RULE 128

HEIRS OF LOURDES SAEZ SABANPAN vs. COMORPOSA

G.R. No. 152807, August 12, 2003

The admissibility of evidence should be distinguished from its probative

value.

Facts:

A complaint for unlawful detainer with damages was filed by petitioners against
respondents before the Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur Municipal Trial Court. The
complaint alleged that Marcos Saez was the lawful and actual possessor of Lot
No. 845, Land 275 located at Darong, Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur. In 1960, he died
leaving all his heirs.

In 1965, Francisco Comorposa who was working in the land of Oboza was
terminated from his job. The termination caused a problem in relocating his
house. Being a close family friend of Marcos Saez, Francisco approached the
late Marcos Saez's son, Adolfo Saez, the husband of Gloria Leano Saez, about
his problem. Out of pity and for humanitarian consideration, Adolfo allowed
Francisco to occupy the land of Marcos Saez. Francisco Comorposa left for
Hawaii, U.S.A and was succeeded in his possession by the respondents who
likewise did not pay any rental and are occupying the premises through
petitioners' tolerance.

On 7 May 1998, a formal demand was made upon the respondents to vacate the
premises but the latter refused to vacate the same and claimed that they were
the legitimate claimants and the actual and lawful possessors of the premises.

Thus, with the complaint filed, the MTC of Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur rendered
judgment in favor of petitioners but the RTC on appeal, reversed and set aside
the said decision. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the admissibility of evidence ipso facto means that it has
probative value?

Held:

No.

The admissibility of evidence should be distinguished from its probative value.

Just because a piece of evidence is admitted does not ipso facto mean that it
conclusively proves the fact in dispute.

In this case, petitioners assert that the CA erred in disregarding the Affidavits of
their witnesses, insisting that the Rule on Summary Procedure authorizes the
use of affidavits. They also claim that the failure of respondents to file their
position paper and counter-affidavits before the MTC amounts to an admission
by silence.

The admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative value.
Admissibility refers to the question of whether certain pieces of evidence are to
be considered at all, while probative value refers to the question of whether the
admitted evidence proves an issue. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be
admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the
guidelines provided by the rules of evidence.

While in summary proceedings affidavits are admissible as the witnesses'

respective testimonies, the failure of the adverse party to reply does not ipso
facto render the facts, set forth therein, duly proven. Thus, petitioners still bear
the burden of proving their cause of action, because they are the ones asserting
an affirmative relief.

PEOPLE vs. MALIMIT

G.R. No. 109775, November 14, 1996

Circumstantial Evidence

Facts:
On April 15, 1991, around 8:00 o'clock in the evening, Malaki while attending to
his store was ransacked by accused Jose Malimit and subsequently stabbed
using a bolo resulting to the formers death. Witnesses to this crime were Malaki’s
houseboy Edilberto Batin and Florencio Rondon, a farmer, who purchase
chemical for his rice farm in Malaki’s store. As a result, both Batin and Rondon
rushed to the nearby house of Malaki's brother-in-law Beloy and informed him of
the tragic incident. Also, the witnesses went immediately to the police station to
report the incident.

Thus, appellant Jose Encarnacion Malimit, charged with and convicted of the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide and was meted by the trial
court the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He was also ordered to indemnify the
heirs of Onofre Malaki the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the cost. On appeal,
the appellant assigns the error where he demurs on the prosecution's evidence,
contending that they are insufficient to sustain his conviction.

Issue:

Whether or not a judgment of conviction can be sustained based on

circumstantial evidence?

Held:

Yes, a judgment of conviction can be properly sustained based on circumstantial

evidence.

In order that circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to convict, the same must
comply with these essential requisites, (a) there is more than one circumstance;
(b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.

In this case, there were at least five (5) circumstances constituting an unbroken
chain of events which by their concordant combination and cumulative effect,
satisfy the requirements for the conviction of the appellant, specifically: (1)
appellant was seen by Rondon and Batin, whose credibilities were untarnished,
holding a bolo in his right hand and rushing out of Malaki's store seconds prior to
their discovery of the crime; (2) Malaki sustained multiple stab wounds and he
died of "cardiac arrest, secondary to severe external hemorrhage due to multiple
stab wounds", (3) witness Elmer Ladica saw the appellant on August 6, 1991,
accompanied by some policemen, retrieve Malaki's wallet underneath a stone at
the seashore in Barangay Hingatungan; (4) appellant himself admitted in his
testimony that on August 6, 1991, he accompanied several policemen to the
seashore where he hid Malaki's wallet; and (5) appellant's flight and his
subsequent disappearance from Hingatungan immediately after the incident.

