec 47 of RA 6975
does not violate the suspended policeman’s constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.
 ICHONG VS HERNANDEZ
G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957

Facts:
Driven by aspirations for economic independence and national security, the Congress
enacted Act No. 1180 entitled “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business.” The main provisions of
the Act, among others, are:
(1) Prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations,
among others, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; and
(2) Prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail
business of additional stores or branches of retail business.
Lao H. Ichong, in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents, corporations and
partnerships adversely affected by the said Act, brought an action to obtain a judicial declaration,
and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance, Jaime Hernandez, and all other persons acting under him,
particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacked the
constitutionality of the Act, contending that, it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the
laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law.

Issue/s:
Whether or not the assailed statute violates the equal protection clause.

Ruling/s:
NO. In this case, the Supreme Court saw no conflict between the raised generally accepted
principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause “does not demand absolute
equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced”; and, that the
equal protection clause “is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling
within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds
exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.”
 People vs. Vera
GR 45685, Nov. 16, 1937
FACTS:
The instant petition stems from the application for bail filed by Co Unjieng. He claims that
he is innocent of the crime charged against him, that he has no existing criminal record and that he
would observe proper conduct in the future if his application for bail is granted. The application
was referred to the Insular Probation Office, but was consequently denied. The denial was
premised on the ground that Act No. 4221 provides probation only to those provinces with
available funds for the salary of probation officers, and the province referred to has no sufficient
funds. Thus, petitioner now comes before the Court assailing the constitutionality of the Act for
being violative of the equal protection clause.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a violation of the equal protection guarantee?

HELD:
Yes. The probation act is in violation of the said constitutional guarantee. It constitutes as
a class legislation which discriminates against persons of the same class and favor others. Persons
with similar circumstances may be afforded with the privilege of probation merely due to the
discretion of the provincial officers. Hence, the Court ruled that the said order is not constitutional.
In the case at bar, the resultant inequality may be said to flow from the unwarranted delegation of
legislative power, although perhaps this is necessarily the result in every case. In the instant case,
one province may appropriate the necessary fund to defray the salary of a probation officer, while
another province may refuse or fail to do so. In such a case, the Probation Act would be in operation
in the former province but not in the latter. This means that a person otherwise coming within the
purview of the law would be able to enjoy the benefits of probation in one province while another
person similarly situated in another province would be denied those same benefits. This is
obnoxious discrimination. While inequality may result in the application of the law and in the
conferment of the benefits therein provided, inequality is not in all cases the necessary result.
Whatever may be the case, it is clear that Section 11 of the Probation Act creates a situation in
which discrimination and inequality are permitted or allowed.

We are of the opinion that Section 11 of Act. 4221 permits of the denial of the equal
protection of the law and is on that account bad. We see no difference “BETWEEN A LAW
WHICH DENIES EQUAL PROTECTION” and a “LAW WHICH PERMITS OF SUCH
DENIAL”. A law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits
of unjust and illegal discrimination, it is within the constitutional prohibition.
 ILLEGAS VS. HIU CHIONG
86 SCRA 270; NO.L-29646; 10 NOV 1978

FACTS:
The controverted Ordinance no. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila on
February 22, 1968 and signed by Mayor Villegas. It is an ordinance making it unlawful for any
person not a citizen of the Philippines to be employed in any place of employment or to
be engaged in any kind of trade business or occupation within the city of Manila without securing
an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and for other purposes.

Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, who was employed in Manila filed a petition praying for the writ
of preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the enforcement of said ordinance.

ISSUE:
Whether or Not Ordinance no.6537 violates the due process and equal protection clauses of
the Constitution.

HELD:
It is a revenue measure. The city ordinance which imposes a fee of 50.00 pesos to
enable aliens generally to be employed in the city of Manila is not only for the purpose of
regulation.
While it is true that the first part which requires the alien to secure an
employment permit from the Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in processing
and approval or disapproval of applications regulatory in character, the second part which requires
the payment of a sum of 50.00 pesos is not a regulatory but a revenue measure.
Ordinance no. 6537 is void and unconstitutional. This is tantamount to denial of the basic human
right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the
Philippines as a state is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted he
cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of
livelihood. Also it does not lay down any standard to guide the City Mayor in the issuance or
denial of an alien employment permit fee.
 PEOPLE vs. MARTI
G.R. No. 81561, January 18, 1991

FACTS:
Andre Marti went to the booth of the Manila Packing and Export Forwarders in the Pistang
Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with them 4 gift- wrapped packages. The packages
were not inspected by Anita Reyes, the proprietress, as Marti refused, who assured her that the
packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich.
However, before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/ or Bureau of Posts, Mr
Job Reyes, proprietor and husband of Anita Reyes, following standard operating procedure,
opened the boxes for final inspection. When he opened appellant's box, a peculiar order emitted
therefrom. His curiosity aroused. He squeezed one of the bundles allegedly containing gloves and
felt dried leaves inside. Opening one of the bundles, he pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding
from the opening of one of the gloves. He made an opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and
took several grams of the contents thereof. Job Reyes reported the incident to the NBI and
requested a laboratory examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper. It
turned out that the dried leaves were marijuana flowering tops as certified by the forensic chemist
of the Narcotics Section of the NBI. ` Thereafter, an information was filed against appellant for
violation of R.A. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act). Appellant contends that the evidence subject of
the imputed offense had been obtained in violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable
searches and seizures and privacy of communication and therefore argues that the same should be
held inadmissible in evidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's

constitutional rights, be invoked against the state?