Thus, we ruled that there can be a verdict of conviction based on circumstantial

evidence when the circumstances proved form an unbroken chain which leads to
a fair and reasonable conclusion pinpointing the accused. Therefore, accused-
appellant is found guilty for the said offense.

RULE 129

TABUENA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and EMILIANO TABERNILLA, JR.

G.R. No. 85423, May 6, 1991

JUDICIAL NOTICE

Facts:

The subject of the dispute is a parcel of residential land situated in Poblacion,

Aklan. In 1973, an action for recovery of ownership thereof was filed in the
Regional Trial Court of Aklan by the estate of Alfredo Tabernilla against Jose
Tabuena. After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the estate of Tabernilla
and Tabuena was required to vacate the disputed lot.

The trial court found that the lot was sold by Juan Peralta, Jr. sometime in 1926
to Alfredo Tabernilla while the two were in the United States. Tabernilla returned
to the Philippines in 1934, and Damasa Timtiman, acting upon her son Juan's
instruction, conveyed the land to Tabernilla. However, Damasa requested that
she be allowed to stay thereon where Tabernilla agreed provided she will pay the
realty taxes on the property, which she promised to do, and did. She remained
on the said land until her death, following which the petitioner, her son and half-
brother of Juan Peralta, Jr., took possession thereof. The complaint was filed
when demand was made upon Tabuena to surrender the property.
Tabuena appealed to the Court of Appeals complaining that, in arriving at its
factual findings, the trial court motu proprio took cognizance of Exhibits "A", "B"
and "C", which had been marked by the plaintiff but never formally submitted in
evidence. Also Tabuena, contends that the trial court erred when to resolve the
ownership of the subject lot, it considered the proceedings in another case
involving the same parties but a different parcel of land.

The respondent Court ruled in favor of private respondent Tabernilla, hence this
petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the trial
court’s action in taking judicial notice of Tabuena's testimony in a case it had
previously heard which was closely connected with the case before it?

Held:

Yes, the respondent Court of Appeals committed reversible error.

It is conceded that as a general rule "courts are not authorized to take judicial
notice, in the adjudication of cases pending before them, of the contents of the
records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in
the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been
heard or are actually pending before the same judge. Nevertheless, an exception
is when:

in the absence of objection, and as a matter of convenience to all

parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the original record of a
case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case pending before it,
when, with the knowledge of the opposing party, reference is made to it for
that purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by which it is
sufficiently designated; or when the original record of the former case or
any part of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives by the court's
direction, at the request or with the consent of the parties, and admitted as
a part of the record of the case then pending.

It is clear that this exception is applicable only when, "in the absence of
objection," "with the knowledge of the opposing party," or "at the request or with
the consent of the parties," the case is clearly referred to or "the original or part of
the records of the case are actually withdrawn from the archives" and "admitted
as part of the record of the case then pending." However, these conditions have
not been established in this present case. On the contrary, the petitioner
(Tabuena) was completely unaware that his testimony in Civil Case No. 1327
was being considered by the trial court in the case then pending before it. As the
petitioner puts it, the matter was never taken up at the trial and was "unfairly
sprung" upon him, leaving him no opportunity to counteract.

BPI-FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, Inc vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et. al

G.R. No. 122480, April 12, 2000

JUDICIAL NOTICE

Facts:

This case involves a claim for tax refund in the amount of P112,491.00
representing petitioner's tax withheld for the year 1989. It appears from the 1989
Income Tax Return that petitioner had a total refundable amount of P297,492.
However, petitioner declared in the same 1989 Income Tax Return that the said
total refundable amount of P297,492.00 will be applied as tax credit to the
succeeding taxable year. On October 11, 1990, petitioner filed a written claim for
refund in the amount of P112,491.00 with the respondent Commissioner of
Internal Revenue alleging that it did not apply the 1989 refundable amount of
P297,492.00 (including P112,491.00) to its 1990 Annual Income Tax Return.

Without waiting for respondent Commissioner to act on the claim for refund,
petitioner filed a petition for review with respondent Court of Tax Appeals,
seeking the refund of the amount of P112,491.00.

Petitioner calls the attention of the CTA, to a Decision rendered by the Tax Court
in CTA Case No. 4897, involving its claim for refund for the year 1990. In that
case, the Tax Court held that "petitioner suffered a net loss for the taxable year
1990 . .

Despite such, the respondent Court of Tax Appeals dismissed petitioner's petition
on the ground that petitioner failed to present as evidence its corporate Annual
Income Tax Return for 1990 to establish the fact that petitioner had not yet
credited the amount of P297,492.00 to its 1990 income tax liability. Respondent
Court also urges that it will not take judicial notice of the said case claimed by the
petitioner.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent Court of Tax Appeals may take judicial notice of the
contents of the records of other cases before the said CTA in resolving the
present case?