RULING:

NO. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the

Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. This constitutional right refers to the immunity
of one's person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by government. The contraband in the
case at bar came into possession of the government without the latter transgressing appellant's
rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. The constitutional proscription against unlawful
searches and seizures applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies
tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom
the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. If the search is made
at the behest or initiation of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private
purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be invoked for only the act of private individuals, not
law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of
alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
SEARCH &
SEIZURE
 STONEHILL VS DIOKNO
G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967

Facts:
Forty-two (42) search warrants were issued at different dates against petitioners and the
corporations of which they were officers. Peace officers were directed to search the persons of the
petitioners and/or their premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences. Books of accounts,
financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including
disbursements receipts, balance sheets, and profit and loss statements and Bobbins were to be
seized.

Petitioner contends that the issued search warrants were null and void as having
contravened the Constitution and the Rules of Court for, among others, it did not describe the
documents, books and things to be seized PARTICULARLY.

Issue:
Whether or not the search warrant has been validly issued.
Whether or not the seized articles may be admitted in court.

Held:
1.The Court held that the warrants issued for the search of three residences of petitioners
are null and void. The Constitution protects the rights of the people from unreasonable searches
and seizure. In the present case, no specific offense has been alleged in the warrant’s application.
The Constitution also requires the things to be seized described with particularity. This is to
eliminate general warrants.
.
The petitioners have no cause of action against the contested warrants on those found and
seized in the offices of the corporations. This is because corporations have their respective
personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of their officers, directors and
stockholders. The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been
impaired.

2.The seized articles are inadmissible in court. Things seized from illegal search warrant is
not admissible as a fruit of a poisonous tree.
 Mata v. Bayona
GR No 50730

Facts:
Soriano Mata was accused under PD 810, as amended by PD 1306, the information against
him alleging that Soriano Mata offered, took and arranged bets on the Jai Alai game by “selling
tickets known as ‘masiao tickets’ without any authority from the Philippine Jai Alai and
Amusement Corporation or from the government authorities concerned.
Mata claimed that during the hearing of the case, he discovered that nowhere from the
records of the said case could be found the search warrant and other pertinent papers connected to
the issuance of the same, so that he had to inquire from the city fiscal its whereabouts, and to which
inquiry Judge Josephine K. Bayona replied, “It is with the Court.” The Judge then handed the
records to the fiscal who attached them to the records.
Petitioner filed a motion to quash and annul the search warrant and for the return of the
articles seized, citing and invoking, among others, Sec 4 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Motion was denied by respondent stating that the Court has made a thorough investigation and
examination under oath of Bernardo V. Goles and Reynaldo T. Mayote, members of the
intelligence section of 352nd PC Co./ Police District II INP, that in fact the court made a
certification to that effect; and that the facts relating to the search warrant were not attached
immediately to the criminal case is of no moment.
Petitioner, with the denial of the motion for reconsideration, prayed that the Supreme Court
declare the search warrant to be invalid

Issue:
Whether or not the search warrant was invalid under the Constitution

Ruling:
The Supreme Court holds that the search warrant is tainted with illegality for being
violative of the Constitution and the Rules of Court.
The Constitution states that “no search warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be
determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and witnesses he may produce.”
More emphatic and detailed is the implementing rule of the constitutional injunction
Section 4 of the Rule 126 which provides that the Judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine an oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and
take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record in addition to any affidavit presented
to him.
Thus, mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are not sufficient. The
examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce and to attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the
Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause , to
hold liable for perjury the person giving it if will be found later that the accusations are false. Court
holds that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform with
the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the record,
rendering the search warrant invalid. Nothing can justify the issuance of the search warrant but the
fulfillment of the legal requisites
 Morano vs. Vivo
G.R. No. L-22196, June 30, 1967
FACTS:
Chan Sau Wah is a Chinese citizen who arrived in the Philippines on November 23, 1961.
She left in China two of her children by first marriage and with her was Fu Yan Fun, her minor
son. They were permitted only into the Philippines under temporary visitor’s visa for 2 months
and after they posted a bond of 4,000 pesos in cash. On January 24, 1962 Chan Sau Wah married
Esteban Morano and had a son with him. To prolong their stay, Chan Sau Wah and Fu Yan Fun
obtained several extensions. The last extension expired September 10, 1962. The Commissioner
of Immigration ordered Cha Sau Wah and Fu Yan Fun to leave the country on or before September
10, 1962 warning them that failure to do so will warrant for their arrest and cause confiscation of
their bond. Cahn Sau Wah, Morano and Fu Yan Fun petitioned the CFI for mandamus to compel
Commission of Immigration to cancel petitioner’s Alien Certificates of registration; prohibition to
stop the issuance of warrant and preliminary injunction. The Court of First Instance granted the
mandamus declared Chan Sau Wah a citizen, dismissed petition with respect to Fu Yan Fun and
authorized commission to forfeit bond of 4,000 pesos. The Court of First Instance also denied
prayer to declare Sec 37 of Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 unconstitutional. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION MAY VALIDLY ISSUE
WARRANT OF ARREST

HELD:
YES. Section 37 of the Immigration Act of 1940 states: The following aliens shall be
arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration for the purpose and deported upon
the warrant of the Commission of Immigration after determination by the Board of Commissioners
of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien. Any alien who remains
in the Philippines in violation of any limitation or condition under which he was admitted as
immigrant.
Petitioners argue that the legal precept just quoted tranches upon Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution.
Petitioner’s say that constitution limits to judges the authority to issue warrants of arrest, and that
the legislative delegation of such power to Commission of Immigration is a violation of Bill of
Rights.
The court perceives that said provision does not require judicial intervention in the
execution of a final order of deportation issued in accordance with law. The court held that the
power to deport or expel aliens is an attribute of sovereignty. The coincidence of local penal law
with the policy of Congress is purely accidental and though supported by same facts, a criminal
prosecution and deportation proceeding are separate and independent. In consequence, the
constitutional guarantee set forth in Section 1 Article 3 of the Constitution aforesaid, requiring that
the issue of probably cause be determined by a judge, does not extend to deportation proceedings.
 NARCISO ALVAREZ VS THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF TAYABAS AND
THE ANTI-USURY BOARD
GR NO. L-45358 JANUARY 29, 1937

FACTS:
On June 3, 1936 the chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board of the DOJ
presented to Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David an affidavit alleging that according to reliable
information, the petitioner kept in his house, books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other
papers used by him in connection with his activities as money-lender charging usurious rates of
interest in violation of the law. The chief of the secret service sated that his answers were correct
to the best of his knowledge and belief. Upon affidavit, the judge issued the warrant, ordering the
search of the petitioner’s house at any time of the day or night. With warrant, agents of Anti-Usury
Board entered the petitioner’s store and residence at 7pm and sized and took possession of the
articles above mentioned. The search for and seizure were made with the opposition of the
petitioner on the grounds that they took even the original documents. Petitioner filed a motion that
agent Emillo Sionco or any other, deposit all the seized articles and that said agent be declared
guilty of contempt for disobeying court order. Court ordered Siongco to deposit all articles within
24 hours from receipt of notice and gave him 5 days to show cause why he should not be punished
for contempt of court. Attorney representing the Anti-Usury Board filed a motion praying that
order be set aside and that Anti-Usury Board be authorized to retain seized articles for 30 days for
investigation. Attorney for the petitioner filed another motion alleging that the Anti-Usury Board
failed to deposit articles seized and prayed that a search warrant be issues that sheriff be ordered
to take all the articles into his custody and Anti-Usury Board be punished for contempt of court.
Attorney also filed an ex parte petition alleging Sionco failed to file an inventory duty verified by
oath of all the documents seized by him and prayed that said agents be directed to file the document
in question immediately. The court issued order requiring agent to do so. Petitioner’s lawyer filed
another petition alleging that the search warrant issued was illegal and that it had not yet been
returned to date together with proceedings and prayed that said warrant be canceled, that an order
be issued directing the return of all articles and that agent who seized them be declared guilty of
contempt and that charges be filed against him for abuse of authority.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE SEARCH WARRANT/ SEARCH AND SEIZURE ISSUED
BY RESPONDENT COURT VALID.

HELD:
NO. The search warrant or search and seizure issued and conducted is not valid.
The petitioner’s claim that warrant is illegal on several grounds is valid because a.) the warrant
was based solely upon the affidavit of the petitioner who had no personal knowledge of the facts
of probable cause and b.) Because he warrant was issued for the sole purpose of seizing evidence
which would later be used in the criminal proceedings that might be instituted against the petitioner
for violation of the Anti-Usury Law. The affidavit which served as the exclusive basis of the search
warrant is fatally defective by reason of the manner in which the oath was made, and therefore,
the search warrant in question and seizure of the books, documents and other papers are illegal and
do not warrant deprivation to which the petitioner was subjected. Also when the applicant’s
knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having a personal
knowledge of the fact is necessary. The warrant issued is illegal because it was based only on the
affidavit of the agent who had no personal knowledge of the facts. Furthermore, at the hearing of
the incidents of the case raised before the court, it clearly appeared that the books and documents
have been seized to enable the Anti-Usury Board to conduct an investigation and later use all or
some of the articles in question as evidence against the petitioner in the criminal cases that may be
filed against him. The seizure of books and documents by means of a search warrant for the
purpose of using them as evidence in a criminal case is against the person in whose possession
they were found is unconstitutional because it is equivalent to a violation of the constitutional
provision prohibiting the compulsion of an accused to testify against himself. Search warrant is
illegal. Documents should be returned.
 People of the Philippines v Del Rosario
GR No 109633