Held:

Yes, the respondent Court of Tax Appeals may take judicial notice of such
records of the case before the CTA in helping to formulate its decision before the
present case.

As a rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the
records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in
the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been
heard or are actually pending before the same judge. Be that as it may, Section
2, Rule 129 provides that courts may take judicial notice of matters ought to be
known to judges because of their judicial functions.

In this case, the Court notes that a copy of the Decision in CTA Case No. 4897
was attached to the Petition for Review filed before this Court. Significantly,
respondents do not claim at all that the said Decision was fraudulent or
nonexistent. Indeed, they do not even dispute the contents of the said Decision,
claiming merely that the Court cannot take judicial notice thereof.

To our mind, respondents' reasoning underscores the weakness of their case.

For if they had really believed that petitioner is not entitled to a tax refund, they
could have easily proved that it did not suffer any loss in 1990.

RULE 130

MUNICIPALITY OF VICTORIAS, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, et. al

G.R. No. L-31189 March 31, 1987
Best Evidence Rule. Technical description of the land is not essential as long as
the sale is proven in some authentic document which is the notarial register.

Facts:

Lot No. 76 containing an area of 208,157 sq. meters located in Bo. Madaniog,
Victorias, Negros Occidental, was in the name of the deceased Gonzalo
Ditching. He was survived by his widow Simeona Jingeo Vda. de Ditching and a
daughter, Isabel, who died in 1928 leaving one off-spring, respondent Norma
Leuenberger.

Respondent Norma Leuenberger, inherited the whole of Lot No. 140 from her
grandmother, Simeona J. Vda. de Ditching (not from her predeceased mother
Isabel Ditching). In 1952, she donated a portion of Lot No. 140, about 3 hectares
to the municipality for the ground of a certain high school and had 4 ha.
converted into a subdivision.

In 1963, Norma discovered that the parcel of land, more or less 4 ha. used by
Petitioner Municipality of Victorias, as a cemetery from 1934, is within her
property. On May 20, 1963, respondent wrote the Mayor of Victorias regarding
her discovery, demanding payment of past rentals and requesting delivery of the
area allegedly illegally occupied by petitioner. The Mayor replied that they bought
the land and when asked to show the papers concerning the sale the Mayor
referred her to the municipal treasurer who refused to show the same.

Respondents filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental

for recovery of possession of the parcel of land. In its answer, petitioner
Municipality, by way of special defense, alleged ownership of the lot, having
bought it from Simeona Jingco Vda. de Ditching sometime in 1934. The lower
court decided in favor of the Municipality. On appeal respondent appellate Court
set aside the decision of the lower court; hence, this petition for review on
certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not the secondary evidence presented by the petitioner municipality

is sufficient to substantiate its claim that it acquired the disputed land by means
of a Deed of Sale?
Held:

Yes.

Under the Best Evidence Rule when the original writing is lost or otherwise
unavailable, the law in point provides:

Sec. 4. Secondary evidence when original is lost or destroyed. —

When the original writing has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, upon proof of its execution and loss or destruction
or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy, or by a
recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the
recollection of witnesses. (Rule 130, Rules of Court).

In lieu of a Deed of Sale, petitioner presented a certificate issued by the Archives

Division of the Bureau of Records Management in Manila, of a page of the 1934
Notarial Register of Vicente D. Aragon.

In the present case, since no deed of sale could be produced, there is no way of
telling what particular portion of the property was sold to defendant municipality
and how big was the sale of the land conveyed to the defendant municipality.

It will be observed that the entries in the notarial register clearly show: (a) the
nature of the instrument. — a deed of sale; (b) the subject of the sale — two
parcels of land, (c) the parties of the contract — (d) the consideration P750.00;
(e) the names of the witnesses and the date of the sale.

It is beyond question that the foregoing certificate is an authentic document

clearly corroborated and supported by: (a) the testimony of the municipal
councilor of Victorias, who negotiated the sale; (b) the testimony of Emilio
Cuesta, the municipal treasurer of said municipality, since 1932 up to the date of
trial on September 14, 1964, who personally paid the amount as consideration of
the Contract of Sale; (c) Certificate of Settlement, (d) Tax Declaration No. 429
and (e) Tax Declaration No. 3601 in the name of the Municipal Government of
Victorias covering the portion occupied as cemetery.

Thus, the said testimonies and documentary evidence sufficiently identify the
land sold by the predecessors-in-interest of private respondent clearly showing
that there exists a contract of sale in favor of the petitioner Municipality.