Facts:
Normando del Rosario was charged for Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition
(Crim Case No 236-91) and Illegal Sale of Regulated Drugs (Crim Case 237-91).
Crim case 236-91 for he has in possession and control a homemade (paltik) caliber .22
revolver with 3 live ammunition and Crim case 237-91 for selling to a poseur buyer an aluminum
foil containing methampethamine hydrochloride also known as “shabu”, a regulated drug. The
court finds him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. An appeal has been interposed.
According to the prosecution’s version, a search warrant was issued authorizing the search
and seizure of an "undetermined quantity of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known
as shabu and its paraphernalias" in the premises of appellant's house. However, the search warrant
was not implemented immediately due to the lack of police personnel to form the raiding team.
SPO3 Untiveros headed the raiding team with PO3 Rogelio Francisco, SPO1 Eduardo
Novero, SPO3 Reynaldo de la Cruz, PO1 Carlito Barbuco, PO3 Onrubio and SPO2 Villegas as
members In the final briefing of the raiding team at the police station, it was agreed upon that PO1
Venerando Luna will buy shabu from appellant and after his return from appellant's house, the
raiding team will implement the search warrant. A marked money consisting of a P100 bill was
given by the Station Commander to PO1 Luna and entered in the police logbook. PO1 Luna with
a companion proceeded to appellant's house to implement the search warrant. Barangay Capt.
Maigue, Norma del Rosario and appellant witnessed the search at appellant's house. SPO3 de la
Cruz and PO3 Francisco found a black canister containing shabu, and aluminum foil, a paltik .22
caliber atop the TV set, three used ammunitions in a cup and three wallets, one containing the
marked money. SPO1 Novero found inside a show box aluminum foils, napkins and a burner.
SPO3 de la Cruz turned over the wallet containing the marked money to PO3 Onrubio.
The findings of NBI Forensic Chemist Aranas disclosed that all the specimen submitted to
her for laboratory analysis by SPO1 Pilapil, thru PO1 Barbuco, gave positive results for
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride.

Issues:
Is there sufficient evidence to prove the guilt of the accused in selling shabu?
Whether or not the “buy-bust” operation was done accordingly and within the proper
procedure.
Whether or not the manner in conducting the search was valid
May the accused be convicted of Illegal Sale of Shabu and Illegal Possession of Firearms
and Ammunition?

Ruling:
There is total absence of evidence to establish the purported sale of shabu by accused-
appellant to because the prosecution failed to call to the witness stand the alleged poseur-buyer,
Venerando Luna. The omission to present the poseur-buyer casts serious doubts that an illegal
sale of a dangerous drug actually took place.
The testimony of prosecution witness PO3 Rogelio Francisco that Veneracion Luna, the
alleged poseur-buyer, bought shabu from accused-appellant was derived solely from what Luna
supposedly told him and, therefore, is patently hearsay evidence, without any evidentiary weight
whatsoever. Likewise, the statements of prosecution witnesses Policemen Reynaldo de la Cruz,
Raymundo Untiveros, and Eduardo Novera, Jr. as to the alleged sale of shabu are hearsay, without
weight, as all of them were not present during the alleged sale.
No. According to the version of the prosecution, during the alleged buy-bust operation,
accused-appellant handed over to Veneracion Luna, the alleged poseur-buyer, a quantity of shabu,
and Luna in turn paid accused-appellant a marked P100 bill and then returned to the police station
and informed the raiding team that he had already bought the shabu from accused-appellant.
Thereupon, the raiding team proceeded to the house of accused-appellant to implement the search
warrant. The version of the prosecution is highly incredible. The record is devoid of any reason
why the police officers did not make any attempt to arrest accused-appellant at the time he
allegedly sold the shabu to Veneracion Luna who was accompanied by another police officer. That
was the opportune moment to arrest accused-appellant. The version foisted by the prosecution
upon this Court is contrary to human experience in the ordinary course of human conduct. The
usual procedure in a buy-bust operation is for the police officers to arrest the pusher of drugs at
the very moment he hands over the dangerous drug to the poseur-buyer. That is the very reason
why such a police operation is called a "buy-bust" operation. The police poseur-buyer "buys"
dangerous drugs from the pusher and "busts" (arrests) him the moment the pusher hands over the
drug to the police officer.
No.
Upon barging into the residence of accused-appellant, the police officers found him lying
down and they immediately arrested and detained him in the living room while they searched the
other parts of the house. Although they fetched two persons to witness the search, the witnesses
were called in only after the policemen had already entered accused-appellant's residence, and,
therefore, the policemen had more than ample time to plant the shabu. Corollary to the
constitutional precept that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved (Sec. 14(2), Article III, Constitutionof the Republic of the Philippines)
is the rule that in order to convict an accused the circumstances of the case must exclude all and
each and every hypothesis consistent with his innocence. The facts of the case do not rule out the
hypothesis that accused-appellant is innocent.
No for both offenses.
At any rate, accused-appellant cannot be convicted of possession of the shabu contained in
a canister and allegedly seized at his house, for the charge against him was for selling shabu with
the information alleging that the "accused, without legal authority did . . . sell to a poseur buyer an
aluminum foil containing Methamphetamine Hydrochloride. . .". Sale is totally different from
possession. Article 1458 of the Civil Code defines sale as a contract whereby "one of the
contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing,
and the other to pay therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent", while "possession is the
holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right" as defined by Article 523 of the Civil Code.
Accused-appellant cannot be convicted of a crime which is not charged in the information for to
do so would deny him the due process of law (People vs. Despavellador, 1 SCRA 205
[1961]; People vs. Mori, 55 SCRA 382 [1974]).
Neither can accused-appellant be convicted of illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition. The search warrant implemented by the raiding party authorized only the search and
seizure of ". . . the described quantity of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known as
shabu and its paraphernalia" (Exh. O, p. 50, original record). Thus, the raiding party was authorized
to seize only shabu and paraphernalia for the use thereof and no other. A search warrant is not a
sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing expedition to seize and
confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime. The Constitution itself
(Section 2, Article III) and the Rules of Court (Section 3, Rule 126) specifically mandate that the
search warrant must particularly describe the things to be seized. Thus, the search warrant was no
authority for the police officers to seize the firearm which was not mentioned, much less described
with particularity, in the search warrant. Neither may it be maintained that the gun was seized in
the course of an arrest, for as earlier observed, accused-appellant's arrest was far from regular and
legal. Said firearm, having been illegally seized, the same is not admissible in evidence (Stonehill
vs. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 [1967]). The Constitution expressly ordains the exclusion in evidence
of illegally seized articles.
Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding.
(Section 3[2], Article III, Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines).
With the exclusion in evidence of the illegally seized firearm, there is, therefore, a total absence
of evidence to support the charge of illegal possession of firearm, against accused-appellant.
The same may be said of the charge of illegal possession of ammunition.
 Umil v. Ramos
R. No. 81567

Facts:
The Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the Capitol Command (R104-CAPCOM)
received confidential information about a member of the NPA Sparrow Unit (Liquidation Squad)
being treated for a gunshot wound at a hospital in Quezon City.

Upon verification, it was found out that the wounded person, listed in the hospital records
as Ronnie Javelon, is Rolando Dural - a member of the NPA liquidation squad responsible for the
killing of two CAPCOM soldiers the day before.

In view thereof, Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM
for security reasons.

While confined, Dural was positively identified by eyewitnesses as the gunman who went
on top of the hood of the CAPCOM mobile patrol car and fired the two CPCOM soldiers seated
inside.

As consequence of the positive identification, Dural was referred to Caloocan City Fiscal
who conducted an inquest and thereafter filed with the RTC of Caloocan City an info charging
him with the crime of Double Murder with Assault upon Agents of Authority.

A petition of habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of Roberto Umil, Rolando
Dural and Renato Villanueva. Umil and Villanueva posted bail and were released. Their petition
for habeas corpus became moot and academic and accordingly dismissed.

For Dural, it clearly appears that he was not arrested while in the act of shooting the soldiers
nor was he arrested just after the commission of the said offense for his arrest came a day after the
said shooting incident. Seemingly, the arrest without warrant is unjustified.

Issue:
Whether or not the arrest is justified

Ruling:

Yes, the arrest is justified.

Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA, an outlawed subversive
organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural without warrant
is justified as it can be said that he was committing the offense when arrested. The crimes of
rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes and crimes or offenses
committed in futherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the
State and are in the nature of continuing crimes.

As stated by the Court in an earlier case;

 From the facts as above-narrated, the claim of the petitioners that they were initially arrest
illegally is, therefore, without basis in law and in fact. The crimes of insurrection or rebel
subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and other crimes and offenses
committed in the furtherance, on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection
therewith under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of continuing
offenses which set them apart from the common offenses, aside from their essentially involving a
massive conspiracy of nationwide magnitude. Clearly then, the arrest of the herein
detainees was well within the bounds of the law and existing jurisprudence in our
jurisdiction.

2. The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements, or for
committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing
them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of
immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not
follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by
a judge of the existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest
and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial
warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence
against government forces, or any other milder acts but equally in pursuance of the
rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is thus impelled by the exigencies of the situation that
involves the very survival of society and its government and duly constituted authorities. If
killing and other acts of violence against the rebels find justification in the exigencies of armed
hostilities which is of the essence of waging a rebellion or insurrection, most assuredly so in
case of invasion, merely seizing their persons and detaining them while any of these
contingencies continues cannot be less justified.
 RODOLFO ESPANO V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 120431 April 1, 1998

FACTS:
Officers from the Western Police District went to Zamora and Pandacan streets to confirm
reports of drug pushing in the area, where they saw petitioner selling something to another person.
They approached him, identified themselves as policemen and frisked him, where they found two
plastic cellophane tea bags of marijuana. Petitioner also said that there was more in the house after
the policemen asked him. The latter then went to his residence where they found ten more
cellophane tea bags of marijuana. He was brought to the police headquarters.

ISSUE:
WON the pieces of evidence seized as he was frisked and those found in his house were
admissible in evidence.

RULING:
The pieces evidence found as petitioner was frisked are admissible in evidence. He was
caught in flagranti as a result of a buy-bust operation on the basis of information received regarding
the illegal trade of drugs within the area. The police officer saw petitioner hand something to an
alleged buyer. After the buyer left, they searched him and discovered two cellophanes of
marijuana. This falls under Rule 113 of the Rules of court.
The pieces evidence found in the house of petitioner are not admissible in evidence. An
exception to the rule on search warrants and warrants of arrest is a warrantless search incidental to
a lawful arrest for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission
of an offense, which may extend to the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. In
this case, the bags seized at petitioner’s house after his arrest at Pandacan and Zamora’s streets do
not fall under said exceptions.
 MALACAT v. CA
G.R. No. 123595. December 12, 1997

FACTS:
Petitioner Sammy Malacat y Mandar was charged for willfully, unlawfully and knowingly
keeping, possessing and acquire a hand grenade, without first securing the necessary license or
permit therefor from the proper authorities. Petitioner admitted the existence of such while the
prosecution admitted that the police authorities were not armed with a search warrant nor warrant
of arrest at the time they arrested petitioner. Rodolfo Yu of Metropolitan Police Force, in response
to bomb threats reports, was on foot patrol with three other police officers. Yu declared that they
conducted the foot patrol due to a report that a group of Muslims was going to explode a grenade
somewhere in the vicinity of Plaza Miranda which were the favorite bombing site during time of
political upheaval. Yu saw petitioner and 2 others attempt to discharge a grenade. Although they
were not creating a commotion, since they were supposedly acting suspiciously, Yu and his
companions approached the Petitioner and Casan from whom a .38 caliber revolver was recovered.

ISSUE:
WON the search and seizure conducted was lawful

HELD:
No. The trial court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of petitioner was similar
to a stop and frisk, where a warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded
by an arrest and whose object is either to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police
officer seeks to obtain more information. The RTC emphasized that Yu and his companions were
confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, threatens the
destruction of evidence. It is reasonable for an officer to conduct a limited search, the purpose of
which is not necessarily to discover evidence of a crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his
investigation without fear of violence. But in this case, the Supreme Court said that there was no
valid search because there was nothing in the behavior or conduct of the petitioner which could
have elicited even mere suspicion other than the eyes of the petitioner moving. There was no
reasonable ground to believe that the petitioner was armed with a deadly weapon.
 Papa v. Mago
G.R. No. L-27360, February 28, 1968

FACTS
Petitioner Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit of the Manila Police
Department, received information that a certain shipment of personal effects, which are allegedly
misdeclared and undervalued, would be released from the customs zone of the port of Manila.
Acting upon this information, the two (2) trucks loaded with nine (9) bales of goods were
intercepted and seized on instructions of the petitioner chief of police Ricardo Papa. Claiming to
have been prejudiced by the seizure and detention of the 2 trucks and their cargo, respondent
Remedios Mago and Valentin B. Lanopa filed a petition for mandamus with restraining order or
preliminary injunction (Civil Case No. 67496) with the Court of First Instance of Manila.
Respondent judge Hilarion Jarencio ordered the release of the goods to the respondent upon filing
her corresponding bond. The petitioners, on their part, alleged among others that respondent judge
acted without jurisdiction in ordering the release of the disputed goods to the respondent.

ISSUES
Whether or not the respondent judge acted with jurisdiction in issuing the order releasing
the goods in question.
Whether or not the petitioners had the authority to effect the seizure without search warrant
issued by a competent court.

HELD
Section 1206 of the Tariff and Customs Code imposes upon the Collector of Customs the
duty to hold possession of all imported articles upon which duties, taxes and other charges have
not been paid or secured to be paid, and to dispose of the same according to the law.
In the instant case, the record shows that the duties, taxes and other charges had not been
paid in full. It also shows that the quantity of goods was underdeclared, presumably to avoid the
payment of duties thereon. The articles contained in the nine bales in question were therefore
subject to forfeiture under the Tariff Customs Code. Likewise, it has been held that merchandise,
the importation of which is effected contrary to law, is subject to forfeiture, and that goods released
contrary to law are subject to seizure and forfeiture. The goods in question, therefore, were under
the custody and disposal of the Bureau of Customs at the time the petition for mandamus (Civil
Case No. 67496) was filed in the CFI.
Hence, respondent judge acted without jurisdiction in issuing the order releasing the goods
in question

The Tariff and Customs Code does not require search warrant in the instant case.
The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 to enter, pass
through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house;
and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, or envelope
or any person on board, or to stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected
of holding or conveying any prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law,
without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said instances.
In the instant case, therefore, the petitioner and his companions had authority to effect the
seizure without any search warrant issued by a competent court.
 People of the Philippines v. Mari Musa
G.R. No. 96177, January 27, 1993

FACTS

During the buy bust operation, one of the Narco agents gave a marked P20.00 bill to
respondent in exchange of two (2) parcels of newspaper-wrapped marijuana. After the transaction,
the agent signaled to his team, then on they went inside the house of the respondent. The agents
searched the respondent for the marked P20.00 bill but they were unable to find it. Hence, they
searched the whole house and stumbled upon a plastic bag in the kitchen. They seized the plastic
bag even if they were unsure of its contents, and arrested Musa. The respondent was then convicted
of selling marijuana in violation of Article II, Section 4 of the Republic Act 6425, as amended or
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

ISSUE

Whether or not respondent Musa’s constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizure was violated.

HELD

Rule 126, Section 12 of the Rules of Court expressly authorizes a warrantless search and
seizure incident to a lawful arrest – “a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search
warrant. In a buy bust operation conducted to entrap a drug pusher, the law enforcement agents
may seize the marked money found on the person of the pusher immediately after the arrest even
without arrest and warrants.

In the instant case, Narco agents searched the person of the appellant after arresting him in
his house but found nothing. They then searched the entire house and found a plastic bag which
was eventually found to be containing marijuana. The warrantless search and seizure, as an
incident to a suspect’s lawful arrest may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include
the premises under his immediate control. Objects in the “plain view” of an officer who has the
right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.
The “plain view” doctrine, may not, however be used to launch unbridled searches and
indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of
defendant’s guilt. In the present case, the plastic bag seized by the agents was not within their
“plain view” when they found it in the kitchen of the house.

Under the circumstances of this case, the “plain view” doctrine does not apply and the
marijuana contained in the plastic bag was illegally seized and cannot be presented in evidence
pursuant to Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution. Hence, there was a violation on the part
of the agents insofar as the constitutional right of the respondent against unreasonable searches
and seizure.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. IDEL AMMINUDIN
G.R.No. 74869 July 6, 1988

FACTS:
The PC officers, headed by the chief of the arresting team, Lt. Cipriano Querol, Jr., had
been receiving a tip from one of their informers of Aminnudin’s previous activities involving
marijuana trafficking. On June 23, 1984, Lt. Querol received an intelligence report with respect to
the coming of Aminnudin. The PC officers, after the informant had pointed him, approached
Aminnudin as he descended from the gangplank and detained him on June 25, 1984. The bag he
was carrying was inspected, where they found marijuana leaves. Lt. Querol also said that a search
warrant was not necessary.

ISSUES:
WON the arrest and search on Aminnudin was lawful.

RULING:
No. There was no urgency to arrest Aminnudin. The PC officers clearly had two days
within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin. His name was
known. The vehicle was identified. The date of its arrival was certain. They could have persuaded
a judge that there was probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant, and yet no effort was
made to comply with the law. The arrest and search did not fall under Rule 113 since he was not,
at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime, nor was it shown that he was about to do so or
that he had just done so. He was merely descending the gangplank of M/V Wilcon 9. It was the
furtive finger that triggered his arrest.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. MIKAEL MALMSTEDT
G.R.No. 91107 June 19, 1991

FACTS:
In the morning of May 11, 1989, Captain Alen Vasco, the Commanding Officer of the First
Regional Command (NARCOM) received information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had
in his possession prohibited drugs, prompting him to order his men to set up a temporary
checkpoint in Tublay, Mountain Province. The bus where the accused was riding was stopped at
1:30 in the afternoon, where members of the NARCOM officers made an inspection. The accused
was found to have a suspicious bulge on the accused’s waist, so they asked him for his
identification papers, and required him to bring out the bulge. It turned out to be hashish, a
derivative of marijuana. He was then invited outside for questioning, brought bags with him which
were opened, and brought to the headquarters for further investigation.

ISSUE:
WON the search on Malmstedt was legal.

RULING:
Yes. He was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs. He was caught in
flagrante delicto. This falls under paragraph (1) of the provisions of law allowing a warrantless
search incident to a lawful arrest. Even though there was no search warrant when it was made,
there was sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there
committing a crime, since accused’s failure to present his identification papers, when ordered to
do so, only managed to arouse suspicion, which is a basis for the existence of probable cause.
Furtheremore, there were persistent reports received by NARCOM that vehicles coming from
Sagada were transporting marijuana and that a Caucasian would come on the same morning, and
faced with on-the-spot information, the police officers had to act quickly and there was no time to
secure a search warrant.
 SILVA v. PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC OF NEGROS ORIENTAL
G.R. No. 81756, October 21, 1991

FACTS:
A money belonging to Antonieta Silva in the amount of P1,231.40 was seized. Antonieta
Silva filed a motion for the return of the said amount on the grounds that the search warrant only
authorized the serving officers to seize marijuana dried leaves, cigarettes and joint. Acting on said
motion, Judge Ontal issued an Order stating that the court holds in abeyance the disposition of the
said amount pending the filing of appropriate charges in connection with the search warrant.
Petitioners filed a motion to quash the Search Warrant on the grounds that it was issued on the sole
basis of a mimeograph and the judge failed to personally examine the complainant and witnesses
by searching questions and answers in violation of Sections 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court.

HELD:
The purpose of the constitutional provision against unlawful searches and seizures is to
prevent violations of private security in person and property, and unlawful invasion of the sanctity
of the home, by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction, and to give remedy
against such usurpations when attempted. The judge must, before issuing a search warrant,
determine whether there is probable cause by examining the complainant and witnesses through
searching questions and answers as stated under Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court. Judge Ontal failed to comply with the legal requirement that he must examine the existence
of probable cause in the form of searching questions and answers.
 Valmonte v. De Villa
G.R. No. 83988, September 29, 1989

FACTS

The National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) installed checkpoints in various
parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. This is in line with their duty to establish effective territorial
defense and maintain peace and order within their area of responsibility. Now, the petitioners in
this case aver that the installation of the said checkpoints caused worry among the residents that
they will be harassed; and that their safety might be jeopardized at the instance of the military
manning the checkpoints. Their alleged fear for their safety increased when a person was gunned
down allegedly in cold blood by members of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint along McArthur
Highway, for refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint. Petitioners further contend that the said
checkpoints give the respondents a blanket authority to make searches and seizures without search
warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution.

ISSUES

Whether or not checkpoints are illegal as they violate the people’s right against
unreasonable searches and seizure.

HELD

Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden.
A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but it is to be resolved according
to the facts of each case.

The setting up of the questioned checkpoints may be considered as a security measure to

enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and
maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. The conduct of checkpoints within
reasonable limits is part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.
Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an
individual’s right against a warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the former
should prevail.

Hence, the questioned checkpoints are not illegal and violative of the people’s right against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
 Go vs CA
G.R. No. 101837, February 11, 1992
Facts:
Rolito Go while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way street, nearly bumped Eldon
Maguan’s car. Go alighted from his car, shot Maguan and left the scene. A security guard at a
nearby restaurant was able to take down petitioner’s car plate number. The police arrived shortly
thereafter at the scene of the shooting. A manhunt ensued.
Six days after, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police Station to verify
news reports that he was being hunted by the police; he was accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The
police forthwith detained him. An eyewitness to the shooting, who was at the police station at that
time, positively identified petitioner as the gunman.
Petitioner posted bail, the prosecutor filed the case to the lower court, setting and
commencing trial without preliminary investigation. Prosecutor reasons that the petitioner has
waived his right to preliminary investigation as bail has been posted and that such situation, that
petitioner has been arrested without a warrant lawfully, falls under Section 5, Rule 113 and Section
7, Rule 112 of The 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides for the rules and procedure
pertaining to situations of lawful warrantless arrests.
Petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested without warrant because he went to the
police station six (6) days after the shooting which he had allegedly perpetrated. Thus, petitioner
argues, the crime had not been “just committed” at the time that he was arrested. Moreover, none
of the police officers who arrested him had been an eyewitness to the shooting of Maguan and
accordingly none had the “personal knowledge” required for the lawfulness of a warrantless arrest.
Since there had been no lawful warrantless arrest, Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which
establishes the only exception to the right to preliminary investigation, could not apply in respect
of petitioner.
Issue/s:
Whether or not a lawful warrantless arrest had been effected by the San Juan Police in
respect of petitioner Go;
Held:
No. The Court does not believe that the warrantless “arrest” or detention of petitioner in
the instant case falls within the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure which provides as follows:
“Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person;
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against
in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.”
Petitioner’s “arrest” took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The “arresting”
officers obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had
allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the “arrest” effected six (6) days after the shooting be
reasonably regarded as effected “when [the shooting had] in fact just been committed” within the
meaning of Section 5 (b). Moreover, none of the “arresting” officers had any “personal knowledge”
of facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The information upon
which the police acted had been derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the
shooting — one stated that petitioner was the gunman; another was able to take down the alleged
gunman’s car’s plate number which turned out to be registered in petitioner’s wife’s name. That
information did not, however, constitute “personal knowledge.”
It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner within
the meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113.
 PEOPLE V. MENGOTE
210 SCRA 174; G.R. NO. 87059; 22 JUN 1992

Facts:

The Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer that there were
three suspicious looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo,
Manila. A surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place. The
patrolmen saw two men looking from side to side, one of whom holding his abdomen. They
approached the persons and identified themselves as policemen, whereupon the two tried to run
but unable to escape because the other lawmen surrounded them. The suspects were then searched.
One of them the accused-appellant was found with a .38 caliber with live ammunitions in it, while
his companion had a fan knife. The weapons were taken from them and they were turned over to
the police headquarters for investigation. An information was filed before the RTC convicting the
accused of illegal possession of firearm arm. A witness testified that the weapon was among the
articles stolen at his shop, which he reported to the police including the revolver. For his part,
Mengote made no effort to prove that he owned the fire arm or that he was licensed to possess it
but instead, he claimed that the weapon was planted on him at the time of his arrest. He was
convicted for violation of P.D.1866 and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. In his appeal he
pleads that the weapon was not admissible as evidence against him because it had been illegally
seized and therefore the fruit of a poisonous tree.

Issue:

Whether or not the warrantless search and arrest was illegal.

Held:

Yes. An evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure inadmissible in any
proceeding for any purpose as provided by Art. III sec 32 of the Constitution. Rule 113 sec.5 of
the Rules of Court, provides arrest without warrant lawful when: (a) the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense, (b) when the offense in
fact has just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating the person
arrested has committed it and (c) the person to be arrested has escaped from a penal establishment
or a place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in
question, the accused appellant was merely looking from side to side and holding his abdomen,
according to the arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that has just been
committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempt by Mengote in their presence.
Moreover a person may not be stopped and frisked in a broad daylight or on a busy street on
unexplained suspicion.
 POSADAS VS. COURT OF APPEALS
[188 SCRA 288; G.R. NO. 89139; 2 AUG 1990]

Facts:

Members of the Integrated National Police (INP) of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned with
the Intelligence Task Force, Pat. Ursicio Ungab and Pat. Umbra Umpar conducted surveillance
along Magallanes Street, Davao City. While in the vicinity of Rizal Memorial Colleges they
spotted petitioner carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be acting suspiciously. They
approached the petitioner and identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner attempted
to flee but his attempt to get away was unsuccessful. They then checked the "buri" bag of the
petitioner where they found one (1) caliber .38 Smith & Wesson revolver with Serial No. 770196,
two (2) rounds of live ammunition for a .38 caliber gun, a smoke (tear gas) grenade, and two (2)
live ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun. They brought the petitioner to the police station for further
investigation. In the course of the same, the petitioner was asked to show the necessary license or
authority to possess firearms and ammunitions found in his possession but he failed to do so. He
was then taken to the Davao Metrodiscom office and the prohibited articles recovered from him
were indorsed to M/Sgt. Didoy the officer then on duty. He was prosecuted for illegal possession
of firearms and ammunitions in the Regional Trial Court of Davao City.

Issue:

Whether or Not the warantless search is valid.

Held:

Yes. In justifying the warrantless search of the buri bag then carried by the petitioner,
argues that under Section 12, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court a person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything used as proof of a commission of an offense without
a search warrant. It is further alleged that the arrest without a warrant of the petitioner was lawful
under the circumstances.

In the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed, it is reasonable considering that it was
effected on the basis of a probable cause. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted
suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was
concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect
the same.

It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the possession of
the petitioner only after they shall have obtained a search warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise
may prove to be useless, futile and much too late.

Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be sustained under the exceptions heretofore
discussed, and hence, the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures has
not been violated.